SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, DONRICO V.

SEBASTIAN,
EULOGIO G. BATINO, SAMUEL A. ATANQUE ET. AL. vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS.,
INC.
G.R. Nos. 164302-03         January 24, 2007
 
FACTS:
The Union and the respondent company had entered into a three-year CBA. Upon its
expiration, the Union desired to continue the CBA and to renegotiate its terms. The CBA
meetings commenced where the union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng
mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The
Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift
rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not
members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the
Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse
ensued.
 
The Union, filed a Notice of Strike, as amended, on the grounds of: (a) unfair labor practice
for the companys refusal to bargain in good faith; and (b) interference with the exercise of
their right to self-organization. Union members, officers and members of the Board of
Directors, and shop stewards, individually filed applications for leave of absence but they
were not granted by reason that operations in the plant would come to a complete stop
since there were no sufficient trained contractual employees who would take over. A day
before the mass action, some union members wore gears, red tag cloths stating YES KAMI
SA STRIKE as headgears and on the different parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.
 
The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it to conduct a mass protest
action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola plant. Thus, the Union officers and members
held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant resulting to absence of a number of
company employees and personnel. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines
operated during the day shift. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000
physical cases versus budget.
 
Respondent allege that because of the slowdown in the work, the Company suffered losses;
the mass/protest action conducted was clearly a strike and since the Union did not observe
the requirements mandated by law the strike was therefore illegal and there being a direct
violation of the CBA, the Unions action constituted an unfair labor practice; and the officers
who knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike should be
declared to have lost their employment status.
 
Petitioner countered that the mass action conducted by its officers and members was not a
strike but just a valid exercise of their right to picket, which is part of the right of free
expression as guaranteed by the Constitution. The workers, including the petitioners,
merely marched to and fro at the side of the highway near one of the gates of the Sta. Rosa
Plant. After 3 hours, everyone returned to work according to their respective shifting
schedules. Lastly, petitioners aver that even assuming that they had indeed staged a strike,
the penalty of dismissal is too harsh. They insist that they acted in good faith.
 
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the herein respondent and declared that the mass leave
was actually a strike by reason that did not report for their usual work. Instead, they all
assembled in front of the Sta. Rosa Plant and picketed the premises. Very clearly, there was
a concerted action here on the part of the respondents brought about a temporary
stoppage of work at two out of three bottling lines at the Sta. Rosa Plant. Also, the strike
conducted by the Union was illegal since there was no showing that the Union complied
with requirement of a valid strike. Such decision was sustained by the NLRC and the CA.
 
ISSUE:
Whether the mass action staged by the Union was a strike
 
RULING:
YES. The mass action staged by the Union was a strike and not merely a picket. Article
212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The fact that the
conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The term "strike" encompasses not only
concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to
damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.
 
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in
a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of
peaceable persuasion.
 
A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
 
That there was a labor dispute between the parties, in this case, is not an issue. Petitioners
notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to picket.
Petitioners’ insistence to stage a strike is evident in the fact that an amended notice to
strike was filed even as respondent moved to dismiss the first notice. The basic elements of
a strike are present in this case: 106 members of petitioner Union, whose respective
applications for leave of absence on September 21, 1999 were disapproved, opted not to
report for work on said date, and gathered in front of the company premises to hold a mass
protest action. Petitioners deliberately absented themselves and instead wore red ribbons,
carried placards with slogans such as: "YES KAMI SA STRIKE," "PROTESTA KAMI," "SAHOD,
KARAPATAN NG MANGGAGAWA IPAGLABAN," "CBA-‘WAG BABOYIN," "STOP UNION
BUSTING." They marched to and fro in front of the company’s premises during working
hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already affected the
company’s operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike.
 
The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayor’s permit is not conclusive evidence that
their action/activity did not amount to a strike. The Mayor’s description of what activities
petitioners were allowed to conduct is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitive of
whether the action staged by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the situation.
 
A strike is the most powerful of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to
force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital.
It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the Union and its members in their
struggle with management for a more equitable due to their labors. The decision to declare
a strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, envisaged by the
tempers and tantrums of a few hot heads, and finally focused on the legitimate interests of
the Union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare, and, to be valid,
a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attainment
of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer.
 
Since strikes cause disparity effects not only on the relationship between labor and
management but also on the general peace and progress of society, the law has provided
limitations on the right to strike. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites
provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with
the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor
practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c)
notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith
renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory
requirements and embarked on their illegal strike. 
 
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ET. AL. vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
         
FACTS:
The petitioner is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners decided to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacañ ang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift as well as
those in the regular second and third shifts; and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
 
Upon knowledge of the same, the Company called a meeting where PBMEO confirmed the
mass demonstration and explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with
the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The
Management informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which
reason, the Company, warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail
to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE, and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.
 
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with
the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through
with the rally.
 
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration, respondent Company filed
with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
 
The lower court found PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and held petitioners
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have
lost their status as employees of the respondent Company. 
 
ISSUE:
Whether the mass demonstration staged by the petitioner amounts to a strike
 
RULING: 
No. The mass demonstration staged by the petitioner is not a strike. The demonstration
held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañ ang was against alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in
general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular
before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers
of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual
aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was
the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its
members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as
well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police.
 
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights— freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances—over property rights has been
sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of
our enlightened civilization—becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any
meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can
generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition.
 
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been
legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike.
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike as the same is not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of
work.
 
 
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
JAIME IBABAO, JOSE BALLESTEROS, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005
 
FACTS:
The Union filed a Notice of Strike with the (NCMB) which alleged as grounds for the
projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on
employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization. A series of conferences was
conducted before the NCMB but no agreement was reached.  The petitioner even filed a
Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed by reason the Union
had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of
the meeting where the strike vote was conducted.
 
On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes of the alleged strike
vote purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioner’s
premises. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the
results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and
eight votes were spoiled.
 
On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. 
Subsequently, the Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption
of jurisdiction over the dispute. The SOLE  assumed jurisdiction over the labor disputes,
Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24)
hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and
accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike. In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union
stopped their strike and returned to work.
 
The Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition for the
cancellation of the respondent Union’s certificate of registration. In a parallel development,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike
staged by the respondents illegal. 
 
The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997 and that no
notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to
the intended holding of the strike vote. According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the
petitioner’s 17 employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported by the
affidavit of the overseer of the parking lot and the security guards, must prevail as against
the minutes of the strike vote presented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held
that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor Code, the respondent Union should have filed a
motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma which was
affirmed by this Court instead of staging a strike.
 
The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which granted their appeal and
reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner elevated its cause to the CA which in
turn dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the NLRC.
 
In the present action, petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the
submission of a notice of a strike vote to the Regional Branch of the NCMB as required by
Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, is merely
directory and not mandatory. The use of the word “shall” in the rules, the petitioner avers,
indubitably indicates the mandatory nature of the respondent Union’s duty to submit the
said notice of strike vote.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the submission of a notice of a strike vote to the NCMBl is mandatory
 
RULING:
YES. The submission of a notice of a strike vote to the NCMBl is mandatory. The strike
staged by the union is illegal. Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263,
paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to
notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24)
hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the
meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable
to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of
supervision. In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC, the Court enumerated the notices
required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the
24-hour prior notice to the NCMB.
 
A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining
unit via a notice of strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call
the parties to a conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in
exploring all possibilities for amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the
conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be encouraged to submit their
dispute for voluntary arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union may hold a
strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is obtained, a strike may ensue. The
purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the
majority of the union members in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same
time, discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even corruption. A strike vote report
submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of strike ensures that
a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the report is false, the seven-day period
affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late.
The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to
amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while
the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the
projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.
 
The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24
hours before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the
intent of the union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on
whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any
acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and (c) should the NCMB decide on
its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including the employer, to
supervise the strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of the
requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be. Unless and until the NCMB is
notified at least 24 hours of the union’s decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date,
place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot determine for itself whether to supervise a strike
vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular conduct. The failure of a union to
comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the NCMB at least 24 hours prior to
the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent strike staged by the union
illegal.
 
In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice
requirement to the NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November
10, 1997. As a result, the petitioner complained that no strike vote meeting ever took place
and averred that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal.
 
Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Section 7, Rule XXII of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, no labor organization shall declare a
strike unless supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and the failure of
a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.
 
EDEN GLADYS ABARIA, ROMULO ALFORQUE, ET. AL.  vs.NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, METRO CEBU COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., ET. AL.
G.R. No. 154113               December 7, 2011
 
FACTS:
The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees of Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. Perla Nava, the President
of NAMA-MCCH-NFL, wrote Rev. Iyoy, the Hospital Administrator of MCCH, expressing the
union’s desire to renew the CBA. However, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal for Nava to
secure first the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining
representative of MCCHI employees.
 
Meanwhile, Atty. Alforque, the legal counsel of NFL, informed MCCHI that the proposed
CBA submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and that NFL has not authorized any
other legal counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations. In a letter
addressed to Nava et al, Atty. Alforque suspended their union membership for serious
violation of the Constitution and By-Laws.
On February 26, 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union
leave with pay for 12 union members.The next day, several union members led by Nava
and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red
armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards,
posters and streamers. Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted activities being
carried out by union members which are not sanctioned by NFL.
 
The DOLE Regional Office issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their records
which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union
submitted only a copy of its Charter Certificate on January 31, 1995. NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed
a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed not filed for want of legal personality on the
part of the file. Despite such rebuff, Nava and her group still conducted a strike vote on
April 2, 1996 during which an overwhelming majority of union members approved the
strike.
 
 On March 30, 1996, MCCHI sent termination letters to union leaders and other members
who participated in the strike and picketing activities. For their continued picketing
activities despite the said warning, more than 100 striking employees were dismissed
effective April 12 and 19, 1996.
 
Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. With the volatile situation
adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed
a petition for injunction in the NLRC on July 9, 1996. Thereafter, several complaints for
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees against
MCCHI, Rev. Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI.
 
On August 4, 1999, Executive Labor Arbiter Reynoso A. Belarmino rendered his decision
dismissing the complaints for unfair labor practice filed by Nava and 90 other
complainants. Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino found no basis for the charge of unfair
labor practice and declared the strike and picketing activities illegal having been conducted
by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a legitimate labor organization. The termination of union
leaders Nava, Alsado, Bañ ez, Bongcaras, Canen, Gerona and Remocaldo were upheld as
valid but MCCHI was directed to grant separation pay equivalent to one-half month for
every year of service, in the total amount of P3,085,897.40 for the 84 complainants.
 
ISSUE: 
What are the consequences of illegal strike to union officers and members?
 
RULING:
 
Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for the consequences of an illegal
strike to the participating workers:
 
x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker
in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment,
even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
 
The above provision makes a distinction between workers and union officers who
participate in an illegal strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere
participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts
during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he
knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an
illegal act during a strike.
 
Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities despite the declaration by the
NCMB that their union was not duly registered as a legitimate labor organization and the
letter from NFL’s legal counsel informing that their acts constitute disloyalty to the national
federation, and their filing of the notice of strike and conducting a strike vote
notwithstanding that their union has no legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI for
collective bargaining purposes, there is no question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers
knowingly participated in the illegal strike. The CA therefore did not err in ruling that the
termination of union officers Perla Nava, Catalina Alsado, Albina Bañ ez, Hannah Bongcaras,
Ernesto Canen, Jesusa Gerona and Guillerma Remocaldo was valid and justified.

With respect to the dismissed union members, although MCCHI submitted photographs
taken at the picket line, it did not individually name those striking employees and specify
the illegal act committed by each of them. As to the affidavits executed by non-striking
employees, they identified mostly union officers as the persons who blocked the hospital
entrance, harassed hospital employees and patients whose vehicles were prevented from
entering the premises. Only some of these witnesses actually named a few union members
who committed similar acts of harassment and coercion. 
 
Since there is no clear proof that union members actually participated in the commission of
illegal acts during the strike, they are not deemed to have lost their employment status as a
consequence of a declaration of illegality of the strike.