Aid and conditionality

The role of the bilateral donor:

A case study of Norwegian–Tanzanian aid relationship

July 1999

Hilde Selbervik

A Report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

by Chr. Michelsen Institute

The Ministry does not accept any responsibility for the information in this
report nor the views expressed, which are solely those of CMI
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1 THEME AND RESEARCH PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 DEFINITIONS AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2. A CHANGE IN NORWEGIAN AID POLICY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.1 FROM DONORSHIP TO OWNERSHIP, CONDITIONALITY TO PARTNERSHIP? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 NORWEGIAN POLICY ON CONDITIONALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3.1 THE NYERERE ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 MAIN TRENDS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 MAIN TRENDS IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4 ODA TO TANZANIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Goals for Norwegian aid to Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

4. CONDITIONALITY, A REVERSED MICRO-MACRO PARADOX AND

THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRIATE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The small state in international politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
The donors’ conditionality policy towards Tanzania – an illustration of a reversed micro–macro paradox? . . . . . 34

5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.2 FROM ALL-WEATHER FRIENDS TO FAIR-WEATHER FRIENDS ONLY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3 THE CG MEETING PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Getting tougher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Honeymoon or grace period? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.4 THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

6. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.1 TYING TOGETHER THE DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A special Nordic–Tanzanian relationship? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Primary Sources – Official/Published . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Archival material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Speeches & Lectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Interviewees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive summary
This study gives a presentation of the role of Norway –
from a conditionality perspective – in the aid negotia-
tion processes within different forums, mainly the CG
meetings and the bilateral annual country consulta-
tions between Norway and Tanzania in order to inves-
tigate the role of Norway, and in more general terms
what has been the role of the bilateral donor in this
regard. The report also analyses how Norway has
applied its conditionality policy towards Tanzania, and
how this has changed over time. Moreover, how the
Norwegian policy can be explained is explored.
For Tanzania the 1980s and the 1990s has been a
period of economic and political reform. In many of
the reform processes both the bilateral and the multi-
lateral donors have been heavily involved. The donors
have imposed many reforms, and the main instrument
to accomplish these aims has been conditionality in
different forms.
Norwegian and Nordic policy towards Tanzania has
gone through notable changes from the mid-1980s to
date. In view of the cordial Nordic–Tanzanian relation-
ship, it might seem like a paradox, therefore, that it
was towards Tanzania that Norway for the first time
actively supported economic conditionality. The impo-
sition of macro-economic conditions meant a signifi-
cant departure from previous Norwegian aid policy. In
the 1980s and 1990s there has been a gradual change
and adjustment to what may be termed as an ‘interna-
tional conditionality’ regime, which represents a fun-
damental change from previous principles.
The novelty in the 1980s and the 1990s was the change
of attitude towards interference and more explicitly the
recipient country’s national policy in the context of
aid, concerning national economic policy, good gov-
ernance, democratisation and human rights.
The policy on how aid can be used as a tool for politi-
cal reform and human rights promotion and how to
react in extreme cases is roughly outlined. The main
instrument to achieve these goals has been positive
measures. Sanctions should only be applied as a last
resort. Aid as an instrument for economic reforms is
even less clearly treated in official policy documents.
No explicit strategy is elaborated.
In the 1980s and 1990s conditionality has been the
most important aid policy instrument to accomplish
reforms, and has been described as the most character-
istic feature of aid in this period. In recent years the
use of conditionality as a tool has been questioned. At
5
the same time, aid in general has come under increas-
ing attack and scrutiny.
The ‘political correct’ slogans currently are ‘partner-
ship’ and ‘ownership’. From being a word of honour
within large parts of the donor community, in the late
1990s conditionality has become more of a swear
word within the same donor circles. Paradoxically the
donors are still practising conditionality, but with no
clear conception of how to apply it.
This study supports the main criticism of conditional-
ity: the donors’ lack of credibility when pursuing a
conditionality policy and the lack of ownership at the
recipient end, which is indispensable for achieving
sustainable results.
If aid is to be used as a mid-wife for reform, condition-
ality seems needed, but the conditions have to be fol-
lowed up and to be worked out in real partnership with
the recipient. There ought to be fewer conditions, and
they should be redefined with stipulated deadlines and
benchmarks.
Norway has since the mid-1980s applied so-called
cross-conditionality towards Tanzania, which means
that Norwegian bilateral aid has been conditional on
Tanzania reaching agreements with the IMF and the
World Bank. But applying cross-conditionality does
not necessarily involve tangible or strict sanctions if
the conditions are not met. Threats have often been
expressed vaguely and equivocally.
Since the mid-1980s Norway has given full backing to
the economic reform programmes initiated by the
Bretton Wood institutions. The Word Bank is the lead-
ing “think tank” on aid questions and sets much of the
aid agenda. Both bilateral donors and recipients seem
increasingly oriented towards the Bank on aid issues in
general and more specifically in the context of condi-
tionality. The role of the bilateral donor has been
weakened in recent years, but at the same time the pol-
icies of the Bank and Norway have converged. Norwe-
gian policy has moved closer to that of the World
Bank, and vice versa.
It has also often been argued that Norway and the Nor-
dic bloc contributed significantly to integrating soft
sector issues in the structural adjustment programmes.
It is difficult, however, to find documentary evidence
to support this claim. Nevertheless, among the inform-
ants there seemed to be a general perception that the
Nordic countries – particularly through their repre-
6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
sentatives in Washington DC –successfully influenced
the Bank in a softer direction.
The group discipline among the donors in the context
of the CG meetings seems strong. If one donor raises
an issue, most of the other donors follow suit. Inform-
ants have stated that if unpopular issues are raised,
donors fear isolation. There is a lot of competition and
positioning among the donors. Since the CG meetings
are closed and more confidential than for example the
country negotiation processes, positioning vis-à-vis
other countries is judged as more important than reac-
tions from the recipient country and the domestic pub-
lic. It is striking that there is a wide discrepancy
between the various donors’ statement and their
pledges. The statements are far more critical and do
not correspond to the pledges. This supports the argu-
ment often advanced in the conditionality literature,
that the donors’ lack credibility when conditionality is
applied.
A game theory model about the Samaritan’s dilemma
is presented in order to explain Norwegian behaviour.
In this model there is only one dominant strategy for
the donor, namely that of disbursing aid. It would be
unproblematic, therefore, for the recipient to predict
the outcome of the donor’s behaviour, and few incen-
tives for the recipient to implement unpopular reforms.
For most of the period under scrutiny the Samaritan’s
dilemma serves as an explanation of Norway’s behav-
iour.
One way of solving the Samaritan’s dilemma would be
for Norway to tie its conditionality policy to the World
Bank. This appears to have been part of the Norwegian
strategy in applying cross-conditionality, thus tying
some of its disbursement to the policy of the multilat-
eral institutions, which may serve as a buffer.
It might be argued that disbursement of aid, independ-
ently of the behaviour of the recipient, has been the
dominant strategy of the multilateral institutions as
well, driven by reward and incentive mechanisms for
World Bank staff. Furthermore, there is much prestige
attached to the implementation of stabilisation and
structural adjustment programmes, so that the IMF and
the World Bank have vested interests in their not get-
ting off track. Hence, disbursement will also be the
dominant strategy of the IMF and the World Bank.
The hesitant reformers will have few incentives, there-
fore, to change their behaviour, and aid will thus not
serve as effective backing for the pro-reform factions.
Hence, piggybacking on the conditionality of the mul-
tilaterals may not solve the Samaritan’s dilemma. It
would be easier to change the incentive structure for
the Bank staff than the Samaritan’s altruistic motiva-
tions. The motivation for disbursing aid is not entirely
altruistic, not even for Norway. Many would probably
claim that other motives have been on the increase. In
addition, a donor like Norway is also faced with the
so-called disbursement imperative, due to a rigid
national budgeting system, and the need to get rid of
the money by the end of the year. The recipient is
aware of this. This only reinforces the general argu-
ment that the donor will have one dominant strategy:
disbursement.
But there are limits to the Samaritan’s willingness to
disburse aid irrespective of the recipient’s behaviour.
In 1994, as a response to allegations of massive cor-
ruption, Norway together with many other bilateral
donors decided to suspend balance of payment sup-
port. At the same time the structural adjustment pro-
gramme went off track. The paradox of this situation
was that the World Bank ended up as the strongest lob-
byists on behalf of the Tanzanian government despite
the latter’s failure to meet the conditions. One reason
may have been that once the bilateral donors cut their
balance of payment support, it would be even harder to
get the structural adjustment and stabilisation pro-
grammes back on track. Thus, even if no agreement
was reached and the conditions not met, the bilateral
donors saw it as crucial to maintain balance of pay-
ment support in such a situation. But this situation did
not last long, even if the agreed conditions had still not
been fulfilled after the election in 1996. Many of the
bilateral donors then decided to disburse their balance
of payment support, as a sign of goodwill towards the
new Mkapa government. This may partly be explained
by the so-called honeymoon thesis, but the argument
may also have been valid during the ‘wedding prepara-
tions’ in Tanzania.
In the early 1980s the discrepancy was wide between
Norwegian bilateral and multilateral conditionality
policies. This was due to the fact that different minis-
tries were handling with these issues independently
vis-à-vis different institutions, without proper co-ordi-
nation. This is not a problem any longer, since general
policy is currently better co-ordinated in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
The pursuance of Norwegian policy in a CG meeting
context as opposed to the bilateral negotiation proc-
esses, reveals differences. Norway is far more critical
in the CG meetings than in the bilateral annual aid
negotiations. In the latter no additional conditions are
attached, apart from the cross-conditionalities. There
are few specifically Norwegian conditions attached.
The Samaritan’s dilemma may also serve as a model
for explaining why Norway seems to be adopting dif-
ferent policies multilaterally and bilaterally. For the
Samaritan it would be easier to leave it to an agent to
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
pursue a tough policy and tie the implementation of
tough conditions to an agent, in casu the World Bank.
Bilaterally the Samaritan is much softer.
It is more difficult for a bilateral donor to contribute to
the political reform process than to the economic
reform process. Human rights and democratisation
have not explicitly been part of the mandate of the
World Bank as a financial institution, albeit indirectly
or even directly under the rubric of good governance.
It is harder for a bilateral donor to operationalise its
conditions and to follow them up with sanctions in this
area. The bilateral donor would not have a buffer, and
would not in the same way be able to tie difficult deci-
sions to an agent or proxy, which has been done in the
economic sphere.
The sources indicate that Norway at first was a bit con-
cerned about being left alone as the only donor impos-
ing sanctions concerning political conditionality as in
the case of Zanzibar. Norway had no wish to be in the
frontline and to set an example.
In the 1990s human rights and democratisation have
been on the agenda of the bilateral annual country
negotiation meetings between Norway and Tanzania.
This was not welcomed by the Tanzanian side, but the
Tanzanians seem more relaxed about it now, even
though it is still sensitive. For the Norwegian side,
raising these issues sometimes has been somewhat rit-
ualistic, done out of duty to follow the instructions and
to appease Norwegian domestic public opinion.
7
After more than ten years with more or less continuous
reform of the Tanzanian economy, the macro-eco-
nomic indicators are promising, and the GoT has suc-
cessfully managed to reach the macro-economic
benchmarks set by the IMF. Even so, many indicators
are still pointing in the wrong direction. The problem
of corruption seems to be escalating. As long as Tan-
zania succeeds in meeting the economic benchmarks
the IMF is “satisfied”, and to some extent other parts
of the donor community as well. This illustrates the
problems of measurement.
IMF’s macro-economic benchmarks have been more
successfully met than the World Bank’s conditions for
structural adjustment loans. This explains why the
IMF has often been more positive in its evaluation of
GoT performance than the World Bank and the bilat-
eral donors. The quantitative benchmarks are easier to
monitor than qualitative conditions. The conditions for
obtaining structural adjustment finance entail deeper
changes and are in general more politically sensitive
and controversial. This illustrates the problems with
the application of political conditionality.
Despite the Nordic change of policy, it seems clear
that the Nordic countries still enjoy a particularly close
relationship with Tanzania, which is often character-
ised as less paternalistic and bossy than those of many
of the other donors like the US and Great Britain.
However, many of the non-Norwegian informants per-
ceive that Norway in recent years has assumed a more
hesitant attitude towards Tanzania. Within the Nordic
bloc, Sweden seemed by far the most articulate and
active donor.
8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ABBREVIATIONS 9

Abbreviations

BoP Balance of Payments

BoT Bank of Tanzania
CCM Chama Cha Mapinduzi (governing political party in Tanzania)
CG Consultative Group
CUF Civic United Front
DAC Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DANIDA Danish Agency for Development Co-operation
EDA Effective Development Assistance
ERP Economic Recovery Programme
ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ESAP Economic and Social Action Programme
ESRF Economic and Social Research Foundation (Dar es Salaam)
EU European Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
GoT Government of Tanzania
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Association
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPC Investment Promotion Centre (now: Tanzania Investment Centre)
JEM Joint Evaluation Mission
KIDEP Kigoma Integrated Development Programme
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway)
NCCR-Mageuzi National Convention for Construction and Reform
NESP National Economic Survival Programme
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OTTU Organisation of Tanzania Trade Unions
Paris Club Informal group of creditor countries
PFP Policy Framework Paper
RPFB Rolling Plan and Forward Budget
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
Sida Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
SPA Special Programme of Assistance for Africa
TRA Tanzania Revenue Authority
TZS Tanzanian shilling
UDP United Democratic Party
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
10 ABBREVIATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction1
1.1 Theme and research problem
This study looks into experience with the use of bilat-
eral conditionality and the role of the bilateral donor,
regarding both the recipient and the international
donor community. These aspects will be scrutinised
through an analysis of the Norwegian–Tanzanian rela-
tionship in the 1980s and 1990s. Tanzania has been
one of the most important recipients of Norwegian aid
– if not the most important one. I will look into the
conditions Norway has attached to its aid to Tanzania
in this period, and how the Norwegian policy has been
received. Have the conditions set by Norway been dif-
ferent from those of other actors, and if so, how? The
Norwegian position and influence towards multilateral
actors and other bilateral donors will also be investi-
gated.
Recent years have witnessed a growing consensus
within the donor community, generally referred to as
the “Washington consensus”.2 Is this a result of
increased donor co-ordination, or is it a consequence
of the weakened position of bilateral donors? This
project will seek to place Norway within a broader aid
context, asking whether Norway’s role as a donor has
changed over time – towards the recipients, and the
donor community at large. In doing so, it explores in
more depth the broad themes outlined in a previous
study: Aid as a Tool for Promotion of Human Rights
and Democracy: What Can Norway Do? (Selbervik
1997).
The present study tries to shed light on an important
and significant aspect of aid policy in this period. A
case study of the Norwegian-Tanzanian aid relation-
ship is highly relevant with regards to this subject, par-
ticularly because of the amicable relationship that had
evolved between the two countries in the 1960s and
1970s. The Nordic countries continued to support Tan-
zania from 1979 until 1985 when Tanzania was resist-
ing IMF’s conditionality. At that time, Norway did not
agree with the IMF’s policy conditions, and rather
emphasised measures, which would cushion the
adverse effects of structural adjustments on the Tanza-
nian economy. Therefore, it was somewhat surprising
when Norway changed its position in 1985/86 and
became a proponent of conditionality. This was the
2 The Washington consensus concerns fiscal discipline, political
expenditure priorities, tax reform, financial liberalisation, a uni-
fied exchange rate, trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregula-
tion, and property rights (Williamson 1994:26–28).
1 Note of acknowledgement. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has commissioned this study. I am grateful to all interviewees for their
forthcoming attitude and for generously giving so much of their valuable time. Special thanks go to the Embassy staff in Dar es Salaam for shar-
ing their insights and for facilitating my stay. Thanks to Arne Tostensen for valuable comments, and to Arne Disch for useful input. Any errors,
whether of omission or commission, are my responsibility.
11
first time Norway actively supported economic condi-
tionality. Since the mid-1980s to date, generally
speaking, Norway has given full backing to the reform
programmes initiated by the Bretton Wood institu-
tions.
Today, over a decade later, it is appropriate to evalu-
ate this new position in the context of bilateral aid.
What is the role of the bilateral donor, at a time when
political scientists and ODA bureaucrats are talking
about increased interdependence and globalisation,
and the pre-eminence of multilateral actors in shaping
new aid policies? What role should – or could – bilat-
eralism play? The report of the DAC Expert Group on
Evaluation: Evaluation of Programs Promoting Par-
ticipatory Development and Good Governance
(OECD 1997) laments that there are few case studies
to draw on. This project intends to make one contribu-
tion to that end.
In recent years, the use of conditionality as a tool has
been widely questioned, while indeed development aid
in general has come under increasing attack and scru-
tiny. It is pertinent, therefore, to see what we can learn
from experiences with the conditionality tool, in chart-
ing a new aid policy. Most previous studies have dealt
with multilateral conditionality with highly aggregated
figures, whereas little has been done focusing on bilat-
eral actors. Furthermore, there are few case studies to
draw on. For Norway, the case of Tanzania seems
especially relevant: if Norway could ever be said to be
in a position to influence a country it would have to be
Tanzania, due to various factors which will be dis-
cussed below (see also Selbervik 1997).
Even though many countries have reduced their aid to
Tanzania – Norway among them – the current Minister
for International Development and Human Rights,
Hilde Frafjord Johnson, has declared that Norway will
not turn its back on Tanzania in this difficult period
(Johnson 1998). Tanzania represents a very interesting
case with regard to experiences with both economic
and political conditionality, not least the highly perti-
nent question of the limits and potentials of bilateral
conditionality. The role of Norway must be seen in
comparison with that of other donors, taking cogni-
sance of what power Norway has in relation to these
actors.
12
How can one understand the role of the bilateral donor
within a broader aid context? What can the bilateral
donor expect to achieve in diplomatic bargaining? Is
there any point in focusing exclusively on the bilateral
donor, when its achievements and influences are so
difficult to isolate from those of other actors and fac-
tors? Studying the role of the bilateral donor involves
considerable methodological challenges, and investi-
gating Norwegian influences on the economic and
political reform process in Tanzania is no exception.
In order to analyse the Norwegian influences on the
Tanzanian reform process it is necessary to investigate
how Norwegian conditionality policy was operational-
ised in various arenas. This study will focus particu-
larly on the bargaining processes. Of particular interest
will be bilateral country negotiations, where the point
of departure will be the conditions laid down in the
annual negotiations. Is there any discrepancy between
the outcome of the negotiations and the instructions
elaborated in Oslo beforehand? What were the recipi-
ent’s responses to these conditions? Were they fol-
lowed up? When did Norway start attaching strings to
its aid to Tanzania? And how did the change in Norwe-
gian policy influence Norwegian–Tanzanian relations?
Another arena of investigation is the Consultative
Group (CG) meetings. In recent years most bilateral
donors have applied “cross-conditionality”, which
means that the donor makes its bilateral aid condi-
tional on the outcome of negotiations between the
recipient and the multilateral institutions (Killick
1998). Has Norway made use of cross-conditionality
towards Tanzania? If so, when and how has this policy
been implemented, and how has this new policy been
received on the recipient end? What role has Norway
played in the CG meetings? Has Norway joined the
rest of the donor community? Were the Norwegian
conditions different – softer or stronger? Is there any
discrepancy between the policy of Norway on the
bilateral scene and that pursued on the multilateral
scene? If so, how can this discrepancy be understood
and explained?
1.2 Definitions and delimitation of the study
Conditionality is an ugly recent addition to the
English language with which government offici-
als in indebted countries have become all too
familiar (Tony Killick in Zormelo 1996:3).
What is aid conditionality? What have been the argu-
ments and motives for conditioning aid? Has the con-
tent of the concept changed over time? The literature
on the topic is vast. Conditionality has been one of the
big aid slogans of the 1980s and 1990s. Development
researchers, especially those of an applied orientation,
1. INTRODUCTION
have produced numerous papers, articles and books on
the topic, and often offered their own definition of the
concept.3 Multilateral institutions like the World Bank
and the IMF have made extensive use of the concept
and the strategy, whereas bilateral donors have gener-
ally been more hesitant.
Aid has always been conditional, but according to
Johannesen and Leraand (1997):
conditionality in its classical form was an
expression of the donor’s strategic and/or econo-
mic interest in addition to claims/conditions to
ensure that the aid would be channelled to
achieve stated goals. From the 1980s the content
of the concept has been broadened and partly
changed, among other things, on the basis of the
economic crisis in many developing countries.
Agreements between the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), often in co-operation with the
World Bank, and the indebted countries about
loans, debt relief, balance of payments support,
became increasingly linked to economic stability
and economic and structural reforms, the so-cal-
led structural adjustment programmes. [Author’s
translation]
According to The Concise Oxford Dictionary
(1976:211) a condition is a “Stipulation, thing upon
the fulfilment of which depends that of another”. In
modern aid terminology, conditionality is not so much
a single strategy, but a set of strategies that the donor
can employ to induce political and economic changes
in recipient countries (Nelson and Englington 1992).
This report will use Kahler’s definition: conditionality
as an exchange of policy changes for external
resources (Kahler 1992:89), or, alternatively, trying to
buy reform with aid (World Bank 1998a).
The essentially coercive nature of conditionality is
underlined in these definitions. A main element is that
the donor is seeking to induce the recipient to pursue
certain goals and to adopt certain policies, set by the
donor, to which the recipient would otherwise not have
given equally high priority.
In the aid literature a distinction is often drawn
between two generations of conditionality. The first
generation refers to economic conditionality, intro-
duced by the World Bank and the IMF in the early
1980s. Balance of payments (BoP) and big sector
loans were explicitly linked to the adoption of certain
economic policies on the recipient side.
3 For a broader and more thorough discussion of the different
meanings of the concept, see Selbervik 1997.
1. INTRODUCTION
Economic conditionality was soon extended to include
political conditionality. This second generation of
conditionality, also known as the new conditionality,
emerged in the 1990s. Political conditionality made
development aid conditional on the implementation of
political reforms in the recipient countries. Demands
related to the second generation of conditionality cen-
tred on the promotion and fulfilment of human rights,
democracy and good governance objectives.
Conditionality or conditionalites can be applied ex
ante or ex post – also referred to as ex status quo and
ex post facto conditionality (see Stolz et al. 1996:36).
Ex ante conditionality means that the donor sets the
pursuit of certain objectives (human rights, democracy
and good governance) as a condition before an aid
relationship can be established. Ex post conditionality
is really a contradiction in terms because conditions,
strictly speaking, can only be imposed in advance.
What it does mean is that a donor expresses before-
hand, but vaguely and implicitly, that there is an
expectation that certain conditions will be met, and
that the donor will consider afterwards what reaction
to make if these conditions are not met.
The donor’s response to the recipient’s meeting/failing
to meet the demands can be either negative or positive.
Negative conditionality means that the donor threatens
to terminate, suspend or reduce aid flows, or actually
does so, if pre-set conditions are not met by the recipi-
ent. In the view of many scholars, the concept of “con-
ditionality” covers only negative conditionality (see
e.g. Stokke 1995:12). When the mass media write of
conditionality, what is generally meant and understood
is this kind of negative conditionality.
Others also include the carrot in addition to the stick.
This may be termed positive conditionality: the donor
promises additional aid as a reward for “good behav-
iour”, for the adoption of given policies or the achieve-
ment of certain goals set by the donor (see Waller
1995:111; Ball 1992; Nelson and Eglington 1992). For
example, additional aid resources can be earmarked
for democracy and human rights measures, or given as
a direct reward to a government, by increasing the gen-
eral volume of aid or BoP support and debt relief.
Withholding BoP support and debt relief is the most
common form of donor sanction when negative condi-
tionality is applied. This choice of reaction is based on
the argument that sanctions at that macro level would
“hurt” or affect the government more directly than
would, for example, withdrawing project support. The
latter would present the donor with the “double pen-
alty” dilemma whereby also “innocent” recipients
would be adversely affected.
13
Positive and negative conditionality can be seen as two
sides of the same coin: a negative or a positive reaction
from the donor, depending on whether the conditions
are meet or not –a kind of punishment or reward. Neg-
ative and positive conditionality can be used separately
or in conjunction. A donor may use conditionality as a
reward for “good behaviour” and then try to support
and accelerate a positive trend or ongoing process in a
particular country by taking positive measures. This
does not necessarily mean that the same country will
be punished if certain conditions are not met.
Applying positive conditionality will involve certain
technical and budgetary problems. If the overall level
of the aid budget is normally stable from year to year
and then additional aid is to be given so as to reward a
recipient country for positive development, that can
cause budgetary strains. In recent years, aid budgets
have not been increasing – they have been stagnant if
not decreasing. In the likely scenario that overall aid
budgets will not increase in the near future, rewarding
one country in line with the positive conditionality
logic would entail reduced aid flows elsewhere. By
implication, negative conditionality would thus have to
be applied to other countries (leading to reduced vol-
umes elsewhere) if the terms of positive conditionality
are to be fulfilled towards those who perform well. A
further operational complication would present itself
to a donor if a positive trend is discernible in one area
and a negative trend in another, within the same coun-
try. Applying combined conditionalities involves many
dilemmas, difficult judgements and trade-offs (Selber-
vik 1997).
Although conditionality can be applied at various lev-
els, a broad distinction can be drawn between macro
and micro levels. This study will deal mainly with
macro conditionality. Some scholars have distin-
guished between four levels of conditionality: 1) sys-
temic and national level; 2) sectoral level; 3) project
and programme level; 4) administrative level (see
Selbervik 1997; Stolz 1996; Stokke 1995). That dis-
tinction is based on degree of political interference,
and the argument that intervention at a lower level is
less “serious” than intervention at a higher level. The
trend in recent years has been towards a higher degree
of political interference, but also towards an increasing
numbers of strings attached at lower levels. This study
will deal first and foremost with conditionality as
applied at levels one and two.
As noted, aid has never been unconditional. Long
before the conditionality concept and problematique
became part of the aid vocabulary, conditions were
applied, particularly at what is referred to above as lev-
els three and four. The overall trend in recent years has
been towards intervention at higher levels and an esca-
14
lation in the number of conditions applied at all levels,
also at lower levels. This has occurred in response to
growing demands for greater effectiveness, improve-
ment in quality, and procedures to be observed in
projects and programmes.
The increasing number of conditions may well come
in conflict with new objectives such as “ownership”
and “recipient responsibility”, perhaps acting to under-
mine them. Having more and more strings attached
and more stringent follow-up routines may mean
increasingly complex management of detail by the
donor and the recipient alike, when simplification was
in fact the objective. At worst, donors may end up
steering projects and programmes in detail. This can
be tantamount to a take-over, and certainly makes a
mockery of recipient responsibility. This line of rea-
soning will not be taken further here; suffice is to note
that the content and effects of conditionality are many-
faceted and sometimes contradictory (Selbervik 1997).
1.3 Methodology and sources
This study employs wide range of primary and sec-
ondary sources, both qualitative and quantitative. In
addition to secondary literature on aid questions, rele-
vant journals and magazines have been consulted. The
study is based on four main categories of primary
sources: 1) official documents, such as White Papers
and official statistics, 2) newspaper articles, 3) archival
material, 4) oral sources.
Particularly important have been documents from the
annual Norwegian–Tanzanian country programme
negotiations and from the Consultative Group (CG)
meetings. At the latter between 20 and 30 different
actors are represented.4
It must be noted, however, that fora like the CG meet-
ings may seem a bit like a semantic exercise. The gen-
eral statements of the various donors have been
prepared in advance, so that there is little actual dis-
cussion. Also donor pledges are largely prepared and
written beforehand. A donor’s general statement con-
veys an impression of the view and positions of that
particular country or institution on important issues.
4 In for example 1995, in addition to the Tanzanian delegation,
fourteen donor countries, ten banks or other organisations and
two with observer status were present: Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, the United States, the African Development
Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the
Commission of European Communities, the European Invest-
ment Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment, the International Monitory Fund, the Saudi Fund for
Development, the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development and
the United Nations Development Programme. Observers were
Belgium and the Development Assistance Committee of the
OECD.
1. INTRODUCTION
CG meetings are organised in such a way that the first
statement is longer and more detailed than the subse-
quent ones. More important for tracing the underlying
currents and motivations is the informal dialogue. This
is available in the general reports from the meetings,
and in the preparatory discussions.
In 1997, there was a change in the setting of the CG
meetings. For the first time the meeting was held in
Dar es Salaam, not in Paris as previously, and the dis-
cussion was far less based on prepared statements.
This resulted in a much freer discussion and greater
participation from the Tanzanian side. The meeting
also got more publicity in the Tanzanian media. There
was no CG meeting in 1998; one was held in May
1999 – but again in Paris. From time to time, informal
CG meetings are also held. Documents from other
meetings like the Nordic–Tanzanian high-level meet-
ing and DAC meetings have been consulted for the
purpose of this study.
Interviews have provided an important supplement to
the written material. They have been conducted with
central actors in Oslo, but also with Norwegian aid
officials at the field mission in Tanzania, with other
donor aid officials, academics, and with representa-
tives from the Tanzanian side.
1.4 Outline of the study
In Chapter 2 the declared aid policy changes from con-
ditionality to partnership will be discussed and ques-
tioned, and Norway’s policy of conditionality in the
1980s and 1990s will be outlined. In Chapter 3 the
Tanzanian context will be sketched out. The main
trends in political and economic development since the
early 1980s to date, and the most important political
and economic reforms will be highlighted. Trends in
aid flow to Tanzania will be summed up, with particu-
lar reference to Norwegian aid. To serve as a guide
through the empirical data, some theoretical perspec-
tives will be drawn up in Chapter 4. How can we
understand the behaviour of the bilateral actor within a
broader aid context? Have the motivations of Norwe-
gian aid changed during the period of investigation?
Has Norwegian aid become more pragmatic and less
idealistic – or perhaps simply more realistic? In order
to explain and understand Norwegian behaviour
within different contexts the Samaritan’s dilemma is
used as an illustration. Chapter 5 provides an empirical
analysis of the role of Norway in the negotiation proc-
esses, bilaterally and multilaterally, from a condition-
ality perspective. The final chapter seeks to link the
empirical findings to the theoretical perspectives pre-
sented in Chapter 4.
2. A CHANGE IN NORWEGIAN AID POLICY?
2. A change in Norwegian aid policy?
It was the two international financial institutions, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), that in the early 1980s paved the way for pol-
icy-based lending and conditionality – as the concept
of conditionality is mostly used and understood today.
The backdrop to this was the crisis in nearly all Afri-
can economies. Economic conditionality was first and
foremost connected to the stabilisation programmes
and structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and
the World Bank, respectively. At the time, Norway
was somewhat resistant to close ranks with these mul-
tilateral institutions in supporting structural adjust-
ment programmes. However, in the mid-1980s
Norway, together with Sweden and other like-minded
donors, abandoned this position and came to accept
the necessity of macro-economic stabilisation and
structural adjustment.
Norwegian development co-operation policy has tradi-
tionally put a high value on solidarity, compassion and
disinterestedness – at least as far as policy rhetoric is
concerned. As a matter of principle – in policy state-
ments referred to as recipient orientation – aid was to
be extended on the terms of the recipients, in accord-
ance with their plans and priorities. These were central
elements of Norwegian aid policy throughout the
1960s and 1970s. Later on, recipient orientation was
replaced by recipient responsibility. Making aid condi-
tional on political and economic policies defined by
the donors was seen as objectionable and was hence
resisted. With no colonial past, Norway adhered to the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
the newly independent states.5
Various arguments have been cited, such as security
interests, but solidarity has been the main justification
given for Norwegian aid. “A South policy based on
solidarity” was also the main message of the Minister
for International Development and Human Rights,
Hilde Frafjord Johnson, when she presented the new
government’s policy on development co-operation to
the Storting on 5 May 1998. A recent study by Alberto
Alesina and David Dollar (1998) concludes, “foreign
aid is dictated by political and strategic considerations,
much more than by the economic needs and policy
performance of the recipients”. That same study also
notes that there are significant differences among
donors: “Certainly donors (notably the Nordic coun-
tries) seem to respond more to the ‘correct’ incentives,
5 Underlying motives for disbursing aid will not here be debated.
At the one extreme are those who argue that providing aid is
mere self–interest in order to pursue political and security inter-
ests. At the other extreme are those who hold that aid is sheer
idealism. Needless to say, neither of these perspectives can give
an adequate picture.
15
namely income levels, good institutions of the receiv-
ing countries, and openness” (Alesina and Dollar
1998:1).
This stance has placed Norway in the group of “like-
minded” countries, consisting of Denmark, Sweden,
Canada and the Netherlands.6 Their aid policies have
traditionally differed from those of other OECD coun-
tries by being persistently more sympathetic to the
recipients than to state self-interest and domestic pres-
sure groups. By contrast, the policies of the bigger
donors like the United States, Great Britain, France,
and Germany have to a far greater degree been driven
by strategic and economic considerations. Norway
came as a reluctant latecomer to the conditionality era.
Both the Nordic bloc and the European Union had
been reluctant to adopt a policy of conditionality. It
marked a significant change of attitude, therefore,
when Norway eventually did change its position.
Later, conditionality spread beyond the economic
sphere to include political conditionality, which
became amplified by the end of the Cold War. In the
1990s, donors started increasingly to focus on political
conditions for providing aid. Human rights perform-
ance and democratisation were formally brought into
programme negotiations with recipient countries
(NORAD 1990). Thus, Norway became part of an
emerging consensus within the international donor
community, whereby conditionality was seen as both
legitimate and desirable (White Paper no. 19, 1995–
96).
2.1 From donorship to ownership, conditio-
nality to partnership?
For most African countries the 1980s and 1990s have
been a period of economic and political reform – an
era of structural adjustment and political liberalisation.
In many of the reform processes both bilateral and
multilateral donors have been heavily involved.
Donors have imposed many reforms, and the main
instrument to accomplish these aims has been condi-
tionality in varying forms.
Roger Riddell (1995) has called “the introduction, the
extension and the widening of conditionality” one of
the most characteristic features of aid policy in the
1980s and 1990s. So extensive and pervasive has the
use of conditionality been that Tony Killick (1998) has
characterised it as “an explosion”.
6 Today, Ireland and Switzerland should perhaps also be included
in the group.
16
Studies on the effect of conditionality in the reform
process have not been very positive in their conclu-
sions (see for example Killick 1997 and 1998; Collier
1997; Mosely 1991).7 Why were the anticipated
results not forthcoming? Was there something wrong
with the goals or with the instruments to achieve
them? According to Killick (1998), whether a country
goes through a reform process or not is not strongly
related to donor conditionalities. Paul Collier and Paul
Mosely, however, are negative not to the use of condi-
tionality as an instrument per se, but more towards the
way in which it has been used. Mosley (1991) focuses
on the donors’ lack of credibility as the main obstacle
to policy success. Collier (1997) argues that condition-
ality has been a disaster because donors have failed to
punish and reward recipients according to whether the
conditions were met or not. “Business as usual” does
not give recipients strong incentives to accomplish
reforms which they resisted in the first place. There-
fore, Collier argues in favour of a different approach
towards conditionality, one which implies greater
selectivity concerning the countries that are to receive
aid. This could also be seen as just another form of
conditionality. Nevertheless, a recent World Bank
report concludes that “conditionality is not likely to
bring about lasting changes if there is no strong
domestic movement for change” (1998:18).
From being a term of honour within large parts of the
donor community, in the late 1990s conditionality has
become more of a swear word within the same donor
circles. “More ownership and less donorship” was one
of the main messages in DAC’s 1996 annual report
(OECD 1996). “Ownership” was introduced as an aid
concept in the early 1990s, and has been used exten-
sively in the aid policy and debate in recent years. It is
based on the acknowledgement that the recipient coun-
try must “own its country’s development” to achieve
sustainable changes.
The politically correct slogan today is “partnership”,
which has been highlighted as the DAC countries’
main strategy for the 21st century (OECD 1996b).8
Partnership was also crucial in the presentation of the
new government’s aid policy by the Norwegian Minis-
ter for International Development and Human Rights,
Hilde Frafjord Johnson (Johnson 1998). In fact, “part-
nership” is hardly a new idea: it was a key concept in
the Pearson Report of 1969.
7 However a World Bank report states that before 1990 only one-
third of the adjustment loans had failed (World Bank 1998a:59).
8 See for example the British White Paper, Eliminating World
Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century (1997); the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997), Partnership with Africa.
Proposals for a New Swedish Policy towards Sub-Saharan
Africa.
2. A CHANGE IN NORWEGIAN AID POLICY?
Critics hold that the change from “conditionality to
partnership” has merely been a rhetorical shift: it has
not led to fundamental changes, and is really just
another kind of conditionality. Kayizzi-Mugerwa
(1998) argues that the “new partnership” contains at
least as many and strict conditions as earlier, unilater-
ally decided by the donor, and that partnership in an
aid relationship is an illusion. Informants within the
DAC system confirm that conditionality is more in use
than ever.
Joan Nelson (1996) suggests that there will be a
decrease in the use of conditionality in the coming
years, and greater selectivity. This is due to the chang-
ing context of aid in recent years, and to increasing
access to additional resources, like private invest-
ments. She also states that the World Bank’s use of
conditionality has been reduced in the latter half of the
1990s. But in a recent study Tony Killick (1998)
claims that whereas this might be the case for Asia and
Latin America, it seems less relevant to Africa, where
only a few countries have enjoyed increased private
investment. Very few African countries have been in a
position to choose between aid and private resources.
The poorest and most aid-dependent countries also
seem more willing to accept conditionality, because
they are not in a position to replace the loss of aid cap-
ital through other channels. In a time of aid fatigue,
generally shrinking aid budgets, in addition to what
seems to be broad donor consensus that a “good policy
environment” is vital for effective aid, it does not seem
very likely that donors will provide unconditional aid.
Some donors are now arguing that they will only
maintain an aid relationship with those governments
who wish to reform and those who want to adopt a
“good and sound policy”. Such an approach is under-
pinned by the recent World Bank study, Assessing Aid
(1998a). Hence, in the years to come there will be
greater selectivity in favour of “good governments”,
which might lead to many of the poorest African coun-
tries becoming losers – again.
Elliot Berg (1997) characterises this as one of the
greatest dilemmas the donor community is facing.
Despite their purported focus on partnership, the
donors continue practising conditionality. Neverthe-
less, because of the changing context of aid, broadly
speaking, it is likely that this also will influence aid
policies and their operationalisation. In a recent paper
Nicolas van de Walle (1998) suggests that various
budgetary pressures and the weakening aid impulses
are likely to result in both smaller and a much less
altruistic resource flow.
Because of the meagre results of aid in general, the
very existence of aid has come under increasing attack
2. A CHANGE IN NORWEGIAN AID POLICY?
and scrutiny. A recent large cross-country study found
no correlation between aid and economic growth
(Boone 1994 and 1996). In addition, few cross-country
studies have shown a robust effect of aid and growth:
“The picture changes, however, if countries are distin-
guished according to their economic management”
(World Bank 1998a:14; see also Burnside and Dollar
1997). According to the latter authors, the outcome is
completely different for countries with poor manage-
ment: for these countries growth is minuscule or even
negative, whatever the amount of aid.
The conclusion of these studies is that financial aid
can work – in a sound policy environment. Donors
should therefore start evaluating their aid as to what
extent the financial resources have contributed to a
sound policy environment, and move away from an
“approval and disbursement culture” (World Bank
1998a:6). But how is this crucial concept of “sound
management” defined? This is not specified in the
World Bank report. It might be difficult to provide a
clear definition, but we can draw on an index offered
by Burnside and Dollar, who hold that sound manage-
ment consists of good fiscal, monetary and trade poli-
cies, involving low inflation, fiscal balance, a
liberalised trade regime, rule of law, an efficient public
bureaucracy and little corruption (1997:30). On the
other hand, the World Bank also notes that the “defini-
tion of ‘good management’ emerges from the actual
experiences of developing countries” (World Bank
1998a:12).
According to the World Bank study, Tanzania would
fall in the category of a poor management regime
(World Bank 1998a:33). But the study goes on to note,
poor management can be changed quickly if society
and the government are committed to reforms
(1998:40). Other studies have concluded that policy
reforms resulting from conditionality are rarely suc-
cessful unless the government is genuinely convinced
that reforms have to be implemented and that the
reforms belong to the government. This means that
conditionality is not likely to bring about lasting
reforms where there is no strong domestic movement
for change. According to the World Bank report, the
solution for the donors would not be inaction, since
“aid can nurture reform in even the most distorted
environments – but it requires patience and focus on
ideas, not money” (1998:4). Yet, there are pitfalls,
because in such circumstances donors may try to find
something to finance: “Surely it must be a good thing
to finance primary health care or basic education? The
evidence, however, is that aid is often fungible, so that
what you see is not what you get” (World Bank
1998a:5). Nevertheless, it is argued that conditionality
still has a role to play “to allow government [sic] to
commit to reform and to signal the seriousness of
17
reform – but to be effective in this it must focus on a
small number of truly important measures” (World
Bank 1998a:19).
The World Bank study emphasises, however, that there
is no value in providing large amounts of money to
countries with poor policy, even “if it technically com-
mits to the conditions of a reform program. Providing
adjustments loans to governments not serious about
reforms has been a major recent problem of foreign
aid” (World Bank 1998a:58). The focus has to be on
supporting reform, not on disbursing money. That dis-
bursement for its own sake has been a dominant fea-
ture of aid will also be argued in this study.
2.2 Norwegian policy on conditionality
It should be unnecessary to repeat: aid has never been
given unconditionally. The major difference with
today’s new conditionalites is their scope and exten-
sion, and the way in which they intrude into domestic
policy-making. For the like-minded countries the
adoption of this new conditionality policy meant a
shift from the basic principles that had guided their aid
policy. It represented a less dramatic shift for those
powers that had been driven primarily by strategic
interests (Stokke 1995:163).
Norwegian aid policy seems characterised by continu-
ity from White Paper no. 36 (1984–85) via White
Paper no. 34 (1986–87), Recommendation no. 186
(1986–87), White Paper no. 51 (1991–92), White
Paper no. 19 (1995–96) to the presentation of the new
government’s aid policy by Hilde Frafjord Johnson.9
The main goals and strategies for Norwegian aid have
been reiterated in these policy documents. Both the
previous Labour government and the current centrist
coalition government emphasise human rights, democ-
ratisation, good governance and economic reform as
main objective and integral parts of Norway’s aid pol-
icy. Nevertheless, with the 1980s and 1990s there
came a gradual change and adjustment to an “interna-
tional conditionality regime”, which in a longer time
perspective represents a fundamental departure from
earlier policy principles.
What was new in the 1980s and in the 1990s was the
change of attitude towards explicit interference in the
internal affairs of recipient countries in terms of
national economic policy, good governance, democrat-
isation and human rights (White Paper no. 51 1991–
92:184). While the 1984 White Paper abandoned the
position from 1971,10 it nevertheless demonstrated
9 Statement to the Norwegian Parliament, 5 May 1998. The new
government has not issued a new White Paper on foreign aid,
but has largely followed the main lines in White Paper no. 19
(1995–96).
10 See White Paper no. 29 (197172).
18
reluctance towards unnecessary interference in a part-
ner country’s domestic affairs. By 1992 (White Paper
no. 51 1991–92:50) this reluctance was replaced by an
acceptance of the weakening of the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs, and the increasing
salience of conditionality.11
As early as in 1984, the promotion of civil and politi-
cal, as well as economic, social and cultural human
rights had been made one of five main goals for Nor-
wegian aid (White Paper no. 36 1984–85). Human
rights observance and democracy were viewed as pre-
requisites for economic and social development
(White Paper no. 19 1995–96:6). In the late 1980s,
after the end of the Cold War, a series of policy state-
ments were made by different donors, stressing human
rights and democracy as main goals in development
co-operation. Continued aid flows were made more
dependent on the human rights record and the democ-
ratisation process at the recipient end.
The stronger emphasis on human rights and democra-
tisation was expressed in White Paper no. 19 (1995–
96:11), and even more so by the current government.12
There has been a broad consensus among the political
parties to give these issues a prominent position in
Norwegian development assistance. Positive measures
have been the main instrument for achieving these
goals. Already in 1985 (White Paper no. 36 1984–85)
support in the form of positive measures was outlined
as the main strategy. In 1991 (White Paper no. 51
1991–92:214) this was reiterated:
[...] the government will continue to put the main
emphasis on positive measures to promote
human rights and democracy, both bilaterally
and multilaterally. Aid should be designed in
such a way that it contributes to supporting and
stimulating the further strengthening of the
human rights system, the rule of law and
democratic institutions. Development co-opera-
tion within this field should also be characteri-
sed by comprehensiveness and a long-term
policy [author’s translation].
Norwegian policy documents have underscored that
aid must not be used as an instrument for “rewarding”
some governments and “punishing” others (White
Paper no. 36 1984–85:118). It has been stressed that
development objectives and strategies have to be for-
mulated in a policy dialogue between donor and recip-
ient. The current government has reconfirmed this
11 This seems to be the only place in the White Papers the word
“conditionality” has been used explicitly, albeit in brackets.
12 Minister of International Development and Human Rights,
Hilde Frafjord Johnson, statement to the Storting on Human
Rights, 22 January 1998, and statement to the Storting on devel-
opment co-operation policy, 5 May 1998.
2. A CHANGE IN NORWEGIAN AID POLICY?
position, in its efforts to strengthen human rights and
democratisation “through persuasion and practical
measures” rather than “sanctions and penalties”.13
Nevertheless, even back in 1984 there were openings
for exceptions, though confined to extreme cases: only
in certain serious circumstances could the Norwegian
government, as a last resort, terminate, reduce, or
modify its aid. This would be when
a government of a country takes part in, tolerates
or directly perpetrates violations of human
rights; when these violations are systematic;
when government efforts to end the abuse and
bring the perpetrators to justice are lacking; and
when the violations are gross and extensive
(White Paper no. 36 1985–84:118, author’s
translation).
This has also been the attitude of the current centrist
government. It has, however, opened up for a slightly
different approach in “extreme cases”: applying posi-
tive measures, and reserving negative conditionality as
a final alternative:
Unfortunately, however, we occasionally have
reason to react against violations of civil and
political rights in a partner country. One exam-
ple is the Palestinian areas, where we have
repeatedly raised the issue of human rights vio-
lations. In such situations we first consider
increasing the amount of assistance for human
rights measures. This will also serve as a signal
to the recipient country. If this is not possible, we
must consider other measures such as shifting
the focus of or reducing the total amount of
assistance to the country, withholding part of the
assistance or, in extreme cases, discontinuing co-
operation altogether. This is, of course, a
response that we wish to avoid. It is therefore
important to make our views clear to the recipi-
ent country, and to maintain a continuous dia-
logue.14
The Norwegian policy on economic reform and condi-
tionality is even more haphazardly treated in official
policy documents and is not seen in connection with
political reforms. Even though economic conditional-
ity is often labelled “the first generation of condition-
ality”, it seems more appropriate to see it as the second
13 Minister of International Development and Human Rights,
Hilde Frafjord Johnson, statement to the Storting on develop-
ment co-operation policy, 5 May 1998.
14 Minister of International Development and Human Rights,
Hilde Frafjord Johnson, “The government’s efforts to promote
human rights”, statement to the Storting on Human Rights, 22
January 1998.
2. A CHANGE IN NORWEGIAN AID POLICY?
generation of conditionality in the Norwegian context,
as least as far as operationalisation is concerned.
Despite the change of Norwegian policy towards Tan-
zania in the mid-1980s, which had wide implications
of principle, the issue was not discussed in the 1984
White Paper. In White Paper no. 36 (1984–85) no
mention is made of the change of the Norwegian posi-
tion on economic reforms and conditionality. How-
ever, it was stated that Norwegian aid could be a
means to support the crisis-ridden economies, through
support to balance of payments and imports. It was
underscored, however, that regardless of the nature of
the measure used, the aim would still be to help the
recipient government to implement its national pro-
gramme and to support the country’s foreign currency
supply (White Paper no. 36 1984–85:113).
The initial Norwegian scepticism towards structural
adjustment programmes had definitely changed by the
early 1990s: “ [...] there is in the beginning of the
1990s considerable agreement between Norwegian
policy and the international conditions attached to
aid”15 (White Paper no. 51 1991–91:185). The World
Bank’s crucial role as co-ordinator of structural adjust-
ment programmes and donor support for their imple-
mentation was stressed particularly, and the CG
15 Author’s translation.
19
meetings were given a prominent role in this regard
(White Paper no. 51 1991–91:186). A general policy
of support to the World Bank and IMF “conditionality
regime” was mentioned, but not discussed in depth in
Norwegian policy papers. The difficult trade-off
between different conditions was not dealt with, nor
that there might be cases where Norway would not be
in line with the prescriptions of the World Bank and
the IMF. It was noted that contributing to the imple-
mentation of structural adjustment programmes was
important, and that Norway would work actively to
ameliorate the adverse effects on the social sectors
during the reform process (White Paper no. 51 1991–
92:196,201). Potential sanctions in the form of with-
drawal or aid freeze were not discussed at all. It was
only stated that the choice was not between adjustment
or no adjustment, but of being with or without the sup-
port of the IMF and the World Bank (White Paper no.
51 1991–92:49). The new government has continued
this line. Frafjord Johnson has stated that we must
impose conditions and be critical in the choice of part-
ner countries and forms of co-operation, but the recipi-
ent countries must be in the lead.16 This statement
illustrates very well the bilateral donor’s dilemma (cf.
discussion above ).
16 Minister of International Development and Human Rights,
Hilde Frafjord Johnson, “Bistand – makt eller avmakt? Bidrar
vi til varig forandring?”, speech made at a regional aid confer-
ence in Stavanger, 18 February 1999.
20
3. The Tanzanian context
3.1 The Nyerere era
In contrast to most African countries, Tanzania had
comparative advantages, or as Gilbert Rist (1997:127)
calls them: “two trump cards”. Firstly, at independence
Tanzania was a country of relative social homogeneity,
in the sense that more than 80 per cent of the popula-
tion lived in the countryside. None of the 120 different
ethnic groups dominated the others, and with Kiswa-
hili as the predominant language of communication –
a lingua franca – it was possible to build a common
Tanzanian identity. Secondly, in President Julius
Nyerere, who had led Tanzania to independence, the
country had a widely respected leader – not only in
Tanzania but also among donors and generally on the
international scene. He was respectfully referred to as
Mwalimu – “the teacher”. Even people in the World
Bank and its former leader, Robert McNamara, were
among his admirers, and actively supported Nyerere’s
initial policy. Tanzania was by many seen as a labora-
tory for testing an original idea that ought to be given
generous backing.
In the 1960s the predominant development paradigm
embraced economic growth and investment in a rather
narrow sense. Economic growth and development –
viewed as more or less identical phenomena – were
seen as a mere question of technical expertise and
knowledge. Advice on matters of capital accumulation
and investment was expected to produce the well-
known trickle-down effect.
In this regard, Nyerere was ahead of his time. In
Nyerere’s philosophy, the point was not to reach the
stage of mass consumption in Rostow’s theory of the
stages of economic growth, which was a dominant the-
ory at the time. Instead, Nyerere subscribed to a form
of “willing austerity based upon discipline at work and
equality of distribution” (Rist 1997:131). He did focus
on economic growth, but based his development strat-
egy on self-reliance and redistribution, making clear
his commitment to a war against poverty. He was also
very early aware of the danger of being too dependent
on aid, which he emphasised in the famous Arusha
Declaration of 5 February 1967:
[...] but it is obvious that in the past we have
chosen the wrong weapons for our struggle,
because we chose money as our weapon. We are
trying to overcome our economic weakness by
using the weapons of the economically strong –
weapons which in fact we do not possess. It is
therefore a complete illusion to think that money
will solve the problems, for the simple reason
3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT
that it is not available; it comes from taxes, and
these cannot be increased.
Nyerere went on to say that he did not believe that for-
eign assistance could solve Tanzania’s problems: “It is
stupid to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our
poverty through foreign financial assistance rather
than our own financial resources” (Arusha Declara-
tion).
In the Arusha Declaration he also stressed that
“[f]oreign aid is a danger to independence … even if it
were possible for us to get enough money for our
needs from external resources, is this what we really
want? Independence means self-reliance”. Nyerere
further asserted that “there is no country in the world
which is prepared to give us gifts and loans, or estab-
lish industries, to the extent that we would be able to
achieve all our development targets”.
However, Tanzania’s development goals have not been
achieved. The average Tanzanian today has the same
standard of living as in 1965 (Paldam 1997:95).
Nyerere had underestimated international willingness
to support his country. The disbursement of aid from
various donor countries has been generous. Few Afri-
can countries have received as much development
assistance as Tanzania. And yet, in 1998 Tanzania was
ranked as the third poorest country in the world
(Human Development Report 1998).
Tanzania’s first development plan for the period 1960–
65 relied on nearly 80 per cent donor funding, almost
half of it from Britain: a new form of domination
through giving (Rist 1997:126, 134). In 1977, Tanza-
nia’s development budget was funded by international
aid to the tune of 60 per cent. According to Gilbert
Rist, in the end, “it was the sympathy evoked by the
Tanzanian experience which helped to bring about its
downfall” (Rist 1997:133). In 1990–91 Tanzania was
second only to Mozambique in its dependence on aid
from DAC countries (EIU 1997:28). Today, the admir-
ers of Tanzania are fewer and the money flow in terms
of aid has decreased, due to poor economic results in
Tanzania and the generally shrinking aid budgets in
many donor countries. In 1997, the OECD countries
reached their lowest aid/GDP ratio since the 1950s; it
would now take an approximately 50 per cent increase
just to return to the 1991 level (World Bank 1998a:2).
What went wrong? Was it due to aid, too much aid,
bad aid, wrong strategies, bad implementation – or
was it not related to aid at all? Was the problem bad
3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT
governance, or was it a case of force majeure, and
therefore beyond the control of both the Tanzanian
government and the donor countries? Or perhaps it
was a combination of all these factors which placed
Tanzania in this unfortunate position? In view of how
much effort the donor countries have contributed in
terms of money and expertise, many have been
tempted to characterise the development efforts in
Tanzania as one of the greatest aid fiascos in Africa.
That is, of course, a counter-factual question: one is
faced with a “chicken and egg problematique” in judg-
ing how Tanzania would have fared without aid. It
might well be that Tanzania would have been even
worse off.
3.2 Main trends in economic development
and reform
In the 1980s and 1990s Tanzania has been in a process
of more or less continuous economic reform (EIU
1997:13). Economic decline and the severe macro-
economic imbalance of the late 1970s and early 1980s
triggered a process of reform process. In comparison
with the period 1970–76, when the annual growth rate
was 5.1 per cent, the growth rate dropped to 1.2 per
cent during 1980–85. There was also a decline in the
annual growth rate in per capita income from 1.9 per
cent to –1.0 per cent during the same period. By 1984
the inflation rate had reached 44 per cent, in addition
to rising external and international deficits (Bagachwa
et al. 1997:169). But, as Michael Chege puts it, in con-
trast to many other countries in the region, in Tanzania
the development efforts have “been paved with the
best of intention” (Chege 1994:266). Intellectual and
politicians have disagreed as to what were the decisive
factors leading to the crisis, but the gravity of the “mis-
takes” has been admitted (Lofchie 1989).
In the early 1980s the Government of Tanzania (GoT)
took some hesitant steps towards reform (Chege
1994:273). Aimed at mobilising domestic resources,
the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP)
was implemented in 1981–82. In 1982–85 a Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) was adopted; this
involved internal and external trade liberalisation,
budget and investment cuts and a limited devaluation.
But these efforts were too weak to trigger any eco-
nomic turnabout. Only 35 per cent of the expected for-
eign aid support to the SAP was forthcoming
(Bagachwa 1997:170; Chege 1994). Donors were
sceptical about the GoT’s willingness to address the
real problems, and reduced their aid sharply in the
early 1980s (see figure 5).
The failure of NESP and SAP, further economic dete-
rioration, growing discontent among the general pub-
lic, and pressure from the donor community all led to
21
Nyerere’s resignation as President in 1985. This in
turn made concessions to market-driven solutions pos-
sible. Many donors, also those that had supported Tan-
zania when the country did not have an agreement
with the IMF, confronted Tanzania in the mid-1980s
with an ultimatum: continued aid would be conditional
on concluding such an agreement.
In 1986 the GoT signed an agreement with the World
Bank and IMF, and the Economic Recovery Pro-
gramme (ERP) was adopted, fully supported by the
new President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Within the govern-
ment there was no consensus on the need to move to a
more liberal, market-based economy. But according to
Darius Mans (1994:354) these first reform pro-
grammes helped “jumpstart the stagnant economy,
[and] the role of more reform-minded technocrats
increased significantly by the late 1980s” (Mans
1994:354).
The main objective of the reform programme was to
design a macro-economic framework for gradual
growth recovery in real income. This programme
included further devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling,
monetary restraint, reform of the foreign exchange
allocation system, price control, parastatal reform,
financial sector reform, liberalisation of agricultural
marketing, and civil service reform (Bagachwa et al.
1997:170). This led to increased bilateral and multilat-
eral aid, as shown in figure 5 below, and debt resched-
uling. Aid flows to Tanzania have been strongly
influenced by concerns in the donor community. In
1986 IMF gave a stand-by credit and the World Bank
supported the ERP. In 1989–92, the Economic and
Social Action Programme (ESAP or ERP II) was
adopted, in order to consolidate ERP and to seek to
mitigate the negative social impact of the reforms. A
three-year Rolling Plan and Forward Budget (RPFB)
replaced ESAP in 1992. The RPFB was intended to
hasten the pace of the reform process, but also to “rea-
lign the government with its basic role of maintaining
law and order and providing social services”
(Bagachwa 1997:170).
The relationship with the IMF has often been strained.
In 1994 renewed IMF support was put on hold, as the
1994/95 budget had veered off course and the scandal
of dubious tax exemptions emerged in late 1994. An
IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)
credit that expired in June 1994 was only half used and
later withdrawn. A new ESAF credit was not granted
until November 1996. Protesting against corruption in
the form of tax exemptions on a scale with apparent
macro-economic significance, many bilateral donors
suspended some of their aid (cf. discussion in Chapter
5).
22 3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT

In January 1996 the GoT established a Shadow Pro-
gramme, which was a reform programme but without
the financial support of IMF. Because of the govern-
ment’s budgetary overruns, which had thwarted the
Bank of Tanzania’s control of monitory aggregates and
inflation, a cash-budget system was adopted: the
amounts released depended on revenue collection in
the previous month.
In the 1997 the GoT announced that the number of
civil servants would be reduced and public-sector hir-
ing frozen. These decisions were unpopular with the
Tanzanian public, but due to the perennial BoP prob-
lem, there seemed few credible alternatives to the
IMF-backed reforms (EIU 1997:13). Even though
Tanzania still faces many problems, Mans (1994:355)
states that the reform programme has, nevertheless,
dramatically turned the country’s economic perform-
ance. Tanzania is better off now than at the onset of the
crisis, but has not yet recovered from the crisis of the
late 1970s. The growth rate has improved since the
early 1980s, as illustrated in figure 1 below. In 1998
average real growth was 3.8 per cent; and according to
EIU’s forecast this figure will increase in 1999 and
2000, depending on the weather conditions (EIU
1998:3)

Figure 117

Growth in per cent

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

The reform process has not made Tanzania less dependent
on aid. Many donor reports conclude that Tanzania
appears more dependent on aid than ever before. One of
the long-term goals of the GoT has been to reduce Tanza-
nia’s dependence on foreign aid. This is partly driven by
an awareness that the aid flows from some countries are
decreasing. The figures below indicate, however, that aid
dependence is still high.
In 1992 the share of aid in Tanzania’s GDP was nearly 30
per cent. The percentage seems to have dropped slightly
in 1996, but in the last two years it has been increasing
again. In 1995 net disbursement of official development
assistance amounted to 24 per cent of GDP (EIU
1997:28).

17 The statistical data used in this report, and all the figures in this chapter, are based on data from various editions of IMF’s International Financial
Flows and OECD’s annual reports, Geographical Distribution to Developing Countries, when nothing else is specified. The figures for GDP and
GDP growth are based on the author’s own calculations, due to lack of comparable statistics for such a long period. It might have been preferable
to also make use of official Tanzanian statistics, in order to compare various sources, but because different and comparable figures were needed
over a relatively long time-frame, and the fact that Tanzanian data are based on fiscal and not calendar years, the two sources mentioned above
were chosen. Another possible source of error is that some IMF figures are given in shillings and some in dollars. All the figures have been con-
verted into dollars here.
3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT 23

Figure 218

ODA as percentage of GDP

35
30

25
20
15
10

5
0
79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

Tanzania’s debt burden is still heavy, despite an agree-
ment in 1997 with the Paris Club to write off US$1bn
of the debt due for repayment in the three years up to
November 1999, and to reschedule the remainder for
servicing over a 23-year period. According to the
World Bank’s Global Development Finance, Tanza-
nia’s external debt in 1995 was equivalent to 207 per
cent of its GNP and 585 per cent of its exports of
goods and services (EIU 1997:28).
During the reform period the development of eco-
nomic and social infrastructure has been neglected, as
well as investment in human capital. For example, pri-
mary school enrolment fell from 98 per cent in 1981 to
76 per cent in 1988 (Chege 1994:274).
This was followed by the adoption of the current
economic recovery program with its market-
based production priorities, which have been
achieved at the expense of increasing income
inequalities and the virtual collapse of the
government-provided social services – especially
health and education – introduced in the 1960s.
(Chege 1994: 273)
In the 1990s increased attention has been given to
these issues. Reform within in the public sector has
been given special attention, as well as socio-eco-
nomic issues.
19
According to Darius Mans (1994:412) the most impor-
tant lesson learned from the reform process in Tanza-
nia has been that the country must focus on adjustment
and not only on economic recovery. Mans states that
Tanzania needs significant structural changes, includ-
ing in public institutions, such as the civil service and
parastatals. Another important lesson, according to
Mans, is that the reform process should have focussed
more on social sectors. The social sectors are in crisis:
“Tanzania’s experience shows the limits of macroeco-
nomic policy reforms aimed at stabilisation and price
reforms if the necessary microeconomic foundations
are not in place” (Mans 1994:413).
3.3 Main trends in political development and
reform
The transition period after Nyerere’s resignation was
smooth and peaceful. The selection of Mwinyi as his
successor was regarded as a compromise between
Rashidi Kawawa, the powerful Secretary General of
the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and
the then Prime Minister, Salim Ahmed Salim. Despite
increasing disrest on Zanzibar since the early 1980s –
largely due to what has been seen as excessive control
exercised by the mainland over the island’s affairs, and
growing dissatisfaction among ordinary people caused
by economic decline – the political atmosphere in Tan-
zania has been calm compared to most other African

18 When aid is referred to in this report, aid is defined as ODA: this refers to financial flows comprising grants plus concessional loans that have at
least a 25 percent grant component from the governments of developed countries and multilateral agencies to the developing world (World Bank
1998:6). It might be argued that other financial flows also should be included, but this share is so minimal that it seems unnecessary to have a sep-
arate graph for such flows (see International Financial Statistics). A recent paper by Charles Chang et al. (1998) questions conventionally used
measures of aid such as ODA, which lump together grants and loans, and then present it as reflecting true aid flows. Chang et al. propose a new
measure for aid: “Effective Development Assistance”, which measures official aid as the sum of grants and the grant equivalents of official loans.
EDA for Tanzania has not been available, but the discrepancy between ODA and EDA in general is much smaller for Africa than Latin America
and Asia. For Africa in general EDA is 10% less than ODA (ibid).
24
countries. The country has had a fairly independent
judiciary and a relatively good human rights record.
Nevertheless, the US Department of State (1996)
reports that the police commit human rights abuses
regularly. It is also reported that arbitrary arrest and
prolonged detention continues, and that the judicial
system is inefficient and corrupt.
In April 1990, a Presidential Commission started its
work of eliciting public opinion on the return to a mul-
tiparty system. This was in response to external pres-
sure and the general winds of change. Despite the pro-
reform pressure group, the National Committee for
Constitutional Reform, there was no credible opposi-
tion to the CCM on the mainland. The conclusion of
the Nyalali Report, named after the Commission’s
chairman, Chief Justice Francis Nyalali, was over-
whelmingly supportive of the status quo. B.U
Mwansasu (1996:71) explains this by the fact that Tan-
zania has had a long tradition of one-party dominance,
“where the very notion of organised opposition was
considered treacherous and, therefore, something no
patriotic citizen could associate with”. Nevertheless,
political reforms were effected, and the single-party
era came to an end in June 1992. A multiplicity of
opposition groups emerged, but there was little evi-
dence of any real threat to the CCM’s position, except
on Zanzibar.
From time to time the political peace has been stirred a
little, as when a group of parliamentarians forced
through a motion calling for the establishment of a
separate mainland government in 1993. Nyerere inter-
vened and the CCM dropped the initiative. In 1994 the
labour movement, Tanzania Trade Unions (OTTO), for
the first time showed signs of being an independent
political force, when a brief general strike was organ-
ised over minimum wage legislation.
Mwinyi’s Presidency was regarded as weak and
accused of mushrooming corruption. Nyerere con-
demned him for incompetence and also criticised the
economic reform process under his rule as an
“unplanned retreat from socialism” (EIU 1995:7). The
final term of Mwinyi was riddled with political scan-
dals. The GoT was also condemned by donors for
“irregular activities” by the Ministry of Finance (EIU
1997:7).
Also after the multiparty election in 1995, Tanzania
and Zanzibar remained under the rule of the CCM. In
the presidential election the CCM candidate, Benjamin
Mkapa, was backed by Nyerere; he was elected and
given the mandate to appoint the “third-phase” govern-
ment.19 Mkapa won the elections with a comfortable
margin, garnering 63 per cent of the vote, while
3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT
Augustine Mreme mustered 27.8 per cent, Ibrahim
Lipumba 6.4 per cent and John Cheyo 4 per cent.
The elections were characterised as dubious, and vot-
ing in Dar es Salaam was postponed three weeks.
When the election results in seven constituencies in
Dar es Salaam were cancelled, the opposition refused
to repeat the poll. An unsuccessful petition to nullify
the election results was delivered to the High Court.
But, according to most sources, there seems little
doubt that Mkapa was desired by a majority of voting
Tanzanians. However, the other political parties con-
tested on very unequal terms. The CCM enjoyed privi-
leged access to state radio as well as having the
advantage of incumbency.
In recent years, the ties which hold the Tanzanian state
together seem to have loosened. In the process of
political liberalisation, divisions have emerged in Tan-
zania as in many other African countries. There has
been increasing division between the mainland and the
islands; between Muslims and Christians; between the
indigenous groups and Asians; and between Zanziba-
ris of African and of Arab ancestry.
The CCM has declared its intention to transform itself
into a political mass party. It has also embraced mar-
ket-based economic reforms and a multiparty political
system, but the slogans of socialism and self-reliance
from the Nyerere era seem to be alive and well, and
large factions within the party appear unconvinced of
the blessings of liberalising reforms.
Even though more than a dozen new political parties
have been registered they have failed to form a united
front capable of challenging the CCM hegemony
(Mwansasu 1996:67). Most parties seem driven by
personal political ambitions or led by old-breed CCM
politicians – or “yesterday people” as Mwansasu
(ibid.) calls them. Nevertheless, a few half-hearted
unification initiatives have been taken. The opposition
groups do not seem to have achieved nation-wide sup-
port, with perhaps a few exceptions. The National
Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-
Mageuzi) has since 1995 been led by the former dep-
uty Prime Minister, Agustine Mreme. The other par-
ties are the Kamati ya Mageuzi Huru, United
Democratic Party (UDP), which enjoys support partic-
ularly from Tanzania’s largest ethnic group, the
Sukuma.20 The Civic United Front (CUF) has been
characterised as an unhappy marriage of convenience
between the mainland-based Chama Cha Wananchi
and the powerful Zanzibari opposition.
19 Mkapa’s “third phase” government followed Mwinyi’s “second
phase” and Nyerere’s “first phase” government.
20 Nevertheless, the Sukuma constitute less than one fourth of the
poulation.
3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT
The political situation on Zanzibar has perhaps been
the hottest political issue in recent years. The 1995
elections on Zanzibar were heavily criticised. Interna-
tional observers found serious irregularities in the poll-
ing process, and questioned the re-election of the then
CCM president on Zanzibar, Salmin Amour Juma (US
Department of State 1996). The Zanzibari government
has also been accused of harassing the opposition.
Thus, the elected CUF MPs decided to boycott the par-
liament.
After the flawed elections, large sections of the donor
community responded by adopting negative condition-
ality. Norway decided not to assist new projects on
Zanzibar until a solution was found to the political
problem on the island. This has been a most difficult
case, not only for the Union Government, but also for
the donor community, which has applied a kind of par-
tial conditionality towards the island while maintain-
ing a normal aid relationship with the mainland. The
situation has changed little since the 1995 elections.
There seems to have been a tacit understanding
between the donor community and the GoT to refrain
from exerting too much pressure on the Union Gov-
ernment to take action. The Union Government does
not seem to have the power to pressurise the Zanzibari
government into compliance. If it tried, the existing
fissures between Zanzibar and the mainland might
widen, secessionist forces on Zanzibar would be
strengthened, and the future of the Union would be put
in jeopardy. Since the CUF accepted the CCM’s main
demand of recognising Amour’s presidency, it has
been up to the CCM to make the next move. Amour
has sought to make constitutional changes so that he
can run again for the presidency in 2000. Such
changes would be possible only if the boycott of the
parliament by CUF MPs were prolonged. However,
the bulk of the donor community made it clear that aid
flows would be resumed only if there were full politi-
cal reconciliation.
In 1998 eighteen members of the CUF were accused
of staging an external plot to destabilise Zanzibar, but
the prosecution has failed to establish concrete evi-
dence against the detainees. Amour’s intransigence in
proceeding with the trial has irritated the donor com-
munity. Finland, the only Nordic country which main-
tained a bilateral aid programme on the island after the
1995 elections, decided in spring 1999 to withhold fur-
ther aid to Zanzibar until the conflict between the CUF
and the CCM was resolved.
However, the impasse on the archipelagos appeared to
be escalating in the beginning of 1999; leaders of the
CUF and the United Democratic Party (UDP) accused
president Makapa of exacerbating the conflict, failing
to meet the opposition while visiting Pemba, one of
25
the Zanzibari Islands, in March 1999. Nevertheless,
less than two months later, on 4 May, the two parties
signed a preliminary 15-point agreement brokered by
Dr. Moses Anafu, a special envoy of the Common-
wealth Secretary-General Emeka Anyaoku. It was
expected that a final agreement would be signed later
that month. As early as September 1998 Anufu had
drafted an agreement, which was accepted by the CUF.
A committee appointed by the CCM had continued to
work on the agreement and proposed several changes
to its content. Thus, in spring 1999 Anufu thought that
the parties had moved so much closer that it was
worthwhile to resume mediation. The result was an
agreed memorandum between the CCM and the CUF,
where it was stated that the parties had realised that if
the impasse was allowed to continue, it would exacer-
bate social divisions, retard the orderly socio-eco-
nomic development of Zanzibar, and undermine the
nascent democracy:
CCM and CUF have therefore agreed to put the
past behind them and in the higher interest of
Zanzibar, to work together in a spirit of national
reconciliation to consolidate democracy in Zan-
zibar, promote human rights and good gover-
nance and ensure that the elections scheduled
for the year 2000 and all other subsequent elec-
tions are free of controversy and in which the
will of the electorate will be respected.21
The agreement proscribed that the CUF endorsed
President Salmin Amour as the winner of the 1995
elections and ended its boycott of the Zanzibar House
of Representatives (East African 12 May 1999). A
presidentially appointed assessor is to implement the
agreement, and to judge the validity of the claims and
advice on the nature and scope of redress. It has also
been agreed to scrap the current Zanzibar Electoral
Commission and replace it with an independent body
with members of both parties. Many disputes remain
to be solved. The 18 opposition members of the CUF
are still in jail; their release was not part of the agree-
ment. The critical point will be the implementation
phase. This agreement should be greeted with guarded
optimism.
Another hot political potato has been the allegation of
corruption. In his election campaign Mkapa promised
a crusade against high-level corruption. In January
1996 a former Prime Minister, Joseph Warioba, was
appointed to chair a presidential commission of
enquiry into official corruption. The Warioba Report
concluded that corruption was widespread. In Decem-
ber 1996 the Minister of Finance, Simon Mbilinyi,
resigned and so did the Minister of Housing, Juma
21 Agreed Memorandum Between Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)
and the Civic United Front (CUF).
26
Ngasongwa. The problem of corruption has been more
or less constantly on the political agenda in recent
years. Lately it has been extensively covered in a more
critical and open Tanzanian press. But the govern-
ment’s commitment to abolish corruption from public
life seems to be faltering (World Bank 1998). Many
are disappointed that Mkapa has not proven tougher in
dealing with corruption. However, others seem to
think that he has gone as far as he can in the circum-
stances, which has been to survey the extent of the
problem. Still others think that he should have been
much harder, because his position would not be threat-
ened. In 1998, the GoT launched a renewed campaign
against corruption, but the recommendations from the
Warioba Report of 1997 have yet to be implemented.
When in 1998 Mkapa reshuffled his cabinet, many saw
this as an opportunity to get rid of some politicians
with a dubious reputation. But the shake-up seemed
rather to be “preservation and even enhancement of
the position of ethnic and regional parties in the upper
echelons of the government” (EIU 1998:3). Govern-
ment critics have pronounced it a tactical move to
secure Mkapa’s re-election in 2000.
Another politically sensitive issue has been President
Mkapa’s elusiveness on the question of constitutional
reform. He has insisted on grassroots participation in
the reform process, but the opposition accuses him of
trying to create a quasi-dictatorial neo-socialist state.
Even former President Nyerere has articulated concern
about the reforms.
3.4 ODA to Tanzania
Nyerere’s ujamaa philosophy met with great enthusi-
asm and admiration among the Nordic countries. Sam-
uel Mushi (1995:226) characterises the Nordic
admiration as “Tanzaphilia”, which has been recipro-
cated by “Nordiphilia” in Tanzania. Norwegian devel-
opment assistance to Tanzania commenced in 1962,
but an extensive country programme was elaborated
only later. The first bilateral agreement was signed in
1966 and was limited to Norwegian economic support
for a vaccination programme in Mbulu, in the Arusha
3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT
region (Tanzania Country Study and Aid Review
1988:200). In 1968 a more extensive agreement was
signed. From the 1960s to 1983 there was a substantial
increase in total bilateral aid to Tanzania. In 1984–85
there was a decrease in total bilateral aid, until the vol-
ume started to rise again after Tanzania reached an
agreement with the IMF in 1986 (Tanzania Country
Study and Aid Review 1988:201).
Tanzania has been a major recipient of Norwegian aid.
From 1962–1970 Tanzania’s share in total Norwegian
bilateral aid constituted only 6.5 per cent, but from
1973 Tanzania became the largest single recipient of
Norwegian development assistance. In 1972 Tanza-
nia’s share in Norwegian bilateral aid accounted for
11.3 per cent, and reached 17.4 per cent in 1983 (Tan-
zania Country Study and Aid Review 1988:201). In
1990 Tanzania received as much as 20 per cent of total
Norwegian bilateral aid.
In 1987, the Norwegian researcher Tore Linné Eriksen
wrote:
Tanzania’s time as a popular co-operation country
seems definitely to be gone. Instead, “aid fatigue” is
discernible, and seems to be noticeable among politi-
cians and the administrative leadership of the Ministry
of Development Co-operation. Those who are first and
foremost preoccupied with the “effectiveness” of aid
do not have so many projects to refer to. For the pri-
vate sector Tanzania is not very attractive, and the
more radical part of public opinion is more concerned
with southern Africa and Latin America. In sum, this
has resulted in Tanzania having lost its special place
in Norwegian development co-operation (Eriksen
1987:132, author’s translation).
But even if the Norwegian Tanzania enthusiasts may
have become disillusioned, and Tanzania’s share in
total Norwegian bilateral aid decreased somewhat in
the 1990s, Tanzania remains one of the biggest and
most important recipients of Norwegian aid. Volumes
of Norwegian aid to Tanzania from 1979 to 1996 are
shown in figure 3 below.
3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT 27

Figure 3

Norwegian bilateral aid to Tanzania

120

100
Millions of USD

80

60

40

20

0
1979

1980
1981

1982

1983

1984

1985
1986

1987

1988

1989
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994
1995

There was an increase in the flow of Norwegian aid to
Tanzania in 1997 and 1998, but there will probably be
a slight reduction in 1999 (Cf. NORAD’s Plan of
Operation in Tanzania for 1999).
Trends in the volume of Norwegian aid to Tanzania in
this period have largely followed the trends in the aid
volume from the Nordic bloc as a whole. In the period
under study, Sweden has been the largest single donor
to Tanzania. From 1979 to 1994, except for the years
1980, 1987 and 1992, Sweden ranked as the biggest
bilateral donor to Tanzania. Since 1994 Japan has
occupied this position. The scaling down of Swedish
aid has been particularly dramatic, especially in view
of the fact that Swedish aid for more than 20 years has
accounted for more half of total Nordic aid.
Apart from in 1989, Norway was the second or third
largest donor to Tanzania from 1983 to 1991. But in
1996 Norway had dropped to seventh place. From
1979 to 1996 the Norwegian share in total bilateral aid
to Tanzania has fluctuated between 7.67 and 13.96 per
cent. In 1996 this figure was down to 9 per cent. How-
ever, if the multilateral aid component is added, the
Norwegian share in Tanzania’s total aid has been 5 per
1996
cent in the period 1995–98 (NORAD’s Plan of Opera-
tion in Tanzania for 1999).
In 1986 the Nordic bloc was responsible for as much
as 50.95 per cent of total bilateral aid to Tanzania.
After 1986 the Nordic bloc’s share in total aid to Tan-
zania was reduced. In 1980 and in 1985 the Nordic
share in total bilateral aid receipts was 32.91 and 39
per cent, respectively. In 1987 the figure was not more
than 32 per cent, but climbed in 1991 to a peak of
46.91 per cent, dropping to 28.38 per cent in 1995, and
then rising to 36.31 per cent in 1996.
If the figure for Nordic aid is compared to total bilat-
eral and multilateral aid, the Nordic countries have
largely followed a similar pattern, but the fluctuations
have not been as dramatic. In the early 1980s the Nor-
dic countries maintained their aid levels; when the
total aid volume to Tanzania peaked in 1992 at US
$1343 mill., the Nordic countries decreased their aid
volume. The top year for the Nordic bloc was 1990
with US $382 mill., and from then on the level
decreased in 1991 to US $358.3 mill. and to a mere US
$166 mill. in 1995.
28 3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT

Figure 4

ODA to Tanzania

1600

1400

1200
Millions of USD

1000
Nordic block
800 Tot bil
600 Tot m+b

400

200

0
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995

Bilateral donors have contributed the largest share of als, as illustrated in figure 5 below. But even though
aid to Tanzania even if the multilateral aid has aid from bilateral donors represents a large proportion
increased in recent years. In 1996 the contribution of all aid to Tanzania, the World Bank and the IMF
from bilateral donors was double that of the multilater- seem to have much more clout regarding the GoT.

Figure 5

O D A to
ODA to Tanzania
T a n za n ia

900

800

700

600
Millions of USD

500
Tot
T o t multi
m ulti
400 Tot
T o t bil
b il

300

200

100

0
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT
Goals for Norwegian aid to Tanzania
In the 1970s Norwegian assistance was predominantly
channelled to individual projects. It was a guiding
principle that support should be allocated to areas
where Norway had special competence, so Norwegian
assistance concentrated on coastal transport, fisheries
and hydropower development. In the 1980s the nature
of Norwegian assistance changed in response to the
economic crisis. Commodity Assistance Support was
introduced in order to increase Tanzania’s capacity to
import raw materials to support agriculture and other
key sectors (Tanzania Country Study and Norwegian
Aid Review 1988:204). In the 1980s Norway gave low
priority to social sectors, whereas productive sectors
and physical infrastructure were given high priority
(ibid: 205). In the 1980s aid also spread to new areas.
Despite increased attention to human rights in the
1980s, there was no particular focus on political and
civil rights, with the exception of the rights of women.
An action plan for women-oriented co-operation was
formulated in February 1987.
29
Since the late 1980s the overriding objectives have
been economic reconstruction, safeguarding a basic
level of social services, and contributing to responsible
management of resources (MFA 1994:20; White Paper
no. 8 1994–95:68–69). According to NORAD’s strat-
egy there has been a gradual reorientation from pro-
gramme aid to sector aid (NORAD 1992:28).
Since a new country strategy has not yet been com-
pleted, the country strategy for 1994–97 is still the
basis for Norwegian aid activities in Tanzania. Priority
is given to seven main sectors: political reforms,
administrative development, economic development,
education, environment and natural resources, infra-
structure, and AIDS prevention. Political reform and
democratisation are seen as prerequisites and key fac-
tors for sustainable development. Hence, political
reform is considered vital and one of the main areas of
concentration in the aid co-operation between Tanza-
nia and Norway (MFA 1994:33–37). In the plan of
operation for 1997 democratisation is identified as a
priority area.
30 4. CONDITIONALITY, A REVERSED MICRO-MACRO PARADOX AND THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA
4. Conditionality, a reversed micro-macro paradox and the Samaritan’s
dilemma
4.1 Introduction
Before entering the presentation and discussion of the
role of Norway in the aid negotiation processes some
theoretical approaches and perspectives will be drawn
up to serve as a guide through the empirical material.
The ambition is not to solve theoretical problems but
to see how theory can help in shedding some light on a
number of questions. What role is the bilateral donor
playing in the broader aid context? What can a bilat-
eral donor realistically hope to achieve in aid negotia-
tions? How can the role of the bilateral donor be
understood and explained in the context of condition-
ality? What role can Norway play towards a country
like Tanzania in a conditionality context, and how can
one understand the changes in Norwegian policy
towards Tanzania? Does Norway play the same role
and behave consistently in different fora, and if not,
how can this be explained?
Scholars refer to increasing consensus in the donor
community (see e.g. Nelson 1996; Killick 1997 and
1998; Hewitt & Killick 1996). But is this a real con-
sensus, or has the framework for aid changed so much
that there is less room for independent policy positions
on the part of bilateral donors? Is the international aid
agenda and policy to a larger extent determined by the
World Bank? (cf. Killick 1998). If so, perhaps Norway
finds itself in the same position as Canada, as Black
and Therien (1996) have argued. They assert that
Canadian aid policy, particularly towards Africa, is
increasingly defined at the systemic level by the inter-
national aid regime. According to Black and Therien
(1996:259) this “illustrate[s] the growing intensity and
coherence of global governance in this area”. These
issues will be discussed in this chapter.
4.2 In search of an appropriate analytical
framework
The discourse within international relations has often
been stylised and oversimplified in two broad and dif-
fering systemic perspectives: the realist and the inter-
nationalist. In the former perspective, international
relations is a question of self-interest and power, as
“the concept of interests is defined in the terms power”
(Morgenthau 1948). Some base this in human nature,
others in the anarchic structure of the international
system, also labelled neo-realism (e.g. Waltz 1979).
That self-interest matters more and takes priority over
a value-based, more ethical foreign policy is based on
the systemic compulsion of how the international sys-
tem works. Contrasted to this is the internationalist
perspective, which is also a many-faceted school of
thought. Here the state is not seen as the principal
actor. In recognition of international interdependence,
peaceful conflict resolution and co-operation are what
are sought.
How can aid be understood as a policy arena? Is aid a
discrete area disconnected from other foreign policy
concerns, driven by humanitarian and moral concerns
alone? Within the aid discourse we find both the realist
and the internationalist perspectives. At the one
extreme, some argue that aid is just self-interest (e.g.
Griffin 1991), whereas at the other pole there are those
who argue that aid policy is driven by humanitarian
concerns and idealism (Lumsdaine 1993). However,
although an internationalist like David Lumsdaine
admits that economic and political interests do influ-
ence the shaping of a country’s foreign policy, he
claims that, when it comes to aid, these interests have
been of minor importance compared to a humanitarian
conviction. He argues strongly that it was a humanitar-
ian concern which shaped aid and forms the basis of
foreign aid:
Aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of eco-
nomic and political interests alone; the essential
causes lay in the humanitarian and the egalitar-
ian principles of the donor countries (Lumsdaine
1996:30).22
Both these perspectives are stylised and inadequate for
grasping the changes in the aid regimes or understand-
ing the behaviour of bilateral donors. The aid policy of
most countries contains elements of both self-interest
and altruism, although the “mix” will vary from one
set of circumstances to another, and also over time.
These perspectives have often characterised the some-
what polarised Norwegian aid debate, with a strong
normative bent.
Recent research reveals that the aid allocations of
bilateral donors can best be explained by political fac-
tors. Economic and strategic interests are important in
bilateral aid policy, whereas multilateral aid is not so
much influenced by such considerations. Significant
differences have been found between donors. Eco-
nomic and strategic considerations were not important
for a handful of countries: Norway, Sweden, Finland,
22 Lumsdaine’s study is thorough and goes though an enormous
amount of data, but his findings are not convincing. His analysis
ends in 1989, at which point the real changes started.
4. CONDITIONALITY, A REVERSED MICRO-MACRO PARADOX AND THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA
Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada (Alesina and
Dollar 1998; Burnside and Dollar 1997; World Bank
1998a:42). Do these middle-sized and small countries
have particular characteristics which can help to
explain their position in international politics?
The small state in international politics
Many studies of Norwegian foreign policy start by
characterising Norway as a “small state”. But is size at
all a relevant analytical concept in the study of interna-
tional politics? And what is a small state in interna-
tional politics? In academic studies size often refer to
states’ capabilities in terms of resources (see e.g. Keo-
hane 1969; Elman 1995). Thus, even if Norway is a
“big” donor in terms of aid as a percentage of GNP –
indeed, it is often ranked at the top – Norway is still a
small donor in terms of money flows in absolute vol-
umes.
Realist historians and realist political scientists often
argue that the foreign policy of small states is merely a
reflection of the power relations between the super-
powers to which they are allied. According to this per-
spective Norway does not have an independent foreign
policy; it follows in the tracks of the great powers and
adapts to their policies. If we accept this argument,
then any change in Norwegian aid policy is just a
reflection of changes in the aid policy of the bigger
donors.
However, this perspective seems insufficient. How can
we explain that Norway as part of the Nordic bloc
prior to 1984 with regard to Tanzania did not follow
suit with the other major bilateral and multilateral
donors (the World Bank and the IMF)? The Nordic
bloc continued to support Nyerere in defiance of the
multilateral institutions. Is this not an example of
small states taking an independent stand? Or is it per-
haps confirmation of the realist argument: taken
together, the Nordic countries were a big donor at that
point in time (see figure 4 in the previous chapter), by
virtue of which they exercised their power. Has Nor-
way on its own, or jointly with Nordic bloc, lost influ-
ence after the volumes of aid have been reduced?
Might there be some areas of foreign policy where
power relations are manifested in different ways?
There are, according to former Norwegian Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Egeland. In 1988 he
published the book Impotent Superpower – Potent
Small State, in which he argued that in the field of
human rights, power relations are turned upside down.
He then concluded that a small state like Norway can
have far greater influence than the superpowers: 23
On the bilateral and multilateral arena the small
state emerges as a more uncontradicted and
31
approved human rights activist than perhaps any
other (Egeland 1988:73).
Egeland explains this with reference to Norway’s
smallness, its good human rights record and non-colo-
nial past, and that Norway was a dedicated advocate of
the de-colonisation process. Norway’s “good behav-
iour” has given it moral authority. Norway can use its
moral authority to induce bigger states to follow suit.
According to Egeland, the superpowers are con-
strained by overriding strategic and security considera-
tions, because of their military and economic strength.
The small state is free from such considerations.
If there were any truth in Egeland’s argument, surely it
would also be applicable to the area of aid and condi-
tionality. Norway, together with the like-minded
group, is among the few countries to have reached the
UN disbursement target of 0.7 per cent of GNP as
ODA. Norwegian aid has also traditionally been less
tied than that of most other countries. Untied aid is
estimated to increase the output on average by 20 per
cent (World Bank 1998a). The Nordic countries seem
to respond more to the “correct” parameters, e.g.
income levels (Burnside and Dollar 1997). Canadian,
Dutch and Nordic assistance has been shown to be sin-
gularly targeted to poor countries (Alesina and Dollar
1998). For instance, half of Swedish aid has gone to
the 12 poorest countries in the world, weighted by per
capita income. These finding were also supported in a
recent World Bank report (1998:16):
In the Nordic countries, strategic variables –
such as colonial past or United Nations voting
patterns – play almost no part in allocations.
Nordic aid is targeted to the poorest countries,
favouring open economies, and democracy.
In terms of Egeland’s argument, Norway’s commenda-
ble aid record should thus translate into moral author-
ity in the aid policy field.
Norway has not only been a relatively big donor to
Tanzania. The Nordic bloc as a whole has been a big
donor in absolute terms. The Nordic distribution was
particularly substantial in the 1980s. 1986 was the
peak year of Nordic bilateral aid to Tanzania – contrib-
uting as much as 50.95 per cent. From 1985–87 Nor-
way was the second biggest bilateral donor to
Tanzania after Sweden.24 Thus, its “clean aid record”
together with a substantial aid contribution would be
23 It should be noted that it was not until in 1998 that Norway
started work on internalising international human rights conven-
tions to Norwegian law; only when this is completed will inter-
national human rights have priority over Norwegian law.
24 From 1979 to 1994 Sweden was the biggest bilateral donor to
Tanzania except for the years 1980, 1987 and 1992, when the
Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom, respectively, topped
the list.
32 4. CONDITIONALITY, A REVERSED MICRO-MACRO PARADOX AND THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA
expected to give Norway moral authority and power to
influence policy in Tanzania.
In a previous study, linkage diplomacy was used as an
analytical approach to the investigation of different
strategies Norway could use with aid as the principal
tool for promoting human rights and democracy
(Selbervik 1997). Linkage diplomacy is a technique of
influence, whereby one state tries to induce changes in
the behaviour of another state. This is basically the
same mechanism that is found when a donor sues aid
as a tool to influence the policy or behaviour of
another country. The analysis revealed that, regardless
of the nature of the issues involved, the linkage strat-
egy was most effective if the target country – the recip-
ient – wished to identify itself with the initiator state –
the donor – in terms of values or ideology. Between
Tanzania and the Nordic countries there has been a
particularly cordial relationship. Nyerere characterised
the Nordic countries as its “all-weather friends”.
Therefore, applying the argument to the Norway–Tan-
zania aid relationship, Norway’s probability of success
in influencing Tanzania should be high on two
accounts. Although a small donor in general, Norway
is a relatively big donor to Tanzania, particularly when
seen together with the other Nordic countries. Second,
Tanzania and Norway are perceived to share values to
a large extent, at least traditionally; thus Tanzania
would be more likely to identify with the position of
Norway. Together with the “nice guy” argument, there
are many good reasons why Norway would be able to
exert influence on Tanzania.
However, the aid volume of the Nordic bloc has been
dramatically reduced in recent years (see figure 4),
although Norwegian aid has not been reduced as dra-
matically as that of Sweden. Can it be convincingly
argued that Norway’s influence has been reduced
because of diminishing aid? Has Norway’s influence
been further reduced after the Nordics “changed sides”
in favour of an agreement with the IMF? Perhaps it
was easier for the Nordic countries to persuade Tanza-
nia that the economy had to be reformed since Norway
and the other Nordic countries were social democratic
countries, and “nice guys” could hardly be suspected
of harbouring ulterior motives.25
Are these perspective adequate to understand interna-
tional bargaining processes, and to explain why Nor-
way seems to behave differently within a multilateral
setting, e.g. in the CG meeting context, than in bilat-
eral aid negotiation processes? Newer research on
international bargaining processes has found that most
conventional perspectives are insufficient. Scholars are
abandoning the conception of the state as a monolithic
25 This argument draws on the study by Cukierman and Tommasi
(1998): “When does it take a Nixon to go to China?”
actor, through which international and domestic theo-
ries of international bargaining are seen as integrated
(see e.g. Moravcsik 1993:5). The two-level game
approach differs from previous theories by projecting
itself as a theory of international bargaining processes
(see Putnam 1988). Andrew Moravscik (1993:4)
argues that to understand international negotiation and
diplomatic history “the statesmen involved simultane-
ously calculate the domestic and international implica-
tions of their actions”, and are trying to balance
international and domestic concerns in a process of
“double edge” diplomacy. This can help explain why
donor behaviour may vary in different settings.
Despite many good arguments to support the small
state influence thesis, Norway is facing dilemmas in
balancing different concerns, and will lack credibility
in pursuing its conditionality policy.
4.3 The Samaritan’s dilemma
The Norwegian conditionality policy towards Tanza-
nia may be illustrated by the “Samaritan’s dilemma”,
based on simple game theory. This may also help
explain why Norway as a bilateral donor may pursue a
different policy or/and behave differently in a CG set-
ting than e.g. in bilateral negotiations. The model may
also help shed some light on the donors’ credibility
problem in pursuing their conditionality policies.26
This theory and argument derive from James M.
Buchanan’s article from 1975, on social problems
within the welfare state. Buchanan applies his hypoth-
esis to certain aspects of current policy discussions on
welfare reform, but adds that it “is only one among
many applications, and by no means the most impor-
tant one” (Buchanan 1975:74).27 According to Bucha-
nan, the “Samaritan’s dilemma” is caused partly by
economic and income growth; actors have increas-
ingly found themselves able to take soft options
(ibid.:75), for example as in our case of aid provision:
Stated in the most general terms possible, the
hypothesis is that modern man has become inca-
pable of making the choices that are required to
prevent his exploitation by predators of his own
species, whether the predation be conscious or
unconscious. The weakness here may be imbed-
ded in man’s utility functions. The term
“dilemma” seems appropriate because the pro-
26 It should be noted, perhaps, that the “Samaritan’s” dilemma is
only a theoretical construction – a condensed expression – or a
pair of glasses worn when interpreting the empirical data.
Therefore, an exhaustive picture of the mechanisms or incentive
structures influencing the Norwegian–Tanzanian aid relation-
ship will not be given. Rather an aspect of crucial importance
will be pointed out, in order to grasp some of the dilemmas a
bilateral donor such as Norway may be facing.
27 The Samaritan’s dilemma has also been applied on aid issues,
see e.g. Pedersen 1996 and Sevensson 1995.
4. CONDITIONALITY, A REVERSED MICRO-MACRO PARADOX AND THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA
blem may not be one that reflects irrational
behaviour on any of the standard interpretations.
Origins of the dilemma are, in part, economic,
and these are found in the increasing affluence of
choice-makers. Analysis here lends substance to
the cliché that modern man has “gone soft”. His
income-wealth position, along with his prefe-
rence order, allows him to secure options that
were previously unavailable (Buchanan 1975:
74–75).
This study will not consider Buchanan’s model in
detail, but try to adapt his argument to the case study at
hand. Buchanan’s model and argument is transferred
to the donor-recipient relationship as illustrated in fig-
ure 6. This model might be particularly fruitful in
explaining the behaviour of a group of small and mid-
dle- sized donor countries – the like-minded countries
– whose policies are more altruistically motivated than
those of most other donor countries (Alesina and Dol-
lar 1998; Burnside and Dollar 1997; World Bank
1998a).28 It will be hypothesised here that, perhaps
precisely because of their altruism, they are facing a
dilemma as described in the model. Their unwilling-
ness to inflict utility loss in a short-term perspective is
likely to prevent the achievement of their real long-
term goals.
Note that it will not be discussed whether it is “right” –
or ethically defensible – to adopt a policy of condition-
ality. The intention is to shed light on the dilemmas
that a bilateral donor like Norway may be facing in
pursuing its conditionality policy towards Tanzania,
and how Norway has tried to overcome these dilem-
mas.29
Recipient
Reform No Reform
1 2
Aid A B
Donor Sanctions (2,2) (1,1)
1 ally applied, this is only temporarily as long as its
Aid C D
2 (4,3) (3,4)
Figure 6. A Samaritan’s Dilemma
28 Small and middle-sized donors are not inherently more altruis-
tic than other donors. However, an empirical regularity seems to
be that a group of a countries with some common characteris-
tics, such as contributing a relatively high percentage of their
GNP as ODA, a non-colonial past (the Netherlands excepted),
limited commercial interests in recipient countries etc., in gen-
eral have been more altruistic than other donors (see also Ege-
land 1988; Stokke (ed.) 1989; Pratt (ed.) 1989).
29 There are also many other problems, perhaps more important
ones, like the well-known disbursement imperative, which both
bilaterals and multilaterals seem to be facing.
33
Figure 6 shows a simple two-by-two payoff matrix
confronting two players – in this case a donor and a
recipient. The donor can choose between rows 1 and 2,
and the recipient between columns 1 and 2. The utility
indicators are the payoffs, arranged in ordinal
sequence. As indicated in the figure, row two will be
the dominant strategy of the donor, regardless what the
recipient does or is predicted to do. According to this
model, cells A and B provide no real alternatives for
the Samaritan, because, even if reforms are carried out,
the “Samaritan suffers by its own inability to provide
charity” (Buchanan 1975:76). The recipient will not be
in the same position; his behaviour will depend on the
donor’s action. If the donor chooses row two – dis-
bursement of aid – the recipient will choose column
two. Since the donor has a dominant strategy, the
recipient can predict the donor’s behaviour. The solu-
tion to this game – equilibrium – will be cell D.
Vague threats to cut off charity in the absence of
reforms, i.e. if the conditions are not met, remain
empty “unless there is demonstrated willingness to
carry out such threats” (Buchanan 1975:76). If arguing
along the lines suggested by Buchanan and actually
carrying out these threats, the Samaritan – the donor –
will suffer disutility: “He may find himself seriously
injured” (Buchanan 1975:76). But for this strategy to
be effective, credibility must be established: the
Samaritan “must accept the prospect of personal
injury” (Buchanan 1975:76).
For the Samaritan an ideal solution to the game would
be cell C. The Samaritan would wish to help as long as
there is need. Ending up ultimately in cell A would
make the donor redundant. That is part of the Samari-
tan’s dilemma, since he will suffer because of his ina-
bility to provide charity. Anyhow, for the Samaritan to
establish credibility he must be willing to go through
temporary suffering.
This may explain why it is so difficult for bilateral
donors to impose sanctions, and if sanctions are actu-
charity is required. Following Buchanan’s argument,
one way to overcome the dilemma would be “to dele-
gate the power of decision in particular choice situa-
tions to an agent, one who is instructed to act in
accordance with the strategic norms that are selected
in advance” (Buchanan 1975: 77–78). This might in
this case be the World Bank, whose policy is the out-
come of the sum of bilateral decisions. The recipient
country would then be more likely to believe that the
agent would behave in accordance with its stated pol-
icy, and the World Bank would not be facing the same
Samaritan’s dilemma. One way of solving the
dilemma would be for Norway to tie its conditionality
policy – by adopting cross-conditionality – to the
34 4. CONDITIONALITY, A REVERSED MICRO-MACRO PARADOX AND THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA
World Bank, which may serve as a buffer the prospect
of short-term disutility. Perhaps this can explain why
Norway’s position bilaterally seems to be much softer
than that taken within a multilateral setting, such as a
CG meeting context. Within a bilateral setting – with
no cushion – it would be difficult and not credible for
the Samaritan pretending to be a “hardliner”.
It might then be rational for the bilateral donor to
transfer all politically difficult decisions to multilateral
institutions. But then again, the bilateral donor may
suffer by not being able to offer with concrete action.
As a consequence of the reform process, the Samaritan
may be facing yet another dilemma.
The donors’ conditionality policy towards Tanza-
nia – an illustration of a reversed micro–macro
paradox?
A major criticism of the structural adjustment pro-
grammes and the donors’ macro-economic condition-
ality has been the social cost of these programmes.
Tanzania’s achievements in basic health services and
primary education, at least at the lowest levels, were
substantial during the early Nyerere era. At many CG
meetings Tanzanian representatives have expressed
fear that these achievements might be jeopardised by a
process of structural adjustment (see Chapter 5). The
negative social consequences of the reform process
have also been a growing concern in the donor com-
munity.
In recent years the Tanzanian government has largely
managed to stabilise the economy and to meet the eco-
nomic benchmark set by the IMF. The argument of the
most “pro-reform oriented” has been that the social
sectors will also benefit in the long run. Furthermore,
there is a widespread impression in the donor commu-
nity that the general standards of living have improved
in recent years.30 But while there has been a clear
improvement at the macro-level, other indicators seem
to suggest a growing discrepancy between the achieve-
ments at macro and micro levels, as will be discussed
later in this study.
In the wake of increased aid fatigue and budgetary
constraints in many donor countries, the debate on the
effectiveness of aid has intensified (cf. Chapter 2).
Whereas some positive effects of aid have been
recorded at the micro level, the results at the macro
level have generally been much poorer.31 Economists
have termed this phenomenon the micro–macro para-
dox of aid.32 According to Karl R. Pedersen (1997),
30 Interviews with several representatives of the donor community
in Dar es Salaam in December 1998.
31 However, the considerable methodological problems in measur-
ing the effectiveness of aid should be noted.
studies of the effectiveness of Norwegian aid have
focused on the micro effects, while neglecting the
macro-economic consequences of aid. According to
Pedersen this gives a misleading picture of the total aid
effect. He further asserts that questions relating to con-
ditionality have not been taken seriously by research-
ers and aid bureaucrats, and that the macro-economic
consequences of aid are critically related to the condi-
tions set towards a country’s national economic policy
(Pedersen 1997:229).
But in Tanzania – as indicated previously – there
seems to be a discrepancy between poor results at a
micro level and reasonably good macro-economic
results in recent years: the reverse situation of the
micro–macro paradox. It may be justified, therefore, to
ask whether aid to Tanzania has contributed to a
reversal of the micro–macro paradox – at least in a
short-term perspective? Perhaps it is attributable pre-
cisely to the donors’ “conditionality regime” and a
somewhat narrow focus on macro-economic bench-
marks?
If such a hypothesis can be substantiated, it is likely
that it will aggravate the “Samaritan’s dilemma”. It
will be even harder to go for tough options at the micro
level, where people are visibly suffering, even if they
might be better off in a longer time perspective. This
will reinforce the Samaritan’s dominant disbursement
strategy, and a potential conditionality policy will
crumble.
It will also be more difficult for donors to legitimise a
conditionality policy towards their “constituency
Samaritans” if poverty alleviation is the stated aid
objective while they fail to increase disbursement to
social sectors at the micro level where the pro-poor
impact is greatest.
Lately there has been increasing recognition of the
need to “get the budgets right”, to improve donor co-
ordination, to reduce project assistance, and, at least in
rhetoric, let the initiative remain with the recipient.
Taking cognisance of these needs could, in turn, have a
number of invidious consequences for the allocation of
future aid, and could create further dilemmas.
The result could be a return to more traditional forms
of aid. Interviews with donors and the minutes from
the CG meetings indicate that this may become a new
trend. How Norway will respond to these challenges
and dilemmas is, however, difficult to judge from the
material available for this study.
32 See Paldam 1997:109–132.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
5. Double-Edged Diplomacy
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus on the aid negotiation proc-
esses and the aid dialogue, particularly the role played
by Norway in different forums. It will be shown in the
discussion that Norway is trying to balance different
concerns in a kind of double-edged diplomacy.
5.2 From all-weather friends to fair-weather
friends only?
Until 1984 Norway supported Tanzania’s own struc-
tural adjustment efforts, short of an agreement with the
IMF. The summary Agreed Minutes from the annual
Norwegian–Tanzanian development co-operation con-
sultations express the Tanzanian delegation’s warm
appreciation of Norwegian support in this difficult
period for the Tanzanian economy (cf. Agreed Minutes
1980–83). Relatively large proportions of Norwegian
assistance were made available for commodity assis-
tance and BoP support, in order to buttress the reform
programmes directly. The indicative planning figures
for 1983–86 allocated 50 per cent of total Norwegian
allocations for such purposes (Agreed Minutes 1982).
No reference was made to the fact that Tanzania had
not concluded an agreement with IMF. This changed
in 1984, however.
During the annual Norwegian–Tanzanian development
co-operation consultations in March 1984, Norway
expressed great concern about the absence of an agree-
ment with the IMF, which was regarded as “seriously
impeding the Structural Adjustment Programme”
(Agreed Minutes 1984:1). Even if Norway were ready
to continue disbursement of BoP in 1984, future dis-
bursement would not be made unconditionally:
Norway has decided to defer a decision on allo-
cations for balance-of-payments support for the
planning period 1985–88. A decision regarding
this will take into consideration the development
of Tanzania’s economy and the progress made in
the negotiation with IMF and the World Bank
(ibid: 2).
According to the Norwegian delegation it was difficult
for Tanzania to obtain the foreign currency needed to
overcome Tanzania’s economic problems. Later in the
same document, it was stated that “further assistance
in this form will have to be assessed by Norway in the
light of the progress made in Tanzania’s negotiations
with the IMF and the World Bank” (ibid:7). Norway
did not stipulate any strict or ultimate conditions at
this stage, but the position was made very clear – a
major shift from Norway’s erstwhile position. In
35
November 1984 a Nordic–Tanzanian symposium was
held in Dar es Salaam in order to discuss Tanzania’s
precarious economic situation, structural adjustment
efforts, and the role of Nordic development co-opera-
tion.33 The change in Norwegian policy had by that
time been made even more resolute.
In the terms of reference for the Norwegian delegation
participating in the symposium on 16–17 November
1984, representatives were instructed to communicate
the new Norwegian position. It was also emphasised in
the instructions that no signals be given to commit
future aid.34
The Norwegian main statement heeded the instruc-
tions in full. One of the Norwegian delegates stated
that a positive attitude towards a real increase in Nor-
wegian aid would be dependent on Tanzania reaching
an agreement with IMF. The Norwegian representative
further said that it was presumed that such an agree-
ment would be followed by a general “moratorium” on
foreign debt. Early visible “proof” of strengthening of
administration and management on various levels was
seen as crucial.35 It was added that it was hoped that
the uncertainties and anxieties, which to some extent
had marked the relationship between the Nordic coun-
tries and Tanzanian authorities over the past years,
would now be “dispelled”.36
All the Nordic countries stressed the need to come to
an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. The
World Bank representative in Dar es Salaam had con-
firmed that this would most likely happen in early
1985. Nonetheless, Finland and Denmark stated that
Tanzania could not expect any aid increase. Sweden
and Norway, on the other hand (notwithstanding the
Norwegian instructions to the contrary, noted above),
indicated that any aid increase would be conditional on
an agreement having been concluded between the GoT
and the IMF.37 Most donor statements were very criti-
cal of Tanzania’s intransigent stand in the negotiations
with the IMF. Tanzania was told in unequivocal terms
that no extra assistance would be forthcoming from the
Nordic countries unless an agreement could be
reached with the IMF – which was tantamount to an
ultimatum. In fact, the Nordic countries had expected
the symposium to take place “very shortly after con-
clusion of an agreement between Government of Tan-
33 333.1-Tan, Press release.
34 331.1-Tan, “Mandat for DUHs deltakelse i Nordisk/Tanza-
niansk symposium Dar es Salaam 16.–17. november 1984.”
35 331.1-Tan. 84/13166-3.
36 331.1-Tan. 84/13166-3.
37 333.1-Tanzania, “Notits”, 22. Nov. 1984.
36
zania and IMF”.38 According to the Swedish statement
the Nordic countries had agreed to hold the sympo-
sium, even though an agreement with the Fund had not
been reached.39 Nevertheless, the Nordic message at
the symposium could hardly be misunderstood: in
order to receive Nordic aid, Tanzania would have to
come to an agreement with the IMF shortly. But how
this was perceived on the Tanzanian side at this point
in time remained to be seen.
Prior to the symposium, there had been many consul-
tations among the Nordic countries. Sources suggest
Sweden as the most eager to change the Nordic posi-
tion, pushing the other Nordic countries to adopt the
Swedish line. Within the Norwegian camp there was
deep disagreement on the issue. Likewise, there
seemed to be discord among high-ranking Norwegian
representatives in Dar es Salaam at the time. In the
end, however, the position in favour of Norway’s con-
tinued support to Tanzania on previous terms lost out.
The fact that Norway and the other Nordic countries
continued to support Tanzania for so long against the
Bretton Woods institutions may relate to many factors.
Strong personalities seemed to play a crucial role.
According to a former Norwegian Ambassador to Tan-
zania, Gunnar Garbo, the change in policy was not
debated in the Norwegian Storting, but only briefly
mentioned in the White Paper on development co-
operation one year later.40 The World Bank’s negative
image, particularly among leftist politicians and aca-
demics, was not as visible at that time; it became evi-
dent only later. In fact, up until the 1980s the World
Bank had been providing project support and massive
support to Nyerere and his socialist experiment.
By 1985 an agreement with the IMF was not yet in
place, and Norway reiterated during the annual consul-
tations that, despite some positive signs in the Tanza-
nian economy, successful reform would depend on an
agreement with the IMF. The Norwegian delegation
believed that such an agreement would result in sub-
stantial inflow of foreign exchange, and pave the way
for increased loans and grants from other donors and
the World Bank (Agreed Minutes 1985:2). Norway
reconfirmed its position, and stated its intention to
review the country programme by the second half of
1985, in case an agreement between the IMF and Tan-
zania was not been reached (ibid).
In the following year’s annual consultations, Norway
reiterated its concern about the economic situation and
38 333.1-Tan, “Swedish introductory statement at TAN–NORDIC
Symposium”.
39 333.1-Tan, “Swedish introductory statement at TAN–NORDIC
Symposium”.
40 Interview, Gunnar Garbo, 14 October 1998.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
the importance of agreeing on an IMF package, and
tempted with a carrot if the negotiations succeeded:
if such programme [IMF package] is establis-
hed, Norway will consider granting additional
funds within a co-ordinated support framework
with other donors and international financial
institutions (Agreed Minutes 1986:4).
The head of the Tanzanian delegation responded that
the Tanzanian government was preparing a more com-
prehensive recovery programme, which would include
both macro and micro measures to improve the econ-
omy, and expressed hope that this would attract more
external resources (Agreed Minutes 1986:3). By 1986,
the Tanzanian government had to give in and accept
the IMF conditions.
5.3 The CG meeting process
In 1986 the first Consultative Group (CG) meeting
since 1977 was held in Paris between Tanzanian repre-
sentatives and the donors. The reason for this long hia-
tus was the inability of the Tanzanian government to
design a comprehensive reform programme “relevant
to the country’s problems”, as seen by the donor com-
munity.41 When the CG meeting was held in June
1986 no agreement between the GoT and IMF was yet
in place; it was to be signed later that year.
Tanzania’s compliance with the IMF conditions was a
result of a tug of war within the government and the
CCM. The government had long had a faction of prag-
matic politicians who were trying to push Nyerere –
who by then had resigned as President but was still the
leader of the CCM – to come to an agreement with the
IMF. At that point Nyerere was taking a position of
wait and see. President Mwinyi had adopted a pro-
reform position, in line with a market-based economy
as suggested and pushed by the IMF. The Prime Min-
ister, Warioba, assumed a kind of middle position.
As the donor community was pressurising the Tanza-
nian government, this was considered a politically
risky exercise. Prior to the CG meeting, the Norwegian
embassy in Tanzania had expressed great concern
about the economic situation in Tanzania, particularly
its potential political ramifications. This concern had
also been expressed in a meeting between representa-
tives of the GoT and the donor community. Norway
was quite self-critical and stated that the big donors
shared the responsibility for the current economic
plight of Tanzania.
41 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortium, “Executive Directors’ Meeting
–June 23, 1986.”
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
Norway also assumed responsibility, together with the
rest of the Nordic bloc and the remaining Western
donor countries, for pushing Tanzania in the direction
of reforms along the same lines as the IMF credit con-
ditions. Great concern was expressed about the politi-
cal consequences if the economic recovery programme
did not succeed, and if donor support failed. Due to the
gravity of the situation, calls were made for co-opera-
tion and goodwill by all parties concerned. Even if
Norway did not have the resources to contribute with
substantial funds, it was seen as crucial that the finan-
cial gap be filled.
Many other donors were also distressed about the
political consequences of the reform process. If the
whole exercise failed, a backlash effect was feared:
return to status quo and maybe even further back to the
situation before the GoT started its economic recovery
programme in the early 1980s. It was feared that influ-
ential people within the CCM could neutralise or
squeeze out the more reform-oriented politicians from
government. It was seen as crucial, therefore, that Tan-
zania be given the economic backing needed for main-
taining a stable political situation.
In IMF’s statement at the 1986 CG meeting it was
made clear that their contribution would be made
available proportional to the level of aid disbursed by
the bilateral donors. This put substantial pressure on
the bilateral donors.
The different bilateral donors’ position that Tanzania
had to reach an agreement with the IMF if their aid
levels would be sustained or increased seemed uncon-
troversial.42 Canada was perhaps most explicit, stating
that the alternative to an IMF agreement would be a
substantial cut in Canadian aid to Tanzania.43
The conclusion of the joint Nordic statement was also
clear on the point that there seemed no alternative to
an agreement with the IMF:
To this end the Nordic countries believe that at
present there exists no realistic alternative for
Tanzania to an agreement with IMF, and a joint
action by the Government of Tanzania and the
donor community.44
Many actors made pledges of extra funding if an
agreement were reached, including the World Bank,
Sweden, Norway, Canada, the Netherlands, and the
Saudi Fund. Finland also appeared with a smaller
pledging statement.
42 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortie, 86/9441-1.
43 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortie, 86/9441-1.
44 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortie, 86/9441-1.
37
According to Tore Linné Eriksen (1987:132) Norway
did not in fact contribute extra funding to Tanzania in
1987 as pledged, except for debt relief on a loan from
1977 and a NOK 9 million increase in 1986. This did
not seem to be due to lack of political will, but rather
to a difficult budget situation in Norway in that fiscal
year.45 Instead, NOK 40 million was reallocated from
project assistance to import support. In total Norwe-
gian direct and indirect contribution to the Recovery
Programme amounted to NOK 65 million in 1986. It
should be noted that Norwegian aid to Tanzania in real
terms increased from US$ 45.4 million in 1985 to US$
71.8 million in 1986. This level was sustained, even
with a slight increase in 1987 to US$ 75.2 million, and
rose further in 1988 to US$ 79.1 million.46
At the CG meeting in 1987 Norway stated that there
was no room for increased aid to Tanzania, since Nor-
wegian aid to Tanzania had made a big jump in 1986,
and aid to Tanzania accounted for almost 16 per cent
of Norway’s total bilateral aid. Nevertheless, it was
reconfirmed that Norway would maintain the previous
year’s aid level, despite the strained economic situa-
tion in Norway. However, the Norwegian delegate said
that Norway would try to persuade other donors to
contribute with a more “fair” share of the total aid flow
to Tanzania. 47
Norway gave its full support to the IMF-initiated
reform process and confirmed that “the main objective
of Norway’s co-operation for the next few years will
be support to the ERP”.48 Nearly 50 per cent or NOK
180–190 million of the annual country programme
was allocated to commodity assistance/import sup-
port.49
By 1987 there seemed to be general satisfaction
among the donors about the way in which the Eco-
nomic Recovery Programme was being implemented,
and the Tanzanian authorities received praise for their
efforts. From the documentation available for this
study, it is hard to judge to what extent it was the eco-
nomic reforms or the good climatic conditions that
year which produced the most significant improve-
ments in Tanzania, especially in the agricultural sector.
The 1987 CG meeting dwelled more on the social sec-
tors than that of the previous year. Many of the speak-
ers, including the World Bank representative, although
not that of the IMF, focused on the social costs of ERP.
According to the World Bank these costs were mainly
a result of the economic recession; in the longer run
the ERP would have a positive impact on social sectors
45 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortie, 86/9441-1
46 OECD 1990; see also figure 3 in Chapter 2.
47 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, General statement (Norway).
48 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, General statement (Norway).
49 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, Pledging statement (Norway).
38
as well. Furthermore, the World Bank conceded that
social services and the education sector had deterio-
rated in the past year. Many of the representatives
emphasised, therefore, the need to balance the ERP
better, and to give higher priority to the social sec-
tors.50 The Tanzanian Minister of Finance also regret-
ted that the country’s substantial results in health and
education was threatened by the ERP. But according to
the World Bank, this would improve:
If it continues to be implemented with vigour,
and is supported with adequate amounts and
appropriate kinds of external resources, the
recovery that is now beginning can be strengthe-
ned and sustained (World Bank 1987:1).
It was believed that even though no dramatic turnabout
had occurred and much of the country’s infrastructure
continued to deteriorate, there was evidence that the
policy was beginning to have a positive impact.
The CG meeting in July 1988 also exhibited broad
donor consensus about progress of the EPR, although
“great enthusiasm” was not in evidence.51 Canada and
Switzerland warned about the dangers if the IMF and
the World Bank wanted “too much, too fast”.52 Com-
pared to previous CG meetings, criticism against the
public and administrative sector increased, pointing to
lack of efficiency. In a self-critical vein the Tanzanian
representatives also pointed to these aspects.
Also in 1988 the consequences of the ERP on “soft
sectors” like health and education were highlighted by
many bilateral donors. A representative of the World
Bank repeated the gist of the statement made by the
Tanzanian Minister of Finance at the CG meeting in
1987, that Tanzania’s achievements in this area were in
danger. Nevertheless, despite the donors’ strong sig-
nals of general belief in the ERP and Tanzania’s ability
in economic reconstruction, critical points were raised.
Some speakers asked whether there was sufficient
political will on the Tanzanian side to implement the
ERP. For example, the political will to close down
unprofitable businesses was questioned. Doubts were
also voiced as to whether the government’s five-year
plan and the party’s fifteen-year plan appreciated the
need for economic restructuring. The Tanzanian Min-
ister of Finance, Msuya, responded by confirming that
it was GoT official policy to shut down unprofitable
parastatals, and stated that the government’s five-year
plan did contain the elements embodied in the ERP. He
50 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, “Den konsultative gruppe for
Tanzania” (Minutes, 17 July 1987).
51 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, Konsultativ gruppe for Tanzania
(Minutes 12–13 July 1988).
52 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, Konsultativ gruppe for Tanzania
(Minutes 12–13 July 1988).
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
was not willing, however, to comment on the party
programme.53
In nearly all donor statements, pledges were made
conditional on progress in the negotiations between
the IMF and Tanzania. Nothing dramatically new of a
negative or positive nature was brought onto the table.
The meeting seemed rather like a repetition of the pre-
vious annual meeting, regarding actors as well as
statements.54
Norway joined the rest of the donor community, and
gave Tanzania credit for the positive developments in
the implementation of the ERP. Norway’s general
statement confirmed that Norway had committed addi-
tional funds to Tanzania, and that total Norwegian aid
to Tanzania in 1987 exceeded the estimated amount,
totalling NOK 546 mill. It was expected that total dis-
bursement for 1988 would make another jump to NOK
640 mill.55 This considerable increase was a reflection
of the Norwegian government’s encouragement to and
confidence in continued vigorous implementation of
the rehabilitation programme:56
Tanzania has over the last three years received
between 25–30% of Norway’s total bilateral
assistance to Africa. This year nearly 30%. On
top of this, Tanzania has certainly enjoyed her
share of Norway’s considerable multilateral
assistance. I hope it will be appreciated that it
may be difficult for my Government to maintain
its assistance to Tanzania at such a high level
over a longer period, regardless of how success-
ful Tanzania may be in her implementation of the
ERP. Having stood by Tanzania for a long time,
we hope that other donors who may have been
lagging behind in previous years, will shoulder
more responsibility, both with regard to aid vol-
ume and by giving aid on more concessional
terms.57
The main objective of Norwegian assistance to Tanza-
nia in this period was stated very clearly as “support to
the Economic Recovery Programme”.58 As regards the
composition and terms of assistance to Tanzania, the
view presented by the World Bank was fully sup-
53 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, Konsultativ gruppe for Tanzania
(Minutes 12–13 July 1988).
54 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, Konsultativ gruppe for Tanzania
(Minutes 12–13 July 1988).
55 Figure 3 shows total disbursement below this figure. The same
is the case for 1989; this is not due to conditionality or any
political motivated hold back off aid, but due to pipeline prob-
lems. Much of the pipeline was disbursed in 1990, which
explain a major jump in the Norwegian aid volume to Tanzania
that year.
56 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, Pledging Statement (Norway),
12–13 July 1988.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
ported, and was “by and large adopted with regard to
Norway’s assistance to Tanzania.”59
The scheduled 1989 CG meeting was postponed twice,
because IMF/GoT agreement had not been reached
concerning the further economic restructuring pro-
gramme as a basis for restructuring loans. But after an
agreement was concluded in late 1990, scheduled for
discussions in the leading organs of the IMF and the
World Bank, it was decided to hold the meeting. The
main theme was the economic situation after three
years’ implementation of the ERP, as well as the strat-
egy for further reconstruction, as expressed in the Eco-
nomic and Social Action Programme (ESAP) for the
subsequent three-year period.
The main conclusion was that implementation of the
ERP had been successful thus far, although many
problems remained. Despite growth in GNP, it was
another question whether the standard of living for the
average Tanzanian had improved. From 1986–89 GNP
increased by 3.5–4 per cent. This was lower than
expected, but still higher than the population growth
rate. It was an immense improvement compared to the
1980–85 period, when the average growth rate was a
meagre 1 per cent.60
The data material does not suggest that the Nordic
countries or other countries within the like-minded
group had given particular emphasis to “soft sector”
issues thus far. The UNICEF representative was the
only one to raise such issues. During the CG meeting
in 1989 the UNICEF representative also insisted on
the inclusion of a gender dimension in ESAP, and a
heightened general awareness on these issues. Swe-
den, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway supported
the remarks made by the UNICEF representative.
However, these issues remained marginal in the ensu-
ing discussion, and were not mentioned in the press
release after the meeting.61
However, ESAP, which was the follow-up to ERP, was
meant to give more attention to the social sectors. Dur-
ing the three-year period of ERP the social problems
were acknowledged by the GoT and the donors, and
repeatedly pointed to by Tanzanian representatives.
Also the World Bank was giving increased attention to
these issues. But the argument was that, once the econ-
omy recovered, the trickle-down mechanism would
improve performance in the social sectors: in other
words, in a slightly longer time perspective, the social
sectors would also benefit. Still, it seemed to be
59 Ibid.
60 37-IBRD-Tanzania-konsortier, Notat, “Møte i den konsultative
gruppe for Tanzania – Paris 18.–20.12.89.” (Norwegian Min-
utes of the meeting).
61 Ibid.
39
acknowledged that too little direct attention had been
given to these issues in the reform process.
It has often been stated that Norway, together with the
rest of the Nordic bloc, has contributed to the strength-
ening of the social dimension in the economic reform
programmes. From the available material it is difficult
to substantiate such a claim, even though this was a
major source of concern by the Nordic countries
already in 1984 during the Nordic–Tanzanian summit.
There is no indication in the material that Norway has
played a prominent role in that regard, particularly not
in the context of the CG meetings. There seems to
have been a general understanding among the Nordic
donors that it was better to try to influence the policy
of the World Bank through their representatives at
headquarters in Washington DC.62 But again, this is
difficult to document. The Nordic countries, since
1991 including the three Baltic republics as well, con-
stitute only 3 per cent of the vote in the World Bank.
All the same, there seems to be a general assumption
among the informants that the Nordic countries have
contributed to increased attention to social sectors in
the World Bank, but there is disagreement as to the
extent to which this is the case.
What seems interesting in light of the initial Norwe-
gian resistance to changing its policy is that, once it
did change, Norway very loyally toed the line of the
multilateral institutions. The somewhat hesitant Nor-
wegian attitude seems to reflect the Nordic disappoint-
ment with developments in Tanzania at the time. The
Nordic countries were, in fact, accused of delaying the
economic reform process by supporting Tanzania with
large amounts of aid, in the absence of an agreement
with the IMF. In the 1990s this trends seems to be
changing slightly.
Getting tougher
In 1992/93 there seems to have been an explicit shift in
the donor community. The donors’ patience was wear-
ing thin. Notwithstanding some improvements in the
Tanzanian economy, too many indicators were point-
ing in the wrong direction. Norway began taking a
much tougher stand than earlier, illustrated by the Nor-
wegian statement at the CG meeting in 1992. Even
though Tanzania had managed to turn overall eco-
nomic decline into growth, these achievements were
accompanied by disconcerting factors:
Firstly, when looking at the large increase in
financial inflows over the years, the GDP growth
rate may seem rather modest [...] Secondly, the
macroeconomic stability problems, both in terms
of external and internal imbalance, seem to have
62 Interviews with Nordic donors in Dar es Salaam, weeks 48 and
49, 1998.
40
increased and except for the inflation figures
there is little evidence that structural adjustment
has yet contributed much to consolidate or
improve the key macroeconomic indicators. [...]
The balance of this, I am afraid, is that Tanzania
seems even more dependent on external aid
today than it was when the [sic] program
started.63
A Norwegian memo prior to the 1993 CG meeting
stated quite frankly that because of increasing aid
dependence and escalating corruption, clear political
and economic signals should be given at the forthcom-
ing CG meeting. Norway would prefer that the CG
meeting resulted in decreased aid to Tanzania, com-
pared to what Tanzania and the World Bank had
planned for the fiscal year 1993/94.64 The memo
pointed to the many mechanisms undermining
achievements, and stated that it seemed justified to put
greater pressure on the Tanzanian government to
implement the reforms and to increase the mobilisa-
tion of national resources. Nevertheless, no sugges-
tions were made as to how pressure should be
increased, or whether Norway would take concrete
action.
The change in attitude was reflected in many of the
donor statements at the CG meeting in 1993. While the
World Bank for some years had been presenting overly
optimistic economic growth estimates, its prognoses
were now becoming somewhat more realistic, after
repeated corrections by many of the bilateral donors. It
was clear that many of the bilateral donors were taking
a much tougher position than the World Bank. This
certainly applied to Norway. The bilateral donors
appeared more willing to put power behind their
threats than did the World Bank. It is interesting to
note that the bilateral donors’ behaviour deviates from
the model presented in Chapter 3. The disbursement
imperative seemed more pressing for the World Bank
than for many bilateral donors, even though this was
obviously also a problem for the latter. The World
Bank was apparently more eager to continue disburse-
ment despite harsh criticism.
This supports one of the main criticisms in the litera-
ture against the use of conditionality: donors lack
credibility when it comes to withholding or cutting
back on their aid pledges if conditions remained unful-
filled. Empty threats give the recipient few incentives
to change its behaviour. There may not be anything
wrong with the conditions as such, but rather the way
in which the donors go about enforcing them. Another
argument against the use of conditionality is the lack
of ownership on the recipient side when conditions are
63 Statement by Norway, CG meeting Tanzania, June 29–30, 1992.
64 37-IBRD-Tanzania, 93/2080-2, “CG-møte for Tanzania”.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
imposed. If the reforming country does not feel owner-
ship, it will do as little as possible to implement the
agreed course of action, and there will be insufficient
political will to make the reform process vigorous and
sustainable.
In Tanzania, as in most other reforming countries,
there are various factions more or less willing to
reform. Reforming the economy may be politically
risky, especially since it may have negative conse-
quences for many sectors and adversely affect a large
number of people. In such a situation the donor com-
munity may work as a supporting factor for the
reformist factions and perhaps tip the balance in their
favour. Obviously, the opposite effect may result if the
donors do not follow through on their conditions.
The main shift in the early 1990s appears to have been
a tougher stand on the part of the bilateral donors in
their criticism and conditions than that of the World
Bank and the IMF. Many of the criticisms expressed
by the donors at the CG meetings were often not
responded to by the Tanzanian representatives, with
reference to lack of progress being caused by external
factors and/or lack of resources and foreign capital.
The donors’ criticism intensified in 1994, when allega-
tions of massive corruption were made, particularly
related to non-collection of customs duties, which
implicated senior officials of the Ministry of Finance,
including the Minister himself. A meeting was sum-
moned to discuss whether the scheduled CG meeting
should be postponed. A letter from the Nordic–Baltic
office in the World Bank stated that:
In view of the serious nature of the corruption
charges and the lack of action taken by the Tan-
zanian authorities so far, the IMF has cancelled
a discussion of a new ESAF for Tanzania sched-
uled to take place on Friday, November 11, and
the World Bank is considering whether to cancel/
postpone the CG meeting planned for November
17–18 in Paris.65
Preliminary investigations indicated that, on an annual
basis, only TZS 8 billion of an estimated TZS 44 bil-
lion in custom duties had been collected. The shortfall
figure of TZS 32 billion was estimated to be equivalent
to around 10 per cent of the government’s total annual
revenues, or approximately 3 per cent of GDP.66
World Bank and IMF staff had established a list of
companies which had been granted customs exemp-
tions for reasons that were questionable or clearly in
65 CG-møte 1994, 93/01069-12, “CG-møte for Tanzania. Lokal
oppfølging”.
66 Ibid.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
violation of existing procedures. The Tanzanian Presi-
dent had earlier come to an agreement with the donors
that immediate action would be taken and that a press
statement be prepared. Several days later, no public
announcement had been made.
Tanzania decided to postpone the CG meeting, but that
decision appeared to have been caused, in effect, from
the resistance expressed by many donors. Several
bilateral donors, together with the World Bank and the
IMF, were not in favour of holding a meeting, because
it could be seen as an ill-judged political signal
towards the Tanzanian Government, and as interfer-
ence in the ongoing investigation of the corruption
allegations.67 The suggestion was made, however, that
a meeting be held without the presence of Tanzanian
representatives.
In this case Norway took a different position, and
found it important to keep up the pressure on the Tan-
zanian authorities. It was thought that this could best
be achieved in the presence of Tanzanian representa-
tives. Hence, Norway suggested that a meeting be
held, but without pledging statements. The Norwegian
Embassy in Dar es Salaam suggested that conditional-
ity could be applied together with positive measures,
e.g. by an expansion of aid and faster implementation
of the planned institutional support to the Ministry of
Finance.
At the request of many of the bilateral donors, the
World Bank called an informal CG meeting in Decem-
ber 1994, where the main item on the agenda was the
irregular tax and duty exemptions. The result was that
many of the bilateral donors cancelled their BoP sup-
port. Norway decided to withhold the committed BoP
support amounting to NOK 70 mill., and indicated that
other forms of sanction might be considered.68 These
cuts seemed to be met with great surprise on the Tan-
zanian side.
One week before the 1995 CG meeting the Business
Times (24.2.1995) announced that the World Bank, the
IMF and the Government of Tanzania had finally
agreed on the Policy Framework Paper (PFP), which
was to be discussed in Paris. However, the tax report
required by the donor community would not be ready
by the CG meeting. According to an official of the
Treasury, the Tanzanian government was required to
collect up to 25 per cent of the outstanding revenues,
mainly import duties and sales tax, as a condition for
credit consideration. Plugging loopholes in the tax
exemption facility was also an area of concern, but
none of the conditions set by the donors were met
67 Ibid.
68 CG-møte 1994, 93/01069-14, “CG-møte for Tanzania. Lokal
oppfølging”.
41
before the scheduled CG meeting took place. Treasury
officials consulted by the Business Times expressed
optimism, nonetheless, and thought that the meeting
was likely to be a success for the GoT. The editorial
the same day also expressed great optimism and hope
that the donors would give Tanzania their blessing:
The funds are going to be released not because
Tanzania has met all the conditions but rather
because God is on our side. The God of Tanzani-
ans has softened the hearts of the donors (Busi-
ness Times 24.2.95).
Beforehand, considerable interest attached to how far
the various donors would go in their criticism of the
Tanzanian government with regard to the corruption
allegations and the unfulfilled conditions set at the pre-
vious CG meeting.
The Norwegian position was unequivocal and surpris-
ingly critical. First a general criticism was expressed:
Tanzania has for a long time been, and still is,
the biggest single recipient of Norwegian devel-
opment aid. The widespread support in Norway
for the high level of assistance to Tanzania has
however recently been undermined by the recur-
rent crises in the country. Norwegian political
parties, the press and the taxpayer all want to
see more tangible results form nearly 30 years of
development assistance. A recent report from a
commission reviewing the whole of Norwegian
Development Assistance, have urged the Govern-
ment to phase out unsuccessful development
projects and assistance. Tanzania has been sin-
gled out as an example where results have not
matched expectations. A serious review of the co-
operation between Norway and Tanzania will
have to be undertaken.69
In the statement regarding external financial require-
ments, the Norwegian criticism went even further.
Serious concern and disappointment were expressed
on behalf of the Norwegian Government, particularly
as to bad governance in the field of fiscal policy and
collection of revenue. The Norwegian government
decided, therefore, to withdraw its BoP support as well
as unused funds under the country programme for
1994. This added up to NOK 90 mill., which was with-
held after the disclosure of the tax evasion scandal in
November 1994. Further BoP support in 1995 was
made conditional on evidence of serious commitment
to eradicate corrupt practices and that the Tanzanian
Government implemented the measures of the Aide
Memoir from the Joint Evaluation Mission (JEM) and
69 815.16-Tan-CG, “Consultative group meeting for Tanzania.
February 27 and 28, 1995”.
42
the recommendation in the Auditor-General’s report.70
The amount set aside for BoP support from the Nor-
wegian Government for 1995 amounted to approxi-
mately NOK 50 mill. This support was to be released
at a later stage, possibly in two tranches, but only if the
conditions mentioned above were met. A Norwegian
memo underlined that implementation of the condi-
tions would be monitored closely.
Prior to the CG meeting Norway had feared being left
alone as the harshest critic. The Tanzanian delegation
was therefore informed in advance about the Norwe-
gian position. Discussions were also held with other
donors. But most donors joined ranks with Norway in
its sharp criticism, and expressed great concern about
insufficient tax collection, caused by extensive evasion
of taxes and duty exemptions through the Investment
Promotion Centre (IPC) and the Ministry of Finance.
Tax evasion and duty exemption were seen as an
expression of growing corruption in Tanzania.
Most of the bilateral donors put as a condition for BoP
disbursement that the recommendations from the SPA/
JEM (Special Programme of Assistance for Africa/
Joint Evaluation Mission), were followed up. Many
donors strongly emphasised the need to tackle the cor-
ruption problem. If the suggested measures were not
implemented, the whole aid programme would be in
jeopardy. Several donors took concrete action. Sweden
was not satisfied with the GoT performance, and
stated that BoP support would be withheld. Finland
and Denmark had not been providing BoP support, but
the attitude was that if they had, it would have been
70 The Joint Evaluation Mission (JEM) was appointed at the infor-
mal CG meeting in 1994. The Mission visited Tanzania 6–15
February 1995 to review the status of the donor financed import
support programme and the Government’s programme for
reducing tax evasion and strengthening enforcement of trade
procedures. This resulted in an Aide Memoire which reflected
the donors’ serious concern regarding bad governance in the
field of fiscal politics and revenue collection. The recommenda-
tions/conditions were presented to the Tanzanian government
on 14 February 1999. The Aide Memoire contained several
measures to secure effective and functioning tax and duty col-
lection and criminal prosecution of the culprits. A SPA/JEM
Follow Up Committee, under the auspices of the World Bank
office in Dar es Salaam, consisting of donor countries disburs-
ing BoP was later appointed. Nevertheless, deadlines were post-
poned and most of the conditions not met. The Scandinavian
countries in particular have several times communicated to the
GoT that the implementation process has been far from ade-
quate. The implementation process was particularly poor in
three areas: criminal prosecution of the suspects of tax- and cus-
tom evasion; collection of counterpart funds; and insufficient
collection of import duties from commodities imported via Zan-
zibar. Thus, the donors agreed that the Swedish Embassy should
formulate a letter to the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance launch-
ing a proposal on how the GoT could speed up the implementa-
tion process. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, after a
while it seems to be acknowledged that many of the recommen-
dations were unrealistic or too political sensitive. At the time of
CG meeting in 1999, the conditions were still unfulfilled, but
were not part of the agenda. This case also underlines the many
dilemmas in applying multiple conditionalities such as difficult
judgements and trade-offs (cf. Chapter 1). As will be illustrated
below, donors are faced with difficult decisions when Tanzania
quite successfully starts implementing a shadow programme in
January 1996, but fails to fulfil the JEM recommendations.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
withheld.71 In a joint Nordic statement prepared by
Norway, the need to redefine the conditions from
deadlines of reporting to central decision-making was
emphasised. The Netherlands also voiced severe criti-
cism, but signalled that its BoP support probably
would be paid out in tranches.
Japan made the only positive statement. Together with
Great Britain, Japan made its further BoP support con-
ditional exclusively on the conclusion of an agreement
for a new ESAF programme between the IMF and
Tanzania. They did not link their BoP support to the
implementation of the SPA/JEM recommendations.
The World Bank estimated that Tanzania required US$
1.13 billion in economic aid in 1995, but the pledges
were just under US$ 1 billion. In other words, there
was a substantial decrease in the aid volume, if not a
massive cut. However, it was decided to hold an infor-
mal donor meeting later in 1995 to consider whether
the conditions had been met. The donors’ strict condi-
tions and harsh criticism were received with surprise
on the Tanzanian side. The conditions would mean
continuous pressure on the GoT, and were clearly a
disappointment to the GoT, which seemed to have
expected that the pressure would wane and the situa-
tion normalise after the meeting. Pledges fell far below
expectations. Normally, the outcome of the pledges
does not reflect the severity of the criticism expressed
by the donors. In this perspective the seriousness of the
donors seemed to be communicated clearly to the Tan-
zanian government.72
That the criticism from the bilateral donors was so
harsh seemed to come as a surprise to the Tanzanian
government, which had probably expected that some
semantic exercises would be sufficient. What appeared
more surprising was the posture of the IMF and the
World Bank, which had chosen to soften their criti-
cism. The World Bank was still negotiating the next
SAP, and preferred to await its board’s report on the
previous SAP. For its part, the IMF awaited its board’s
report on the new ESAF. Prior to the CG meeting the
World Bank’s vice president for the Africa region,
Edward Jaycox, responded very positively to the steps
taken by the GoT, and generally to the latest develop-
ment in Tanzania. The advance signals, Jaycox’ ges-
tures, and the statements by the World Bank
representatives at the CG meeting were somewhat
inconsistent. Paradoxically enough, at the CG meeting
the World Bank representatives ended up as the
71 This was also confirmed in an interview in Dar es Salaam,
December 1998.
72 Later in 1995 the pressure from the donors was sustained. In
May 1995 the USAID issued quite a strong statement to Tanza-
nia’s Minister of Finance, expressing deep concern about the
Tanzanian government’s declining economic management per-
formance and signalling negative implications for future
USAID funding levels.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
strongest lobbyists on behalf of the Tanzanian govern-
ment, and tried to persuade the bilateral donors to
release their BoP support!
Nevertheless, the donor statements expressed overall
agreement that the economic reform process in Tanza-
nian had taken a turn in the right direction, even
though some aspects gave reason for concern. The
Tanzanian government responded by promising to pro-
ceed with the economic reform programme. The
donors also praised Tanzania’s decision to introduce a
multiparty system in 1992. It was emphasised, how-
ever, that new political parties ought to be given equal
access to the media in their election campaigns. The
donor community further requested the presence of
international election observers, but this met with
resistance on the Tanzanian side.
Prior to the informal donor meeting in July 1995,
interest was directed to whether the suspended BoP
support as a response to the duty and tax evasion crisis
would be released. Tanzania’s Minister of Finance,
Kikwete, announced that the government’s efforts
since January had improved tax collection. He said
that the 1995/96 budget was a “crisis budget”, partly
because aid volumes were so much lower than
expected:
Due to shortfall in foreign aid, the government
had to borrow from the Bank of Tanzania and
sell Treasury Bills to bridge the deficit. You will
therefore realize, your Excellencies, that the
delayed release of pledged foreign aid had a neg-
ative impact on our recurrent budget.73
He requested, therefore, the donors’ co-operation and
quick release of BoP support to avoid a deeper macro-
economic crisis and the economy getting out of con-
trol. Kikwete’s request petitioned the donors not to
condition BoP support on a new government being in
place after the elections in October 1995.
The IMF was at this point preparing a new ESAF
agreement with the GoT. According to the IMF, reve-
nue collection had been quite weak during the first
quarter of the fiscal year, but had then begun to
improve. On the other hand “expenditure control,
which had also been weak during the first quarter,
showed no signs of improving”.74 Nonetheless, the
IMF encouraged the bilateral donors to release frozen
BoP support.
73 Statement by J.M. Kikwete, Minister of Finance, at donors’
briefing meeting on 19 July, 1995.
74 Statement by the IMF representative at the Informal Consulta-
tive Group Meeting for Tanzania, Paris, 25 July 1995.
43
Norway had co-ordinated its policy with the Nether-
lands, Sweden and the European Commission. Prior to
the meeting it had been agreed that the Netherlands
and Norway would announce that some of the BoP
would be released. Sweden would declare that with-
held debt relief fund would be disbursed. In addition,
Sweden and the European Commission would advise
the meeting that suspended BoP support could be
released if Tanzania reached a new ESAF agreement
with the IMF, scheduled for August. However, the
joint stand collapsed when Commission subsequently
announced that no EU country would release BoP sup-
port at this point in time. The Norwegian decision to
release some of the BoP support was partly based on
the joint agreement with the Netherlands, Sweden and
the EU.75 Since the EU changed its policy, Norway
announced early at the CG meeting that the Norwegian
decision to freeze BoP support would be sustained.
The Norwegian statement at the meeting was quite
critical, and Norway kept a high profile in this case.
Even if Norway agreed with the Tanzanian Minister of
Finance, the World Bank and the IMF that some posi-
tive achievements had been accomplished – such as
the recovery of illegally exempted taxes – it was
believed that the many seatbacks overshadowed the
positive signs. According to the Norwegian statement,
the Tanzanian government’s failure to cut expenses
and reallocate funds to prioritised activities under-
mined macro-economic stability. Norway also
responded to the Tanzanian Minister of Finance’s
insinuation that the donors were to blame for Tanza-
nia’s difficult financial situation:
My delegation is somewhat puzzled that the Tan-
zanian government tend to blame donors for the
unfortunate situation. We are inclined to say that
in a situation when highly placed officials in a
host country have been involved in authorising
tax exemptions leading to misuse of funds, donor
governments would fail in their responsibilities,
at any rate towards their taxpayers, if they did
not take appropriate action including withhold-
ing disbursements, until the situation improves.76
The Norwegian statement also asserted that the eco-
nomic plans for the coming period were overly opti-
mistic, even though the budget was as balanced as
could be expected in the prevailing circumstances.
However, it was thought that the revenue targets were
based on weak foundations. The Norwegian statement
disputed whether sufficient measures were being taken
to curb corruption, since there would still be little risk
75 However, in a note from the Norwegian Embassy prior to the
meeting it was suggested that some of the balance of payment
support should be disbursed.
76 Norwegian statement, informal donors’ meeting – Tanzania,
Paris 25 July 1995.
44
of sanctions. Tax evasion with effective impunity
would be a disincentive to paying tax.77 Even if there
had been improvements in all the areas that had led to
suspension of donor funds, Norway would wait and
see if measures originally agreed upon would be
implemented by Tanzanian authorities. Conditions for
further disbursement included prosecution of tax evad-
ers, budgetary transparency, and sound fiscal policies.
Sweden, Great Britain, Switzerland, and the European
Commission supported the Norwegian conditions, and
linked their further release of BoP support to a new
Tanzanian ESAF agreement with the IMF. However,
the only condition for further Dutch BoP support was
continuance of the negotiations with the IMF. Kikwete
responded to the bilateral donors’ continued suspen-
sion of BoP support by reassuring them that sufficient
action was being taken: “there was a crisis, but the cri-
sis is now over”. Kikwete was evidently disappointed
at the outcome of the meeting.
When the meeting was about to close, the Netherlands
made a complete turnabout and announced that,
despite its earlier statement, it would nevertheless
release BoP support. This reversal took everyone by
surprise, including the Tanzanian side, which was well
aware of the close donor co-ordination on such issues.
This case shows that co-ordination is difficult – even
among the like-minded group – and that donor behav-
iour can be unpredictable, even if the bilateral donors
tend to follow the crowd (cf. Chapter 2). The reason
why first EU and then the Netherlands changed their
previous positions in this case cannot be traced from
the available sources. It is indeed rare that a bilateral
donor like the Netherlands makes a complete turna-
bout at a CG meeting. This shows that, despite the
dominant position of the Bretton Woods institutions
and the influence they exert on bilateral donors, there
may be cases in which bilateral will break ranks and
resist pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, even
if this may prove short-lived.
Although many of the bilateral donors maintained
their sanctions in order to try to induce economic
reforms, most donors gave generous pledges in sup-
port of the election process. Norway announced that
approximately US$ 2.5 million would be disbursed to
planning and administration of the general elections in
a co-financing scheme with other donors.78
Honeymoon or grace period?
The tone of the 1996 CG meeting changed, best
expressed in a USAID minutes from the meeting.
77 Norwegian statement, informal donors’ meeting – Tanzania,
Paris 25 July 1995.
78 Ibid.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
Donor confidence was renewed “but can Tanzania stay
the course?” (USAID 1996).
However, in discussions prior to the CG meeting the
donors agreed that progress in the follow-up of the
SPA/JEM recommendations had been poor. According
to a consultancy report, only 10 per cent of the SPA/
JEM recommendations had been implemented. As
noted, it had been agreed earlier that these recommen-
dations were to be fulfilled by 30 April 1996. This had
not materialised. It was discussed, therefore, what con-
sequences this would have at the next CG meeting.
According to USAID, the new Mkapa government had
showed great resolve in its efforts to improve the
macro-economic situation since the CG meeting in
February 1995, by meeting the conditions of the IMF
shadow programme. But it was emphasised that the
slow pace with respect to addressing the JEM/SPA
recommendations continued to cast doubt on the
GoT’s true commitment to tackling these structural
and political problems. The USA was emphatic that
something had to be done about the corruption prob-
lem. Without progress on governance and tax adminis-
tration and signing of an ESAF, it would not be
possible to continue US assistance at the same or
higher levels.79 Many donors set as a general condition
for their aid co-operation that the political and eco-
nomic reform process should continue. Japan was the
only bilateral donor to indicate that new political con-
ditionality should not be placed on the GoT.
Perhaps the hardest critic was Belgium, announcing
that no new pledges would be made as long as there
were no guarantees of progress on current projects. A
mid-term review of Belgium’s programme had been
undertaken in July 1996, indicating that too much
attention was paid to macro-economics and not
enough to the SPA/JEM recommendations. Belgium
stated that the GoT needed to prove its seriousness by
plugging tax evasion loopholes and prosecuting the
wrongdoers. Otherwise, Belgium would discontinue
its import support programme, and there would be a
return to project support based on technical assistance.
Belgium was, however, unusually critical.
The Tanzanian Minister of Finance, Simon Mbilinyi,
blamed deep-seated structural problems and political
campaigning in 1995 for the lack of progress on the
JEM/SPA recommendations. He promised that this
work would be given top priority and would be started
immediately. He also tried to reassure donors that the
corruption problem would be dealt with, and that most
of the others demands and conditions would be met.
79 018 CG, 96/00846-9, “Tanzania Consultative Group Meeting,
Paris, July 18–19, 1996.”
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
However, in one area the attitude of the GoT was dif-
ferent. The Minister of Finance stated that the interna-
tional community had overreacted with regard to the
political situation on Zanzibar, who lacked a sufficient
understanding of the political history of the island. He
said that a group of impartial academics and politi-
cians was needed to review the situation and to make
recommendations on how to address the problem.
Nevertheless, according to the preparatory documents,
many donors were quite positive, particularly the
World Bank, Denmark, Switzerland and the Nether-
lands. That the performance of the Tanzanian Govern-
ment had improved so dramatically is difficult to see
from the documentation prepared for the meeting, as
well as from hard figures. Nevertheless, 1995 had been
a good year for Tanzania, but this seems rather more a
result of favourable weather conditions. The donors’
satisfaction was largely related to the results of the
Shadow Programme, which was meant to be the point
of departure for a new ESAF agreement (cf. Chapter
3). Another factor which may have contributed to this
change of attitude among donors was their inclination
to give the newly elected government a chance. There-
fore, they signalled a more positive attitude than there
was substantive basis for. According to the Swedish
statement, the recent freeze of aid disbursements had
the positive effect of creating a growing recognition
among Tanzanians that they must begin to take charge
of their own destiny. With few exceptions, donors
expressed a generally positive attitude, and hope that
things would be different this time around:
That donors stressed almost identical themes in
their statements is a positive sign that increased
collaboration on key topics can be achieved in
the field, especially for policy and legislative
reform [...] The impression gained by the end of
the meeting was that donors are cautiously opti-
mistic, guarding some hope that things will be
different this time around and the GoT will con-
tinue steadily on the road to reform without the
backsliding, which has unfortunately so often
characterised its performance in the past.80
In this regard Norway followed suit. In 1995 NOK
47.5 mill. (USD 7.3) was set aside for BoP support,
which was later withheld, pending satisfactory imple-
mentation of the recommendation of the SPA/JEM.
Later the same year Norway was satisfied that
progress had been made, but shortcomings in impor-
tant areas prevented release of these funds in 1995.
Nevertheless, despite Norway’s critical pledging state-
ment at the 1996 CG meeting due to the Tanzanian
80 018 CG, 96/00846-9, “Tanzania Consultative Group Meeting,
Paris, July 18–19, 1996”.
45
government’s failure to meet the SPA/JEM recommen-
dations, funds were released for BoP support:
As a sign of goodwill towards the new Govern-
ment of Tanzania, Norway earlier this year
released half of the amount for balance of pay-
ment support transferred from 1995.81
In line with the new focus on partnership, the CG
meeting in 1997 was for the first time held in Dar es
Salaam. According to a World Bank representative,
the new format of the CG meeting was an effort to
open up for consultation and broader participation
within Tanzania, including an NGO forum and a busi-
ness forum. The initiative was met with enthusiasm on
the Tanzanian side.82 Since the meeting was held in
Dar es Salaam there was much broader Tanzanian par-
ticipation, and the meeting was widely covered in Tan-
zanian mass media. Instead of long, prepared
statements, the meeting was expected to foster real
dialogue with shorter statements.
Prior to the meeting much excitement was linked to
how much emphasis the donors would put on corrup-
tion, but it seemed as if the donors were reluctant to
raise the issue. However, in the opening statement by
President Mkapa, considerable stress was put on the
problem of corruption:
The war on corruption that my Administration
has begun is an extension of our desire for good
governance. [...] There have been calls that
those people mentioned in the Report of the War-
ioba Commission on Corruption should be
promptly sent to court. I should like to state in
response that my war on corruption is not
restricted within the covers of the Warioba
Report. Anyone mentioned in the Report, or any-
one else against whom sufficient evidence that
can stand in court is established, will be sent to
court – and that is official. I have no intention or
reason to protect anyone. Corruption must and
will be made a high-risk, low-profit endeavour.83
During the meeting, corruption was a central topic,
also among the donors. Mkapa was praised for his
government’s fight against corruption, even though
there were great challenges related to good govern-
ance. A particularly controversial issue in 1997 was
the Independent Power Tanzania Ltd. project. Accord-
ing to the World Bank, the deal with a Malaysian part-
81 815.16-Tan-CG, 96/11249-12, “Norsk innlegg på CG-møte for
Tanzania, 18–19 juli 1996”.
82 Also confirmed in interviews by high ranking Tanzanian repre-
sentatives, Dar es Salaam, week 47 and 48 1998.
83 97/00824-16, “Opening statement by President of the United
Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Benjamin William
Mkapa”.
46
ner was costly, and the power generated would be
much more expensive than the tariff at the time. It was
also assumed that high-ranking politician and bureau-
crats had been involved in large-scale corruption
related to the project (East Africa, November 24–30
1997). The former president of the World Bank, Rob-
ert McNamara, should presumably have used this as
an illustration of the high level corruption in Tanzania.
Thus, the World Bank threatened to pull out all sup-
port for the government’s energy sector if the Inde-
pendent Tanzania Limited project went ahead. Shortly
before the CG meeting Mkapa had chastised the World
Bank, arguing that IPTL was the answer to Tanzania’s
power shortage.
Another central agenda item was implementation of
the SPA/JEM recommendations, so critical during the
last year’s meeting. In 1997 Norway was the only
country to raise the issue and ask for a status report.
This had been promised by the Tanzanian Minister of
Finance during a state visit to Norway in May 1997,
but had not yet been received:
Earlier this year, Tanzania was informed that
Norway had decided not to release the last half
of the balance of payment support transferred
from 1996. This decision was based on lack of
documented progress on SPA/JEM actions. The
funds have later been allocated for other devel-
opment purposes. The Ministry of Finance has
previously indicated that a SPA/JEM completion
report would be submitted shortly. However, so
far we have not received any such report, and I
would like to ask the Tanzanian Government
about the status of this report. We have empha-
sised this issue in previous meetings as well, as
we see a need for continued dialogue and docu-
mented progress with regard to the SPA/JEM fol-
low-up actions.84
Notwithstanding the many shortcomings, the bilateral
donors, the IMF and the World Bank made generally
positive statements concerning macro-economic
developments in Tanzania during the past year. The
IMF was of course particularly satisfied since Tanza-
nia had reached the economic benchmarks. But, as
Norway remarked, there were reasons for qualifica-
tions:
We suspect that the economic forecasts presented
at this meeting may be too optimistic, seen
against a background of recent climatic prob-
lems and difficulties in the power sector.85
84 97/00824-17, “Giverlandsmøte for Tanzania Dar es Salaam, 10–
11. desember 1997”.
85 97/00824-17, “Giverlandsmøte for Tanzania Dar es Salaam, 10–
11. desember 1997”.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
It was emphasised, however, that the positive trend
ought to benefit the common Tanzanian as well.86
UNICEF, the Netherlands and Ireland were particu-
larly preoccupied with soft-sector issues. The discrep-
ancy between the positive macro-economic indicators
and much poorer result at the micro level were under-
scored. But here were obvious dilemmas, because
increased aid to these sectors presupposed improved
planning and implementation capacity on the Tanza-
nian side.
Zanzibar was also a subject of discussion about which
bilateral donors were particularly concerned. In 1996
the Tanzanian government had promised that a com-
mission would be appointed to review the situation on
Zanzibar and to offer recommendations for improve-
ment. This had not been done. The countries that had
frozen aid to Zanzibar earlier maintained their posi-
tion. The EU later announced that aid to Zanzibar
would be stopped. All in all, then the pressure
increased further in 1998.
Also at the CG meeting in May 1999 attention was
given to the Zanzibar question. Norway expressed
concern about the situation on Zanzibar, and stressed
the need for a speedy and fair trial of the members of
the opposition who had been charged with treason. It
was underscored that their treatment was not in
accordance with internationally established human
rights. Participants at the meeting were aware that an
initial agreement between CUF and CCM had been
signed during the talks in Paris. Thus, several donors,
among them Norway, opened up for resumption of aid
to Zanzibar. Nevertheless, considering statements
made by diplomats in Dar es Salaam to the Tanzanian
press, any prompt resumption of frozen development
aid is highly unlikely. According to James Adams, the
World Bank director for Tanzania and Uganda, the
bank was watching the situation before it opened dia-
logue for the resumption of development aid frozen in
1995 (East African, 12 May 1999). An European dip-
lomat is quoted in the same newspaper: “The agree-
ment is very positive, but this will still not solve other
political and human rights violations taking place on
Zanzibar” (East African, 12 May 1999).
Recent years have seen a variety of threats that donors
would reduce their assistance, despite Tanzania’s con-
tinued dependence on aid. Most of these threats have
not been related to the application of negative condi-
tionality. The most notable announcement came in late
1997, when the Japanese government said that it
would reduce its aid budget by 10 per cent and redirect
flows towards East and South-East Asia (EIU
1997:28). For Tanzania this could be serious, since
86 Ibid.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
Japan has been one of the most important bilateral
donors in recent years.87 In 1996 Japan contributed
almost one-fifth of Tanzania’s total bilateral aid
receipts. But other factors might point in the opposite
direction. Countries like Finland, Sweden, Great Brit-
ain and EU are increasing or planning to increase their
aid to Tanzania. Norway has indicated a decrease.
5.4 The bilateral negotiation process
After 1986 Norway did not impose special conditions
at the annual bilateral meetings between the two coun-
tries, but followed the other donors. Macro-issues
were first discussed and presented at the CG meetings,
and the Norwegian position was later repeated in the
annual bilateral negotiations.
In the 1980s macro-economic or macro-political
issues were not given particular attention in these
negotiations. Even though the tone in the negotiation
process at this level seemed friendlier and calmer than
within the CG context, NORAD sometimes put for-
ward tough demands and conditions, but for the most
part they related to the micro or project level. At these
meetings, the focus was on projects and programmes
within the country programme.
In the 1990s democratisation and human rights were
put on the agenda of the annual consultations. Political
conditionality involving aid cuts or threats of reduc-
tion was not imposed, but human rights issues were
brought into the aid dialogue. When Norway first
raised such issues, this was not welcomed by Tanza-
nia. In 1990 the Norwegian delegation, in accordance
with its instructions, brought up the situation of Zanzi-
bar’s former Chief Minister – definitely the single case
which caused most friction. The leader of the Norwe-
gian delegation expressed concern that the former
Chief Minister on Zanzibar had been held in detention
for so long, and hoped that he would be brought to trial
shortly with the legal assistance provided for under
Tanzanian law.
The head of the Tanzanian delegation did not comment
on the Norwegian statement, but later added that it
would probably be referred to in the minutes and read
by people “more competent and better informed than
me”.88 The Tanzanian delegation seemed surprised
that the issue was raised at all, and declared that aid
negotiations was not the right forum for such issues.
To this the Norwegian delegation replied that there
87 In 1994, 1995 and 1996 Japan disbursed aid to Tanzania to the
amount of US$ 104.8 m, US$ 124.3 m, and US$ 105.7 m
respectively. The World Bank through its soft loan window,
IDA, was the single biggest multilateral donor in the same
period, contributing US$ 172.3 m, US$ 147.8 m, US$ 120.5 m
in the same three years (EIU 1998:54; OECD 1997:194).
88 311-Tan, 90/1623-1, “Landprogram-forhandlingene Norge–
Tanzania 2–4 april 1990”.
47
was broad consensus in Norway on the close relation-
ship between aid and human rights, and that it formed
part of Norwegian aid policy. A Tanzanian delegate
then asked why Norway had not raised human rights
issues on Zanzibar previously, when the situation was
even worse.
The Tanzanian delegation did not accept that reference
was made to the Zanzibari case in the agreed minutes,
and a compromise resulted:
The Norwegian Government attach great impor-
tance to the human rights issues. Accordingly,
Norway commends Tanzania for their reasona-
ble clean records so far in this respect, and trusts
that Tanzania would maintain this trend, especi-
ally with regard to the trials now going on in
Zanzibar (Agreed Minutes 1990).
Human rights and democratisation were again brought
into the country consultations in 1991. It was under-
scored that the new Norwegian government would
give priority to human rights and democratisation; “the
strong linkage between a democratic political develop-
ment and the economic and social development was
further emphasised” (Agreed Minutes 1991). The Nor-
wegian delegation also noted with appreciation the
decision to appoint a commission to review the ques-
tion of introducing a multiparty system, as well as
more open discussions on the issue in the Tanzanian
mass media. During the meeting reference was made
to the case of Zanzibar, which had been brought up
during the previous year’s discussion, and great appre-
ciation was expressed that detainees were about to be
released (ibid).
At this point human rights and democratisation were
not given particular practical attention in the Norwe-
gian aid programmes to Tanzania, in the form of direct
financial support to these sectors (cf. Selbervik 1997).
But in the aid dialogue the Norwegian stand on “good
governance, including people’s right to express their
views freely and choose their leaders, and respect for
human rights, as prerequisite for development”, was
stated more frequently (Agreed Minutes 1992). During
the annual country negotiations in 1992, the Norwe-
gian delegation leader informed the meeting about the
recently established Norwegian democracy fund
administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
support of preparation and conduct of multiparty elec-
tions. Nevertheless, it was underlined that political
parties would not be eligible for funding from this
source (Agreed Minutes 1992). The country pro-
gramme for the planning period 1993–1996 (NORAD
1992:10) stated that Norwegian support to the democ-
ratisation process in Tanzania through e.g. the democ-
racy fund would be considered. Should support be
48
needed for promoting a multiparty society, Norway
would be prepared to consider such support (Agreed
Minutes 1993).
Together with the other Nordic countries, Norway sup-
ported the Constitutional Commission to travel to Nor-
dic countries as well as to other African countries to
study multiparty systems. Practical facilitation was
supported in connection with a seminar on multiparty-
ism, organised by opposition groups. This kind of sup-
port was not welcomed by the Tanzanian authorities.89
With the local, parliamentary, and presidential elec-
tions in 1994/95 approaching, Norway was enthusias-
tically assisting these processes. Norway had
previously given some support to this area (Cf. 5.3),
over the regional allocation for Africa. NORAD now
suggested that support for democratisation efforts
should be supported through the country programme
in dialogue with Tanzanian authorities. This was in
line with the proposal for a new country strategy
towards Tanzania. At the annual country consultations,
Norway suggested that the country frame could also
be used in support of the political reform programme,
including preparations for the local and national elec-
tions to be held in 1994–95 (Agreed Minutes 1994).
The head of the Norwegian delegation stressed that
Norway attached great importance to democracy,
political pluralism and good governance as “a basis for
the development co-operation between the two coun-
tries” (Agreed Minutes 1994).
But a bilateral donor is faced with many dilemmas. As
mentioned above, Tanzania experienced severe macro-
economic imbalances in the early 1980s, including
budgetary imbalance, credit expansion beyond pro-
gramme targets, and monetary imbalance (Agreed
Minutes 1994). In late 1993, this resulted in suspen-
sion of the ESAF programme, and the IMF and the
World Bank froze their BoP support. The Tanzanian
Government then started to implement the IMF/World
Bank-initiated Shadow Programme, which was
intended to last until 30 July 1994. For further such
support to be released, a number of conditions had to
be fulfilled. But both the IMF and the Government of
Tanzania feared that bilateral donors would also sus-
pend their BoP support, because it was in a way
“included” in the Shadow Programme. It was made
dependent on the bilateral donors not following the
World Bank and the IMF. This was clearly stated by
the head of the Tanzanian delegation. He concluded
his statement by appealing for a speedy release of BoP
support, since the Shadow Programme critically
depended on it. He made it clear that if the programme
failed, it could mean a reversion to the economic situa-
89 Norwegian Embassy, note of 16 October 1992; Garbo 1995.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
tion of the pre-reform days (Agreed Minutes 1994).
This was obviously a dilemma and undermined the
bilateral donors’ credibility.
Norway had earlier decided on a gradual reduction in
its BoP support. For 1994 Norway had allocated
approximately NOK 70 mill, and had to decide
whether those funds should be released or not. Prior to
the meeting, NORAD suggested that Norway would
express willingness to disburse such support for the
first part of 1994 in accordance with earlier plans. Fur-
ther support would have to be reassessed. Future BoP
support would be disbursed on the condition that the
bilateral donors agreed on a sufficient joint plan of
support, and that it was likely that the reform pro-
gramme would be on track and be supported by the
IMF and the World Bank by 1 August 1994.90
By the end of March 1994, Norway had not yet
decided whether BoP support would be released. Such
assistance was still under consideration, assuming that
the economic reform programme continued and that
the currency market operated in a transparent way. The
final decision concerning volume, timing and form
was expected to be made shortly, depending on the fol-
lowing factors: progress in collecting outstanding
counterpart funds on earlier support; assessment of the
post-OGL system; the attitude of other bilateral donors
with regard to BoP support; assessment of the likely
success of the Shadow Programme (Agreed Minutes
1994). Because of slow progress, BoP support was not
disbursed.
In the mid-1990s a change of attitude and much
tougher conditions emerged. Norway expressed con-
cern about the most recent economic developments in
Tanzania, and announced that the budget deficit
seemed to reflect “lack of budgetary discipline”
(Agreed Minutes 1994:3). On the reduction of the
country frame for 1994, it was said that Tanzania still
remained by far the country with the largest financial
country frame for Norwegian assistance. The immedi-
ate background for the reduction was the need to
accommodate new priorities within a constant budget,
but it also reflected “concern about Tanzania’s ability
to mobilise its own resources for development, and
thus continued high dependence on aid and concerns
for Tanzania’s capacity to make effective use of donor
resources” (Agreed Minutes 1994:3). The reduction in
the level of aid might be viewed as an application of
negative conditionality. It was striking that more con-
ditions were imposed at all levels in this period, as
reflected in the Agreed Minutes from 1994: “From the
Norwegian side more focus will be on results and fol-
90 311-Tan , 94/1380-1, “Tanzania – Landprogramgjennomgang”.
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
low-up conditions and commitments contained in the
projects agreements”.
With reference to the slow progress in collecting out-
standing counterpart funds on earlier CIS/OGL
schemes, the head of the Norwegian delegation asked
to be briefed on actions being taken to speed up the
process and have the matter finalised within reasona-
ble time. He also reiterated Norway’s statement from
the CG meeting that an amount of NOK 92.5 mill
intended for BoP support in 1994 had been withdrawn.
As for 1995 the release of the amount (NOK 47.5 mill)
set aside for BoP support would depend on concrete
action taken by the Tanzanian government on tax mat-
ters, exemptions and evasions and implementation of
the recommendations made by the SPA mission
(Agreed Minutes 1995:3–4).
After the election on Zanzibar, Norway decided not to
start up new projects on the island until the situation
had improved. According to the Agreed Minutes
(1996) the Tanzanian delegation did not comment on
the Norwegian decision. According to a summary
from the meeting, the negotiations took place in a
friendly and relaxed atmosphere, even though the Nor-
wegian delegation reiterated its concern about the slow
implementation of the SPA/JEM recommendations. If
these were not implemented it would have conse-
quences for further Norwegian disbursement of BoP
support.
The focus and issues have definitely changed in the
1990s. Previously, attention had been on project and
programmes. In the annual consultations there were
four main issues the Norwegian delegation wanted to
discuss: the macro-economic situation; the political
situation and democratisation; overall development co-
operation; and the Civil Service Reform Programme
(Agreed Minutes 1996:3)
The head of the Norwegian delegation expressed satis-
faction with the economic situation and the fact that
Tanzania and the IMF had reached an agreement on a
Shadow Programme. He confirmed that Norway had
agreed to release NOK 23.7 mill. in the second quarter
of 1996, as a sign of goodwill towards the new Gov-
ernment of Tanzania (cf. 4.3). However, Norway
shared the concerns of large parts of the donor com-
munity on the follow-up on the recommendation by
the SPA/Joint Evaluation mission. It was stressed in
particular that performance with regard to implemen-
tation of the JEM recommendations would be a key
factor in Norway’s deliberations to provide further
BoP/import support to Tanzania, and debt relief
through the 5th dimension facility (Agreed Minutes
1996:3).
49
It was further stated that although some logistics prob-
lems had been revealed, credit was given to Tanzania
for the way the election of the Union president and
parliament had been conducted. Nevertheless, the situ-
ation that had evolved on Zanzibar following the elec-
tion was viewed with concern. Norway, together with
other major donors, had already stated dissatisfaction
with the lack of transparency during the election and
the counting of votes. Norway stated that it was not
considered possible to assist new development projects
on Zanzibar until progress had been made towards a
solution of the political problems of the island. In con-
sequence, further consideration of the Phase IV of the
electrification programme would be shelved.
The annual bilateral consultations in 1997 were
marred by poor preparations on the part of the Tanza-
nian delegation. This was partly due to the fact that
Tanzania had completed the annual consultations with
Denmark only on the previous day. This in turn illus-
trates the general problem of an overburdened Tanza-
nian administration, which undermines ownership.91
The Norwegian delegation praised the general attitude
of transparency and self-examination expressed in the
Warioba Report on corruption, but also stressed the
need for speedy implementation of the recommenda-
tions. The Tanzanian delegation responded by pointing
to the actions already taken. The Norwegian delega-
tion asked for a status report by the Tanzanian govern-
ment on the follow-up of the SPA/JEM, and
emphasised the need for continuous dialogue on these
issues. Tanzania was informed that Norway had
decided not to release the remaining BoP support
funds of NOK 23.8 million transferred from 1995, due
to lack of progress in the implementation of the SPA/
JEM recommendations. Tanzania was also advised
that BoP support was not under consideration in 1997
(Agreed Minutes 1997). Furthermore, Norway would
take a tougher conditionality line at lower levels if the
contractual obligations were not honoured. Disburse-
ment would be delayed if presentations and accounts
were slow. NORAD’s new policy was communicated
with reference to the RUDEP programme and the
Road Sector Programme; funds unaccounted for
would have to be repaid (Agreed Minutes 1997). Prior
to the annual consultations in 1998 the Embassy in
Dar es Salaam had recommended that repayment
should not be insisted upon in either of the cases,
despite delays. Tanzania should be given a second
chance. NORAD supported this view.92
91 In 1998 the Nordic countries tried to co-ordinate their annual
consultation, to lessen the burden on the Tanzanian administra-
tion. The effort initiated by the Swedish Embassy stranded, due
to practical impediments on the donor side.
92 NORAD, note of 25 February, 1998.
50
The head of the Tanzanian delegation thanked for the
Norwegian assistance before and during the 1995 gen-
eral elections and for supporting the democratisation
process. The Norwegian delegation brought up the sit-
uation on Zanzibar as instructed, and expressed con-
cern about the political deadlock and the urgency of an
authentic dialogue. It was stressed that the obligation
to find a solution rested not only on the Union and the
Zanzibar governments, but also on the opposition. The
Tanzanian delegation took note of the Norwegian posi-
tion that resumption of aid to Zanzibar would be con-
ditional on an agreement between the parties. A
section in the press release expressing the Norwegian
concern about the situation on Zanzibar was deleted.
From the Norwegian point of view, it was more impor-
tant to be able to formulate a press release that both
parties could accept.
The Norwegian position towards Zanzibar did not
change in 1998, and was restated during the annual
consultations that year (Agreed Minutes 1998). Moreo-
ver, for the first time, Tanzania agreed to include the
Norwegian concern about Zanzibar in addition to
human rights and good governance in the joint press
release. This may be seen to reflect a more open atti-
tude with respect to the existence of such problems.
Referring to statements of Hilde Frafjord Johnson, the
Norwegian Minister of International Development and
Human Rights, the Norwegian government saw human
rights and development as integrated issues, and that
human rights would play a more prominent role in aid
5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY
negotiations than previously. It was thus indicated that
there might be a change in Norwegian development
policy.93
Norway thanked for the SPA/JEM report received at
the CG meeting, and asked to be kept informed about
the follow-up on these issues. Tanzania stated that
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) had been
instructed to follow up on the collection of arrears, that
substantial part of it would be collected in the course
of that fiscal year, and that wrongdoers would prose-
cuted as appropriate (Agreed Minutes 1998). Norway
also emphasised, with reference to the Norwegian-
funded audit of the IPC (Investment Promotion Cen-
tre), that irregular exemptions had indeed been granted
by the IPC. Norway suggested that the audit report be
distributed to the donors that participated in the 1995
SPA/JEM. Tanzania responded by promising that the
report would be distributed. To maintain donor confi-
dence the importance of a clear demonstration of true
commitment to fighting corruption was emphasised.
The head of the Norwegian delegation advised that the
new Government of Norway planned to increase the
volume of development assistance to one percent of
GDP, but that release of funds would, as a matter of
general aid policy, be made conditional on docu-
mented quality and efficiency of Norwegian aid.
93 Statement by head of the Norwegian delegation, at the annual
consultations, 24–27 March 1998.
6. CONCLUSION
6. Conclusion
6.1 Tying together the discussion
The previous sections have sought to give a presenta-
tion of the role of Norway – from a conditionality per-
spective – in the aid negotiation processes within
different forums, mainly the CG meetings and the
bilateral annual country consultations between Nor-
way and Tanzania. What has been the role of Norway,
and in more general terms, what has been the role of
the bilateral donor in this regard? How has Norway
applied its conditionality policy towards Tanzania, and
has it changed over time? How can the Norwegian pol-
icy be explained?
Norwegian and Nordic policy towards Tanzania has
undergone notable changes from the mid-1980s to
date. In view of the cordial Nordic–Tanzanian relation-
ship, it might seem paradoxical that it was towards
Tanzania that Norway for the first time actively sup-
ported economic conditionality. The imposition of
macro-economic conditions meant a significant depar-
ture from previous Norwegian aid policy. According to
former Norwegian Ambassador to Tanzania, Gunnar
Garbo, it was a great disappointment to many Tanza-
nian that the Nordic countries “changed sides”.94
Since Tanzania reached an agreement with the IMF in
1986, the reform process has been off track several
times, but Tanzania has had a clean track record from
1996 up to date. Multilateral and bilateral donors have
given substantial support to the various reform pro-
grammes in this period. That Tanzania finally reached
an agreement with IMF in 1986 was undoubtedly
linked to the pressure exerted by the donor community,
and here the Nordic countries’ ultimatum-like condi-
tions in 1984 may have contributed to tip the balance.
Some will argue, however, that Tanzania would have
reformed its economy regardless of international pres-
sure, and that Tanzania had in fact already started to
reform the economy at that time (cf. Chapter 3). At
any rate, it is clear that the donors contributed to a vital
push of the Tanzanian government toward concluding
an agreement with the IMF. As mentioned in chapter
2, most studies are quite negative when evaluating the
efficacy of conditionality, but argue that in some cases
the donor community can contribute to tip the balance,
and give support to pro-reform factions (World Bank
1998a; Williamson and Haggard 1994). This seems to
have been the case in Tanzania in the mid-1980s,
although it is difficult to judge whether the pro-reform
factions were “real reformers” or merely opportunistic
politicians.
94 Interview, Gunnar Garbo, 14 October 1998. According to
Garbo, this was a general perception expressed in several dis-
cussions he had with Tanzanian politicians.
51
Like most other bilateral donors, Norway has since the
mid-1980s applied cross-conditionality, which means
that Norwegian bilateral aid has been conditional on
Tanzania reaching agreements with the IMF and the
World Bank. But applying cross-conditionality does
not necessarily involve tangible or very strict sanctions
if the conditions are not met. Threats have often been
vaguely expressed – for instance, that the level or
design of Norwegian aid might be altered if agree-
ments are not reached with the international financial
institutions, but without more specific implications
being stipulated. Norway has since the mid-1980s,
generally speaking, given full backing to the reform
programmes initiated by the Bretton Wood institu-
tions.
It might seem surprising that once Norway changed its
position after much resistance prior to 1984, it has
remained loyal to the line of the World Bank and the
IMF. At least, little official opposition towards this
policy has been expressed openly. One explanation
may be that Norway, together with the Nordic bloc,
was disillusioned at the time, since things had not gone
very well in Tanzania despite massive Nordic aid. The
Nordic countries have often been blamed for aggravat-
ing and prolonging the economic crisis in Tanzania, by
providing generous support to the Tanzanian govern-
ment in defiance of the IMF. After 1985–86 it may
seem as if Norway, together with the Nordic countries,
for some years took a position of “wait and see”. This
may have been due to a general feeling of disillusion-
ment among the Nordic countries.
Another explanation of the altered Norwegian position
may be that Norwegian aid policy in general changed
in the 1980s, becoming more oriented towards market-
based solutions. There also seem to be a general per-
ception that the Bretton Wood institutions would man-
age to help solve the economic crisis in Tanzania.
According to a former Nordic executive director of the
World Bank, one reason why the World Bank’s struc-
tural adjustment efforts were so unsuccessful – partic-
ularly in the beginning – was that the Bank lacked the
required competence when implementation of these
programmes started in the late 1970s and early
1980s.95 In the late 1980s and early 1990s there was
increasing criticism of the structural adjustment pro-
grammes in general. Few denied that something had to
be done with the many crisis-ridden African econo-
mies – that of Tanzania included – it was more a ques-
tion of how, by whom and how fast.
95 Interview, Einar Magnussen, 15 October 1998.
52
Despite little direct opposition among central actors
against the new policy, Norway may have tried to
influence the Bank’s policy through other channels. It
has often been argued that Norway and the Nordic
bloc contributed significantly to integrating soft sector
issues in the structural adjustment programmes. It is
difficult, however, to find documentary evidence to
support this claim. Nevertheless, among the various
informants there seemed to be a general perception
that the Nordic countries – particularly through their
representatives in Washington – quite successfully
influenced the Bank in a softer direction.
Was the growing consensus in the donor community in
the latter part of the 1990s a result of increased co-
ordination or a weakened position of the bilateral
donors relative to that of the Bretton Woods institu-
tions? The answer is equivocal. Particularly in the
1990s, the World Bank’s policy has also changed. In
many ways it seems justified to state that the policies
of the World Bank and Norway have converged. Nor-
wegian policy has moved closer to that of the World
Bank, and vice versa.
Undoubtedly, there seems to be broader consensus
among the donors when it comes to general policies,
but in practical operations in the field there are still big
differences. Even so, a situation like the one in the
beginning of the 1980s when the Nordic countries per-
sisted with their generous support to Tanzania without
an IMF agreement for such a long time, seems totally
unrealistic today. According to Einar Magnussen,
there have been earlier periods, in the 1970s and
1980s, when the Nordic bloc took a far more radical
position in the World Bank, and were blamed for try-
ing to politicise the Bank. This has changed. Gunnar
Garbo characterises the current Norwegian position as
being much more cowardly than earlier. Others might
say more “sensible”.
Despite the Nordic change of policy, it seems clear
that the Nordic countries still have a particularly close
relationship with Tanzania, often characterised as less
paternalistic or bossy than those of many of the other
donors like the USA and the UK. However, many non-
Norwegian informants perceived that Norway in
recent years had assumed a more hesitant attitude
towards Tanzania. Within the Nordic bloc, Sweden
seemed by far the most articulate and active donor.
At the same time, the World Bank has taken on a far
more prominent role than in the past, and note only
with reference to Tanzania. In general, the Word Bank
has become a leading “think tank” on aid questions
and now sets much of the agenda in this area. Both the
other bilateral donors and recipients seem increasingly
oriented towards the World Bank on aid issues in gen-
6. CONCLUSION
eral and more specifically in the context of condition-
ality.
How can the role of Norway in the aid negotiation
processes be explained? It seems that donors are far
more critical at the CG meetings than in the bilateral
negotiation processes, a point confirmed by informants
who have participated in both types of negotiations.
The group discipline among the donors at the CG
meetings seems strong. Donors tend to be reluctant to
raise controversial issues unless it is known before-
hand that other donors will support their stand. If one
donor raises an issue, most of the other donors will fol-
low suit. In interviews informants have stated that
donor fear isolation if unpopular issues are raised.
There also seems to be a lot of competition and posi-
tioning among the donors. Since the CG meetings are
closed and more confidential than for example the
country negotiation processes, positioning towards
other countries is judged as more important than reac-
tions from the recipient country and the domestic pub-
lic.
In the context of the CG meetings it is striking that
there seems to be a wide discrepancy between the var-
ious donors’ statement and their actual pledges: state-
ments are far more critical and do not correspond to
the ensuing pledges.96 This supports the argument,
often advanced in the conditionality literature, that
donors lack credibility when conditionality is applied.
In Chapter 4 a model based on the Samaritan’s
dilemma was presented in order to explain Norwegian
behaviour. According to this theory there was only one
dominant strategy for the donor, namely that of dis-
bursing aid – the donor imperative. This means that it
would be unproblematic for the recipient to predict the
outcome of the donor’s behaviour, and there would be
few incentives for the recipient to implement unpopu-
lar reforms. For most of the period under study here,
the Samaritan’s dilemma can serve as an explanation
of Norway’s behaviour. As mentioned in Chapter 4,
one way of solving the dilemma would be for Norway
to tie its conditionality policy to the World Bank. This
appears to have been part of the Norwegian strategy in
applying cross-conditionality, linking some disburse-
ment to the policy of the multilateral institutions,
which may serve as a buffer.
It might be argued that disbursement of aid, independ-
ent of the behaviour of the recipient, has been the
dominant strategy of the multilateral institutions as
well, but perhaps for other reasons. However, the dis-
bursement imperative is driven by reward and incen-
tive mechanisms for World Bank staff. Considerable
96 This paradox was also pointed at by many interviewees.
6. CONCLUSION
prestige also attaches to the implementation of these
programmes, so that the IMF and the World Bank have
vested interests in not getting off track. It can be
argued, therefore, that disbursement will be the domi-
nant strategy of the IMF and the World Bank as well.
If this is the case, hesitant reformers will have few
incentives to change their behaviour, and aid would
not serve as effective backing of the pro-reform fac-
tions. In short, it may not be solving the Samarian’s
dilemma. Nevertheless, it would be easier to change
the incentive structure for the Bank staff than the
Samaritan’s altruistic motivations. Of course, the moti-
vation for disbursing aid is not entirely altruistic, not
even for Norway. Many would probably claim that
other motives have been on the increase. In addition, a
donor like Norway is faced with the disbursement
imperative, due to its rigid national budgeting system,
and the need to dispose of the money by the end of the
year. The recipient is aware of this. Still, this will not
weaken the general argument that the donor will have
one dominant strategy: disbursement.
As discussed in section 5.3, in 1994 many of the bilat-
eral donors, including Norway, decided to apply sanc-
tions and withheld BoP support. That disbursement
had been the dominant strategy previously may be
illustrated by the fact that this decision was met with
great surprise on the part of Tanzania. A new situation
had arisen, which may be illustrated in a game-like sit-
uation, as shown in figure 7.
Recipient
Reform No Reform
1 2
Aid A B
Donor Sanctions (4,2) (1,1)
1
Aid C D
2 (2,3) (3,4)
Figure 7,97 A Samaritan’s dilemma
This is a situation with two equilibria, so it will be
impossible to predict the behaviour of the donor and
the recipient. But in sequential games, there may be
two possible solutions, depending on who acts first. If
the donor decides to impose sanctions, the recipient
will implement reforms. If there is no reform by the
recipient, the donor will disburse aid all the same. On
the other hand, it should be kept in mind that such
models are only stylised illustrations of superior or
dominant patterns of behaviour.
97 This figure is based on what Buchanan characterises as a pas-
sive Samaritan’s dilemma, in opposition to the active Samari-
tan’s dilemma shown in figure 6.
53
Even so, the model above describes very well the situ-
ation between Tanzania and the donors in 1994. When
some donors applied sanctions and the structural
adjustment programmes went off track, the Tanzanian
government implemented a shadow programme very
successfully. But the paradox of this situation was that
the World Bank ended up as the strongest lobbyists on
behalf of the Tanzanian government, despite the lat-
ter’s failure to meet the conditions. How can this be
explained? One reason may have been that once the
bilateral donors cut their BoP support, it would be
even harder to get the structural adjustment and stabili-
sation programmes back on track. Thus, even if no
agreement was reached and the conditions were not
met, the bilateral donors saw it as crucial to maintain
BoP support in such a situation.
This situation did not last very long, even if the agreed
conditions had still not been fulfilled after the election
in 1996. Many bilateral donors then decided to dis-
burse their BoP support, as a sign of goodwill towards
the new government. This may partly be explained by
the “honeymoon thesis”, which holds that economic
reformers are likely to enjoy greater freedom of politi-
cal manoeuvre immediately after they have taken
office, when problems and mistakes can be blamed on
the previous government (Williamson and Haggard
1994). This thesis is most commonly used to explain a
government’s relationship with the legislature, but it
may also be applied to explain the government’s room
for political manoeuvre towards the donor community
– the recipient government’s international constituency.
It may also be hypothesised that the argument seemed
valid during the “wedding preparations” in Tanzania. It
will be most interesting to see what happens in the run-
up to and after the election in the year 2000. Will the
Tanzanian government be blessed both during the wed-
ding preparations and while on honeymoon?
Would the same apply to political and economic con-
ditionality? Has Norway adopted a different policy
bilaterally and multilaterally? And if so, how can these
differences be explained? In the early 1980s the dis-
crepancy between bilateral and multilateral condition-
ality policies was so wide that there would appear to
be no connection, according to Einar Magnussen.98
This was closely related to the fact that different min-
istries in Oslo were dealing independently with these
issues towards different institutions, without proper
co-ordination. This does not seem to be much of a
problem any longer, since general policy in these areas
are currently better co-ordinated in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
98 Interview, Einar Magnussen, 15 October 1998.
54
If we look at how Norway has pursued its policy in
e.g. a CG meeting context as opposed to the bilateral
negotiation processes, there are still differences. Nor-
way seems to be far more critical in the CG meetings
than in the bilateral annual aid negotiations. In the lat-
ter no additional conditions are attached, apart from
the cross-conditionalities. There are few specifically
Norwegian conditions attached. The Samaritan’s
dilemma may serve as a model for explaining why
Norway seems to be adopting different policies multi-
laterally and bilaterally. For the Samaritan it would be
easier to leave it to an agent to pursue a tough policy
and to link the implementation of tough conditions to
an agent, in casu the World Bank. Bilaterally, the
Samaritan would be much softer.
However, it may have been more difficult for a bilat-
eral donor to contribute to the political reform process
than to the economic reform process. Human rights
and democratisation have not been part of the mandate
of the World Bank as a financial institution, although
they may enter indirectly under the rubric of good gov-
ernance. It may be hypothesised that it will be harder
for a bilateral donor to operationalise its conditions
and to follow them up with sanctions in this area. The
bilateral donor would not have a buffer, and would not
in the same way be able to tie difficult decisions to an
agent or proxy, as has been done in the economic
sphere.
Democratisation and human rights have not figured
prominently on the agenda at CG meetings. The prob-
lems on Zanzibar have been raised repeatedly, but this
has rather been the doing of the bilateral donors. There
have been few cases where specific political condi-
tions have been attached, partly because of the lack of
the same monitoring mechanisms and benchmarks as
in with economic reforms. The one exception has been
Zanzibar, where Norway together with a group of
other bilateral donors decided not to start new projects
until the human rights problem had been solved.99 But
since that decision was made, the case has reached a
deadlock. Sources also show that Norway at that time
was afraid of being left alone as the only donor to
impose sanctions. Norway definitely had no wish to be
in the frontline and to set an example.
On the other hand, in the 1990s human rights and
democratisation have been issues on the agenda of the
bilateral annual country negotiation meetings between
Norway and Tanzania. This was not welcomed by the
Tanzanian side, but the Tanzanians seem more relaxed
now about Norway raising human rights issues, even
though it has remained sensitive. From the Norwegian
side, raising these issues sometimes seems a bit ritual-
99 According to Gunnar Garbo, interview 14 October 1998, this
was a disproportionate reaction.
6. CONCLUSION
istic – something done out of duty, to follow instruc-
tions and to appease public opinion at home.
Many bilateral donors, including Norway, now seem
to be taking a position of wait and see “whether the
government is really serious this time”, as some
informants have suggested. But is it likely that there
will be fundamental changes in the behaviour of a
bilateral donor like Norway in the near future? After
more than ten years of ongoing reform of the Tanza-
nian economy, the macro-economic indicators are
promising, and the GoT has successfully managed to
reach the macro-economic benchmarks set by the IMF.
Even so, many indicators are still pointing in the
wrong direction. The problem of corruption seems to
be escalating, even though Tanzania is said to be one
of the best documented countries in the world when it
comes to investigating corruption. It has been docu-
mented that corruption is widespread, large-scale and
with many high-ranking bureaucrats and politicians
involved (World Bank 1998). But despite President
Mkapa’s repeated statements that something serious
will be done about the problem, few concrete steps
have been taken (ibid).
As long as Tanzania succeeds in meeting the economic
benchmarks, the IMF is “satisfied”, and to some extent
other parts of the donor community as well. This illus-
trates the problems of measurement. What should be
done when some conditions are met while others are
not? What factors should count the most? IMF’s
macro-economic benchmarks have been more success-
fully met than e.g. the World Bank conditions for
structural adjustment loans. This explains why the
IMF has often been more positive in its evaluation of
GoT performance than the World Bank and the bilat-
eral donors. It is easier to monitor quantitative bench-
marks than qualitative conditions. The conditions for
obtaining structural adjustment finance entail deeper
changes and are in general more politically sensitive
and controversial. This points up the problems
involved in applying political conditionality.
There is another paradox as well. In contrast to macro-
economic performance, the socio-economic indicators
for Tanzania are not as promising. This is so despite
the inclusion of social cushioning elements in more
recent reform programmes, in response to criticism.100
It is interesting, therefore, to compare some socio-eco-
nomic indicators for Tanzania from the start of the
reform process to date.101 Life expectancy at birth has
clearly dropped in this period – from 54 years in 1987
to 50.6 years in 1995. However, this figure is likely to
100 These issues are discussed in greater depth in the UNICEF
report, Adjustment with a Human Face.
101 The figures are collected from various editions of UNDP’s
Human Development Report and the World Bank report World
Development Indicators 1998.
6. CONCLUSION
have been influenced by the increasing numbers of
AIDS victims and people dying from HIV-related dis-
eases. Adult literacy has also declined dramatically –
from 75 per cent in 1985 to 67.8 per cent ten years
later. From being far above the average for “all devel-
oping countries” in 1985, when the average literacy
rate was 62 per cent for all developing countries, Tan-
zania is now below the average for all developing
countries. In 1995 this figure showed 70.4 per cent for
this group of countries.102 Also other indicators such
as access to health services and sanitation show a dra-
matic deterioration in the last 10–15 years (UNDP
1990, 1998).
How can we explain this gap between macro and
micro levels? The material for this study is not suffi-
cient to enable firm conclusions, but it is tempting to
suggest that the donors’ macro-conditionality has in
part resulted in a reversed micro–macro paradox (cf.
Chapter 4). It may be argued, of course, that it is not
until recently that macro-economic stability has been
achieved, and that these macro achievements will ulti-
mately filter down to lower levels. This remains to be
seen.
What implications will this have for a bilateral donor
like Norway? It is suggested that it will aggravate the
Samaritan’s dilemma, and that disbursement will
remain the dominant strategy, independent of what the
recipient might do. Particularly at a time when the
results at the micro level are so weak, it would be diffi-
cult for the Samaritan to impose sanctions. It is also
likely that many donors will be eager to support the
soft sectors. This is likely to occur despite the new
idea of partnership, with Tanzania at the helm, that the
donors wait for national sources to be mobilised, and
that national capacity must match the donors’ dis-
bursement. According to a recent World Bank report
(1998a) the only solution to such a situation would be
patience, but this will obviously constitute a dilemma
for the Samaritan. It is also likely that the national
Samaritans – public opinion and parliament – will put
pressure on the donor to act. At the same time it is
likely that the other Nordic donors will increase their
aid to Tanzania in the future, because a large percent-
age of total aid is earmarked for sub-Saharan Africa.
In Tanzania there is no civil war, and aid absorption
capacity is better than in most other African countries.
The aid has to be disbursed somewhere.
102 However, the figure for Tanzania is still above the average for
the group of least developed countries, where the figures for
1995 and 1985 were 49.2 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.
It is thus interesting to note that adult literacy rate has stagnated
during the past decade.
55
A special Nordic–Tanzanian relationship?
In the late 1990s particularly, discontent and disillu-
sionment among the donors seemed to be growing.
After the Tanzanian general elections in 1995, the
Nordic countries took an initiative to renew co-opera-
tion with Tanzania, and to express support for the
ongoing democratisation process. The Nordic coun-
tries also wanted to signal to the newly elected govern-
ment that Nordic support would be sustained at a high
level. This initiative also reflected an acknowledge-
ment that huge amounts of aid over a long period of
time did not seem to have been reflected in positive
developments in Tanzania. The Nordic strategy was
now to give Tanzania the leading role in the new part-
nership.
The dialogue started with meetings between the Nor-
dic Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Tanzanian author-
ities. After a relatively long process, a high-level
meeting took place in Dar es Salaam on 12–13 Sep-
tember 1996 between Tanzanian and Nordic represent-
atives. After an initiative from the Nordic
Parliamentary Secretaries to their Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, a joint Nordic memorandum was prepared,
proposing renewed co-operation with Tanzania. The
Nordic memo was handed over to the Tanzanian gov-
ernment in December 1996.
The high-level meeting was given relatively good cov-
erage in the Tanzanian press, which at the rhetorical
level seemed inspired by slogans from early Nyerere
speeches. President Mkapa declared to the Tanzanian
press that: “this government would like to strengthen
the fundamental principles of self-reliance” (Daily
News 14.09.96). He further underscored that the new
co-operation should place emphasis on Tanzania’s
enhanced participation in its own development, thus
changing the hitherto existing donor–recipient rela-
tionship (Daily News 14.09.96). According to state-
ments from the meeting, the new development
partnership implied a radical change of rules and roles
between the partners, but with Tanzania in charge.
Speaking on behalf of the Nordic delegation, Sida’s
Director General, Bo Göransson, said that the Nordic
countries had contributed significantly to Tanzania’s
development since independence in 1961, but the
results were limited. He further stated that it was
important for Tanzania to look for internal resources,
because donor funds were becoming increasingly dif-
ficult to obtain (Daily News 13.09.1996). From a Nor-
wegian perspective the meeting was judged as very
constructive, and an agreed note between the parties
was elaborated.
In December 1997 another Nordic high-level meeting
was held, but confined to representatives from the
Embassies in Dar es Salaam. Despite Nordic enthusi-
56
asm about the initiative, there was no corresponding
enthusiasm from the Tanzanian side. This was con-
firmed in a Norwegian memo commenting on the
meeting, stating that it could unfortunately be seen as a
ritual duty, and that it had been impossible to achieve
substantial results. This stood in glaring contrast to the
Norwegian excitement after the meeting in 1996. It
was further said that the Tanzanian delegates had been
poorly prepared. The Tanzanian representatives
seemed generally resigned and overwhelmed by
reform in every sector. To avoid conflicts before the
CG meeting, the Nordic countries thus opted to keep a
low profile, highlighting positive trends instead.
Prior to the Nordic initiative in 1995, the Danish Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish government
had assembled in mid-1994 a group of independent
advisers on development co-operation issues between
Tanzania and its donors. This group submitted its
report – the Helleiner report, after the head of the team
– in June 1995 at a time when relations between the
GoT and bilateral donors were very strained (cf. previ-
ous section).
The group offered a list of recommendations, pre-
sented at a meeting in January 1997 between central
donors and the GoT. The recommendations implied
radical changes in the roles and rules of the relation-
ship between the donors and the GoT, which involved
taking partnership and ownership seriously and not
just as fashionable aid slogans. These perspectives
were also embraced in the 1996 DAC/OECD docu-
ment Shaping the 21st Century. This would among
other things mean that the GoT should insist on pre-
paring the first draft of all policy documents, and that
the donors were willing to withhold or delay aid until
the local conditions necessary for ownership were sat-
isfied, rather than merely carrying on business as
usual. It was also seen as crucial that a gradual decline
in external support for Tanzania was planned (see Hel-
leiner et al. 1995).
The ideas from the Helleiner Report, the Nordic initia-
tive and Shaping the 21st Century in Tanzania were
supposed to be followed up in the Development Co-
operation Forum, consisting of Tanzanian representa-
tive and a smaller group of donors, participating on a
rotation basis. Even though some might prefer busi-
ness as usual, there seemed general acknowledgement
that the donor–recipient relationship ought to change.
But when the Nordic countries tended to judge the
Nordic initiative as the most important step in the part-
nership process, some other donors put more emphasis
on Shaping the 21st Century. There seemed to be a cer-
tain element of donor competition linked to the part-
nership initiative. As reflected in the documents, there
6. CONCLUSION
seemed to be no corresponding enthusiasm on the Tan-
zanian side.
There seems to be a difference among donors in their
attitude and willingness to implement the partnership
idea, and also a slight departure from the most com-
mon donor constellations. Norway is still among the
most progressive countries, together with Sweden, the
Netherlands, and Ireland, followed by a group of
slightly less progressive countries such as Denmark,
Finland, Switzerland, Belgium and perhaps the UK.
Then follow Canada, the USA, and the European
Commission. Japan and Germany seem to be rather
passive or ignorant about the whole partnership proc-
ess.
What has been achieved? Among the donors and rep-
resentative on the Tanzanian side, perceptions differ
greatly as to what has actually been achieved, if any-
thing. Some informants said that the whole process
had lost its dynamics due to little enthusiasm, while
others were slightly more optimistic. Nevertheless,
Samuel Wangwe asserts that some positive sign can be
traced, such as more local involvement and initiative
on the Tanzanian side, but hastens to add that there
still is a long way to go.103
Some have argued that Tanzania has been infected by
aid, and has to be cured. The donor–recipient relation-
ship is also characterised as a relationship between a
social client and social security office. To change this
relationship, the incentive structure on both sides will
have to be transformed. During the OECD/DAC
Forum of Development Partners held in Paris in 1998,
L.A. Msamichaka described the relationship between
the donor and the recipient as of a daddy and son/
daughter relationship:
Son/daughter is rarely asked what s/he wants.
And if it happens that the child is asked, then it is
done to lure the child that daddy loves her/him
or that s/he is grown up. In a more refined form,
the same things happen between donors and aid
recipient.104
To achieve true partnership, this relationship will have
to undergo fundamental changes. In the type of rela-
tionship as referred to above, the result tends to be a
Samaritan’s dilemma, and changed behaviour in direc-
tion of reform is not very likely.
Nevertheless, donor perceptions of a new partnership
do not appear to be based on a partnership disbursing
103 Interview, Samuel Wangwe, Dar es Salaam, 30 November 1998.
104 L. A. Msambichaka, 1998, “Partnership: the reflection for the
civil society perspective”. Paper presented at OECD/DAC meet-
ing in January 1998.
6. CONCLUSION
unconditional aid. Donors emphasise that each side
must take the other seriously, but aid must be based on
strict conditions. On the other hand, conditionality is
very complex, involving an intertwined set of political
and economic reforms within different areas. There
are also difficult trade-offs in different phases of the
57
reform process. The economic reform process seems
to be much more driven by the donors than is the polit-
ical reform process. As regards the economic reform
process, the bilateral donors have most of the time
been “dangling after IMF/IBRD”, as one interviewee
put it.
58
Literature
Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar. 1998. Who Gives
Aid to Whom and Why? Cambridge: NBER
Working Paper Series, no 6612.
Ball, Nicole. 1992. Pressing for Peace: Can Aid
Induce Reform? Washington DC: Overseas
Development Council.
Bagachwa, Mboya. 1997. “Aid effectiveness in Tanza-
nia” in Carlsson et. al. Foreign Aid in Africa.
Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African
Studiesska Afrika Insitutetet.
Barya, John-Jean B. 1993. “The new political condi-
tionality of aid: an independent view from
Africa”, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 1.
Berg, Elliot J. (ed.). 1993. Rethinking Technical Coop-
eration. New York:
Berg, Elliot. 1997. “Dilemmas in donor aid strategies”,
in Catherine Gwin and Joan Nelson (eds).
Perspectives on Aid and Development. Wash-
ington DC: Overseas Development Council.
Black, David and Jean-Phillipe Thérien. 1996. “Mov-
ing with the crowd: Canadian aid to Africa”,
International Journal, No 2, spring 1996.
Boone, Peter. 1994. The impact of foreign aid on sav-
ings and growth. London: London School of
Economics, 1994.
Boone, Peter. 1996. “The politics and effectiveness of
foreign aid”, European Economic Review, No
40.
Buchanan, James. 1975. “The Samaritan’s Dilemma”
in Edmund Phelps (ed). Altruism, Morality
and Economic Theory. New York: Russell
Sage Foundation.
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar. 1997. Aid, Policy and
Growth. Working Paper, no. 1777. Policy
Research Department, Macroeconomics and
Growth Division Washington DC: World
Bank.
Cassen, Robert & Associates. 1994. Does Aid Work?
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Chang, Charles et al. 1998. Measuring Aid Flows: A
New Approach. Washington DC: World
Bank.
Chege, Michael. 1994. “Swapping development strate-
gies: Kenya and Tanzania after their founding
presidents”, in David E. Apter and Carl G.
Roseberg, Political Development and the new
Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Charlottes-
ville: University Press of Virginia.
Collier, Paul. 1997. “The failure of conditionality”, in
Catherine Gwin and Joan Nelson (eds). Per-
spectives on Aid and Development. Washing-
ton DC: Overseas Development Council.
LITERATURE
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea and Richard Jolly, and
Frances Stewart (eds.) 1987. Adjustment with
a human face. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cukierman, A and M. Tommasi. 1998. “When does it
take a Nixon to go to China?”, American
Economic Review. Vol. 1899, No. 1.
Egeland, Jan. 1988. Impotent Superpower – Potent
Small State. Oslo: Scandinavian University
Press.
Elman, Miriam Fendus. 1995. “The Foreign Policies
of Small States: Challenging Neorealsim in
Its own Backyard”. British Journal of Politi-
cal Science, Vol. 25, Apr 1995.
Eriksen, Tore Linné (ed.). 1987. Den vanskelige
bistanden. Noen trekk ved norsk utviklings-
hjelps historie. Oslo: Scandinavian Univer-
sity Press.
Evans, Peter et al (eds). 1993. Double-Edged Diplo-
macy. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Friedman, M. 1958. “Foreign Economic Aid: Means
and Objective”, Yale Review, Vol. 47.
Garbo, Gunnar. 1993. Makt og bistand. En ambas-
sadørs møte med norsk bistandspolitikk i
Afrika. Oslo: Spartacus.
Gibbon, Peter. 1993. “The World Bank and the new
politics of aid”, European Journal of Devel-
opment Research, Vol. 5, No. 1.
Gillies, David. 1996. Between Principle and Practice.
Human Rights in North–South Relations.
Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Gwin, Catherine and Joan Nelson (eds). 1997. Per-
spectives on Aid and Development. Washing-
ton DC: Overseas Development Council.
Haggard, Stephen and John Williamson. 1994. “The
political conditions for economic reforms”, in
John Williamson (ed.). The Political Econ-
omy of Policy Reform. Washington DC: Insti-
tute of International Economics .
Helleiner, Gerald 1995. Report of the Group of Inde-
pendent Advisers on Development Co-opera-
tion Issues Between Tanzania and its Aid
Donors.
Hewitt, Adrian P. and Tony Killick. 1996. “Bilateral
aid conditionality and policy leverage”, in
Stokke, Olav (ed.). 1996. Foreign Aid
Towards the Year 2000: Experiences and
Challenges. London: Frank Cass.
Hveem, Helge. 1989. “Norway: the hesitant reformer”,
in Cranford Pratt (ed.), Internationalism
under Strain. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Jankowitsch, Peter. 1993. “The New Political Condi-
tionalities: The Role of European Parlia-
LITERATURE
ment”. Report series 2/92, International
Conference, The New Political Conditionali-
ties of Development Assistance: Human
Rights. Democracy and Disarmament
(Vienna, April 23–25 1992). Vienna: Vienna
Institute for Development and Co-operation.
Jayawardena, Lal. 1993. The Potential of Development
Contracts and Conditionality: Towards Sus-
tainable Development Compacts. Helsinki:
World Institute for Development Economic
Research.
Johannessen, Bjørn and Dag Leraand. 1997. Bistands-
leksikon. Oslo: Gazette Bok.
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Steve. 1998. “Africa and the donor
community: from conditionality to partner-
ship”, mimeo, London: ODI.
Keohane, Robert O. 1969. “Lilliputian’s Dilemmas:
Small States in International Politics”, in
International Organization, Vol. 23.
Killick, Tony. 1997. “Principal Agents and the Failings
of Conditionality”, Journal of International
Development, Vol. 9, No 4.
Killick, Tony. 1998. Aid and the Political Economy of
Policy Change. London: Routledge.
Li, Chien-Pin, 1993. “The effectiveness of sanction
linkages: issues and actors”. International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37.
Lofchie, Michael F, 1989. The Policy factor: agricul-
tural performance in Kenya and Tanzania.
Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers.
Lumsdaine, David Halloran. 1993. Moral vision in
international politics: the foreign aid regime,
1949-1989. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Mans, Darius. 1994. “Tanzania: resolute action”, in
Ishrat Husain and Rashid Faruqee, Adjust-
ment in Africa. Washington DC: World Bank.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. “Introduction – integrating
international and domestic theories of inter-
national bargaining”, in Evans, Peter et al
(eds). 1993. Double-Edged Diplomacy. Ber-
keley: University of California Press.
Mosley, Paul. 1987. Conditionality as Bargaining
Process: Structural-Adjustment Lending,
1980–86, Essays in international finance, no.
168, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mosley, Paul. 1991. “Kenya”, in Jane Harrigan, Paul
Mosley and John Toye (eds.), Aid and
Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based
Lending, Volume 2. London: Routledge.
Mosley, Paul (ed.). 1992. “Development Finance and
Policy Reform”, Essays in the Theory and
Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed
Countries. Houndmills: Macmillan
Mosley, Paul et al. 1991. The World Bank and Policy-
Based Lending, Volume 1. London:
Routledge.
59
Msambichaka, L. A. 1998, “Partnership: the reflection
for the civil society perspective”. Paper pre-
sented at OECD/DAC meeting in January
1998.
Mushi, Samuel S. 1995. “Determinants and limitations
of aid conditionality: Some examples from
Nordic–Tanzanian Co-operation”, in Olav
Stokke (ed.). 1995. Aid and Political Condi-
tionality, London: Frank Cass.
Nelson, Joan M. and Stephanie J. Eglinton. 1992.
Encouraging Democracy: What role for
Aid?. Washington D. C.: Overseas Develop-
ment Council.
Nelson, Joan M. 1996. “Promoting Policy Reforms:
The Twilight of Conditionality”, World
Development. Vol. 24, No 9.
Paldam, Marin. 1997. Dansk u-landshjælp”. Aarhus:
Aarhus Universitetsforlag.
Persen, Karl, Rolf. 1996. Aid, Investment and Incen-
tives. Bergen: Norges handelshøyskole, Insti-
tutt for samfunnsøkonomi.
Persen, Karl, Rolf. 1997. “Norge”, in Paldam, Marin.
Dansk u-landshjælp. Aarhus: Aarhus Univer-
sitetsforlag.
Putnam, Robert.1988. “Diplomacy and domestic poli-
tics. The logic of the two-level game”, Inter-
national Organization, vol. 42.
Riddell, Roger. 1987. Foreign Aid Reconsidered. Lon-
don: Overseas Development Institute.
Riddell, Roger. 1995. A New Framework for Interna-
tional Development Cooperation: Towards a
Research Agenda. London: Overseas Devel-
opment Institute.
Rist, Gilbert. 1997. The History of Development. Lon-
don: Zed Books.
Selbervik, Hilde. 1997. Aid as a Tool for Promotion of
Human Rights and Democracy: What can
Norway do? Evaluation Report 7.97. Oslo:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Sevensson, Jakob. 1995. When is Foreign Aid Credi-
ble? Aid Dependence and Conditionality.
Stockholm: Stockholm University, Institute
for International Economic Studies.
Singer, Hans W. 1994. Aid Conditionality, IDS Discus-
sion Paper No. 346, Brighton: Institute of
Development Studies.
Spraos, John. 1986. IMF Conditionality: Ineffectual,
Inefficient, Mistargeted. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Stern, H. 1974. “Professor Bauer on Development”,
Journal of Development Economics, No. 1
1974.
Stevens, Michael. 1993. “The World Bank and the
New Political and Economic World Order:
The Political Conditionalities”. Report series
2/92, International Conference, The New
Political Conditionalities of Development
60
Assistance: Human Rights. Democracy and
Disarmament (Vienna, April 23–25 1992).
Vienna: Vienna Institute for Development
and Cooperation.
Stokke, Olav. 1989. Western Middle Powers and Glo-
bal Poverty. The Determinants of the Aid Pol-
icies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden. Uppsala: Scandinavian
Institute of African Studies.
Stokke, Olav. 1993. “Norsk bistandspolitikk mot år
2000: Veivalg og verdier”, Internasjonal
Politikk, vol. 51, no. 1.
Stokke, Olav (ed.). 1995. Aid and Political Condition-
ality. London: Frank Cass.
Stokke, Olav (ed.). 1996. Foreign Aid Towards the
Year 2000: Experiences and Challenges.
London: Frank Cass.
Stolz, Walter, Anjet Lanting and Neil Middleton.
1996. “Donor Experiences in Support of
Human Rights”. The Hague: Directorate
General for International Co-operation of the
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
mimeo.
Streeten, Paul. 1982. “A Cool Look at ‘Outward-look-
ing” Strategies for Development”. The World
Economy. September 1982.
Swamy, Gurushri. 1994. “Kenya: patchy, intermittent
commitment”, in Ishrat Husain and Rashid
Faruqee (eds.). Adjustment in Africa. Wash-
ington DC: World Bank.
Sørbø, Gunnar M. 1995. “Norsk bistandspolitikk”, in
Svein Gjerdåker, Torbjørn L. Knutsen and
Gunnar M. Sørbø (eds.). Norges Utenriks-
politikk, Oslo: Cappelen.
Thiis, Øyvind. 1996. “Norwegian development assist-
ance and the right to development”, Human
Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook.
The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Thomas, V. and J. Nash. 1991. “Reform of trade pol-
icy: Recent evidence from theory and prac-
tice”, World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 6,
No. 2.
Tisch, Sarah and Michael Wallace. 1994. Dilemmas of
Development Assistance. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Tomasevski, Katrina. 1993. Development Aid and
Human Rights Revisited. London: Pinter Pub-
lishers.
Tvedt, Terje. 1993. “Norske oppfatninger om den
ikke-europeiske verden på 1970- og 1980-tal-
let. Et eksempel på krysskulturell represen-
tasjon”. PhD thesis. University of Bergen.
van de Sand, Klemens 1993. “New political criteria:
The German concept”. Report series 2/92,
International Conference, The New Political
Conditionalities of Development Assistance:
LITERATURE
Human Rights. Democracy and Disarmament
(Vienna, April 23–25 1992). Vienna: Vienna
Institute for Development and Cooperation.
van de Walle, Nicolas. 1998. “Managing Aid to
Africa: The Rise and Decline of the Struc-
tural Adjustment Regime”. mimeo.
Vigland, V.C. 1996. Economic Security for Africa
inside Political Conditionality of Aid. Paper
presented at EADI General Conference, 11–
14 September 1996. Vienna: EADI.
Waller, Peter. 1995. “Aid and political conditionality:
The case of Germany with particular refer-
ence to Kenya”, in Olav Stokke (ed.). Aid and
Political Conditionality. London: Frank Cass.
Wilhelm, Rolf. 1993. “The new political conditional-
ity: The Swiss situation”. Report series 2/92,
International Conference, The New Political
Conditionalities of Development Assistance:
Human Rights. Democracy and Disarmament
(Vienna, April 23–25 1992). Vienna: Vienna
Institute for Development and Cooperation.
Williamson, John (ed.). 1994. The Political Economy
of Policy Reform. Washington DC: Institute
of International Economics.
Winter, A. 1996. Is Anyone Listening? Communicat-
ing Development in Developing Countries.
Geneva: Non-Governmental Liaison Service
(NGLS).
Wohlgemuth, Lennart. 1976. Bistånd på mottagarens
villkor, Stockholm: Sida.
Wohlgemuth, Lennart. 1990. Bistånd på utvecklingens
villkor, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of
African Studies.
Zeylstra, Willem Gustaaf. 1975. Aid or Development.
The Relevance of Development Aid to Prob-
lems of Developing Countries. Leyden: A.W.
Sijthoff.
Zormelo, Douglas. 19996. Is Aid Conditionality Con-
sistent with National Sovereignty? Working
Paper 95, London: ODI.
Primary Sources – Official/Published
AusAID. 1995. Towards a Sustainable Future. Can-
berra: Australian Government Publishing
Service.
CIDA. 1995. Canada in the World. Hull: CIDA.
DAC. 1997a. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Participatory Development and
Good Governance. Part 1. Paris: OECD.
DAC. 1997b. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Participatory Development and
Good Governance. Part 2. Paris: OECD.
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1996. Danmark
deltagelse i det internasjonale udviklingsar-
bejde 1995. Copenhagen: Utenrigsministeriet
– Danida.
LITERATURE
DAC. 1997. Evaluation of Programs Promoting Par-
ticipatory Development and Good Govern-
ance. Paris: OECD.
DAC. 1996a. Survey Report on DAC Members’ Bilat-
eral Development Co-operation Activities for
the Promotion of Human Rights. Paris:
OECD.
DAC. 1996c. Good Government Assessment Method-
ology. Paris: OECD.
DAC. 1996d. European Community. Co-operation
Review Series. No. 12, 1996. Paris: OECD.
DAC. 1995b. Participatory Development and Good
Governance. Paris: OECD.
DAC. 1994b. Canada. Development Co-operation
Review Series. No. 5, 1994. Paris: OECD.
EIU.1980–1999, Tanzania/Comoros Country Profile
(annual)/Country Report (quarterly). Various
editions, London: EIU.
International Monetary Fund. 1980–1998. Interna-
tional Financial Statistics – Yearbook. Vari-
ous editions. Washington DC: IMF.
Innst. S. no. 229 (1995–96). [Recommendation to the
Parliament from the Committee on Foreign
Affairs].
NORAD. Agreed Minutes (and instructions) from the
annual consultations on Development Co-
operation between Tanzania and Norway. For
the period 1980–1998.
NORAD. 1984. Report on Review of Norwegian
Financial Assistance to Tanzania. Oslo:
NORAD.
NORAD. 1990. Strategies for Development Coopera-
tion. Oslo: NORAD.
NORAD. 1992. Bistands-ABC. Oslo: NORAD.
NORAD. 1980–1998. Annual Report. Various edi-
tions, Oslo: NORAD.
NORAD. 1995. Civil Service Reform in Tanzania.
Consultancy to Prepare and Make Recom-
mendations on a Nordic Initiative for Assist-
ance to Civil Service Reforms, restructuring
and Institutional Development. Oslo:
NORAD.
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1996. White
Paper no. 19 (1995–96). Oslo: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1993. Support
for Democratic Development. Oslo: Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1992. White
Paper no. 51 (1991–92). Oslo: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1985. White
Paper no. 36 (1984–85). Oslo: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1977. White
Paper no. 93 (1976–77). Oslo: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
61
OECD. 1980–97. Geographical Distribution of Finan-
cial Flows. Various editions. Paris: OECD
OECD. 1996a. Evaluation of Programs Promoting
Participatory Development and Good Gov-
ernance. Paris: OECD.
OECD 1996b. Shaping the 21st Century: The Contri-
bution of Development Co-operation. Paris:
OECD.
OECD.1997. Evaluation of Programs Promoting Par-
ticipatory Development and Good Govern-
ance. Synthesis Report. Paris: OECD.
Sida. 1997. Development Cooperation in the 21st Cen-
tury. Stockholm: Sida.
UK Government. 1997. Eliminating World Poverty: A
Challenge for the 21st Century. White Paper
on International Development. London:
HMSO.
UNDP. 1990–1998. Human Development Report. Var-
ious editions. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
United Republic of Tanzania. 1987. Programme for
Recovery. Report prepared by the Govern-
ment of Tanzania for the meeting of the Con-
sultative Group for Tanzania. Dar es Salaam
June 1987.
World Bank. 1987. Report to the Consultative Group
for Tanzania on the Government’s Economic
Recovery Program. The World Bank, Africa
Region, June 17, 1987.
World Bank. 1989. Sub-Saharan Africa. From Crisis
to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Per-
spective Study, Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 1992. Governance and Development,
Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 1996. Poverty Reduction and The World
Bank: Progress and Challenges in the 1990s.
Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 1998a. Assessing Aid. Washington DC:
World Bank
World Bank. 1998b. World Development Indicators.
Washington DC: World Bank
Archival material
821.1-Tan. 95/1597-1, Instruks for landprogram-
forhandlinger, Tanzania 28.-29. mars 1995.
821.1-Tan. 95/1597-2, Instruks for landprogram-
forhandlinger, Tanzania 28.-29. mars 1995.
821.1-Tan. 95/1804-1, Instruks for landprogram-
forhandlinger, Tanzania 28.-29. mars 1995.
821.1-Tan. 95/1767-1, Instruks for landprogram-
forhandlinger, Tanzania 28.-29. mars 1995.
821.1-Tan. 95/2483-1, Instruks for landprogram-
forhandlinger, Tanzania 28.–29. mars 1995.
821.1-Tan. 95/2483-1, Agreed Minutes fra landpro-
gramforhandlingene, Tanzania 30–31. mars
1995.
62
311-Tan, 91/1580, “Samtale med statsminister Male-
cela om IMF-forhandlinger og partisystem”.
801.2-Tan, (871.4), “Tanzania. Referat fra
bistandsminister Nordheim-Larsens samtale
med valgkommisjonene leder, dommer L.
Makame i Dar es Salaam, 20. oktober 1994”.
801.2-Tan, (801.6), “Referat fra møte med Tanzania’s
høyesterettsjustittiarius F.L. Nyalali 22. sep-
tember 1994”.
801.2-Tan, (95/13151), “Tanzania. Presseomtale i f m
høynivåmøte New Nordic–Tanzania Partner-
ship i Dar es Salaam 12–13.9.96.
(19.09.1996)”.
333.1-Tan. “Mandat for DUHs delatakere i Nordisk/
Tanzaniansk symposium Dar es Salaam 16.–
17. november 1984.”
333.1-Tan. “Nordic symposium – Innlegg vedrørende
‘management of foreign exchange’”.
333.1-Tan, 84/13166-3, “Tanzania/nordisk sympo-
sium”. (1984).
333.1-Tan, “Notits, Symposium vedr. Tanzanias
udviklingspolitik”.
333.1-Tan, 84/13166-4, “Symposium om Tanzanias
ekonomiska kris och biståndets roll mellam
Norden och Tanzania 16–17 november i Dar
es Salaam”.
333.1-Tan, “The state of the economy, adjustment pro-
gramme and rehabilitation requirements”,
Paper prepared by Tanzania for the Nordic–
Tanzanian Symposium.
333.1-Tan, 84/13166-3, “Tanzania/nordisk sympo-
sium”. (1984). Press release.
333.1-Tan, 84/13166-3, “Tanzania/nordisk sympo-
sium”. (1984). Swedish introctory statement
at TAN-NORDIC Symposium.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsoriter, 86/9441-1, “Referat
fra CG i Paris 10.–11.06.86” (25.juni 1986).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsoriter, “Executive Directors’
Meeting –June 23, 1986”.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “List of participants”,
6 July 1987.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Verdensbankens kon-
sultative gruppemøte for Tanzania”, Paris, 6–
7 July 1987, (1.07.87).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Consultative group
meeting for Tanzania”. Paris. 6–7 July. Gen-
eral Statement (Norway) (30.06.87).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, Press Release.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Den konsultative
gruppe for Tanzania” (Minutes, 17 July
1987).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Current Economic
Situation in Tanzania and Policies and Pro-
gramme for Recovery”. Statement by HON.
C. D. Msuya, Minister for Finance, Eco-
nomic Affairs and Planning – Tanzania (July
1987)
LITERATURE
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Statement by UNDP
representative”.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Tanzania – IMF staff
report for the 1987 article IV consultation
and review under stand-by arrangement”,
IMF document EBS/87/88 of April 28, 1987.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Donor Information
Forms for Consultative Group for Tanzania”.
(1987).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Statement on the Cur-
rent Economic Situation, World Bank”.
(1987).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Chairman’s Opening
Statement” (1987).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Statement by IMF
Staff Representative” (1987).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Vedr. Consultative
Group for Tanzania”, Paris 12.–13. juli
1988”, Notat (11.07.1988).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, Press Release, Con-
sultative Group for Tanzania, Paris, 13 July
1988.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Statement by the
Swedish delegation”, by Mr. Johan Holm-
berg, Assistant Director General of SIDA
(1988).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Technical Coopera-
tion and External Assistance Requirements”,
Swedish Statement by Mr. Sten Rylander
(1988).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Program and Pros-
pects for Economic Recovery”, Statement by
Mr. Sten Rylander, Assistant Under-Secre-
tary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1988).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Pledging Statement”
(Norway), 12–13 July 1988.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “General Statement of
Norway”, 12–13 July 1988.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, Konsultativ gruppe for
Tanzania, (referat) 12–13 July 1988.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, Notat, “Møte i den
konsultative gruppe for Tanzania – Paris 18.–
20.12.89. (Norwegian summary from the
meeting).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, Notat, “Møte i den
konsultative gruppe for Tanzania – Paris 18.–
20.12.89. (Norwegian summary from the
meeting).
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “General Statement
Norway”, Paris 18. –20.12.1989.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Public expenditure
review”, public sector management and the
priority social action programme (PSAP)”,
Statement by Hon. K. A. Malima, Minister of
State for Planning, Paris 18.–20.12.89.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, Pleding Statement,
Norway, 18,–20.12.1989.
LITERATURE
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, Press Release, 18.–
20.12.1989.
37-IBRD–Tanzania-konsortier, “Statement by the
Danish Delegation”, 18.–20.1989.
37-IBRD–Tanzania, 93/2080-2, “CG-møte for Tanza-
nia”.
37-IBRD–Tanzania, 93/2080-1,”CG-møte for Tanza-
nia”.
CG-møte 1994, 93/01069-12, “CG-møte for Tanza-
nia”. Lokal oppfølging”.
CG-møte 1994, 93/01069-14, “CG-møte for Tanza-
nia”. Lokal oppfølging”.
CG-møte 1994, 93/01069-15, “CG-møte for Tanza-
nia”. Lokal oppfølging”.
018-CG meeting, “Tanzania. Uformelt givermøte i
Verdensbanken”, Paris 14 December 1994.
815.16-Tan-CG, 95/1090-1, The World Bank Group,
“Tanzania CG Background Documentation”.
815.16-Tan-CG, 95/1100-1, “CG-moete –Tanzania”.
815.16-Tan-CG, 95/821-2, “Consultative Group Meet-
ing for Tanzania 27–28 February 1995”.
815.16-Tan-CG, 95/1101-2, “CG-Møte for Tanzania”,
27–28 februar 1995. Norske holdninger”.
815.16-Tan-CG, 95/1158-1, “CG-møte Tanzania,
pledging statement”. (Norway).
815.16-Tan-CG, “Consultative group meeting for Tan-
zania”. 27 and 28 February 1995”.
815.16-Tan-CG, “CG-møtet for Tanzania. Norske
innlegg”.
815.16-Tan-CG, “Tanzania – CG møte i Paris –
presseklipp”.
815.16-Tan-CG, 95/00200-7, “Referat fra CG-møte
for Tanzania”, 27.–28. februar 1995”.
URT, “Civil Service Reform Programme”, prepared
for the Consultative Group Meeting of July
1996, Paris.
95/00613-1, “USAID Mission to Tanzania”.
815.16-Tan-CG. Instruks for CG-møte for Tanzania,
18–19 juli 1996.
815.16-Tan-CG, 96/11249-2, “CG-Meeting”.
815.16-Tan-CG, 96/11249-6, “Tanzanias CG-møte
18.–19. juli 1996, vurdering av bakgrunnsin-
formasjon.”
815.16-Tan-CG, 96/11249-7, Var. correspondence.
815.16-Tan-CG, 96/11249-10, “Joint Nordic approach
to Seeif Sharif Hamad, CUF, Zanzibar”.
815.16-Tan-CG, 96/11249-12, “Norsk innlegg på CG-
møte for Tanzania, 18.–19. juli 1996”.
815.16-Tan-CG, “External Financing Requirements”.
World Bank, July 1996.
815.16-Tan-CG, “Progress in the Economic Pro-
gramme”, July 1996.
018 CG, 96/00846-9, “Tanzania Consultative Group
Meeting, Paris, July 18–19, 1996 (USAID)
Renewed donor confidence, but can Tanzania
stay the course?”.
1996 – Nordic high-level meeting.
63
801-2-Tan, 95/13151-24. “Det nordiska Tanzania-initia-
tivet”.
801.2-TZA, 95/13151-29, (01.10.97), “Høynivåmøtet
mellom Tanzania og de Nordiske land 12.-13.
september 1996. Oppfølgingsmøte”.
801.2-TZA. 95/13151-30. (30.9.97), “New develop-
ment co-operation strategy –rapport fra kon-
sultasjonsmøte mellom Tanzanias
myndigheter og giverne”.
Speeches & Lectures
Johnson, Hilde Frafjord. “Norway’s Aid Policies and
Poverty Alleviation”. Address given at the
Overseas Development Institute, London, 19
February, 1998.
Interviewees
Baum, Alexander, First Secretary (Economic
Adviser), European Union, Delegation of the
European Commission, Dar es Salaam, 30
November 1998.
Bell, David, G, First Secretary (Development), British
High Commission, Dar es Salaam, 1 Decem-
ber 1998.
Finanger, Lornts, Programme Officer (NORAD), Dar
es Salaam, 2 December 1998.
Føreland, Gunnar, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of
Norway, Dar es Salaam, 25 November and 3
December 1998.
Garbo, Gunnar, Norwegian Ambassador to Tanzania,
1987–92, Oslo, 14 October 1998.
Heide, Morten, Country Economist (NORAD), Dar es
Salaam, 25 November 1998.
Jensen, Mark, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Den-
mark, Dar es Salaam, 27 November 1998.
Jørgensen, Nils-Johan, Norwegian Ambassador to
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 1 and 2 December
1998.
Laatu, Riikka, Counsellor, Embassy of Finland, Dar es
Salaam, 27 November 1998.
Magnussen, Einar, Executive Director to the World
Bank 1990–91, Oslo, 15 October 1998.
Mc Nab, Christin, Counsellor, Embassy of Sweden,
Dar es Salaam, 27 November 1998.
Mgonja, G. S, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry
of Finance, 2 December 1998.
Rijn, Frans van, First Secretary Economic Affairs, Dar
es Salaam, 1 December 1998.
Rugumamu, Severine, Director, University Consul-
tancy Bureau, Dar es Salaam, 28 November
1998.
Rutabanzibwa, Patrick, Permanent Secretary, Ministry
of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, 2
December 1998.
Valvatne, Lars Sigurd, Counsellor, Embassy of Nor-
way, Oslo, 16 October 1998.
64 LITERATURE

Wangwe, Samuel, Executive Director, Economic and Williams, Cheryl, Programme Officer, USAID, Dar es
Social Research Foundation, Dar es Salaam, Salaam
30 November 1998.