IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution

Research Article

Power theft localisation using voltage ISSN 1751-8687

Received on 15th December 2016
Revised 10th March 2017
measurements from distribution feeder nodes Accepted on 28th March 2017
E-First on 14th July 2017
doi: 10.1049/iet-gtd.2016.2011
www.ietdl.org

Kalyan Dasgupta1 , Manikandan Padmanaban1, Jagabondhu Hazra1

1IBM research India, Bangalore, India
E-mail: kalyand1@in.ibm.com

Abstract: In this study, a novel algorithm to locate regions in a distribution feeder, where power is being illegally tapped, is
proposed. The basic requirements of the algorithm are voltage measuring devices located at distribution feeder nodes or
transformers that can communicate data to the distribution substation. Initially, how voltage magnitude difference between
successive nodes in a feeder can help identify possible locations of illegal tapping is shown. The technique is further refined by
a normalised voltage double difference method, to pin-point the exact location of power theft. The algorithm does not require
network parameters. Simulations are performed on the IEEE 34 node test feeder, to demonstrate the efficacy of this method.

 Nomenclature
V̄ k, | V̄ k| voltage phasor at node k, magnitude of voltage
phasor at node k
Īk, Īth current phasor at node k, current phasor
representing theft
Zk j impedance of the feeder line joining nodes k and
j model/parameters of the distribution system and mainly the voltage
Re( . ), Im( . ) real and imaginary parts of a phasor
Esubstn energy reading in a distribution substation
ΣEnodes sum of the energy consumed at all the feeder
nodes
δ angle between voltage phasors of successive
node
θ angle between voltage and lagging current
phasors at a feeder node
Var( . ), MD( . ) variance function, Mahalanobis distance function
σk − 1, k standard deviation in ( | V̄ k − 1 | − | V̄ k | ) over a set
of measurements
C, μ sample covariance matrix, sample mean vector
Lp, Lnp peak period load, non-peak period load in kW
1 Introduction
Power/energy theft, also known as non-technical losses (NTLs), is
a huge problem in distribution systems all over the world. The
world loses US$89.3 billion annually to electricity theft and
especially in India, NTL can be of the order of 20–30%. India loses
around US$16.2 billion annually to NTL [1]. Identification of
power theft and consequently their localisation are crucial to
stopping this menace. Now, many countries have started putting in
place, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) to measure, collect,
store, analyse and use power consumption information [2]. AMI
essentially involves having smart meters and their associated
communication systems in large numbers in the distribution
system. In emerging economies like India, most of the metering is
through legacy meters and installation of AMI infrastructure may
take some time. While digital meters have been installed in
distribution feeder nodes, they lack the ability to communicate data
to a distribution substation.
Several papers and reports on using smart meter or AMI data to
detect NTL can be found in the public domain. In [3], techniques
using AMI data to detect power theft is discussed. It lists out
several AMI energy-theft detection schemes, relying on
classification-based, state estimation-based, and game theory-based
algorithms and finally compares all these methods. Erol-Kantarci
and Mouftah [4] discuss how data extracted from smart meters and
data collectors can provide evidence to legal proceedings in
electricity theft matters. In [5], the authors discuss existing smart
metering practices and the prevailing situation in the Netherlands.
They also present a novel automated method to detect tampering
and theft. In [6], the authors propose a method to locate illegal
tapping by using smart meter data. In this method, the network
measurement data from the smart meters are used to locate theft
points. The voltage measurements from smart meters are compared
with the estimated voltages of the network, and a probable theft
current is calculated. This was one paper where voltage
measurements were made use of to detect theft. However, this
method requires knowledge of the network parameters (which may
have a lot of inaccuracies) and also requires estimation of an
impedance matrix of illegal (theft) loads.
There are several other papers on theft detection using smart
meters. The primary difficulty all methods/algorithms face is the
lack of network topology and parameter data beyond the
distribution transformer (DT). In [7], a method of detection of theft
by estimating a statistical model of technical losses and NTL is
discussed. It does this by making the assumption that every user is
connected directly to its local DT and thereby calculating effective
resistances between the DTs and the customer premises. If the NTL
detected goes beyond a statistical threshold, the utility can be
warned of possible illegal loads. A method of identifying energy
theft by using pattern recognition techniques is proposed in [8]. It
uses the energy meter readings of the smart meter and the energy
reading of a central observer for several time instants. A state
estimation based approach for energy theft detection in microgrids,
while preserving privacy is proposed in [9]. This paper mainly
deals with theft involving tampering of smart meter data. In [10],
the authors propose a method based on dynamic programming, by
which an optimal number of feeder remote terminal units need to
be deployed for detection. One can also find papers using game
theoretic approaches to detect power theft [11, 12]. Game-theory
based approaches focus on detecting the amount of power stolen by
rigging or tampering of the AMI meters at the customer level by
formulating the problem as a game between the electric utility and
the electricity thief. They do not use network parameters to detect
theft. However, these methods do not detect illegal hooking/
tapping into the distribution lines.
In the contemporary literature, all the works have been focused
on detecting and localising power theft based on the data from
smart meters and AMI at the customer and at the distribution
feeder level. This may not be feasible for countries like India,

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Fig. 1  Schematic and phasor diagram of a typical distribution feeder
(a) Schematic diagram of the distribution feeder, (b) Phasor diagram for two successive nodes
where cost effective solutions are the need of the day. A solution
involving a low-bandwidth communication system integrated with
an existing metering infrastructure at the DT level could be more
acceptable. In this paper, a method is proposed by which a utility
can detect and locate probable points in a feeder (DT level) where
electricity theft is happening, by using only voltage measurements.
This requires digital meters that can record voltage measurements
at the DT level and can calculate and communicate differences in
voltage magnitude measurements between successive nodes to the
substation. While the digital meter can record a lot of
measurements (power level, units consumed, power factor etc.)
apart from voltage measurements, it needs to communicate only
the voltage information data. This would require a low-bandwidth
communication system. For example, for a hundred node three-
phase system, having 1 min granularity, a 1 kbps data rate would
be more than sufficient to communicate voltage difference
information data to the substation. The choice of voltage
measurements has its inherent advantages, since it well captures
the state of system as compared to other derived measurements.
In many developing countries, bulk of the meters at the
consumer premises, downstream to the DT are legacy meters.
Given the granularity of the legacy meters, which are in the order
of days to month, it will be difficult to locate power theft. While
the granularity of measurement data in smart meters is in minutes,
in the legacy meters it is in days. Detecting and locating theft at the
consumer level, in areas where we have a mix of legacy and smart
meters, is a very difficult proposition. On the other hand, if we
have the voltage measurements at the DT level with high
granularity, we could use the proposed algorithm to at least detect
and locate points of electricity theft at the feeder. Fig. 1a gives the
schematic diagram of the distribution feeder. Once detected, an
inspection of all the connections below the suspected DT, could
lead to identification of theft points at the consumer level.
The proposed method here mainly uses voltage measurements
taken from meters located at all the important nodes of the feeder.
The nodes could either be DTs or an industrial consumer premise.
The granularity of the measurements is expected to be in minutes.
The algorithm we propose uses voltage magnitude difference
between successive nodes. There are two variations of these
methods. The first one uses a simple voltage measurement
difference between successive nodes. The second variation uses a
normalised voltage double difference (NVDD) technique. In both
of these methods, essentially, outliers are detected using a
statistical approach. The biggest advantage of the proposed method
is that it uses only voltage measurements and it does not require
network parameters.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the formulation
of the methods is presented. The outlier detection technique used in
the simulations is also presented. In Section 3, some of the
implementation issues and how data are to be processed before
finally implementing the algorithm are discussed. In Section 4,
some of the simulation results are presented. Finally, Section 5
gives the important conclusions.
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2 Formulation
Let us have a look at the voltage difference between successive
nodes in a distribution feeder. Fig. 1b gives the phasor diagram of
the voltage phasors for two successive nodes. V 2 is upstream to the
node V 1. I is the current flowing between the nodes. Re and Im
shown in Fig. 1b refer to the real and imaginary of a phasor,
respectively. The voltage drop, V d, in the line is defined as the
difference in the voltage magnitude of voltages at nodes 1 and 2. It
is given as follows:
V d = | V̄ 2 | − | V̄ 1|
The bar indicates that they are phasors. In distribution feeders, the
ratio of resistance-to-reactance (R/X ratio) is higher as compared to
transmission lines and successive nodes/buses are also not very
distant. This leads to very low phase angle differences in the
voltages of successive nodes, denoted by δ shown in Fig. 1b. Since
the angle δ between phasors V̄ 2 and V̄ 1 is very small, V d is
approximated as
V d ≃ Re(ZĪ) (1)
In other words, the voltage drop is approximately equal to the real
part of the impedance drop [13]. As current in the line increases, so
does the voltage drop.
2.1 Voltage difference as an indicator
Detecting NTL/electricity theft is easier than locating it. NTL is the
difference in the energy reading in a distribution substation (Esubstn)
and the sum of the energy consumed at all the nodes (ΣEnodes), plus
the technical losses (I 2R losses) in the network, as given in the
following equation:
NTL = Esubstn − ΣEnodes − I 2R losses (2)
Power theft points can be located when network parameters and
voltage measurements are available by (i) first estimating the
voltages that is expected at the customer premises and then (ii)
comparing the estimates with meter readings. A significant
difference in the measured and estimated values indicates the
prevalence of theft [6]. The problems of these methods faced are
i. the network parameters for a distribution system as provided
by the utility companies are not very accurate and are seldom
known,
ii. in case of theft, the difference in the estimated and measured
values will be noticeable everywhere in a radial feeder,
iii. not every customer may have a smart meter.
To correctly determine the exact location, thus, is a tricky business.
IET Gener. Transm. Distrib., 2017, Vol. 11 Iss. 11, pp. 2831-2839
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2017
Fig. 2  Radial feeder system with a main node branching into lateral nodes
As mentioned in Section 1, two variants of the algorithm are
proposed. The main idea of the first variant is given as follows:
i. The basic idea is to analyse the measured voltage magnitude
difference between successive nodes in the radial system. The
voltage readings can be obtained from meter readings at the
nodes of the feeder as shown in Fig. 1a.
ii. The voltage difference between successive nodes in a radial
feeder would rise significantly upstream to the theft location.
iii. Downstream to the theft location the voltage difference would
not change significantly.
iv. The voltage difference is also a subject of time, as the loading
condition changes throughout the day. The challenge is to
identify the difference under conditions of theft. The
cumulative loading condition of a group of customers follows a
rough pattern every day and one could use this information.
To understand the concept, let us have a look at Fig. 2. The
voltages and currents in the figure are all phasors. In Fig. 2a, we
have a normal case with no power theft. A main node branches out
into lateral nodes. Every node has a group of customers. The total
current drawn by the loads in node 2 is Ī1. Similarly, the loads
connected to nodes 3 and 4 draw currents Ī2 and Ī3, respectively.
The current flowing in the radial line connecting nodes 1 and 2 is
thus Ī1 + Ī2 + Ī3. In Fig. 2b, we have a case where there is illegal
tapping at node 3, represented by Īth. Due to this extra current, the
voltage drop between nodes 1 and 2 and between nodes 2 and 3
increases. However, the drop between nodes 3 and 4 remains the
same. In other words, upstream to node 3 we see increased voltage
drops, whereas downstream to node 3, the drops remain the same.
This can be summarised by the following set of equations.
• Under normal circumstances, the voltage differences are
approximated as follows:
|V̄ 1 | − | V̄ 2 | ≃ Re (Ī1 + Ī2 + Ī3)Z12
|V̄ 2 | − | V̄ 3 | ≃ Re (Ī2 + Ī3)Z23
|V̄ 3 | − | V̄ 4 | ≃ Re Ī3Z23
• Under conditions of illegal tapping (theft)
|V̄ 1 | − | V̄ 2 | ≃ Re (Ī1 + Ī2 + Ī3 + Īth)Z12
|V̄ 2 | − | V̄ 3 | ≃ Re (Ī2 + Ī3 + Īth)Z23
|V̄ 3 | − | V̄ 4 | ≃ Re Ī3Z23
IET Gener. Transm. Distrib., 2017, Vol. 11 Iss. 11, pp. 2831-2839
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2017
Clearly, |V̄ 1 | − | V̄ 2| and |V̄ 2 | − | V̄ 3| change depending upon Īth.
|V̄ 3 | − | V̄ 4| remains unchanged. Node 3 is the probable point where
illegal power consumption is happening. Once we are able to find a
node, upstream to which there are changes in voltage drops, we can
manually inspect all the connections emanating from the DT
representing that node and pin-point illegal tapping. This change in
drop should ideally be noticeable throughout the day under
different loading conditions (different times of the day) of the
feeder. A technique to detect voltage drops as outliers (and hence
detect theft) using a statistical approach has been discussed later in
this section.
This kind of an analysis ideally should work when there are not
too many nodes in the lateral. When there are many nodes, the
cumulative variation in the currents being drawn at all the nodes,
could overshadow the current due to illegal tapping/theft. For
example, for a given time window, if Īσ1, Īσ2 and Īσ3 are the
standard deviations in the currents Ī1, Ī2 and Ī3, respectively, (refer
Fig. 2), we could have
|Īσ1 + Īσ2 + Īσ3 | > | Īth| (5)
for a given set of days. Under such conditions the described
method will not be very accurate. To overcome this problem, we
propose the NVDD technique.
2.2 NVDD technique
Let us have a look at Fig. 3. The voltage phasors at node k − 1, k
etc., are V̄ k − 1, V̄ k and so on, respectively. Zk − 1, k is the impedance
of the line connecting nodes k − 1 and k. Node k has some illegal
load connected to it. Under normal circumstances the current
drawn at node k is Īk − 1. The illegal load draws a current of Īth.
Without any instances of power theft (illegal load), we have
|V̄ k − 1 | − | V̄ k | ≃ Re (Īk − 1 + Īk + Īk + 1)Zk − 1, k (6)
(3) |V̄ k | − | V̄ k + 1 | ≃ Re (Īk + Īk + 1)Zk, k + 1 . (7)
The double differencing of node voltages essentially involves
calculating the difference of (6) and (7). If Zk, k − 1 ≃ Zk, k + 1, the
difference will give us
(4) ( | V̄ k − 1 | − | V̄ k | ) − ( | V̄ k | − | V̄ k + 1 | ) ≃ Re Īk − 1Zk − 1, k . (8)
However, when there is an illegal load at node k, we have
2833
 Considering Ī js to be independent and of almost identical phase,
(13) can be reduced to
k+n−1
Re(Ī jZk − 1, k)
X1 ≃ ∑ k+n−1
j=k−1 Var(∑ j = k − 1 Re(Ī jZk − 1, k))
k+n−1
(15)
|Ī j|
≃ ∑ k+n−1
.
j=k−1 ∑ j = k − 1 Var( | Ī j | )

where Var(.) is the variance function. In (15), the effect of the

impedance Zk − 1, k has been eliminated. Similarly, let

( | V̄ k | − | V̄ k + 1 | )
X2 ≃
σk, k + 1
k+n−1 (16)
|Ī j|
= ∑ k+n−1
.
j=k ∑j = k Var( | Ī j | )

Now
k+n−1
|Ī j|
X1 − X2 ≃ ∑ k+n−1
j=k−1 ∑ j = k − 1 Var( | Ī j | )
Fig. 3  Radial feeder with illegal load at one of the nodes k+n−1
(17)
|Ī j|
( | V̄ k − 1 | − | V̄ k | ) − ( | V̄ k | − | V̄ k + 1 | ) ≃ Re (Īk − 1 + Īth)Zk − 1, k (9)
− ∑ k+n−1
.
j=k ∑j = k Var( | Ī j | )

which can also be written as Equation (17) can be further reduced if certain assumptions are
made as follows:
( | V̄ k − 1 | + | V̄ k + 1 | ) − 2 | V̄ k | ≃ Re (Īk − 1 + Īth)Zk − 1, k . (10)
• Let Var( | Ī j | ) = ϵ for j = k − 1k + n − 1.
So, by doing a double differencing with respect to node k, we get • Let ∑kj =+ nk −− 11 |Ī j| = (n + 1)I μ, and similarly ∑kj =+ nk − 1 |Ī j| = nI μ
the voltage drop only due to the current drawn at node k, i.e.
Īk − 1 + Īth. If we run an outlier detection algorithm on the double
The first assumption is based on the fact that the variance in the
differenced voltage, we should ideally get an outlier, provided the
current sum drawn by a set of customers (connected to one node)
standard deviation in the current Īk − 1 is less than Īth as given in the does not change much as we move from node to node. The second
following equation: assumption is true when we have a large number of nodes.
Equation (17) can be written as follows:
Īσ(k − 1) ≤ Īth (11)
(n + 1)I μ nI μ
When this is compared with the set of equations given in (4), one X1 − X2 ≃ −
(n + 1)ϵ nϵ
can clearly see that with a double difference technique, the chances (18)
of an outlier getting detected are higher, since we do not have the I μ (n + 1) n
= −
sum of variations in the other branch currents ( Īk and Īk + 1) in the ϵ (n + 1) n
network to deal with.
In the double difference technique, if Zk, k + 1 ≠ Zk − 1, k, we will On taking the binomial expansion n + 1 = n(1 + (1/2n)), we
have (see (12)) Here again, the effect of Īk and Īk + 1 could have
overshadow the effect of Īth, if the difference between Zk, k + 1 and
I μ (n + 1) n − n n(1 + (1/2n))
Zk − 1, k is significant. X1 − X2 ≃
ϵ n(n + 1)
One can get around this problem by a normalisation procedure. (19)
Let there be n nodes downstream to the node (node k) we are Iμ Iμ
≃ =
checking. Let 2 (n + 1)ϵ 2 ∑kj =+ nk −− 11 Var( | Ī j | )

( | V̄ k − 1 | − | V̄ k | ) With electricity theft at node k, we will have

X1 ≃ (13)
σk − 1, k
Iμ
where σk − 1, k is the standard deviation in ( | V̄ k − 1 | − | V̄ k | ) over a set X1 − X2 ≃
k+n−1
2 ∑ j = k − 1 Var( | Ī j | )
of measurements spanning several reference days (reference days
is discussed in the next section). Now, as per (1), and without any |Īth|
electricity theft + (20)
k+n−1
∑ j = k − 1 Var( | Ī j | )
k+n−1 I μ /2 + | Īth|
( | V̄ k − 1 | − | V̄ k | ) ≃ ∑ Re(Ī jZk − 1, k) . (14) =
k+n−1
j=k−1 ∑ j = k − 1 Var( | Ī j | )

( | V̄ k − 1 | − | V̄ k | ) − ( | V̄ k | − | V̄ k + 1 | ) ≃ Re (Īk − 1 + Īth)Zk − 1, k
(12)
−Re (Īk + Īk + 1)(Zk, k + 1 − Zk − 1, k) .
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Fig. 4  Selection of days for analysis
So, in the NVDD technique, not only has the effect of variations in
the sum of multiple currents been eliminated, the effect of
impedance being different in different feeder sections is also not a
factor.
2.3 Theft at a junction point
We could have junction points that carry significant load currents
in all the line segments connected to it. Under such circumstances,
(17) will need modifications. Let the node i, as discussed in (13)–
(17), be a junction point, branching out into two separate line
segments. Let the immediate nodes in these segments be denoted
by k + 1 and k + 2, respectively. For theft localisation, (17) should
then be changed, to calculate X1 − (X2 + X3), where X3 is given by
( | V̄ k | − | V̄ k + 2 | )
X3 ≃ (21)
σk, k + 2
2.4 Outlier detection
The method we propose here essentially compares the calculated
voltage differences (as discussed in the previous subsection) of
some observation days with a fixed number of reference days.
Reference days are the days during when, it is considered that no
power theft has taken place. The observation days are the days that
are being tested for power theft. The proposed algorithm, in that
sense, will not be able to detect power theft that was taking place
before the installation of the system. It can only detect power theft
once data comprising a sufficient number of reference days are
available, after the installation of the meters and the collection of
voltage measurement data. The outlier is detected in the
observation days. If no outliers are found, the observed days are
deemed normal and a subsequent set of observation days are
chosen. The voltage profile may also change if new legitimate
connections come up at any of the nodes. Under such
circumstances, the reference days will require an update. Once
sufficient reference days become available, the theft analytic can be
started again. The implementation issues concerning the choosing
of reference and observation days are discussed in the next section.
In our simulations, the Mahalanobis distance metric to detect
outliers has been used. This kind of a metric has been used in
power systems for a wide variety of applications, ranging from bad
data detection in state estimation to event detection using PMU
data [14, 15]. The Mahalanobis distance MD(y) of a sample vector
y ∈ Rm from the sample mean vector μ ∈ Rm is given as follows:
MD(y) = (y − μ)TC−1(y − μ) (22)
C ∈ Rm × m is the sample covariance matrix given by
IET Gener. Transm. Distrib., 2017, Vol. 11 Iss. 11, pp. 2831-2839
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2017
N
1
N − 1 i∑
C= (xi − μ) ⋅ (xi − μ)T (23)
=1
taken over N instances. For a normal distribution, MD2 is the Chi-
squared distribution. We could then use the thresholds in a Chi-
squared distribution to detect our outliers.
The sample mean μ and the covariance matrix C in our
electricity theft case are chosen from the reference days. The
Mahalanobis distance MD(y) is calculated for the observation days.
A value above the Chi-squared threshold for a given confidence
level is considered a suspect case.
3 Implementation issues
3.1 Reference days and observation days
It has been mentioned before that the algorithms will not be able to
locate existing power theft. However, any new cases of theft can be
detected. To effectively detect and locate theft, we need to have a
good set of reference days. A set of observation days are then
checked with respect to these reference days. This is represented in
Fig. 4.
Here D1, D2, …, Dr represent the r reference days. t1, t2, …, tm
represent the different time slots in a day. The loading condition at
every node varies throughout the day. The voltage pattern also
varies accordingly. However, the pattern is roughly the same every
24 h working day for a group of customers, connected to a node
(with some noise). D1, D2, …, Dp are the p observation days, as
shown in the right side of the figure. V ij denotes the voltage
difference value (simple difference or NVDD) at the jth time slot
of the ith day.
In our case, the vector xi ∈ Rm in (23) represents the vector
T
V 1i , V 2i , V mi from the ith reference day. The vector μ ∈ Rm is the
sample mean vector, with the mean taken over the r reference days.
The covariance matrix can then be calculated over the r [N in (23)]
reference days. The vector y ∈ Rm, whose distance we are going to
find [as given in (22)], is the mean of the p observation days. For
example, the jth element of y is given as follows:
p
1
p i∑
y( j) = V ij (24)
=1
V ij in (24) are selected from the observation days here. Both
observation and reference days are chosen in the form of a moving
window. In the figure, there are r reference days and p observation
days in a window with r > p.
2835
3.2 Selection algorithm
Since power consumption pattern changes with time, reference
days and observation days should have identical consumption
patterns (e.g. Monday–Friday, summer, winter etc.). Reference and
observation days could be selected based on the calculated
equivalent load (Leq) at the distribution substation. Leq is calculated
as follows [16]:
0.5
Lp ⋅ tp + Lnp ⋅ tnp
Leq = (25)
tp + tnp
where Lp and Lnp are the peak and non-peak period loads (in kW/
kVA), respectively, and tp and tnp (in min/h) their corresponding
duration. Lp and Lnp can be calculated by adding the energy
consumption data of all the digital meters located at the nodes
(DTs). If the variance of Leq for a set of days is below some
threshold, then these days could be examined for locating theft.
The algorithm to select reference and observation days is given
below as a step-by-step process.
i. Let us consider that the first N days were found to have Leq
with variance below the threshold. We take the last p days from
this set, as our observation days and the first r = N − p days as
our reference days. p is a constant in our algorithm selected
beforehand.
ii. If the observation days are found to be normal (no theft), then
we take the first k (out of the p) observation days and together
with the last r − k days from the reference set, from our new
reference set.
iii. The next set of p observation days is created, such that the
variance of their Leq is within the specified threshold. If we are
not able to find these p days, the value of k is decreased
suitably to allow for more days from the previous observation
set to join the present set of observation days.
Thus the set of reference and observation days are continuously
updated till theft at a node is located. Once theft is suspected at a
node, the reference days are left unchanged and only the window
of observation days is kept moving.
3.3 Data communication
In the literature, several papers on communication technologies as
applied to power networks can be found. In [17], communication
infrastructure for smart grids at different levels is considered and
the pros and cons of different technologies at the field level are
discussed. In [18], the role of power line communications (PLC) in
the smart grid is discussed. This paper gives a detailed review of all
the different technologies available in PLC, their standards and
their applications in power networks. Given the low bandwidth
requirement for the proposed system, a less expensive narrow band
PLC with bandwidth in the range of tens of kbps should suffice.
Although, we have already discussed about the low bandwidth
requirements of the proposed method, there could be further
Table 1 Sensitivity to noise levels in voltage magnitude
difference measurements
% Noise level Average MD values % Confidence
1 27.13 99.93
2 26.89 99.92
3 24.68 99.82
4 20.5 99.13
5 20.4 99.10
6 20.2 99.03
7 18.89 98.45
8 15.47 94.93
9 13.36 89.99
10 11.42 82.09
2836
innovative ways of relaying data to the substation to reduce the
communication overload. In [19], the authors proposed a multi-
agent system in a small-scale power network, whereby the nodes
communicate data only to its neighbour after an event. The data
transmission scheme proposed in [19] is aperiodic and an event is
triggered when the measurement error crosses a threshold. While
the focus of the paper is not on the communication protocol, we
would like to add that a similar approach could be used in the
algorithm proposed here. In this case, however, an event could be a
significant change in the voltage difference measurements of
neighbouring nodes. Voltage difference with respect to a
downstream node/bus could be calculated at every node and
relayed back to the substation control centre in the event of a
significant deviation. The downstream nodes in turn could
communicate its voltage measurement information to an upstream
node. Once all the information has been collected for a day at the
substation, average measurements representative of a time span
(hourly, half-hourly etc.) could then be used for further analysis.
3.4 Complexity of the methods
Complexity wise, the NVDD method is different from the simple
voltage difference method only in the calculation of the
normalisation factors (13). In the simple voltage difference method,
for every node, and for r reference days, p observation days and m
time slots, the number of operations required are 2(r + p)m. The
factor 2 comes because, first, the voltage magnitude differences are
calculated and second, the mean for every time slot is calculated.
This is done for all the reference days as well as the observation
days. In the NVDD technique, apart from the 2(r + p)m operations
for calculating the voltage differences and their mean, an extra
2(r + p)m (total 4(r + p)m) operations are required for calculating
the normalisation factors.
Calculation of the Mahalanobis distance is common to both the
methods. Calculation of the covariance matrix has a complexity of
O(rm2), while calculation of its inverse has O(m3). It is to be noted
that the complexity discussed so far is only for a node. In any
typical feeder system, the number of nodes is going to be in the
tens. Given that for hourly data, m = 24, reference days in the
range of 15–20 days and observation days in the range of 5–10
days, the overall complexity of the process is not going to be very
large for the computers in a distribution control centre and can be
calculated within seconds (if not milliseconds).
3.5 Limitations
The primary limitation of this method is in the accuracy of voltage
difference measurements. The algorithm requires voltage
difference measurements with error/noise levels below 5–6% (refer
Table 1). Higher levels of noise would result in no/incorrect
outliers getting detected.
Another point where the proposed method will fail is if the
cumulative load of customers connected is highly variable with
time of day. The basic assumption made here is that the cumulative
load of multiple customers would follow some pattern (with some
noise) in a 24 h period. For the experiments conducted using the
proposed algorithm, we have allowed for a ±10% noise in the
cumulative load levels of all the customers connected to a feeder
node at every instant of time. Violation of this assumption could
result in inconsistent results.
One example of such cumulative load variations could be due to
heavy penetration of rooftop PVs. On normal sunny days, PV
outputs follow a predictable pattern with respect to time. This will
get reflected in the load and voltage profile of reference days, and
should not adversely impact the outcome of the method. However,
on sudden cloudy days, and with a large percentage of loads being
normally displaced by PV, this could adversely affect the outcome.
If the variations in the cumulative output of all the rooftop PVs
concerning that node are more than the considered noise levels of
the entire load at the feeder node, the results may not be consistent.
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© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2017
Fig. 5  IEEE 34 bus feeder system
(a) Single-line diagram of the IEEE 34 bus feeder system, (b) Voltage magnitude variation in a day for node 842
Fig. 6  Mahalanobis Distance (MD)
(a) MD of the voltage differences, (b) MD of the NVDD
4 Results from simulated data
All the simulations were performed in the IEEE 34 bus feeder
system [20]. Load flow analysis was done on this setup using a
Newton Raphson (NR) method. Fig. 5a gives the single-line
diagram of the feeder system.
Load data was generated for several time instances for each of
the nodes to simulate the load variations over a day. The load data
for a particular day (base data) was generated by varying the base
load over a range of ±10%. The load data was generated for
several days by adding 10% normally distributed noise to the base
load values. The voltage magnitude at the nodes varies accordingly.
Fig. 5b gives the variation of the voltage magnitude at node 842 for
one particular day.
4.1 Power theft at a node
4.1.1 Voltage difference: To demonstrate the usefulness of
measuring simple voltage magnitude difference, the following
experiment was performed. The nodes 814, 850, 816 and 824 (see
Fig. 5a) were considered. A feeder segment branches out from
node 816 towards node 818. As such, the line segment between
nodes 850 and 816 carries currents serving loads at two different
line segments. The node 816 does not have any spot load; it has a
distributed load of 5 kW in phase 2, in the line segment connecting
816 and 824. We also have a distributed load of 40 kW in phase 2
in the line segment joining nodes 824 and 826. Nodes 818, 820 and
822 do not have any load in phase 2. An extra load of 40 kW in
phase 2 of node 816 was added to mimic illegal load/power theft.
Power flow data was generated for 40 days. For the first 20
days, no illegal load was added. From day 21 to day 40 the extra
(illegal) load was added in phase 2 of node 816. For calculation of
MD, the size of the voltage vectors was kept at R8, by selecting
equally spaced time slots (e.g. V 1i , V 4i , , V 22
i
), with each slot
representing an hour. This was done to cover the entire day and at
the same time to keep the matrix of measurements from becoming
ill-conditioned due to repetitive measurements. The first 15 days
were chosen as the reference days in the first instance. The number
of observation days was kept at 5. The sliding window of
observation days and reference days were shifted by one day every
time. So, the first window of observation days ranged from day 16
to day 20. These days were normal days and hence the MD had no
spikes. As such, the reference days’ window was shifted to days 2–
day 16. The observation days’ window was shifted to day 17–day
21. This set had one day (day 21) with illegal load. The MD starts
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© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2017
rising. Since the MD starts rising, the reference days’ window is
kept fixed and the observations days’ window is kept moving, e.g.
day 18–day 22, day 19–day 23 and so on. Fig. 6a gives the MD of
the voltage magnitude differences of phase 2.
The Chi-squared threshold for 8° of freedom with a 99%
confidence level is 20.09. Clearly, the MD of voltage magnitude
difference between the nodes 850-816 rises and remains so (except
for the first window) for all the windows of observation days. The
MD crosses the threshold in the fifth window itself. The sixth
window has day 21–day 25, all of which were days that had the
extra load. The MD peaks in the sixth window. The difference for
nodes 850-816 rises because this line segment carries the extra
current for the illegal load. As is discussed in Section 2.1, the
difference should also show up for all the lines upstream to 816.
This, however, does not happen in our case, as can be seen from
the line 814-850. Clearly, when we have a significant number of
nodes downstream to the point of theft, not all upstream voltage
differences may come out as outliers. This test still does the job of
pointing out where we may have a load that has not been accounted
for.
4.1.2 Normalised voltage double difference: The same set of
data is taken and the NVDD technique is used. Fig. 6b gives the
MD for the double difference. The MD for (850-816)–(816-824),
which we will refer as 816, spikes up by a huge margin. The
threshold is crossed in the third window, much earlier than the
simple voltage difference case. The MD for (814-850)–(850-816),
which we will refer as 850, remains within the threshold limit.
In the example that was just discussed, it was seen that a power
theft of the order of 40 kW is quite high when compared to the
normal load level attributed to that node. It is, thus, easier for the
algorithm to detect an outlier. Next, we show the effect of changing
the load level (from high to low) of the illegal load, on the
performance of the outlier detection algorithm.
4.2 Sensitivity to changes in the theft load level
To see the sensitivity of this algorithm to the level of theft, the
illegal load level at a node with respect to its already existing legal
load is varied. In the IEEE 34 node feeder system, node 844 has a
spot load of 135 kW and 105 kVar in all the three phases. To create
multiple scenarios, extra loads (illegal load) varying from 2 to 10%
of this load (with a power factor of 0.8), on phase 2 of node 844
were added, to mimic power theft.
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Fig. 7  MD of the NVDD with different theft load levels
Eighty days of power flow data were generated for each of the
scenarios by adding noise to the base case (as mentioned in the
previous section). For the first 40 days, for all the scenarios, no
extra/illegal load was added. For the remaining 40 days, extra load
was added at node 844. The window size of reference days was
kept at 25 and the window size of observation days at 5. For
calculation of MD, the size of the voltage vectors was kept at R8,
with each element representing an equally spaced hour (hours 1, 4,
7, …, 22). Fig. 7 gives the MD plot for the NVDD of phase 2, for
three different scenarios: 2, 5 and 10% illegal load levels.
In Fig. 7, 844 refers to the NVDD, (842-844)–(844-846). There
are 51 windows of observation days. The first window has day 26–
day 30, while the last window has day 76–day 80. From the figure,
it can be observed that with a 2% power theft (compared to the
existing base case load), only a couple of minor peaks come up in
the MD. These peaks cross the Chi-square threshold of 18.17 for a
98% confidence level. With a 5% power theft, one can see some
peaks and a sustained high level of MD for some of the windows.
The peaks cross the Chi-square threshold for a 98% confidence
level, while the sustained higher level of MD crosses the threshold
for a 90% confidence level at 13.36. With a 10% theft level, the
MD rises from the 15th window onwards, and remains above the
threshold for a 99% confidence level, on a consistent basis.
It is clear from the above simulation, that with very low levels
of power theft with respect to the existing load, the algorithm may
not be able to detect anything. This is primarily because of the
noise level in the load demand of the customers, connected to the
node. With higher levels of theft, the algorithm is able to detect
power theft correctly. Detection accuracy will be dependent on the
levels of power theft with respect to the variation in the existing
load from day to day. The variation level (normally distributed) in
the existing load in our simulation case studies is at 10% (1σ ). So,
for example, if we calculate the MD squared for only one degree of
freedom (one time instant, univariate distribution), with theft levels
of 10% and above, there is a 68% chance that the total load
(existing + theft) would be considered as an outlier. Whereas, if the
theft levels are above 30% (≥ 3σ of existing load variation levels),
there is a 99% chance of detection. With a higher number of
degrees of freedom (more time instants spanning over the day), the
chances of outlier detection will be dependent upon the Chi-square
distribution.
4.3 Sensitivity to noise levels in voltage magnitude difference
measurements
The outlier detection technique will be sensitive to noise in the
voltage magnitude difference measurements. To check for the
effect of noise levels in the voltage difference measurements, we
considered the case discussed in Section 4.2. 10% of the load (with
a power factor of 0.8) on phase 2 of node 844 was added, to mimic
power theft. Normally distributed noise was then added to the
voltage magnitude differences, ranging from 1 to 10%. Table 1
gives the MD values and the Chi-squared confidence levels (8° of
freedom) with such values.
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A noise level of 1–6% in the measurements could still result in
a confidence level above 99%. With a 10% noise level, the
confidence level is quite low and cannot be used to conclude
anything. From the above results, it is clear that a noise level of 6%
and below is preferable for the algorithm to give good results.
4.4 Effect of mutual coupling on other phases
Due to the effect of mutual coupling between phases, the double
differencing of voltages on the other phases (phases that do not
have illegal loads) can also throw up some outliers. The probability
of getting outliers in the other two phases is more, when the node
which is being examined for theft does not have any existing load
in these two phases. If the other two phases have loads, then
mutual coupling effect due to the theft load may not be significant.
In Section 4.2, a theft at phase 2 of node 844 is simulated. It has a
spot load of 135 kW and 105 kVar in all the three phases. Fig. 8a
gives the MD plot for the NVDD of phase 1 of node 844.
Clearly, the effect on phase 1 due to a theft in phase 2 is not
strong enough to throw up an alarm. This is mainly because of the
135 kW spot load present in phase 1 of node 844.
Node 808 on the other hand, has a base load of 8 kW in phase 2
and no loads in phases 1 and 3. An extra 8 kW (illegal) load in
phase 2 of node 808 was added. Fig. 8b gives the MD plot of
phases 1 and 2 of node 808. The MD in phase 2 gives a clear
indication of extra current flowing into node 808, with very high
values. The MD in phase 1 also points to something abnormal.
Fig. 8c gives the plot of voltage magnitudes of phase 2 (the
phase where we have the illegal load) and phase 1. The plot gives
the hourly values for all the 80 days (24 × 80). If we look at the
plot of phase 2, we see a clear dip in the voltage magnitudes for the
last 40 days. This gets reflected in the high MD values. The dip in
phase 1 cannot be found visually. Nonetheless, the MD still throws
up an alarm. This information from a mutually coupled phase could
be useful under circumstances where we may have missing data in
one of the phases.
4.5 Theft at a junction point
In Section 4.1, a theft at node 816, which is a junction point with
two different line segments downstream to it, is simulated. While
doing the voltage double differencing, (850–816) and (816–824)
were considered, but (816–818) was ignored. This is because,
nodes 818, 820 and 822 do not have any load in phase 2 and any
voltage drop in the line segment 816-818 due to the current in
phase 2, would be negligible.
To simulate a theft at a junction, an extra load in phase 1 of
node 834 was added. Node 834 is a junction point with two line
segments branching out of it (to nodes 860 and 842). Between
nodes 834 and 860, distributed loads of 16, 20 and 116 kW in
phases 1, 2 and 3, respectively, are distributed. A theft of 20% in
phase 3 was simulated. The voltage double difference now was
calculated using (21). Since phase 3 has a bigger load compared to
the other phases, a 20% theft in phase 3 will have a significant
effect on the other phases due to mutual coupling. Fig. 8d gives the
IET Gener. Transm. Distrib., 2017, Vol. 11 Iss. 11, pp. 2831-2839
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2017
Fig. 8  Simulation results
(a) MD in a mutually coupled phase having load, (b) MD in a mutually coupled phase having no load, (c) Voltage magnitude plots of phases 2 and 1 for 80 days, (d) MD in a
mutually coupled phase due to theft at a junction point
MD plot of phase 1 corresponding to node 834. There is a definite
rise in the MD.
5 Conclusions
Simple voltage differences and normalised double differences
between successive nodes in a distribution feeder can be used to
detect and locate power theft/illegal loads. Mahalanobis distance
measure to detect outliers was used. Once an outlier is detected,
technicians on the field can be asked to verify the connections
going out of a feeder node.
The algorithms discussed here, however, are dependent on very
accurate voltage measurements. The fact that the algorithms are
dependent on voltage magnitude differences and double
differences, the presence of measurement/calibration errors in the
voltage measurements could lead to additive errors and hence
erroneous results. With increased availability of accurate digital
meters, this kind of algorithms could be deployed in the future in a
large scale.
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