Ong v.

Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 126858 | September 16, 2005

Facts:

A complaint was filed by Congressman Gillego against Petitioner Joe U. Ong, then Commissioner of BIR,
has allegedly amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. Under Sec. 2 of
R.A. 1379, a preliminary inquiry should be conducted and that the petitioner was directed to submit his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence. Instead of complying with the order, petitioner filed a
motion claiming that the Order allegedly violates his right to due process and to be presumed innocent
because it requires him to produce evidence to exculpate himself. A resolution concluded that the properties
acquired by him during is incumbency are manifestly and grossly disproportionate to his salary as a public
official and his other lawful income which directed the filing by the Ombudsman with the OSG, of a petition
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth under R.A. 1379 in relation to RA 3018 and R.A. 6770. Petitioner presented
several affirmative defenses, such as the alleged deprivation of their right to due process considering that
no preliminary investigation was conducted as regards Nelly Ong, and the nullity of the proceedings before
the Ombudsman because the latter, who acted both as investigator and adjudicator in the determination of
the existence of probable cause for the filing of the case, will also prosecute the same. Moreover, the
Petition filed before the Sandiganbayan also allegedly failed to state a cause of action because RA 1379 is
unconstitutional as it is vague and does not sufficiently define ill-gotten wealth and how it can be determined
in violation of the non-delegation of legislative power provision, and insofar as it disregards the presumption
of innocence by requiring them to show cause why the properties in question should not be declared
property of the state.

Issue:
Won R.A. 1379 is void-for-vagueness

Held:
No. Void-for-vagueness is when a statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that man
of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application, that law is
deemed void. Such kind of statute violates the first essential requisite of due process of law because it
denies the accused the right to be informed of the charged against him.

In the present case, the law defines the sufficient particularity unlawfully acquired property of a public officer
or employees and provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired property. The public is given fair
notice of what acts are proscribed and does not offended the basic concept of fairness and due process of
the constitution. Neither the presumption of innocence is violated under Sec. 2 of 1932 which states that
property acquired by a public officer or employee during his incumbency in an amount which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
Furthermore, it has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is
violated by a statue providing that proof by the State of some material facts or facts shall constitute prima
facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that
such act or acts are innocent and are committed without any unlawful intention.