raffles and the Founding of Singapore: a reassessment*

by Ahmat Adam
(Rencana ini mula-mula dibentangkan dalam “Persidangan International
Association of Historians of Asia” yang diadakan di Bangkok sangat lama
dahulu. Memandangkan ia mungkin berguna untuk para mahasiswa Sejarah dan
rakan-rakan fb yang berminat, maka penulis siarkan di Facebook ini dengan
manghadkan nota kakinya untuk mengelakkan daripada diplagiat).

Much have been written about the founding of Singapore. While many writers
have given the credit to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles for the procuration of
Singapore in 1819, few have ventured to look into the details of how Raffles
secured the island for his beloved England. Even a very strong critic of Raffles’
policies such as the sociologist, Syed Hussein Alatas, had not delved into the
issue of Raffles’ ‘founding’ of Singapore despite the fact that he accused
Raffles of being a ‘schemer’. Even the authors of Singapore’s history had
viewed the events surrounding the founding of Singapore from a Euro-centric
perspective. Few would question the operational method by which Raffles
executed his plan to acquire the island of Singapura which was carried out in a
very discreet form of conspiratorial diplomacy.
This paper intends to look at the diplomatic role of Thomas Stamford Raffles in
playing off one native raja against another in achieving his goal, namely to
procure the island of Singapore for the sake of preserving “a free and
uninterrupted commerce” with islands of the Malay Archipelago and to ensure
that Britain “would lose no time in securing ... the command of one of these
Straits [Straits of Sunda and Malacca]; and the Straits of Malacca on account of
their proximity to our [Britain’s] other Settlements appeared the most
eligible...” As was claimed by Raffles himself, his negotiations to secure a
“Station that might equally command the southern entrance ... occupied a period
of several months, but they ended successfully”. How he carried out these
‘negotiations’ will be the central argument of this paper.
Raffles’ fear of the Dutch attempt to extend supremacy over the whole of the
Malay Archipelago and thus , according to him, leaving the British hardly “an
inch of ground to stand upon” became such an obsession to the man that he
endeavoured to secure Singapore, the only strategic spot left which would
enable Britain to counteract the Dutch efforts.(Note: Raffles’ choice of
Singapore nevertheless was only final after Captain Ross, who was sent to
survey the suitability of the Karimon islands in the Straits of Malacca
(following the recommendation of Major William Farquhar), reported that
Karimon was much inferior to Riau. Whereas “Singapore has”, so Raffles wrote
to the Secretary of the Supreme Government on 16th January 1819, “on its
southern shores, by means of the several smaller islands which lay off it,
excellent anchorage and smaller harbours.” He wrote, Singapore was “far more
convenient and commanding than even Rhio, for our China trade passing down
the Straits of Malacca, and every native vessel that sails through the Straits of
Rhio must pass in sight of it...”). But Singapore being in the southern extremity
of Johor was under the jurisdiction of the Sultan of “the kingdom of Johor,
Riau, and dependencies”, who was enthroned at Lingga. To realize his ambition
of acquiring the island which he was to call “a child of his own”, Raffles almost
unabashedly went back on the English word of recognition of the Sultan of
Lingga as the legitimate sovereign of Johor.
Since the time of Sultan Mahmud Riayat Syah (r. 1761 - 1812) both British and
Dutch authorities had considered the Sultan of Lingga as the rightful sovereign
of Johor. Mahmud Syah who was made Sultan by the Bugis chief, Daeng
Kemboja in 1761, when he was still an infant, was titled “Sultan of Johor,
Pahang, Riau, Lingga, the Karimons, Singapore and other lesser islands and
dependencies”. (Note: Bugis influence on the succession of Malay rulers in the
Johor kingdom started in 1721 when they installed Sultan Sulaiman as the
Sultan of Johor-Riau following the assassination of Sultan Abdul Jalil).
Dutch recognition of the Malay sovereign was sealed by a treaty signed in 1784
following the expulsion of the Bugis from Riau. (Note: Bugis domination of the
Malay rajas in the 18th century led to tensions between the two parties which
culminated in the attempt by Sultan Sulaiman in 1756 to seek Dutch help in
expelling the Bugis in exchange for economic benefits for the Dutch. Dutch
onslaught on the Bugis in 1757 led to the latter acknowledging Dutch authority
and recognizing the Sultan of Johor as their sovereign. However the Malays
reconciled with the Bugis after 1760 when trade in Riau declined due to the
departure of the Bugis). Mahmud was nevertheless given back Riau in 1795
even after the fiasco of his conspiracy in 1787 with the Illanuns from Tempasuk
to oust the Dutch in Riau, which resulted in Dutch vengeance,.
The taking over of Malacca from the Dutch by the English did not deprive the
ruler of Lingga of the acknowledgement by both nations as the Yang Dipertuan
of Johor and Pahang and their dependencies. British recognition was further
extended when on 19th August 1818, less than six months before Raffles landed
on Singapore, Major Farquhar, the Resident of Malacca, signed a treaty with the
Raja Muda of Riau, the Agent of the Sri Sultan Abdul Rahman Syah [of
Lingga], “King of Johor, Pahang and their dependencies”. As a matter of fact,
even Raffles himself had in 1813 acknowledged Abdul Rahman as sovereign of
Johor, Pahang and all their dependencies. Why then would Raffles alter his
stand later on? For sure, his obsession to undermine the influence of the Dutch
in Sumatra and his attempts to forestall their return to Padang and Palembang,
as well as to counteract Dutch influence by establishing British outposts in the
Lampungs and on the islands off the west coast of Sumatra (which led to
disapproval from his superiors) had been given as the principal factors by many
writers. It was said that his determination to check Dutch influence in the Malay
Archipelago prompted him to lobby with the Governor-General in India who
later gave him support in securing a commercial station at the southern entrance
to the Straits of Malacca.
However, the urgency of raising the British flag on Singapore island was also
driven by the fact that in Raffles’ eyes it was an opportune moment for the
English to exploit the political situation then, whereby there appeared to be a
successional dispute to the throne of the Johor-Riau kingdom. But was there
really a dispute in regard to the question of succession to the throne of Johor?
Raffles must have known that matters pertaining to the island of Singapore were
intrinsically linked to the kingdom of Johor and that accounted for his attempt,
as soon as he made his landing on the shores of Singapore, to obtain the
approval of the Temenggong, Abdul Rahman, agent of the raja of Lingga, to
allow the English to set up a station on Singapore island.
The Temenggong had in fact been on the island, setting up a Malay and proto-
Malay settlement in as early as 1811. In 1814 he wrote to the Sultan of Lingga
asking permission for him to sail away seeking his fortune anywhere he liked.
He had even authorised the opening of about twenty gambir plantations by
Malays and Chinese. It must have been in recognition of the Temenggong’s
presence on the island that Raffles had a provisional treaty signed between him
and the Temenggong on 30th January 1919 in order to have the latter’s
authorisation of the English occupation of Singapore. (Note: Under the treaty
the Temenggong was paid an annual sum of 3,000 dollars in exchange for
permitting the English to establish a station. The Temenggong was also
promised protection, while he on his part “undertook to have no relations with
any other nation”). However, Raffles was politely told by the Temenggong that
the ultimate decision could only be made by higher authorities, namely the
Yang Dipertuan Muda of Riau and the Sultan of Lingga “who were the
sovereigns of this country”.
As was stated earlier, Raffles was nevertheless determined to exploit the
dubious situation in regard to what he perceived as the irregular method of
succession to the throne of Johore. From his Malay studies he must have learnt
that succession to the throne in most Malay states had seldom been smooth and
easy. As a matter of fact, from the latter part of the eighteenth century until the
last quarter of the nineteenth century the Malay states or kerajaans witnessed
continuing disputes over succession. The Rival claimants had often led to
family squabbles in the Malay royal house. Now, in the case of the Johor-Riau
kingdom Raffles was informed that Tengku Hussein or better known as Tengku
Long had been bypassed as ruler in Lingga, even though he was the elder
brother to the reigning Sultan Abdul Rahman Syah of Johore-Riau-Lingga.
Our knowledge of the issue of the succession of the Johor-Riau kingdom after
the death of Sultan Mahmud at Lingga has mostly been derived from the
writings of scholars whose sources were mainly based on Peter J. Begbie’s The
Malay Peninsula which was first published in 1834. According to Begbie, when
Sultan Mahmud Syah of the Johor-Riau empire died in 1810 [sic] he left two
sons. The eldest was Tengku Hussein, generally known as Tengku Long, whose
mother was Mahmud’s second wife, Incik Mako. (Note: She was the daughter
of a Bugis called Incik Japhar and his wife, Incik Halimah. Hussein’s mother
was not, according to Begbie, of royal birth.) The second son was Tengku
Abdul Rahman. His mother, Incik Meriam, who was the third wife of Sultan
Mahmud, was also a commoner. (Note: Her father was also a Bugis who
married a Balinese women named Incik Senai, also known as Petis.) Mahmud
had four wives but only the fourth, Putri Hamidah bore him a daughter who,
nevertheless, did not live long.
Begbie claimed that about a year before Mahmud’s death, he had indicated that
he wanted Hussein to be his successor, while Abdul Rahman, given his religious
disposition, was advised to go to Mecca for the pilgrimage. Begbie then
narrated the incident of the father and his two sons sailing to Bulang, an island
off Riau, during which time Sultan Mahmud again signalled his choice of
Hussein as his successor by asking the young man to hoist the royal standard.
Hussein was also said to have been vested with the royal seal. According to
Begbie also, when Mahmud suddenly died, Hussein was in Pahang who was
presumably sent to marry Wan Esah, the niece of Wan Ali, the Bendahara of
Pahang. Since Hussein was not around during the burial ceremony, Abdul
Rahman, by sheer conspiracy of the Yang Dipertuan Muda of Riau, Raja Jaafar,
with the immediate relatives of the prince, was made Sultan to succeed Sultan
Mahmud. What Begbie wrote seems to have become the standard source of
reference for almost all writers. Even though Begbie never mentioned his
sources, his writing has generally been accepted as “reliable”.
The standard interpretation of the whole episode of the succession to the throne
of the Johor-Riau kingdom was further established by Richard Winstedt when
in his History of Johore he disputed the claim by the Tuhfat al-Nafis (which he
believed was not without the author’s biasness), that Sultan Mahmud on his
death-bed had beseeched Yam Tuan Muda Jaafar to ensure Komeng (the
nickname for Abdul Rahman) to succeed him. Winstedt more or less affirmed
whatever argument forwarded by Begbie in asserting Hussein as the rightful
successor.
But other than what Begbie reported, which is also not corroborated by clear
evidence of sources, there is really nothing to fall on, except for the Tuhfat al-
Nafis which Winstedt and others seem to cast doubt on its objectivity.
But was Winstedt himself objective? When exactly did Sultan Mahmud of
Johor-Riau-Lingga die? If the date given by Winstedt regarding Mahmud’s deah
is correct, one may then ask: when exactly did Abdul Rahman become the
Sultan of Lingga, given the fact that new information is now available?. Such
pertinent questions may be able to dispel some of the biasness in the
construction of the history of how Singapore was “acquired” by Thomas
Stamford Raffles.
In the eyes of many Western scholars Sultan Abdul Rahman who succeeded
Mahmud as ruler of Lingga was illustrated more as a weakling than a man of
good repute. In fact Winstedt and others believed that it was the Yam Tuan
Muda Raja Jaafar who had manipulated Abdul Rahman, who in actual fact did
not really want to become the Sultan. They pointed out the fact that the regalia
of the kingdom was never surrendered to Abdul Rahman. It was kept by his
step-mother, Raja Hamidah, who was the sister of the Yam Tuan Raja Jaafar.
(Note: But neither was Raffles successful in procuring the kerajaan [regalia] for
Sultan Hussein).
Despite the controversy surrounding the issue of the succession to the Johor
sultanate, of which Raffles must have been quite aware of, there were attempts
by the English to persuade the Yam Tuan Muda at Riau to align the Johor-Riau
kingdom with them. However, realizing that the Sultan of Lingga would never
be able to make any concession to the English because of their long-established
relationship with the Dutch, Raffles immediately seized the opportunity of
giving recognition to Hussein, being the eldest son, as the rightful successor to
the throne of Johor. The argument was that Sultan Abdul Rahman Syah, the
younger brother, had dispossessed Hussein “of his rights and property and
usurped the throne of his father”. (Note: Like most writers, Wurtzburg who
relied on the diary of Captain J. G. F. Crawford also seemed to share this theory
of conspiracy by Sultan Abdu Rahman and the Yam Tuan Muda of Riau in
usurping the throne of Lingga.)