G.R. No.

185734, July 03, 2013

ALFREDO C. LIM, JR., Petitioner, 
v. 
SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO AND CARMEN T.
LAZARO,Respondents.

Facts: On August 22, 2005, Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for

sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment before the RTC, seeking to recover
from respondents-spouses Lazaro the sum of P2,160,000.00,
which represented the amounts stated in several dishonored
checks issued by the latter to the former, as well as interests,
attorney’s fees, and costs.

The RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application

and upon the posting of the required P2,160,000.00 bond,
issued the corresponding writ. In this accord, three (3) parcels
of land situated in Bulacan, registered in the names of Sps.
Lazaro, were levied upon.

Nonetheless, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement

whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of
P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis.

Subsequently, Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to

lift the writ of preliminary attachment annotated on the subject
TCTs, which the RTC granted on March 29, 2007.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was

properly lifted.

Ruling: The Court finds that the discharge of the writ of

preliminary attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro
was improper.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the
length of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to
subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence
dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid,
or the sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner
provided by law.

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of

the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of
Sps. Lazaro was improper.

Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a

compromise agreement which had already been approved by
the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the
obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with –
particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of
P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains
unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have
continued to subsist.
 G.R. No. 190028, February 26, 2014
LETICIA P. LIGON, Petitioner, 
v.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56 AT
MAKATI CITY AND ITS PRESIDING JUDGE, JUDGE
REYNALDO M. LAIGO, SHERIFF IV LUCITO V.
ALEJO, ATTY. SILVERIO GARING, MR. LEONARDO J.
TING, AND MR. BENITO G. TECHICO, Respondents.

Facts: On November 20, 2002, petitioner Ligon filed an

amended complaint before the Quezon City RTC for
collection of sum of money and damages, rescission of
contract, and nullification of title with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment against Polished Arrow
and its incorporators.

The parties stipulated on the existence of the December 9, 2004

Decision of the Makati City RTC, after due proceedings, the
Quezon City RTC rendered a Decision directing Sps. Baladjay to
pay Ligon the amount of ₱3,000,000.00 with interest, as well
as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

On September 25, 2008, the March 26, 2008 Decision of the

Quezon City RTC became final and executory. However, when
Ligon sought its execution, she discovered that the December 3,
2002 attachment annotation had been deleted from TCT No.
9273 when the subject property was sold by way of public
auction on September 9, 2005 to the highest bidder, respondent
Ting during the execution proceedings in the Makati City Case.
In this regard, Ligon learned that the Makati City RTC had
issued its first assailed directing Atty. Garing, as the Register of
Deeds of Muntinlupa City, to: (a) register the Officer’s Final
Deed of Sale on the official Record Book of the Register of
Deeds of Muntinlupa City; and (b) cancel TCT No. 8502 in the
name of Sps. Baladjay and issue a new title in the name of Ting,
free from any liens and encumbrances

Issue: Whether or not the Makati City RTC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders

Ruling: Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT

No. 9273 due to the Makati City RTC’s December 9, 2004
Decision rescinding the transfer of the subject property from
Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same
was made in fraud of creditors, Ligon’s attachment lien over the
subject property continued to subsist since the attachment she
had earlier secured binds the property itself, and, hence,
continues until the judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to Ligon as
adjudged in the Quezon City Case is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. The
grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its
directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting
free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of action
clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment lien and, also,
defies the legal characterization of attachment proceedings. It
bears noting that Ligon’s claim, secured by the aforesaid
attachment, is against Sps. Baladjay whose ownership over the
subject property had been effectively restored in view of the
RTC’s rescission of the property’s previous sale to Polished
Arrow. Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment lien against Sps. Baladjay
as well as their successors-in-interest should have been
preserved, and the annotation thereof carried over to any
subsequent certificate of title, the most recent of which as it
appears on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico,
without prejudice to the latter’s right to protect his own
ownership interest over the subject property.
 G.R. No. 166759, November 25, 2009

SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF

MARIO TORRES and SOLAR RESOURCES,
INC.,Petitioners, 
vs.
NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA
SATSATIN, NIKKI NORMEL SATSATIN and NIKKI
NORLIN SATSATIN, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioners filed before the regional trial court (RTC) a

complaint for sum of money and damages, against
Nicanor, Ermilinda Satsatin, Nikki Normel Satsatin, and Nikki
Norlin Satsatin.. Petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among other things:
that respondents are about to depart the Philippines; that they
have properties, real and personal in Metro Manila and in the
nearby provinces; that the amount due them is P19,000,000.00
above all other claims; that there is no other sufficient security
for the claim sought to be enforced; and that they are willing to
post a bond fixed by the court to answer for all costs which may
be adjudged to the respondents and all damages which
respondents may sustain by reason of the attachment prayed
for, if it shall be finally adjudged that petitioners are not
entitled thereto.

On October 30, 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing

the petitioners to post a bond in the amount of ₱7,000,000.00
before the court issues the writ of attachment.

On November 19, 2002, a copy of the writ of attachment was

served upon the respondents. On the same date, the sheriff
levied the real and personal properties of the respondent,
including household appliances, cars, and a parcel of land
located at Las Piñas, Manila.

On November 21, 2002, summons, together with a copy of the

complaint, was served upon the respondents. On November 29,
2002, respondents filed their Answer.

On the same day respondents filed their answer, they also filed
a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment anchored on the
following grounds: the bond was issued before the issuance of
the writ of attachment; the writ of attachment was issued before
the summons was received by the respondents; the sheriff did
not serve copies of the application for attachment, order of
attachment, plaintiffs’ affidavit, and attachment bond, to the
respondents; the sheriff did not submit a sheriff’s return in
violation of the Rules; and the grounds cited for the issuance of
the writ are baseless and devoid of merit. In the alternative,
respondents offered to post a counter-bond for the lifting of the
writ of attachment.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of attachment was improper

and irregular.

Ruling: In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there

was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the
bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the
requisites for its approval were complied with.

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of

the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:
first, the court issues the order granting the application; second,
the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the
writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two
stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation
of the writ commences, the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction,
the court has no power and authority to act in any manner
against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not
bind the defendant.

Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also upon
consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the
complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or
contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment,
service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the
application for attachment, the applicant’s affidavit and bond,
and the order must be served upon him.
 G.R. No. 125027, August 12, 2002
ANITA MANGILA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND LORETA GUINA, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: Petitioner contracted the freight forwarding services of

private respondent for shipment of petitioner’s products.
Petitioner agreed to pay private respondent cash on delivery.
Private respondent’s invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent
interest per annum on all overdue accounts. In case of suit, the
same invoice stipulates attorney’s fees equivalent to 25 percent
of the amount due plus costs of suit.

However, for the next three shipments, March 17, 24 and 31,
1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping
charges amounting to P109, 376.95.[4]

Despite several demands, petitioner never paid private

respondent. Thus, on June 10, 1988, private respondent filed
Civil Case No. 5875 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for collection of sum of money.

On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriff’s Return showing

that summons was not served on petitioner. The sheriff found
out further that petitioner had left the Philippines for Guam.[5]

Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing petitioner’s departure

from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her
creditors, private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary
Attachment. On September 26, 1988, the trial court issued an
Order of Preliminary Attachment against petitioner. The
following day, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment.
On November 7, 1988, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Discharge Attachment[8] without submitting herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then,
she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the
summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person.[9]

The trial court granted the Motion to Discharge Attachment on

January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioner’s counter-bond. The
trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction
and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.

On December 26, 1988, private respondent applied for an alias

summons, which the trial court issued on January 19, 1989.[11] It
was only on January 26, 1989 that summons was finally served
on petitioner.[12]

Issue: Whether or not Respondent court erred in not holding

that the Writ of Attachment was improperly issued and served

Ruling: This Court has long settled the issue of when

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired
in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party
to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically,
Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the
remedy “at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter.”[21] This phrase refers to the date of filing of the
complaint which is the moment that marks “the
commencement of the action.” The reference plainly is to a time
before summons is served on the defendant, or even before
summons issues.
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[22] this
Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:

“It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the
Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
defendant - issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ
of attachment - these do not and cannot bind and affect the
defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is
eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of
summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission
to the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper
officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it
is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the
applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of
attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but
also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy
of the complaint xxx.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional

remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court
issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of
attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is
not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ
commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power
and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any
order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.[23]

In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was

issued on September 27, 1988 and implemented on October 28,
1988. However, the alias summons was served only on January
26, 1989 or almost three months after the implementation of
the writ of attachment.

The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment
on September 27 since a motion for its issuance can be filed “at
the commencement of the action.” However, on the day the writ
was implemented, the trial court should have, previously or
simultaneously with the implementation of the writ, acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as was shown in the records
of the case, the summons was actually served on petitioner
several months after the writ had been implemented.
 G.R. No. 139941       January 19, 2001
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: On July 30, 1987, the government filed before the

Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0027 against the Marcos spouses,
several government officials who served under the Marcos
administration, and a number of individuals known to be
cronies of the Marcoses, including Chuidian. The complaint
sought the reconveyance, reversion, accounting and restitution
of all forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally and stashed
away by the defendants.

While the case was pending, on March 17, 1993, the Republic of
the Philippines filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
attachment15 over the L/C, citing as grounds therefor the
following:

(1) Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently misapplied the funds of

ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity, justifying issuance of the
writ under Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d) of the same rule as
Chuidian is guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring
the obligation upon which the action was brought, or that he
concealed or disposed of the property that is the subject of the
action;

(3) Chuidian has removed or disposed of his property with the

intent of defrauding the plaintiff as justified under Section 1(c)
of Rule 57; and
(4) Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on whom
summons may be served by publication, which justifies the writ
of attachment prayed for under Section 1(e) of the same rule.

On August 11, 1997, or almost four (4) years after the issuance
of the order of attachment, Chuidian filed a motion to lift the
attachment based on the following grounds:

First, he had returned to the Philippines; hence, the

Sandiganbayan's "most potent ground" for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment no longer existed. Since his
absence in the past was the very foundation of the
Sandiganbayan's writ of preliminary attachment, his presence
in the country warrants the immediate lifting thereof.

Second, there was no evidence at all of initial fraud or

subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted by
the PCGG Chairman citing mere "belief and information" and
"not on knowledge of the facts." Moreover, this statement is
hearsay since the PCGG Chairman was not a witness to the
litigated incidents, was never presented as a witness by the
Republic and thus was not subject to cross-examination.

Third, Chuidian denies that he ever disposed of his assets to

defraud the Republic, and there is nothing in the records that
support the Sandiganbayan's erroneous conclusion on the
matter. Fourth, Chuidian belied the allegation that he was also a
defendant in "other related criminal action," for in fact, he had
"never been a defendant in any prosecution of any sort in the
Philippines."21 Moreover, he could not have personally appeared
in any other action because he had been deprived of his right to
a travel document by the government.
Fifth, the preliminary attachment was, in the first place,
unwarranted because he was not "guilty of fraud in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation". In fact, the L/C was not a
product of fraudulent transactions, but was the result of a US
Court-approved settlement. Although he was accused of
employing blackmail tactics to procure the settlement, the
California Supreme Court ruled otherwise. And in relation
thereto, he cites as a sixth ground the fact that all these
allegations of fraud and wrongdoing had already been dealt
with in actions before the State and Federal Courts of
California. While it cannot technically be considered as forum
shopping, it is nevertheless a "form of suit multiplicity over the
same issues, parties and subject matter." 22 These foreign
judgments constitute res judicata which warrant the dismissal
of the case itself.

Chuidian further contends that should the attachment be

allowed to continue, he will be deprived of his property without
due process. The L/C was payment to Chuidian in exchange for
the assets he turned over to the Republic pursuant to the terms
of the settlement in Case No. 575867. Said assets, however, had
already been sold by the Republic and cannot be returned to
Chuidian should the government succeed in depriving him of
the proceeds of the L/C. Since said assets were disposed of
without his or the Sandiganbayan's consent, it is the Republic
who is fraudulently disposing of assets.

Finally, Chuidian stressed that throughout the four (4) years

that the preliminary attachment had been in effect, the
government had not set the case for hearing. Under Rule 17,
Section 3, the case itself should be dismissed for laches owing to
the Republic's failure to prosecute its action for an
unreasonable length of time. Accordingly, the preliminary
attachment, being only a temporary or ancillary remedy, must
be lifted and the PNB ordered to immediately pay the proceeds
of the L/C to Chuidian.

Issue: Whether or not Chuidian’s grounds for

discharge are proper

Ruling: No. It is clear that these grounds have nothing to do

with the issuance of the writ of attachment. Much less do they
attack the issuance of the writ at that time as improper or
irregular. And yet, the rule contemplates that the defect must be
in the very issuance of the attachment writ.

Supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge

of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule.

In the instant case, there is no showing that the issuance of the

writ of attachment was attended by impropriety or irregularity.

The Rules of Court specifically provide for the remedies of a

defendant whose property or asset has been attached. As has
been consistently ruled by this Court, the determination of the
existence of grounds to discharge a writ of attachment rests in
the sound discretion of the lower courts.29

The question in this case is: What can the herein petitioner do
to quash the attachment of the L/C? There are two courses of
action available to the petitioner:

First. To file a counterbond in accordance with Rule 57, Section

12, which provides:

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond.

– At anytime after an order of attachment has been granted, the
party whose property has been attached, or the person
appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the
applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the
judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order
discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security
given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the
attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond executed
to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party,
with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is
made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached
as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.
Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall
forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer.
Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the
provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds
of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the
deposit or giving the counter-bond, or the person appearing on
his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid standing in
place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for
any reason be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the
party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-
bond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of
attachment.

or

Second. To quash the attachment on the ground that it was

irregularly or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section
13 of the same Rule:

SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular

issuance. - The party whose property has been attached may
also, at any time either before or after the release of the
attached property, or before any attachment shall have been
actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor,
apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the
court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge
the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or
irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the
part of the party whose property has been attached, but not
otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the same by
counter-affidavits or other evidence in addition to that on which
the attachment was made. After hearing, the judge shall order
the discharge of the attachment if it appears that it was
improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is not cured
forthwith.

It would appear that petitioner chose the latter because the

grounds he raised assail the propriety of the issuance of the writ
of attachment. By his own admission, however, he repeatedly
acknowledged that his justifications to warrant the lifting of the
attachment are facts or events that came to light or took place
after the writ of attachment had already been implemented.
 G.R. No. 203530, April 13, 2015
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, TOMAS CLEMENTE,
JR., AND OSCAR RAMIREZ, Petitioners, v.ERLINDA
KRISHNAN, Respondent.

Facts: Petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente,

and Oscar Ramirez (hereafter petitioners) are the respondents
in the complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages
filed by respondent Erlinda Khrishnan (hereafter respondent
Erlinda) on February 7, 2001. Respondent Erlinda claimed that
she is a client of respondent bank wherein she maintained
several accounts including time deposits. On several occasions,
when respondent Erlinda presented her Time Deposits
Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for payment because
they have become due, petitioners refused to honor them for the
reason that they were fraudulent. Respondent Erlinda likewise
applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the RTC
granted

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision

which denied petitioners' motion praying that bank property be
deposited in lieu of cash or a counter-bond

Ruling: We rule in the negative.

Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that

"[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon
motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action
is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of
the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is
issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to
satisfy the applicant's demand, unless such party makes deposit
or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to
that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to
satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be
attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."

Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff

enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all reasonable
diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action,
only so much of the property in the Philippines of the party
against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the
former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is
issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an
amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of
attachment or to the value of the property to be attached,
exclusive of costs."

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of

attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners
in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the
counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that petitioner's argument
that it has the option to deposit real property instead of
depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the
attachment or stay the implementation thereof is
unmeritorious.

In fact, in Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-

Infante,6 we held that one of the ways to secure the discharge of
an attachment is for the party whose property has been
attached or a person appearing on his behalf, to post a
counterbond or make the requisite cash deposit in an amount
equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment. 7
 G.R. No. 203240, March 18, 2015
NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO.,
INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DENNIS AND
CHERYLIN* GARCIA, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE
NAME AND STYLE “ECOLAMP MULTI
RESOURCES,”, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint with application for a writ

of preliminary attachment, before the RTC against
respondents. It alleged that: (a) from March to July 2004,
petitioner caused the delivery to respondents of various
appliances in the aggregate amount of P8,040,825.17;7 (b) the
goods were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio
Lines, Inc., and were accepted in good order and condition by
respondents’ representatives;8 (c)  the parties agreed that the
goods delivered were payable within 120 days, and that the
unpaid amounts would earn interest at a rate of eighteen
percent (18%) per annum;9 (d) however, the value of the goods
were not paid by respondents despite repeated demands;10 and
(e) respondents fraudulently asserted that petitioner had no
proof that they  had indeed received the quantity of the subject
goods.

Thereafter, or on January 11, 2006, respondents filed a Motion

to Discharge Excess Attachment,15alleging that the attachment
previously ordered by the RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given
that the estimated value of the attached properties, including
the garnished bank accounts, as assessed by their appraiser,
Gaudioso W. Lapaz (Lapaz), amounted to P17,273,409.73, while
the attachment bond is only in the amount of P8,040,825.17.

Issue: Whether the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of
the preliminary attachment after petitioner appealed the
decision in the Main Case, and thereafter ordered the
transmittal of the records to the CA

Ruling: It cannot be seriously doubted that the RTC had

already lost jurisdiction over the Main Case.

With the RTC’s loss of jurisdiction over the Main Case

necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over all matters merely
ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety of conducting a trial by
commissioners in order to determine the excessiveness of the
subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary matter
to the Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.

Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral,40 the Court, in view of

the nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that
the attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action
independent of the principal action because the attachment was
only an incident of such action, viz.:

Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the

property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either
at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as
a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.

It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent

existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the
plaintiff against the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a
principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself
cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer
be justified.
 G.R. No. 212025, July 01, 2015
EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL,
INC., Petitioner, v. VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE
CORPORATION, AND FAR EASTERN SURETY &
INSURANCE CO., INC., Respondents.

Facts: On March 26, 1996, petitioner Excellent Quality

Apparel, Inc. (petitioner), then represented by Max L.F. Ying
(Ying), Vice-President for Productions, and Alfiero R. Orden,
Treasurer, entered into a contract with Multi-Rich Builders
(Multi-Rich), a single proprietorship, represented by Wilson G.
Chua, its President and General Manager, for the construction
of a garment factory within the Cavite Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (CPEZA). The duration of the project was for a
maximum period of five (5) months or 150 consecutive calendar
days. Included in the contract was an Arbitration Clause in case
of dispute.

On January 26, 2004, Win Multi-Rich filed a complaint for sum

of money and damages against petitioner and Ying before the
RTC.5 It also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment,
claiming that Ying was about to abscond and that petitioner had
an impending closure.

Win Multi-Rich then secured the necessary bond in the amount

of P8,634,448.20 from respondent Visayan Surety and
Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety)6 In the Order,7 dated
February 2, 2004, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
attachment in favor of Win Multi-Rich.

To prevent the enforcement of the writ of preliminary

attachment on its equipment and machinery, petitioner issued
Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 160149,8 dated February 16,
2004, in the amount of P8,634,448.20 payable to the Clerk of
Court of the RTC.

On February 19, 2004, petitioner filed its Omnibus

Motion,9 seeking to discharge the attachment. Petitioner also
questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC due to the presence of
the Arbitration Clause in the contract. It asserted that the case
should have been referred first to the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) pursuant to Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 1008.

Win Multi-Rich then filed a motion,13 dated April 29, 2004, to

release petitioner's cash deposit to it. Notably, the motion was
granted by the RTC in the Order,14 dated May 3, 2004.
Subsequently, on May 7, 2004, Win Multi-Rich posted Surety
Bond No. 1019815 issued by respondent Far Eastern Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. (FESICO) for the amount of P9,000,000.00,
to secure the withdrawal of the cash deposited by petitioner.
Thus, Win Multi-Rich was able to receive the funds of petitioner
even before the trial began.

On June 26, 2009, petitioner moved for execution thereof,

praying for the return of its cash deposit and, in the event of
refusal of Win Multi-Rich to comply, to hold Visayan Surety and
FESICO liable under their respective bonds.

Issue: Whether or not failure to implead the surety

respondents as parties is crucial

Ruling: In this case, the attachment bond was issued by

Visayan Surety in order for Win Multi-Rich to secure the
issuance of the writ of attachment. Hence, any application for
damages arising from the improper, irregular or excessive
attachment shall be governed by Section 20, Rule 57, which
provides:

Sec. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or

excessive attachment.

An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or

excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before
appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory,
with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties,
setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the
amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after
proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the
main case.

If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party

against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim
damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing
an application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties,
before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory.
The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and
decided by the trial court.

In a catena of cases,44 the Court has cited the requisites under

Section 20, Rule 57 in order to claim damages against the bond,
as follows:

The application for damages must be filed in the same case

where the bond was issued

1. Such application for damages must be filed before the

entry of judgment; and
 2. After hearing with notice to the surety.

In the present petition, the Court holds that petitioner

sufficiently incorporated an application for damages against the
wrongful attachment in its answer with compulsory
counterclaim filed before the RTC. Petitioner alleged that the
issuance of the improper writ of attachment caused it actual
damages in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00. It added that
the Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 160149 it issued to the RTC
Clerk of Court, to lift the improper writ of attachment, should
be returned to it.50 Evidently, these allegations constitute
petitioner's application for damages arising from the wrongful
attachment, and the said application was timely filed as it was
filed before the finality of judgment.

The next requisite that must be satisfied by petitioner to hold

Visayan Surety liable would be that the judgment against the
wrongful attachment was promulgated after the hearing with
notice to the surety. Certainly, the surety must be given prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
application for damages before the finality of the judgment. The
Court rules that petitioner did not satisfy this crucial element.

Section 20, Rule 57 specifically requires that the application for

damages against the wrongful attachment, whether filed before
the trial court or appellate court, must be with due notice to the
attaching party and his surety or sureties. Such damages may be
awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the
judgment on the main case.

Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the
facts supporting the applicant's right to damages and the
amount thereof under the bond is indispensable. The surety
should be given an opportunity to be heard as to the reality or
reasonableness of the damages resulting from the wrongful
issuance of the writ. In the absence of due notice to the surety,
therefore, no judgment for damages may be entered and
executed against it.
 G.R. No. 181721, September 09, 2015
WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT, ROSARIO
E. RAÑOA, Petitioner, v. ALFRED RAYMOND
WOLFE, Respondent.

Facts: Watercraft hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe

(Wolfe), a British national and resident of Subic Bay Freeport
Zone, Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager.

During his employment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull,

within Watercraft1 s boat storage facilities, but never paid for
the storage fees.

On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of

Wolfe.

Sometime in June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from

Watercraft's storage facilities after signing a Boat Pull-Out
Clearance dated June 29, 2002 where he allegedly
acknowledged the outstanding obligation of Sixteen Thousand
Three Hundred and Twenty-Four and 82/100 US Dollars
(US$16,324.82) representing unpaid boat storage fees for the
period of June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated demands,
he failed to pay the said amount.

Thus, on July 7, 2005, Watercraft filed against Wolfe a

Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages with
an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment.

Issue: Whether or not the allegations in the affidavit of merit

concerning fraud are sufficient to warrant the issuance of a
preliminary writ of attachment by the trial court in favor of the
petitioner

Ruling: After a careful perusal of the foregoing; allegations, the

Court agrees with the CA that Watercraft failed to state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required
by Section 5,24 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, and that Wolfe's
mere failure to pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily
amount to fraud, absent any showing that such failure was due
to insidious machinations and intent on his part to defraud
Watercraft of the amount due it.

In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,25 the

Court explained that to constitute a ground for attachment in
Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown
that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation intended to defraud the creditor. A debt is
fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it, the
debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. "The
fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must
have been the reason which induced the other party into giving
consent which he would not have otherwise given."

Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a condition of the

mind beyond the reach of the senses, usually kept secret, very
unlikely to be confessed, and therefore, can only be proved by
unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances.27 Thus, the
applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently
show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because
fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere
non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his
obligation.28 The particulars of such circumstances necessarily
include the time, persons, places and specific acts of fraud
committed.29 An affidavit which does not contain concrete and
specific grounds is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such
writ. In fact, mere general averments render the writ defective
and the court that ordered its issuance acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment

does not contain specific allegations of other factual
circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the
obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
Neither can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars of
why he was guilty of fraud in the performance of such
obligation.
 G.R. No. 193821, November 23, 2015
PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING
CENTER, Petitioner, v. RCJ LINES AND ROLANDO
ABADILLA, JR., Respondent.

Facts: On various dates between March 5, 1990, and August

29, 1990, petitioner Phil-Air sold to respondent RCJ Lines four
Carrier Paris 240 air-conditioning units for buses (units).

All the post-dated checks were dishonored when Phil-Air

subsequently presented them for payment. Check No. 479759
was returned because it was drawn against insufficient funds,
while Check Nos. 479760 and 479761 were returned because
payments were stopped.10

Before presenting the third check for payment, Phil-Air sent a

demand letter11 to Rolando Abadilla, Sr. on April 7, 1992, asking
him to fund the post-dated checks.

On July 17, 1996, Phil-Air demanded payment from Rolando

Abadilla, Jr., for the total amount of P734,994.00 plus interest,
and attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the amount due. Phil-
Air warned that it would take court action if payment is not
made within five days from demand.12

In view of the failure of RCJ Lines to pay the balance despite

demand, Phil-Air filed on April 1, 1998 the complaint for sum of
money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.

The RTC granted the application for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary attachment after Phil-Air posted an attachment
bond in the amount of P1,656,000.00.
The CA ordered Phil-Air to reimburse the premium on the
counter-bond amounting to P82,274.00 since the writ was
improvidently issued.

Issue: Whether Phil-Air should reimburse RCJ Lines for the

counter- bond premium and its alleged unrealized profits

Ruling: The CA and the RTC erred when it held Phil-Air

directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ Lines'
alleged unrealized profits. Granting that RCJ Lines suffered
losses, the judgment award should have been first executed on
the attachment bond. Only if the attachment bond is
insufficient to cover the judgment award can Phil-Air be held
liable.49
Section 4 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules)
provides that "the party applying for the order must...give a
bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the
court, in its order granting the issuance of the
writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the
costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and all
damages that he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto."

There are various modes of discharging an attachment under

Rule 57, viz.: (1) by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond
under Section 12;52 (2) by proving that the attachment bond was
improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is
insufficient under Section 13;53 (3) by showing that the
attachment is excessive under Section 13; and (4) by claiming
that the property is exempt from execution under Section 2.54

RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by posting a counter-bond.

Under the first mode, the court will order the discharge of the
attachment after (1) the movant makes a cash deposit or posts a
counter-bond and (2) the court hears the motion to discharge
the attachment with due notice to the adverse party.

The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond must be equal

to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of
costs. The cash deposit or counter-bond shall secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover
in the action.

The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the attachment applies

when there has already been a seizure of property by the sheriff
and all that is entailed is the presentation of a motion to the
proper court, seeking approval of a cash or surety bond in an
amount equivalent to the value of the property seized and the
lifting of the attachment on the basis thereof. The counter-
bond stands in place of the property so released.

To reiterate, the discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon

posting of a counter-bond or depositing cash, and after hearing
to determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or counter-
bond. On the other hand, the discharge under Section 13 takes
effect only upon showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond
was improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is
insufficient. The discharge of the attachment under Section 13
must be made only after hearing.58

These differences notwithstanding, the discharge of the

preliminary attachment either through Section 12 or Section 13
has no effect on and does not discharge the attachment
bond. The dissolution of the preliminary attachment
does not result in the dissolution of the attachment
bond. Justice Narvasa, writing his separate opinion in one
case, explained:

The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon

security given [Section 12], or a showing of its irregular or
improper issuance [Section 13], does not of course operate
to discharge the sureties on plaintiffs own attachment
bond. The reason is simple. That bond is executed to the
adverse party,. . . conditioned that the ... (applicant) will pay all
the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if
the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not
entitled thereto." Hence, until that determination is made, as to
the applicant's entitlement to the attachment, his bond must
stand and cannot be withdrawn.59

As discussed above, it is patent that under the Rules, the

attachment bond answers for all damages incurred by the party
against whom the attachment was issued.60

Thus, Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the costs

adjudged to and the damages sustained by RCJ Lines because of
the attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57 positively lays down the
rule that the attachment bond will pay "all the costs which
may be adjudged to the adverse party and
all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto."

The RTC, instead of declaring Phil-Air liable for the alleged

unrealized profits and counter-bond premium, should have
ordered the execution of the judgment award on the attachment
bond. To impose direct liability to Phil-Air would defeat the
purpose of the attachment bond, which was not dissolved
despite the lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment.
 G.R. No. 141853       February 7, 2001
TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. GUMERSINDO DE
GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON.
PRUDENCIO A. CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 220, Quezon City, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus

private respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for execution
before the Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently
issued a certification to file action.

On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed

an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate
mortgage dated March 21, 1994.

On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public

auction to respondent Gumersindo, as the highest bidder and
consequently, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.

On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint for annulment of
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction against private respondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino
Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack
of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of
the real estate mortgage. In the meantime, a temporary
restraining order was issued by the trial court. 1âwphi1.nêt

On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary

injunction enjoining private respondents, the Deputy Sheriffs
and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the
issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership
of the subject property in favor of the De Guzman spouses.

On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the

petition and annulled the assailed writ of preliminary
injunction. Teresita Idolor filed her motion for reconsideration
which was denied in a resolution dated February 4, 2000.

Issue: Whether or not that has no more proprietary right to the

issuance of the writ of injunction

Ruling: In the instant case, we agree with the respondent

Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of
over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a
writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was
sold in a public auction to private respondent Gumersindo on
May 23, 1997 and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.
Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale
to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or
before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled
to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property.
When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff's
sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to
show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be
protected as her right of redemption had already expired on
June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the
complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the
party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and
no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she
shows no equity.11 The possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of actual existing right is not aground for an injunction.
 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250      February 28, 2001
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-332-MTJ]
RIMEO S. GUSTILO, complainant, 
vs.
HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR., Presiding Judge, 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-Manapla,
Negros Occidental, respondent.

Facts: Libo-on sought the recounting of ballots in two

precincts, preliminary prohibitory injunction, and
damages.1âwphi1.nêt

On May 21, 1997, respondent ordered the issuance of summons

to the parties and set the hearing on June 6, 1997.3

On May 27, 1997, however, Libo-on filed a motion to advance

the hearing to May 29 and 30, 1997.

The next day, respondent granted Libo-on's motion. The

hearing was advanced to May 29 and 30, 1997 cancelling the
hearing for June 6, 1997.4 Complainant avers that he was not
furnished a copy of this Order dated May 28, 1997.

On May 29, 1997, respondent judge issued a temporary

restraining order (TRO) and annulled the proclamation of
complainant as the duly elected punong barangay of Punta
Mesa, Manapla.

On June 5, 1997, the RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent

and declared as null and void the order nullifying complainant's
proclamation as duly elected punong barangay.7

On June 11, 1997, respondent denied complainant's motion for

inhibition and after hearing Libo-on's motion for permanent
injunction, issued a second TRO "to maintain the
status quo between the contending parties.

Complainant argues that by issuing the second TRO,

respondent reversed the order of the RTC of Silay City dated
June 5, 1997. He also claims that by preventing him from
assuming office, he was excluded by the DILG from
participating in the election of the Liga ng Mga Barangay on
June 14, 1997.

Issue: Whether or not the judge’s failure to abide by

Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO
constitutes grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.

Ruling: The foregoing clearly show that whenever an

application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the
application only after all parties have been notified and heard in
a summary hearing. In other words, a summary hearing may
not be dispensed with.9 In the instant case, respondent admits
that he issued the injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after
receiving the applicant's evidence ex parte. His failure to abide
by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO is
grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial
to the proper administration of justice.

Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the

following requisites be present: (1) there must be aright
in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act
against which injunction to be directed is a violation of such
right.11 The onus probandi is on movant to show that there
exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the
act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that
the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent a serious damage.12 In this case, complainant had been
duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong
barangay. He had taken his oath of office. Unless his election
was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We
do not see how the complainant's exercise of such rights would
cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing
candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary
restraining order "to maintain the status quo." We see no
reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident
purpose of the second TRO was to prevent complainant from
participating in the election of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
 G.R. No. 168367
MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS, Petitioner,
V.
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.), INC./MEAD
JOHNSON PHIL., RICHARD SMYTH as General
Manager and FERDIE SARFATI, as Medical Sales
Director, Respondents.

Facts: On March 23, 2000, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas

effective immediately. Lagrosas then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th
month pay, attorney’s fees, damages and fair market value of
his Team Share Stock Option Grant.

Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a Decision9 in

NLRC, declaring the dismissal illegal. He noted that while
Lagrosas committed a misconduct, it was not connected with
his work. The incident occurred outside of company premises
and office hours. He also observed that the misconduct was not
directed against a co-employee who just happened to be
accidentally hit in the process. Nevertheless, Labor Arbiter
Hernandez imposed a penalty of three months suspension or
forfeiture of pay to remind Lagrosas not to be carried away by
the mindless dictates of his passion.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

set aside the Decision of Labor Arbiter Hernandez in its
Decision dated September 24, 2002. It held that Lagrosas was
validly dismissed for serious misconduct in hitting his co-
employee and another person with a metal steering wheel lock.
The gravity and seriousness of his misconduct is clear from the
fact that he deliberately waited for Lim and Menquito to return
to McDonald’s. The NLRC also ruled that the misconduct was
committed in connection with his duty as Territory Manager
since it occurred immediately after the district meeting of
territory managers.

Later, Labor Arbiter Hernandez issued a writ of execution.

Notices of garnishment were then served upon the Philippine
British Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bond posted by
Bristol-Myers and the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the
balance of the judgment award.

Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending

that it timely filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers’
petition and issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO)17enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution and
notices of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the
appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 17, 2004.

Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO

cash bond. It argued that since it has posted an injunction cash
bond, the TRO cash bond should be legally discharged and
released.

Issue: Whether or not the injunction cash bond must be

discharged and released

Ruling: A preliminary injunction may be granted only when,

among other things, the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files
with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a
bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to
be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay
such party or person all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled
thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction shall be issued.

The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in

case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have
been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined
party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction, and
the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.

In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary

injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution
and notices of garnishment "pending final resolution of this
case or unless the [w]rit is sooner lifted by the Court."

By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court

disposed of the case by granting Bristol-Myers’ petition and
reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of the NLRC
which dismissed the complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the
discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond.
Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were
satisfied.

Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to

the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter and the
NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of execution and
notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect
amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any
damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction
bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas’ claim, it is
not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.
 G.R. No. 172138, September 8, 2010
NELSON JENOSA and his son NIÑO CARLO JENOSA,
SOCORRO, Petitioners, 
vs.
REV. FR. JOSE RENE C. DELARIARTE,
O., Respondents.

Facts: On 5 December 2002, the parents of petitioner students

(petitioner parents) sent a letter to the University President
urging him not to implement the 28 November 2002
agreement. According to petitioner parents, the Principal,
without convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate
transfer of petitioner students

On 3 January 2003, petitioners filed a complaint

for injunction and damages with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, Iloilo City (trial court). Petitioners assailed the
Principal’s decision to order the immediate transfer of
petitioner students as a violation of their right to due process
because the COSD was not convened.

On 5 February 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary

injunction and directed respondents to admit petitioner
students during the pendency of the case.

On 28 May 2003, petitioners filed another complaint for

mandatory injunction praying for the release of petitioner
students’ report cards and other credentials. The trial court
consolidated the two cases.

On 17 June 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary

injunction and directed the University to release petitioner
students’ report cards and other credentials.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
holding that Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
in Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and 03-27646 did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case for failure of
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies

Ruling: Yes. Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he

who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean
hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he
who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently
stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he
who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground
that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.

Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without

any justifiable reason, come to court with unclean hands. This
Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue.
 G.R. No. 179665               April 3, 2013
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS
INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioners, 
vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts: On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests,

penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and
unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure
proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint "To Compel
Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte
Temporary Restraining Order" in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City.

Issue: Whether or not SBI and MFII are correct that their
mortgaged properties are shielded from foreclosure by CBC on
the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed
by CBC on the loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous and
unconscionable

Ruling: As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not

have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from
foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of
alleged "usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of
interest."30 First, assuming that the interest rate agreed upon by
the parties is usurious, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious
interest does not affect the lender’s right to recover the
principal loan, nor affect the other terms thereof.31 Thus, in a
usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the
mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the
creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due.32
Second, even the Order dated December 14, 2000 of the trial
court, which granted the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, recognizes that the parties still have to
be heard on the alleged lack of "fairness of the increase in
interests and penalties" during the trial on the merits.33 Thus,
the basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be
controversial or disputable as there is still a need to determine
whether or not, upon consideration of the various
circumstances surrounding the agreement of the parties, the
interest rates and penalty charges are unconscionable.
Therefore, such claimed right cannot be considered clear, actual
and subsisting. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance
of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.34

The Order dated December 10, 2001 also shows the reasoning
of the trial court which betrays that its grant of the application
of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction was not based on a clear legal right. Said the trial
court:

It was likewise shown that plaintiffs SBI and MFII had the clear
right and urgency to ask for injunction because of the issue of
validity of the increase in the amount of the loan
obligation.35 (Emphasis supplied.)

At most, the above finding of the trial court that the validity of
the increase in the amount of the loan obligation is in issue
simply amounted to a finding that the rights of SBI and MFII
vis-à-vis that of CBC are disputed and debatable. In such a case
where the complainant-movant’s right is doubtful or disputed,
the issuance of an injunctive writ is not proper.
 G.R. No. 172909               March 5, 2014
SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y.
PLAZA, Petitioners, 
vs.
GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE
MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON
GOLOSENO, Respondents.

Facts: On September 14, 1999, Vidal’s son and daughter-in-

law, the petitioners, filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages,
Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan.
They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully
and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject
property. According to the petitioners, they acquired the land
from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and
winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of
Butuan on December 27, 1996.

In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were

never delinquent in paying the land taxes and were in fact not
aware that their property had been offered for public auction.
Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee, was
disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section 89
of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners failed to show clear

and unmistakable rights to be protected by the writ

Ruling: As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no

ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the latter’s
reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. Because they
were never owners of the property, the petitioners failed to
establish entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction.
"[T]o be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected
and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing
of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency
of the principal action. When the complainant’s right or title is
doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and,
therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper."23

Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on

August 8, 2013, the question of issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. In
Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, the Court ruled that a
case becomes moot and academic when there is no more issue
between the parties or object that can be served in deciding the
merits of the case. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the
question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
automatically died with it. A writ of preliminary injunction is a
provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to
the determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon
the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.
 G.R. No. 172206, July 03, 2013
OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. ERNESTO M. DE
CHAVEZ, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, SR., DR. PORFIRIO
C. LIGAYA, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, JR. AND GLORIA
M. MENDOZA, Respondents.

Facts: Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU-BOR)

received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman Victor Fernandez
directing the former to enforce the aforementioned Office of the
Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution,
finding herein respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service
with its accessory penalties, despite the fact that said Joint
Decision and Supplemental Resolution are pending appeal
before the CA. Pursuant to said Order, the BSU-BOR issued a
resolution resolving to implement the Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus, herein respondents filed a petition for
injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
of Batangas City, Branch 4 (RTC), against the BSU-BOR. The
gist of the petition before the RTC is that the BSU-BOR should
be enjoined from enforcing the Ombudsman's Joint Decision
and Supplemental Resolution because the same are still on
appeal and, therefore, are not yet final and executory.

The RTC ordered the dismissal of herein respondents' petition

for injunction on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Respondents filed their notice of appeal and promptly filed a
Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Injunction dated December 8, 2005 with the CA. On February
17, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution granting respondents'
prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the BSU-
BOR from enforcing its Resolution No. 18, series of 2005.

Thereafter, on March 7, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman

filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion to
Recall Temporary Restraining Order, with the Motion to Recall
Temporary Restraining Order attached thereto. CA issued the
Resolution subject of the present petition, pertinent portions of
which are reproduced below:

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are accepting and

taking cognizance of the pleadings lodged by the Office of the
Ombudsman only in so far as to afford it with ample
opportunity to comment on and oppose appellants' application
for injunctive relief, but not for the purpose of allowing the
Ombudsman to formally and actively intervene in the instant
appeal.

Petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari before

the Supreme Court

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred when it did not allow

Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal

Ruling: The CA should have allowed the Office of the

Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal pending with the lower
court. The wisdom of this course of action has been exhaustively
explained in Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.6 In said
case, the CA also issued a Resolution denying the Office of the
Ombudsman's motion to intervene. In resolving the issue of
whether the Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to
intervene in the appeal of its Decision, the Court expounded,
thus:
x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different
from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because the people under its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay
or dismiss investigations directed against them. Its function is
critical because public interest (in the accountability of public
officers and employees) is at stake.

xxxx

The Office of the Obudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest

in the subject matter of litigation. Paragraph 2 of its motion for
intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall writ of
preliminary injunction averred:

"2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the

right to seek redress on the apparently erroneous issuance by
this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision x x x."

In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the

Office of the Ombudsman correctly summed up its legal interest
in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked
its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people,"
a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial function to
resolve administrative disciplinary cases against public officials.
To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating
its salutary functions as the guardian of public trust and
accountability.

Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal

interest in the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts
constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable under the
Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It
was in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people
and preserve the integrity of public service that petitioner had
to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of
its authority.

It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or

disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound
discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. However, such discretion is not without
limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is
that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the
Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the
Ombudsman's powers as provided in the Constitution and RA
6770.

Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the

Ombudsman to a judge whose decision was in question. This
was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful) of
the power, duties and functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be
detached, disinterested and neutral specially when defending its
decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against
government personnel, the offense is committed against the
government and public interest. What further proof of a direct
constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public
officers is necessary?7

Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint

Decision and Supplemental Resolution is in danger of being
impaired, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal
interest in defending its right to have its judgment carried out.
 G.R. No. 185954 : February 16, 2010
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS.
MAXIMO D. SISON, RESPONDENT.

Facts: On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement

filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Ombudsman accusing
Governor Milagrosa T. Tan including respondent Maximo D.
Sison, of highly anomalous transactions. Sison was the
Provincial Budget Officer.

The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation

dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication
Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found,
among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34
million went without proper bidding procedures and
documentations; that calamity funds were expended without a
State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and
that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement
were substantially overpriced.

On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman found basis

to proceed with the administrative case. 

In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the

accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his
innocence on the charges.

On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a

Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials of the
Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
dismissing him from service.
Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review
under Rule 43. The CA rendered a decision reversing and
setting aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
against Sison.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for

Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA.

Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed

to intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision
rendered by the CA.

Ruling: The appeal lacks merit.

Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court

It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a

Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.[7] The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the intervention,

To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,

two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties,
nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being
properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which
entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation
and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment.

In Mamauag, this Court ruled:

RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to
appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and
45 of RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal in the instances
that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-
respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty
of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the
government when the disciplining authority imposes the
penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal
from the service is the proper penalty.

However, the government party that can appeal is not the

disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the
case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the
service. The government party appealing must be the one that is
prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent.
Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the
disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of
being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in
prosecuting the respondent.

Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate

party to intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial
and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role
as an adjudicator, not an advocate.

 It is an established doctrine that judges should detach

themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed to a
higher court for review. The raison detre for such a doctrine is
the fact that judges are not active combatants in such
proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend
their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the
issues without the judges active participation.[17] When judges
actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a
way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial instead.[18]

In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation

and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG),[19] the Court applied this
doctrine when it held that the CA erred in granting the Motion
to Intervene filed by the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:

The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and

impartial, not only when hearing and resolving the case before
it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a
higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-
judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who
must settle the controversies between parties in accordance
with the evidence and applicable laws, regulations and/or
jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and
completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no
more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is
appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the
quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case,
he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his
interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is
no longer only to settle the controversy between the original
parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his
judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellants
assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from
being overturned on appeal.

Likewise, the facts reveal that this case was elevated to the CA
via a verified Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court and Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95
dated May 16, 1995, which govern appeals to the CA from
judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.
Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides
that the petition for review shall state the full names of the
parties to the case without impleading the court or agencies
either as petitioners or respondents.[20] Thus, the only parties in
such an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and appellee as
respondent. The court or, in this case, the administrative agency
that rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in the
said appeal.

Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have the legal
interest to intervene. As the CA held correctly:

The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a

legal interest in the administrative case against the petitioner
such that it would be directly affected by the judgment that this
Court had rendered. It must be remembered that the legal
interest required for an intervention must be direct and
immediate in character. Lest it be forgotten, what was brought
on appeal before this Court is the very Decision by the Office of
the Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman, as an
adjudicator, and not an advocate, has no legal interest at stake
in the outcome of this Rule 43 Petition.[21]

Motion for Intervention Was Not Filed on Time

Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to

intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment
by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for
Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision
of the CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008.

It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware

of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court provides that
the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review
with the CA, with proof of service of a copy on the court or
agency a quo.[23] Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had
sufficient time within which to file a motion to intervene. As
such, its failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The
Office of the Ombudsman is expected to be an activist
watchman, not merely a passive onlooker.[24]

In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for

Intervention was belatedly filed. As we held in Rockland
Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is
permitted after a decision has already been rendered.[25]
 G.R. No. 193809, March 23, 2015
SATURNINO NOVECIO, GAVINO NOVECIO,
ANASTACIO GOLEZ, ABUNDIO SOMBILON, BERTING
RODRIGUEZ, MELITON
CATALAN, Petitioners, v. HON. RODRIGO F. LIM, JR.,
AS CHAIRMAN, , Respondents. 

Facts: Respondents Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V.

Nieto, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Lope Durotan (the
respondents), filed complaints4 for forcible entry with damages
against petitioners Saturnino Novecio, Gavino Novecio,
Anastacio Golez, et al. (the petitioners).

The MTC ruled in favor the petitioners. The RTC reversed the
MTC decision. The petitioners filed on April 30, 2009 a Petition
for Review16 with the CA - Mindanao Station, assailing the
judgment of the RTC.

As the respondents sought the execution of the RTC judgment,

the petitioners filed on May 14, 2010 an Extremely Urgent
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order.

On July 13, 2009, the CA issued a TRO effective for sixty (60)
days. Meanwhile, the CA directed the parties to submit their
memoranda and position papers.

On January 28, 2010, the CA issued the first assailed resolution

denying the petitioners' application for preliminary
injunction.18 The CA, without necessarily resolving the petition
on the merits, held that the petitioners were not entitled to the
relief demanded under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on July 16,
2010.
Issue: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it
denied the petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction

Ruling: A review of the records, however, shows that the CA

ignored relevant facts that would have justified the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. Contrary to established jurisprudence,
the CA also denied the prayer for preliminary injunction
without giving the factual and legal bases for such denial.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a

preliminary injunction may be granted when the following have
been established:

i. That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and

the whole or part of such relief consist in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;

ii. That the commission, continuance or non-performance of

the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or

iii. That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,

threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to

be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial
interest in the right sought to be defended. As this Court has
previously ruled, "while the existence of the right need not be
conclusively established, it must be clear."23

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on

initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence need only be a
sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of
justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision
on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal
action which has yet to be decided.24

In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is

not required to submit conclusive and complete
evidence. He is only required to show that he has an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint.

In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their

entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the relief
demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC
decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land.
Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive
their source of livelihood would work injustice to the
petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is
probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to
render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases
ineffectual.
 G.R. No. 205875, June 30, 2015
LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., NOW
KNOWN AS WI-TRIBE TELECOMS,
INC., Petitioner, v. ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM,
INC., Respondent.

Facts: Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (Atlocom) is a grantee of

a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 8605. On October
8, 2003, the National Telecommunication Commission (NTC)
issued an Order in NTC Case No. 98 -158 relative to the
application of Atlocom for a Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) granting Atlocom a Provisional Authority (PA) to install,
operate and maintain a Multi -Point Multi -Channel
Distribution System (MMDS) in Metro Manila, subject to the
assignment of frequency by the Frequency Management
Division of the NTC. As stated in the Order, the PA shall be
valid for a period of eighteen (18) months, or until April 8,
2005. In a letter dated April 5, 2004, Atlocom thru its counsel
requested for "an extension of time of the allocation of the
above -mentioned frequencies and for the period of
construction and installation of the radio stations in the
condition no. 2 of the Order." Earlier, Atlocom filed an
Application for Permit to Import necessary equipment. Atlocom
followed up its application for extension of PA through a letter
dated June 2, 2005 addressed to Deputy Commissioner Jorge
Sarmiento. Subsequently, Atlocom filed a Motion for Extension
of Provisional Authority in NTC Case No. 98 -158 on March 3,
2005. On August 23, 2005, NTC issued Memorandum Circular
No. (MC) 06 -08 -2005 re -allocating the bands for broadband
wireless access for fixed, nomadic and mobile networks. On
December 23, 2008, NTC denied Atlocom's motion for
extension of PA, citing the re -allocation of MMDS frequencies
for Broadband Wireless Access in accordance with MC 06 -08
-2005 and the unavailability of other alternative frequencies.
On September 8, 2009, Atlocom filed in the RTC a Petition to
enjoin the implementation of MC 06 -08 -2005 and reinstate
the frequencies of Atlocom. It was further prayed that after
hearing, the court render judgment declaring the said issuance
as null and void because NTC unlawfully deprived Atlocom of
the right to its assigned frequencies without notice and hearing.
Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (LBNI), also a grantee of a
legislative franchise for radio and television broadcasting, as
well as radio stations for international and domestic
communications of all types and services, and holder of a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to
operate a radio communications network, was allowed to
intervene in the case, joining NTC in opposing Atlocom's
claims. Pursuant to MC 06 -08 - 2005, frequency bands 2535
-2545 MHz and 2565 -2595 MHz were re -allocated and
assigned to LBNI, which covered 2572 -2596 MHz being
claimed by Atlocom as allegedly assigned to it.

Issue: Whether Atlocom complied with the requisites for

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

Ruling: In deciding whether to grant an injunction, a court

must consider established principles of equity and all the
circumstances of the test for issuing an injunction is whether
the facts show a necessity for the intervention of equity in order
to protect rights cognizable in equity. Here, there are factual
and legal justification for issuance of the writ of injunction. To
reiterate to the point of being pedantic, petitioner's right to its
frequencies is covered by a provisional authority. The
provisional authority was withdrawn by MC No. 06-08-2005
without the Respondent NTC acting on petitioner's plea for
previous extensions. The propriety for the issuance of MC No.
06-08-2005 is placed in issue on the ground of fairness.
Petitioner as the rightful grantee thereof has the right, in the
meantime, to enjoin its implementation.
 September 7, 2015, GR. No. 197472
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
Commander Raymond Alpuerto of the Naval Base
Camillo Osias, Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan, Petitioner, 
vs.
REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent.

Facts: Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a

missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable
activities, established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde,
Palaui Island.

He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession

of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of
Palaui Island... which he, with the help of Aetas and other
people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural
purposes in order to support his... charitable, humanitarian and
missionary works.

Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction[5]
against Rogelio C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as Commanding
Officer of the Philippine Naval Command

According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon

orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of
the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15,
2000, they commanded him and his men, through the use of
force... and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought
assistance from the Office of the Philippine Naval Command, he
was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened with drastic
military action if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his
men were constrained to leave the area.

the RTC issued an Order[8] dated February 21, 2002 granting

the... application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. However, the same pertained to five hectares
(subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to
have been occupied by Rev. Cortez, viz.:

It should be noted that the claim of [Rev. Cortez] covers an area

of 50 hectares more or less located at the western portion of
Palaui Island which is within the Naval reservation. [Rev.
Cortez] presented what he called as a survey map (Exh. "H")
indicating the... location of the area claimed by the Church of
the Living God and/or Rev. Claudio Cortez with an approximate
area of 50 hectares identified as Exh. "H-4". However, the
Survey Map allegedly prepared by [a] DENR personnel is only a
sketch map[,] not a survey map as claimed by [Rev.

Cortez]. Likewise, the exact boundaries of the area [are] not

specifically indicated.

For this reason, there is merit to the contention of [Biñas] that

[Rev. Cortez]' claim to the 50 hectares of land identified as Exh.
["]H-4" is unclear and ambiguous. It is a settled jurisprudence
that mandatory injunction is the strong arm of equity that never
ought to be... extended unless to cases of great injury, where
courts of law cannot afford an adequate and commensurate
remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury
impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the
protecting preventive process of injunction.

Admittedly, the documentary exhibits of [Rev. Cortez] tended

only to show that [he] has a pending application of patent with
the DENR. Even so, [Rev. Cortez] failed to present in evidence
the application for patent allegedly filed by [him] showing that
he applied for patent on... the entire 50 hectares of land which
he possessed or occupied for a long period of time. Under the
circumstances, therefore, the title of petitioner to the 50
hectares of land in Palaui Island remains unclear and doubtful,
and [is] seriously disputed by the government.

More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was issued on
May 22, 1967, [Rev. Cortez] has not perfected his right over the
50 hectares of land nor acquired any vested right thereto
considering that he only occupied the land as alleged by him in
1962 or barely five (5)... years before the issuance of the
Presidential Proclamation. Proclamation No. 201 had the effect
of removing Palaui Island from the alienable or disposable
portion of the public domain and therefore the island, as of the
date of [the] Issuance [of the proclamation], has ceased to... be
disposable public land.

However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev. Cortez] has

lawfully possessed and occupied at least five (5) hectares of land
situated at the western portion of the Palaui Island identified as
Exh "H-4". During the hearing, Cmdr. Rogelio Biñas admitted
that when he was assigned... as Commanding Officer in
December 1999, he went to Palaui Island and [saw only] two (2)
baluga families tilling the land consisting of five (5) hectares.
Therefore, it cannot be seriously disputed that [Rev. Cortez] and
his baluga tribesmen cleared five (5) hectares of land for...
planting and cultivation since 1962 on the western portion
identified as Exhibit "H-4". The Philippine Navy also admitted
that they have no objection to settlers of the land prior to the
Presidential Proclamation and [Rev. Cortez] had been identified
as one of the early settlers... of the area before the Presidential
Proclamation. The DENR also acknowledged that [Rev. Cortez]
has filed an application for patent on the western area and that
he must be allowed to pursue his claim.

Although the court is not persuaded by the argument of [Rev.

Cortez] that he has already acquired vested rights over the area
claimed by him, the court must recognize that [Rev. Cortez]
may have acquired some propriety rights over the area
considering the directive of the DENR... to allow [Rev. Cortez]
to pursue his application for patent. However, the court wants
to make clear that the application for patent by [Rev. Cortez]
should be limited to an area not to exceed five (5) hectares
situated at the western portion of x x x Palaui Island identified
in... the sketch map as Exh. "H-4." This area appears to be the
portion where [Rev. Cortez] has clearly established his right or
title by reason of his long possession and occupation of the
land.

On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision[11] making the

injunction final and permanent. In so ruling, the said court
made reference to the Indigenous Peoples' [Fight] Act (EPRA)
as follows:

The Indigenous [Peoples' Right] Act should be given effect in

this case. The affected community belongs to the group of
indigenous people which are protected by the State of their
rights to continue in their possession of the lands they have
been tilling since time immemorial.

No subsequent passage of law or presidential decrees can

alienate them from the land they are tilling.[12]

In its Decision[17] dated June 29, 2011, the CA upheld the

RTC's issuance of a final injunction
Issue: Whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of
mandatory injunction.

Ruling: We grant the Petition. While Rev. Cortez relies heavily

on his asserted right of possession, he, nevertheless, failed to
show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part
of the public domain and therefore can be the proper object of
possession.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public

domain belong to the State.

Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under private

ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public
lands remain part of the inalienable land of... the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them
to private persons."[45] To prove that a land is alienable, the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an...
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land
as alienable and disposable must be established.[46]

In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject

portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and
disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence,
it must be considered as still inalienable public domain.

The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and

Proclamation No. 447 were made subject to private rights.

As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land

had been segregated from the military reservation, the
respondents had to prove that the subject properties were
alienable or disposable land of the public domain prior to its
withdrawal from sale and... settlement and reservation for
military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265.

Without first determining the nature and character of the land,

all other requirements such as length and nature of possession
and occupation over such land do not come into play. The
required length of possession does not operate when the land is
part of the public... domain.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed
to conclusively establish his claimed right over the subject
portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a
final injunction.
 G.R. No. 135706, October 1, 2004
SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S.
LARROBIS, petitioners, 
vs.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondent.

Facts: Petitioner spouses contracted a monetary loan with

respondent Philippine Veterans Bank secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage executed on their lot together with the improvements
thereon. On March 23, 1985, the respondent bank went
bankrupt and was placed under receivership/liquidation by the
Central Bank. More than fourteen years from the time the loan
became due and demandable, respondent bank filed a petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of petitioners’
property. On October 18, 1995, the property was sold in a public
auction by Sheriff Arthur Cabigon with Philippine Veterans
Bank as the lone bidder. On April 26, 1996, petitioners filed a
complaint with the RTC, Cebu City, to declare the extra-judicial
foreclosure and the subsequent sale thereof to respondent bank
null and void. RTC rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint. It held that the defendant bank’s right to foreclose
the mortgaged property prescribes in ten (10) years but such
period was interrupted when it was placed under receivership.

Issue: Whether or not the period within which the bank was
placed under receivership and liquidation was a fortuitous
event which suspended the running of the ten-year prescriptive
period in bringing actions

Ruling: The answer is in the negative. One characteristic of a

fortuitous event, in a legal sense and consequently in relations
to contract, is that its occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for a party to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner. Respondent’s claims that because of a fortuitous event,
it was not able to exercise its right to foreclose the mortgage on
petitioners’ property; and that since it was banned from
pursuing its business and was placed under receivership from
April 25, 1985 until August 1992, it could not foreclose the
mortgage on petitioners’ property within such period since
foreclosure is embraced in the phrase "doing business," are
without merit. While it is true that foreclosure falls within the
broad definition of "doing business. Foreclosure should not be
considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever
banks are "prohibited from doing business" during receivership
and liquidation proceedings. Section 29 of the Republic Act No.
265, as amended known as the Central Bank Act, provides that
when a bank is forbidden to do business in the Philippines and
placed under receivership, the person designated as receiver
shall immediately take charge of the bank’s assets and
liabilities, as expeditiously as possible, collect and gather all the
assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
and represent the bank personally or through counsel as he may
retain in all actions or proceedings for or against the institution,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing and foreclosing
mortgages in the name of the bank. This is consistent with the
purpose of receivership proceedings, i.e., to receive collectibles
and preserve the assets of the bank in substitution of its former
management, and prevent the dissipation of its assets to the
detriment of the creditors of the bank. There was no legal
prohibition imposed upon herein respondent to deter its
receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under
the law. However, the bank may go after the receiver who is
liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to collect the
assets of such bank and to safeguard its asset
 G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013

MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER

CABOVERDE, Petitioners, 
vs.
DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE
CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDE-LABRADOR, and
JOSEPHINE E. CABOVERDE, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioners are children of respondent Dominalda

Espina-Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of other
respondents in this case are the registered owners and in
possession of certain parcels of land, having purchased them
from their parents, Maximo and Dominalda Caboverde. The
present controversy started when respondents Eve and Fe filed
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court where they prayed
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring
certain parcels of land from their parents Maximo and
Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and their
other siblings, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand. During the
pendency of the civil case, Maximo died. Eve and Fe filed an
Amended Complaint with Maximo substituted by his eight (8)
children and his wife Dominalda.

Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered,

Dominalda filed with the Regional Trial Court a Verified Urgent
Petition/Application to place the controverted parcels of land
under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had a
legal interest in the controverted properties and their produce,
she could not enjoy them, since the income derived was solely
appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected
kin. She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in
the income of these properties for her daily sustenance and
medical expenses. Also, she insisted that unless a receiver is
appointed by the court, the income or produce from these
properties is in grave danger of being totally dissipated, lost and
entirely spent solely by Mila and some of her selected kin.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of

discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver despite
clear showing that the reasons advanced by the applicant are
not any of those enumerated by the rules

Ruling: First, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray

her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for
the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application
for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted
but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial
need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which
prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership.
The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is
justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-
all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in cases
falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear
showing that there is imminent danger that the properties
sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or
injured.

Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties

are in danger of being lost or materially impaired and that
placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible
means to preserve, administer or dispose of them.

Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not

necessary to save Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or
irremediable damage.
 G.R. NO. 168332, June 19, 2009
ANA MARIA A. KORUGA, Petitioner, v. TEODORO O.
ARCENAS, JR., ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, CESAR S.
PAGUIO, FRANCISCO A. RIVERA, and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD
DIVISION, Respondents.

Facts: Koruga’s Complaint charged defendants before the

RTC-Makati with violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the
Corporation Code, prohibiting self-dealing and conflict of
interest of directors and officers; invoked her right to inspect
the corporation’s records under Sections 74 and 75 of the
Corporation Code; and prayed for Receivership and Creation of
a Management Committee, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Securities Regulation Code, the Interim
Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies,
the General Banking Law of 2000, and the New Central Bank
Act. She accused the directors and officers of Banco Filipino of
engaging in unsafe, unsound, and fraudulent banking practices,
more particularly, acts that violate the prohibition on self-
dealing.

Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over cases which

seeks to place a bank under receivership

Ruling: RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that

seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership. Under Section
29 of the New Central Bank Act, the appointment of a receiver
under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board. On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary
Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for
receivership of banks. Crystal clear in Section 30 is the
provision that says the "appointment of a receiver under this
section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board."
The term "exclusively" connotes that only the Monetary Board
can resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under
receivership and, upon an affirmative finding, it also has
authority to appoint a receiver. This is further affirmed by the
fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action
"summarily and without need for prior hearing." And, as a
clincher, the law explicitly provides that "actions of the
Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of
this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained
or set aside by the court except on a petition for certiorari on
the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or
with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction."
 G.R. No. 174356, January 20, 2010
EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-
DELES, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS, Respondents.

Facts: Respondent Fidela Y. Vargas owned a five-hectare land.

Petitioner Evelina had been staying in a remote portion of the
land. Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide the gross sales of all
products from the land between themselves. Since Fidela was
busy with her law practice, Evelina undertook to hold in trust
for Fidela her half of the profits. Fidela claimed that Evelina had
failed to remit her share of the profits and, despite demand to
turn over the administration of the property to Fidela, had
refused to do so. Consequently, Fidela filed a complaint against
Evelina for recovery of possession, rent, and damages with
prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver Fidela also
filed three estafa cases with the RTC of Olongapo City and a
complaint for dispossession with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evelina and Aida.
In all these cases, Fidela asked for the immediate appointment
of a receiver for the property.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of an administrative, civil and

criminal cases, all of which with prayer for appointment of
receiver constitutes forum shopping

Ruling: The answer is in the negative. By forum shopping, a

party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals,
grounded on the same cause, trusting that one or the other
tribunal would favorably dispose of the matter. The elements of
forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration. The above cases are
similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela
sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of
them. But receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary
remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in
one case will amount to res judicata on the merits of the other
cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still
depend on the need for it in the particular action.
 G.R. No. 203527, June 27, 2016

SPS. AURELIO HITEROZA AND CYNTHIA

HITEROZA, Petitioners, v. CHARITO S. CRUZADA,
PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN, CHRIST'S ACHIEVERS
MONTESSORI, INC., AND CHRIST'S ACHIEVERS
MONTESSORI, INC., Respondents.

Facts: On February 25, 2010, the Sps. Hiteroza filed

a Complaint for a derivative suit with prayer for the creation of
a management committee, the appointment of a receiver, and a
claim for damages against Charito, the President and Chairman
of the school.

The Sps. Hiteroza alleged that Charito employed schemes and

acts resulting in dissipation, loss, or wastage of the school’s
assets that, if left unchecked, would likely cause paralysis of the
school operations, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
detrimental and prejudicial to the school’s interests. The
particular alleged schemes and acts of Charito that brought
about the Sps. Hiteroza’s prayer for the creation of a
management committee and the appointment of a receiver.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of a receiver is

proper

Ruling: The Court finds that the CA correctly nullified the

assailed RTC order appointing a receiver for the school without
satisfying the requirements of Sectionl, Rule 9 of the Interim
Rules.

Applicants for the appointment of a receiver or

management committee need to establish the
confluence of these two requisites. This is because
appointed receivers and management committees will
immediately take over the management of the corporation and
will have the management powers specified in law.1âwphi1 This
may have a negative effect on the operations and affairs of the
corporation with third parties,86 as persons who are more
familiar with its operations are necessarily dislodged from their
positions in favor of appointees who are strangers to the
corporation’s operations and affairs. (emphasis supplied)

In Villamor, Jr., the Court recognized that Section 1, Rule 9 of

the Interim Rules applies to both the appointment of a
receiver and the creation of a management committee. Further,
the Court held that there must be imminent danger of both the
dissipation, loss, wastage, or destruction of assets or other
properties; and paralysation of its business operations that
may be prejudicial to the interest of the minority stockholders,
parties-litigants, or the general public, before allowing the
appointment of a receiver or the creation of a management
committee.

In the case of Sy Chim v. Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc., 68 the Court
similarly held that the two requisites found in Section 1 of Rule
9 of the Interim Rules should be present before a management
committee may be created and a receiver appointed by the
RTC.

The reason for the stringent requirements on the creation of a

management committee and the appointment of a receiver was
explained in the Sy Chim case, as follows:

The rationale for the need to establish the confluence of the two
(2) requisites under Section 1, Rule 9 by an applicant for the
appointment of a management committee is primarily based
upon the fact that such committee and receiver appointed by
the court will immediately take over the management of the
corporation, partnership or association, including such power
as it may deem appropriate, and any of the powers specified in
Section 5 of the Rule. x x x.

Thus, the creation and appointment of a management

committee and a receiver is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy to be exercised with care and caution; and only when
the requirements under the Interim Rules are shown. It is a
drastic course for the benefit of the minority stockholders, the
parties-litigants, or the general public allowed only under
pressing circumstances and, when there is inadequacy, or
ineffectual exhaustion of legal or other remedies. The power to
intervene before the legal remedy is exhausted and misused
when it is exercised in aid of such a purpose. The power of the
court to continue a business of a corporation, partnership, or
association must be exercised with the greatest care and
caution. There should be a full consideration of all the attendant
facts, including the interest of all the parties concerned.

Considering the requirements for the appointment of a receiver,

we find that the CA correctly attributed grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC when the RTC prematurely
appointed a receiver without sufficient evidence to show that
there is an imminent danger of: (1) dissipation, loss, wastage, or
destruction of assets or other properties; and (2) paralysation
of its business operations that may be prejudicial to the interest
of the minority stockholders, parties-litigants, or the general
public. The RTC explicitly stated in its May 14, 2010 decision
that there was yet no evidence to support the Sps. Hiteroza’s
allegations on Charito’s fraud and misrepresentation to justify
the appointment of a receiver.
 G.R. No. 111080             April 5, 2000
JOSE S. OROSA and MARTHA P. OROSA, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FCP CREDIT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners purchased a vehicle from Fiesta Motors

payable in installment. Petitioners executed by promissory note
and a chattel mortgage over the vehicle to secure future
payment thereon. Fiesta Motors assigned the PN and mortgage
to FCP. Petitioner failed to pay 4 monthly installment. FCP
Credit Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and damages
against petitioner to recover possession of the vehicle subject of
the chattel mortgage. Writ of Replevin was issued. However,
RTC eventually dismissed private respondent's complaint and
ordered private respondent's surety, Stronghold Insurance Co.,
Inc. to jointly and severally with private respondent return to
petitioner the 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan or its and to pay
damages to the extent of the value of the bond in the replevin
(i.e., double the value of the sedan plus the return of the car)
The surety company assailed the decision by way of petition for
certiorari, but the same was dismissed by CA’s First Division.
SC affirmed CA’s First Devisioin’s decision. Meanwhile, in
private respondent's appeal, the CA’s Eighth Division affirmed
the ruling of the trial court and ordered respondent to: (1)
return the car subject of the replevin issued; and (2) to pay
petitioner the amount equivalent to the value of the fourteen
(14) monthly installments paid by them. Petitioners assailed the
ruling of the CA- 8 th division as it amounts to annulling the
decision of the CA-1 st division.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the main case wherein
replevin was availed of results to the return of the property
taken by the sheriff and the payment of the full amount of the
bond posted by the applicant

Ruling: The answer is in the negative. Court of Appeals that

the trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to
return the subject car or its equivalent considering that
petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to
sustain the trial court's decision would amount to unjust
enrichment. The Court of Appeals was correct when it instead
ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself, but only
the amount equivalent to the fourteen installments actually
paid with interest. To uphold the assertion of the petitioner
would result to the return of the car to them plus payment of
the bond equivalent to double the value of the car. It is as if
petitioner’s initial asset, i.e., the car’s value was multiplied to
three fold.
 G.R. No. 148132             January 28, 2008

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner, 

vs.
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent.

Facts: Astorga was employed by respondent Smart

Communications as District Sales Manager and enjoyed various
benefits including a car plan in the amount of P455,000.00. In
February 1998, SMART launched an organizational realignment
to achieve more efficient operations. The realignment resulted
to Astorga’s termination on ground of redundancy. Astorga to
file a Complaint for illegal dismissal. Meanwhile, SMART sent a
letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market
value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under
the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to
the company for proper disposition. Astorga, however, failed
and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit
for replevin Astorga moved to dismiss on the ground that the
regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because
the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an
employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is
vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts. Astorga’s
motion to dismiss the replevin case was denied. Her subsequent
MR was denied as well. Astorga elevated the denial of her
motion via certiorari to the CA. Granting the petition and,
consequently, dismissing the replevin case, the CA held that the
case is intertwined with Astorga’s complaint for illegal dismissal
On the other hand, the illegal dismissal case was decided by
NLRC in favor of SMART
Issue: Whether or not regular courts has jurisdiction to grant
an application for replevin over a vehicle issued to an employee
pursuant to an employment car plan benefit.

Ruling: The answer is in the affirmative. Contrary to the CA’s

ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the
suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s
motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market
value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is
not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of
debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations.
As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.
 A.M. No. P-07-2384             June 18, 2008
KENNETH HAO, complainant,  vs. ABE C. ANDRES,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao
City, respondent.

Facts: Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case

for replevin while respondent is the sheriff who implement the
writ of replevin. Complainant Hao filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent and alleged the
following: (1) Andres gave undue advantage to the replevin
applicant in the implementation of the order and that Andres
seized the nine motor vehicles in an oppressive manner; (2) the
day after the seizure, the seized vehicles were kept in a
compound owned by the applicant; (3) allowed applicant’s
lawyer Atty. Macadangdang to get a keymaster to duplicate the
vehicles’ keys in order to take one motor vehicle; and (4) eight
of the nine seized motor vehicles were reported missing.

Investigating judge found Andres guilty of serious negligence in

the custody of the nine motor vehicles.

Issue: Whether or not a property seized pursuant to a writ of

replevin may be kept in a place owned by the applicant for
purposes of safekeeping the following day immediately after the
implementation of the writ.

Ruling: The answer is in the negative. Section 6 of Rule 60, of

the Rules of Court provides that: If within five (5) days after the
taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not
object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms
its approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond, or
if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his
bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not
forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered
to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered
to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.
In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no
less than five days in order to give the complainant an
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the
surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized
motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do. It
matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles
merely for safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The
rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately
delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of
the seized property for at least five days. Hence, the act of
Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after
seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without observing the
five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
 G.R. No. 153788               November 27, 2009
ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC
Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO,
doing business under the name KARGO
ENTERPRISES, Respondents.

Facts: A lease agreement with option to purchase entered into

by and between Respondent and petitioner whereby the latter
delivered unto the former six (6) post-dated checks. As the said
checks were dishonored upon presentment, Respondent Karen
T. Go filed two complaints for replevin and/or sum of money
with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go
prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two
(2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. Petitioner maintains
that the complaints were premature because no prior demand
was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease
agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.

Issue: Whether or not prior demand is required for the

issuance of writ of replevin

Ruling: Demand is not required prior to filing of replevin

action. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must
do is to file an affidavit and bond. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule
60 of the Rules, which states: The applicant must show by his
own affidavit or that of some other person who personally
knows the facts: (a) That the applicant is the owner of the
property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof; (b) That the property is wrongfully detained
by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof
according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of
execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under
custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure
or custody; and (d) The actual market value of the property. The
applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party
in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit
aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse
party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the
adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant
in the action. Nothing in these provisions requires the applicant
to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before
he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand
is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
 G.R. No. 182963               June 3, 2013
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON
AGNER, Petitioners, 
vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Respondent.

Facts: Petitioners spouses Agner executed a Promissory Note

with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. Thereafter
the right and interest of Citimotors, Inc. in the Promissory Note
with Chattel Mortgage was assigned the same to respondent
BPI. For failure to pay four successive installments from May
15, 2002 to August 15, 2002 despite repeated demands,
respondent filed an action for Replevin and Damages. A writ of
replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was not
seized. After trial on the merits, RTC ruled for the respondent
and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay the amount
of Php576,664.04 plus interest at the rate of 72% per annum
from August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs of suit. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision. Petitioner elevated the case before the
SC and argued that respondent’s remedy of resorting to both
actions of replevin and collection of sum of money is contrary to
the provision of Article 1484 of the Civil Code

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a writ of

replevin and ordering the party against whom writ was issued
to pay the applicant the value of the obligation considering that
the writ was never implemented.

Ruling: The answer is in the negative. The vehicle subject

matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to
respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there
was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners
were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged
vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded
its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully
granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is
equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the
obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust
enrichment to speak of.
 G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch
130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES
DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL
D. ANDRES, respondents.

Facts: Vircel D. Andres, in her capacity as the legal guardian of

the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought Civil Case Q
-88-935 for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis
alleging that Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of
subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former
refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the
latter, despite repeated demands. Subsequently, Andres filed a
manifestation withdrawing the petition on the agreement that
herein petitioner would no longer pursue his counterclaim. By
virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting
thereupon, RTC terminated the case. On September 7, 1995,
another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought
against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother,
Vircel D. Andres. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on
the ground of res judicata, alleging that instant case is barred by
the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q
-88-935. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. CA likewise denied
petitioner’s petitioner for certiorari assailing RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not a second action for support is barred by
the previous action for support which was dismissed upon
agreement of the parties

Ruling: The answer is in the negative. Future support cannot

be the subject of a compromise according to Art. 2035 of the
Civil Code. The right to support being founded upon the need of
the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to
renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning
the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be
renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the
former, cannot be renounced. The manifestation sent in by
respondent's mother in the first case, amounted to renunciation
as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the
right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
As the dismissal of the first case is anchored on an invalid
compromise, it cannot have the effect of barring the second
action for support.
 G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
MANUEL MANAHAN, alias "Maning," defendant-
appellant.

Facts: Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death

by the court a quo. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim
P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs, and acknowledge
and support the offspring of his indiscretion.

Issue: Whether or not support may be granted in a criminal

action for rape.

Ruling: The answer is the affirmative. Article 345 of The

Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall
also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law
should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to
support the offspring."
 G.R. No. 163209               October 30, 2009
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA
LIM, Petitioners, 
vs.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her
minor children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM,
III, Respondents.

Facts: Respondent Cheryl S. Lim married Edward Lim. They

have three children. The family resided at the house of
petitioners, Edward’s parents in Forbes Park, Makati City. On
14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence,
bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward. Cheryl, for herself and her children,
sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (petitioners)
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial
court) for support. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of
the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of
parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time
respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that
the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

Issue: Whether or not grandparents may be sued for support of

their grandchildren and daughter-in-law

Ruling: Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their

Grandchildren. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the
liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Although the obligation to provide
support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from
spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the
obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX
(and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing
to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the
obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not
only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability
to provide sufficient support.
 G.R. No. 165166               August 15, 2012
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, 
vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

Facts: Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory

recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the
petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. During the pendency
of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, granted a
P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.
RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
proving Gliffze’s filiation. CA consequently set aside the RTC
decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son
Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00
monthly child support

Issue: Whether or not the amount in the order granting

support is fix and may not be changed

Ruling: The answer is in the negative. Support consists of

everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on
the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.
 G.R. Nos. 175279-80               June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, 
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.

Facts: On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed

an action for the   declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua

In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two
children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondent's huge earnings from
salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses
here and abroad.

After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an

Order... granting support pendente lite

From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount

of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be
sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.  This amount
excludes the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand
Pesos... for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for
the operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable upon the
conduct of such operation.  The amounts already extended to
the two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant,
should be continued by him... considering the vast financial
resources at his disposal.

According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is

demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but
is payable only from the date of judicial demand.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she
does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their
children and respondent has continued to support the family
for... their sustenance and well-being in accordance with
family's social and financial standing.

As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly

support pendente lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive
support, respondent found it unconscionable and... beyond the
intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of
the respondent.

His second motion for reconsideration having been denied,

respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA

On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,... nullified and

set aside and instead a new one is entered... to pay private
respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00

ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16

plus 946,465.64, or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current
total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two (2) children;

The appellate court said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars,
payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry... goods and books, which
certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but
their mother (petitioner) as well.

It also noted the lack of contribution... from the petitioner in

the joint obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA

Issue: Whether or not the honorable court erred in ordering

the deduction of the amount of php2,482,348.16 plus
946,465.64, or a total of php3,428,813.80 from the current total
support in arrears of the respondent to the petitioner and their
children

Ruling: As a matter of law, the amount of support which those

related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged
to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.[18]  Such
support... comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.

Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage,
or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding,
the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of
the... parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of
judgment or final order.[19]  Because of its provisional nature, a
court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the... case
before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court
is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application.
It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary... evidence appearing in the record.[20]... n this
case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for
petitioner and her two children was determined after due
hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
parties.  Although the amount fixed by the trial court was
reduced on appeal, it is... clear that the monthly support
pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended
primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g.,
food, clothing,  salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other
household expenses. 

Petitioner's testimony also mentioned the cost of regular

therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.

As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt

that he can solely provide for the subsistence, education,
transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities
of his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then
unemployed and a full-time... housewife.

The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional

support from the salary of the spouse.

Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by

the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no controversy
as to its sufficiency and reasonableness.  The dispute concerns
the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in...
arrears.

The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a

commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
 G.R. No. 201043               June 16, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
(AFPFC), Petitioner, 
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.

Facts: Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the

issuance of protection order under the provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[3] otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,"

A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to protect the

respondent from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was
ordered to provide reasonable financial spousal support to the
respondent. In his failure to appear before the court with a
counsel and with an answer to the charges against him, the
court has granted PPO for the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It
was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon should provide for the
financial spousal support to his wife from his retirement
benefits. However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance
Center contended that half of the retirement benefits of Sgt
Yahon cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a military
institution. The petitioner contended that money due to
government employees is not liable to the creditors of the said
employees in the process of garnishment.

Issue: Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be

subject to the ruling of the court to provide for the financial
spousal support of respondent.
Ruling: Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the
financial spousal support of respondent. As a rule in statutory
construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court
should not distinguish. As section 8 (g) of RA No. 9262 used the
general term 'employer', it includes in its coverage the military
institution, which is the employer of Sgt Yahon.
 G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE
MATUSALEM, Respondent.

Facts: Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for

Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the
Regional Trial Court

Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son

Christian Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994.
Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she
was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a
widower. Petitioner rented an... apartment where respondent
stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child,
including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioner's family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned... respondent and her child and left them to the
mercy of relatives and friends.

Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly

support

Petitioner filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses

and counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of
loose morals

Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo

corroborated respondent's testimony as to the payment by
petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent
and financial support to her, his presence during and after
delivery of respondent's baby, respondent's attempted suicide
through sleeping pills... overdose and hospitalization for which
she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and
meeting with petitioner's wife at the headquarters.

On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision[8] in favor

of respondent... the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal.

On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court's ruling

that respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate
filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error
was committed by the trial court in granting respondent's
prayer for support.

Issue: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling

that respondent's evidence sufficiently proved that her son
Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.

Ruling: We grant the petition.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines,

illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.

Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth[24] (Exhibit

"A-1") of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner
appears as his father but which is not signed by him.
Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and
signed the... said document though she claims it was petitioner
who supplied the information she wrote therein.

Ruling: We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly

identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had
a hand in the preparation of the certificate.[25] Thus, if the
father did... not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his
name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity.[26] Neither can such birth
certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument[27]
and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged
father.[28]

As to the Baptismal Certificate[29] (Exhibit "B") of Christian

Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have
ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of... the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.

The rest of respondent's documentary evidence consists of

handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs
taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented
apartment unit.

Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the
alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.
showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment
unit thus have scant... evidentiary value. The Statement of
Accoun from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where
respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise
incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding... petitioner's admission in his answer that he
shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent's child as
an act of charity.

As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent

showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic
trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo's
filiation to petitioner as they were not... signed by petitioner
and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he
is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were
authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis
Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of... illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed

filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting... his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[38] Reviewing the
records, we find the totality of respondent's evidence
insufficient to establish that... petitioner is the father of
Christian Paulo.

In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo,

by themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the
totality of respondent's evidence failed to establish Christian
Paulo's filiation to petitioner.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of
proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order
for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued... only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.
 G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her

minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner, 
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, Respondent.

Facts: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders[1] dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court... of Cebu City
(RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People
of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against

Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan

Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994, they were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
of the filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16) years of
age.[3]

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by

virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland.[4] At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.[5] Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home
to the Philippines.[6]
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty (250) Guildene

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and

remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat.

To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are

presently living in Cebu City.[11]

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a

letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.[12]

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a

complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City

Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu

issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent.[16] 
Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently,
posted bail.

Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent

Protection Order

Subsequently,... respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed

Order,[21] dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order[25]
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration

Issue: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to

support his minor child under Philippine law

Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable

under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his
minor child

Ruling: We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do

not fully agree with petitioner's contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under

R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to
support exists.

we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article

195[34] of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls

under family rights and duties.  Since the respondent is a citizen
of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine
law, as to whether... he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.[37]

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not

obliged to support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland.

This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to

support... petitioner's son altogether.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is... the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.[44] Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
to be the same with Philippine law, which... enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.

the

Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely

show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the
divorce decree was issued.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the

national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is
not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,... Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a... foreign
country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is

the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
splitting up of a single cause of action.
RICHELLE P. ABELLA, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER
MINOR DAUGHTER, MARL JHORYLLE ABELLA,
PETITIONER, V. POLICARPIO CABAÑERO,
RESPONDENT.

Facts: In a Complaint[8] for Support (Complaint) filed on April

22, 2005, petitioner Richelle alleged that while she was still a
minor in the years 2000 to 2002, she was repeatedly sexually
abused by respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at
Barangay Masayo, Tobias Fornier, Antique.[9] As a result, she
allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002.[10]

Richelle added that on February 27, 2002, she initiated a

criminal case for rape against Cabañero. This, however, was
dismissed. Later, she initiated another criminal case, this time
for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act. This, too, was dismissed.[11]

Richelle prayed for the child's monthly allowance in the amount

of P3,000.00.[12]

In his Answer, Cabañero denied sexually abusing Richelle, or

otherwise having any sexual relations with her. Thus, he
asserted that he could not have been the father of Richelle’s
child.[13]

In its March 19, 2007 Decision,[16] the Regional Trial Court

dismissed Richelle's Complaint without prejudice, on account of
her failure to implead her minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff.

Richelle filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the

Court of Appeals.[17]
In its assailed August 25, 2011 Decision,[18] the Court of Appeals
sustained the dismissal of the Complaint.

However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Regional

Trial Court's basis for dismissing the Complaint. It emphasized
that non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action and added that it would have sufficed for
the Regional Trial Court to have "ordered the amendment of the
caption of the [C]omplaint to implead the minor child."[19] The
Court of Appeals still ruled that the dismissal of the Complaint
was proper as the filiation and paternity of the child had not
been previously established. As the child's birth certificate did
not indicate that Cabañero was the father and as Cabañero had
not done anything to voluntarily recognize the child as his own,
the Court of Appeals asserted that Richelle "should have first
instituted filiation proceedings to adjudicate the minor child's
paternity."[20]

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that

filiation proceedings should have first been separately instituted
to ascertain the minor child's paternity and that without these
proceedings having first been resolved in favor of the child's
paternity claim, petitioner Richelle P. Abella's action for
support could not prosper

Ruling: While it is true that the grant of support was

contingent on ascertaining paternal relations between
respondent and petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was
unnecessary for petitioner's action for support to have been
dismissed and terminated by the Court of Appeals in the
manner that it did. Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of
Appeals should have remanded the case to the Regional Trial
Court. There, petitioner and her daughter should have been
enabled to present evidence to establish their cause of action—
inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal relations—against
respondent.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper

action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not
admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina's demand for support
for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera's
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he
had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him. The child's remedy is to file through her mother
a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of
obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support
and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.

Dolina's remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action

against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to
establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she
may directly file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.

The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for
support into one for recognition but merely allowed the
respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner
who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed
resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel
recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in
accordance with jurisprudence.