Republic v Doldol

GR no. 132963
September 10, 1998

Statement of Facts:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork
purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of Forestry, however,
rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a
resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot
unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970. Seventeen years
later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the
area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National
Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for
its intended projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to
move. In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint for accion
possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the school's favor
and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for
thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991. Sometime in 1970, the
Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on school’s
power.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the court ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he
occupied, he having possessed the same for 32 years.

Issue:
Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute.

Ruling:
No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land
and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must
either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions
set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of title/certificate of tile being issued. The evidence presented
shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in accordance with the District Forester’s
Certification. Doldol thus meets the first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed land since his occupation
of the same started only in 1955, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions
set forth by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right
superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.

The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual or vested right in
the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands even
though this may defeat the imperfect right of settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to
entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.

Republic v Director of Lands

GR no. 163767
March 10, 2014

Statement of Facts:
An application for land registration was filed in the CFI in Bulacan by herein Respondent. The subject
property was a riceland with an area of 12,342 sq.m. known as Lot 2633, Cad-297, Paombong, Bulacan.
It was originally owned and possessed by one MamertoDionision since 1907 and was, thereafter, sold to
Romualda Jacinto in 1926. Upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto (mother of the
respondent) inherited the land. Thereafter, upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963, respondent had
herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against
the whole world, and in the concept of owner since then. Taxes due thereon had been paid as well.

The CFI ordered the registration of the land in favor of respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently
established her open, public, continuous and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than
30 years. The OSG appealed to the CA and alleged that subject land is a part of the unclassified region
denominated as forest land of Paombong, Bulacan. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the land subject of the application for registration is susceptible of private acquisition.

Ruling:
No. Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree provides for those who may apply for
registration of title to land.

The Court in Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631 held that nder Section 14(1), respondent had to
prove that: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain and (2) she,
by herself of through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.Thus, the burden of proof is on the applicant and failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the
application.

It is without question that respondent complied with the second requisite. However, the same cannot be
said with regard to the first requisite. No evidence was presented that the subject land had been declared
alienable and disposable by the State.

Realizing that the burden to prove the second requisite belongs to her, respondent attached to her appellee
brief the certification dated March 8, 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office declaring that Lot 2633 falls within
the alienable or disposable land of Paombong, Bulacan. The CA, however, expunged the appellee brief.
The Court in Menguito v. Republic G.R. No. 134308 declared that a survey conducted by a geodetic
engineer that included a certification on the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was not
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain.

It is a standing doctrine that land of the public domain, in order to be the subject of appropriation, must be
declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR.

Granting for the sake of argument that the certification alone would have sufficed, respondent application
would still be denied considering that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable came only
after the filing of the application in court in 1976. The certification indicated that the land was reclassified
as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980.

Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree provides that ownership of private lands acquired
through prescription may be registered in the owner name. However, respondent did not acquire the land
through prescription notwithstanding the fact that possession of the same by her and her predecessors-in-
interest could be traced back as early as in 1926.

The Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987 ruled that, roperty of public
domain, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
xxx It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run./span>
 Republic of the Philippines v Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese
GR no. 185092
June 04, 2014

Statement of Facts: 
Respondents filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel of land with
an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of
Bulacan, and more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, PulilanCadastre, under Plan No. AP-
03-004226.

Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their
mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that the property was not
within a reservation.

In support of their application, respondents submitted among others a survey plan approved by the
Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III of the DENR stating that the
land subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry
on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there
was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a certain Luis
Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.

On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, that: "This survey is inside the alienable and
disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1,
1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." Finding the application sufficient in form and
substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the
corresponding publication. After compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding publication,
mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the application followed.

During the trial, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim over the subject lot.
Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered were
admitted by the MTC in the Order, without objection from the public prosecutor. The OSG did not
present any evidence to oppose the application. The MTC ordered the registration of the subject property
in the name of respondents. Later, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA. In its brief, the OSG
presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public domain occupied and
possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title;
and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.

The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from
inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as
alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would start.

Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents supposed possession of the subject property. Save for
the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject property,"
there was no evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract of land or that they had
introduced improvement thereon. The CA however, affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The CA was of the view that the doctrine
of constructive possession was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation
inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the
Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified
that a small hut was built on the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover,
neither the public prosecutor nor any private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration
of the subject property. The CA also stated that respondents claim of possession over the subject property
was buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese,
minor, representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of
payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No.
99-19015-01557 were respondents.

The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals err on a question of law in ruling that the approved survey plan
identified by one of the respondents is proof that the subject land is alienable and disposable?

Ruling:
Yes. In Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012 citing Republic v. Sarmiento 547 Phil. 157,
166167 (2007) and Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274, 287-288 (2000), the Court reiterated the rule that
that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed was alienable and
disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the property from the inalienable
domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the
property was inalienable. Thus:

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and subdivision plan
approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is alienable
is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.

"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State”.
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against
the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must
be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a
law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer
retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to
be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. It is still
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529.
Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and (b)
that their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to prove the alienable
and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more cannot apply for registration by way of
prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not only
did respondents need to prove the classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to
show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether respondents were able to prove that their
possession and occupation were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been
rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations. GRANTED.
 Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque v Mario Ebio
GR no. 178411
June 23, 2010

Statement of Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was an accretion of Cut-cut
creek, and that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather,
Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro
continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit
declaring possession and occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in
his name. Since then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. On April 21, 1987,
Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of
Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro’s name were cancelled and new ones were
issued in Mario Ebio’s name.

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series
of 1999 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road
along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay and would be traversing the lot occupied by the
respondents. When the city government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area,
respondents immediately registered their opposition thereto. Threatened of being evicted, respondents
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. The RTC denied the petition for lack of
merit. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals who issued its Decision in
favor of the respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property entitles
them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

Ruling:
No. In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of
Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through a
parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners,
however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public
domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of
the public domain. Such contention is untenable.
        
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually
settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the
accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 (“Accretions deposited gradually
upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands”), which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of
the Civil Code (“To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters”).
          
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do
not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added.  The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may
be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
          
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the
possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of
public domain. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is
formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of
the public domain by clear provision of law.

It was also held that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested land
entitles them to the avails of the action.
In the case at bar, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought
to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over
the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have
yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is
not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over
the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration
merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

Republic v East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

GR no. 186961
February 20, 2012

Statement of Facts:
The Republic assails the decision of the CSA, affirming the RTC’s grant to East Silverlane Realty
Development Corporation (ESRDC) of its petition for registration of a parcel of land situated in El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental. ESRDC purchased a portion of the subject property from Francisca Oco in
November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U.
Tan on April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945. The Republic
alleges that the respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property
in the manner and for the length of time CA No. 141 and PD No. 1529.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the CA No. 141 and PD No.
1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Ruling:
No. On the premise that the application for registration, which was filed in 1995, is based on Section 14
(2), it was not proven that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject property in the manner prescribed by law and for the period necessary before acquisitive
prescription may apply. While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on
December 31, 1925 per the April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997 Report of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
converted the same from agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990. Also, it was only in 2000
that the Municipality of El Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the
industrial zone. Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject property had been declared patrimonial and
it is only then that the prescriptive period began to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged
possession of its predecessors-in-interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the
public domain, it may not be acquired by prescription. The respondent’s application was filed after only
four years from the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the DAR’s
October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive
period.

Furthermore, the phrase “adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner,” by which the
respondent describes its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of law. The
burden of proof is on the respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged
possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration required by law. It is therefore
inconsequential if the petitioner failed to present evidence that would controvert the allegations of the
respondent. A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by
himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he
must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. The
respondent’s claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax declarations alone because it is
only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they may
become the basis of a claim of ownership. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.

Republic v CA
GR no. L-61647
October 12, 1984

Statement of Facts:
The respondents (Tancinco’s) were registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan, bordering on the
Maycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to
their fishpond, but because of the recommendation of the Commissioner, they only pushed for the
registration of two. The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.

The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their
overseer). The Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not accretions. They assert that what
actually happened was that the respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further down the river
bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-made.

Respondents counter that their evidence shows that accretion happened without human intervention and
that the transfer of the dikes occurred only after.

Issue:
Whether or not accretion took place.

Ruling:
No. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not evidence that the addition to said
property was made gradually through the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The lands in question
total almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion. The lone
witness testified that she observed an increase in the area in 1939, but the lots in question were not
included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted in 1940. They were also not included in the
Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Maycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer
was indeed telling the truth, the accretion was sudden, not gradual. When the respondents transferred their
dikes towards the river beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their
property from the destructive force of the waters of the river. The lots in question were portions of the bed
of the Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as public property.

Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note: The lands sought were not even dry land. The
entire area was under one to two meters of water.

Ignacio Grande et al. v Court of Appeals

GR no. L-17652
June 30, 1962

Statement of Facts:
Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande inherited a parcel of land from their parents wherein
its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River.
Through the actions of the river an accretion of around 1.9 hectares formed through alluvial deposit.
Domingo and Esteban Calalung has then possessed said accretion since 1933, while Ignacio et al. entered
the land with a claim of ownership in 1948
In 1958 Ignacio et al. filed a petition to quiet title of the said portion of land claiming that they have been
in open, peaceful, notorious, and continuous possession of the land and their predecessors-in-interest
since prior 1933 when Domingo and Esteban claimed to have possessed the land
The trial court ruled in favor of Ignacio et al. based on their title to the land wherein the accretion was
attached to and saying that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by another through prescription
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court based on the two witnesses produced by
Domingo and Esteban and the Tax Declarations they have presented and saying that the latter has indeed
acquired through prescription the said land formed by alluvium

Issue:
Whether or not the land formed through accretion by alluvium.

Ruling:
Domingo and Esteban Calalung has acquired the land through prescription. Although the provisions of
the Civil Code provides that accretion formed by alluvium is part of the land of the riparian owner whose
land is situated adjacent to the river bank and thus has a claim of ownership thereof, the Land Registration
and Cadastral acts provide that imprescriptibility of a land is only gained when a Torrens Title has been
issued covering the said land, Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest
or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. The petitioners, Ignacio et al, never
sought for the registration of the land formed by alluvium, thus said land has not acquired the shield from
acquisitive prescription. Land formed by alluvium must is owned by the riparian owner whose land is
adjacent to the river bank where the accretion has formed but must register the accretion separately to
acquire a Torrens Title over the same.

Republic of the Philippines v CA
GR no. L-40912
September 30, 1976

Statement of Facts:
Eugenio de Jesus, father of private respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for
Salon Patent of a 33-hectare land in Davao. Being awarded in a bidding, he deposited P221.00,
representing 10% of the price of land at P100.50 per hectare. However, the Director of Lands ordered an
amendment on the Sales Application since a portion of the land was needed by the Philippine Army for
its military camp site purpose. The area excluded [LOT 1176-B-2] consists of 12.8081 hectares. On 7 Sep
1936: Pres. M.L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85, withdrawing said lot from sale and settlement and
reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.

On 15 May 1948: Director of Lands ordered the issuance of patent to de Jesus for “a tract of land having
an area of 10.6400-hectares.” On the same day, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources granted a
Sales Patent to de Jesus for “a tract of agricultural public land containing an area of 20-hectares, 64 ares,
and 00 centares.”

On 11 Aug 1956: Pres. Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85, and declared the subject lot open to
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the resettlement of squatters.On 9 Oct 1956:
Pres. Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the subject lot for medical center site
purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital.On 6 Dec 1969: Petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of subject lot with CFI-Davao, claiming “fee simple”
title to the land on the strength of Proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site
purposes.

Respondent de Jesus opposed the registration on the ground that his father had acquired a vested right on
the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued.
CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.
On appeal, CA reversed the trial court decision.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land
by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical site purposes.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that, by virtue of Proclamation No. 350, then Pres. Magsaysay legally effected a land
grant of the whole lot to petitioner, and such is validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land
Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a “fee simple” title or absolute title in avor of
petitioner.

Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496, which governs the registration of grants or patents
involving public lands, provides that: “Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands.” From the mentioned provision, it would then be
absurd for the petitioner to only be entitled to register the portion of land it occupies and not the full
extent of the reservation, when the Proclamation explicitly reserves the entire lot to them.

Evidence show that what was really awarded to private respondent’s father was only 20.6400-hectares
and not the 33-hectares initially applied for. Furthermore, the fact that a deposit of P221.00 strongly
suggests that what was bidden and/or purchased and awarded was only 22-hectares.

The phrase “whole tract” in the award cannot be the basis for the conclusion that the area awarded to the
applicant was the whole area of 33-hectares. Such general description of “whole tract” cannot prevail
over the specific description delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries.
Specific description is ordinarily preferred to a general description, i.e., the quantity of the land granted
must be ascertained from the description in the patent, because such is exclusive evidence of the land
conveyed. Courts do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a patent and determine the tract and
quantity of land apart from the patent itself.

The alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement on the land did not vest on the private respondent
(or even on his predecessor in interest) a right of preference or preemptive light in the acquisition of the
land. The privilege of occupying public lands with a view to preemption confers no contractual or vested
right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or
acquisition by the public prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands.
Where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all
persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who
has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. (patents for lands which have been
previously granted/reserved from sale/appropriated are void)

Private respondent also failed to prove any private rights over the subject lot. Well-settled is the rule that
unless the applicant has shown clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain
was acquired by him or his ancestor, either by (1) composition title from the Spanish Government, or by
(2) possessory information title, or (3) any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such grants or
patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain.

La Tondeña, Inc. v Republic of the Philippines

GR no. 194617
August 05, 2015
Statement of Facts:
The petitioner applied for the registration of a parcel of land alleged to have been possessed by the
petitioner before World War II. Petitioner based its allegation of possession on the notation on a survey
plan which was purportedly issued on 1938. The MTC granted its application. On appeal by the
respondent, the CA reversed the decision for the reason that the petitioner did not prove possession from
June 12, 145 or earlier. Also, on appeal the respondent presented a report from the LRAA that the subject
land was declared as disposable and alienable only sometime in 1987.

Issue:
Whether or not the land applied for registration under Section14 (1) should have been declared as
alienable and disposable land since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and
Whether or not the applicant satisfactorily proved that the land is disposable and alienable.

Ruling:
Based on Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, an applicant for land registration must comply with the following requirements:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation
of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since
June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Heirs of Mario Malabana clarified that the June 12, 1945 reckoning point refers to the date of possession
and not to date of land classification as alienable and disposable.

Survey notations are not considered substantive evidence of the land’s classification as alienable and
disposable. It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Republic v Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation

GR no. 164408
March 24, 2014

Statement of Facts:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro,
Laguna an application for original registration covering a 1,520 square meter parcel of land situated in
Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna alleging that: land was purchased from
Abalos for P300,000.00; that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of its predecessor-
in-interest;
that there was no encumbrance of any kind affecting the land (no adverse claimant); and that the applicant
and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of
the land in the concept of an owner. 
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application on the ff. grounds: not in
OCEN possession since June 12, 1945;
tax declarations presented did not constitute competent evidence of bona fide acquisition; land was still
part of public domain

It was found that the land was declared for the first time in 1960 under Tax Declaration No. 6712 in the
name of Enrique Hemedez, CENRO Officer Hernandez stated that the land had been "verified to be
within the Alienable and Disposable land under Land Classification Project pursuant to PD 705, dated
September 28, 1981. The land was purchased by the applicant from Abalos on March 9, 1992

Based on the evidence presented, RTC rendered judgment in favor of applicant-respondent. CA Affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not the application should be granted.

Ruling:
No. An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish the following
requisites, namely:
(a) the land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain;
(b) the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
(c) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

The Court has clarified in Malabanan that under Section14(1), it is not necessary that the land must have
been declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the law simply requires the
property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time of application for registration of
title.
On the other hand, an application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish
the following requisites, to wit:
(a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain;
(b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years,
in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and;
(c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the
beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.
In other words, for registration under Section 14(2), the property must be alienable and disposable at the
time of possession.

Moreover, it should be noted that Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while
Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Thus, an application under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529 (based on acquisitive prescription) must comply with the law on prescription as provided
by the Civil Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription pursuant to the Civil Code.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription.

In this case, the respondent’s application does not explicitly specify as to whether it was filed under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. At any rate, the evidence presented by the applicant and
its averments in the other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on Section
14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

The Applicant failed to present evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly
declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, the SC has no choice but to dismiss this
application under Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529.