StatCon Digests:

A. When Constitution becomes effective

De Leon vs. Esguerra

Facts:

De Leon et al were barangay officials elected in 1982 for six-year terms, in accordance with BP 222, in
Brgy. Dolores in Taytay, Rizal. The EDSA Revolution overthrew the Marcos administration, and
installed Corazon Aquino. On Mar. 25, 1986, the Freedom Constitution came into effect. Art. III,
Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution allowed President Aquino to install OIC officials. Under this
law, the OIC Governor of Rizal, Esguerra, signed a memorandum on Feb. 8, but backdated to Dec. 1,
1986, replacing the petitioners with OIC barangay officials. Meanwhile, the 1987 Constitution, which
repeals the provision in the Freedom Constitution, was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb. 2, 1987.

Issue:

Is the replacement of the petitioners valid?

Held:

No. The court ruled that because the people voted in favor of the 1987 Constitution on Feb. 2, it has
immediately taken effect from that date, as prescribed in Aricle XVIII, Sec. 27, which says that the
Constitution has taken effect upon its ratification.

Some justices, however, are of the opinion that Feb. 11 should be the actual date that the Constitution
took effect, because jurisprudence supports the interpretation that ratification is only perfected when
the will of the people has been ascertained, and all the votes have been counted.

B. When statutes take effect

NCC Art. 2 – Laws shall take effect after 15 days upon the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general publication, unless it is otherwise provided.

Tanada vs. Tuvera

Facts:

Tanada, and a group of other concerned lawyers, filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme
Court, demanding the publication of Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instruction, General Orders,
Proclamations, Executive Orders, Letters of Implementation, and Administrative Orders in the Official
Gazette. Solicitor General questions their standing, but the standing of petitioners is upheld because the
laws affect the public. Respondents argue that the meaning of Art. 2 in the Civil Code should construe
laws having specific effectivity dates as exempted from the rule of publication (“unless it is otherwise
provided”).
Issue:

Are the laws exempted from publication in the OG?

Held:

No. Art. 2 should be construed as requiring all such statutes to be published in the OG or in a
newspaper of general circulation. Ignorance of the law excuses nobody, but only if the public has been
informed beforehand.

Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Vega

Facts:

Petitioner union filed claims for the benefits of employees of the Philippine Veterans Bank, which in
1985 commenced liquidation proceedings. Liquidation is the payment of a company's obligations to its
creditors, and the demand of payment of its debtors, in order to settle all obligations before its
corporate personality is dissolved. Respondent judge awards benefits to only a few, and on Mar. 8,
1991, petitioner moves to disqualify respondent judge for being biased. On Jan. 8, 1992, Congress
passes RA 7169 rehabilitating the PVB. Petitioners move for awarding of benefits and reinstatement,
while respondents continue liquidation proceedings and froze the petitioner's benefits, while awarding
them to others through a separate lawyer.

Issue:

Can respondent judge continue liquidation proceedings?

Held:

No. RA 7169 takes effect immediately, as mentioned in the law's effectivity clause. Rehabilitation,
which restores a corporate entity to regular operations and solvency, is the opposite of liquidation.
Liquidation proceedings are therefore permanently stopped.

C. When regulations take effect

People vs. Que Po Lay

Central Bank Circular No. 20 requires people to sell foreign exchange notes to the Central Bank within
one day. Que Po Lay argues it wasn't published. SC ruled that circulars have to be published in
accordance with RAC Art. 11, because they affect the general public.

Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs

9,000 bags of refined sugar were seized from Yaokasin for allegedly being imported. The District
Collector of Customs ruled that they were locally made, but reversed that ruling later, and subjecting it
to automatic review by the Commissioner of Customs by virtue of Memorandum Order 20-87 dated
May 1987. Petitioner argues it wasn't published. SC rules that it is an internal matter. If a collector from
a far-flung province rules adversely to the government, automatic review is mandatory as it is in the
government's interest to prevent corruption by lower officials.

Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix

CMO 27-2003 makes distinctions between food grade and feed grade wheat, whereby 3% tariffs will
be given to food grade wheat, and 7% tariffs will be given to feed grade wheat. The assailed order has
an exclusive list of corporations which fall under either classification, and Hypermix was included in
the 7% list. Hypermix argues that there was no public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration in the UP Law Center, and that the Memorandum Order violates the equal protection
clause. The Court ruled in favor of Hypermix. The rules in the Revised Administrative Code were not
followed. If a regulation is merely interpretive, it need not be published, but if it substantially increases
the burden on those governed, due process must be observed, and those affected must be given a
chance to be heard.

CIR vs. M. Lhuillier Pawnshop

On Mar. 11, 1991, Commissioner on Internal Revenue Jose Ong issued Revenue Memorandum Order
15-91 collecting 5% tax on the gross income of pawnshops as they are supposedly part of the
classification “lending investors” mentioned in Sec. 116 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), as amended by EO 273. The court applied statutory construction, using the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, or the mention of one type is the exclusion of the other types. Sections 192
and 161 of the same NIRC, before its amendment by EO 273, makes distinctions between lending
investors, who lend money for interest, and pawnshops, who lend money with personal property given
as a security. The exclusion of the word “pawnshops” therefore means that it is not included in the
businesses chargeable by the 5% tax in Sec. 116. In addition, RMO 15-91 and 43-91 are invalid
because they were not published. If a regulation is merely interpretive, it need not be published, but if it
substantially increases the burden on those governed, due process must be observed, and those affected
must be given a chance to be heard.

D. When ordinances take effect

Municipality of Paranaque vs. VM Realty

The city government of Paranque passed a resolution expropriating the property of respondent
corporation, for a social housing project. The petitioner filed a claim in the RTC of Makati to buy the
property at fair market value. The court rules in favor of VM Realty, hence the petition. The SC ruled in
favor of VM Realty. The power of eminent domain, or to expropriate private property for government
purposes, is lodged in the legislature. There has to be an act by Congress in order to expropriate it. Res
judicata, or barring the losing party for future actions on the same subject, however, does not apply to
cases of public interest, and thus, petitioner may still claim the property in the future with the correct
remedies.

Bagatsing vs. Ramirez

The Municipal Board of Manila, under petitioner mayor, enacted Ordinance No. 7522 regulating
market stalls and imposing fees. Respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors sought to nullify the
ordinance based on the publication requirement in the Revised Charter of Manila, which states requires
that a city ordinance be put into publication both before and after it is passed. The city only posted it
after it was passed, in accordance with the Local Tax Code, which speaks about ordinances imposing
taxes. Lower court rules in favor of respondent. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mayor Bagatsing.
General laws (Tax Code) which refer to a subject in particular (ordinances about taxes) prevail over
special laws (Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which refer to a subject in general (Manila
ordinances in general). Also, lex posteriori derogat priori was applied. Later laws prevail over earlier
laws when they speak about the same subject.

E. Manner of Computing Time

National Marketing Corporation vs. Tecson

Plaintiff corporation is the successor to the properties, assets and rights of the Price Stabilization
Corporation. On Dec. 21, 1965, petitioner sought a revival of a judgment in the CFI of Manila against
respondent, who, jointly and severally with Alto Surety Insurance Corp., was required by the court to
pay the Price Stabilization Corporation P7200.00 plus 7% interest. That decision became final back in
Dec. 21, 1955. The CFI of Manila ruled in favor of respondent, saying that the prescription period has
already passed. Art.1144 of the Civil Code says that the prescription period for revival of judgments is
10 years from the finality of the decision. The lower court relied on the explanation that Art. 13 of the
Civil Code describes years as having 365 days, and that 1955 to 1965 includes 2 leap years which have
an extra day each. The Court of Appeals referred this case to the Supreme Court, which upheld the
lower court's ruling. Art. 13 expressly states that years have 365 years, and therefore should be
construed as such. To do otherwise would amount to judicial legislation. Changing the provision should
be a legislative, not a judicial act.

CIR vs. Primetown

Primetown filed for a refund of taxes paid with the BIR, saying that it suffered losses in 1997. The BIR
asked for more supporting documents, and thus the respondent filed for a review in the Court of Tax
Appeals on April 14, 2000. Respondent company was found to have filed its tax returns on April 14,
1998. Art. 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) states that the prescription period for
recovering taxes erroneously collected is 2 years after payment of such tax. The CTA denied
respondent's petition, but the CA reversed the decision. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
respondent. Sec. 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code describes a year as having
12 calendar months, with no specific number of days. When incompatible laws speak about the same
subject, the more recent law applies. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

PNB vs CA

Private respondent Epifanio De La Cruz filed for the reconveyance to him of 2 parcels of land in
Bocaue, Bulacan, which he alleged were illegally foreclosed by the petitioner. Sec. 3 of Act No, 3135
requires the publication of notices of auction of foreclosed properties for 3 consecutive weeks. The
notice was published in the Daily Record on Mar. 28, Apr. 11, and Apr. 12, 1969. The CFI ruled in
favor of PNB, but the CA reversed the CFI's decision. The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision.
While Art. 13 of the Civil Code excludes the first day in counting a period, it would create an absurdity
with publication, if the first day of publication is not counted in the week. Thus, the second week
should have ended on Apr. 10, and not Apr. 11.

Garvida vs. Sales

Florencio Sales and Lynette Garvida were rivals for the SK Chairmanship in Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
Garvida won. The COMELEC suspended her proclamation on the ground that she is overaged. She was
21 years, 11 months, and 5 days old on the day of the elections. The Supreme Court upheld the
COMELEC's decision, and disqualified Garvida. Sales, however, was not allowed to take her place,
because a losing candidate may not be installed. Thus, the other SK members shall choose the SK
Chairperson from among themselves by simple majority. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratiowas used in
interpreting the law. Section 424 of the Local Government Code sets the maximum age at not more
than 21 for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan, but there is no reckoning date. There is an
additional qualification in Sec. 428 of the LGC, which mandates that candidates should not be more
than 21 years of age on the date of the election. Of things dissimilar, the rules are dissimilar. “Not more
than 21 years of age” means not even one day older than 21 years of age on election day.

Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino

The City Fiscal of QC filed a charge of slight physical injuries against petitioner on Feb. 1, 1965, for a
crime allegedly committed on Dec. 2, 1964. Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the basis of
prescription, but the respondent judges denied it. Light felonies, such as slight physical injuries, have a
prescription period of 60 days. The 60th day fell on a Sunday. Respondents argue based on Art. 31 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which says that if the last day of a period falls on a holiday, it should
be moved to the next working day. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. For criminal
cases, prescription periods should be strict, not because of liberality to the accused, but because proof
and memory wear out with time.

F. Effectivity of laws until repealed

Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez

Law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. Legislative acts
done by a de facto government, except those of a political complexion, continue even when the de jure
government resumes the exercise of the acts of its sovereignty, until the legislative branch repeals such
laws.

Peralta vs. Dir. Of Prisons

McArthur's proclamation nullifying laws created by the 2nd Republic is not even necessary. Laws of a
political complexion become null and void upon a change in the exercise of sovereignty. Peralta was
set free because he violated a law of political complexion during the Japanese occupation.

Laurel vs. Misa

Treason (Art. 114 of the RPC) is not repealed with a change of sovereignty even when it is of a
political nature. Treason against the de jure government is punishable upon the restoration of such
government, such as the Commonwealth after the Japanese Occupation. This is because such law is
necessary to ensure survival of the de jure government.