Beast Statcon Digests for Saturday, 9/5/2015

Statutory Construction

A. Definition

Caltex vs. Palomar

Facts:
 In 1960, Caltex conceived a promo called “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” in which customers,
without having to purchase Caltex merchandise, may win prizes by estimating the number of
liters a hooded gas pump in a Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.
 The contest has 3 stages – the “Dealer Contest”, “Regional Contest”, and the “National
Contest”. Forseeing the extensive use of the mail for advertising and communications, Caltex
sought clearance with the postal authorities.
 Enrico Palomar, the Postmaster General, denied Caltex use of the mail for advertising because
the use of the mail violates Sec. 1954(a) and 1982 of the Revised Administrative Code. Palomar
argues that the promo involves consideration, or if not, that it is a “gift enterprise” prohibited by
the Postal Law.
 The trial Court ruled in favor of Caltex, but the respondent appealed.

Issue:
 1) Does petition state a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?
 2) Does petitioner violate the Postal Law?

Held:
 1) Yes. Declaratory relief is a remedy by which the Court applies statutory construction to
interpret laws. Caltex' promo depends on the construction of the provisions in the Postal Law.
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the intention and
meaning of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided for in the law.
 2) No. The provisions in the Postal Law are meant to prohibit gambling. Even if Caltex' contest
was a “gift enterprise”, it does not encourage gambling because customers are not asked to
purchase anything from Caltex to join the contest.

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao vs. Land Registration Commission

Facts:
 On Oct. 4, 1954, Mateo Rodis sold a parcel of land to petitioner, a corporation sole with Msgr.
Clovis Thibault, a Canadian, as actual incumbent.
 Respondent Registry of Deeds of Davao denied the issuance of a deed in favor of the petitioner
because petitioner is a corporation sole with only one incorporator, who is a foreigner.
Philippine law requires that in order for corporations to be able to own land, at least 60% of
such corporations should be owned and controlled by Filipinos, as required by Sec. 1 and 5 of
Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution.
 Land Registration Commissioner also ordered the Registry of Deeds to deny the issuance of a
deed, hence the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Is the sale violative of Sec. 1 and 5 of Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution?

Held:
 No. In statutory construction, the judiciary assumes that the framers of the law knew
what they were talking about. In the present case, the framers of the Constitution knew about
the existence of corporations sole of a religious nature, and did not intend to include them under
the restrictions of said Sec. 1 and 5 of Art. XIII. The foreign priest is merely an administrator,
and the true owners are the local members of the religion.

B. Purpose of Construction

City of Baguio vs. Judge Pio Marcos of CFI Baguio

Facts:
 Private respondent Belong Lutes claims that he and his ancestors were illiterate Igorots who
have been in actual, open, adverese, peaceful, and continuous possession of the land in question
since Spanish times. He petitioned in the respondent court to reopen cadastral proceedings
questioning a 1922 decision taking his land for public use.
 The proceedings were instituted in 1912, the decision was made in 1922, and respondents filed
for reopening 1961.
 Private petitioners who are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed with the Bureau of
Forestry, and the City of Baguio filed their opposition to the reopening of the case.
 Respondent decided in favor of the petitioner. Petitioners question before the Supreme Court the
jurisdiction of the court to reopen the case, and if the cadastral court has power to reopen the
case.
 RA 931 is the statute in question. The title says “AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN
THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS TO
TITLE OF PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY
VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS
NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT”. Sec. 1 speaks of parcels of land that
“have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act.”

Issue:
 Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the case?

Held:
 Yes. In arriving at the decision, the court applied statutory construction. The purpose of
statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. The true object of construction is
to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be
enforced.
 Where literal meaning of the law would not carry out the legislative intent, the title may be
resorted to. The title is an index or clue to the legislative intent of the law. “No bill may be
enacted into law which shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.”

MCC Industrial vs. Ssangyong Corp.

Facts:
 Petitioner is engaged in importing steel products, respondent is a Korean company supplying
respondent with such products. The two conducted businees via phone calls and fax
transmissions.
 On Apr. 13, 2000, Ssangyong confirmed by fax to Mr. Gregory Chan, MCC's manager, MCC's
order of 220 MT of stainless steel at a preferential rate of $1,860. 4 days later, a pro forma
invoice letter was sent, saying that MCC has to pay via letter of credit (L/C) as is the usual
practice.
 MCC confirmed, and Ssangyong ordered its manufacturer Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation to
make the products to be sold. MCC, however, said that it could not get a credit line from the
bank due to another transaction, and asked for an extension.
 Exasperated, Ssangyong sent a demand letter to Chan saying that if MCC doesn't give the L/C
by Aug. 26, 2000, Ssangyong will be constrained to cancel the contract and file for damages
against MCC.
 Ssangyong filed for damages on Nov. 16, 200l for breach of contract. The Makati RTC awarded
damages in favor of Ssangyong. The CA affirmed the RTC decision but absolved Mr. Chan of
damages.
 Petitioner filed case before SC, saying that the lower court erred in admitting as evidence mere
photocopies of pro forma letters sent by fax, and that actual damages should be reduced, if not
deleted.

Issue:
 Did court err in admitting photocopies of pro forma letters sent by fax?

Held:
 Yes. The court used the E-Commerce Act of 2000. Said law offered definitions for “electronic
data message” and “electronic document”. While “electronic data message” does not
necessarily give rise to an obligation, unlike the definition for “electronic document”, the
legislature intended for them to have similar meanings in the law.
 Looking into the discussions bet. Senators Defensor-Santiago and Magsaysay, it was clear that
the legislature intended for fax messages not to be included under “electronic documents” and
therefore inadmissible as electronic evidence. A photocopy of a fax is even more inadmissible.
 The IRR implementing the E-Commerce Act erred in including fax under electronic documents
because it failed to realize legislative intent.
 MCC, however, is still liable due to other evidence presented proving the existence of the
contract. It is not, however, liable for actual damages.
 In the construction or interpretation of a legislative rule, the primary rule is to search for
and determine the intent and the spirit of the law. A construction should be rejected that
gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for
which the law was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be
attained by the enactment.

C. When construction is resorted to

Garcia vs. Social Security Commission

Facts:
  Petitioner is one of the directors of Impact Corporation, which is engaged in manufacturing
aluminum tube containers. Said business was in financial trouble in 1978, and labor unrest
beseiged it in 1980.
 Impact Corporation asked for suspension of payments in the SEC in Mar. 1983.
 On May 8, 1985, the union filed a Notice of Strike before the Ministry of Labor, noting the
inability to pay wages, 13th month pay, and SSS remittances.
 On Jul. 3, 1985, the SSS filed to collect remittances from Impact Corporation.
 Petitioner argues that Sec. 28(f) of the SSS Law provides that the Director of a corporation is
liable only for the penalties on such corporation, and not for unpaid SSS contributions of said
corporation. Petitioner also argues that only “managing heads”, “managing directors”, or
“managing partners” should be held liable.

Issue:
 Is petitioner liable for unpaid contributions?

Held:
 Yes. Sec. 22(a) clearly states that every employer is required to deduct and remit contributions
to SSS, and that if employer fails to pay, 3% penalty shall be imposed. The law clearly says the
employer should pay both the contributions and the penalty.
 Petitioner relied on an argument that Sec. 28(f) of the SSS Law (its managing head, directors, or
partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act) includes only “managing heads,
“managing directors”, or “managing partners”, and wants the court to use statutory construction
(ejusdem generis).
 The Court finds no need to resort to statutory construction. The law clearly says 1) managing
heads, 2) directors, and 3) partners.
 Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to
apply them regardless of personal belief or predilections - when the law is unambiguous
and unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is imperative.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining

Facts:
 Petitioners are heirs of miners of respondent corporation who were buried in a cave-in incident
in Tuba, Benguet. They filed for damages in the CFI of Manila for negligence.
 The CFI of Manila in Dec. 16, 1968 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdication, stating that the
Workmen's Compensation Commission has original jurisdiction over the case.
 The petitioners argue that it is a civil case based on Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, or the
provisions on quasi-delicts.

Issue:
 Does the court have jurisdiction over the case, and did it err in saying that it is a Workmen's
Compensation case and not a civil case?

Held:
 Yes. The case was remanded to the lower court for it has jurisdiction over the case.
 The dissenting opinion, however, postulates that the Court, in saying that the lower courts may
try the case, is essentially legislating, because Sec. 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act says
that the rights and remedies granted to employees excludes those given by the Civil Code.
  A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the
law-making body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and
considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations,
according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle
construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-making body does
not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. Consequently, the grammatical
reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.

Power to Construe

A. Executive Construction

PAFLU vs. Bureau of Labor Relations

Facts:
 Respondent NAFLU won 429 votes to 414 exclusive rights to represent workers of Philippine
Blooming Mills, Inc. in collective bargaining. Respondent Director of Labor Relations certifies
this.
 Petitioner argues that spoiled ballots should be counted, in accordance to the doctrine in Allied
Workers' Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations.
 Respondent, however, argues that the doctrine only applies to the time when the Industrial
Peace Act was still in force.

Issue:
 Did respondent commit grave abuse of discretion in saying that the doctrine is irrelevant?

Held:
 No.
 The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers
of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should
ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in
our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Hypermix

The Court, in ruling that CMO 27-2003 as unconstitutional, in violation of the Civil Code
provision on publication, and the equal protection clause, also ruled that the BIR went beyond the
delegation to it of legislative powers. The Court ruled that it violates Sec. 1403 of the Tariff and
Customs Law, which gives customs officers the power to assess and determine the classification
of imported articles. By giving already a classification beforehand (food grade and feed grade),
the BIR is already denying the customs officers of their mandate. Rules and regulations which are
product of delegated power should be in conformity with statutory laws. This is a limitation on
the executive's power to construct laws.

CIR vs. M. Lhuillier

Administrative rules by executive bureaus such as the BIR can be divided into two: legislative
rules and interpretative rules. The first kind needs to be published, the second kind is merely an
interpretation, and therefore needs no publishing. The law in question in the case putting
pawnshops in the same classification as lending investors, and thus subject to the 5% tax, is a
legislative rule, and therefore should be published. The BIR did not simply interpret the law, but
imposed a new tax on pawnshops.

Victorias Milling vs. SSC

Facts:
 Petitioner challenges Circular No. 22 of the SSC, which states that effective Nov. 1, 1958, all
employers should take into consideration all bonuses and overtime pay in computing SSS
contributions.
 Petitioner says it needs to be approved by the President and published in the Official Gazette
because it is a legislative rule.
 Respondent says it doesn't have to be approved because it is an interpretative rule.

Issue:
 Is Circular No. 22 a legislative rule, or an interpretative rule?

Held:
 It is an interpretative rule, and therefore needs no presidential approval and publication.
 Sec. 8(f) in RA 1161 explicitly excluded bonuses. In RA 1792, however, they are not
mentioned, and therefore the need arose for the BIR to interpret it, and the interpretation was
done in Circular No. 22.

B. Judicial Construction

Basis, Extent, and Limitations

Endencia vs. David

Facts:

 Petitioners are judges who assail Sec. 13 of RA 590, and want the refund of the income tax they
paid to the BIR, under respondent commissioner David.
 Petitioners argue that income tax paid by judges is in violation of Sec. 9 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which says that the salary of judges shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
 Respondent, however, argues that it is not a diminishing of their salary.

Issue:
 Is Sec. 13 of RA 590 constitutional?

Held:
 No. In creating a law that gets income tax from judges, the legislative is making its own
interpretation of Sec. 9 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, by interpreting income taxes to mean
that they do not diminish the salary of judges.
 The power to interpret the laws is lodged in the judiciary. The Constitution, in the said
provision, intends to protect the financial autonomy of the judiciary from being held hostage by
 the other branches, thus maintaining judicial independence.
 WEIRD LANG KASI JUDGES GET TO INTERPRET LAWS TO BENEFIT THEMSELVES

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

Facts:
 Jose Angara filed in the SC for prohibition against the respondent Electoral Commission to
restrain it from taking further cognizance of the electoral protest filed against him by another
respondent, Pedro Ynsua. Jose Angara is a member of the National Assembly.
 Respondent argues that the Electoral Commission is an independent body formed by the 1935
Constitution with quasi-judicial powers, and whose decisions are final and not appeallable to
the Supreme Court.
 Respondent also argues that the Electoral Commission may still take cognizance of the electoral
protest filed against petitioner.

Issue:
 Does SC have jurisdiction?

Held:
 Yes. The Judiciary has the final say over this matter. Natura vaccuum abhorret – nature abhors a
vaccuum. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries between the 3
branches, it does not assert superiority over the other branches, but merely asserts the power
given to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
constitution. The judiciary, with the Supreme Court as final arbiter, checks the other
departments if they are violative of the Constitution.
 That said, the Court ruled in favor of the respondent, saying that the Electoral Commission
indeed has jurisdiction over the case.

Marcos vs. Manglapus (Secretary of Foreign Affairs), along with other cabinet secretaries

Facts:
 President Cory Aquino said in a statement that she forbids the remains of Ferdinand Marcos to
be brought into the country until such time as the administration or the succeeding one decides
to allow it. This is in consideration of peace and order matters.
 The Marcos family filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the SC.

Issue:
 Did Aquino exercise her power arbitrarily in preventing a Filipino to be buried in his homeland?

Held:
 No. The court clarified the power of the President in this decision. (Separation of powers)
 The Court said that the 1987 Constitution intended to weaken the President's commander-in-
chief powers, not the general exercise of the President's executive power.
 There is no grant of the specific power of legislation to the President, unlike in Amendment No.
6 of the 1973 Constitution.
 The President may order such forbidding, in the interest of the public as the President deems it.

IBP vs. Zamora

The IBP seeks to nullify on constitutional grounds President Erap Estrada's order to call out the
Marines to help the police in keeping the peace in Metro Manila. Respondent executive secretary
Zamora argued that the court does not have jurisdiction to decide on this matter because it is a political
question. The discretion of the President to call out the armed forces, or to declare martial law is a
matter of his wisdom, and is therefore a political question. However, grave abuse of discretion may be
committed by the President, when the order goes beyond constitutionally mandated limits. The court is
deciding on the legality or constitutionality of the order, not its wisdom, and therefore, it is not a
political question as stated by the respondent. Nevertheless, the Court decided that the order is
constitutional.

Requisites for Judicial Review

Southern Hemisphere Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council

Facts:
 Petitioners Southern Hemisphere, and the Makabayan coalition of partylists (Gabriela, Bayan
Muna, etc.) seek the unconstitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007.

Issue:
 May the court take jurisdiction of the case?

Held:
 No. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy, 2) the petitioner must possess
locus standi, 3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity,
and 4) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. In the present case, the
dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.
 The petitioners lack locus standi because none of them have presented a personal stake, i.e., are
charged under RA 9372. A party must have a direct and personal interest, that it sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining some injury as a result of the enforcement of the law, and that
it personally suffered some actual or threatened injury.
 There is no actual case or controversy. The pleadings must show an antagonistic assertion of a
right, on one hand, and a denial, on the other hand. It must concern a real issue and not a
theoretical issue. Obscure allegations of sporadic survaillance and being tagged as communist
fronts in now way approximate a credible threat of prosecution.

Penafrancia Sugar Mill vs. Sugar Regulatory Administration

Facts:
 Responent SRA on Sep. 14, 1995 released Sugar Order No. 2 s. 1995-1996, which provided that
a lien of P2.00 per LKG-bag shall be imposed on all raw sugar quedan-permits, as well as other
sugar products, in order to fund the Philippine Sugar Research Institute.
 Petitioner assailed the validity of said order, and both the RTC and CA upheld the validity.
 While the case is before the Supreme Court, the SRA released Sugar Order No. 5 s. 2013-2014,
which revoked the assailed Sugar Order.
Issue:
 May the Court take cognizance of the case?

Held:
 No. It is moot and academic. A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled
to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the
judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in
the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.

Mendoza vs. Familara

Facts:
 Petitioner is a barangay captain who questions the constitutionality of Sec. 2 of the Local
Government Code, and the retroactive application of the three-term limit imposed on barangay
officials beginning from the 1994 barangay elections.
 On Oct. 2007, respondent filed to disqualify petitioner on the basis that he has been elected 3
consecutive times in 1994, 1997, and 2002.
 Another electoral rival filed to disqualify Mendoza in 2007, and while he won the elections, he
was disqualified.
 While the case is pending, the 2010 barangay elections came and went.

Issue:
 Does the Court still have jurisdiction over his case?

Held:
 No. It is moot and academic. The 2010 elections have already brought a new set of leaders for
the barangay, which would render the decision useless anyway.
 Certainly, the rule is not set in stone and permits exceptions. Thus, we may choose to
decide cases otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest involved; third, the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evasive of review. None of the foregoing exceptions calling for this Court to
exercise jurisdiction obtains in this instance.

Kilosbayan vs. Morato

Facts:
 Petitioners seek reconsideration of an earlier ruling by the Supreme Court.
 In the earlier ruling, the Court found the agreement between the PCSO and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) to be invalid, and thus the two parties agreed to an
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) that does not have the objectionable features of the
previous contract.
 Petitioners say that their 1) their standing and 2) that PCSO may not enter into a collaboration
 or association in operating an on-line lottery have been decided upon in the previous case, and
thus should apply to this new case.

Issue:
 Does petitioner have standing?

Held:
 No. The stricter rule on real parties in interest, used in civil cases, is used rather than the more
liberal rule on standing in constitutionality cases.
 The petitioner argues that it has standing based on Sec. 5, 12, 13, and 17 of Art. II of the
Constitution, but these provisions are not self-executing, nor does the ruling in Oposa vs.
Factoran apply, because in the said case, Sec. 16 does confer the right of the people to a
healthful and balanced ecology. The other articles do not confer rights which may be
enforceable in courts and thus, give standing.
 Kilosbayan also asserts that as a people's organization, it deserves standing based on Sec. 16,
Art. XIII of the Constitution, which guarantees effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political and economic decision-making to such organizations. This is because
it does not change the rule that only real parties in interest, or those with standing, may invoke
judicial power. In this case, there is no actual case and controversy which involves the
petitioner.
 Neither does petitioner have standing as taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, or legislators.
They have only been allowed to sue 1) in cases involving constitutional issues and 2) under
certain conditions. Taxpayers are only allowed to sue when there is illegal disbursement of
government funds which come from their taxes. Voters are allowed to question election laws
only. Concerned citizens are only allowed to sue when the issue is of transcendental importance.
Legislators are only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
 In addition to not having standing, the doctrines of “the law of the case” and res judicata do not
apply, because the cause in the first case is different from this case. The contract in question in
this case is not the same as the one in the first case, and it doesn't have the objectionable
features found in the first agreement.

David vs. Arroyo

In the case, PP 1021 has already lifted the state of emergency, and thus cancelling the effects of PP
1017 and GO 5. Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent President, argues that the case has become
moot and academic by virtue of the lifting, thus, there is no more actual case and controversy.
However, the Court admit exceptions to lack of an actual case and controversy, when 1) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution, 2) the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public is involved, and 3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and 4) if the case is capable of repetition
and yet evading review. In this case all 4 exceptions are present. With regard to standing, some of the
petitioners do not have locus standi, as they do not fall under valid taxpayer, voter, concerned
citizen, or legislator suits. However, the case is entertained by the court, because the issue falls under
the doctrine of transcendental importance.

BPI vs. Shemberg Biotech Corporation

Facts:
 Respondent filed for approval of its rehabilitation plan before the RTC of Cebu City. Petitioner
opposed the rehabilitation plan.
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent on Oct. 12, 2001, saying that Shemberg complied with the
requirements for rehabilitation.
 The CA upheld the RTC ruling, hence the petition.
 The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Coportate
Rehabilitation before the SC for the first time, and not in the lower court.

Issue:
 May constitutionality be raised before the SC if it hasn't been raised in the lower court?

Held:
 No. The four requisites of judicial review are that: 1) there must be an actual case and
controversy, 2) locus standi of the petitioner, 3) constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity, and 4) constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case. In this case, the 3rd
requisite is not present, because constitutionality was only raised in the SC. The Court said that
in Umali vs. Guingona, Jr., the Court did not even accept a case where the constitutionality was
raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC ruling.

Carbonilla vs. Board of Airlines Representatives

Facts:
 Petitioner Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 amending CAO
7-92 that increases the overtime rates of customs personnel in NAIA.
 Usec. Mendoza of the Dept. of Finance, and the Office of the President upheld the validity of
CAO 1-2005. Publication requirement has been satisfied, because there have been meetings
with stakeholders prior to the coming out of the order. Petitioner Carbonilla et al motioned to
intervene as parties in interest because they are customs personnel in NAIA.
 The Court of Appeals ruled in the BAR's favor. In its decision, it passed upon the validity of
CAO 7-92 and Sec. 3506 of the TCCP.

Issue:
 Does Carbonilla have standing as an intervenor?
 Did the CA err in passing upon the validity of CAO 7-92 and Sec. 3506 of the TCCP?

Held:
 No. He was after back payments for services rendered, and not for the increase in overtime
rates, and therefore he should have filed a separate case instead.
 No. While the issue was not raised for the first time in the lower court (in the Usec's office),
higher courts may still pass upon the constitutionality of statues and administrative regulations.
The Court has ruled that the Court of Appeals is imbued with sufficient authority and
discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case or
to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. Further, while it is
true that the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the first opportunity, this Court,
in the exercise of sound discretion, can take cognizance of the constitutional issues raised
by the parties in accordance with Section 5(2)(a), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
General vs. Urro

Facts:
 Petitioner seeks the unconstitutionality of the appointment of respondent as commissioner of
NAPOLCOM. General is also a commissioner of NAPOLCOM.
 Petitioner was appointed in an acting capacity on 2008 to serve out the remainder of the term of
the deceased commissioner Roces.
 Later, PGMA appointed Urro as General's replacement, with an appointment paper dated Mar.
5, 2010.
 Pres. Noynoy Aquino was elected president, and he issued EO No. 2 revoking midnight
appointments made by the previous administration, which includes respondent. Such midnight
appointments include those given before Mar. 11, 2010, but whose offices only become vacant
after the date. Roces was supposed to have finished on Sep. 2010, which is after Mar. 2010.
 Petitioner argues that he is the legally subsisting commissioner until the new president has
appointed another qualified commissioner to replace him. Petitioner also seeks the remedy of
quo warranto, for the court to recognize that he is the rightful commissioner. Quo warranto is a
remedy by which a person may assert his entitlement to hold a public office.

Issue:
 May the court pass upon the constitutionality of Urro's appointment?

Held:
 No. The fourth requisite of judicial review, which is that the constitutionality is the lis mota of
the case. In this case, the lis mota, or the primary issue of the case, is not the constitutionality of
Urro's appointment, but petitioner's right to hold office, because if petitioner establishes his
right to hold office, then the constitutionality of Urro's appointment won't matter anymore.
 General only has a temporary appointment anyway, so he does not have cause of action for a
quo warranto.

Effect of Unconstitutionality

Peralta vs. CSC

Facts:
 Petitioner was appointed as Trade Specialist II in the DTI on Sep. 25, 1989.
 On Dec. 8, 1989, he received his first salary (WOW TAGAL, GOVERNMENT TALAGA)
covering the period from Sep. 25 to Oct. 31. Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI
deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his absences on Sep. 29 and Oct. 20,
inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays succeeding those 2 Fridays. Thus, he got deductions for
Sep. 29 and 30, Oct. 1, 20, 21, and 22.
 Petitioner sought clarification from the General Administrative Service, who told him that
Chapter 5.49 of the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service, that if the
employee is absent without leave on the day immediately preceeding a Saturday, Sunday, or a
Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay.
 CSC Chairman Patrica Sto. Tomas that none of the Civil Service Laws provide a provision
which supports the regulation in question.
 On May. 25, 1990, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 90-497, and later, 90-797
 upholding the deduction to petitioner's salary, sayting that such policy on absences on Fridays
or Mondays has been in effect since 1965.
 Memorandum No. 16 issued by CSC Chair Sto. Tomas later in 1991 has effectively made the
Resolutions invalid. While this may have made the case moot and academic, the court decided
on whether or not the policy has been in effect since 1965, because it will affect back payments
made to petitioner.
 The Supreme Court ruled the resolutions to be invalid.

Issue:
 What is the effect of invalidation of the assailed resolutions?

Held:
 It should be as if they have not been valid from the beginning.
 The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal
contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
 However, to refund all the lost earnings of all the other employees over such a long period of
time may cause financial constraints. The Court must take this into consideration. Thus, the
Court did not order the CSC to give back all these lost earnings, and instead, calls upon the CSC
and Congress the handle this situation with justice and equity.
 The CSC, however, is ordered to give petitioner his lost earnings.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. San Roque Power

Facts:
 3 consolidated cases involving the CIR, against San Roque Power, Taganito Mining, and Philex
Mining.
 The 3 companies filed for refund of taxes. Par. (A) and (C) of Sec. 112 of the Tax Code allows
companies with zero-rated sales to file judicial claims for refund if their administrative claims
before the CIR are fully or partially denied, or if the CIR fails to act on the claims within 120
days. Companies may file for refund within 30 days of receiving the denial, or after 120 days
have passed and the CIR has not acted on their petitions.
 San Roque and Taganito filed prematurely, and Philex filed too late, after 426 days.
 San Roque filed on April 10, 2003.
 The BIR came out with BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on Dec. 10, 2003, which states that the
taxpayer need not wait for the 120 + 30 day period to lapse.
 Taganito filed on Feb. 14, 2007.
 The SC decided on the case of CIR vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia on Oct. 6, 2010,
reinstating the mandatory application of the 120 + 30 day periods.

Issue:
 When did the interpretation of Par. (A) and (C) of Sec. 112 of the Tax Code take effect?

Held:
 Art. 8 of the Civil Code says judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
 While the interpretation should have taken effect since the passage of the Tax Code, it should
not prejudice Taganito, which filed after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before
 the Aichi decision. Taganito filed it in good faith while the erroneous interpretation of the BIR
was still in force.
 Thus, San Roque's petition must be denied, but Taganito's petition must be granted. Meanwhile,
Philex' petition must be denied because if the CIR does not act on a petition, it is deemed a
denial, and therefore, the 30 day period begins after the 120 days.

Lopez vs. CA

Facts:
 Petitioner is Chairman of the PCSO.
 A case was filed against respondent Romeo Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department of the
PCSO, in the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman suspended him for 6 months and 1 day.
 The CA, however, issued a TRO enjoining the Ombudsman from implementing the suspension
order until a final decision has been rendered.
 Sec. 27 of RA 6770 says that motions for reconsideration of decisions by the Ombudsman may
be filed in 5 days from such decision, that suspensions of not more than 1 month are final and
unappealable and that in all administrative cases, the decisions of the Ombudsman may be
appealed in the SC within 10 days. Respondent relied on this provision in appealing his
suspension by the Ombudsman.
 Petitioner argues that Sec. 27 of RA 6770 has been made unconstitutional by the ruling in
Fabian vs. Desierto.

Issue:
 Is Sec. 27 of RA 6770 unconstitutional?

Held:
 Not entirely. Only that which pertains to the procedure has been made unconstitutional. In this
case, appeals on the decisions of the Ombudsman should be filed with the CA, not with the SC.
Everything else in the law is still constitutional.
 It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that a statute may be constitutional
in one part and unconstitutional in another and that if the invalid part is severable from
the rest, the portion which is unconstitutional may stand while that which is constitutional
is stricken out and rejected. Whenever a statute contains unobjectionable provisions
separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of the court to so declare
and to maintain the act insofar as it is valid.

Tatad vs. Dept. of Energy

Facts:
 RA 8180 is “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes”.
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the act on so many grounds.
 Supreme Court declares the law unconstitutional for it creates an oligopoly of Petron, Shell, and
Caltex, which is against Sec. 19, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution which encourages
competition and is anti-trust.
 Sec. 23 of the assailed law has a separability clause, which says the parts which are not
constitutionally infirm are separable from the unconstitutional parts, and must remain valid.

Issue:
  What is the effect of unconstitutionality of RA 8180?

Held:
 The offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the Court decided to strike
the whole law down altogether.
 Before deregulation, Petron, Caltex, and Shell had an oligopoly. After deregulation, the big 3
still have an oligopoly, only this time, without government control to check it.
 The unconstitutionality of RA 8180 also restores to revive the former laws it repealed.
 This means the appeals of the big 3 may be refered to the Energy Regulatory Board.
 While it appears the Court interefered with the economic policy of the Congress, it only decided
upon the constitutionality of the law, and the Constitution goes against trusts and monopolies.

Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. vs. City of Cagayan de Oro

Facts:
 Respondent came out with Ordinance No. 9503-2005 imposing a tax on the lease or rentals of
electric and/or telecommunications posts at 10%.
 Petitioner CEPALCO filed for declaratory relief in the RTC, saying that it is a tax prohibited by
Sec. 133(a) of RA 7160 or the Local Goverment Code, and that even if the tax is valid, the
petitioner is exempt by virtue of RA 9284.
 The Supreme Court ruled that said ordinance is unconstitutional. Ordinance did not have a
separability clause.

Issue:
 What is the effect of unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 9503-2005?

Held:
 The whole law is unconstitutional, because it lacks a separability clause.