THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148597. October 24, 2003.]

GRACE F. MUNSAYAC-DE VILLA, LILY F. MUNSAYAC-SUNGA

and ROY MUNSAYAC, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS;
Judge ANTONIO C. REYES, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61; NORA F. MUNSAYAC-
VISPERAS (Represented by Her Heirs); and GELACIO F.
MUNSAYAC JR., respondents.

Ismael M. Estella for petitioners.

Tenefrancia Agranzamendez Liceralde & Associates for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The present controversy arose from a special proceeding case for letters
of administration of the late Munsayac Couple's intestate estate wherein
Gelacio Munsayac, Jr. was appointed as administrator pursuant to respondent
Judge's order. Thereafter, petitioners requested for the inhibition of respondent
Judge. Petitioners likewise assailed the arrest order issued by respondent Judge
for them to immediately surrender in custodia legis to the court certain
amounts of money. The Court of Appeals (CA) nullified the arrest order issued
by respondent Judge ruling that he had summarily ordered the arrest of
petitioners without any written charge filed against them or any hearing
conducted thereon. As to the request for inhibition, the CA held that there was
no convincing proof that the demeanor of the trial judge had put him under
suspicion. Hence, this petition where petitioners alleged that the CA erred in
not ordering the inhibition of respondent Judge.

The Supreme Court ruled that the petition for inhibition has no merit. The
main case from which this petition arose has already been decided by the CA.
The decision is now final and executory. Already terminated in that main case
was the special proceeding case for letters of administration, which had given
rise to a number of incidents and petitions including the herein matter. The
petition, therefore had already become moot and academic in view of the
termination of the main case. Now that the case has finally been terminated, it
follows that neither respondent judge nor his court has any more right to hold
the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the special proceedings.
Consequently, the Court directed respondent Judge to immediately lift any
freeze order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in
custodia legis.

SYLLABUS

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 1. REMEDIAL LAW; PETITION UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT
AND ORDINARY APPEAL OF A CRIMINAL CASE, DISTINGUISHED; CASE AT BAR. —
In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — as distinguished from an
ordinary appeal of a criminal case in which the whole case is opened for review
— the appeal is limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Since respondents
did not contest the Decision of the CA, no affirmative relief can be sought by or
given to them. Thus, not all the issues raised before the appellate court need to
be considered by this Court. The sole issue in the present Petition is the
question of inhibition of respondent judge.

2. ID.; ACTIONS; PETITION FOR INHIBITION IN CASE AT BAR HAS

BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC IN VIEW OF THE TERMINATION OF THE MAIN
CASE. — After the CA terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, we see no
more reason why the inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The
Petition therefor has already become moot and academic in view of the
termination of the main case. How can he be inhibited from a case that has
already been decided with finality? It should be clear that the CA Decision
terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition executed by all the parties was the "final, complete and absolute
settlement of their respective shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses
Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac." As such, any and all incidents
relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been
terminated.
3. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; A TRIBUNAL ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT
EXERCISES LIMITED JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR. — When Judge Reyes issued
his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio
City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners and to deposit certain
amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the presiding judge in the probate court
that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R. Now that the case has finally
been terminated, it follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to
hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the special
proceedings. Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of
any property previously deposited with the court should be effected. The judge
had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property
deposited should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in
relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the
long-standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises
limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property should
be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such
determination is only provisional — not conclusive — in character and subject to
the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTIONS ON AN ADVANCE MADE BY THE DECEASED
TO ANY HEIR MAY BE HEARD BY THE COURT THAT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
ESTATE PROCEEDINGS. — [Q]uestions on an advance made or allegedly made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court that
has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings; and that the final order of the
court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
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 heirs.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PROBATE COURT MAY NOT DECIDE A QUESTION OF
TITLE OR OWNERSHIP; EXCEPTIONS. — [G]enerally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties
are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties
consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not
impaired.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

Once a case has been decided with finality, a petition for the inhibition of
the judge therefrom becomes moot and academic.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the March 2, 2001 Decision 2 and the June 21, 2001
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60914. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED only insofar as nullifying
and setting aside the order of arrest contained in Respondent Judge
Antonio C. Reyes' Orders dated June 22, 2000 and August 28, 2000 in
Special Proceedings 704-R, entitled 'In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta
Munsayac.' DCcSHE

"No pronouncement as to costs." 4

The assailed Resolution denied both petitioners' Partial Motion for

Reconsideration 5 and private respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. 6
The Facts
The facts of the case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
"A recapitulation of facts shows that the present controversy
before [u]s stems from Special Proceeding Case No. 704-R, entitled 'In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and
the Late Vicenta Munsayac' and pending before Branch 61 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The said special proceeding case
was filed on November 17, 1998 by Grace F. Munsayac-De Villa ('DE
VILLA'), Lily F. Munsayac-Sunga ('SUNGA') and Roy Peter F. Munsayac
('ROY') — three (3) of the five (5) children of the late Spouses GELACIO
and VICENTA MUNSAYAC — for letters of administration nominating DE
VILLA as administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents. DE
VILLA's nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children of the
late Munsayac Spouses, namely, Gelacio F. Munsayac, Jr. ('MUNSAYAC,
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 JR.') and the late Nora F. Munsayac-Visperas ('VISPERAS'), who
nominated MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late Munsayac
Couple's intestate estate.
"MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator
pursuant to respondent Judge's Order dated March 22, 2000, replacing
Lawyer Ceasar G. Oracion as special administrator of the said intestate
estate, pursuant to the Order dated April 27, 1998.
"Despite the approved 60-day suspension of the proceedings to
enable the parties to discuss an amicable settlement, the protracted
exchange of pleadings between the opposing siblings in Special
Proceeding Case No. 704-R was of no help in the immediate settlement
of the intestate estate of the late Munsayac Couple.
"Even the efforts of the petitioners to inhibit respondent Judge
further complicated the intestate proceedings. Thus, there was the
Request for Inhibition dated September 28, 1999, which was filed by
DE VILLA and SUNGA. Barely a week after the aforesaid Request for
Inhibition was filed and before respondent Judge could act on it,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
which was received by this Court on October 4, 1999, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP NO . 55193 which has for its petitioners and respondents the
same respective parties involved in the present petition before [u]s,
and questions, among others, respondent Judge's Order in open court
dated September 29, 1999 directing/ordering DE VILLA to produce by
2:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the same date certain bank time deposit
certificates/documents; and the order of arrest of DE VILLA by about
4:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the same date, for failure to produce the
said bank certificates/documents. Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. SP
NO . 55193, petitioners filed an administrative case dated July 11, 2000
before the Supreme Court, docketed as OCA IPI NO. 00-989-RTJ, which
not only prayed for respondent Judge's suspension but also his
permanent removal from office on grounds of grave misconduct and
serious inefficiency.

"Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated April 24, 2000 which was
filed by the administrator of the intestate estate, respondent Judge
issued the Order dated May 4, 2000, which underscored the order to
surrender, under pain of contempt, (a) the amount of the bank
investment discovered in the names of the late VICENTA, DE VILLA and
SUNGA made with the United Coconut Planter's Bank, Baguio City
('UCPB') under Investment Confirmation No. 0666 worth
P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not disclosed by the
petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the surrender of all
the pieces of jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and
SUNGA, subject of the 'freeze order' with the China Banking
Corporation.

"The Court a quo substantially reiterated the import of the Order

dated May 4, 2000, by issuing the Order dated May 24, 2000 and, on
the account of petitioners' failure to faithfully comply therewith, issued
the Order dated June 22, 2000, which contained the following decretal
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 portion —
'WHEREFORE, for their failure to comply with the Order of
this Court dated May 24, 2000, the petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily
Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are hereby ordered ARRESTED in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 71, of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, until their compliance to immediately surrender in
custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the
amount of P13,506,343.33 plus the legal interest of 12% per
annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully
complied with or a total amount of P23,802,788.00 more or less,
as of May, 2000.
'The petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy
Munsayac are likewise ORDERED to surrender in custodia legis to
this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of
P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest of 12%
per annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully
complied with or a total amount of P32,267,868.00, more or less,
as of May 2000, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Order. CcSEIH

'SO ORDERED.'
and the Order dated August 23, 2000, the pertinent portion of
which reads —
'The order for the petitioners to surrender the amounts
stated in this Court's order dated June 22, 2000 shall stand and
the order for the petitioners' arrest shall not be lifted until their
full and faithful compliance with the order to place the said
money in the legal custody of either the special administrator or
this Court. The motion for reconsideration on the matter of
petitioners' standing order of arrest is therefore DENIED.
'SO ORDERED.'

were issued by respondent Judge and are now both subject of this
present petition . . .." 7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In nullifying the arrest order issued by Judge Reyes, the CA ruled that he
had summarily ordered the arrest of petitioners without any written charge
filed against them or any hearing conducted thereon. According to the
appellate court, "there is nothing in Rule 71 which explicitly allows that the
requirements of filing a written charge and hearing in indirect contempt cases
may be dispensed with." 8 It thus set aside the Order of Arrest issued by
respondent judge.
Ruling on the request for inhibition filed by petitioners, the CA, however,
held that there was no convincing proof that the demeanor of the trial judge
had put him under suspicion, especially in the light of their clear display of
contumacious behavior toward the court. 9 It further held that their request for
inhibition was unacceptable, because they had come to the court with "unclean
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 hands." 10

Hence, this Petition. 11

The Issue
In their Memorandum, 12 petitioners submit this sole issue for our
consideration:
"With due respect, the Respondent Court of Appeals erred as a
matter of law in not ordering the inhibition of the respondent presiding
judge who, as shown in all his actuations and orders, [has]
demonstrated vindictiveness, arbitrariness, prejudice and bias against
petitioners and partiality in favor of private respondents thereby
denying petitioners' fundamental right to be entitled to an impartial
tribunal." 13

The Court's Ruling

The Petition for inhibition has no merit, but the trial judge must lift the
freeze order and cause the return of property or money still in custodia legis.
Sole Issue:
Inhibition
Before delving into the issue of inhibition, we note that the CA Decision
nullified and set aside the Order of Arrest issued by Judge Reyes against
petitioners. Consequently, the propriety of the Order was no longer raised in
this Petition. Neither was it raised by respondents.
In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — as distinguished from
an ordinary appeal of a criminal case in which the whole case is opened for
review — the appeal is limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. 14 Since
respondents did not contest the Decision of the CA, no affirmative relief can be
sought by or given to them. 15 Thus, not all the issues raised before the
appellate court need to be considered by this Court. The sole issue in the
present Petition is the question of inhibition of respondent judge.

We emphasize at the outset that the main case from which this Petition
arose has already been decided by the CA. The Decision is now final and
executory. 16 Already terminated in that main case was Special Proceedings No.
704-R, which had given rise to a number of incidents and petitions including the
herein matter. In CA-GR SP No. 64025, the CA found that Judge Reyes had
gravely abused his discretion when he disallowed the Extrajudicial Partition 17
executed by the heirs of the Munsayac spouses. Thus, the appellate court
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil
action is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated
March 1, 2001 and March 21, 2001 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one ENTERED approving the Extrajudicial Partition
between the Heirs of the Spouses Gelacio J. Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta
F. Munsayac, and terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R pending
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 before respondent Court[.] The parties are hereby ENJOINED to abide
by the same." 18

Petitioners, however, argue that since there are still matters pending
before the trial judge, such as the withdrawal/release of money deposited in
custodia legis and the lifting of a freeze order on certain jewelry, his inhibition
is still needed. 19
We disagree. After the CA terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, we
see no more reason why the inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue.
The Petition therefor has already become moot and academic in view of the
termination of the main case. How can he be inhibited from a case that has
already been decided with finality?

It should be clear that the CA Decision 20 terminating Special Proceedings

No. 704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the
parties was the "final, complete and absolute settlement of their respective
shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and
Vicenta Munsayac." 21 As such, any and all incidents relating to the special
proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated.

When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of
the China Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of
petitioners 22 and to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, 23 he did so as
the presiding judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings
No. 704-R. Now that the case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither
he nor his court has any more right to hold the properties that were the subject
of his Orders in the special proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any
property previously deposited with the court should be effected. The judge had
no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property deposited
should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to
the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the long-standing
principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction.
24 However, the determination of whether a property should be included in the
inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only
provisional — not conclusive — in character and subject to the final decision in
a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. 25
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an advance made
or allegedly made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined
by the court that has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings; and that the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
and on the heirs. 26
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled,
corollary principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title
or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the
question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its
assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired. 27
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 These principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the
main proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation
must come to an end. 28
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the
properties deposited with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the
progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now.
Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of
the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already
entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and
absolute settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done
is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property
originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.

In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to

immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order the release of any
property deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure
for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding,
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. 29 To achieve
that end and to expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a
directive to the trial judge to lift the freeze order and release the property
deposited with the court becomes indispensable. 30

WHEREFORE, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Antonio C. Reyes is

hereby DENIED for being moot and academic. However, he is DIRECTED to
immediately lift any order he made on properties relative to Special
Proceedings No. 704-R. He is further ORDERED to cause the return of any
amount or property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis. No
pronouncement as to costs. acCDSH

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 10–33.
2. Annex "A" of the Petition; rollo, pp. 34–40. Penned by Justice Martin S.
Villarama Jr. and concurred in by justices Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. (Division
chairman) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (member).
3. Annex "B" of the Petition; rollo, pp. 42–44.
4. CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 39.
5. CA rollo, pp. 298–309.
6. Id., pp. 402–411.

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 7. CA Decision, pp. 2–4; rollo, pp. 35–37. Citations omitted.
8. CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 39.
9. CA Resolution dated June 21, 2001, p. 2; rollo, p. 43.

10. Id., pp. 3 & 44.

11. The case was deemed submitted for decision on July 10, 2002, upon this
Court's receipt of petitioners' "Supplemental to Manifestation/Motion for
Reconsideration," which was signed by Atty. Ismael M. Estella. Earlier or on
March 20, 2002, this Court received petitioners' Memorandum signed by the
same counsel. Private respondents' Memorandum, signed by Attys. Reynaldo
U. Agranzamendez and Miguel B. Liceralde was filed with this Court on April
15, 2002.
12 Rollo , pp. 107–127.
13. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 118. Original in upper case.
14. Manalili v. CA, 345 Phil. 632, October 9, 1997.
15. Rayandayan v. CA , 373 Phil. 27, September 14, 1999; China Banking
Corporation v. NLRC, 329 Phil. 608, August 22, 1996.
16. See Entry of Judgment dated June 17, 2002 in CA-GR SP No. 64025; Annex
"A" of petitioners' "Supplemental to Manifestation/Motion for
Reconsideration"; rollo, p. 160.

17. Records, Vol. III, pp. 834–837.

18. CA Decision dated November 29, 2001, p. 12; rollo, p. 99.
19. Petitioners' "Supplemental to Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration," p.
2; id ., p. 158.
20. Dated November 29, 2001; records, Vol. III, pp. 883-895; penned by Justice
Ramon A. Barcelona (Division chairman) and concurred in by Justices
Bernardo P. Abesamis and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (members).

21. CA Decision dated November 29, 2001, pp. 4-5; id ., pp. 886-887.
22. Order dated March 24, 1999, records, Vol. I, p. 142.
23. Order dated May 4, 2000, records, Vol. II, pp. 1037-1045; Order dated May
24, 2000, id ., pp. 1103-1104.
24. Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes v. Reyes, 345 SCRA 541, November 22, 2000; Lim
v. CA, 380 Phil. 60, January 24, 2000.
25. Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes v. Reyes, supra; Sanchez v. CA, 345 Phil. 155,
September 29, 1997; Valera v. Inserto, 149 SCRA 533, May 7, 1987.
26. Natcher v. CA, 418 Phil. 669, October 2, 2001.
27. Ibid.; Coca v. Borromeo , 81 SCRA 278, January 31, 1978.
28. Province of Camarines Norte v. Province of Quezon, 419 Phil. 372, October
11, 2001; Flores v. CA, 328 Phil. 992, July 29, 1996.

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 29. San Luis v. CA, 417 Phil. 598, September 13, 2001; Ching v. CA, 387 Phil.
28, April 27, 2000; De los Reyes v. CA , 372 Phil. 522, September 3, 1999.

30. De los Reyes v. CA, supra; Golangco v. CA, 347 Phil. 771, December 22,
1997; Heirs of Gabriel Almoradi v. CA, 229 SCRA 15, January 4, 1994.

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