ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No.

148560, November 19, 2001

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of
the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of
mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the
alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial
challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge.

Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance
since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.

Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.

Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one
to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more
imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress ‘decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE GR No. 203335 February 11, 2014

FACTS

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed
malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring
“presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyber libel affected the requirement of “actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis
for conviction of libel.

RULING

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of
actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a
barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law,
mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the author of a defamatory statement
where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law)
from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even
if it was in fact true.

Orceo VS COMELEC GR 190779, March 26, 2010

Petition:

Certiorari questioning the validity of Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it provides that the term “firearm” includes

airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations, which results in their coverage by the gun ban during the election period this year.

Petitioner: Atty. Reynante B. Orceo

Respondent: COMELEC

Ponencia: J. Peralta

DOCTRINE: ART II Section 12 Family Life; Mother; Unborn

FACTS:

Petitioner prays that the Court render a decision as follows:

(1) Annulling Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it includes airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations within the meaning of “firearm,” and declaring the Resolution as
invalid;

(2) ordering the COMELEC to desist from further implementing Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are concerned;

(3) ordering the COMELEC to amend Resolution No. 8714 by removing airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations within the meaning of “firearm”; and

(4) ordering the COMELEC to issue a Resolution directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police and other law enforcement agencies
deputized by the COMELEC to desist from further enforcing Resolution No.8714 insofar as airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are concerned.
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members. Families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the
COMELEC. Thus, petitioner contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies in these constitutional provisions:

(1) Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x

(2) Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino familyas the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

(3) Art. II, Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to x x x sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.

COMELEC’s response: We adhere to the aforementioned state policies, but even constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged to some extent
to serve appropriate and important interests.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.

PROVISIONS:

Resolution No. 8714 is entitled Rules and Regulations on the:(1) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting of Firearms or other Deadly Weapons; and (2) Employment,
Availment or Engagement of the Services of Security Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election Period for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. It
contains the implementing rules and regulations of Sec. 32 (Who May Bear Firearms) and Section 33 (Security Personnel and Bodyguards) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7166, entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.

RULING+RATIO:

NO. The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft guns and airguns in the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 for
purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The COMELEC’s intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and their resultant coverage by the
election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able
to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun,
which is sought to be averted. Ultimately, the objective is to ensure the holding of free. However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are excluded
from the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714.

DISPOSITION:

1. PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion of replicas and imitations of airsoft guns from the term “firearm” is concerned. Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns
and airguns are hereby declared excluded from the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714.2. The petition is DISMISSED in regard to the exclusion of airsoft guns from
the term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft guns and airguns are covered by the gun ban during the election period.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if
not sold, after the expiration of 30 days. The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy. When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he
will pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.

Corpuz argued as follows:

a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.

b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by
Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as
evidence)?

Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.

Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed
to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?

No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion
of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

3. The name of the offended party; and

4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the
prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.

What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?

Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even
be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would
be tantamount to a demand.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was tantamount to a demand.

May a sole witness be considered credible?

Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.

The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the
value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.

CS Garment, Inc. v CIR, G.R. No. 182399, March 12, 2014

I. The Tax Amnesty Law intended the immediate enjoyment of the immunities and privileges after the requirements are fulfilled by the taxpayer.

The OSG has already confirmed26 to this Court that CS Garment has complied with all of the documentary requirements of the law. Consequently, and contrary to
the assertion of the OSG, no further assessment by the BIR is necessary. CS Garment is now entitled to invoke the immunities and privileges under Section 6 of the
law.

Similarly, we reject the contention of OSG that the BIR was given a one-year period to contest the correctness of the SALN filed by CS Garment, thus making
petitioner’s motion premature. Neither the 2007 Tax Amnesty Law nor Department of Finance (DOF) Order No. 29-07 (Tax Amnesty Law IRR) imposes a waiting
period of one year before the applicant can enjoy the benefits of the Tax Amnesty Law. It can be surmised from the cited provisions that the law intended the
immediate enjoyment of the immunities and privileges of tax amnesty upon fulfilment of the requirements. Further, a reading of Sections 4 and 6 of the 2007 Tax
Amnesty Law shows that Congress has adopted a “no questions asked” policy, so long as all the requirements of the law and the rules are satisfied. The one-year
period referred to in the law should thus be considered only as a prescriptive period within which third parties, meaning “parties other than the BIR or its agents,” can
question the SALN – not as a waiting period during which the BIR may contest the SALN and the taxpayer prevented from enjoying the immunities and privileges
under the law.

This clarification, however, does not mean that the amnesty taxpayers would go scot-free in case they substantially understate the amounts of their net worth in their
SALN. The 2007 Tax Amnesty Law imposes a resolutory condition insofar as the enjoyment of immunities and privileges under the law is concerned. Pursuant to
Section 4 of the law, third parties may initiate proceedings contesting the declared amount of net worth of the amnesty taxpayer within one year following the date of
the filing of the tax amnesty return and the SALN. Section 6 then states that “All these immunities and privileges shall not apply x x x where the amount of networth
as of December 31, 2005 is proven to be understated to the extent of thirty percent (30%) or more, in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 hereof.”

Accordingly, Section 10 provides that amnesty taxpayers who willfully understate their net worth shall be (a) liable for perjury under the Revised Penal Code; and (b)
subject to immediate tax fraud investigation in order to collect all taxes due and to criminally prosecute those found to have willfully evaded lawful taxes due.

II. Only a final and executory decision will preclude the availment of the benefits of the Tax Amnesty Law.

We cull from the aforementioned provisions that neither the law nor the implementing rules state that a court ruling that has not attained finality would preclude the
availment of the benefits of the Tax Amnesty Law.

Visayas Community Medical Center vs Yballe Case Digest: GR 196156 Jan 15, 2014

Facts:

The NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCH (now VCMC). NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a local affiliate whose union leaders
proceeded to strike despite the fact that it is not a legitimate labor organization. The respondents in this case are staff nurses and midwives of MCCH who actively
joined and were believed to have took part in committing illegal acts during the strike. Consequently, MCCH terminated the union leaders of NAMA-MCCH-NFL as
well as the respondents. The CA, however, found that respondents cannot be considered to have committed illegal acts since their participation was limited to the
wearing of arm bands.

Issue 1: W/N the dismissal of the respondents is valid

Held:

No. Article 263 (a)(par 3) provides that any union officer who knowingly participated in an illegal strike and any union officer or union member who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Here, the respondents merely participated in the
illegal strike but did not commit any of the illegal acts. Hence, their termination is not valid.

Issue 2: W/N the respondents are entitled to backwages

No. The principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor” remains as the basic factor in determining the award of backwages. If there is no work performed by
the employee there can be no wage or pay unless the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise
illegally prevented from working. For this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal. Since the strike in this case was illegal, the respondents cannot be
awarded with backwages.

Issue 3: W/N the respondents are entitled to reinstatement

No. Considering that strained relations ensued, the grant of separation pay to respondents is the alternative in lieu of reinstatement.

Jurisprudence states that the alternative relief for union members who were dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike is the payment of separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because
of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employer’s interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the
best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers’ continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have
supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer and employee. ##

DAYAO V. COMELEC

Antonio D. Dayao, Rolando P. Ramirez, Adelio R. Capco (GR 193643), and Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. (FPII) (GR 193704),

PETITIONERS, Versus

COMELEC and LPGMA,

RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

- LPGMA (LPG Marketers Association, Inc.) filed a petition for registration as a party list organization for the purpose of participating in the May 10, 2010 elections.
(Party-List System Act, RA 7941)

- COMELEC approved LPGMA’s petition on January 15, 2010.

- Petitioners filed a complaint with COMELEC to cancel LPGMA’s registration on grounds that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of the society
because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and independent re-fillers of
LPG that control 45% of the national LPG market and have significant ownership interests in various LPG refilling plants.

- LPGMA countered that (1) Sec. 5(2), Art. VI of the 1987 constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or
underrepresented sector of the society; (2) that the grounds cited are not mentioned in Sec. 6 of RA 7941; and (3) petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost
chance to oppose the petition for registration.

- COMELEC dismissed the complaint on August 5, 2010 for two reasons: (1) ground for cancellation cited by petitioners is not found in Sec. 6 of RA 7941; and (2)
complaint is a belated opposition to LPGMA’s registration which was approved with finality on January 5, 2010. Subsequent Motion for reconsideration for the
complaint on September 6, 2010 was also dismissed.

- Petitioners implored the Court to determine the correctness of COMELEC’s resolutions.

- On March 17, 2011, the court received from the Office of the Solicitor General a Manifestation and Motion to remand since the COMELEC failed to resolve the
factual issue on the qualifications of LPGMA as a registered party-list organization and have committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for
cancellation of LPGMA’s accreditation.

- COMELEC’s reasons, as stated above, if not incorrect are contestable: (1) ground for cancellation cited by petitioners are valid as per Par. 5 of Sec. 6 of 7941
includes Sec. 2 of RA 7941 “the party -list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized, and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties to become members of the House of Representatives.” ; and (2) There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation. “An
opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for cancellation.”

-On a resolution dated December 13, 2012, COMELEC conducted an automatic review for the qualifications of party-list groups. LPGMA was found compliant with
the guidelines set by law and jurisprudence and its accreditation retained for purposes of the 2013 party-list elections.

- Petitions were dismissed as the issues and all other relevant questions regarding LPGMA’s qualifications are passed upon by the COMELEC in its resolution dated
December 13, 2012.

People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)

Facts: At around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a
drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Jaime Agbanlog. Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the
companions of his son. As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking.
The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants
immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school. The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robber
Agbanlog and his companions were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the hospital for medical treatment. However,
Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital for wounds sustained which the grenade explosion inflicted. Robert’s companions sustained shrapnel injuries. The
appellants were arrested the following day but denied any participation in the incident, claimed they were elsewhere when the incident occurred and that they had no
animosity towards the victims whatsoever. After trial, the court a quo convicted appellants of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder for having
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and with the use of an explosive.

Issue: Whether or not the use of explosive qualifies the crime to murder? Whether or not appellants conspired to kill the victims?

Held: Yes, the killing by means of explosives qualifies the crime to murder. The information alleges that both treachery and the “use of explosive attended the crime.
Since both circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court held that when the killing is perpetrated
with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudencesupport this view but also, since
the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then
be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance. No, there was no conspiracy. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of
throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist
him. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime
itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.

GONZALES V. COMELEC GR. No. 28196 November 8, 1967

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was
provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned
by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who
would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.

II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

HELD:

I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the
people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as
Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.

II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had
been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does
not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent
or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.

Carandang v. Santiago G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled
Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of
Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the person of Cesar Carandang,
petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for
libel or slander and assault and battery under American law. But respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was
inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but
frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal
action for frustrated homicide.

HELD:

Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no
specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been
used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that
the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should
be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent G. R. No. 189755July 04, 2012Sereno, J.

FACTS

In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to
settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already
sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September
1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes
died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over the parcel of land.
The latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of
Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility
or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space

ISSUE

Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” as defined in P.D. 1216.

RULING: Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.” The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to
determine whether the area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities.
Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include – or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle,
the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and
amenities” should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without
which, survival in the community would be impossible.

CIR VS. AMERICAN EXPRESS GR NO 152609 June 29, 2005

Facts:

Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a unit of AMEX-Hongkong Branch and facilitating the collections
of AMEX-HK receivables from card members situated in the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines.
It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B of the 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax
attributable to the purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal
revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.”

In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in
acceptable foreign currency which is remitted inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated xxx”

Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the claimant as they partake of the nature of tax exemption.

CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA affirmed this decision and further held that respondent’s
services were “services other than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines” and paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of BSP.

Issue:

W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund

Held:

Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. Section 102B particularly provides for the services or
transactions subject to 0% rate:

(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the
services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP;

(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels and other service establishments, the consideration for
which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP

Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for
persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are zero-rated.
Respondent renders service falling under the category of zero rating.

As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country
where they are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated, while imports are taxed.

In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the utilization of consumption of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation
is done in the Philippines, the consumption is not. The services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to its foreign client the drafts and bulls it has
gathered from service establishments here, and are therefore, services also consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination principle, such service is subject to
10% VAT.

However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0% VAT rate for services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the following requirements for exemption, and thus
should be zero-rated:

(1) Service be performed in the Philippines

(2) The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax Code

(3) It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.

Romualdez vs Marcelo G.R. Nos. 166510-33 July 28, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7
of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus
there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of
prescription.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter
exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation;
that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in
1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need
not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both
RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal
Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.

Issues:

(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity?

(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?

Held:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7
of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus
there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of
prescription.

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS. CIR GR. No. 147749 June 22, 2006
Statutory Construction – Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) was assessed a 3% tax on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products – this is pursuant to Section 168
of the 1987 Tax Code. Said corn and edible oil products were sold to United Coconut Chemicals (UNICHEM) who in turn exports these products and sell them
abroad.

SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same Section of the 1987 Tax Code which provides in part:

xxx Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and
desiccated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of
the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products: xxx (underscore added by uberdigests)

SPMC’s interpretation of the law is as follows:

That there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products;

But that said tax exempts manufacturers who export these edible oil products;

That SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil products to UNICHEM, its purchaser, who then exports the oil products.

ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC’s interpretation is correct.

HELD: No. The legal maxim “Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius” applies. Nowhere in the law was “corn oil” included in the enumeration of tax exempt exported
products. Nor did it mention to exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil products nevertheless sells said product to a purchaser who
does export. Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly
mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is
intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Coconut Oil Refiners Association vs Torres G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005

Facts: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit the Executive Branch, through the public respondents Ruben Torres in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), from allowing, and the private respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic
Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare the following issuances as unconstitutional, illegal, and void:

1. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80,[1] dated April 3, 1993, regarding the CSEZ.

2. Executive Order No. 97-A, dated June 19, 1993, pertaining to the SSEZ.

3. Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034,[2] dated May 18, 1993, pertaining to the CSEZ.

Petitioners contend that the aforecited issuances are unconstitutional and void as they constitute executive lawmaking, and that they are contrary to Republic Act No.
7227[3] and in violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III (equal protection clause), Section 19, Article XII (prohibition of unfair competition and
combinations in restraint of trade), and Section 12, Article XII (preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods).

Issue: Whether the issuances are unconstitutional for supposedly violating the equal protection clause

Held: No.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. First, contrary to petitioners’ claim, substantial
distinctions lie between the establishments inside and outside the zone, justifying the difference in their treatment. In Tiu v. Court of Appeals, the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 97-A was challenged for being violative of the equal protection clause. In that case, petitioners claimed that Executive Order No. 97-A was
discriminatory in confining the application of Republic Act No. 7227 within a secured area of the SSEZ, to the exclusion of those outside but are, nevertheless, still
within the economic zone.

Upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A, this Court therein found substantial differences between the retailers inside and outside the secured
area, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification:

Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called “secured area” and
the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other hand,
definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities
outside the “secured area” are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the
benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. Additionally, as
the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the “secured area,” which is already fenced off, to prevent “fraudulent
importation of merchandise” or smuggling.

It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between
territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always
avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.

The Court in Tiu found real and substantial distinctions between residents within the secured area and those living within the economic zone but outside the fenced-
off area. Similarly, real and substantial differences exist between the establishments herein involved. A significant distinction between the two groups is that
enterprises outside the zones maintain their businesses within Philippine customs territory, while private respondents and the other duly-registered zone enterprises
operate within the so-called “separate customs territory.” To grant the same tax incentives given to enterprises within the zones to businesses operating outside the
zones, as petitioners insist, would clearly defeat the statute’s intent to carve a territory out of the military reservations in Subic Bay where free flow of goods and
capital is maintained.

The classification is germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 7227. As held in Tiu, the real concern of Republic Act No. 7227 is to convert the lands formerly
occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives
to the establishments within the zone to attract and encourage foreign and local investors. This is the very rationale behind Republic Act No. 7227 and other similar
special economic zone laws which grant a complete package of tax incentives and other benefits.

The classification, moreover, is not limited to the existing conditions when the law was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, inasmuch as the law envisioned
the former military reservation to ultimately develop into a self-sustaining investment center.
And, lastly, the classification applies equally to all retailers found within the “secured area.” As ruled in Tiu, the individuals and businesses within the “secured area,”
being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. They are all similarly treated, both in
privileges granted and in obligations required.

With all the four requisites for a reasonable classification present, there is no ground to invalidate Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative of the equal protection
clause.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 are hereby
declared NULL and VOID and are accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void
provisions. All portions of Executive Order No. 97-A are valid and effective, except the second sentences in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order, which
are hereby declared INVALID.

COA v. Province of Cebu

G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001;

FACTS:

In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the
teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship
grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and
scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local
government unit concerned.

HELD:

Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under the doctrine of necessary implication,
the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes.

Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related
benefits of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. With respect, however, to
college scholarship grants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds
of the SEF may be appropriated.

GUTIERREZ VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATVES

G.R. No. 193459 : February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D.
LIM, FELIPE PESTA, EVELYN PESTA, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY
JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP);
ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.

FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,Respondent-Intervenor.

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

FACTS:

For resolution is petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration.

To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee
"separately, one after the other “is to dismantle her own interpretation of Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing of the impeachment
complaint. Petitioners Motion concedes that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the Houses initial action on the
complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere
filing of an impeachment complaint.

Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the
complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion in
Francisco.

In Justice Azcunas opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that
the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of the House. Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that were
successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committees finding of sufficiency of substance
or upon the Houses affirmance or overturning of the Committees finding, which was clearly referred to as the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the
House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant matters." Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" did not refer to the aspects of filing
and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.

The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want to stretch and those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of
which could disrupt the provisions congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioners imputation that the Courts Decision presents a sharp
deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow.

Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the
beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion.

Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be
commenced against the same official more than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of the beginning." To
immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.
In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court closely applied Francisco on what comprises or completes the
initiation phase. Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco. Petitioner must come to terms with her denial
of the exact terms of Francisco.

Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members of the House.

ISSUE: Whether the period of one year to file impeachment complaint is mandatory.

HELD: The decision is sustained

POLITICAL LAW impeachment

The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-
year bar, however, is to commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for
grave abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the Houses power or function to refer a complaint.

Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the
appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry
of the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the
influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression. She particularly cites
Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulos concerns on the amount of time spent if "multiple impeachment charges "are allowed. She fails, however, to establish
whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than one complaint or charge.

In sum, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present case, with Francisco as the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to
see the other half of that light, however.

The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of
government on how to do so when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings
and cause the House of Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods" She insists that the Committee, after publishing the Impeachment Rules, would
still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period within which to finish its business.

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it
asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding the
inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality
towards the concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision.

Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is
beyond the Courts control. Again, impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject only to the constitutionally
imposed limits. And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which would effectively carry out
its constitutional mandate.

DENIED FOR BEING BEREFT OF MERIT.

CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO GR NO. 118127 APRIL 12 2005

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from
operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such
nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City
reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to
promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity,
not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the
means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different from sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The Supreme Court Said that it is baseless and insupportable.

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. Ordinances placing
restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid. The
Ordinance however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an
unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the
guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid