CASE FACTS
1. Topic: Dual Citizenship/ Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and
Dual Allegiance private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were
JAPSON VS. COMELEC candidates for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
Ø  Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before
the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his
Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino,
having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was
then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter
Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and
Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ø  Ty eventually migrated to the United States of
America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty
had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years.
When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28
March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he
was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14
May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø  While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as
required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
ISSUES RULINGS
Whether or not the defendant Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency
has complied with the requirements for elective position.
residency requirement for Ø  It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the
elective positions. manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would
reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence
of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions.
Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for
the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor
does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No.
9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is
only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law
to allow for dual citizenship.
Ø  There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and
never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14
May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a
resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously
ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to
other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least
nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not
necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it
1991
Ø  Inspite of  having reacquisition in his Philippine
citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA,
the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006
lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ø  Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport
himself as an American citizen as proven by his
travel records. He had also failed to renounce his
foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
Ø  Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the
COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of the
latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ø  Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino
who went to the USA to work and subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed,
however, that prior to filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
on 28 March 2007, he already performed the
following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-
born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate
General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an
application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA;
does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed
intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø  Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty
arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year
residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty
candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v.
COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an elective
post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable
certainty that he has effected a change of residence for
election law purposes for the period required by law. As this
Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by
substantial evidence that he had established
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to
the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a
candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he
garnered the most number of votes.
Ø  To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must
clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect
and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his
claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the
instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss
(3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in
his application that his residence in the Philippines
was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application
was approved and he was issued on 26 October
2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty
personally secured and signed his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General
Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was
at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty
was registered as a voter in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4
January 2007 again stating therein his address
as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19
March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship.
Ø  He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his American citizenship, and he had
been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year
prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty
sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No.
07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was
declared Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
Ø  The COMELEC First Division found that Ty
complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5
 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement
for holding an elective public office, and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other
than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Ø   Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of
Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of
the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March
19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225.
Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying
public office nor is in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the
armed forces in the country of which he was
naturalized citizen
Ø  Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in
stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year
before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned
that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the]
Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen
in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that
he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one
(1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007
as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ø  The petition was denied and COMELEC was in
favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable
resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to
file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the
COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion
and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
Ø  Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside
the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28
September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division
and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution
denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate
of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly
elected Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø  Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition.
According to Ty, the COMELEC already found
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident
of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very
same pieces of evidence without violating the well-
entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court.
Ø  The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet
the one-year residency requirement set by law to
qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the
14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no
merit in the Petition at bar.
Ø  . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his Certificate of
 Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively
renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely
his Philippine citizenship.

Ø  The  Court of Appeals set aside the appealed

orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals
and annulled the election of the respondent as
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the
ground that respondent's immigration to the United
States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being
a green card holder, which was proof that he was a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States, and in the absence of any waiver of his
status as such before he ran for election on January
18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified
under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
2. JUAN DOMINO v. DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1.Whether or not the 1.The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art.
COMELEC, GR No. 134015, position of Representative of the Lone Legislative judgment of the IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny
1999-07-19 District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in Metropolitan Trial Court of due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the
item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in Quezon City declaring exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence
the constituency where he seeks to be elected for... petitioner as resident of of the COMELEC to determine whether false...
one (1) year and two (2) months immediately Sarangani and not of representation as to material facts was made in the
preceding the election. Quezon City is final, certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the
conclusive and binding residence of the candidate.
private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo... filed with
upon the whole world,
the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
including the Commission
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy City in the exclusion proceedings... does not preclude the
on Elections
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO... is not a
resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had
complied with the one-year residence requirement
and that he has been residing in Sarangani since
3.Whether or not respondent
January 1997.
the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution
declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate... for
lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the... cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy... his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio
St., Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This... negates all
his protestations that he established residence at
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22,
1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No.
4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on
May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1)
year residency requirement provided for candidates
for Member of... the House of Representatives
On... the day of the election, the COMELEC issued
Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046,
ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted
but to suspend the proclamation if winning,
considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as
candidate had not yet become... final and
executory.
2.Whether or not petitioner
herein has resided in the
subject congressional
district for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding
the May 11, 1998 elections
COMELEC has jurisdiction
over the petition a quo for
the disqualification of
petitioner.
COMELEC, in the determination of
DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue
of compliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the
list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual
findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the
exclusion proceedings... not conclusive upon the COMELEC.
However,... a decision in an exclusion or inclusion
proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire
the nature of res judicata.
it does not operate as a... bar to any future action that a
party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the
proceeding.
Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be
conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent
proceedings on his right to... be registered as a voter in any
other election.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its
18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani
It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an
exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a
resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower
court over exclusion... cases is limited only to determining the
right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that
the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in
which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's
disqualification.
The result of the election... shows that DOMINO
garnered the highest number of votes over his
opponents
DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution... which was denied by the COMELEC en
banc
The trial court has no power... to order the change or
transfer of registration from one place of residence to another
for it is the function of the election Registration Board
2. the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the
qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the
same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that... place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when
once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) a man can have but one... residence or domicile at a
time.
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon,
Ilocos Sur... and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old
Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned
his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new
"domicile" of choice at the Province of
Sarangani.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona... fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical
presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a
domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile.
No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is
absent. Intention to... acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of
domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without
intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997,
does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease
contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in
Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's... original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent
residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence
in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City.
it... give rise to a strong presumption of residence...
especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former
barangay.

3. the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus

 Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction
continues even after election, if for any reason no final
judgment of... disqualification is rendered before the
election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted
for and receives the highest number of votes[38] and
provided further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or has taken his oath of... office.
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress as
provided under Section 17 of Article VI of... the Constitution
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives.
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an
election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate.[41] A candidate must be proclaimed and
must have taken his oath of office before he can be
considered a member of the House... of Representatives.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as
Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the
House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not
the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over... the issue
of his ineligibility as a candidate.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED

G.R. Nos. 163619-20 Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position 1. Whether Dumpit- The Ruling of the COMELEC
November 17, 2005 of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union Michelena’s motion for
during the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and reconsideration was filed on In a Resolution issued on 9 March 2004, the COMELEC
IN THE MATTER OF THE Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. time; Second Division ruled, as follows:
PETITION FOR De Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera,
DISQUALIFICATION OF Salvador Carrera and Domingo Carrera ("Boado, et 2. Whether Dumpit-Michelena WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions are
TESS DUMPIT- al.") sought Dumpit-Michelena’s disqualification and was denied due process of hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby adjudged to be a
MICHELENA, TESS the denial or cancellation of her certificate of law; and non-resident of Brgy. San Julian West, Agoo, La Union for
DUMPIT-MICHELENA, P candidacy on the ground of material purposes of the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
etitioner, misrepresentation under Sections 746 and 3. Whether Dumpit-Michelena elections. Accordingly, her Certificate of Candidacy is hereby
vs. 787 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 ("Omnibus Election satisfied the residency CANCELLED on the ground of material misrepresentation
CARLOS BOADO, Code"). requirement under the Local under Sections 78 and 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, as
FERNANDO CALONGE, Government Code of 1991. amended, in relation to Comelec Resolution No. 6452.
SALVADOR CARRERA, Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the
BENITO CARRERA, daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. SO ORDERED.8
DOMINGO CARRERA, ("Congressman Dumpit") of the Second District of
and ROGELIO DE La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC Second Division held that Boado, et al.
VERA, Respondents. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a established by convincing evidence that Dumpit-Michelena is
resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La not a bona fide resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred The COMELEC Second Division found that among the
------------x her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, neighbors of Dumpit-Michelena who executed affidavits in her
La Union on 24 October 2003. Her presence in San favor, only one is a resident of San Julian West. The others
IN THE MATTER OF THE Julian West, Agoo, La Union was noticed only after are from other barangays of Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC
PETITION TO DENY she filed her certificate of candidacy. Boado, et al. Second Division noted that several affiants who declared that
DUE COURSE OR TO presented, among other things, a joint affidavit of Dumpit-Michelena resides in San Julian West later retracted
CANCEL CERTIFICATE all barangay officials of San Julian West to prove their statements on the ground that they did not read the
OF CANDIDACY FOR that Dumpit-Michelena is not a resident of contents of the documents when they signed the affidavits.
MAYOR, TESS DUMPIT- the barangay.
MICHELENA, Petitioner, Dumpit-Michelena moved for the reconsideration of the
vs. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.
CARLOS BOADO, acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when
FERNANDO CALONGE, she purchased from her father, Congressman In a Resolution issued on 7 May 2004, the COMELEC En Banc
SALVADOR CARRERA, Dumpit, a residential lot on 19 April 2003. She even denied Dumpit-Michelena’s motion for reconsideration. The
BENITO CARRERA, designated one Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of COMELEC En Banc ruled that the motion for reconsideration
DOMINGO CARRERA, her residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented was filed three days after the last day of the prescribed
and ROGELIO DE the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in period for filing the motion.
VERA, Respondents. San Julian West to prove that she actually resides in
the area.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

On Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration

We rule that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse

of discretion in denying Dumpit-Michelena’s motion for
reconsideration for late filing.

Resolution No. 64529 provides:

SECTION 8. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to

reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a division
shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the
execution for implementation of the decision, resolution,
order and ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the

Clerk of the Commission shall notify the Presiding
Commissioner. The latter shall, within two (2) days
thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en banc.
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the motion for
reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc
within three (3) days from the certification thereof.

In this case, the Resolution cancelling Dumpit-Michelena’s

Certificate of Candidacy was promulgated in open court on 9
March 2004. Dumpit-Michelena’s counsel was present during
the promulgation. Following Section 8 of Resolution No. 6452,
Dumpit-Michelena had until 12 March 2004 within which to
file her motion for reconsideration. However, while Dumpit-
Michelena claims to be familiar with Resolution No. 6452, she
filed her motion for reconsideration on 15 March 2004. This is
because during the promulgation of the cases on 9 March
2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order10 which
states:

On call of these cases today for promulgation, counsels for

the respondent appeared. There was no appearance for the
petitioners. Counsel manifested that they filed a
manifestation and motion and an urgent motion holding in
abeyance the promulgation of the resolution of these cases.
The motions to hold in abeyance the promulgation is hereby
denied. However, the respondent may file a motion for
reconsideration within five (5) days from receipt of the
decision if the decision is adverse to their client. (Emphasis
supplied)

Apparently, the COMELEC committed an oversight in

declaring that Dumpit-Michelena had five days within which
to file her motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC
overlooked Resolution No. 6452. For her part, Dumpit-
Michelena only followed the period provided in the Order. She
filed her motion for reconsideration on 15 March 2004 since
14 March 2004 fell on a Sunday. This Court can hardly fault
her for following the COMELEC Order.

On Denial of Due Process

Dumpit-Michelena asserts that she was denied due process

when the COMELEC summarily resolved the disqualification
case against her without giving her a fair opportunity to
submit additional evidence to support her case.

Resolution No. 6452 delegates the reception of evidence in

disqualification cases to field officials designated by the
COMELEC.11 The summary nature of disqualification
proceedings is provided under Section 5(A)(6) of Resolution
No. 6452 which states:

6. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the

testimonies, the parties shall submit their affidavits or
counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence including
their position paper or memorandum within a period of three
(3) inextendible days;

The position paper or memorandum of each party shall

contain the following:

a. A "Statement of the Case", which is a clear and concise

statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the
documentary evidence and other matters necessary to an
understanding of the nature of the controversy;

b. A "Statement of the Issues", which is a clear and concise

statement of the issues;

c. The "Argument" which is a clear and concise presentation

of the argument in support of each issue; and

d. The "Relief" which is a specification of the judgment which

the party seeks to obtain. The issues raised in his/its
pleadings but not included in the Memorandum shall be
deemed waived or abandoned. Being a summation of the
parties’ pleadings and documentary evidence, the
Commission may consider the memorandum alone in deciding
or resolving the petition.

In these cases, Dumpit-Michelena filed a motion for the

inhibition of Atty. Marino V. Salas ("Atty. Salas"), the
Provincial Election Supervisor and hearing officer designated
to receive the evidence of the parties. She alleged that
Boado, et al.’s counsel was the former Regional Director of
the COMELEC Regional Office and undue influence might be
exerted over Atty. Salas. In the meanwhile, she submitted a
"semblance of a memorandum if only to insure x x x that she
would be able to convey her opposition to the petitions filed
against her."12 Dumpit-Michelena alleged that she wanted to
submit her evidence to a hearing officer who would not be
biased and would not be inclined to side with Boado, et al.

Without resolving the Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Salas forwarded

the records of the case to COMELEC Manila. However, to
obviate suspicion of partiality, Atty. Salas did not make any
recommendation as required under Resolution No. 6452.

We rule that there was no denial of due process in the cases

before the Court.

Section 5(A) of Resolution No. 6452 provides:

7. The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from

the date of the filing of the answer. The Hearing Officer
concerned shall personally or through his authorized
representative submit to the Clerk of the Commission his
Hearing/Case report(s) indicating his findings and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of
the hearing and reception of evidence together with the
complete records of the case;

8. Upon receipt of the records of the case [indicating] the

findings and recommendations of the Hearing Officer
concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall immediately
docket the case consecutively and calendar the same for
raffle to a division;

9. The division to whom the case is raffled shall, after

evaluation and consultation, assign immediately the same to
a member who shall pen the decision within five (5) days
from the date of consultation.

Resolution No. 6452 is clear. The hearing officer is only

designated to hear and receive evidence. His conclusions are
merely recommendatory upon the COMELEC. Dumpit-
Michelena knew fully well that the entire records of the case
would be forwarded to COMELEC Manila for the resolution of
the cases. She had all the opportunity to present her
evidence to support her stand. Instead, she chose to file a
Memorandum which she described as one "done in ‘half-
hearted’ compliance with the rules."13 She may not claim now
that she was denied due process because she was unable to
present all her evidence before the hearing officer.

On Residency Requirement

Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has complied with

the residency requirement.

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the

qualifications for elective provincial, city, municipal
and barangay officials shall be those provided for in the Local
Government Code. Section 39(a) of the Local Government
Code of 199114 states:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be

a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able
to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect. (Emphasis supplied)

The concept of residence in determining a candidate’s

qualification is already a settled matter. For election
purposes, residence is used synonymously with
domicile.15 In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives,16 this Court declared:

x x x The term "residence" has been understood as

synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal

that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a
candidate for congress continues to remain the same as that
of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in

the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my
question is: What is the committee’s concept of residence of
a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular

members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, ‘and a
resident thereof’, that is, in the district, for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was
in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation
given to it was domicile." (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87)
xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2.

I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
‘resident’ has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. Delos Reyes: Domicile.

M[r]s. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider

at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than
mere intention to reside?

Mr. Delos Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty

especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence." (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier

definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as
having the same meaning as domicile.

Prior to her transfer, Dumpit-Michelena was a resident and

registered voter of Ambaracao North, Naguilian, La Union.
She claims that she has already acquired a new domicile in
San Julian West and is thus qualified to run for the position of
mayor. She transferred her registration as a voter of San
Julian West on 24 October 2003.

Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April

2003 showing her acquisition of a parcel of land in San Julian
West where she eventually built a house. However, property
ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for
an office.17 Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost.18 To
successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be
concurrence of the following requirements:

(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of

residence and establishing a new one; and

(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.19

Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these

three requirements, the domicile of origin continues.20 To
effect change, there must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi.21 The intent to remain in the new
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time,
the change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 22

The Court agrees with the COMELEC Second Division that

Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she has abandoned
her former domicile. Among the documents submitted by
Dumpit-Michelena is a Special Power of Attorney23 authorizing
Clyde Crispino ("Crispino") to "apply, facilitate and follow up
the issuance of a building permit of the beach house" she
intended to put up in her lot. She also authorized Crispino to
help her caretaker oversee the lot and the construction of the
beach house. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC
Second Division, a beach house is at most a place of
temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of
residence.

In addition, the designation of caretaker with monthly

compensation of ₱2,50024 only shows that Dumpit-Michelena
does not regularly reside in the place. The Deed of Absolute
Sale states that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident of Naguilian,
La Union25 while the Special Power of Attorney states that she
is a resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union and No. 6
Butterfly St. Valle Verde 6, Pasig, Metro Manila. Dumpit-
Michelena obviously has a number of residences and the
acquisition of another one does not automatically make the
most recently acquired residence her new domicile.

We considered the affidavits submitted by Dumpit-Michelena

where the affiants retracted their previous affidavits stating
that Dumpit-Michelena was not a resident of San Julian West.
The affiants alleged that they signed the first affidavits
without knowing their contents. However, the COMELEC
Second Division pointed out that Boado, et al. also submitted
affidavits with the affiants repudiating their previous affidavits
that Dumpit-Michelena was a resident of San Julian West.
The Court is inclined to give more weight to the joint affidavit
of all the barangay officials of San Julian West attesting that
Dumpit-Michelena is not a resident of their barangay.

Hence, the COMELEC Second Division did not commit grave

abuse of discretion in cancelling Dumpit-Michelena’s
Certificate of Candidacy.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the

Resolution dated 9 March 2004 of the COMELEC Second
Division and the Resolution dated 7 May 2004 of the
COMELEC En Banc with MODIFICATION that Tess Dumpit-
Michelena’s motion for reconsideration was not filed late.
 PUNDAODAYA vs. This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the
COMELEC G.R. No. Resolution of the Commission on Elections
179313 September 17, (COMELEC) En Banc which declared private
2009 Residence, respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run
Domicile, Dwelling for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental,
in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and
Local Elections.  Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya is
married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against
Noble for the position of municipal mayor of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
Pundaodaya filed a petition for
disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter
lacks the residency qualification prescribed by
existing laws for elective local officials; that he never
resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed
place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental; and that he does not appear to
have the intention of residing therein permanently.  one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.  In this case,
Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident
of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also
maintains a business called OBERT Construction
Supply.
Norlainie Mitmug Limbona, for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary
petitioner, vs. Commission restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeks
on Elections to reverse and nullify the September 4, 2007 Resolution of
and Malik “Bobby” the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in SPA Case No. 07-
T. Alingan, 611 disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of the
respondents. municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, as well as the
Should “residence” and
“domicile” be construed as
referring to “dwelling”? Did
Noble effectively change his
domicile?
Whether or not the Honorable
Commission on Elections acted
with grave abuse of discretion
disqualifying petitioner to run as
mayor of the municipality of
Pantar, Lanao del Norte?
No to both. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held
that the term “residence” is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that
is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi).”  In Domino v. Commission on
Elections, the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,
pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
The documentary evidence of Noble, however, failed to
convince the Court that he successfully effected a change of
domicile.  To establish a new domicile of choice, personal
presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative
of that intention.  It requires not only such bodily presence in
that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it
Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his
actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. 
Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent
place of residence
The Comelec did not err when it continued with the trial and hearing of
the petition for disqualification. The Comelec correctly found that
petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement.
The term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with
“domicile”.
 For purpose of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of
 G.R. No. 181097June 25, January 9, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for
2008 reconsideration. Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
(Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona
(Mohammad), and respondent Malik “Bobby” T. Alingan
(Malik) were mayoralty candidates in
 Pantar, Lanao del Norte during 2007 Synchronized National
Elections. Petitioner and her husband filed their certificates of
candidacy with Acting Election Officer, while respondent filed
his certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election
Officer. On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify
Mohammad for failure to comply with the residency
requirement and also another petition to disqualify Norlainie
on the ground of lack of the one-year residency
requirement. On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of
Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy. Thereafter, or on
May 2, 2007 she filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition of
disqualification to the Election Supervisor.
The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainie’s
certific
ate of candidacy. Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec
granted the petition of Malik and disqualifying Mohammad
from running as Municipal Mayor for failing to satisfy the
one-year residency and fornot being a registered voter of the
said place. Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of
candidacy as substitute for Mohammad which was given
due course by the Comelec en banc. Thus, Malik filed a
second petition for disqualification against Norlainie. After
the election, Norlainie emerged as
the winning candidate and accordingly took her
oath and assumed office. However, on September 4, 2007
the Second Division of Comelec disqualified her on three
grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement; not
intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a
person actually resides. Three rules are, however, well established:
first 
, that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;
second 
, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired;
and
third 
, a man can have but one domicile at a time. In order to acquire a
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change
of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.
Petitioner’s claim that she has been physically present and actually
residing in
Pantar for almost20 months prior to the elections, is self-serving and
unsubstantiated. As correctly observed by the Comelec:
“In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent which
consists merely of self 
-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she abandoned her
domicile of origin or domicile in Marawi City. Further, we
find no other act that would indicate respondent’s intention to stay in
Pantar for an
indefinite period of time.
The Court find that her domicile by operation of law (by
virtue of marriage) effected only on November 11, 2006 when
her husband Malik change his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte on the same date. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:
“Art. 68.
being a registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of
her certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place
other than the Office of the Election Officer.
 
Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the petition
moot and/or for reconsideration on the ground the Comelec
en banc approved her withdrawal and was given due course
to her new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate
for Mohammad. Malik opposed the Omnibus Motion. On
November 23, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec
disqualify Norlainie from running as mayor of Pantar, Lanao
del Norte.
On January 9, 2008, the Comelec en banc denied Norlainie’s
motion for reconsideration.
 Hence, this petition.
The husband and wife are obliged to live together 
, observed mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. Art. 69.
The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile
. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other
if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption
. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with
solidarity of the family.”
 Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a
separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to
prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of Family Code is proper
and is in consonance with human experience. Thus, for failure to
comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run
for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
However, petitioner’s disqualification would not result in Malik’s
proclamation who came second during the special election.
 The rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply,
to wit:
“Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of
the Governor, Vie-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.
 –
 If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx
vice-mayor
concerned shall become the xxx mayor.”
 Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED
 and the Commission on Elections resolution disqualifying petitioner
Norlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the Mayor of
Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the Resolution denying the Motion for
reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED
. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall
SUCCEED
 as Mayor
 Petitioner Norlanie Mitmug Limbano, her
NORLAINIE MITMUG husband and respondent Malik Bobby T.
LIMBONA v. COMELEC Alingan were mayoralty candidates in Pantar,
Lanao Del Norte. After filing their Certificate
of Candidacy, the respondent filed a petition
GR No. 186006, Oct 16, to disqualify the husband of the petitioner for
2009 noncompliance with the one-year residence
requirement. Subsequently, respondent also
Topic: Residence vs. filed the same petition, this time against the
petitioner. Petitioner files for withdrawal of
Domicile
her candidacy which the Comelec granted.
The Comelec granted the disqualification of
petitioner’s husband. Petitioner filed new
certificate of candidacy as substitute
candidate for her husband which was
approved by the Comelec. Respondent yet
again sought petitioner’s disqualification.
Petitioner claimed that she has been staying,
sleeping and doing business in her house for
more than 20 months in Lower Kalangaan.
Whether or not petitioner Petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency
satisfied the one-year requirement.
residency requirements
in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention toabandon an
old domicile. A person's domicile once established is
considered tocontinue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established.
The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community.
Petitioner's claim that she has been physically present and
actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the
elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated.Furthermore,
the court finds no other act that would indicate petitioner's
intention to stayin Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The
filing of certificate of candidacy in Pantar isnot sufficient to
hold that she has chosen Pantaras her new residence. In SPA
No. 07-611, the commission has even found that she is not a
registered voter in the paidmunicipality warranting her
disqualification as a candidate.The court noted the findings of
the comelec that petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing,
Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth, and that her
domicile byoperation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapasun,
Marawi City. The comelec found that the petitioner's husband
effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar,
LanaoDel Norte only on November 11,2006. Since it is
presumed that the husband and wife

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the

Petition is DISMISSED and the Resolution dated November
23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections and the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA No. 07-621
are AFFIRMED.
 respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of
MITRA v. COMELEC, GR petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly
No. 191938, 2010-07-02 misrepresenting that he is a resident of the
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where
he... ran for the position of Governor.  Mitra came to
this Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation.
When his COC for the position of Governor of
Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the
incumbent Representative of the Second District of
Palawan.
He was... elected Representative as a domiciliary of
Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative
district for three (3) terms immediately before the
elections of 2010.
before the end of Mitra's second term as
Representative), Puerto Princesa City was
reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus
ceased to be a component city of the Province of
Palawan.  The direct legal consequence of this new
status was the... ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City
residents from voting for candidates for elective
provincial officials.
with the intention of running for the position of
Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his
Voter's Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720
of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio
Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality... of Aborlan,
Province of Palawan.
whether Mitra deliberately We find the petition meritorious.
misrepresented that his
Nature of the Case under Review:
residence
COC Denial/Cancellation Proceedings
Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial
of due course to, COCs.  The combined application of these
sections requires that the candidate's stated facts in the COC
be true,... under pain of the COC's denial or cancellation if
any false representation of a material fact is made. To quote
these provisions:
SEC. 74.  Contents of certificate of candidacy. -- The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs;
civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election... purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is
not... a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge.
He subsequently filed his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales
and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a
petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra's COC.
They essentially argued that Mitra remains a
resident of Puerto
Princesa City who has not yet established residence
in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for
Governor of Palawan.
The Ruling of the COMELEC's First Division
Domicile imports not only the intent to reside in a
fixed... place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of this
intention.
To acquire a new domicile - a domicile by choice -
the following must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to
remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the
old domicile.
In other words, there must be an animus non...
revertendi with respect to the old domicile, and an
animus manendi at the domicile of choice. The
intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time and the acts of
the person must be consistent with this intent.
Based on its consideration of the submitted
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation... contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing not later than fifteen... days before the election.
The false representation that these provisions mention must
necessarily pertain to a material fact.  The critical material
facts are those that refer to a candidate's qualifications for
elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence.
The candidate's status as... a registered voter in the political
unit where he or she is a candidate similarly falls under this
classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local
Government Code), must be reflected in the COC.
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the
purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to... the would-be
candidate's qualifications for public office.
Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot
be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist
in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent,
or where... no deception on the electorate results.
Based on these standards, we find that Mitra did not commit
any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.
evidence (including various affidavits submitted by
both parties and the photographs of the room that
Mitra claims to be his residence) and citing...
jurisprudence, the First Division granted the
respondents' petition to cancel Mitra's COC.
The COMELEC En Banc Ruling
The COMELEC en banc - in a divided decision[32] -
subsequently denied Mitra's motion to reconsider
the First Division ruling
Under the evidentiary situation of the case,... there is clearly
no basis for the conclusion... that Mitra deliberately
attempted to mislead... the Palawan electorate.
Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from
Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan to comply with the residence
requirement of a candidate for an elective provincial office.
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government
Code, does not abhor this intended transfer of residence, as
its Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to be a
resident of the local government unit where he intends to run
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
the law itself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change
of domicile or residence, but imposes only the condition that
residence at the new place should at least be for a year.
For him to qualify as Governor... he had to abandon his
domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local
government unit where he intended to run; this would be his
domicile of choice.
To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the
COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the... following:
(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
We do not believe that he committed any deliberate
misrepresentation given what he knew of his transfer, as
shown by the moves he had made to carry it out.
From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence
confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in
Mitra's favor
By failing to take into account whether there had been a
deliberate misrepresentation in Mitra's COC, the COMELEC
committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error
in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material...
representation.  In this case, it doubly erred because there
was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows,
Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period
required by Section 74 of the OEC.
Mitra has significant relationship with,... and intimate
knowledge of, the constituency... he wishes to serve.
the purpose of the residency requirement under the law.
By law, this residency can be anywhere within the Province of
Palawan, except for Puerto Princesa City because of its
reclassification as a... highly urbanized city. Thus, residency
in Aborlan is completely consistent with the purpose of the
law, as Mitra thereby declared and proved his required
physical presence in the Province of Palawan.
We also consider that even before his transfer of residence,
he already had intimate knowledge of the Province of
Palawan, particularly of the whole 2nd legislative district that
he represented for three terms.  For that matter, even the
respondents... themselves impliedly acknowledged that the
Mitras, as a family, have been identified with elective public
service and politics in the Province of Palawan.[78]  This
means to us that Mitra grew up in the politics of Palawan.
We can reasonably conclude from all these that Mitra is not
oblivious to the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potential for
growth and development, and all matters vital to the common
welfare of the constituency he intends to serve.
Mitra has been proclaimed winner... in the electoral contest
and has therefore... the mandate of the electorate to serve...
the manifest will of the people as expressed through the
ballot must be given fullest effect... in case of doubt, political
laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate.
while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in
mandatory terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions, requiring
certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory...
after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
however, we warned against a blanket and unqualified
reading and application of this ruling, as it may carry
dangerous significance to the rule of law and the integrity of
our elections.
Short of adopting a clear cut standard, we thus made the...
following clarification:
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we
have made in the past by the clarification that COC defects
beyond matters of form and that involve material
misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling
that COC mandatory... requirements before elections are
considered merely directory after the people shall have
spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement
involves more than the will of the people in any given locality.
Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is
made,... thereby violating both our election and criminal laws,
we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people
of the Philippines as expressed in our laws.  In a choice
between provisions on material qualifications of elected
officials, on the one hand, and the will... of the electorate in
any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that
we cannot choose the electorate will.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC[87] provided the following test:
To successfully challenge a winning candidate's...
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that
the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater... prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote.
With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case
to appeal to the primacy of the electorate's will.  We cannot
deny, however, that the people of Palawan have spoken in an
election where residency... qualification had been squarely
raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their
verdict on Mitra's qualifications.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition
and ANNUL the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
We DENY the respondents' petition... to cancel Abraham
Kahlil Mitra's Certificate of Candidacy.
 We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration Filed by
G.R. No. 191938 : public respondent Commission on Elections
October 19, 2010 (COMELEC) and the Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion for Oral Arguments filed by private
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R.
MITRA, Petitioner, v. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents), dated July 19,
COMMISSION ON 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our
ELECTIONS, ANTONIO Decision of July 2, 2010 (July 2, 2010 Decision or
V. GONZALES AND Decision).We annulled in this Decision the February
ORLANDO R. BALBON, 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010 Resolutions of the
JR., Respondent. COMELEC, and denied the private respondents
petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra).
To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that
despite our limited certiorari jurisdiction in election
cases, we are not only obliged but are
constitutionally bound to intervene when the
COMELEC's action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion in this case, a situation where resulting
errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by
the COMELEC, mutated from being errors of
judgment to errors of jurisdiction.Based on our
evaluation of the evidence presented by both
parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any
deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We
noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading
it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan,
Palawan.We also found that the COMELEC failed to
critically consider whether Mitra deliberately
Whether the SC erred when
it reviewed the probative
value of the evidence
presented and substituted its
own factual findings over that
of the public respondent.
We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for
reconsideration and for oral arguments.
We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private
respondent's arguments are mere rehashes of their previous
submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the
issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2,
2010 Decision.Thus, both the COMELEC and private
respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument
meriting reconsideration.The denial of the motion for oral
arguments proceeds from this same reasoning; mere
reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our
Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit
the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall
require.
Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the
aspects of the case the motions touched upon, if only to put
an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of our July 2,
2010 Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to
DENY with FINALITY, for lack of merit, the motions
for reconsideration and motion for oral arguments
now before us.Let entry of judgment be made in due
course.
attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that
would otherwise render him ineligible for the
position of Governor of Palawan.
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately
misrepresented his Aborlan residence to deceive and
mislead the people of the Province of Palawan, we
found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced
positive evidence of transfer of residence which the
private respondents evidence failed to sufficiently
controvert.Specifically, the private respondents
evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a
Puerto Princesa City resident.

In this regard, we took note of the incremental

moves Mitra undertook to establish his new domicile
in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following:(1)
hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside
of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a
provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves
starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of
registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial
transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya
Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent
home; and (6) the construction of a house on the
said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was
leasing pending the completion ofhis house.Thus,
we found that under the situation prevailing when
Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that
Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether
inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in
Aborlan.We also emphasized that the COMELEC
could not even present any legally acceptable basis
(as it used subjective non-legal standards in its
analysis) to conclude that Mitras statement in his
COC concerning his residence was indeed a
misrepresentation.In sum, we concluded that the
evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed,
showed that Mitra indeed transfered his residence
from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the
period required by law.
In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19,
2010, the COMELEC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our July 2,
2010 Decision. The COMELEC argues that we
overstepped our review power over its factual
findings; as a specialized constitutional body, the
findings and conclusions of the COMELEC are
generally respected and even given the status of
finality.The COMELEC also contends that the Court
erred in taking cognizance of the present petition
since the issues raised therein are essentially factual
in nature.It claims that it is elementary that the
extraordinary remedy ofcertiorariis limited to
correcting questions of law and that the factual
issues raised in the present petition are not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari.

Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong v
Comelec G.R. No. 178831-32
Sec 17, Article VI of the
Constitution- Senate and
the House of
Representatives shall each
have an electoral tribunal
which shall be the “sole”
judge of all contests
relating to the election
returns, and qualifications
of their respective
members. Each electoral
tribunals shall be
composed of 9
members……
 Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first
district of Negros Oriental. Her rival Olivia Paras,
and some other concerned citizens filed a
disqualification case against Limkaichong. The latter
allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
because when she was born, her father was still
a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost
her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the
case, election day came, and votes were cast.
Results came in and Limkaichong won over Paras.
Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of
disqualification, Comelec issued a proclamation
declaring Limkaichong as the winner. This is in
compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting the
disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered
the proclamation, filed a petition before the
Comelec.
 WON the proclamation done
by the Comelec is valid, and
WON Comelec should still
exercise jurisdiction over the
matter.
The proclamation of Limkaichong is valid. the HRET must
exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC
has invariably held once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member
of the House of Rep., the Comelec’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and disqualification
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then
that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
Comelec of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at
the time of proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET. The use of the word “sole” in
Sec.17 Art. VI of the Constitution and in Sec. 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the
electoral tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to
its members.
 Limkaichong ran as a representative in the
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 1 st
 District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her
192149 August 23, opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens 2.WON the HRET already
2011        filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong.
They  alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural
RENALD F. born citizen of the Philippines because when she
VILANDO, Petitioner, was born her father was still a Chinese and that her
vs. mother,  lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her
HOUSE OF marriage to Limkaichong’s father. During the
REPRESENTATIVES pendency of the case against Limkaichong before
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were
JOCELYN SY cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her
LIMKAICHONG AND rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared
HON. SPEAKER Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the
PROSPERO counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong
NOGRALES, Respondents. as a disqualified candidate. On the following days
however, notwithstanding their proclamation
disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a
proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner
of the recently conducted elections. This is
in compliance withResolution No. 8062 adopting
the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with
pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing
and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition
before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’
petition arguing that since she is now the
proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has
the jurisdiction over the matter and not the
COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
1.WON the proclamation done 1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong
by the COMELEC is valid.
acquired jurisdiction over
the case.
3.WON Limkaichong is
qualified to hold an office in
the Republic of the
Philippines
2.    The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s
3.    Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in
timely filed with the COMELEC En Bancher motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the
incorporated directive suspending her proclamation.   The
filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively
suspended the execution of the COMELEC’s Joint
Resolution.  Since the execution of the Joint Resolution
was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid
proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.   It follows
then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation.   The party
questioning his qualification should now present his case in
a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally
mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to
the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.     The use
of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores
the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.
 Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.  The governing law
is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The
HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of
validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959
Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental,
which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a
naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those
persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution )  It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by
naturalization.  Therefore, following the line of
transmission through the father under the 1935
Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office,
as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young
voter in 1976, accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984, and
ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad,
Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of
Philippine citizenship.  The case of In re:Florencio Mallare,
elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions
indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that
respondent had informally elected citizenship after January
17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered
as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The
Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET
declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of
the House of Representatives representing the First District,
Negros Oriental.
 Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.
CASAN MACODE [3] However, as a consequence of his subsequent
MAQUILING v. COMELEC, naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
GR No. 195649, 2013-04- America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
16
Arnado applied for repatriation... before the
Consulate General... and took the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippine
Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of his foreign citizenship,... Arnado filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte... respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy
Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by
the Bureau of Immigration
Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines.
the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the
highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION... treating the
Petition... as one for disqualification... the First
whether or not intervention is
allowed in a disqualification
case.
whether or not the use of a
foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one's qualifications to
run for public office.
whether or not the rule on
succession in the Local
Government Code is
applicable to this case.
Intervention of a rival candidate in a... disqualification case is
proper when... there has not yet been any... proclamation of
the winner.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an... election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the... pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.
Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that
the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has
not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the
second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC[30] are...
present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right
to elevate the matter before this Court.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one's nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the
Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
Division disagreed with Arnado's claim that he is a
Filipino citizen.
Arnado's continued use of his US passport is a
strong indication that Arnado had no real intention
to renounce his US citizenship and that he only
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him
to run for office.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),
another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes
in the 2010 elections,  intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc
Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case.
he claimed... that the cancellation of Arnado's
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained
the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment
by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set
aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado's Motion for Reconsideration, on the
elective position.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier...
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it
took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado's bid for public office, as
it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen
only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14
April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport
after renouncing his American citizenship.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be... seasonably challenged.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same
Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified
not only from holding the public office... but  even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
With Arnado's disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
following premises:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A.
No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine
citizenship as though he never became a citizen of
another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009,
that the respondent became a pure Philippine
Citizen again.
The use of a US passport […] does not operate to
revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such.
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.
a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes
cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at
all... in determining the winner of an election.
the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and
has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the... proclamation.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
effect of which is to disqualify the individual... from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship.
He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office
based on Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate,
his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections... because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the
prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches... back to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be
not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
No. 207264 (2013) for the position of Representative of the lone district
of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and
Topic. Art. VI, Sec. 17 – resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque,
Jurisdiction of Electoral filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
Tribunal  cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31,
2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on
the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained
material misrepresentations regarding the
petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth
and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the
petitioner is an American citizen and filed in
February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to
admit newly discovered evidence and amended last
exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division
issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC
on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the
Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a Resolution denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner
of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013
took her oath of office before the Speaker of House
1. Whether or not the 1.
COMELEC has the
jurisdiction over the
petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and
who has already taken
2.
her oath of office for the
position of member of
the House of
Representative.
2. Whether or not the
COMELEC erred in its
ruling that the petitioner
is illegible to run for
office
Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election returns and
qualification of the members of House of Representative.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino
citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following 1)
take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the
requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial
Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of
residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC
that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that
he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall
be counted from the time he made it his domicile of
choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner
reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so
as to conclude  that the petitioner renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she
served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not
of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has
noon of June 30, 2013. never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she
remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not
Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse
executory.
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

EN BANC G.R. No. 157870,
November 03, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
(SJS), PETITIONER, VS.
DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD AND PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),
RESPONDENTS.
(Social Justice Society vs.
Dangerous Drugs Board
G.R. No. 157870
November 03, 2008)
Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions 1.    Do Sec. 36(g) of RA [The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
assailing the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165 and COMELEC declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165  and  COMELEC Resolution
9165 or theComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of Resolution No. 6486 impose No. 6486  as  UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY
an additional qualification for GRANTED  the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by
2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
candidates for senator? declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d)  of  RA
of candidates for public office,students of secondary Corollarily, can Congress 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of enact a law prescribing 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently
public and private offices, and persons qualifications for candidates enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec.
chargedbefore the prosecutor's office with certain for senator in addition to 36(f) and (g)  of  RA 9165.]
offenses. those laid down by the
Constitution? 1.    YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 2.    Are paragraphs (c), (d), qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress
elections, saidmandatory drug testing imposes an and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for
unconstitutional? candidates for senator in addition to those laid down
additional qualification for Senators beyond that
by the Constitution.
which are provided by theConstitution. No provision
in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
COMELEC to expand the qualificationrequirements and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
of candidates for senator. additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points
out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications
and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
unduedelegation of legislative power when they give citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to (5) residency.  Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
determine the manner ofdrug testing. It also
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
violates the equal protection clause as it can be elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
used to harass a student or employee validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
deemedundesirable. The constitutional right against standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force
unreasonable searches is also breached. of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
In addition to the abovementioned contentions,
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and
taxpayers maintainsthat said provision should be
struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the rightagainst
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to
the dueprocess and equal protection guarantees.
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken.  Accordingly, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented
by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution.  As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified
illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity
of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.”  Viewed,
therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is
to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment,
as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs
(f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering  students of secondary
and tertiary schools

Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School

District 47J v. Acton  and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and
applied the following principles: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision
of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools,
acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health
and well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such
duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra,  and Board of

Education, supra,  the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions
to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.  To be
sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering  officers and employees

of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the

Constitution is couched and as has been
held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at
issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing
policy for employees—and students for that matter—under
RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing
what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and informal
disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause standard is not
required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of

reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In
this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for
the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and
the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management
and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
 Just as defining as the first factor is the character of
the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a
question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly
set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling
law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly
focused"?

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For

one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly
embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or
she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when
and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d)
of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall
be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the
company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place.”

For another, the random drug testing shall be

undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as
possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the
mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure
shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and
the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as
possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled
laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the
DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
“need to know” basis; that the “drug test result and the
records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results.”  Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result
of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the

reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees,
the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search,
and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we
hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector,

government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. 
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for
civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required
to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering  persons charged before

the prosecutor’s office with a crime with an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and
1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of

RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory
drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority
of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of

persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment.  The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.”  In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants
in a criminal complaint.  They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion.  When persons suspected
of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and
are impleaded against their will.  The persons thus charged,
by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy.  To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case would
violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
G.R. No. 170338 December Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the
23, 2008 Senate to continue with the conduct of the
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO,
questioned legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello
petitioner,
Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped
vs.
THE HOUSE OF communication of then President Gloria Macapagal-
REPRESENTATIVES Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC Garcillano, without duly published rules of
INFORMATION, PUBLIC procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
ORDER AND SAFETY, requirement.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their
SUFFRAGE AND pleadings and even on oral argument that the
ELECTORAL REFORMS, Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
respondents. Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers
of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when
they first opened their session. Respondents justify
their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that,
they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page, invoking R.A. No. 8792.
Whether or not the invocation
by the respondents of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, to support their claim
of valid publication through
the internet is a substantial
compliance of the
constitutional requirement of
publication.
NO.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
ROMULO L. NERI vs. In these proceedings, this Court has been called (1) whether or not there is 1. There Is a Recognized Presumptive
SENATE COMMITTEE upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate a a recognized presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege
ON ACCOUNTABILITY hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between presidential
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS the Court’s co-equal branches of government. On communications privilege Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time
AND INVESTIGATIONS, September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before in our legal system; the presumption in favor of the presidential communications
SENATE COMMITTEE respondent Committees and testified for about (2) whether or not there is privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That
ON TRADE AND eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the factual or legal basis to is far from the truth. There, the Court enumerated the cases
COMMERCE, AND National Broadband Project (the “NBN Project”), a hold that the in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized,
SENATE COMMITTEE project awarded by the Department of communications elicited by among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential
ON NATIONAL DEFENSE Transportation and Communications (“DOTC”) to the three (3) questions are Commission on Good Government (PCGG),14 and Chavez v.
AND SECURITY Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (“ZTE”). covered by executive PEA.15 The Court articulated in these cases that, “”the right
G.R. No. 180643, Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on privilege; to information does not extend to matters recognized as
September 4, 2008 Elections (“COMELEC”) Chairman Benjamin Abalos (3) whether or not ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his respondent Committees which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated have shown that the correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo communications elicited by meetings.”
(“President Arroyo”) of the bribery attempt and that the three (3) questions are
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, critical to the exercise of
when probed further on President Arroyo and their functions; and In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, (4) whether or not Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a
petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive respondent Committees specific matter involving an executive agreement between the
privilege.” To be specific, petitioner refused to committed grave abuse of Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3)
answer questions on: (a) whether or not President discretion in issuing the questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or contempt order. Senate Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of
not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v.
whether or not she directed him to approve it. Ermita.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing
petitioner’s answers to these three questions by A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
requiring him to appear and testify once more on alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to express except privately. These are the considerations
respondent Committees and requested them to justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground
of executive privilege.
The senate thereafter issued a show cause order,
unsatisfied with the reply, therefore, issued an
Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-
at-Arms until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the above Order. Denied. Petition
for certiorari and Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
(with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction) granted by the SC court.
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution x x x
2. There Are Factual and Legal Bases to
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to
secure a foreign loan does not relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power,” because the Constitution
does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the
Monetary Board which is required to give its prior
concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of
another entity does not make such power less executive. The
power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an
executive power. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall
submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before
contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish
the executive nature of the power. In the same way that
certain legislative acts require action from the President for
their validity does not render such acts less legislative in
nature.
B. The “doctrine of operational proximity” was laid down
precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
conclusive.

Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of

the application of the “doctrine of operational proximity” for
the reason that “it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope
of the presidential communications privilege to
communications between those who are ‘operationally
proximate’ to the President but who may have “no direct
communications with her.”

It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational

proximity” was laid down in In re: Sealed Case27precisely to
limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege “to
a large swath of the executive branch” (a fear apparently
entertained by respondents) is absent because the official
involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly
within the term “advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter
ego and a member of her official family.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely
based on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent
Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court
did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
government transparency, accountability and disclosure of
information.

The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary

Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in
relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another
sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Even in Senate v.
Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the
Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which
the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect
for a coordinate and co-equal department.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations

In PMPF v. Manglapus, .” The Resolution went on to state,

thus:The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of
authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in
executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy
is its confidential nature.

With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of

constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people
to information and public accountability and transparency, the
Court finds nothing in these arguments to support respondent
Committees’ case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional
right of the people to information and the constitutional
policies on public accountability and transparency. These are
the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a
democratic government. In the case at bar, this Court, in
upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3)
specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right
to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could
continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to
testify again.

3. Respondent Committees Failed to Show That

the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions

The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past

decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of
privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling
needfor disclosure of the information covered by executive
privilege.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees
argue that the information elicited by the three (3) questions
are necessary in the discharge of their legislative functions,
among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate
Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption.

We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions.

The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees,
since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of
the President in order to gather information which, according
to said respondents, would “aid” them in crafting legislation.
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot
be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical
and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial
power to adjudicate actual controversies.

For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not

critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with
relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by
courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before
this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly
admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations
even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In
other words, the information being elicited is not so critical
after all.

Oversight Function of the Congress

Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be
stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in
the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in
instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in
nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely
an oversight function of Congress.44 And if this is the primary
objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3)
questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their
claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not
oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft
and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of
Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot
transgress bounds set by the Constitution.

Office of the Ombudsman: The Office of the Ombudsman is

the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws
to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of
anomaly are true and who are liable therefor.

4. Respondent Committees Committed Grave

Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
Respondent Committees contend that their Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the
“Rules”) are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true
that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal
processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of
government, however, when a constitutional requirement
exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’
compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to
possible violations of the Constitution simply out of
courtesy.

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not believe that respondent Committees have the

discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is
especially true here where what is involved is the contempt
power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not
promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is
the witness who has the highest stake in the proper
observance of the Rules.
Congress as a “continuing body”

On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this

Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing”, as it
is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the
conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of
the Congress before it.
Motion for Reconsideration Denied.
__________
NOTES:
“Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment
of something, the concentrated essence of substance.24
“non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility
remains with the obligor.

Restrictions on the right to information: (1) national security

matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3)
criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
National security matters include state secrets regarding
military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on
inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements. It was further held that
even where there is no need to protect such state secrets,
they must be “examined in strict confidence and given
scrupulous protection.”
 LCP vs COMELEC During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into 1. Whether the Cityhood 1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of
November 18, 2008 law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. Laws violate Section 10, the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 Article X of the Constitution;
and 2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between
other municipalities into cities. During the 12th
2. Whether or not the municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act Cityhood Laws violate the Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills.
No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA equal protection clause The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is
9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from
Code by increasing the annual income requirement another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not
million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification
sought to exempt from the P100 million income criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended converting into cities.
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No.
29. During the 13th Congress, the House of
Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the
Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all
the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006,
the House of Representatives approved the cityhood
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which
was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC
to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters
in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as
for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce
the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
 In October 1949, the Philippine Government,
Arnault v. Nazareno (G.R. through the Rural Progress Administration, bought
No. L-3820) two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong
July 18, 1950 | 87 Phil. for P4.5M and P0.5M respectively, or for an
29 aggregate amount of P5M. Of this sum, P1.5M was
paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,
supposedly as payment for his interest in the two
aforementioned estates. Jean L. Arnaut, Burt's
representative in the Philippines, collected the sum
of P1.5M in the form of checks. From this amount,
he encashed P400,000, which he eventually gave to
an undisclosed person as per Burt's instructions.
It turned out, however, that these transactions were
dubious in nature. For one, both estates were
already owned by the Philippine Government, so
there was no need to repurchase them for P5M.
Second, Burt's interest in both estates amounted to
only P20,000, which he wasn't even entitled to
because of his failure to pay off his previous loans. 
A Senate investigation was thereafter held to
determine how the Philippine Government was
duped and who ultimately benefited from the
assailed transaction. One of the issues pursued was
to whom did Arnault give the cash amounting to
P400,000. Arnault's refusal to provide the name of
the person, initially because he couldn't remember it
and later for fear of self-incrimination, led to his
being cited for contempt. He was thereafter held in
prison, and was to be freed only after saying the
name of the person he gave the P400,000 to. 
1. Whether or not the Senate
has the power to punish
Arnault for contempt.
2. Whether or not the Senate
can impose punishment
beyond the legislative
session.
3. Whether or not Arnault can
invoke the right against self-
incrimination as an excuse in
not answering the question
he is being asked in the
Senate.
Before delving into the issues at hand, the Court laid down
some general principles of law: 
 The Philippine Constitution is patterned after the US
Constitution. But despite similarities in the basic structure of
government, one essential difference is that the Philippine
legislative department is more powerful than its US
counterpart, in the sense that the latter shares power with
the congresses of individual states. 
 The power of inquiry -- with process to enforce it -- is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function of the Philippine congress. Although there are no
express provisions in the constitution that invest either the
House or the Senate with the power to conduct investigations
and exact testimony, such power is implied. 
1. Yes, the Court ruled that such power is necessary,
especially in the conduct of inquiries that fall within the
Senate's jurisdiction (see [b] above). With this in mind, it is
not a requirement that each and every single question asked
of witnesses necessarily be material to the case. This is so
because the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
action and the form and character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the information to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited from a single question. 
2. In the instant case, the resolution holding Arnault for
contempt was issued on May 15, 1950. He was subsequently
detained for 13 days, or beyond the legislative session of
Congress, which session ended on May 18 of the same year.

Subsequently, Arnault filed this instant petition for
habeas corpus in an apparent bid to be freed from
imprisonment.  a continuing body and does not cease to exist upon the
G.R. No. 180050, February April 3, 2002, the Office of the President advised the
10, 2010 Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Surigao del Norte to
Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor deficient population in the propsed Province of
Bernal and Rene Medina Dinagat Islands.
vs Exec. Sec. Eduardo
Ermita Consequently, Prov. Gov't. of Surigao del Norte
conducted a special census with the assitanc eof the
NSo District Census Coordinator to determine the
population of Dinagat. The census yield 371,576
inhabitants. NSO, however, did not certify the result
of the special census.
Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that
Arnault claimed that his continued detention had no legal
basis, since the body that issued the resolution had already
been dissolved by law. But the Court ruled that the Senate is
periodical dissolution of the Congress. As such, there is no
time limit to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may be constitutionally exerted.
3. No, the Court held that Arnault's invocation of the right
against self-incrimination has no basis. Arnault failed in
discharging his duty of providing frank, sincere, and truthful
testimony before a competent authority -- a violation of the
State's right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation. When
a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each
other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is
clear and imperative, the former must give way to the latter.
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS DISMISSED.
Petition is granted. SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A
province may be created if it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office:
the average annual income of Dinagat was 82M .
The land area is 802.12 sqkm.
Later, Congress passed the bill for the creation of
the Province of Dinagat which was approved by then
President GMA. Then a plebiscite was ratified and
approved by the majority. Consequently, new set of
provincial officials took their oath of office following
their appointment by PGMA, another set were then
elected in the election later.
Petitioners aver that they are taxpayers and
residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, they
are Vice-gov and members of the provincial board.
They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands
as a new province is an illegal act of Congress and
unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte a
large chunk of its territory, IRA and rich resources
from the area.
They also claim that the creation is not valid
because it failed to comply with the population and
land area requirement.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
The requirements for the creation of a province contained in
Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code are clear, plain and
unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in
absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in Art. 9(2) of the
IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one or
more islands from the land-area requirement cannot be
considered an executive construction of the criteria prescribed
by the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous provision
not intended by the Local Government Code and, therefore, is
null and void.
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat
Islands "contains an approximate land area of eighty
thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or
802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and
approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355,
therefore, failed to comply with the land area requirement of
2,000 square kilometers.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the
population requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants
as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of
Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the
Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only
106,951.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte

conducted a special census of population in Dinagat Islands in
2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result
was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local
Government Code.34 Moreover, respondents failed to prove
that with the population count of 371,000, the population of
the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would
not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement
prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new
province.

Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of

Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering on the ground
that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a
population of 118,534 inhabitants, from the new province for
complete political dominance by Congresswoman Glenda
Ecleo-Villaroman. This is unsubstantiated.

"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an

apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to
give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative
district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An
EDUARDO ERMITA, (D) Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections
2011 (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for
the ratification of the creation of the province under
the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite
yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. With the approval of the people
from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte
and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.
The Court dismissed the petition on technical
Whether or not the provision
in Article 9(2) of the Rules
and Regulations
Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991
valid.
a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to
comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province
of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and about 47 islets
closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate
territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the
province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-
Villaroman.
Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of
Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No.
9355, following the exemption from the land area
requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces,
can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In
effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress
breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2)
of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted
R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of
a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that
Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its
average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been
denied. proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the
results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in
certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of
from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would
in stunting such capacity.
unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,
the area. They pointed out that when the law was for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is
passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not
kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently,
failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC. within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is
within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3)
within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not
main arguments to challenge the above Resolution,
to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that
namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355
would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
operates as an act of Congress amending Section
461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from
territorial contiguity, when the intended province
consists of two or more islands, includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land
area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact
Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for

 Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that
the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said
motion was before and not after the resolution of
this case.

September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a

Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court,
allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2,
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed
at any time before the rendition of judgment. They
alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections,
their legal interest in this case was not yet existent.
They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in
this case.

October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry

of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case
had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.

G.R. No. 188078, January May 1, 2009, RA 9591 passed into a law, amending RA 9591 is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution requires
25, 2010 the Malolos Charter by creating a separate that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have
legislative district for the city. The population of a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.[5] The
Victorino Aldaba, etc. Malolos is a contested fact given that the house bill
for this law relied on the undated certification issued
vs COMELEC by NSO that the population of Malolos will be
254,030 by year 2010 due its current population
growth rate.
Petitioners, taxpayers and registered residents of
Malolos filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250k for a city to merit
representation in Congress.
OSG contended that Congress use of projected
population is non-justiciable as it involves a
determination on the wisdom of the standard
adopted by the legislature to determine compliance
with constitutional requirement.
only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a
population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected,
for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA
9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is
unconstitutional.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based
on demographic projections, is without legal effect because
Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to
issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face
because based on its own growth rate assumption, the
population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year
2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot
be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose
population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a
legislative district only in the immediately following election
after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state
that the demographic projections he certified have been
declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not
also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda
is based on demographic projections declared official by the
NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the
requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be
as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no
showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated
by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for
demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such
official designation, only the certification of the NSO
 Administrator can be given credence by this Court.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation

of a legislative district must be based on an official and
credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order
No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be
unreliable or speculative.

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution

provides:

Any province that may be created, or any city whose

population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member or such number of members
as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx.
(Emphasis supplied)

Herrera vs COMELEC In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Whether or not the COMELEC COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is
Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of dismissed
to have the province subdivided into two provincial discretion in issuing
districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Resolution No. 2950? 1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact,
Election Supervisor conducted two consultative contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means
meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border,
barangay captains, barangay kagawads, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for
representatives of all political parties, and other considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras
interested parties. A consensus was reached in favor shows that the municipalities grouped together are
of the division. contiguous or adjacent.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the 2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of
division of the province. the Provincial Election Supervisor. As required by COMELEC
 Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th
class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1
issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance
of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which
allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to
Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista and San
Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva
Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.
The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950,
pointing out that:
1.the districts do not comprise a compact,
contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true
sentiment of the voters of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not
equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of
voters that a Board Member represents.
Juanito Mariano v. Re: Based on verifiable indicators of
COMELEC, G.R. No. viability/projected capacity
118577, March 7, 1995
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854
which sought to convert the Municipality of Makati
to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Makati. Petitioners contend that the special law
did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with
technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of
(1) WON RA 7854 did not
properly identify the land
area or territorial jurisdiction
of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical
descriptions.
(2) WON it attempted to alter
or restart the "three
Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified
and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic
Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided
into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being
a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall
have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2313, the basis for division shall be the number of inhabitants
of the province concerned not the number of listed or
registered voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras
was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati
will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In language
that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that,
the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality." The court take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds
description of land areas of other local government units with
Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart the
"three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials; that it increased the legislative district of
Makati only by special law; that the increase in
legislative district was not expressed in the title of
the bill; and that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with the population
requirement, thus violative of the constitution and
the LGC.
consecutive term" limit for
local elective officials.
(3) WON it is unconstitutional
for it increased the legislative
district of Makati only by
special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional
provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the
return of every census.
(4) WON it is unconstitutional
for the increase in legislative
district was not expressed in
the title of the bill.
(5) WON it is unconstitutional
for the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Section 5
(3), Article VI of the
unsettled boundary dispute.
(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from
complied with these requirements. The petition is premised
on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would
seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to
ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper
parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.
(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall
be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati
stands at only 450,000. Said
section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one
representative.
6. Whether or not there is an
actual case or controversy to
challenge the constitutionality
of one of the questioned
sections of R.A. No. 7854.
members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an
increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation
for an indeterminate period of time.
(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a
law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue
all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to such general subject.
(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000),
its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.

6. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the

constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements.

The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this
coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the
same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely
pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig
(except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
239 SCRA 106 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic WON the RA No. 7675 is The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of
G.R. No. L-114783 Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act unconstitutional. the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution
December 8, 1994 Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a stating that each city with a population of at least two
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
RAMON M. GUZMAN, Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
TERRY T. LIM, assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and San Juan belonged to only one legislative congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
and ROBERTO R. district. The petitioners contend on the following: separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, (1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence
vs. contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
HON. CITY MAYOR provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
CITY TREASURER into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
WILLIAM MARCELINO, the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
and THE into two separate districts. 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless
SANGGUNIANG (2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into otherwise provided by law."
PANLUNGSOD, all of separate congressional districts under Section 49 of As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in
the City of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
Mandaluyong, Metro composition of the House of Representatives beyond legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted,
Manila, respondents. that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including
Constitution. Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any on a right which pertains to itself.
census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements. Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the
right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that
“within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section
G.R. No. 176970, RA 9371 was approved dividing Cagayan de Oro into
December 8, 2008 two legislative districts. Later, COMELEC
Rogelio Bagabuyo promulgated Resolution 7837 implementing RA
vs COMELEC 9371.
Bagabuyo then filed a petition against COMELEC and
other officers asking for nulliffication of RA 9371 and
Res. 7837 saying that RA 9371 failed to conduct a
plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or
conversion of a local governement unit. The court
did not grant the TRO or writ of prelim. injunction,
so the May elections proceeded with CDO divided
into two legislative districts.
COMELEC, thru OSG argued that: 1) the petitioner 3)     Does R.A. No. 9371
did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the violate
Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent representation doctrine?
jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality
of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House
of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod
pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; 3) the criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only
apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this
case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit
took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about
any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population
1)     Did the petitioner
violate the hierarchy of courts
rule; if so, should the instant
petition be dismissed on this
ground?
2)     Does R.A. No. 9371
merely provide for the
legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does
it involve the division and
conversion of a local
government unit?
the equality of
Except for issue on the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the
petition totally without merit.
The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and
the nature of the issues raised among them, whether
legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de
Oro City as a local government unit are reasons enough for
considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of
courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of
the COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative
apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action
against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by
this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. For these
reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to
be a stumbling block in our consideration of the present case.
Plebiscite
Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary
as the determination of the number of representatives which
a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize population and voting power among
the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the
realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987
and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is
required.
Constitution lays down the rules on legislative apportionment
under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty members
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal
apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local
government units (historically and generically referred to as
municipal corporations) that the Constitution itself classified
into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. In its
strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as a
body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of
the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local
government thereof. The creation, division, merger, abolition
or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered
by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of
this Article provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit
directly affected.

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of

the Constitution, the authority to act has been vested in the
Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment
and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts
on local government units by setting the standards for their
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of
boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging,
abolishing local government units and altering their
boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much
commonality exists between the two provisions since they are
inherently different although they interface and relate with
one another.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and,

Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The
Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit.

Holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative

apportionment or reapportionment. After it became
constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always
identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with
the concept of legislative apportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a

reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the
authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4)
of the Constitution. Its core provision Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district

of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to
commence in the next national elections after the effectivity
of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas,
Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San
Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan,
Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon,
Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan
shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig,
Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon,
Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays
from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second
district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as

a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated.
Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its

Bai Sandra Sema v On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the
Comelec July 16, 2008 ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in
the first district of Maguindanao.  MMA Act 201
provides:
   
     Later, three new municipalities were carved out
of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of
municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its
second legislative district. Cotabato City, although
part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not
part of the Province of Maguindanao.
     On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status
of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the
First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province” under MMA Act 201.
The petitions raise the
following issues:
     I. In G.R. No. 177597:
         (A) Preliminarily –
           (1) whether the writs
of Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus are proper to test
the constitutionality of
COMELEC Resolution No.
7902; and
           (2) whether the
proclamation of respondent
Dilangalen as representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City mooted
the petition in G.R. No.
177597.
   
   (B) On the merits –
           (1)  whether Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power
administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory
remains completely whole and intact; there is only the
addition of another legislative district and the delineation of
the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the
House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is
necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two
districts.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic
Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the
Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.   Thus,
we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we
rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
The creation of any of the four local government units –
province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.  
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of
the Constitution.  Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
     There is neither an express prohibition nor an express
grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate
to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution.  In fact, Congress has delegated to
     Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the
recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department
under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,
provides in pertinent parts:
     Considering the foregoing, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that
pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.  representative in the House
     On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”
to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays,
is constitutional; and
           (2) if in the
affirmative, whether a 10, Article X of the Constitution.   However, under the Local
province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant
to Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 is entitled to one
of Representatives without
need of a national law
creating a legislative district
for such province.
     II. In G.R No.  177597
and G.R No.  178628,
whether COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is valid for
maintaining the status quo in
the first legislative district of
Maguindanao (as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City [formerly First
District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City]”), despite the
creation of the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan out of
such district (excluding
Cotabato City).
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power
to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section
Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.
     However, the creation of provinces and cities is another
matter.  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides,
“Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.” 
     Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without
a legislative district.
     This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive
power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied
in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law.  It
would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created
by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership
of the superior legislative body. 
In view of certiorari and mandamus
     The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave
abuse of discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other
hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act
“which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”
In view of mootness
     There is also no merit in the claim that respondent
Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007
elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City” mooted this petition. This case does not
concern respondent Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves
an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,
as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054.  Admittedly, the outcome of this
petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes
cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
“Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be
included in the canvassing of ballots.   However, this
incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed
with the resolution of the novel issues raised here.  The
Court’s ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently
concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections
for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM
Regional Assembly to create in the future additional
provinces.
In view of the Felwa case
As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the
statement in Felwa that “when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district comes into
existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot
provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation
of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.” 
    
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether
Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and
providing for congressional representation in the old and new
provinces, was unconstitutional for “creating congressional
districts without the apportionment provided in the
Constitution.”
     Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695
because  (1) it validly created legislative districts “indirectly”
through a special law enacted by Congress creating a
province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will
not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative
districts provided under the 1935 Constitution.   Felwa does
not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by
Congress itself.  Here, the new province was created merely
by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly. 
     What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative
district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’
power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from
Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created
without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is
created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each
province shall have at least one representative” in the House
of Representatives.
     Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a
legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this
will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao.  However, Cotabato City
cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of
the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only
163,849. 
     Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition
and independence of the House of Representatives. Under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM
with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of
RA 7160, namely:  minimum annual income of P20,000,000,
and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers
or minimum population of 250,000.  The following scenarios
thus become distinct possibilities:
     It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions
cannot prevail over the Constitution.  Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers
of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution
and national laws, x x x.”  The Preamble of the ARMM
Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM
Government is established “within the framework of the
Constitution.”   This follows Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created
x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.”  

Atong Paglaum, The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Inc. v. COMELEC Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and
(G.R. No. 203766) organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation
as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No.
7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng
Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB
was denied participation in the elections because PBB does
not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction
from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued
Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13
petitioners in the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC
En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
Whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in
the elections.
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in
the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings
in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and
to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again
that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means
that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941
and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang
Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction
from the Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names
of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for
the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued
Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-
list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only,
but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to
deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-
list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent
them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option
the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart
from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and
express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941