1 A.C. No.
3694 June 17, 1993
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES
MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.
Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.
Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.
Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20, 1991 by
Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical
Center (hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical practitioners. The
respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages
from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients against the
aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.
Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re Almacen,
31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct
of officers of the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs.
Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).
Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for his
immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese
business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose
P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).
Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his
promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August 20,
1991, he was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical practice.
Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not effectively reform him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy Court of
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. The following are Judge
Bernad's findings:
The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St.
Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal
pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's, Dr.
Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and diagnosed her
problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on Christmas day, December 25,
1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December 27,
1990, she died together with her unborn child.
Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with his three
(3) minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the attending physicians of
his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint entitled: "Attorney
Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr.
and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to Branch 172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as
requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina
Robles.
On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another hearing
of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical records of
Mrs. Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical records. The
respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia
crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately returned the
folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious act) and left the
office.
Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered Sandico
to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man
(presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's car). When the man
approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his coatpocket. Sandico returned
to the office and reported what she had seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge
Capulong. The three of
them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to
Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from medical
folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way back
to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel, Attorney
Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge
Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed on to
him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared
that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his pants pocket
and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages "72" and "73" of the medical folder were
shown to Sandico, she identified them as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed in a dead
faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where she later regained consciousness.
In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of
ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized
this, so she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to submit
a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.
A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver who was
known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter
the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and asked
for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to his province by Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor confirmed that
Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".
The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court, so much so
that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the incident, Judge
Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.
At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse of the
late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro,
counsel of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the medical folder
which lay among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court Robles. When he
allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro
come out of the building and walk toward a man in the parking lot to whom he handed a piece of paper.
Afterward, Attorney Castro reentered the courthouse.
Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He alleged that
the person who was caught in possession of the detached pages of the medical record was actually
"planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.
He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so he was
fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at
exactly 9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the building. He
did not leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly a very warm day, he
wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an
absolute falsehood. He alleged that he would not have done the act imputed to him, because the
medical chart was the very foundation of the civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors.
He wondered why the man, alleged to be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave the detached pages
of the medical chart, was neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even established.
He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had never
seen him before.
He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court personnel,
accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical record and he alleged that the unidentified man
remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.
In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee, Maria Arnie
Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and "without any noticeable
guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross examination" (p. 11,
Judge Bernad's Report).
That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly clerk, Ms.
Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the medical record,
was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature. Nevertheless, they had the
presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who forthwith took appropriate steps to
recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro had absolutely no motive to testify falsely
against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney Grecia's "driver,"
her swift action in summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the medical
chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the man was
fruitless for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who stole the
pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication. Not
only is it directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed to
mention it during the confrontation with the man inside Judge Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney
Aves) was present.
His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for he would
have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for the man to ascertain
his identity.
In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the
investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge Bernad
noted that while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on
July 16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue barong tagalog (an
apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not sharp when he was cross-examined regarding more
recent events. For instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but the truth
is that a hearing was held on that date as shown by the transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the absence of a
court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the
chart be left with the clerk of court.
His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical chart for the
entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact, the entries show that
after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to stabilize
her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge
against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and
passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty
tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of
justice."
The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of
his profession has been stressed by this Court repeatedly.
. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing.
Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member
of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992,
pp. 13-14.)
. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges
of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge
of professional duties as a member of the bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders
him unfit to continue in the practice of law. (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)
. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to
those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the
profession, a s well as being subject for judicial disciplinary control for the protection of court, clients and
the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42
SCRA 302, 305.)
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the
legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable
fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the
privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which
tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.
(Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, p. 15.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of
the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of
DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
2 Pimentel vs. Llorente
Adm. Case No. 4680, August 29, 2000
Facts:
Complainant was then a candidate during the May 8, 1995 elections. He filed this complaint against
respondent Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon, in their capacity as members of the Pasig
City Board of Canvassers, for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer’s
oath. Complainant alleges that respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result
that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC), other senatorial
candidates were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while,
on the other hand, petitioner’s votes were reduced. Respondents denied the allegations, claiming that
the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of misconduct.
Held:
Considering the facts, the Supreme Court held that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, despite the fact that the discrepancies,
especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of
votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC were apparent on the face of the documents and that the
variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the 3 [ A.C. No. 2029, December 07, 1993 ]
Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful LUIS G. CONSTANTINO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PRUDENCIO G. SALUDARES,
conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government RESPONDENT.
service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.”
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:

In an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 21, 1978, complainant Luis G. Constantino charges respondent
Atty. Prudencio S. Saludares with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan which
the latter obtained from complainant's son Luis Constantino, Jr.

It appears that sometime in August 1977, respondent borrowed money in the amount of P1,000.00 from
complainant's son Luis, Jr. Respondent procured the loan purportedly for an urgent personal obligation
promising to pay it back promptly the following day.

Respondent failed to comply with his promise. Subsequent demands for payment were then made by
Luis, Jr. but to no avail.

In the interim, Luis, Jr. left the country and afterwards wrote his father, authorizing the latter to collect
the sum of money owed by respondent. Despite complainant's repeated demands however, respondent
persistently refused to pay back the said amount, prompting the former to seek assistance from the Civil
Relations Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through an affidavit-complaint. The Civil
Relations Office in turn endorsed the affidavit-complaint to this Court on April 24, 1978. (Rollo, p. 4)

The complaint alleges that respondent lawyer, by abusing the trust and confidence of complainant's
son, was able to obtain a loan in the amount of P1,000.00 which he unjustifiably refused and still
refuses to pay despite repeated demands. This act, complainant alleges, constitutes conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court and is a clear violation of respondent's oath of office.

In compliance with this Court's resolution dated May 25, 1979, respondent filed his comment on the
affidavit-complaint alleging among other things that the complaint was without basis and malicious in
nature. He however, categorically admits having borrowed money from complainant's son, Luis, Jr. He
reasons out that he was unable to repay the loan because Luis, Jr. failed to appear at the appointed
place of payment. Respondent further cites the fact of Luis Jr.'s absence from the country to justify such
act of non-payment.

Complainant, in his reply, challenged the veracity of respondent's contentions and reiterated his
previous allegation of respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his indebtedness despite repeated
demands.

On October 15, 1979, the case was duly referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 139 of the Rules of Court and was assigned
to the office of Solicitor Jesus G. Bersamira. After the investigation conducted by the said Solicitor,
wherein respondent failed to appear despite due notice, the case was deemed submitted for report and
recommendation. Solicitor Bersamira, however, was appointed to the Bench and no report nor
recommendation was made by him. On November 8, 1984 the case was re-assigned to another
Solicitor.
On March 12, 1990, the Solicitor General rendered its report, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Prudencio S. Saludares be charged with
violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and his Lawyer's Oath and that
he be suspended for 1 year from the practice of law.
Attached is a copy of the complaint for suspension."
(Solicitor General's Report and Recommendation, p. 3)
The Solicitor General found that respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his debt was apparent from the
averments in the affidavit-complaint and this fact was sufficiently established during the proceedings
before the investigating Solicitor. The Solicitor General further adds that respondent's refusal to pay the
debt constitutes a violation of his lawyer's oath under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and
is therefore a proper subject for disciplinary action.
There is no doubt that respondent, borrowed P1,000.00 from Luis Constantino, Jr. purportedly for an
urgent personal need, promising to pay it back the following day. As a matter of fact, the respondent
admits said indebtedness but has not given any just and valid reason for his refusal to pay this debt.
It has been held that when a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him, he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and show
proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which is at all times expected of
him (Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
By his failure to present convincing evidence to justify his non-payment of the debt, not to mention his
seeming indifference to the complaint brought against him made apparent by his unreasonable absence
from the proceedings before the Solicitor General, respondent failed to demonstrate that he still
possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar.
Granting arguendo that he failed to meet Luis, Jr. at the appointed place of payment, respondent does
not deny the fact that he has refused and still refuses to repay the P1,000.00 loan despite repeated
demands by complainant who was duly authorized to collect the same. Had respondent intended to
settle his indebtedness, he could have done so in the several instances repayment was demanded of
him.
It is clear from the records that after Luis, Jr. left the country, complainant and his wife took turns in
trying to recover the debt from respondent, only to be repeatedly turned away empty-handed. This
prompted Luis, Jr. to write respondent a letter dated February 3, 1978 reminding the latter of the
P1,000.00 loan extended to him and at the same time demanding payment thereof. (Rollo, p. 19) This
however, like the other demands, was left unheeded.
The foregoing factual antecedents compel Us to conclude that from the very beginning, respondent had
no intention to honor and/or pay his just debt. We cannot simply close our eyes to the unwarranted
obstinacy displayed by respondent in evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such a conduct, to
say the least, is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar. A lawyer's professional
and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. He must perform
his duties to the Bar, to the courts, to his clients, and to society with honor and dignity (Marcelo vs.
Javier, 214 SCRA 1 [1992]).
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably establish respondent's failure to live up to his
duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only his person but his
profession as well.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provides that a lawyer must not engage in
unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. A member of the Bar must act with integrity, honesty and
professional decorum. He must comport himself in a manner which will secure and preserve respect
and confidence of the public. Both his professional and personal conduct must be kept beyond reproach
and above suspicion. He is required not only in fact to be possessed of good moral character, but must
also be perceived to be leading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
His conduct should be characterized by candor, competence and fairness (Roque Vs. Clemencio, 212
SCRA 618 [1992]).
It bears stressing that a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness and candor. (FellIner vs. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729 as
cited in Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 [1992]). To this end nothing should be done by any member
of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the profession (Lyons vs. Hall [LQ App] 90 So2d 519, 60 ALR 2d 1003 as cited
in Marcelo vs. Javier, supra).
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant, it is
well‑settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer
upon him (Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]).
In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to honor his
just debt to complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. This dishonest conduct was
compounded by respondent's act of interjecting paltry excuses for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid
and just debt.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ORDERS the Suspension of Attorney Prudencio S. Saludares from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the
same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be spread
on the records of said respondent, with copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and duly circularized to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
4 ARRIETA VS. LLOSA (A.C. NO. 4369 11/28/1997)

case digest

FACTS:
A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Llosa by Pike P. Arrieta for allegedly notarizing a Deed of
Absolute sale, wherein, vendors noted were already dead prior to its execution. In answer, respondent
admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But before affixing his notarial seal, he first
ascertained the authenticity of the signatures, verified the identities of the signatories, and determined
the voluntariness of its execution.

However, in a later date, the respondent sought to dismiss the disbarment case admitting to the fact the
instant case is only a product of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of some facts and is now
convinced that everything is in order. The designated Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
recommended the dismissal of the instant case. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the above
recommendation and resolved to dismiss the instant case after finding no compelling reason to continue
with the disbarment proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or suspended from practice of law.

HELD
: YES. Respondent ordered SUSPENDED for six months from practice of law with a warning that
another infraction will be dealt with more severely. Citing Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 also known
as the Notarial law, the Supreme Court explained the importance of adherence to said law as part of the
responsibility of a duly deputized authority to conduct such notarial process. Due diligence is to be
observed, this being part of a lawyers professional responsibility and procedural lapse is not an excuse
to cater to the convenience of clients. Any violation is tantamount to misconduct. Such misconduct is a
ground for disbarment as stated by the Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court stressed the primary responsibility of lawyers as stated in Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes. A lawyer must also refrain from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and
counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity may be disbarred or suspended.

5 SORIANO V. DIZON
Facts:
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that
Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga,
may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon
diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba
problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals…”
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of
his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun.
His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify
disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to “obey the laws of the
land.” The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition
for his probation (you ungrateful person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.
6 [A.C. No. 4515 : December 07, 2010]
CECILIA A. AGNO VS. ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated DECEMBER 7, 2010, which reads
as follows:
"A.C. No. 4515 (Cecilia A. Agno vs. Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan)
On July 14, 2008, this Court promulgated its Decision on the instant complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Cecilia A. Agno against respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR and ONE
(1) MONTH from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a
more severe penalty; and ordered to RESTITUTE the amount of P500,000.00 to the complainant.
On September 16, 2008, this Court resolved to deny with finality respondent's motion for
reconsideration, there being no substantial matters raised to warrant the reversal of the questioned
decision.
Respondent again filed a Motion to Resolve Respondent's Alternative Prayer for New Trial of this
Administrative Case to Avoid Miscarriage of Justice, which this Court also denied for lack of merit on
December 2, 2008.
On December 19, 2008, complainant filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that this Court issue an
order enjoining respondent to immediately comply with the judgment in the present case. Acting on
complainant's motion, this Court issued a Resolution on January 20, 2009, requiring respondent to
submit proof of compliance with the Decision dated July 14, 2008 within ten (10) days from notice.
Respondent then filed a Compliance with Manifestation dated March 20, 2009 stating, among other
things, that even before this case was resolved by Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan, the respondent had already executed an Absolute Deed of Sale covering 5,000
square meters of real property situated in Candelaria, Quezon, in complainant's favor. Respondent also
alleged that said Deed of Sale was delivered to and accepted by complainant, so he was then confident
that this would settle the civil aspect of the case and eventually result in the dismissal of the
administrative charge against him.
Respondent also averred that in the proceedings before the IBP, he had already brought attention to the
amicable settlement of the case which, however, was objected to by complainant's counsel, who
claimed that the property ceded to complainant was no longer owned by respondent, having already
been taken over by the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Even
assuming that the property subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale has indeed been placed under the
CARP, respondent argued in his Compliance and Manifestation that the said Deed is still a valid
contract because he still retained an area of five hectares or 50,000 square meters from which the
5,000 square meters sold to complainant could be taken.
Ultimately, respondent implored this Court to consider the execution of the above-mentioned Deed of
Absolute Sale as full settlement and compliance with the Decision dated July 14, 2008 of this Court
insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned. Respondent also reiterated his prayer for the
reopening of the investigation of the case based on the IBP Commissioner's willful violation of the Code
of Judicial Ethics.
In the Resolution dated April 28, 2009, this Court noted respondent's Compliance with Manifestation
and required complainant to comment thereon.
Complainant filed a Counter Manifestation dated April 8, 2009, in which she admitted that she was
willing to accept respondent's offer of his real property in Candelaria, Quezon, as settlement of the civil
aspect of the case. However, upon acceptance of the Deed of Absolute Sale, complainant verified the
records of the subject property with the concerned government agencies. Records revealed that the
subject property was already acquired and distributed to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries as early
as October 7, 1998. Thus, complainant prayed that respondent be adjudged in contempt of court for
misleading the Court with his purported compliance and his deliberate refusal to comply with the
Decision dated July 14, 2008 of this Court.
The Court, in the Resolution dated June 9, 2009, noted complainant's Counter Manifestation and
required respondent to comply with the Decision dated July 14, 2008, otherwise, he shall be held in
contempt.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated June 9,
2009 Requiring the Respondent to Comply With the Decision dated July 14, 2008, praying therein that
this Court consider the consummated Deed of Absolute Sale as full restitution of complainant's claim
against respondent, considering that complainant did not return the said Deed to respondent.
Respondent also averred that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) had offered P2,618,695.57 as
just compensation for the Candelaria, Quezon property. Such amount is enough to cover complainant's
claim against respondent, and it is still deposited with the Land Bank, Lucena Branch, pending the
latter's appeal of the valuation of his property. In addition, even when respondent's property was placed
under the CARP, there remained a guaranteed retention of five (5) hectares in favor of respondent, as
owner of the property.
In the Resolution dated August 11, 2009, this Court, among other things, required respondent to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to fully and faithfully comply with the
Resolution dated January 20, 2009, and denied with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration.
On September 16, 2009, respondent filed a Manifestation and Compliance with the Resolution of this
Honorable Court dated August 11, 2009. Respondent insisted that he honestly believed that the sale of
his property to complainant for P700,000.00 was duly consummated upon respondent's execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale and complainant's acceptance of the same, in full settlement of respondent's
monetary liability to complainant. Respondent finally stated that he does not have P500,000.00 cash to
pay complainant.
The Court noted respondent's Manifestation and Compliance in a Resolution dated November 17, 2009.
Respondent next filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated March 2, 2010, alleging
that he had already served from July 14, 2008 to September 14, 2009 the suspension ordered by this
Court in its Decision dated July 14, 2008. Hence, respondent prayed that the order of suspension be
lifted to enable him to apply for notarial commission.
In the Resolution dated March 23, 2010, this Court resolved to:
(b) HOLD IN ABEYANCE its action on the aforesaid Motion to Lift Order of Suspension until the said
respondent fully complies with the Decision dated 14 July 2008.
Acting on the Manifestation and Compliance (with the Resolution of 11 August 2009) filed by the
respondent, the Court resolved to:
(a) CONSIDER the Manifestation and Compliance as UNSATISFACTORY; and
(b) DIRECT the respondent to FULLY COMPLY with the Decision dated 14 July 2008 by restituting the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to the complainant within ten (10) days from
notice hereof.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing resolution on the ground that he is "now penniless
and helplessly unemployed due to old age and suffering from poor health." In the Resolution dated June
29, 2010, the Court denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 23,
2010.
In respondent's latest pleading - Motion for Clemency and Reconsideration of the Court's resolution
denying issuance of certification as member of the Philippine Bar dated June 24, 2010 - he prayed that
an order be issued directing the Bar Confidant to issue a certification that respondent is a bona
fide member of the Philippine Bar. Respondent intends to use said certificate for the purpose of applying
for a notarial commission. Acting thereon, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 27, 2010 directing
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to comment on respondent's Motion for Clemency and
Reconsideration.
Presently before the Court is the Comment and Compliance dated October 19, 2010 of the OBC
recommending that respondent's Motion for Clemency and Reconsideration be considered "MOOT and
ACADEMIC as the requested Certificate of Membership in the Philippine Bar has already been issued
to herein respondent," upon request and payment of the corresponding fee therefor. Said Certificate of
Membership in the Philippine Bar dated August 10, 2010, was already received by respondent's
authorized agent.
The Court agrees with the OBC that in light of the latter's issuance of a Certificate of Membership in the
Philippine Bar in respondent's favor, respondent's prayer for an order directing the OBC to issue such a
certificate is already rendered moot and academic. Nonetheless, this Court stresses that said certificate
only serves to confirm respondent's membership in the Philippine Bar, particularly, that he had passed
the bar examinations and signed the rolls. A certificate of membership in the Bar is distinct and
separate from a certificate of good standing/clearance as a lawyer. It is the latter certificate
which is actually required for an application for notarial commission. Respondent could not be
issued a certificate of good standing/clearance as a lawyer considering that per the Resolution
dated March 23, 2010 of this Court, the lifting of his suspension has been held in abeyance
pending his restitution of the amount of P500,000.00 to complainant. The Court is not inclined to
grant respondent clemency or to reconsider its Resolution dated March 23, 2010. To recall, the Court, in
its Resolution dated June 29, 2010, had already denied with finality respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 23, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to:
(a) NOTE the Comment and Compliance dated October 19, 2010 of the OBC;
(b) CLARIFY that respondent has been issued a Certificate of Membership in the Philippine Bar, but not
a certificate of good standing/clearance as a lawyer, and it is the latter certificate which is required for a
notarial commission; and
(c) DENY for lack of merit respondent's Motion for Clemency and Reconsideration dated June 24,
2010." Velasco, Jr., J., on official business.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court
EN BANC
 [A.C. NO. 4515 : July 14, 2008]
legalize the arrangement and to cause the issuance of the corresponding certificate of stocks to Mr.
CECILIA A. AGNO, Complainant, v. Atty. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Respondent.
Khalifa and his group;
DECISION
2. That likewise, the sharing of the profits shall be on an equal basis (50-50) after deducting all the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
pertinent expenses that the officers of the corporation shall be: Chairman of the Board of Directors - Mr.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno against respondent Atty. Marciano J.
Cagatan for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, President and General Manager, Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN or his

designated representative, Treasurer, Ms. Cecilia Agno all of whom shall be members of the Board of
The record shows that respondent was the President of International Services Recruitment Corporation
(ISRC), a corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas employment. On July Trustees together with two others;
12, 1988, ISRC's recruitment license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) for violation of labor law provisions and subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC was forever
banned from participating in overseas recruitment.1 3. That for and in consideration of the above joint ownership of the corporation, Mr. KHALIFA

On Sepetember 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the DOLE's cancellation of ISRC's license with the undertakes as his contribution to the stock ownership thereof, the following:
Office of the President. The appeal was resolved by the said office in respondent's favor in the
Resolution dated March 30, 19932 which set aside the order of cancellation and directed both the DOLE
and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to renew the recruitment license of ISRC (a) To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) initially on or
subject to the payment of a guarantee bond which was double the amount required by law.
before AUGUST 25, 1992, said amount to be used to have the license of ISRC reinstated;
Since ISRC's recruitment license had already expired on September 17, 1989, ISRC filed on April 12,
1994, an application for renewal of its recruitment license with the POEA. 3 (b) Upon the release of the license, to pay the additional amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with the Office of the President, THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) to start the business operations of the corporation and to liquidate
particularly on August 9, 1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 4 with a United
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr. Khalifa H. Juma,5 the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A. pending government and other obligations, if any;
Agno. The Memorandum of Agreement is quoted in toto hereunder:
4. The management of the corporation shall be handled by Mr. KHALIFA and his group while the legal
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
and government liaisonship shall be the responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN; mutual consideration with each

other in the course of the business operations shall be maintained in order to avoid problem with the
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
government, the workers and the employers;

That the undersigned, Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, U.A.E. national, and Mr. MARCIANO J.
5. There shall be a regular accounting of the business every month, with the assistance of a qualified
CAGATAN, Filipino citizen, have entered into this Memorandum of Agreement this 9th day of August
accountant and each of the herein parties shall be furnished copy thereof; the share of the parties may
1992, at Manila, Philippines, concerning the joint ownership and operation of INTERNATIONAL
be released to each of them as often as the parties agree, however, advances against the share of each
SERVICING AND RECRUITMENT CORPORATION (ISRC) and have mutually agreed, in connection
may be agreed upon by the parties;
therewith, as follows:

6. Any claim of workers or other parties against the ISRC before the signing of this agreement shall be
1. That ISRC shall be jointly owned by the herein parties on a 50-50 basis and accordingly, immediate
the sole responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN and Mr. KHALIFA or his 50% ownership shall be free from such
steps shall be taken to submit the necessary documents to the Securities and Exchange Commission to
claims.

Manila, August 9, 1992.
JOMA HUMED KHALIFA : MARCIANO J. CAGATAN
CECILIA AGNO
WITNESSES:
_______________ : _________________
On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years after the execution of the aforesaid
agreement, a Complaint-Affidavit6 for disbarment was filed with this Court by the complainant against
the respondent claiming that the latter used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her
husband, Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the amount of P500,000.00 and that although the
respondent received the aforesaid amount, the complainant learned from her inquiries with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the POEA that the respondent failed to comply with
the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement. The complainant found out that the said Memorandum of
Agreement could not be validated without the approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While
respondent even had the complainant sign an affidavit stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of
ISRC, her appointment as Treasurer was not submitted to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed
that the Board of Directors, officers and stockholders of ISRC remained unchanged and her name and
that of her husband did not appear as officers and/or stockholders thereof. From the POEA, on the other
hand, the complainant learned that ISRC's recruitment license was yet to be reinstated.
The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own personal benefit the P500,000.00 that she
and her husband invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent return the said sum of money,
respondent issued a bank check dated March 30, 19947 in favor of the complainant in the amount
of P500,000.00 which was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Despite repeated
demands by complainant, the respondent failed to settle his obligation or redeem his dishonored check,
prompting the complainant to file a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the
respondent. An information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, charging the
respondent with the said offense and a warrant of arrest was issued against respondent after the latter
failed several times to attend his arraignment. The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the
respondent for issuing a bouncing check and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband
that the Memorandum of Agreement would suffice to install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC
which induced them to invest in said corporation the amount of P500,000.00.
In his Comment,8 respondent denied the charges against him and averred that while ISRC's recruitment
license was cancelled by the DOLE in 1988, such cancellation was lifted by the Office of the President
on March 30, 1993, on appeal. During the pendency of the said appeal, he and complainant's husband
Khalifa entered into a Memorandum of Agreement because the latter offered to buy shares of stock of
ISRC in order to finance the then pending appeal for the reinstatement of the ISRC license and for
Khalifa and the complainant to undertake the full management and operation of the corporation. The
respondent further alleged that Khalifa H. Juma, through the complainant, paid on various dates the
total amount of P500,000.00, which respondent claimed he used to reimburse borrowed sums of money
to pursue the appeal with the Office of the President. According to the respondent, while there were still
legal procedures to be observed before the sale of shares of ISRC to non-stockholders, Khalifa and
complainant were in a hurry to start the business operation of ISRC. Consequently, respondent sold and
assigned his own shareholdings in ISRC for P500,000.00 to Khalifa as evidenced by a Deed of
Assignment9 dated April 26, 1993. The respondent, in turn, issued a check in the amount
of P500,000.00, which was not intended to be encashed but only to guarantee the reimbursement of the
money to Khalifa and the complainant in case the appeal would be decided adversely against ISRC.
Conversely, the check would be returned to respondent if the appeal is resolved in favor of ISRC. The
respondent denied employing fraud or misrepresentation since allegedly, Khalifa and the complainant
decided to buy his shares after being told, upon inquiry in Malacanang, that ISRC had a good case. The
respondent averred that complainant was motivated by bad faith and malice in allegedly fabricating
criminal charges against him instead of seeking rescission of the Deed of Assignment and refund of the
consideration for the sale of the shares of stock. The respondent surmised that they decided not to
proceed with the Memorandum of Agreement when complainant had secured her own license after she
had received the Deed of Assignment and assumed the position of acting treasurer of the ISRC. The
respondent justified the non-submission of copies of the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of
Assignment and complainant's appointment as Acting Treasurer with the SEC because of the
cancellation of ISRC's license to recruit and the pendency of the appeal for reinstatement since 1989.
Aside from a copy of the Deed of Assignment in favor of the complainant and her husband Khalifa
regarding the five hundred shares of stock, respondent also presented in support of his allegations
copies of 1) his Letter10 dated April 12, 1994 to the POEA requesting the renewal of ISRC's license, and
2) a Letter11 dated May 24, 1994 from the Licensing and Regulation Office of the POEA requiring him:
(1) to submit an escrow agreement with a reputable commercial banking corporation in the amount
of P400,000.00 to answer for any valid and legal claim of recruited workers; cash bond deposit
of P200,000.00; and surety bond of P100,000.00; and (2) to clear ISRC's pending cases with said
agency before respondent's request for reinstatement of ISRC's license as a land based agency.
In a Resolution12 dated May 22, 1996, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, held
several hearings, the last of which was on November 13, 2003. During those hearings, the complainant
presented her evidence. For his part, the respondent, instead of presenting his defense before the CBD
in open court, opted to present a position paper which was allowed by the Order dated April 20,
200413 of Commissioner San Juan. However, in lieu of said position paper, the respondent submitted a
Memorandum14 after the complainant had filed her formal offer of evidence. Eventually, on October 12,
2004, Commissioner San Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation.15 Said the Commissioner
in her report:
There is no question that the Memorandum of Agreement between the parties was executed on 9
[August] 1992. In said Memorandum, no mention was made of the assignment of shares of stock in
favor of the complainant and her husband. The conditions stated therein was that the amount to be
contributed by the complainant shall be used for the reinstatement of the license of the ISRC. No
mention was made regarding the assignment of shares in favor of the complainant and her husband.
Respondent presented a Deed of Assignment of shares of stock in favor of the complainant and her
husband worth P500,000.00 dated 26 April 1993, however, it is noted that there is a super imposed date
of 24 November 1994 in a notarial series of 1993 of Mario S. Ramos, Notary Public, which raises doubt
as to the date it was executed. Apparently, the Deed of Assignment was executed when the
complainant started her investigation regarding the true condition of the corporation. Anent the
reinstatement of the license of the company there is no showing that the respondent used the amount
he received from the complainant in compliance with the respondent's undertakings in the
Memorandum of Agreement. The accusation of enticement employed by respondent is supported by the
fact that complainant was made to appear that she will be appointed as treasurer of the corporation,
however there was no action on the part of the respondent to change the composition of the Board of
Directors and the treasurer in the records of the corporation on file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The respondent did not fully reveal the true condition of the corporation regarding the
reinstatement of the corporation's license to operate. Likewise the issuance of a check in favor of the
complainant on 30 March 1994 against a closed account shows the respondent had no desire to return
the money entrusted to him for the reinstatement of the license of the corporation. The letter of the
POEA dated 24 May 1994 xxx clearly show that the payment of surety bond will not suffice to reinstate
the license of the corporation in view of several cases of violations of recruitment pending before the
POEA against said corporation. This fact was not disclosed to complainant when the Memorandum of
Agreement was entered into by the parties.
Thus, the Commissioner's recommendation:
Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent manifested lack of candor, when he knowingly
failed to provide the complainant with accurate and complete information due her under the
circumstances. It is respectfully recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law in the maximum period prescribed by law and to return the money received from the complainant.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-
10216 adopting and approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and recommendation of the
investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding, the Recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's lack of candor
when he knowingly failed to provide complainant with the accurate and complete information due her,
Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and
Restitution of the money received from complainant.
Two (2) days later, or on November 24, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to this
Court the Notice of Resolution together with the records of Administrative Case No. 4515. 17
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 of the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. In IBP
Resolution No. XVII-2006-8319 dated January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent's motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter
already endorsed to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
After this Court noted the aforementioned IBP Resolution on June 28, 2006, a Motion for
Reinvestigation20 was filed by the respondent on September 12, 2006.
Subsequently, on November 15, 2006, the parties were required to manifest within ten (10) days from
notice, if they were willing to submit this case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. 21
In ourResolution22 dated March 5, 2007, we noted without action respondent's motion for
reinvestigation in view of respondent' subsequent compliance and Manifestation dated December 27,
2006. In the same resolution, the Court noted (1) the said respondent's compliance and manifestation of
December 27, 2006 relative to the aforementioned November 15, 2006 Resolution; (2) complainant's
Manifestation dated December 19, 2006, stating that she was willing to submit the case for resolution
based on the pleadings filed and the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors; (3) respondent's
Comment on Complainant's Manifestation dated January 4, 2007; and (4) complainant's Manifestation
dated January 10, 2007.
At the outset, the Court shall resolve respondent's challenge as to complainant's personality to file this
complaint. In his Motion for Reconsideration23 of the IBP Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation of October 12, 2004, respondent contends that complainant, not being a party-in-
interest in the agreement between respondent and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, has no legal standing to file the
instant complaint.
Respondent's argument lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 139-B24 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that proceedings for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the IBP
upon the verified complaint of any person. Accordingly, we held in Navarro v. Meneses III, 25 as
reiterated in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin,26 that:
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Section
1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment
proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from
the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by complainant before
the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions.
(Emphasis ours)
The rationale was explained by us in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,27 viz:
[The] rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct
is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice. (Word in brackets ours)
Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore, immaterial whether or not complainant herein was a party to the
subject transaction. In any event, complainant is actually a party-in-interest thereto because she is
mentioned as the treasurer of ISRC in the Memorandum of Agreement; 28 as well as one of the
assignees in the Deed of Assignment of shares of ISRC stocks which respondent alleged to have
executed;29 and as the payee in the bank check issued by the respondent for the amount
of P500,000.00.30
We shall now proceed to the merits of the case.
The pivotal issue herein is whether respondent employed fraud, deceit or misrepresentation when he
entered into the Memorandum of Agreement with Khalifa and received from the latter a sum of money in
the amount of P500,000.00.
We rule in the affirmative.
The complainant contends that pursuant to their agreement, she gave the amount of P500,000.00 to the
respondent to be used for the reinstatement of ISRC's recruitment license as well as to start the
business operation of the corporation. The respondent, however, claims that complainant misinterpreted
their agreement because the P500,000.00 the latter gave him was in payment of his personal shares of
ISRC stock, as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment.
We are constrained to give credence to the complainant's contention. The due execution and
authenticity of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the parties are undisputed. Moreover,
the terms thereof are clear and explicit that for and in consideration of the joint ownership of ISRC, the
husband of the complainant, Mr. Khalifa Juma, would pay the amount of P500,000.00, P250,000.00 of
which would be used for the reinstatement of ISRC's license, while the other P250,000.00 was for the
start of the operation of the corporation and to liquidate pending government and other obligations, if
any.31 Nowhere in said MOA is the alleged assignment of shares mentioned. The testimony of the
complainant32 on this score is more credible than that of the respondent because it conforms with the
written stipulations in the MOA. In contrast, the respondent's explanations with respect to
the P500,000.00 in question had been inconsistent. The respondent averred in his Comment that
the P500,000.00 was given to him initially for the purpose of pursuing the appeal with the Office of the
President and that he used the same to pay loans or to "reimburse borrowed money" spent for the said
purpose. However, respondent also alleged that since the complainant was in a hurry to start the
business operation of ISRC, the money was used to buy his own shareholdings in the corporation for
which he executed a Deed of Assignment in complainant's favor, which respondent claimed he could
validly do without the approval of ISRC's Board of Directors. His subsequent Memorandum 33 submitted
to the IBP contained new allegations that aside from the P500,000.00 paid by the complainant for his
personal shares of ISRC stocks, an additional P500,000.00 should have been given to him as fresh
capital of the corporation and because of this failure of complainant to put up the alleged fresh capital,
ISRC was not able to put up the deposits required by the POEA resulting in the non-renewal of the
license of ISRC up to the present.
Indeed, the deceit and misrepresentation employed by the respondent was seemingly evident right at
the outset when he entered into the MOA concerning the joint ownership and operation of ISRC with the
complainant's husband, knowing fully well that he could not do so without the consent of and/or
authority from the corporation's Board of Directors. The unilateral execution by respondent of the Deed
of Assignment is a lame excuse offered by the respondent. We agree with the observation of
Commissioner San Juan that the said deed, which was not at all mentioned in the MOA, was executed
by the respondent after the complainant had conducted her investigation of the true condition of the
corporation. The so-called "guarantee check" appears to have also been issued by respondent for the
same reason.
Moreover, while the respondent made it appear in the MOA that the complainant would be appointed
treasurer and her husband Chairman of the Board of ISRC, the respondent had not complied with the
said undertaking as per the Certification34 dated October 13, 1995 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The respondent could not justify his non-compliance with the terms of the MOA by
citing ISRC's inability to comply with other governmental requirements for the reinstatement of its
license for various reasons, since the respondent failed to disclose the same to the complainant and her
husband.
Particularly, the respondent failed to apprise the complainant as to the true state of ISRC's affairs that
the reinstatement of the corporation's recruitment license would require not only a favorable action by
the Office of the President on ISRC's appeal and the payment of a surety bond, but also ISRC's
clearance or exoneration in its other cases for recruitment violations pending with the POEA. 35 The
respondent could not pass the blame to the complainant because of his belated excuse that
complainant failed to infuse an additional amount of P500,000.00. This new defense is clearly an
afterthought and not supported by evidence.
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent has violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as his attorney's oath.
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following :
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.chanrobles virtual law library
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not
only in the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. 36 A lawyer must conduct
himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times.37 For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the
highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor.38 Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the
duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with
others.39 Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court. 40
Hence, in this case, we are in accord with the findings of the IBP Commissioner, as affirmed by the IBP
Board of Governors. What is more, we find respondent to be guilty of gross misconduct for issuing a
worthless check.chanrobles virtual law library
In Sanchez v. Somoso,41 the Court ruled that a lawyer who paid another with a personal check from a
bank account which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely low regard to his
commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers, thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the
profession which he should hold in high esteem. In Moreno v. Araneta, 42 we held that the issuance of
worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.
Respondent herein admitted having issued a check but claimed that it was only to guarantee the
reimbursement of the P500,000.00 given to him by the complainant in case of an adverse decision in
ISRC's appeal with the Office of the President. We note, however, that said check was issued on March
30, 1994 or one year after the appeal adverted to had already been favorably acted upon on March 30,
1993. Hence, our conclusion is that the check was issued only after the complainant demanded the
return of their P500,000.00 investment in ISRC. In any event, respondent's act of issuing a guarantee
check for P500,000.00, when he was presumably aware that at the time of his issuance thereof his bank
account against which the check was drawn was already closed, clearly constitutes gross misconduct
for which he should be penalized.
In sum, the amount of P500,000.00 was received by the respondent for the reinstatement of the license,
but there is no showing that it was used for such purpose, as the respondent failed to give any credible
accounting or explanation as to the disbursement of the said amount in accordance with the stipulations
in the MOA. Respondent failed to disclose all the existing hindrances to the renewal of ISRC's
recruitment license, which enticed complainant and her husband to part with the aforesaid sum of
money. He also admittedly issued a check drawn against a closed account, which evinced his lack of
intention to return the money to the complainant pursuant to his supposed guarantee. It is thus proper ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
for the Court to order its restitution as recommended by the IBP. Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years by the IBP
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Board of Governors to be too harsh considering that this is respondent's first administrative offense. It is
settled that the appropriate penalty which the Court may impose on an errant lawyer depends on the ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 43 Accordingly, for employing deceit Associate Justice Associate Justice
and misrepresentation in his personal dealings as well as for issuing a worthless check, we rule and so ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
hold that the penalty of suspension for one (1) year and one (1) month from the practice of law is Associate Justice Associate Justice
sufficient to be meted out to respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR and ONE
(1) MONTH from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a
more severe penalty; and ordered to RESTITUTE the amount of P500,000.00 to the complainant. RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service."
Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.
SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society as agents of social
SO ORDERED.
change and to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by the less privileged
members of society and expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free legal service
Republic of the Philippines by members of the bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective administration
SUPREME COURT of justice especially in cases involving indigent and pauper litigants.
Manila
SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to
B.M. No. 2012 February 10, 2009 render free legal aid services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent
and pauper litigants where the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other
PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS members of the legal profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
RESOLUTION
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:

Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re: Comment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal
Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said Rule and its
implementing regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of general circulation.
February 10, 2009
(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the National
Labor Relations Commission, National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor
and Employment Regional Offices, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and
National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing lawyers" shall exclude:
(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to
practice;

(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO legal clinics of law schools and lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Associate Justice Associate Justice and peoples’ organizations (POs) like the Free Legal Assistance Group who by the
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ nature of their work already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants and
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES (iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are
Associate Justice Associate Justice employed in the private sector but do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts
of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
 (b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court and Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30
October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);
(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and
administrative in nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal
representation;
(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and in behalf
of an indigent or pauper litigant and the preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall also cover
assistance by a practicing lawyer to indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed mediation and in
other modes of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Services rendered when a practicing
lawyer is appointed counsel de oficio shall also be considered as free legal aid services and
credited as compliance under this Rule;
(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization of lawyers in the
country;
(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically
tasked with handling legal aid cases;
(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked
with disciplining members of the Bar;
(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines located in the
different geographical areas of the country as defined in Rule 139-A and
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing lawyer rendered free
legal aid services. In the case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding an
equivalent or similar position.
The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in agencies exercising quasi-
judicial functions, or a responsible officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited
mediator who conducted the court-annexed mediation proceeding.
SECTION 5. Requirements. -
(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid
services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a period of twelve
(12) months, with a minimum of five (5) hours of free legal aid services each month. However,
where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to render legal aid service for more than five (5)
hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding
periods.
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court for cases where
he may render free legal aid service. He may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about cases where he may render free legal aid
service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter shall regularly
and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court.
The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten (10) days of the
last month of each quarter of the year.
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of
Court attesting to the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a case.
The certificate shall contain the following information:
(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the party or parties in
the said case(s) for whom the service was rendered, the docket number of the said
case(s) and the date(s) the service was rendered.
(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or conducting trial on a
particular case in the court or quasi-judicial body.
(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation, conciliation or any other
mode of ADR on a particular case.
(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing or conference) or pleading filed on a particular case shall be
considered as one (1) hour of service.
The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be retained
by the practicing lawyer, one (1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1)
copy to be attached to the lawyer's compliance report.
(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter
within the court’s jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked with immediately
verifying the contents of the certificate with the issuing Clerk of Court by comparing the copy of
the certificate attached to the compliance report with the copy retained by the Clerk of Court.
(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the concerned
lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit the compliance reports to the IBP’s NCLA for
recording and documentation. The submission shall be made within forty-five (45) days after
the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the practicing lawyers.
(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies the number and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the immediately
preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(i)
and (ii), shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are
employed with the government or incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice or
lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court.
The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together
with the payment of an annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution
shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.
 (g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iii)
shall secure a certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO
to the effect that, during that year, they have served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or
actively participated in the NGO’s or PO’s free legal aid activities. The certification shall be
submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.
(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iv)
shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are neither
practicing lawyers nor covered by Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and
submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with the payment of an annual
contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support for the efforts of practicing
lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services. Said contribution shall accrue to a
special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.
(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000) for that year which amount shall also accrue to the special fund for the legal
aid program of the IBP.
SECTION 6. NCLA. -
(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the IBP local chapters
for the proper handling and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing lawyers can
represent.
(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with respect to
the coordination with Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of certificates
submitted by practicing lawyers.
(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance with this Rule.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by the Clerk of Court
and forms mentioned in Section 5(e) and (g).
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and penalties that will be
paid by lawyers pursuant to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions of this Rule. For this
purpose, it shall annually submit an accounting to the IBP Board of Governors.
The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the Supreme Court in connection
with its request for the release of the subsidy for its legal aid program.
SECTION 7. Penalties. -
(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum
prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through the
NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render the minimum prescribed number of hours. If no
explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall
make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors that the erring lawyer be
declared a member of the IBP who is not in good standing. Upon approval of the NCLA’s
recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not
in good standing. Notice thereof shall be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter
which submitted the lawyer’s compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is
registered, in case he did not submit a compliance report. The notice to the lawyer shall
include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the
special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.
(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) months
from the receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During the
said period, the lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided,
however, that the "not in good standing" status shall subsist even after the lapse of the three-
month period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.
(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least three (3)
consecutive years shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu
proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall afford the erring lawyer due process in
accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. If found
administratively liable, the penalty of suspension in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be
imposed upon him.
(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be submitted under this Rule
or any contents thereof shall be administratively charged with falsification and dishonesty and
shall be subject to disciplinary action by the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of
criminal charges against the lawyer.
(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or
by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an
administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or Chairperson. This is without prejudice to
the filing of the criminal and administrative charges against the malfeasor.
SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). - A lawyer who renders
mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for the three year-period covered
by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: two (2) credit units for
legal ethics, two (2) credit units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for alternative dispute
resolution, four (4) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit units for substantive
and procedural laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed
by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(9), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for at least
two consecutive years within the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the Rules on
MCLE shall be credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit for trial and
pretrial skills, one (1) credit unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units for legal writing and
oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and three (3)
credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2
of the Rules on MCLE.
SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given authority to
recommend implementing regulations in determining who are "practicing lawyers," what constitute "legal
aid cases" and what administrative procedures and financial safeguards which may be necessary and
proper in the implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the various legal
chapters in the crafting of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon approval by the IBP Board
of Governors, the said implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
approval.
SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect on July 1,2009 after
they have been published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
7 St. Louis University High School Faculty and Staff vs. Atty. dela Cruz, AC No. 6010, Aug.
28,2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Ø disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory
High School against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS on the grounds that:
1. Gross Misconduct:
a. pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student
b. a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an
Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of
misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers
c. pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region,
on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.
2. Grossly Immoral Conduct: second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage
o respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera before Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas.
He subsequently married with Mary Jane Pascua before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan
which was subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
3. Malpractice: notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
o On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and
notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondent’s notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification dated 25 May 1999 was
issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court to the effect that respondent had not applied for
commission as Notary Public for the period 1988 to 1997.
Ø Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:
1. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first
marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year
2. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial
commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another 1 year.
Ø IBP Board of Governors approved and adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner.
ISSUE: W/N respondent should be penalized for a suspension of 2 years in total.
HELD:
Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 2 years, and another 2 years for
notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission
Ø A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree
the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath
or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct
of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
Ø Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the
lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life.
Ø One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice must be continuous. Otherwise, “membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer
ceases to have good moral conduct.”
Ø Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage.
As such, he cannot feign ignorance.
Ø the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against
him. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.
Ø Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.
o Immoral conduct-conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community
o grossly immoral- must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree
Ø In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondent’s act as grossly
immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator
and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
1. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost 7 years, he
has not been romantically involved with any woman
2. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person
3. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child
4. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry with relation to his wife
5. After the annulment of his 2nd marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went
to Australia
6. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.
Ø respondent himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble
enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.
Ø imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. I
Ø a penalty of 2 years suspension is more appropriate.
Ø respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no
longer had authority to do so. He alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.
Ø Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 7 ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND STAFF V. ATTY. DELA
Ø The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere CRUZ
casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the
Facts:
requisite commission to do so as “reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x
Disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the SLU-LHS against Atty. Dela
x the crime of falsification of public documents.” Cruz, its principal, on the ff grounds:
Ø The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of a. Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed against the respondent: criminal case for
the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be child abuse; admin case for unethical acts of misappropriating money for teachers; and the
subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty for illegal deduction of salary.
of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging his first marriage. He was married in 1982 and they separated in-fact a year after. 7 years after, he
contracts another marriage, but this was annulled for being bigamous.
in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 in total), from 88-97 despite the expiration of
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which his notarial commission in 87.
provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By acting as Respondent denied the charges in the cases pending against him, but admitted his second
a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the marriage and its subsequent nullification. He also admitted having notarized documents when his
same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered defenses such as good faith, lack of
profession. malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
Ø Other charges constituting respondent’s misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz for 1 year for his bigamous marriage and 1 year also
for notarizing without commission (2 years total)
abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutor’s Office of
Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before Held:
an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the SC finds respondent guilty of immoral conduct, and suspended him from the practice of law for
NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not 2 years, and another 2 years for notarizing documents.
be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of
innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent. Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous marriage.
However, after his failed first marriage, he remained celibate until the 2nd marriage, showed his good
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
intentions by marrying the 2nd wife, and he never absconded in his family duties. The SC finds that
penalty of disbarment is too harsh.
7 SLU vs. DELA CRUZ As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized documents without the necessary
Facts: A disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University- commission, SC stresses notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. For doing such
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, constitutes not only malpractice but also the crime of falsification of public documents. Respondent also
predicated on the following grounds: violated the Notarial Law for so doing, and this falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 and
1. Gross misconduct- he has pending case of child abuse, administrative case and labor case. Canon 7.
2. Grossly immoral conduct – contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The other cases against respondent are pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the
3. Malpractice- notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission. presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
Issue: May a pending case constitutes facts that determines the existence of gross misconduct by the
respondent?
Held: Practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess the qualifications required by law. The purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to
remove from the profession those unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
thereby protecting the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to
punish an attorney.
Contracting a second marriage despite existence of first marriage is a violation of the continous
possession of good moral character as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice.
The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission to do so as “reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also the
crime of falsification of public documents.” Notarization of a private document converts the document
into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must
observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Pending case does not constitute facts that determines the existence of gross misconduct by
the respondent as these are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of
innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
 9 [A.C. NO. 7280 : November 16, 2006]

DAHLIA S. GACIAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ALEXANDER BULAUITAN, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment instituted by the herein complainant Dahlia S. Gacias
against Atty. Alexander Bulauitan on grounds of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Herein respondent Atty. Alexander Bulauitan used to own a parcel of land with an area of 1,242 square
meters located at Tuguegarao City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79190. Sometime
in February 1996, complainant and respondent entered into an agreement for the purchase, on
installment basis, of a 92-square meter portion of the 1,242-square meter lot at a unit price of P3,500.00
per square meter. Out of the total consideration of P322,000.00, complainant initially paid respondent,
as down payment, US$3,100.00, or its equivalent of P82,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt dated
February 28, 1996. Subsequent installment payments were remitted, as mutually agreed upon, to the
Bank of Philippine Islands, Kamuning Branch, under the account of respondent's daughter, Joan
Christine. All told, complainant had, as of November 1996, paid the respondent, in cash and in kind, the
peso equivalent of US$6,950.00, which, per complainant's computation, using the $1:P43 dollar-peso
rate of exchange, amounted to P300,000.00.
As complainant would also allege in her affidavit-complaint dated April 23, 2001,1 as amended,2 she
asked for the copy of the title over the 92-square meter portion upon learning about the mortgage the
respondent constituted over his Tuguegarao property. According to complainant, respondent's inability
to produce the desired title impelled her not to complete payment anymore and to request the return of
the amount she had already paid the respondent. Complainant further alleged that the respondent
agreed, but has not made good his undertaking, to make reimbursement. Her request for assistance
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) proved futile, too. Meanwhile, the mortgagee bank,
China Bank, foreclosed the mortgage constituted on the respondent's property, then consolidated the
title over it in its name.
In his answer in compliance with an order from the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent
admitted entering into a land purchase agreement with the complainant, but stressed the private nature
of the transaction between them. He described as premature the complainant's demand for delivery of
title inasmuch as the aforementioned agreement was not consummated for complainant's failure to pay
in full the purchase price of the 92-square meter portion. Respondent admitted, though, that he
undertook to pay back the amount of P300,000.00 as a measure to avoid scandal, given what to him
was complainant's penchant to make a scene whenever the opportunity presented itself.
To the answer, complainant countered with a reply, to which respondent filed a rejoinder.
In the meantime, complainant, upon the facts above narrated, filed a criminal complaint for estafa
against the respondent before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan.
Following several failed preliminary conferences and hearings, IBP Bar Discipline Hearing
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J. E. Reyes issued, on July 22, 2005, an order 3 declaring the case as
submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and position papers submitted by the parties, with
their attachments.
In its report dated November 8, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommends that
respondent be adjudged guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
The recommendation to suspend and the findings holding it together commend themselves for
concurrence.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest or
deceitful conduct.4 The complementing Rule 7.03 of the Code, on the other hand, provides that "a
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." Another
complementing provision is found in the Rules of Court providing that a member of the bar may be
suspended or even removed from office as an attorney for any deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in
office.5 And when the Code or the Rules speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not
confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer's professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession,
would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
invest him with. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza.6 "[T]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of
the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, including
dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity."
Like Atty. Adaza in Orbe, respondent Atty. Bulauitan also refused without justifiable reason to comply
with his just obligation under a contract he entered into with the complainant. There can be no quibbling
as to the complainant having paid respondent the amount of P300,000.00 out of the total contract cost
of P322,000.00. In other words, there had been substantial contract compliance on the part of the
complainant. A reciprocal effort towards complying with his part of the bargain would have been
becoming of respondent, as a man of goodwill. It would appear, however, that this kind of gesture was
alas too much to hope for from the respondent. For, instead of going through the motion of delivering
the portion of his property to its buyer after his receipt of almost the entire purchase price therefor, the
respondent mortgaged the whole property without so much as informing the complainant about it. Like
the IBP investigating commissioner, the Court finds the respondent's act of giving the property in
question in mortgage bordering on the fraudulent and surely dishonest. The Court, to be sure, takes
stock of respondent's attempt to make amends by promising to return the amount of P300,000.00. But
this promise strikes the Court, as it did the IBP investigating commissioner, as a mere ploy by the
respondent to evade criminal prosecution for estafa, what with the fact that he has yet to make good his
commitment to return.
Respondent had shown, through his dealing with the complainant involving a tiny parcel of land, a want
of professional honesty. Such misdeed reflects on the moral stuff which he is made of. His fitness to
continue in the advocacy of law and manage the legal affairs of others are thus put in serious doubt too.
The private nature of the transaction or the fact that the same was concluded without the respondent
taking advantage of his legal profession is really of little moment. For, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him wanting
in honesty, probity or good demeanor.7
While the Court agrees with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline respecting the guilt of respondent
and the propriety of a suspension, it is not, however, inclined to impose the severe recommended
penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, herein respondent, ATTY. ALEXANDER BULAUITAN, is found guilty of gross
misconduct and dishonesty and ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year effective upon his receipt hereof. Let copies of this decision be spread on his record in the Bar
Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
10 AILEEN A. FERANCULLO v. ATTY. SANCHO M. FERANCULLO, AC. NO. 7214, 2006-11-30
Facts:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Aileen Ferancullo (petitioner)
against Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. (respondent) grounded on his alleged commission of estafa,
bigamy and violation of the lawyer's oath. Both parties have starkly... contrasting stories to tell. Hence,
the necessity of presenting both versions.
February 2004, a certain SPO1 Lino Taytay referred her to respondent as she was in need of legal aid
concerning a string of complaints for estafa filed against her
Respondent purportedly advised complainant to stay for the meantime at his office located at GF-7,
Elenel Apt.,... 2243 Luna corner Mabolo Sts., Pasay City, to avoid arrest and to keep her safe from the
people suing and threatening her.
hat allegedly became the start of his courtship. Complainant averred that respondent... would send her
breakfast and flowers. When asked about his personal circumstances, respondent supposedly told
complainant that he was still single although he had a child out of wedlock. Complainant also
maintained that she saw no apparent indications suggesting that respondent... was married.[4]...
between February and July 2004, complainant purportedly entrusted to respondent varying amounts of
money totaling Four Hundred Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P431,000.00) based on his assurance that
her cases merely involved money claims which can be settled amicably
Complainant further alleged that she and respondent moved to a unit at Parrison Tower at F.B.
Harrison, Pasay City sometime in April 2004, where they started living together as husband and wife.
The unit was purportedly owned by a client of respondent who agreed to offset the... amount of rental
with the legal fees due him
Complainant found out that she was pregnant sometime in June 2004. On August 4, 2004, complainant
and respondent allegedly wed in a rite solemnized in Kawit, Cavite.[11] In support of this averment,
complainant annexed to the complaint a photocopy of the... marriage certificate.[12]... married to a
certain Marlin M. Maranan. Complainant then confronted respondent who allegedly admitted that he
was... married but assured complainant that he was ready to leave his wife so that they can be together.
The relationship between complainant and respondent turned sour eventually leading to their
separation.[13]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued its Report and Recommendation to dismiss the complaint
against respondent for lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said Report
and Recommendation... in a Resolution[32] dated 20 March 2006, finding the recommendation to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the
complaint lacked merit.
Issues: For what ethical breaches then may respondent be held liable?
Ruling:
Contrary to the IBP's opinion, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent maintained an illicit
relationship with complainant who was not his legal wife. It also appears that respondent contracted a
second marriage with complainant as evidenced by their marriage... certificate.
There is substantial evidence suggesting that more than a business or professional relationship
existed... between complainant and respondent. Complainant presented certain evidence either proving
her claim or demonstrating as incredible respondent's defense that complainant was merely extorting
money from him. For instance, to prove her allegation that she and respondent lived... together,
complainant presented the original of the retainer agreement between respondent and the owner of the
condominium building where they allegedly lived together.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
On several occasions, the Court has held that an illicit relation is considered disgraceful and immoral
conduct which is subject to disciplinary action.[43] In Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,[44] it was held:
Respondent's intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife shows his moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.[48] It is a time-honored rule that good
moral character is not only a condition precedent... to admission to the practice of law
The exacerbating circumstances present in the cited cases are absent in this case. Moreover,
complainant failed to prove that respondent misappropriated her money. Thus, the Court finds that
suspension from the practice of law is adequate to penalize respondent for his grossly... immoral
conduct.
Principles:
11 Guevarra vs. Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala
A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Facts:
On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the
respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her
friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read “I
love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very
late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work.
When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal
or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22,
2001 complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding
to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11
Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He
also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Emmanuel Eala.
Held:
Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall
not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be
convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of
Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress in
a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional
in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly
immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold.
Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
12 Gross Immorality of Lawyer (Bigamy)
Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
A. C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012
Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) filed this complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (respondent).
Facts:
In this Complaint for disbarment, complainant Villatuya charged Atty. Bede
S. Tabalingcos with:
1.) Unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy
firms as fronts for his legal services;
2.) Non-payment of fees to complainant despite having promised to
complainant (a financial consultant), via a verbal agreement, that the latter
would
be entitled to
₱ 12 MANUEL G. VILLATUYA v. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012 Case
50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by
their clients; and
3.) Gross immorality for marrying two other women while his first marriage
was subsisting, as supported by three different marriage contracts bearing
the name of respondent and three other women secured by the complainant.
In his defense, respondent asserted that complainant himself was
unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no
verbal agreement between them regarding the sharing of professional fees
paid by his clients. He presented documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any
unlawful solicitation. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
II. Issues
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
non-payment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married
Thrice
III. Ruling
1. Under Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. There was no violation
of this provision in this case, for complainant failed to proffer convincing
evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
2. The Court held that respondent indeed used the business entities such as
Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., both
owned by him, to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services,
purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the
facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers
from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not prohibited from
engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though,
when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as
to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.
3. Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy
twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IV. Adjudication:
The Court resolved the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and
solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly
immoral conduct
Digest
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against
respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a
comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation.
In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, complainant and
his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The commission ordered
the parties to submit their verified position papers.
In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was
employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate
rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be
entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition
to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued
by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases
that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that
respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as
fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of
committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was
subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an
employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the
financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent
in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of
fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the
salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To
support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the
Vice-President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality,
respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as
having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts of respondent
wherein he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification
issued by the NSO.
On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant,
claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that criminal cases for
bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He
also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage
contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and
Pilar Lozano on different occasions.
The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent moved for the
suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending outcome of petition for
nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative case
against him be submitted for resolution.
On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the
specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain
shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services
and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third
charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to
the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his
name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to
disbar him was premature.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed
their Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to
complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
RULING:
First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.
Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur
with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is
violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law.
In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a
layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the
lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in
this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this
matter.
Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.
In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated
the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from
soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent
with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that
can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used
as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer,
would be regarded as the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc.,
which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a
means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice
of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering
consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules
2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third charge: Bigamy.
The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural
technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by
the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.
First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of
public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications
or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainant
submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the
latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third
marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his
first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct
which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be
expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and
honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court,
demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients
may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of
committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and ordered that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.