G.R. No. 221697 Llamanzares who was then based at the US.

Grace Poe then

became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his
vs. father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents. demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to
be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the
x-----------------------x
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
G.R. No. 221698-700
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents. MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA
9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship.
FACTS:
From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe
declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years
and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in
Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974.
She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she
cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was
a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her
COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the
ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for
Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born
Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen.
For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-
born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as
being shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos,
aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there
are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s
bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial
evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural
born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935
Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-
born citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as
covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year
residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS
MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled
with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to
US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225.
Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.
G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
FACTS:  Rommel Arnado is a natural bon Filipino citizen who lost
his citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen.
Subsequently, he renounced his American citizenship and ran as a
Mayor of Lanao del Norte. After he was proclaimed the winner, the
COMELEC anulled such proclamation and consequently directed
that the order of succession under the Local Government Code be
followed. Maquiling, another candidate for mayor, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the election
intervened the case, claims that he should be proclaimed as the
winner. 
Arnado's candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission on election offenses as provided for in the Omnibus
Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes
cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. The old doctrine was that the vice mayor or the
vice governor, as the case may be, shall succeed the disqualified
winning candidate, not the candidate for the same position who
had received the next highest vote.  

ISSUE:  Is the rule on succession in the Local Government Code

applicable?

DECISION:  No, it is not applicable. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The disqualifying circumstance surrounding

G.R. No. 210164               August 18, 2015 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, ROGELIO BATIN

vs. CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORANTE AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., Respondents.
CAPITAN, Respondents,

FACTS: Petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero and private respondent

Jonathan Enrique Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of
Batanes. Nanud filed a Petition to the COMELEC to deny due
course to or cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy
(COC) that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes
despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-resident thereof.
During the conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested
that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and the
petition was served by registered mail not in his address in
Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy
of the petition during the conference. Petitioner did not file an
Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private
respondent’s substantial allegations in his petition.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that

petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan,
Batanes within one year prior to the election.
 niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case
Without the COMELEC Resolution becoming final and executory, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties
elections were subsequently held and petitioner won. Petitioner to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.
then filed for a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En
Banc, which denied the aforesaid motion. In Tolentino vs. COMELEC and De Castro vs. COMELEC the Court
held that “in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC En Banc gravely erred in its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC
disregarding the clear import of procedural rules provided for must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules I resolving election
under COMELEC Resolution No. 9523. disputes.”

HELD: NO. While private respondent failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on the
mode of service, the settled rule, however, is that COMELEC Rules
of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the
COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as
provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure, to
wit:
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. – In the interest of justice and in
order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before
the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be
suspended by the Commission.
The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even
suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including
obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it.
This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of its objectives – ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as
achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC.

Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope

with all situations without concerning itself about procedural
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time
of his election.
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs. RULING:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
LEE, respondents. No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996 Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs. He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
FRIVALDO, respondents. local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship
under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated
  that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he
really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
FACTS: accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725.
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and by naturalization, or by repatriation.
assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with
the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and
proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted
the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that
his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of
survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law
Dictator’s agent abroad.

ISSUE:
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, this disqualification.
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold
elective office on the ground that he is both an American citizen
and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the United States of
Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified
Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to the Local
Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running any public position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to
hold or run office in the local position.

RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is
inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA
G.R. No. 148326      November 15, 2001 Accused knows at the time of the issuance that there is no
sufficient fund on the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, full upon its presentment.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.
CAGAS, respondents.
The presence of the 2nd element represents moral turpitude as
stated in the ruling of People v Atty. Fe Tuanda where conviction
for violation of BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral
Facts: Petitioner seeks to annul Comelec resolution disqualifying
character of a person.
him as congressional candidate of Davao Del Sur and for the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and denial of motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner was disqualified upon the petition of
his rival candidate for disqualification on grounds of his previous
conviction in violation of BP 22 (bouncing check law) which
constitutes moral turpitude, a ground for disqualification for
electoral candidacy under the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: WON a violation of BP 22 constitutes a disqualification for

electoral candidacy.

Ruling: A violation of BP 22 involves the following elements:

Accused makes, draws, issues any check to apply to account or for

value;
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999

ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a

vs. full term of office for two reasons, he cannot be considered elected
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and as the proclamation was void and he also did not voluntary
EUFEMIO MULI, respondents. renounce office, but was involuntary severance from office.
  The petition is granted and the resolution of the COMELEC
declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two
1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections
Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation was contested and resulted to declaring
his opponent winning the election and ordered Lonzanida to
vacate the office. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again
filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for
disqualification on the grounds that it is a violation of the three-
term rule. COMELEC granted the petition. Petitioner filed a
petition challenging the validity of the COMELEC resolution.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s assumption of office from May 1995 to

March 1, 1998 is considered full term of office for the purpose of
three-term rule
G.R. No. 201716               January 8, 2013

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit
vs. rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on
VEGA, Respondents. Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of
FACTS: RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004,
2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three
Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor. In terms.
both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as
the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service
and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of
the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos
2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over
three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken
one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections
during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title
where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat
which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have
relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers
been the rightful choice of the electorate.
disqualification to run.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019
the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of
the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO, PETITIONER, v.
the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NORBERTO B.
VILLAMIN, AND SENANDRO M. JALGALADO,
been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his
RESPONDENTS.
opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary
interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to
have served the full 2004-2007 term.

Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in
the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.
During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from
exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period during
which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a
rest period or break in his service because prior to the judgment in
the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was
exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid
proclamation.

Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995 arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to
the Philippines then. 
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner,
vs. Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after
RODRIGUEZ, respondents. conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged flee to avoid prosecution. 

Facts:   Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight

Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code.
Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to
Governor of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is.
this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against There was a pronouncement from the Chairman
Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because he is a that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment,
“fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR. 
Government Code.

Sec. 40.    Disqualifications. The following persons are Issue: 

disqualified from running for any elective local position:
         xxx          What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be
(e)   Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political followed? 
cases here or abroad

Held: 

Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after
criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his
support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as G.R. No. 192221               November 13, 2012
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. 
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local vs.
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M.
"fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who PACETE, Respondents.
has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law. 

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon

law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and
considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when
there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it
must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative
rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but
must remain congruent to it. 

G.R. No. 206666               January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a
Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position of President but was
opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of
the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc.
Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of
votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured
into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of
Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing
Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual
Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second
Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that
President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively
restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President
Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest
votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground
as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed
as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in
public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former
President Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded
by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal
bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were
issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in
the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored
to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of
the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person
who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction
by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter
alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position. Petition is dismissed
G.R. No. 195229               October 9, 2012 G.R. No. 193237               October 9, 2012

EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner, DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,

vs. vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J.
ANTlPOLO, Respondents. CARDINO, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 193536

AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.

FACTS: Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26,

1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old
and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008,
at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his
brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he
took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
hence, he was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009
he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn
renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.)
9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential
property in the same village where he lived. He applied for
registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent
Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act. Election
Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the
COMELEC voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for
the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list. MTC
denied Erasmo’s petition. He appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same
as MTC’s. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for
the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny due
course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that Jalosjos made
material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply
with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year
residency requirement of the Local Government Code. COMELEC
ruled against Jalosjos, because it failed to comply with the 1-year
residency ruequirement. Jalosjos won the elections
ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency
requirement
HELD: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’
domicile of origin, the place of his birth. His domicile was changed
from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for
26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by
choice. But, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to
live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his
allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And
he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
G.R. No. 189698               December 1, 2009
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO,
JR., Petitioners, Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,

Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC

FACTS: Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive office

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the

third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be

Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his

they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. certificate of candidacy“

BACKGROUND: ISSUE:

Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13

paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the

Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of

unconstitutional. the constitution.

HELD: The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not

The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification if the groupings

second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real

of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from

Resolution 8679 as constitutional. the other.

RULING: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 individual or class privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or

Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and employees the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit

from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not

civil service officers and employees in partisan political campaign demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that

is unmistakable. all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and

conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced.


The equal protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable
ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and
appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue
of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.
G.R. No. 189698               February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer
election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the
Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person
holding a public appointive office or position including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.b) Any person
holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same
or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their
offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions
in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,
filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No.
8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution,
contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing
of their CoCs.
The SC in its 2009 decision penned by Justice Nachura ruled that
the said resolution is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Hence this motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the provision on the deemed resigned is violative
of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not the provision suffers from Overbreadth
Ruling:
1. No. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our
Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be
mistaken. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding
apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not
cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned 8or
controlled corporations with original charters.] This is because
elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in
partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of
the campaign period. Political partisanship is the inevitable
essence of a political office, elective positions included
The law does not violate the equal protection clause. Farias ruling
on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned
provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum.  the legal
dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification,
as there are material and significant distinctions between the two
classes of officials. the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is
a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant
distinctions between the two classes of officials. the legal
dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification,
as there are material and significant distinctions between the two
classes of officials. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected systematic abuse perpetuated by a powerful political machine that
to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only has amassed the scattered powers of government workers so as to
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on the
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an reins of power.
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in
The restriction is valid regardless of the position sought, even for
a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
baranggay elections. it is well to note that from as far back as the
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. The
enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has
dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is
intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by
therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was
special rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations
made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. In any
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is
event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that
outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding
balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of
provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also
deferring to the sovereign will.
to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth
challenge would still be futile. 
2. No. According to the assailed Decision, the challenged
provisions of law are overly broad because they apply
indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts,
without due regard for the type of position being held by the
employee running for elective office and the degree of influence
that may be attendant thereto.
G.R. No. 191084               March 25, 2010
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan
vs.
potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M.
PAGDANGANAN, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the
winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of
Bulacan, besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin
of 15,732 votes. Respondent filed the Election Protest which,
anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by
petitioner.
Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently
filed by the parties, the COMELEC Second Division went on to
render the 1 December 2009 Resolution, which annulled and set
aside petitioners proclamation as governor of Bulacan and
proclaimed respondent duly elected to said position. Coupled with
a directive to the DILG to implement the same, the resolution
ordered petitioner to immediately vacate said office, to cease and
desist from discharging the functions pertaining thereto and to
cause a peaceful turn-over thereof to respondent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing resolution with the COMELEC En Banc on the ground
that lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of the
Commission pursuant to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. However, the motion was dismissed in a Resolution
dated 8 Feb 2010. Petitioner filed before the COMELEC an Urgent
Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010.
Anchored on the same ground, petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the
Office of the Solicitor General argue that, in addition to its
premature filing, the petition at bench violated the rule against
forum shopping.
ISSUE: Is the assailed COMELEC Resolution valid?
HELD: No, the assailed resolution is not valid. The failure
of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote
even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the
dismissal of respondent's Election Protest.
Even before petitioners filing of his Urgent Motion to Recall the
Resolution Promulgated on 8 February 2010 and the instant
Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, the record shows that the COMELEC En
Banc issued the 10 February 2010 Resolution, ordering the re-
hearing of the case on the ground that "there was no majority vote
of the members obtained in the Resolution of the Commission En
Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010." Having conceded one of
the grounds subsequently raised in petitioners Urgent Motion to
Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010, the
COMELEC En Banc significantly failed to obtain the votes required
under Section 5(a), Rule 3 of its own Rules of Procedure for a
second time.
The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required
majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should
have caused the dismissal of respondents Election Protest.
Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article
IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any
trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically
provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the
Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed
cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed;
and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied.
The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its
literal tenor cannot be gainsaid. As one pertaining to the election
of the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondents Election
Protest was originally commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to
its exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Although initially
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said
election protest on motion for reconsideration before the
Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered an appeal.
Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly
observed in the lone dissent penned by COMELEC Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento, respondents Election Protest was filed with the
Commission "at the first instance" and should be, accordingly,
considered an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the
Commission."
There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by
the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the
kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the
case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial
court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate
jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a
motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where
a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the
required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands
affirmed.
Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant
case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest
invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest,
as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which
process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for
reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is
reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall
be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be
deemed affirmed.
In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no
completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will
complete the process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in
the form of a majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other
choice except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the
Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding
that has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an
appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed,
reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and
resultingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. GRANTED.
G.R. No. 154512             November 12, 2002
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto
Princesa City, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto
Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy.
MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary
Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and
Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and
PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA,
JR. respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 154683             November 12, 2002
VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. Nos. 155083-84             November 12, 2002
MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and
BIENVENIDO OLLAVE, SR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S.
HAGEDORN, respondents.
Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against
Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the
recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the
recall election.
Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were
consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for
the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground
that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city
for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998
immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner
for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to
run in the recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive
full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.
Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is
found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
“Section 8.  The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.  Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
provides:
 “Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b)  No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected.”
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve
for more than three consecutive terms.  The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule.  The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office
for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate re-election for a fourth term.  The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term.  Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons.  First, a subsequent election like a
recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three
consecutive terms.  Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission,

what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a
fourth term following three consecutive terms.  The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth
term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of
the third consecutive term.  A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but
not an immediate re-election after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking

immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election
involving the same term of office.  What the Constitution prohibits
is a consecutive fourth term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on
September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third
consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001.  The immediate
re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking
referred to the regular elections in 2001.
G.R. No. 161872             April 13, 2004
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
 DECISION:  Dismissed 

FACTS:  Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy

(COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner
and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political
party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of
Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public
service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can
afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying
him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal
qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government.  
G.R. No. 206004               February 24, 2015

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner,
ISSUE:  Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold office  vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
 PANGASINAN; BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
BRGY. STO. TOMAS, SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN,
Board of Election Tellers of Prec. Nos. 30A/30A1, 31A,
31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO PLACIDO, respondents.

Facts:
Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased
husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that
petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents
wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801
and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits
substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended
that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was
the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the
only candidate running.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec
denied petitioner’s request that she be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling:
G.R. No. 154198            January 20, 2003 There being no specific provision governing substitution of
candidates in barangay elections, a prohibition against said
PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner, substitution cannot be said to exist.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ELECTION
OFFICER LUDIVICO L. ASUNCION OF SAN JACINTO,
Petitioner’s letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy
when COMELEC issued its resolution denying the same. In the
contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of
votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases
should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
G.R. No. 199612               January 22, 2013
RENATO M. FEDERICO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR and OSMUNDO M. MALIGAYA, Respondents.
FACTS: Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo
M. Maligaya (Maligaya) were candidates for the position of
municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the 2010 Elections.
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the
gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died. Edna
withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
mayor. She then filed a new COC and a Certificate of Nomination
and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute
candidate for her deceased husband.
On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed
with the Office of the Election Officer his COC and CONA as
official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute
candidate for mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna.
Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Federico before the Comelec. Maligaya
sought to have Federico declared ineligible to run as substitute
candidate for Edna since the period to file the COC for substitute
candidates had already lapsed after December 14, 2009.
The COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna as
substitute gubernatorial candidate in the Batangas province and to
that of Federico as substitute mayoralty candidate.
But the official ballots had already been printed. On the day of
elections, the name “SANCHEZ, Edna P.” was retained in the list
of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest
number of votes - 28,389 against Maligaya’s 22,577 votes.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed Edna as
the winning mayoralty candidate. Maligaya filed his Petition to
Annul Proclamation of Edna Sanchez. This petition was later
withdrawn.
The MBOC credited the same number of votes garnered by Edna to
Federico and proclaimed the latter as the winning candidate.
Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federico as
mayor.
Meanwhile, Maligaya’s petition to deny due course and to cancel
the COC of Federico was denied by the Comelec Second Division.
The Comelec First Division denied Maligaya’s petition to annul the
proclamation of Federico for having been filed out of time.
Maligaya elevated the matter to the Comelec En Banc. The
Comelec En Banc issued the assailed Resolution granting
Maligaya’s partial motion for reconsideration. The Comelec En
Banc was of the view that the annulment of Federico’s
proclamation was in order because of his invalid substitution of
Edna, as his substitute COC was filed beyond the deadline and due
to the illegality of the proceedings of the MBOC in generating the
second COCVP without authority from the Comelec and without
notice to the parties.
Federico filed the present Petition for Certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Pending resolution of the case, Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva
(Intervenor Silva) of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, filed his Motion for
Leave to Intervene, praying essentially that as Federico failed to
qualify, he should be adjudged as his legal successor as mayor,
under the Local Government Code.
ISSUES: Could Federico validly substitute Edna who
withdrew her candidacy for the mayoralty position?
Granting that Federico was disqualified, should he be
succeeded by Intervenor Silva under the LGC or be
replaced by Maligaya?
HELD: The electoral commission committed no grave abuse of
discretion. FIRST ISSUE: Federico’s substitution of Edna Sanchez
as mayoralty candidate was not valid. SECOND ISSUE: There
being no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number
of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec
came out with Resolution No. 8678. On substitution, Section 13
thereof provides, “the substitute for a candidate who withdrew
may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided for the
office affected not later than December 14, 2009.”
 succession under Section 44 of the LGC cannot be
invoked. DENIED.
In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the
substitute should have filed a COC by December 14, 2009.

When Batangas Gov. Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010,

Edna withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substituted her late
husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29,
2010. The party actually had the option to substitute another
candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By fielding Edna as their
substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she had to
withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the deadline
for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no
person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden
death of then Governor Sanchez and the substitution by his widow
in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated substitution in
the mayoralty race.

As Federico's substitution was not valid, there was only one

qualified candidate in the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas -
Maligaya. Being the only candidate, he received the highest
number of votes. Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly
elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 elections.

Considering that Maligaya was the winner, the position of G.R. No. 215995
Intervenor Silva that he be considered the legal successor of
Federico, whom he claims failed to qualify, has no legal basis. VICE-MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE, Petitioner,
There is simply no vacancy. When there is no vacancy, the rule on vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC and WINSTON
B. MENZON, Respondents.