CONSTITUTIONAL LAW appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after
executing an affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 221697      March 8, 2016
x–––––––––––––––––––––––x
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
  G.R. No. 221698-700
PEREZ, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo
on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the parental care and custody over
petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she
has been reported and registered as a foundling and issued a
Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given
the name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses
Ronal Allan Kelley (aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe
(aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her adoption. The trial court
granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in
1986; in 1988, she applied and was issued Philippine Passport by
the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her passport.
She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies
after enrolling and pursuing a degree in Development Studies at
the University of the Philippines. She graduated in 1991 from
Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in
Political Studies.
She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to
flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to her
eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the
Philippines.
She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came
back to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for
president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her youngest
daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few
months, she rushed back to the Philippines to attend to her ailing
father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005
and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed suit;
acquired property where she and her children resided.
In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children which was
granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport;
before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a Certificate of
Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.
In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner
obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator
on 16 May 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency
for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The
petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she
cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were
Filipinos.  The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she was in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations
in her COC.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6
votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency.  Three
justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship
issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
Held: 
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be
considered a natural-born Filipino.
It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
as there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or
language permitting discrimination against foundlings as the three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the
laws.
Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported
by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.
Source:
Poe-Llamanzares v COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. No.
221698-700, March 8, 2016. Retrieved
from: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1964/dec1964/gr_20089
_1964.html.
Note: Special case assigned to the class related to Article 49 of the
Civil Code.
By:
JOY G. DE LOYOLA
Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna
CASE DIGEST: MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND
ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents. (March 8, 2016;
G.R. No. 221697).

Grace Poe-Llamanzares wishes to run for the Office of the

President of the Republic of the Philippines. However, she's a
foundling. Her parents are unknown. Mr. and Mrs. Militar who
found the infant Grace in a church gave her to Mr. and Mrs. Poe,
her adoptive parents.

Under the Constitution, no person who is not a natural-born citizen

shall serve as President of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Is Grace a natural-born citizen or a naturalized citizen

or something in between?
HELD: Grace is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal
principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from
the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption
is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the

present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1)
those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,
ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he
is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
 CIVIL LAW
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-20089. December 26, 1964.]
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO
X. VELEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir, for Defendant-Appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for Plaintiff-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; WHEN
ACTIONABLE WRONG. — Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs, for which the erring promisor must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY BE
AWARDED IN AN ACTIONABLE BREACH OF PROMISE
SUIT. — When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded
under Article 2219 (10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may
also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven
that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner.
3. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS IN
PETITION FOR BELIEF MUST STATE FACTS
CONSTITUTING DEFENSE. — An affidavit of merits supporting
a petition for relief from judgment must state facts constituting a
valid defense. Where such an affidavit merely states conclusions or
opinions, it is not valid.
4. ID.; TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER; CLERK OF COURT MAY
BE VALIDLY DESIGNATED. — The procedure of designating
the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT’S CONSENT TO DESIGNATION
OF COMMISSIONER NOT NECESSARY WHERE HE IS IN
DEFAULT. — The defendant’s consent to the designation of the
clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is not necessary
where he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court.
6. AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT; MUST CONTAIN FACTS AND
NOT CONCLUSIONS OF FACT. — Affidavits of merit to be
valid must contain facts and not mere conclusions of facts.
7. ID.; ID.; WHEN CONCLUSION OF FACT, NOT A FACT,
DEEMED CONTAINED IN AFFIDAVIT. — An affidavit of
merit stating no facts, but merely an inference that defendant’s
failure was due to fortuitous events and/or circumstances beyond
his control, is held to contain a conclusion of fact, not a fact.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and
hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors,
but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their
mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September
4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note
for his bride-to-be:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Dear Bet —
"Will have to postpone wedding. My mother oppose it. Am leaving
on the Convair today.
"Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That
would only create a scandal.
Paquing"
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following
telegram:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY
SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.
PAKING"
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of
court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.09 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00
as attorney’s fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders,
judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it out. But the court, on
August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear
before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement."
It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for
relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
resolution."cralaw virtua1aw library
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before the court.
Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer
for two weeks the resolution on defendant’s petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de
Oro City — the latter’s residence — on the possibility of an
amicable settlement. The court granted two weeks counted from
August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by
the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and
his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in
its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to
appear on July 13, 1956. This time, however, defendant’s counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were
nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant’s
aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court.
In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant
alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment
by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no
answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being
negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an
affidavit of merit stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant’s affidavit of merits attached
to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and
valid defense against plaintiff’s cause of action, his failure to
marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous
event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of
merits like this, stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of
facts is not valid. (Cortes v. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951;
Vaswani v. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits
was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the
judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been
based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province
of Pangasinan v. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court
pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now
Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant’s consent to
said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was
declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez v.
Ramas, 40 Phil., 787; Alano v. Court of First Instance, L-14557,
October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration,"
defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason
given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing"
an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in
Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960) as
reiterated in Estopa v. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that
"mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong.
We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the
draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts

not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "Any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."cralaw virtua1aw library

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant
applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued. (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends
and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to- be’s trousseau,
party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was
bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6;
Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for
plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother
opposes it . . ." He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the
next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and
was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As

stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his aforestated petition that the damages

awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the award of
actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is
that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219(10) of the new Civil Code,

moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article
21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends
that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the new Civil Code the condition precedent is that
"the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under
the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly
acted in a "wanton . . . reckless [and] oppressive manner." This
Court’s opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated

modification, the lower court’s judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,

Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi (CASE DIGEST)

GR No. 119190

16 January 1997

TOPIC: Persons, Persons and Family Relations, Family Code,

Psychological Incapacity, Legal Medicine

FACTS:
On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married.
Although they slept in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, no sexual intercourse took place. Because of this,
they submitted themselves for medical examinations. She was
found healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her husband’s
examination was kept confidential.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual, and that the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen,
to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and
to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. The plaintiff
is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his
wife’s fault. He claims no defect on his part, as he was found not to
be impotent, and any differences between the two of them can still
be reconciled. He admitted that they have not had intercourse since
their marriage until their separation because his wife avoided him.
He added that his wife filed this case against him because she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewellery of his
mother, and, that the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he
is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within
the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding
that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. However, neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
But the fact remains that there has never been coitus between them.
At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party,  the question of who refuses to have sex with
the other becomes immaterial.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
“to procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal
of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The petition is DENIED.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS and GINA
LAO-TSOI, respondents G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997

FACTS:

On May 22, 1988 and Chi Ming Tsoi had their marriage at the
Manila Cathedral, Intramuros Manila. The first night of their
married life was spent in the house of Gina’s mother. Both of the
slept in the same room and in one bed, but there was no sexual
intercourse that occurred between them. Similar events happened
until the fourth night. From the day of their marriage until the day
of their separation, no intercourse has taken place between them.
For this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to
Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, who is a urologist in the Chinese General
Hospital. The results of Gina’s tests were disclosed, but the
petitioner’s results and medications were kept confidential.
Subsequently, Gina filed a motion to the Regional Trail Court of
Quezon City to nullify their marriage and the Train Court granted
the motion and stated their marriage void. Chi Ming Tsoi, the
petitioner then filed a motion to the Supreme Court appealing that
it is Gina, respondent, who had a problem on sexual intimacy.

ISSUE:

Is refusal for sexual intercourse a connotation of psychological

incapacity?

RULING:

yes, because the prolonged refusal to have sexual intercourse with

his or her spouse is an indicator of psychological incapacity. Chi
Ming Tsoi admitted that he is unwilling to perform sexual
intercourse with his wife, whom he love and who has not resisted
to his supposed approaches. This is an indicator of personality
disorder which is related to psychological disorder. The Supreme
Court denied the petition because of the lack of pieces of evidence.
Moreover, the petitioner stated several erroneous arguments. One,
he said that there is no concrete evidence as to who, between them,
is suffering from psychological incapacity. Second, he attempted to
have sex with the respondent, but it is she who refused. He added
that a possible reason for her refusal may not connote a
psychological incapacity, but a physical disorder. The Supreme
Court disagreed with the arguments presented by the petitioner,
thus declaring the sustained judgment of the respondent appellate
court. The Court of psychological incapacity. For the second
argument, the Court argued that if that was the case, then the
petitioner should have discussed with the respondent what is
bothering her, but he never did. In addition, considering that the
petitioner did not go to court before the respondent, it weakens the
arguments that he presented.