Poe-Llamansares vs COMELEC

Facts:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September
1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported
and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-
Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the
name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted
their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,
the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the
lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate
of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. Without
delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in
the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the
local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511
and DD156616. On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish
in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the
couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991.

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
1992. Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born
in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively.

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire
family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.
The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's
schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester; coordination
with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the
U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be
followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit
her job in the U.S.

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a
Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Juan City in the second half of 2005. The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006. Meanwhile, her children of school age began
attending Philippine private schools.

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. The family home was eventually
sold on 27 April 2006. Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006,
arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July
2006.

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City where they built their family home and to this day, is where the couple and their
children have been residing. A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in
the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003. Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three minor children on 10 July 2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI
acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her
Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the
names of her three (3) children.

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August
2006. She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.
This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No.
EC0588861 by the DFA.

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following
day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office
as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila
an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that day, she
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she
had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others,
of relinquishing her American citizenship. In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that
she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29
July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
City on 14 October 2015.

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of
several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

In a Resolution promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that
petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC
First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for
certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary
restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives
from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The
Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.

Issue:
1. Whether or not she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
2. Whether or not petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did
not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship.

Held:
1. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should
have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling
did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her
parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos. Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City.She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black
hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a
child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a
class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Domestic laws
on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide
that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in
the first place to be adopted. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention
and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the
jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the
empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual
certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations.

2. R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC where we described it as an "abbreviated
repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v.
Commission on Audit, which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, where we said that "[t]he
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno
v. Commission on Audit is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying
"that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from
birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine
how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to
disagree with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already
rejected in Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time
of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In
Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the
1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens.

David vs Senate Electoral Tribunal

Facts:
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). On
October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States in
the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011. On this occasion, she
also filled out the Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.
On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality
for Senator Poe. The certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of
State, on February 3, 2012.
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. On September 27, 2012, she
executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the Commission on Elections on
October 2, 2012. She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested the election of Senator
Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the
1987 Constitution." Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01
requiring David "to correct the formal defects of his petition." David filed his amended Petition on
August 17, 2015. On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1)
Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate
Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4)
Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of Court.

Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21, 2015.91 The
parties were then "required to submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the
submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date."

On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission of DNA test
results. The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015 through
Resolution No. 15-08. On November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the
results of DNA Testing, which stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took provided
results that would shed light to the real identity of her biological parents." The Manifestation also
stated that Senator Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue and submit any
development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted "the issue of her
natural-born Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal arguments set forth
in her submissions to the Tribunal. On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator. On November 23, 2015, David moved for
reconsideration. avid's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal
on December 3, 2015:

Issue:
Whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding
that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Held:
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological
parents are unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly
makes reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction
in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable
interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established personal circumstances of
private respondent. It could not have asked the impossible of private respondent, sending her
on a proverbial fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose
because private respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for
an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical
consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution
provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and
the implications of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.

On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which
principally governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born
citizens." This definition must be harmonized with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a
reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual
milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts,
and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent's
Filipino parentage.

On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its
mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal
access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons
for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments. Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at
birth. This status' commencement from birth means that private respondent never had to do
anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic
Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term "natural-born citizens."
This is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As against Section 1's generic
listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count themselves as natural-born.
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and naturalized.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines
"from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By
necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born.

Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is
on point. To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must look into
whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an
inquiry into whether she underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino.

She did not.

At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual
naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and more effective way to terminate
this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack of proof.

At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to foundlings, as well as
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at analogies are
misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly
devised. The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose
capacity to act is restricted. It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the
relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the grant of which is
contingent on evidence that he or she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be
discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It
privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the
restrictive process of naturalization.

So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born status is clear. It

should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be contrasted,
not against other procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for
the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens. Apart from how private respondent is a natural-
born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of
natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a
presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise.
Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof must show that both—not
just one—of a foundling's biological parents are not Filipino citizens.

Tecson vs COMELEC
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter “FPJ”), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines under the KoalisyonngNagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be “Fernando Jr.,” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, his date
of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr., Respondents,” initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003
before the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions—first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days
later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

Issue:
Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the
presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?

Held:
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of
the 1935 Constitution. Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that
the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had
not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September
1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17
May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestizaEspañol mother, Marta Reyes.
Introduced by petitioner was an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In
the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan
F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-
one years old and married. In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or
not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954,
in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the
totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

Republic vs Lim
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a
petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule
Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
4933.

In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan
City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her
Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be
corrected.

During the hearing, respondent testified thus:

First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all
her school records and in her marriage certificate. She presented a clearance from the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".

Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co
Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."

Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that
her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her
mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a
Filipino citizen.

Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were
both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter’s father were never married
because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.

In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil
registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage
between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.

The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although
it actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining
respondent and her witnesses.

On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s petition

Issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE
CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM "CHINESE" TO "FILIPINO" DESPITE
THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.

Held:
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply
only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly
an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married.
As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to
become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

Co vs House of Representatives
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was
held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Issue:
whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held:
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.

Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the
community.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.

The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years
was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records
to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971,
his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the
basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born
citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly
situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was
meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render
those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative
provisions. There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the
time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected
or chose to be a Filipino citizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age
is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen.
Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn
statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In
1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

In re: Application for Admission to the Bar of Vicente Ching

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila
A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his
birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled
on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching’s citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching’s petition for admission to the
bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" n strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An
Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that" (w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election
upon reaching the age of majority." In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not
formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar
circumstances surrounding Ching’s case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing
rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of
the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. Since Ching has
already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has
elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his
citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

Issue
whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

Held:
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article
IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age
of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that" (t)hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over
to the 1987 Constitution which states that" (t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before
the effectivity of the new Constitution.

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. It is true that this clause has been construed
to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice
has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship
is not indefinite.

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years
old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
"upon reaching the age of majority," Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. The
Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and
his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to
disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he
reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship
is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age
of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Cabiling Ma vs Fernandez
Facts:
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma
(Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma
(Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a
Filipina.
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of
the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60)
years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education
in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and
they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines.
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates
of Registration (ACRs).

Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that "(t)hose
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr.
executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before
then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. On 14 January
1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City,
Surigao del Norte. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C.
Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7
March 2005.

Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have
the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was
only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that
Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied
with the registration requirement.

On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of Immigration charged them for
violation of Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations,
the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), composed of the public
respondents, rendered a Judgment dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children
violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum
Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively. In its
Resolution30 of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially reconsidered their Judgment of 2
February 2005. They were convinced that Arceli is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No.
613, Section 13(g). However, they denied the Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Felix
Ma and the rest of his children. On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
after finding that the petitioners "failed to comply with the exacting standards of the law
providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in the Philippines either as
aliens or as its nationals.

Issue:
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who
executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents
of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation
as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?

Held:
Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It
was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly
done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship
has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such
election. We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public
official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say
is that where, as in petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents
of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship
have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine
citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine
public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. In the
instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration
of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will
confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that
citizenship has been claimed.

Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present
status having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity
except that which they chose upon reaching the age of reason.

Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR
presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on account of the new requirement to present
an E-series ACR, they are deemed not properly documented. On the contrary, petitioners
should not be expected to secure E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with the
election of citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts made public, among
others, their exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted
stay in the Philippines since birth. The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with
petitioners’ election of Philippine citizenship.
The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have been
indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that liberalized the requirement on time of election, and
recognized positive acts of Philippine citizenship.

The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution of the constitutional
provision on Philippine citizenship.

Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching their age of majority, upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they
automatically become Filipinos and need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority.

We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement
under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born
citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941
statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the
obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.1avvphi1

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect
Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly
negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still
be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The
documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the
civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate
agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the
administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of
Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.

Yu vs Defensor-Santiago
Facts:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4
July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. After manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf
of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. Counsel for the parties were
heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits,
and to file memoranda. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the
Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the
Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino
citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November
1988. On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining
order dated 28 November 1988.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5
December 1988.

Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December
1988. Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of
which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of
Commissioners on 2 December 1988. Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral
argument on 8 December 1988.

In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention was filed by petitioner on
13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14
December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the
lifting of the TRO.

The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is
urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from
immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of
Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, urgent motion
for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, the memorandum in furtherance
of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988, motion to set case for oral argument dated
8 December 1988.

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated
9 December 1988, and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988,
the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice
within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines
despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport.

Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December 1988
followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed
on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining
order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.

Issue:
whether or not the person has renounced his Philippine citizenship

Held:
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in
1971, valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the
proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10
February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a
citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality
as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai
Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese
citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as
a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself
as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such
resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

Maquiling vs COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 28 April 2010, respondent
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."To further bolster his claim
of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009. In the matter of the issue of citizenship,
however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED.’

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one
for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,
having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of
proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and
granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that
time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again. Maquiling filed
the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the
winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Issue:
whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.

Held:
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary
act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for
an elective position. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and
voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and
privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced
his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and
that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America."

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status
as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s
bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position. In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven
days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport
after renouncing his American citizenship.

Frivalado vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer
dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged
but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only
to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced
upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law
Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title
should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within
ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue
under the said section.

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask
that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing
on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the
respondents.

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a
naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.
They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to
prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab
initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one for quo
warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it
was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that
the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League
but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.

Issue:
whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held:
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of
them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have
been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of
allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I
absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen,"
meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. If he really wanted to disavow his American
citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD
No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is
between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he
did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that
he became a stateless individual. Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated
himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been
constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary.
That is far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It
would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned
citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply
filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

Republic vs De la Rosa
Facts:
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of
Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under
Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16,
1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which
should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the
posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule,"
where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged
that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the
scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to
January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).

The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition
was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a

citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the
rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).

On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before
respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted
with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a
timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is a Filipino citizen.

Held:
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the
Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It
is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes,
even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient
or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was
formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special
procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private
respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken
therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements
under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for
hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and
a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and
a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2)
that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak
and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship;
and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the
justification therefor.

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400
[1992]).

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who
vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of
arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of
the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six
months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation
and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his
receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195
[1974]).

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to
observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself
continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any
act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.

Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision
granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.

Respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Labo vs COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January
20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26,
1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or
twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the
filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. The Court notes that while
arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to
pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of
citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of
citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is
regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner
insists upon.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen.

Held:
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that
he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified
in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his
duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot
stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also
worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled
after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country.
What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship
and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he
may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines. Under CA No. 63 as amended by
PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim,
that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any
judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon
him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725.

Aznar vs COMELEC
Facts:
n November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy
with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18,
1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground
that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by
the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that
private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No.
B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March
27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers
from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him
until the final resolution of the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First
Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of
sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is a Filipino citizen.

Held:
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation
of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws
of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose
his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of
losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing,
the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken
and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does
not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a
Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost
his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish
this fact. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of
allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up
to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private
respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

Mercado vs Manzano
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III.

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on
the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons
with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. On May 19, 1998,
petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Petitioner's motion was opposed
by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor
of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Issue:
whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship

Held:
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.9 For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
father's' country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Clearly, in including §5
in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160,
§40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members
of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child
of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of another country is something
completely beyond our control." However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age
of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority
age.

Bengzon III vs HRET

Facts:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.
Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision
in its resolution dated April 27, 2000

Issue:
Whether or not Teodoro Cruz is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held:
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways
of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)
not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not
been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed
any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode
of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of
the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover,
repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration

Facts:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great
(grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a
period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y,
Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen
Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions,
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962
(Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of
respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary
injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-
in-law, or sisters-in-law.

Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the
instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the Order
of this Court, dated March 19, 1962. The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His
Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the
brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was
shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter,
it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost
ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in
her womb for seven months a child by her husband."

Issue:
Whether or not the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer
on the latter Philippine citizenship.

Held:
It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the
matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a
Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of
submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.

Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the
appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the
alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly
Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary
of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series
of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office,
I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not
requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be
naturalized. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified
to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from
any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Altajeros vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the
May 10, 2004 national and local elections.

On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered
voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny
due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a
Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he]
was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country."

Private respondents alleged that based on a letter1 from the Bureau of Immigration dated June
25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of
Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of
Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.
On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer stating, among others, that he did not commit
false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December
17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus,
petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run
as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition.

In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the
findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution
stated, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby

disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled
and his name deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections

On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following
documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus
entitled him to run for an elective office. On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?

Held:
The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration."
Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of
Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on
February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore,
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position, but before the elections. Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed
Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation
of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-
born Filipinos. The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation
retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons
quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997.
Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May
10, 2004 elections.