2015 PREBAR REVIEW NOTES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:
A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting
waters and other natural features which are closely interrelated
that such islands, waters, and other natural resources form an
intensive geographical, economic, political entity or to have
historically regarded as an archipelago.
- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one
or more archipelagos and may include other islands.
- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat
Kalayaan Group of Islands (KGI) and Scarborough Shaol:
whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines;
and/or consider as part of the regime of islands.
- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of
Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of DND.
Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of Palawan.
- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as
scarborough reef, Panatag Shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in
the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the province
of Zambales. A shaol is a triangle shaped chain of reefs and
islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of
150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis:
terra nullius; 200 EEZ
- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire
archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The
Philippines essentially claims only the western section of
Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.
configuration of the archipelago, including the extended
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it more
compliant with the UNCLOS.
- It redrew the country’s baseline to comply with the UNCLOS
requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the
disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal from
the main archipelago and classifying them instead as “regime of
islands”. They excluded from the baselines. The national territory
constitutes a roughly triangular delineation which excludes large
areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular
enclosing the Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of
Paris.
- Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) – consists of islands
or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water that
remain above water during high tide. The principle forces
claimant states over a certain territory to maintain peace in the
area because no country can claim exclusive ownership of any of
these islands. The islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.-
- Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16,
2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KGI and the
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse
legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have
committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First,
Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such
baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2)
of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not
exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the
total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical
miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty
 over the KGI and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades,
these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from
the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any
straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint
will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago”.
- Constitutional issues:
Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of
Paris vs. RA 9552
- Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and
right of overflight
- 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and
Contiguous Zone) – READ: UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)
- Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)
- Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and
complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the
consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign
power are within the territorial domain of the host State. The
ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the
foreign State to which the premises belong.
- Kalayaan Island Group
a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
f) RA 3046 (demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State)
g) RA 5446 (reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah in North Borneo
h) RA 9552
- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra
nullius
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
- Republicanism
- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot
interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon
vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive
privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643,
Mach 25, 2008)
- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,
et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).
 Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of
legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief
executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that
either department now comprises different and non-
intermingling official personalities with the end in view of
ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system
of check and balance between the two. The avowed intent of
Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative
functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the
executive functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10, 2005).
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 Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).
Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate
legislation)
Tests of valid delegation:
1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17,
2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,
3/19/97; Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Exec. Sec.
- Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice,
GR No. 203335, February 11, 2014- In order to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court
has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to prevent the delegation from running riot.
- Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]
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- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimente vs.
Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of
customary law (Mejoff vs. Director of
Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no
obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires
the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a
procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of
the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The
classical formulation in international law sees those customary
rules accepted as binding result from the combination two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that
the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of
a rule of law requiring it.
- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582, April
8, 2010- At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these
Yogyarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlines in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. Xxx Using even the most
liberal lenses, these Yogyarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors,
are – at best - de lege refenda- and do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature,
i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
 rights, most of which amounts to no more than well-meaning
desires, without support of either State practice or opinio juris.
- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 – generally accepted
principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.
- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was
enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles
of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political
Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict
is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are
not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect
– a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a
treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law
of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]
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- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor,
June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend “compelling state interest”.
- Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours,
the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom
of personal and religious activity.
- Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014-
Conception refers to the moment of “fertilization” and the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. Xxx Only those
contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited.xxx ection 7 of RH law which excludes parental consent
in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had miscarriage is anti-family and violates Section
12 of Art. II. Also, Section 23(a)(ii) is unconstitutional as it denies
the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
“non-surgical procedures”.
- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. This right implies, among other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country’s
resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal
vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local
government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of
local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state of an “imperium in imperio”
(unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or
otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it
is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to
local governments.
- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No.
183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of the Philippine territory for independence.
- An association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. Xxx In international practice,
the associated state arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full
independence. Xxx The concept of Association is not recognized
under the 1987 constitution.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
- Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., GR No.
195649, April 16, 2013- Citizenship is not a matter of
convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant
civil and political rights accorded by the State to its citizens, It
likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to
one’s flag and country.
- Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007-
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner
into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her the
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privileges of a citizen. Xxx Under current and existing laws, there
are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to RA
No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to CA No. 473 ,
as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law
enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father
at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian
passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute
an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate
against the claim of Filipino citizenship.
- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a person’s citizenship
may be done through a direct action for its nullity.
- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions
in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is
effective:
1. the mother of the person making
the election must be citizen of the
Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority.
- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the “evolvement
from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election
requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express
classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987
Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941
statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election
should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.
- The Court concluded that, “having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is
the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship.
Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the
 election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother.
The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.”
- Republic of Phil vs. Nora Fe Sagun (Feb 15, 2011)- there is no
specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of
a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the
courts. CA 625- election within reasonable time is 3 years from reaching
the age of majority
- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1)
desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied forces
in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage
of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity.
- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995,
is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b)
of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
To claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor
age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by
the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs.
CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that
Tabasa’s parents lost their Philippine citizenship “on account of
political or economic necessity”].
- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper
civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite
in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
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- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of one’s
application for repatriation. Supra.
- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before he
lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino.
- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,
amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)-
including citizens repatriated and unmarried children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18
years of age of those repatriated.
- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA
630- The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens).
In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual
citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship.
The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy
constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
- The phrase “dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) of the LGC
must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”.
Consequently, persons with dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. It should suffice if, upon filing of their certificate
of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship.
- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009-
The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino,
who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an
American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for
 public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has
applied the twin requirements to cases “which involve natural-
born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another
country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In
the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a
natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized
citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA
No. 9225 do not apply to him.”
- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 –
Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his
citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply
with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary
that the candidate for public office must state in clear and
unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008
– Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual
allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.
- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January
19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225
governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a
foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal
that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the
natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic
Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent
with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence
either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is
also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant
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when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run
for public office. Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public
office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19,
2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they
are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it
must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public
office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount
to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.
The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable
because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.
- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of
Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual
 citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the
Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements,
which will restore their good standing as members of the
Philippine Bar.
- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The
Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international
law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable
to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the
Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as
follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than
one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status
and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize
exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in
which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of
the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in
fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth
but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and
acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the
outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which
had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and
confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German
national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its
citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice
held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he
was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989
- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007-
It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225
is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
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become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out
of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting
the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned
foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5, Article IV
of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were
not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate
to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including the Supreme
Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier
vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a
“citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The
term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant,
2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3)
an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April
1899. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion
on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
 under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization”
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father
of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate.
- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not
distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child
of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The
civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of the Philippine citizenship.
- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA
292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same.
- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res
judicata principle) 1.) a person’s citizenship be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.)
the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) – grants
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens
born and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply
for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status
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by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend
the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent
Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and
jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly
procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a
matter that maybe raised by private persons in an election case
involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino
citizen’s acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. The “green card” status in the USA is a renunciation
on one’s status as a resident of the Philippines.
- Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, GR No. 195649,
April 16, 2013- The act of using a foreign passport is not one
of the acts enumerated in CA No. 63 constituting renunciation and
loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position. Xxx The
citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation
of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens citizenship issue to attack.
ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)
- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right
is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law.
- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others
the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996).
- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of
residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individual’s permanent home or a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent.
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile:
1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly
acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at
any given time.
- Absentee voting – under Section 2 of RA 9189 – is an exception
to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.
- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision
in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals"
to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals”
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter
under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators).
It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence,
to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to
vote.
- Residence is equated with domicile. In election law, residence is
synonymous to “domicile,” not necessarily with a person’s home
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address. A man may have several places of residence but has only
one domicile. Or he may be a nomad or travelling salesman with
no permanent home. Nonetheless, the law recognizes one
domicile for him.
- There are three kinds of domicile: 1) domicile of origin—that
is, a child follows the domicile of the parents; 2) domicile by
operation of law; and 3) domicile of choice made freely by a
person of legal age.
- Domicile of choice “imports not only the intention to reside in
one fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent for business or
pleasure or for like reasons, one intends to return.” Makalintal vs.
COMELEC, July 10, 2003. In short, domicile of choice is a question
of fact. One intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent (animus
revertendi).
- Settled jurisprudence recognizes three rules to determine a
person’s domicile: First, everyone must always have one of the
three kinds of domicile; second, once established, a domicile
remains the same until a new one is acquired; and third, a person
can have only one domicile at any given time.
- Applied to Poe. As a foundling found in Jaro, Iloilo, she acquired
the domicile (and citizenship) of her parents who, according to
“generally-accepted principles of law,” are presumed to be
Filipinos. So, her domicile of origin is Jaro, Iloilo. After she married
an American and moved to and worked in the United States, she
lost her domicile of origin and followed the domicile of her
husband in America. When she and her husband moved back for
good here after the death of Fernando Poe Jr., she acquired a new
domicile of choice in the Philippines. As to when she acquired
it depends, on her clear intention, conduct and physical
presence in the new location.
- In Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995), the Supreme Court held
that “the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy, [is] decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the Constitution’s residence qualification
requirement.” The Supreme Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos
made an honest mistake in writing “seven months residence” in
her certificate of candidacy for a congressional seat, a period less
than the constitutional requirement of “not less than one year”
for that position.
- Recent jurisprudence. Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009) held
that residency is not dependent on citizenship because even a
foreigner can establish a Philippine domicile.
- More clearly, Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009) ruled that a
former Filipino who was naturalized abroad may choose to
reestablish his/her domicile here even prior to the reacquisition
of citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law.
- Said the Supreme Court: “[I]n order to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur: 1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, 2) an intention to
remain there, and 3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. “The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.”
- Moreover, Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010) ruled that the
abandonment of a home in Australia, renunciation of Australian
citizenship, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and settling
down in Zamboanga Sibugay show an “intent to change domicile
for good.”
- Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013) clarified, though, that
the use of an American passport after a renunciation of American
citizenship effectively reverses such renunciation and disqualifies
one who reacquired citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law
from being elected to a public office.
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- (References: Columns of Fr. J.Bernas and Justice A. Panganiban)
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino
citizen’s acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation of
one’s status as a resident of the Philippines.
- But: Q. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA
9225 have the effect of restoring his Philippine domicile?
- A. No. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to
stay in the Philippines. After he does that, his occasional absence
from the recovered domicile does not have the effect of removing
him from the domicile for as long as he manifests animus manendi
et revertendi (Japzon vs. Ty, January 19, 2009)
ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13,
2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is
that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with
other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he
prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2)
questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the board of
canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and the due
execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of
RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.
- Non delegation of legislative power
- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
 delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the
EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as
sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;"
"adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and
equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy
and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices."
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability,
security and affordability of the supply of electric power” and
“watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations
on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent
unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could
not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of
the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule
making authority under RA No. 8177.
- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-
Power of Subordinate Legislation – with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by “filling” the details which Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of legislative power.
It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the
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law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the
12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified
fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation
of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive.
- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the
President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12%
came from Congress and the task of the President is simply to
execute the legislative policy.
- Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement
that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule of
presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act
of both chambers. It can be exercised neither solely by one of the
two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers.
- The President’s Ordinance Power is the Executive’s rule-
making authority in implementing and executing constitutional or
statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers
vested in the Executive that are self-executory.
- Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No.
166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR,
the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of
the Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.
- Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No.
180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED
under RA 7722.
- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008-
Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives
 and to reapportion legislative districts is vested
exclusively in Congress.
- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No.
1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list
of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The last sentence of Section
7 of R.A. 7941 reading: “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall
not be shown on the certified list” is certainly not a justifying card for
the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition
imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the
same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read
into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from
disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the “Certified
List” the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an
absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The
interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No.
7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups
- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October
6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006
– Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is not mandatory. It
merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and RA
7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation:
the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the
2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the
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total votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat
in the House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4) proportional
representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled
to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes”.
- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%
threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those
garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit
our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters.
The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the
17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of
the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second,
we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed
all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The
Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed
all political parties to participate in the party-list elections.
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups. In defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as
either “a political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
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- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to
establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through
the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing.
The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate
with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate
in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its
fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI)
can do the same for the urban poor.
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-
up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives
found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section
5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of
the House of Representatives to Congress: “The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.” The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-
list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives
from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
- ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April 2,
2013- In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013
and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:

- 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
- 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations
do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
- 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party
list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
- 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.”
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
- 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent
those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
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- 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
- The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist
elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, and (2) all nominees
must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along
sectoral lines and do not represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to
the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they
may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because
they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even
if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed
above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under
such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.
- Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no
specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum
population that must compose legislative district. For while a province
is entitled to at least a representative with nothing mentioned about a
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly situated.
- Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010- In
this case, there is no official record that the population of the City of
Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected prior to the May
2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a
legislation district of its own under Section 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution.
- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010
- that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting standards that the
“marginalized and underrepresented sector must demonstrate (1) past
subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an immutable
or distinguishing characteristic, attribute, or experience that define
them as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or economic
powerlessness.”
- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown “that the LGBT sector has
been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against because of
negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of violence
perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by reason of their
sexual orientation and gender identity.” It added that the magnitude of
opposition against petitioner’s participation in the party list system is,
by itself, demonstrative of the sector’s lack of political power; so, too,
is the fact that proposed legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory
treatment against LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.
- LEGISLATIVE PERKS – (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) –
The history of the provision granting Senators and Congressmen
immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of
innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of
civil and politicsl rights.
- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever
his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecnoming of a member thereof (Osmeña vs. Pendatun).
- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard
Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election
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to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a “private
organization merely performing public functions”, and that the
“PNRC Chairman is not a government official or employee.” Not
being a government office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held
by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of
Congress. NRC is “autonomous, neutral and independent” of the
Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that “does
not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress”. The PNRC is not a
part of any of the government branches. PNRC Chairmanship is
not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of
the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution.” Senator Gordon can
validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his
senatorial position.
Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the
members. The base in computing majority is normally the total
membership of the body, within the coercive power of the House.
Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority
simply means the greater number or more than half. Who
shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note:
splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and another
Senator). When the Constitution provides that the Senate
President shall be elected by the majority it does not
delineate who comprises the majority or the minority. The
defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate presidency are
not necessarily the minority.
- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA
268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in enacting a
law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in
the absence of showing that there was violation of a constitutional
provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere
procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.
- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmeña vs Pendatun, The House of
Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case which
will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the
legislature.
- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as
congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his
offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to
be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of
congress, for the people elected him with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action and movement.
- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to
shield a member of congress from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the
immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at
most by correctional penalties.
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress
to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13 of
RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.
- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of
the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators
elect. This does not fall within the powers of the electoral tribunal.
The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests in which
contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also
have himself inducted into office.
- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras
vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his
election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winning candidate
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divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the proclamation.
- RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al. -
clearly under law and jurisprudence, it is the State thru its
reps. Designated by statute, that may question the illegally
or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. HRET no matter
how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it
authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of
naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong.
To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on
the citizenship of the father which is not permissible.
(Aug. 23, 2011).
- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in
the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail
one’s eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to
file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a
petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the
HRET Rules.
- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10,
2002- Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending
the proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc
was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the
said Order of the 2nd Division. The said Order was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality, the timely filing of
the motion for reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot,
thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the 4th
District of Leyte.
- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity
of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division was seasonably
challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for
reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
 jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET
cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase “election,
returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s
title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that “election”
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; “returns” to the canvass of the returns
and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” to
matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against
the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive
jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code),
nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in
elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members
of the House of Representatives.
What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors” in the
certificate of canvass or election returns”. To be manifest,
the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass
or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections
thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has
jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation
of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.
- This Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and
resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or
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excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power
because of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission; Pena vs. HRET).
- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of
congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution.
- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not
lost upon the instance of the parties bu| continues until the
case is terminated.
- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates
only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.
- Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506,
respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list nominees
are considered as “elected members” of the House, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
- Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808, June
26, 2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) vested the COMELEC
with “jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives
and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee” and that no
grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELEC’s First
Division and COMELEC En Banc which had declared President
Villanueva the proper party to submit CIBAC’s Certificate of
Nomination instead of Perla, who allegedly served as acting
 secretary-general. As provided in Atienza v. Commission of
Elections, COMELEC also possesses the authority to resolve intra-
party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally
mandated power to enforce election laws and register political
parties. “The power to rule upon questions of party identity and
leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its
enforcement powers,” the Court declared
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the
SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of
Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.
- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of
Representatives is authorized to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do not
include temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political
party must have at least two senators to be able to have a
representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such party a membership in
the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).
- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even
assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient
number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections
17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives
must first show to the House that they possess the required
numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA.
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the
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Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in
the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek
recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is
necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the
court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court is
premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members to
the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
- APPROPRIATION- it is vested in the Legislature, subject to the
requirement that appropriations bills original exclusively in the
House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose
or concur with amendments.
- In Philconsa, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of
individual menbers of Congress to propose and identify priority
projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature and
is also recognized that individual members of Congress far more
than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely
to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project (LAMP vs.
DBM Secretary, GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012)
- Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November
19, 2013- Pork barrel- commonly referred as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Legislature, although
its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the
Executive. Xxx declared unconstitutional in view of the inherent
defects in the rules within which it operates. Insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight,
post enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the
system has violated the principle of separation of powers;
insofar as it has conferred unto the legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from
which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has
 created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized
into the appropriation bills, it has flouted the prescribed
procedure of presentment and, in the process denied the
President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted
the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators
a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance
which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system
has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has
authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in
affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable
local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy; and again insofar as it has conferred to the President
the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of “priority
infrastructure development projects”, it has once transgressed
the principle of non delegability.
- Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014- the
transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under section 25(5),
must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites,
namely: (1) there is law authorizing the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice and the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are saving
generated from the appropriations of their respective offices; and
(3) the purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices. The
following were declared unconstitutional: 1) The withdrawal of
unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the GAA; 2) the cross-border transfers of the
savings of the executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive; 3) The use of unprogrammed funds
despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer
that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non
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compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant GAA
(Araullo, MR Feb. 3, 2015).
- Impoundment- refusal of the president for whatever reason to
spend funds made available by Congress.xxx there was no
instance of executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment is
prohibited by the GAA, unless there will be an unmanageable
government budget deficit.
- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14,
2008- Any government expenditure without the corresponding
appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no
dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or not,
cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior
appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a
loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds
enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the
government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds to
fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan
proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan falls
due, Congress must make another appropriation law authorizing the
repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National
Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is
covered by the automatic appropriation
- IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate
Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the
determination whether a law has been violated is not in aid of
legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of
separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate the
matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and
that the inquiry into the same justiceable controversy would be
an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction
that had set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of
legislation).
- Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
 court, or obstructing the administration of justice (Romero II vs.
Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009).
- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks,
GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a
criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient
ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.
- The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power
to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation
as the branch of government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority
and punish contumacious acts against it. Except only when the
Congress and/or its Committee exercise the power of contempt,
it cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming
evidence of criminal culpability. It can only recommend measures
to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed
during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may
appear liable.
- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of
the President to withhold information requested by other
branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly
grant this power to the President but courts have long recognized
implied Presidential powers if “necessary and proper” in
carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the
Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction,
several decisions have recognized executive privilege starting
with the 1995 case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most
recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief
Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military
and national security matters affecting the nation. In the
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discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it
necessary to withhold sensitive military and national
security secrets from the Legislature or the public.
As the official in control of the nation’s foreign service by
virtue of the President’s control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of the
foreign policy relations of the State. The President’s role as chief
implementer of the State’s foreign policy is reinforced by the
President’s constitutional power to negotiate and enter into
treaties and international agreements. In the discharge of this
responsibility, the President may find it necessary to refuse
disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or
the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with
considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will
not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with it.
There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the
internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and
advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough
exchange of views, the President’s communications with his
Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare of
publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers
may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy issues
and executive matters knowing that their discussions will be
publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of candid advice.
Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The
interest of protecting military, national security and
diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential
communications, must be weighed against other
constitutionally recognized interests. There is the
declared state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest, the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, the
accountability of public officers, the power of legislative
inquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial and
documentary evidence in deciding cases.
 The balancing of interests – between executive
privilege on one hand and the other competing
constitutionally recognized interests on the other hand - is
a function of the courts. The courts will have to decide the
issue based on the factual circumstances of each case. This is
how conflicts on executive privilege between the Executive and
the Legislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary,
have been decided by the courts.
Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear
that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged
by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged
even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude
that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations. xxx Diplomatic
negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting
exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type
of information as privileged does not mean that it will be
considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration
of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if
there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired
information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.
- “Operational Proximity Test” (Neri vs. Senate Committee,
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications
elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President
followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to
prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead
and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?]
are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with
publish rules.
- Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the
Philippines, GR No. 180308, June 19, 2012- the wide latitude
given to the Congress in the conduct of legislative inquiries and
no would not fault the Senate for approving the resolution on the
very same day that it was submitted. The court also held that the
petitioners were invited as resource persons at the inquiry,
and as such, they do not have the constitutional right to
counsel.
- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas
corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006-
The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends
“to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. xxx
So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent
Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their
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 efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action.
The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the
realm of proper investigation
- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a
mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power
of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.
- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their
basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.
- Varieties of Executive Privilege
1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would
subvert crucial military or diplomatic objective.
2. informer’s privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged
with the enforcement of that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it
and state the reason therefore and why it must be
respected.
- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves
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therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power
of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom.
- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in its appearance of department
heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of
Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a)
to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b)
to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.
- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its
oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision.
- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE – Abakada Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 – the signing of a bill
by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent and the
certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that
it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
- A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of
the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the
Senate to propose amendments, it cal propose its own version
even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution
to originate in the House.
- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme Court
recognizes the long standing legislative practice of giving said
conference ample latitude for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment in the
nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is
germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.
After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both
houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department.
- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004 – Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in
order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened
to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable
institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. “Exclusive” is defined as
possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from
participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a
manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words
“dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for the
words “used exclusively” without doing violence to the
Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively
ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)
- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting
president evolved through case law.
Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by
virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would
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prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President’s prerogative.
Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that
the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term to
which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear
that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure (representing the period during which the
incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (the time during
which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right).
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive
immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.
David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 – It is not proper
to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and
there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law
grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election
contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or
separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for
President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number
of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent
with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of
canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive
duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election
returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of
canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral
tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not
said duly certified election returns have been irregularly
 made or tampered with or reflect the true results of the
elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to
recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass
upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the
same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose
favor, which Congress has no power to do.
- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has
effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election
protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA
559).
- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda
effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in
the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the Vice-
Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda
v. De Castro, February 12, 2008.
- Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain
reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a
grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the
same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant
of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to
"promulgate its rules for the purpose."
- It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
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government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara
pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers
of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did
not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in
Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions
contemplated in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are post
election remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo
warranto. The word “contest” means that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of the President or Vice-President – there can be no
“contest” before a winner is proclaimed.
- TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988,
August 31, 2010)- Estrada was not elected President the second
time he ran. Since the issue will be premised on the second
election as President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case.
- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- Estrada vs.
Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read: TEMPORARY
DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The question whether the claimed
temporary inability of Estrada is a political question beyond the
Supreme Court’s power of review. The decision that President
Arroyo is the dejure President made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE) –
Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005-
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the
Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an
agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia
 in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument
of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it
should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their
very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional
powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation
which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those
powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR.
3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These distinctions
hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which
arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would
involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call
for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration
of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special
class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive,
but there must be a showing that the executive power in question
is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude
that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign
debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the
decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public
interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken
by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary
incident, but from the established functions of governance.
- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs.
Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs.
Carale- Congress cannot expand the constitution by
increasing those officers who need prior confirmation by
the CA.
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- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De
Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No.
191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re
Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to
Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v.
JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No.
191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17,
2010, April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII, Section
15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the term of the outgoing President does not apply to
vacancies in the High Tribunal. “Although Valenzuela came to hold
that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot
be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the
confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice
Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should
prevail.“ Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so.
- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,
2002- An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once an appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is effective
until disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment
of Congress. It is extended only during a recess of
Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer
be extended a new appointment. If by-passed, the
President is free to renew the ad-interim appointment.
- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA
622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to make such
 acting appointment. The President may even appoint in acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.
- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office. It may be extended any time there is
vacancy, given while Congress is in session.
- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21¬ 2006- Under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints
three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the
Executive departments," ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group
refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is
a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. xxx The President appoints the first group
of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints
the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared
unconstitutional.
- Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position of
department manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is not a third
level position and does not require presidential appointment.
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- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding multiple
positions and receiving compensation therefrom- BITONIO VS.
COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.
- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule
has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged
with the legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as
bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to
inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws
may grant him broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President.
- Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935,
December 7, 2010- The creation of the Philippine Truth
Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. The President's power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws
- in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief
Executive. Suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but
only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of
the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July
31, 2007 – The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution
and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of
control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution. The President’s power to reorganize the
executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under
Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the
 President broad organization powers to implement reorganization
measures. Be that as it may, the President must exercise good
faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency
of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good
faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient.
- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential
Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that
“all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed
or revoked.
- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 –
The President’s power (EO 292) to reorganize offices outside
of the Office of the President Proper is limited merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The
DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even
if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31
(2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer
any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President.
Under its charter, the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is
attached to the Office of the President. Therefore, the President
has the authority to transfer the “functions, programs and
activities of DECS related to sports development” to the PSC,
making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.
- Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The presidential
power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to
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all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest
clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and
does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail
the President’s power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In
mandating that the President “shall have control of all executive x x
x offices,” Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office — one performing executive functions
outside of the independent constitutional bodies — from the President’s
power of control. xxx The President’s power of control applies to the
acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true
whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control
means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a
subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP– (Lacson vs. Perez,
May 10, 2001)- The declaration by the President of ‘state of
rebellion” during or in the aftermath of the May 1, 2001 seige of
Malacanang is not violative of the separation of powers doctrine.
The President, as Commander in chief of Armed Forces of the
Philippines, may call upon such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
- Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656,
February 3, 2004- The President’s authority to declare a state
of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive
and, at the same time draws strength from her Commander-in-
Chief powers pursuant to her calling out power.
- Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011- The
President does not need any congressional authority to exercise
his calling out power.
- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- It is on the President that
the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again,
the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual
 members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.
Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Supreme Court will without hesitation
affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the
President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the
AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.
- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora – The President
has full discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is
necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to
call out the armed forces.
- David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006-
PP 1017 constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017’s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience
to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the president; and (3) to impose
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the absence of legislation,
the President cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest.
- The President can validly declare the existence of a state of
national emergency even in the absence of congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a
delegation from Congress.
- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT- Requisites: 1)
there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the delegation must
be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation must be subject to
such restrictions as Congress may prescribe and 4) the
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emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.
- David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also
to other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers
of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress
(like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the
Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that
Congress should first authorize the President before he can
declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion
then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence
of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
- Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 - the calling
out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief and that
a provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon
the Armed Forces at its own bidding. It ruled that only the
President is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI and the calling out powers under
Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. While the President
exercises full supervision and control over the police, a local chief
executive, such as a provincial governor, only exercises
operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control
only in day-to-day operations. As discussed in the deliberation of
the Constitutional Commission, only the President has “full
discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is necessary
to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion,” the Court stressed.
- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The
pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable.

- AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13,
2009.- The text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by President
Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it extends to all
persons who committed the particular acts described in the
provision, and not just rebels or insurgents.
- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA
449-It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international
law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Also read
USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the field of
negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it.
Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus
that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President, being
the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed
in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of
his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ
and authority in the external affairs of the country. In
many ways, the President is the chief architect of the
nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of
foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast
powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of
the nation, as Jefferson describes, is “executive altogether.”
As regards the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the Constitution vests the same
in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least
two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this
light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification
of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the
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Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel
v. Executive Secretary where the Court ruled:
In our system of government, the President, being the
head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole representative
with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend
or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole
authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring
the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate
for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It has long been recognized that the power to enter into
treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject
only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the
authority of the President to enter into trade agreements
with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be
interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already
inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold
the President or its representatives accountable to Congress
for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
 This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to
enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate
concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties
will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the
Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may
not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While
Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence,
such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant
to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole
that has been given the authority to concur as a means of
checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the
Senate.
- Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under
our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence,
it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision
is within the competence of the President alone, which
cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. The
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin
the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive
branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate.
- POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE
SAME- The power to classify lands as alienable belongs to the
President. Only lands, which have been classified as alienable,
may be sold. There must be a law authorizing its sale or
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alienation by the President or by another officer before
conveyance can be executed on behalf of the government
(Section 48, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code).
Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797- The President may not
convey valuable real property of the government on her sole will.
Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress.
- POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS- to
ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. xxx
Insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local
officials administratively.
ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)
- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona;
Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato;
IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa
(private citizen not proper party).
- Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally
recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the great
responsibility of the judiciary in maintaining the allocation of
powers among the three great branches of the government.
- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April
24, 2009- Although the courts are without power to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their
own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the Court
may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such
judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when
the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to
the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias.
- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered,
under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate
disputes between the legislative and executive branches of
government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.
- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts
the “DIRECT INJURY” test. In People vs. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been
allowed to sue under the “principle of transcendental
importance”; of overreaching significance to society or of
paramount public interest. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO;
CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739; Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth
Commission, December 7, 2010.
- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may
be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives
as legislators.
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- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a
citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party
1. registered voter – must show that the action concerns his right
of suffrage
2. taxpayer – he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the
third party; the third party cannot assert his constitutional right;
the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court
is allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claim.
- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court
is not concerned with whether the petitioners are real parties in
interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA BUGAL-
B’LAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.
- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the
Court still entertains to adjudicate the substantive matter if there
is a grave violation of the constitution; to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public and capable of
repetition, yet evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved, third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the
public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
 evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.;
SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS.
GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435
SCRA 98; Belgica vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19, 2013.
- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES will not
preclude the SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of
judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of issuing authority under its EXPANDED JURISDICTION-
BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.
- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 -
Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s
organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the
qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed
a member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional
mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the
merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, the Supreme
Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as
the JBC has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear,
therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong
is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision
of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.
- Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative
or Executive Act- The doctrine operative fact doctrine
recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but
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sustains its effects. xxx It applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions
that will permit its application. Xxx Its application to the DAP
proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting
from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or
could no longer be undone.(Araullo vs. Aquino)
- Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBC’s
principal function is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary.
For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at
least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody
who is not in the list. Any vacancy in the SC is required by the
Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence
thereof. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the
constitutionally named Chair could not sit in the JBC. Although it
would be preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the
JBC can still operate to perform its mandated task of submitting
the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally
named ex-officio Chair does not sit in the JBC, the Court stressed.
The Court held that considering that the complete membership in
the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power over
the JBC, it should not be deprived of representation. It ruled that
the most Senior Justice of the High Court, who is not an applicant
for the position of Chief Justice, should participate in the
deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant
post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the
constitutionally named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of
RA 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, which reads: “In case of
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office,
they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief
Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply
to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of the Chief
Justice.”
- Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court
held that the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction. The word “Congress” is used in its generic sense.
Considering the language of the subject constitutional provision
is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to extrinsic
aids such as the records of the Constitutional Commission.
- The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended to
create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the public
clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of
members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they
adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the
private sector and the three branches of government would have
an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of
the Judiciary. “To allow the Legislature to have more quantitive
influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak,
whether with one full vote or one-half a vote each, would, as one
former congressman and member of the JBC put it, ‘negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government
which is enshrined in the Constitution,’” declared the Court.
- The Court also held that the JBC’s seven-member composition
“serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting.” It further held that under the
doctrine of operative facts where actions prior to the declaration
of unconstitutionality are legally recognized as a matter of equity
and fair play, all JBC’s prior official acts are valid.
- The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to who
should remain as sole representative of Congress in the JBC and
that such is best left to the determination of Congress.
- Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In
cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualification is raised,
the observance of due process neither negates nor renders
illusory the fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to recommend. The
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“unanimity rule” of the JBC-009 resulted in the deprivation of his
right to due process.
- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief Justice
must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations
where augmentation is needed.
- AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and the
Supreme Court en banc determine and decide the who, what,
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they may
extend to the justices, judges, court officials and court personnel
within the parameters of the court’s granted power.
- PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.
- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines – is justiciable- the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.
- FARIÑAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are
not the concern of the Supreme Court- government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government.
- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A motion
to change the venue of (and authority to conduct) preliminary
investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the courts for lack of
jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation is a
function of the Executive department and not of the judiciary.
- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should
be resolved in favor of change of venue.
- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006-
In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the
penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
- SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise
known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as
the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders
and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.
- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of
law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure;
uniform; not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
- GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14, 2010-
The Supreme Court has now the sole authority to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, pactice and procedure in all courts,
Viewed from this perspective, the claim of legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA
8291 necessarily fails.
WRIT OF AMPARO – The right to enforce and protect a person’s
rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of rights. It is a
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remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and
security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment,
the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge,
upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If
the petitioner is an organization, association or institution
referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall
accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and
any member of the immediate family, in accordance with
guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private
institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may
be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. ” The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession
or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry
for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be
inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the
motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the
privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is
necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to
 be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the
person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the
date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of
all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of
its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute
or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to
produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by
or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the
ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct
a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to
protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge,
upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other
government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
- Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A
petition for a writ of amparo is improper remedy to regain
parental authority and custody ove a minor child who was legally
put up for adoption.
- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17,
2008- To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was
originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
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perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations
of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available
under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Where, as
in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with
the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly
intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or
security – the personal concern that the writ is intended to
protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that
the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar,
however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper
case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari,
applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ
with a separately filed criminal case.
- WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires
the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
- (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or
 threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
- (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
secure the data or information;
- (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;
- (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database
or information or files kept by the respondent.
- Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule requires that
the petition must sufficiently allege the manner in which the right to privacy
is violated or threatened with violation and how such violation, or threats
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
- Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24, 2012- The
forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zenarosa Commission was not
unlawful act as that violates or threatens to violate the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security as to entitle the petitioner to the writ of habeas data.
- Vivares vs. St. Therese College, GR No. 202666, September 29,
2014- petitioners have no reasonable expectation of privacy that would
warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas data when their daughters shared
the incriminating pictures with their Facebook Friends. Before one can have
an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network activity, it is
necessary that the user in this case, the sanctioned students, should
manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or limit its visibility.
Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC
cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in
the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
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pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the
Supreme Court.
Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005-
Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence of the
Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as meaning
there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974
which requires full payment before the State may exercise
proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires only a
deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 – While the fundamental law
requires mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where
the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. The
Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to provide in these
cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more
squarely within the rule making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law making power of Congress.
The rule allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals,
a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the
Supreme Court for automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604-
does not violate Section 14. Resolutions are not decisions within
the constitutional requirement; they merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained and the petition to review
decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence, there is no need to fully explain the Court’s
denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the CA decision.
- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA
329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the
constitution is applicable only in cases “submitted for decision”,
i.e, given due course and after the filing of the briefs or
 memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is
issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal basis
thereof.
- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The
constitutional mandate that “no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is bases”, does not preclude the validity
of “memorandum decisions”, which adopt by reference the finding
of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals.
- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No.
181107- The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion
to decide whether a “minute resolution” should be used in lieu of
a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme
Court explained that the grant of due course to a petition for
review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.
When it fails to find any reversible error committed by the CA,
there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial as it means
that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and
conclusions of the CA. “There is no point in reproducing or
restating in the resolution of denial the conclusions of the
appellate court affirmed”.The constitutional requirement of
sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear presentation of facts and laws
applies to decisions, where the petition is given due
course, but not where the petition is denied due course,
with the resolution stating the legal basis for the dismissal.
- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14
does not preclude the validity of “Memorandum Decision”
which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended
to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions
thereof) of the lower court.
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ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service
Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to
decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the authority
to see that what has been decided is carried out.
- Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC
is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the
responsibility of the establishment, administration and
maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned
department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting
the department agency with respect to these qualification
standards and approving them.
- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The
Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil
service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch,
agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government,
including every government-owned or controlled corporation. It
is further classified into career and non-career service
positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance
is based on merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2)
there is opportunity for advancement to higher career positions;
and (3) there is security of tenure. A state university president
with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing
board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil
service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and
members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear
 provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant
who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the
CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by
government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a complaint
may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the authority to
hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to
deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as
provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The Supreme Court also
ruled that since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC and the
CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s
exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no “report,
no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic connotes
something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means
that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a
general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But a
distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be made.
If the GOCC was established through an original charter (or
special law), then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and
SSS. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these
chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is excluded from the
coverage of the civil service.
- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government
refers to any of the various units of the government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality or government-
owned or controlled corporation or a local government or a
distinct unit therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
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national government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
institutes and government-owned or controlled corporations,
- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed
in a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil service law applies.
It is not true either that with respect to money claims, the Labor
Code applies. Regardless of the nature of employment or claim,
an employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by the
Civil Service Law.
- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) – the
appointment to the positions in the Career Executive Service may
be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys security
of tenure.
- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent
appointment can be issued only to a “person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.” The mere fact
that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he
does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have
to “depend on the nature of appointment, which in turn depends
on his eligibility or lack of it.
- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented
transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a
violation of the security of tenure clause in the Constitution.
- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims
by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation
constitutes removal.
- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 – In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
 accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its
violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also
protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing such state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of
the government involving termination of services may appeal to
the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to
the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still
feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.
- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28,
2001- The CSC is expressly empowered by the Administrative
Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil Service primarily
confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on two
instances when a position may be considered primarily
confidential: (1) President declares the position to be primarily
confidential upon recommendation of of the CSC; (2) when by the
nature of the functions, there exists close intimacy between the
appointee and appointing authority which ensures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily
confidential.
PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of Casino
Operations Manager is not primarily confidential
- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There
must intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
- To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public
office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the
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term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an acceptance by the
proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238
of the Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276, 1997)
- Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman as
board member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is
unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the CSC, and
for violating the rule against holding of multiple government
positions as well as the concept ex-officio positions.
- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) – rule on double
compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving
pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such
pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to
which another compensation is attached.
- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 – PCCG Chair
Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution from
simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The
position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices since
the CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that
the general rule to hold more than one office is “allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position”/
- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997-
When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is
later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is
considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the
silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back
salaries.
- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 –The Supreme
Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination
with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can be awarded in
his favor.
- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil
service officer or employee, who has been found illegally
 dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to such person completes his term of office which could be seven,
back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of five or three years. There must be a confirmation by the
his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement, Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
and if at the time the decision of exoneration is promulgated, he before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.
is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to back
wages but also to full retirement benefits.
- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 – The CSC as an aggrieved in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243
party, may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the SCRA 690.
Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a
civil service employee of administrative charges. - Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The
COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an
- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all
of an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6,
service system, and does not fall under the provision on Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of
Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power
to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as
- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
from its list of eligibles those who falsified their
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary
proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the
- The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by
system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law
the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be
or the rules of the service.
classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial.
The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to
- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the
resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election
Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether
laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No.
returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to
6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.
the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election
laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly
be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers
COMELEC
to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A)
- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs.
and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the
Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase “without reappointment”
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the
applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not

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 provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code.7
- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v.
Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following manner,
viz:
- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other
hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the
rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from
them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in
a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it
is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power
due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
- Task Force Maguindanao’s fact-finding investigation – to probe
into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in
said province; and consequently, to determine whether the
certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an
election offense had possibly been committed – could by no
means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative
function.
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- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was
exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind
the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted
hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned
and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and
support their respective positions.
- The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a
government institution hinges on its authority to compel
attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings
or proceedings.
- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to
punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding
investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would
render nugatory the COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an
essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose
of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner
obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer
questions regarding the various election documents which, he
claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and
custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for
such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.
- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board
of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear before
it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board
of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises
quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to
determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine
election returns signed by the proper officers.10 When the results
of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being
canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited numerous
questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the
COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in
order to shed light on the issue of whether the election documents
coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner
 unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within
the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
resolutions.
- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al-
[G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011- The power to fix the date
of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from,
and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
- Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable
solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxx xxx x x. Section 4.. . . Unless otherwise provided by
law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall
be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours while
Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for . . . the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, terms, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours
- Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not
have the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of
the plenary legislative power.
- LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 - The
COMELEC correctly stated that “the ascertainment of the identity
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of [a] political party and its legitimate officers” is a matter that is
well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other
than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC
the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise
of such power and in the discharge of such function, the
Commission is endowed with ample “wherewithal” and
“considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it
was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.
- LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007 –
COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership within
a party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and leaders. xxx
The COMELEC is endowed with ample “wherewithal” and
“considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it
was created to promote free and orderly honest elections.
- Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010-
While the question of party leadership has implications on the
COMELEC’s performance of its functions under Section 2 of Art.
IX-C of the constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
pertaining to Ateinza, et al.’s expulsion from the LP. Such
expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and
discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot interfere, given the
limited scope of its power over political parties.
- Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793,
February 22, 2011)- In election cases involving an act or
omission of a municipal or regional trial court, petition for
certiorari shall be filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
- Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28,
2005- Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as
to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to
do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of
 Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any
applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect.
- Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section
3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC
en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or
resolutions decided by a division. Since the petitioner
seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested
of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of
the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was
yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing
of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It
cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of
the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th
legislative district of Leyte.
- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en
banc does not have the authority to hear and decide cases at the
first instance. Under the COMELEC Rules, pre-proclamation cases
are classified as Special Cases and in compliance with the
provision of the Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC
are vested with the authority to hear and decide these special
cases.
- Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
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or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the “completeness” and the “sufficient standard” tests.
- The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative
only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and
Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered
voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis
of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of
plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a
case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the
COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of
election and related laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
- Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 –
Contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
- Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may
validly order a manual count notwithstanding the required
automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law authorizing
the commission to use an automated election system, if that is
the only way to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the
Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.

- Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid
exercise of the COMELEC’s constitutionally mandated power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of
the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the
objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the
interest of justice and fair play. Accordingly, those candidates
whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the
elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from
the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their proclamation
shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases.
- Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765- The 1987
constitution vests COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving barangay officials decided by the trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011- Final
orders of a COMELEC Division denying the affirmative defenses of
petitioner cannot be questioned before the Supreme Court even
via a petition for certiorari.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
- COA’S AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs.
Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COA’s auditing powers
are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity
handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec.
2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving subsidies or
equity directly or indirectly from or through the government are
required to submit to post audit.
- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA
of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even
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with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination
and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind
government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private
audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets
escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly, the
express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its
framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does
not have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of
certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as
when there is a private investment in a government-controlled
corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or
publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government
borrows money from abroad.
- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing
to a public officer may not, without his consent, be withheld and
applied to his indebtedness to the government.
- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting
by himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a decision
for the commission. The power to decide on issues relating to
audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial
body which has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before
it.
- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868,
COA’s power over the settlement of accounts is different
from power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is
within the ambit of judicial power.
- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the
proper officer to withhold a municipal treasurer’s salary and other
emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage but no to
apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her
liability is still being litigated.
- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.
- DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February 7, 2012]-
There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct
a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government
agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found
in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post audit is mandated
for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity
and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is
inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including
a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
- Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court
may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with
the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision
be unduly enlarged by this Court.
- GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The
appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional; the
appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven years
in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion
of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution;
- Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessors, but such appointments cannot
be less than the unexpired portion as this will disrupt the staggering of
terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D);
- Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of seven
years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment
to any position in the Commission;
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- A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less
than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chair
for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chair. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that
the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioners and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven
years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Char
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment;
and that
- Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
-
- Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18 of RA
6758 prohibits officials and employees of COA from receiving salaries,
honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any
government entity, except compensation paid directly by COA out of its
appropriations. This prohibition is mandatory.
ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271.
October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of local officials, their term
has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no
vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
- If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new
term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view — like
the extension of the elective term— is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a
way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed,
 if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then
all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.
Hence, holdover — whichever way it is viewed — is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
- Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the
question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of
approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly
from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v.
COMELEC, Adap v. Comelec, and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the
Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in
a hold over capacity.
- The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office
of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay
officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be
denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms
of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, and extended the terms of
the President and the Vice-President in order to synchronize elections;
Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that
terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.
More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has
the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for
less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years as
this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmeña.
- The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake
the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:
- It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy
that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of
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vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of
any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the
best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the
procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the
provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no
merit. As between the President who has supervision over local
governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are
junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise.
- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation
under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of
representation and governance in their own local government.
- In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their
chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the
management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor
or the Vice-Governor is missing. (Emphasis ours.)
- As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor,
and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21
months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays
in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management
of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical
developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the
President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment
power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to
take.
- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS- Socrates vs.
COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-
election for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately
 after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way
in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
- renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009-
The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their
term for purposes the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code. Preventive suspension, by its nature does
not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.
- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-
term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary loss of the title
to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is
barred from performing the functions of his office and does not vacate
and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only
results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009- Bolos was
serving his third term as punong barangay when he ran for Sangguniang
Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the position of SB member,
thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as punong barangay which the
court deems as voluntary renunciation of said office.
- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the recall
election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years
for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s
terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a candidate loses in an
election to gain a third consecutive term but later wins in the recall
election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two
consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the recall term, when
another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in the
continuity of service.
- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the
three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
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length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule to
apply, the local official concerned must serve three consecutive terms
as a result of election. The term served must be one for which he was
elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of succession, the
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.
- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis Ong, “service for the full term”, and should
be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position. His continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be
taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-
term rule, notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his
proclamation. There was actually no interruption or break in the
continuity of Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001 term.
- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed
of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic
Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is
declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of
the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof
are declared VALID.
- League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No.
176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for cityhood
from P20 million to P100 million in sec. 450 of the , explicitly exempt
the respondent municipalities from the said increased income
 requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending cityhood bills before
the passage of RA 9009 and that the year before the amendatory RA
9009, respondent LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted
for cityhood under the LGC of 1991.
- METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its function
is limited to the delivery of basic services. RA 7924 does not grant
the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. The MMDA
is a development authority. It is not a political unit of
government. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances
and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).
- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by
the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any
other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police
power. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide
impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge
expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard
to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of the valiant
efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads
of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the
MMDA’s enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must
be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid
law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source
(MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).
- MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009-
MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards and other forms of
advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT
3), the latter being a private property. MMDA’s powers were limited to
the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and
administration, and therefore, it had no power to dismantle the
billboards under the guise of police and legislative power.
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- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657, August
15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its powers and
functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project
(Greater Manila Transport System) as envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it
could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake
the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the
elimination of respondents’ terminals. Even the MMDA’s claimed
authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance
with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.
INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695).
- LGUS’ SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED
WITHOUT ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM ANY
GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the 1987constitution
provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. When
passed, it would be readily see that such provision mandates that (1)
the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; and (2) “just
share” shall be determined by law; (3) that “just share” shall be
automatically released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.
(ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)
- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that “pending
the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government
units shall be withheld” is declared in contravention of Section 286
of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs.
Aguirre, July 19, 2000).
- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of local
autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is
mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments, and local
governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue
exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations.
The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a
constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and
appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSIS’s tax-exempt status,
in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but
restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject real
property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS
while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may
be collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12,
August 18, 2005).
- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of
Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial
Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from paying
franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax, the
enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such
exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in National Power
Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.
- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is
primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be
exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a
valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by
Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An “agency” of the
Government refers to “any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-
owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein;” while an “instrumentality” refers to “any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-
owned and controlled corporations.” It had already become, even if
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it be conceded to be an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the
Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the
withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the
payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to
MCIAA.
- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the port
and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the general public
does not exempt it from the payment of real property taxes. It must be
stressed that the said port facilities and appurtenances are the
petitioner’s corporate patrimonial properties, not for public use, and that
the operation of the port and its facilities and the administration of its
buildings are in the nature of ordinary business.
- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAA’s Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and
thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA
are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from
real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of
public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are
devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The Airport
Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are
properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the
Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of
man. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.
- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed
and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any
doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved
against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local
governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the
taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants
an exemption to a national government instrumentality from
local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of
the national government instrumentality.
- PRESIDENT’S SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes,
September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga ng
mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his
alter ego.
- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos
cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment
on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it
violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the
executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).
- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of LGUs to
grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of
allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local
funds, the genuine and meaningful local autonomy is ensured.
- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power
to grant franchises.
ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
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- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of
Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of an impeachment
judgment. Conviction in the impeachment proceeding is not
required before the public officer subject of impeachment may
be prosecuted, tried and punished for criminal offenses
committed.
- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November
10, 2003- definition of “TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT”-
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice.
- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers
the series of steps that follow.
- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee or override its contrary resolution, De Castro vs.
Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995.
- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond the
reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached.
- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010- The
doctrine of condonation cannot be extended to reappointed coterminous
employees like petitioners as in their case, there is neither subversion
of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate. The
unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous
precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants,
particularly local government, with blanket immunity from
administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse of
bureaucracy.
- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of
constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of the
 Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).
- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of bank
accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.
- OMB’S POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March 20,
2001- The power to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is
plenary and unqualified. The law does not make a distinction between
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular
courts.
- Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231,
September 4, 2012 January 28, 2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770
providing that the President may remove a deputy ombudsman is
unconstitutional because it would violate the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over her deputies.
- Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear
constitutional design, the Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is separate from the Office of the Ombudsman. The inclusion
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of the Ombudsman
does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded the same levels of
constitutional independence as that of the Ombudsman and the Deputy
Ombudsman.
- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has
consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. xxx
However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively
suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special
Prosecutor. The obvious import of this exclusion is to withhold
from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.
- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, April
13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
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involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors.
DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then
respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
take over at any stage.
- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority to
determine the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and com the head of the office or
agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other
words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s
functions and not its jurisdiction.
- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June 16,
2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power
to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such
power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the
conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to
possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee
found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the
Ombudsman to be “an activist watchman,” not merely a passive one.
- Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011- Appeals
from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases do not
stay the execution of the penalty imposed.
- Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the
respondent is absolved of the charge or in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, or suspension for the
period not more than one month or a fie equivalent to one month’s
 salary, the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor
unappelable, subject to judicial review.
- Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26, 2011-
The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases may be
executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly states that an appeal shall
not stop the decision from being executory. Also, the power of the
Ombudsman to implement the penalty is not merely
recommendatory but mandatory.
- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584,
January 22, 2008 – Supreme Court reiterated this ruling in Office of
the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that “the Ombudsman’s
order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer
or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory.” Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is,
however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
- Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in
accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.
It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670
confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public
school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative
investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18,
1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the
people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on
November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be
restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority
on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and
employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.
- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is
originally created by charter or not. What is decisive is that it
has been acquired by the government to perform functions
related to government programs and policies.
and
- JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376
SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of
RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or
employee of government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters to perform any act or duty required by law or to stop
any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee on
Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272- Section 15 of Article XI
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to
criminal cases.
ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)
- ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881, July
31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or
privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural
resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under
the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease
agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked,
rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public
interest so requires. The determination of what is in the public interest is
necessarily vested in the State as owner of the country's natural
resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that
enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the
people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter,
as well as to the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license is not
even a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as
such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. xxx
- The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to recover
their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen by many as a
victory attained by the private respondents only after a long and costly effort,
the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social justice, abhors a further delay
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 in the resolution of this controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by
denying the petition.
- CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371 categorically
declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to
have been public land. Domains and lands under native title are,
therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands
and are private. The right of ownership granted to indigenous peoples
over their ancestral domains does not cover the natural resources. The
right granted to IP to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration to ensure ecological and
environmental protection.
- Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 – recognized the
existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of possession
under a claim of ownership since time immemorial as an exception to
the theory of jus regalia.
- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable.
Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas are also form part
of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
- The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the
public domain may only be leased and not sold to private parties.
These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain which the government
could not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes
a law authrizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public service. xxx The ownership of
lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine,
which declares that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to
the State
- But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable
lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to private
corporations which can only lease the same. The State may only sell
alienable public land to Filipino citizens.
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- Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar private
corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid
for their services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits,
following the explicit constitutional mandate, is for private corporations
to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of private
corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at
public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain. They can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual,
and the land thus acquired becomes private land.
- Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Government
owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to
private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by the
government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which even
private corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or
municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial
property in the hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once
converted to patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the
public or municipal corporation to private parties, whether
Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.
- Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR No.
179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become patrimonial
property or private property of the government only upon a declaration
that these are alienable or disposable lands, together with an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth.
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.
- in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that “those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
 ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title, to such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land Act merely requires
possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession. The possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation
of title as soon as the land it covers is declared alienable and disposable.
This is, however, subject to the December 31, 2020 deadline imposed
by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 9176.
- Fortun vs. Republic- applicants must prove that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of
acquisition or ownership for at leats 30 years or at least since May 8,
1947.
- DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No. 17775,
October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the State except for the
lot areas with existing titles. The continued possession and considerable
investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested
right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply a title to the
land they are presently occupying. The present land law traces its roots
to the Regalian Doctrine.
- Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme Court
said that Boracay was unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400 hecs of reserved forest land
and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural land). Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. Forest lands do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by
dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
- Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No. 16678,
April 24, 2009 – The classification of lands of the public domain is of
two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The
primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. The agricultural lands of the public domain
may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they may
be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to
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as secondary classification. Congress, under existing laws, granted
authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial
or other urban uses.
- Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014- The
DENR Secretary is empowered by law to approve a land classification
and declare such land as alienable and disposable.
- Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009- While
the acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the country by a
foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the Constitution, the
subsequent acquisition of the said properties from the foreigner by a
Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title
of the transferee is valid.
- Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by PEA
or through a contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed
lands still remain alienable lands of public domain which can be
transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private corporation. This
is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose
of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred
to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other
hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of
public lands under its charter—The Revised Administrative Code
of 1987. The NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles
over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are
transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State
which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations,
60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the
reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to
NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot
legally transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More importantly, it
cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer
patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers to
raise funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we find
that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and
 disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has
been reclassified as patrimonial property.
- Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable
or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the
Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.
- JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the prohibition
in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not
extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article
415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation
where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and
growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and
Filipino corporations only.
- Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and those
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. A homestead patent, such as the subject of the
instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable
for agricultural purposes.
- La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1, 2004 –
Foreign corporations are confined to technical and financial
assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or utilize the
country’s natural resources by entering into the necessary agreements
with individuals or entities in the pursuit of visible operations. Service
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contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control
and supervision of the State. Control by the state must be on the
macro level, through the establishment of policies, guidelines,
regulations, industry standards and similar measures that would
enable the government to control the conduct of the affairs in
various enterprises and restrain activities deemed not desirable
or beneficial.
- GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association,
Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al., March 30, 2006-
the Constitution expressly allows service contracts in the large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
mineral oils via “agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance” as provided by law. The Court
said that these agreements with foreign corporations are not
limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with
foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full
control and supervision of the State.
- GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No. 152619-20, Balite
Communal Portal Mining Cooperative v. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR No. 152870-71, The Mines
Adjudication Board and its Members, et al. v. Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining
operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within the full
control of the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining operations
in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full
control of the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of
RA 7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration,
development, and utilization of the area or it can enter into agreement
with qualified entities.
- Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426 SCRA
517 – Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution does not apply
retroactively to a “license, concession or lease” granted by the
 government under the 1973 constitution or before the effectivity
of the 1987 constitution.
- Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of law
that possession, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
- PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA 316 – The
operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.
- Gamboa vs. Teves, GR No. 176579, October 9, 2013- Both voting
control test and beneficial ownership test must be applied to determine
whether a corporation is a Filipino national.
- Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, February 23,
2015- a franchise is not required before each and every public utility
may operate. There is no law that states that a legislative franchise is
necessary for the operation of toll facilities. What constitutes a public
utility is not their ownership but their use to the public.
- Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc., 556
SCRA 742)- doctrine states that the public utility has the imperative
duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and
equipment to ensure they do not malfunction.
- FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum, it
does not appear that, in approving §23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress
intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of
laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory
provisions on municipal taxing powers, we hold that §23 of R.A. No.
7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's
franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local
franchise taxes.
- Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not authorized to cancel the
certificates of public convenience (CPCs) and other licenses it had issued
to the holders of duly issued legislative franchises on the ground that
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the latter had violated the terms of their franchise. As legislative
franchises are extended through statutes, they should receive
recognition as the ultimate expression of State policy.
- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353- Under
the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the condition that
it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when the public interest so
requires. Franchises are also subject to alteration by the power
to tax, which cannot be contracted away.
- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 – The constitution
is emphatic that the operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.
- Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7, 2003 -
The constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It mandates the
State to regulate them when public interest so requires.
ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)
- SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have
revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo v.
Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).
- HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs. Com. on
Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of civil and
political rights only either by government official or private individual.
- Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial powers
to the CHR re violations of human rights.- refer to Section 5- perform
such other functions and duties as may be provided by law.
- CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although admittedly
a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative
fiat.
- People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that the
eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a
just and humane manner does not mean validity or legality of the
demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of resettlement area
designated or earmarked by the government.
ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)
- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No.
180046, April 2, 2009- A “review center is not an institution of higher
learning as contemplated by RA 7722…[i]t does not offer a degree-
granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.”
Moreover, “[a] review course is only intended to ‘refresh and enhance
the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees,’” and it does not
require enrollment, attendance, a grade or submission of a thesis in
order to complete the review center course requirements or take the
licensure examination.
- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational institution
and the members of the academe. The Supreme Court sustained the
primacy of academic freedom over Civil service rules on AWOL, stressing
when UP opted to retain private petitioner and even promoted him
despite his absence, the University was exercising its freedom to choose
who may teach or who may continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs.
CSC, April 3, 2001).
- Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The Show
Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondnets’ academic
freedom as it does not dictate upon the law professors the subject
matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. They are free
to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach.
Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom
for the Supreme Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary
action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing
proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
The right to freedom expression of members of the BAR may be
circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to
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the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and
the justice system.
- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As
enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos v. Court
of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to formulate rules and
guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms
part of academic freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed
much less controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse
of discretion, the courts may not disturb the University’s decision not to
confer honors to petitioner.
- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with academic
freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning
has the prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and determine
whether these standards have been met. At the end of the probation
period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation, belongs to the
university as the employer alone.
- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic freedom
to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”
Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should
teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of
professors and other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo
de Manila University v. Capulong: “As corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by
external controls or pressure.”
- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2),
Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims
and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls
for some restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic
freedom encompasses the independence of an academic
 institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what
may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be
admitted to study.
- It cannot be gainsaid that “the school has an interest in teaching the
student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field
of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.” Indeed,
while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982
that students have a right “to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation,” such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its
academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for
admission to its school.
ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)
- IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general principles;
Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3, 2006)- The hornbook
rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions
against an officer of the government by a private citizen which would
result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must
be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not
shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an
interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer
is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of
his/her duties.
- UP vs. Dizon, August 23, 2012- The funds of UP are government
funds that public in character. They include income accruing from the
use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds, subject of
the action could not be validly made the subject of writ of execution or
garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit
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to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by
execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not
necessarily mean its liability.
- COA vs. Link Worth Int’l. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13, 2009-
The COA is an unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy
a separate juridical personality of its own, Hence, even in the exercise
of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily governmental
functions, COA cannot be sued without its consent.
- Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June 26,
2009- Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract
with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDA’s
funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of
a writ of garnishment or attachment.
- GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint health insurance
project of the German and Philippine governments, is not entitled to
immunity from suit in the Philippines as GTZ, being the equivalent of a
government-owned-and-controlled corporation, has the power and
capacity to sue and be sued under the Corporation Code. GTZ is akin to
a governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter
which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be
sued,
- PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the government
itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the
main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For,
as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private
party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus
opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have
against it. Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case
No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the
plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity
against private respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case.
- NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs. Executive
Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion, January 28, 2000, the
new PNP absorbed the members of the former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP,
all three of which accordingly abolished.
- Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or indirectly,
in any partisan political activity, except to vote. They cannot be
appointed to a civilian position in the government, including GOCCs or
their subsidiaries.
- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a
civilian position to speak of.
- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.
- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership
- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY – 70%
- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools established
by religious groups and mission boards.
ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)
- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591,
183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008- The Court noted
that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is itself a
violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, it
virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither
the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make
such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only
in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way
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that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with that
process.
- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting as a
Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers to propose
amendments or to call a convention. The grant to Congress as a
Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority includes, by virtue of
the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary to the
effective exercise of principal power granted, such as the power to fix
qualifications, apportionment, etc..
- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is insufficient in
providing for mechanism to govern initiatives for constitutional
amendments. While the Constitution recognizes the right of citizens to
propose amendments, the people cannot exercise such until Congress
provides for its implementation.
- LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -Clearly, the
framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the
people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated
that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on
the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.” The essence of
amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
- DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS. COMELEC,
21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative power to
Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly
 grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component elements of a Constituent
Assembly.
- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals for
amendments, it does not have the final say on whether or not its acts
are within constitutional limits- an issue which is clearly subject to
judicial review.
- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times necessary
in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be validly held
together with general elections.
- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no piece
meal ratification.
- Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of
amendment/revisions. UNLESS, the proposed amendments/revisions so
provide.
ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)
- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory
Provisions show a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence
in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops
are allowed entry into the Philippines only be way of direct exception.
- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from engaging in
an offensive war on Philippine territory. The Supreme Court, however,
cannot accept the bare allegations that the Arroyo administration is
engaged in double speak in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise
an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil.
- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA
449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
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government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as
a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said
State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be
taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of
submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are
policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further
implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to
Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act,
within sixty days from ratification. The second reason has to do with
the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of
August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified
with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States
Senate.
- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al.,
Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No. 170516,
July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been
given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
power of the President, but only the Senate.
- Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith,
et al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al.,
G.R. No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but
the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are
DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with
the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on
detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V,
Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained
until further orders by this Court.
ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)
- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052,
February 13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their
right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if
forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s exercise of police
power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former
should prevail,”.
- Procedural Due Process- Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca
Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the constitution
is a limitation on government powers. It does not apply to the exercise
of private power, such as the termination of employment under the
Labor Code.
- Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs, et al., GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012- Pichay’s right to due
process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the
administrative complaint against him. IN administrative proceedings,
the filing of the charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having thte
opportunity to explain one’s side.
- Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is
neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested
right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of one’s residence maybe
revoked at anytime.
- MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to
operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted
by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the State in the
exercise of police power.
- Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process
suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity.
INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:
1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative
functions;
2. Abatement of nuisance per se;
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers);
5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR
Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad;
10. Suspension of bank’s operations by the Monetary Board upon a
prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs.
Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000);
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13. TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013)
- SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April 23,
2014- Prior notice and hearing, as elements of due pocess of law, are
only required in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, not when the
government agency is engaged in the performance of quasi legislative
or administrative functions.
- Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that they
were denied due process during the NBI Investigation. The functions of
the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in nature. The NBI
has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting any
relief to any party, it cannot even determine probable cause.
- Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41,
January 21, 2015- there is no law or rule that requires the
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents.
Equal Protection of the Law
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- Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the
strict scrutiny standard, an American constituted construct, useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of
things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification
that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantaged of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or race as
well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier
application to equal protection. In the cases, the Supreme Court finds
nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved
in punishing what is essentially condemnable act- accessing the
computer system of another without right. It is universally
condemned act.
- Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010- the Arroyo administration is but just a member of
a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement
as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a
Congressman is not reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
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- USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of Congressman
is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class.
- Fariñas vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10, 2003,
Substantive distinctions exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
people while the latter hold their office by virtue of their designation by
an appointing authority.
- PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011- PAGCOR cannot find
support in the equal protection clause of the constitution. It was granted
a franchise , subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.
Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures
- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs.
Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of
protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ
of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and
liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.
- PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix; Webb
vs. de Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs. COMELEC.
- Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012- The
confiscated items having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to warrantless search
conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible in evidence since a
barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority under the
Revised Penal Code.

- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain
view is justified only when:
1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted.
5. Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid warrantless
searches and seizures:
6. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA
280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553);
7. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
8. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit
nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent and established
until after they have been turned over to the Chinese embassy and
the Bureau of Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered
as evidence in plain view);
9. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
10. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person
waiving has knowledge of such right, actually or constructively; and
3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis Int’l
Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)-
It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and voluntarily given;
11. stop& frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search – (Terry vs,
Ohio, 1968; Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by
law enforcement officer based upon “reasonable suspicion” that a
person may have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas an
arrest requires “probable cause” that a suspect committed a criminal
offense;
12. Armed conflict (war time);
13. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escaño, GR No.
129756-58, January 28, 2000);
14. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA
716), where a warrantless search was allowed where there was a
prevailing general chaos and disorder because of an ongoing coup;
15. Conduct of “Area Target Zone” and “Saturation Drives” in the
exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181
SCRA 623);
16. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23,
2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).
WARRANTLESS ARREST
- Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the
Rules, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. As a corollary,
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. xxx In
this case, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
-
HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:
 The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer
must be continuous from the time of the
commission of the offense to the time of the arrest.
 There must be no supervening event which breaks
the continuity of the chase.
- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest
proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully
arrested without warrant.
- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be
availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime.
(2) such commission of a crime must be done in the presence and within
the view of the arresting officer.
- PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure
of immediacy between the time of the offense was committed and the
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 time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an appreaciable lapse of
time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured.
- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited to
actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of the law
is complied where the arresting officer was within an earshot from the
scene although he did not personally witness the commission of the
crime.
- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against
the State. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. Right applies only against the government and agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-
- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By administrative
authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding
of violation of law.
- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the
Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner who has
been ordered to be deported.
- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to more
than one offense.
- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE
SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT
REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be
reasonable certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to
be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving
commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken, nothing is
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left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. VALLEJO VS.
CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.
- Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can
be arrested but only if it is absolutely necessary to do so.
You will be freed as soon as you no longer represent a threat
to public security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are
questionable;
vii. If you are in the country illegally.
- Disini Jr., et al. vs. Secretary of Justice- Two constitutional
guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to
be left alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the state has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the expectation has
been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano,
et al. vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters
alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential
letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel
when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the
letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between
 the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read
the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of
the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could
intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only
to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned.
The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438,
as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees
and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
- Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from
attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech
and privacy of communication. The invocation of these rights will not,
however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained
defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed
against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse
of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot
be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used
to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect
therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as
a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule,
degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio, October 17,
2006- In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court
must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
- SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870, November
3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the provisions of
RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office
and persons accused of crimes. However, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the said RA insofar as random drug testing for
secondary and tertiary school students, as well as for officials and
employees of public and private offices is concerned. The need for drug
testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.
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- Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the right
to be let alone is not an absolute right where the person is a public figure
and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute matters of a public character.
- Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition in
the constitution is if there is a “lawful order from a court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law”.
- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, January 21, 2015- There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the freedom of expression.
- Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited commercial ads; and the State cannot rob him of his right
without violating his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
- GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when the
COMELEC drastically reduced the airtime within which national
candidates and political parties may air political advertisements on
television and radio, it unduly restricted and constrained the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the
people.
- RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law
(R.A. 4200) which prohibits not only the unauthorized taping of private
conversations, but also: (a) the possession of such tapes with the
knowledge of their nature as illegal wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the
tapes to any person; and (c) to communicate the contents thereof either
verbally or in writing, such as the provision of transcripts. The potential
jail term, if convicted, ranges from six months to six years.
- Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code
- RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to the
contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and
members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals,
listen to intercept, and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or
 type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means
for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation,
discussion or spoken or written words between members of a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons or any person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance,
interception and recording of communications between lawyers and
clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and
confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
Section 4- Freedom of expression-
- Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880
practically codify the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-65366,
November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569. By way of a summary. The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or
the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application
should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned
to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at
the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
the proper judicial authority.
B.P. No. 880
SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.--
A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize
and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park
duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
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required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations
of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any
election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall
comply with the following guidelines:
(b) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of
the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the
date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for
the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be
used.
(c) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of
applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(d) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city
or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be
held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public
assembly.
(e) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged
in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the
same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city
or municipal building.
-SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on
the application within two (2) working days from the date
the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application
for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and
shall be deemed to have been filed.
 (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on
the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court
of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate
court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the
same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in
terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately
executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided
within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases
filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the
next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed.
- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of
public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies.
- In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the
fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people
and to nurture their prosperity. He said that “in cases involving liberty,
the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and
in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed
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and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights
come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity.
These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny.”
- For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has
no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness
that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by
some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880
cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the
time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
“maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government.
The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is
valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and
present danger” standard.
- IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP which
should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing
of the venue under BP 880, the Public Assembly Act. It found that
Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of
the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which
is an indispensable condition to such modification. “Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, which ‘blank’ denial or modification would, when granted
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
judicial scrutiny thereto,”
- Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election
surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of expression as they
refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters as
regards to a candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter
of public discussion in relation to the election, including the voter’s
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period.The prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 of RA 9006
(Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior restraint on the
freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period; and 3) the government interest sought to be promoted
 can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression.
- Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of
speech may either be content-based (the subject of the speech or
utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it regulates
only the conduct associated with speech, such as the time, place and
manner). To pass constitutional muster, any content-based regulation
must show that the government has a compelling or overriding
interest in the subject regulation. A content neutral restriction, on the
other hand, need only show an important government interest, as
long as it leaves open alternative channels of communication.
- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15,
2008- The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning
television stations against playing the “Garci tapes” under pain of
revocation of their licenses, were content-based restrictions and should
be subjected to the “clear and present and danger test”.
- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR
No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate
implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the
burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to prove
that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights.
As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling
reason to infringe the right to free expression.
- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application
only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law.
- A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
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discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms.
- As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine
assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and
will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
- A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-applied” challenge.
- Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant
facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the
entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
- The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
- The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by
the aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise
of which should not at all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier,
this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear
an “in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading
the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
- The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to
a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a
 penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered.
No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing
a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed,
would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at
best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court
to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my
opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes,
such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted,
there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the
State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third
parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that
the law is clear as applied to him.
- It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
- By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial
type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably
almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied
to the litigant.
- In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court,
in at least two cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment,and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely,
if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation
that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct.
Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the “transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression.”
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- American jurisprudence instructs that “vagueness challenges that do not
involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific
facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial
validity.”
- In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the
due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality
of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the Court brought the
doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment
of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision
under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners
in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada
cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute,
unlike in the present case.
- From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section
3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender
commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws;
(2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition
of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace;
and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government
to give in to an unlawful demand.
- Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must
first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an “unlawful demand.”
Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
- Read: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech vis-a-
vis Section 4©(3) of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
if unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
 expression, but is nonetheless is entitled to protection. The State cannot
rob him of his right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitmate forms
of expression.
- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The prohibition of
publication of exit poll or electoral survey would be unreasonably
restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not
only for election day projections, but also for long term research.
- MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives
petitioner “the power to screen, review and examine “all television
programs,” emphasizing the phrase “all television programs”. Thus,
when the law says “all television programs,” the word “all” covers all
television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news
documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative body
made no qualification in the use of general word or expression. It then
follows that since “The Inside Story” is a television program, it is within
the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.
- Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No.
165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said that Soriano’s
“statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as
protected speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a “G” rating
for general viewership. The Supreme Court said the MTRCB suspension
was limited only to the show Ang Dating Daan, not Soriano, as the
MTRCB “may not suspend television personalities, for such would be
beyond its jurisdiction.”
- Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential
that the victim is identifiable although it is not necessary that he be
named. It must also be shown that a third party could identify him as
the object of the libelous article. Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following:
1. private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty;
2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceeding which are not confidential in nature
including any statement made therein or act
performed by public officer.
- A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged (those
which are not actionable or even if author acted in bad faith, e.g. speech
by member of Congress therein or any committee thereof) or qualified
privileged (those containing defamatory imputations which are not
actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair and true
reports without any comments/remarks).
- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine
of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved.
Section 5- Freedom of Religion-
- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 -
members of Jehovah’s witnesses may validly refuse participating in flag
ceremonies (singing the national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on
account of their religious beliefs.
- Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated when it will bring about clear and present danger of a
substantive evil which the State has a duty to prevent. However,
criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas does not constitute clear
and present danger.
- Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 – Freedom of religion does
not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax on the
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 sale of religious materials by a religious organization. For the purpose
of defraying cost of registration.
- Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary, 405
SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards are drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs.
By giving the Office of the Muslim Affairs exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organization to interpret what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. The State has in effect forced Muslim to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah on halal food.
- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that “[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.” Thus, it found a grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and Koran to
justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. The Court held that moral
disapproval “is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party list system.” Upholding
equal protection, the Court ruled that from the standpoint of the political
process, LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated.
As such, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The
Court also found that there was a transgression of AngLadlad’s
fundamental right of freedom of expression since, by reason of the
COMELEC action, the former was precluded from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other party-list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)
- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared that
the COMELEC order to remove the tarpaulin did not violate freedom of
religion, It does not convey any religious doctrine of the catholic church.
- Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the
obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of
the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
- Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005- The
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.
Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel-
- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CA- Relate
to suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected countries. In
relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction
on his right to travel.
- Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The
person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by
the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. Whether the
accused should be permitted to leave the country for humanitarian
reasons is a matter addressed to the court’s discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR
No. 141529, June 6, 2001).
- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that
everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
- Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
- Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM NO.
MTJ-10-1770-July 18, 2012- OCA Circular No. 49-2003- does not
restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by
judges and court [personnel, before they can go on leave to travel
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 abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing
something; to “regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule.
Section 7- Right to Information
- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional
right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract is consummated. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions liked privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
- Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under Section
17, Art. XI has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a
matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a “duty to
disclose” sprang from the “right to know”. Both of constitutional origin,
the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there
is a duty on the part of members of the government to disclose their
SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law. xxx While public
officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to
regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or
copied by interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it the
authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the
records. After all, public office is a public trust.
- Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC
- Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official records
may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.
Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector
- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15-
Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited supervisors
from forming labor unions. the right to strike does form an integral part
of the Right to Association.
Section 9- Expropriation
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- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the
procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary
guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For
example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain
through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974,
which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national
government infrastructure projects.
- Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in
instances when the national government expropriates property “for
national government infrastructure projects”.
- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA
303- There are at least two crucial differences between the respective
procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the
government is required to make immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to make
an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary, and Rule
67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974 which provides,
as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of
the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant
zonal value of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
- LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29,
2012- When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of its agrarian program, the constitutional provision
which governs is Section 4 Article XIII of the constitution which provides
that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of the farmers and regular farm workers who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
Notably, the provision also imposes upon the State the obligation of
 paying landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the
government’s agrarian reform purposes. It pertains to the fair and full
price if the taken property.
- LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust
account to provisionally pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,45 we struck
down as void the DAR administrative circular46 that provided for the
opening of the trust accounts in lieu ofthe deposit in cash or in bonds
contemplated in Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657.47 We pointedly
declared that the explicit words of Section 16(e) did not include "trust
accounts," but only cash or bonds, as valid modes of satisfying
the government’s payment of just compensation.
- Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process, the
Court determined that the legal interest should be 12% after recognizing
that the just compensation due was effectively a forbearance on the part
of the government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical
factor, then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time
the RTC decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the
12% interest was imposed from the time that the Republic commenced
condemnation proceedings and took the property.
- LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015- the
Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases
where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to
the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part
of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest
p.a. from the time of taking.
- Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015- As often
ruled by this Court, the award of interest is imposed in the nature of
damages for delay in payment which, in effect, makes the obligation on
the part of the government one of forbearance to ensure prompt
payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the
owner. However, when there is no delay in the payment of just
compensation, the Supreme Courthas not hesitated in deleting the
imposition of interest thereon for the same is justified only in cases
where delay has been sufficiently established.
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- Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The twin
elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves,
direct limitations to the exercise of eminent domain, arguing, in a way,
against the notion of fee simple title. The simple fee does not vest until
payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private
property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance
to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in
expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will.
Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly
followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine
need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose
to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the
complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired
an expansive meaning to include any use that is of usefulness, utility,
or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]. If
the genuine public necessity the very reason or condition as it
were allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a
private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent
point for the governments retention of the expropriated land.
The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes
the property to another public use very much different from the
original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another
private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its
power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to
another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizens own
private gain, is offensive to our laws. A condemnor should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government
cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it
pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation.
This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play
- ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners who
were able to prove the commitment of the government to allow them to
repurchase their land.
- Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State,
through expropriation proceedings may take private property even if,
admittedly, it will transfer this property again to another private party
as long as there is public purpose to the taking.
- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a property
subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was subsequently
declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the earlier taking.
- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009 -
For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements
should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution
authorizing the expropriation, and second, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA.
- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the Constitution
is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in
keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary
exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individual’s
rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly
interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in
favor of the property owner.
- While the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
This is in consonance with the principle that “the government cannot
keep the property and dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year
period limitation will encourage the government to pay just
compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity.
After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just
compensation.
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- Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent
domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community).
- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity
(patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must be paid just
compensation. If the property owned is public or otherwise held in trust
then no compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs. NAWASA).
- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).
- GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land
Incorporated, September 18, 2009- The Court said that the total
prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added that
the State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking
police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’
property without payment of just compensation.
- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26,
2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21,
2006 – The tax credit given to commercial establishments for the
discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a form of just
compensation for private property taken by the State for public use,
since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly
from the State, but from private establishments concerned.
- Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then power of eminent domain comes into play. It
is inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long as in the end,
public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).
- Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of property
for socialized housing is for public use.
- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order: 1)
government lands; 2) alienable lands of the public domain; 3)
unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands within the declared
 areas for priority development, zonal improvement program sites, slum
improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired;
5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-
owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).
Section 10- Non-impairment clause
- There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate
transactions entered or perfected even prior to its imposition. The
contract clause is not a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power
of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a
valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)
- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that
impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)
- Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, GR No.
195540, March 13, 2013- Section 47 of RA 8791 did not divest
juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but
only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the
one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new
redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and
expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive
application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts
from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and
whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Sections 11 & 12 – Custodial Investigation Rights
- Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.
- People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay
based organizatios in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of
bantay bayan, are recognized by local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay
level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Banting and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated
to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
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investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, section 12 of the
constitution. The Supreme Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial
confession of Lauga which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.
- Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial
investigation, nor it can be considered a formal arrest, by the very
nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.
- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624
- PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need
not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The
presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel should not prevent
an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
- PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the constitutional
guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally
arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning.
- PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person is
admission in evidence.
- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is inadmissible.
- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).
- Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court
sustained the admissibility of the sworn statements of the other
accused, explaining that the investigations performed by the PNP were
administrative and not custodial in nature.
- Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an
administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a
 party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent’s
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel.
Section 13- Bail
- Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but later
convicted of non-capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be granted
as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266 SCRA 281).
- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.
The right is not available in extradition proceedings that are not criminal
in nature. In the absence of any provision in the constitution, the law or
the treaty, adopting the practice of not granting bail, as a general rule,
would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
- Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon
a clear and convincing showing: 1) that, once granted bail, the applicant
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and 2) that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling reasons (Gov’t. of USA vs.
Purganan, September 24, 2002).
- Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs. Judge Olalia,
Jr., April 19, 2007 – Potential extraditee may be granted bail on the
basis of “clear and convincing evidence” that the person is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.
Section 14- Rights of accused
1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.
2. The right to be heard
- The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of certainty
for the law to be upheld- not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto, November 19, 2001).
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- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused appellant
may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the failure of the
information to allege relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476).
- A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign State
is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is
not criminal proceeding which will call into operations all the rights of
an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditee’s right to
notice and hearing is present only when the petition for extradition is
filed in court- it is only then when he has the opportunity to meet the
evidence against him (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377,
2000).
-
- Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11,
2014- the burden of demonstrating political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present
evidence.
3. Right to public trial
- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe trial (Sec
of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29, 2001).
- RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE
MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The impossibility of holding
such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the
interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the
proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to
provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the
courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public
 trial. Thus, the Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the
request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court
proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the
guidelines outlined therein.
- analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been
- Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to
speedy trial maybe waived except when otherwise expressly provided
by law. One's right to speedy disposition of his case must, therefore, be
asserted. Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert his right, he is
considered to have waived it.
4. Right to face to face confrontation
- The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the
supervening death of plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render the
deceased’s testimony inadmissible. Where no fault can be attributed to
plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike out all that has
been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696).
Section 16- Speedy disposition
- Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for
preliminary investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3 years
and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature and was prosecuted
for political reasons, it is held that there was violation of the accused’s
right to speedy disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition extends
to preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).
Section 17- Against Self-incrimination
- The right against self-incrimination is available in administrative
hearings when the nature of the penalty is penal in nature (like forfeiture
of property or dismissal from employment) and the hearing partakes the
nature of criminal proceeding (Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059).
- Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the
privilege to practice medical profession (Pascual vs. Board of Medical
Examiners).
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- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA
456- The right against self incrimination is extended in an
administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are
held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all cases in
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a
party of not.
- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of
documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).
- In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19,
2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and probative value
of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first ever Supreme Court
decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v. Vallejo,
G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in Yatar,
held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
should consider, inter alia, the following factors: “how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests”
- In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant
contended “that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA
tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as
his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of
the Constitution”.
- The Court rejected the argument. It held that “the kernel of the right is
not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion”, citing
Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held
that “the right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt”
and that “it does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object evidence”.
 - Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320
SCRA 383, the Court held that “although accused-appellant insisted that
hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may
be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use
of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.”
- Hence, according to the Court, “a person may be compelled to submit
to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no
testimonial compulsion involved”. It cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No.
133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where immediately after the
incident, “the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel”. In that case, the Court ruled that “there was no
violation of the right against self-incrimination”. It further stated that
“the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to
determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused”.
Section 18 – Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised
Penal Code)
Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime;
2. service in defense of the state
3. naval enlistment;
4. posse comitatus;
5. return to work order;
6. patriapotestas
Section 19- Death penalty
- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total abolition
of the death penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper for Congress
to determine its reimposition because of compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes. (PP v, Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682).
Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt
- The civil liability from a crime is not “debt” within the purview of the
constitutional provision against imprisonment for non payment of “debt”
-
- Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the Constitution,
refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. Clearly,
the non payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee
against imprisonment.
Section 21- Double Jeopardy
- As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
places the accused under double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs. People,
GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).
- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not
concluded as a series of events prompted the Senate to declare the
impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither acquitted nor was the
impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent.
Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the claim of double
jeopardy must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).
- Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal of
a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one year for offenses
punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six years or a lapse of two
years for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six years.
- For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the
accused, the following must be established: 1) the provisional dismissal
had express consent of the accused; 2) the provisional dismissal was
ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; 3) the 1 yr. or
2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no justification to file a
subsequent case beyond the period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson,
May 28, 2002).
- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment
of conviction. It merely approved the agreement between the parties on
the plea to a lesser offense by the accused and the condition attached
to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)
-
- Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the offender
under both section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article 353 of RPC is
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 unconstitutional because it constitutes a violation of the proscription the probative weight of the evidence presented”. (PP vs. Yatar, May 19,
against double jeopardy. Same with charging the offender under section 2004)
4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti Child Pornography constitute -
double jeopardy.

- Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double

jeopardy if the subsequent information charges the accused with
different offense, even if it arises from the same act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same act is not proscribed; what is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense.

Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

- RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law on jurisdiction
whose retroactive application is constitutional (Lacson vs. Exec.
Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).

- Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be considered
ex-post facto law as long as it operates prospectively since its stricture
would cover only offenses committed after and not before its enactment.

- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to court
doctrines pursuant to the maxim “legisinterpretatiolegis vim obtinet”-
the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).

- The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying

circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc, 398
SCRA 62).

- Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being

unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto was tantamount to
the application of an ex-post facto law- Describing the argument as
specious, the Supreme Court held “no ex-post facto law was involved in
the case at bar”. It added that “the science of DNA typing involved the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under
the Rules of Court”. Whereas, “an ex-post facto law referred primarily
to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of

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