2019 PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ARTICLE I recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:
A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting
waters and other natural features which are closely interrelated that
such islands, waters, and other natural resources form an intensive
geographical, economic, political entity or to have historically regarded
as an archipelago.
Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one or more
archipelagos and may include other islands.
The Maritime Baselines Law (R.A. No. 9522)
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)
demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),
codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their
“territorial sea,” the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.
Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in
Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA
3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation
passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting
typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522.
The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.
Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and
contour of baselines of archipelagic states like the Philippines and sets
the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental
shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes
of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones. (Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16, 2011,
En Banc [Carpio])
RA 9522 is not unconstitutional. It is a statutory tool to demarcate the
country’s maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not
to delineate Philippine territory.
It redrew the country’s baseline to comply with the UNCLOS
requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the
disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal from the
main archipelago and classifying them instead as “regime of islands”.
They excluded from the baselines. The national territory constitutes a
roughly triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters
within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine
archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s
delineation of internal waters.- Whether referred to as Philippine
“internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic
waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49[1]), the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory.
It is a multi-lateral treaty regulating, among others, sea use rights over
maritime zones (i.e. the territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the
baselines), contiguous zone (24 nautical miles from the baseline),
exclusive economic zones (200 nautical miles from the baselines) and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades
long negotiation among UN members to codify norms regulating the
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas,
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a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States- parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to
the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights, namely: the exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33),
and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
(Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio])
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement or diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, states acquire (or conversely, lose) territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulation of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS IIII, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law. (Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et
al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476,
August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio])
RA 9522’s use of the framework of Regime of Islands to determine the
maritime zones of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal is not inconsistent with the Philippines’ claim of
sovereignty over these areas.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters” under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact
and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering
its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by
154,216 square nautical miles x x x.
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the
KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text
the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal x x x
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would
have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two
provisions of UNCLOS III. X x x
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying
areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline
loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably “depart
to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of our
archipelago.”
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the
Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the
extended continental shelf provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III].
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as “’Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121” of UNCLOS III manifests
the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS
III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide,” such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under
the category of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones. (Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476, August
16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio])
UNCLOS III defines major zones where different standards, rights
and rules are applicable:
Internal waters : all waters landward of the baselines (e.g. low-water
line)and all harbours (Any law in force in the country, including the
common law, shall also apply in its internal waters and the airspace
above its internal waters. The right of innocent passage does generally
not exist in the internal waters.)
Territorial waters : the sea within a distance of 12 nautical miles (22
km) from the baselines (Any law in force in the country, including the
common law, shall also apply in its territorial waters and the airspace
above its territorial waters. The right of innocent passage shall exist in
the territorial waters. In the territorial sea, submarines and other
underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to
show their flag.)
Contiguous zone : the sea beyond the territorial waters but within a
distance of twenty-four nautical miles (~44 km) from the baselines
(Within its contiguous zone and the airspace above it, the country shall
have the right to exercise all the powers which may be considered
necessary to prevent contravention of any fiscal law or any customs,
emigration, immigration or sanitary law and to make such
contravention punishable.)
Maritime cultural zone : the sea beyond the territorial waters but
within a distance of twenty-four nautical miles (44 km) from the
baselines (Subject to any other law the country shall have, in respect
of objects of an archaeological or historical nature found in the
maritime cultural zone, the same rights and powers as it has in respect
of its territorial waters.)
Exclusive economic zones (EEZ): the sea beyond the territorial
waters but within a distance of two hundred nautical miles (367 km)
from the baselines (Subject to any other law the country shall have, in
respect of all natural resources in the exclusive economic zone, the
same rights and powers as it has in respect of its territorial waters.)
Continental shelf : comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to
that distance.
Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of Region IV-B,
Province of Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380
miles west of the southern end of Palawan. Spratly Archipelago-
international reference to the entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan
chain of islands is located. The Philippines essentially claims only the
western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.
Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as scarborough
reef, Panatag Shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China
Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A shaol
is a triangle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55
kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles
west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ
* Arigo vs. Swift GR No. 206510, September 16, 2014- a foreign
warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting
damage to marine resources is one situation in which Articles 30 & 31
may apply. Even if US a non member of UNCLOS, it does not mean it
will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a coastal state over its
internal waters and territorial sea.
Key Points on Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Verdict on the
PH-China Dispute over Scarborough Shoal: On July 12, 2016, the
arbitral tribunal agreed unanimously with the Philippines. In its award,
it concluded that there is no evidence that China had historically
exercised exclusive control over the waters or resources, hence there
was "no legal basis for China to claim historic rights" over the
nine-dash line. The tribunal also judged that China had caused
"severe harm to the coral reef environment", and that it had violated
Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by
interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, for
example restricting the traditional fishing rights of Filipino fishermen at
Scarborough Shoal.
China’s claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible with the
detailed allocation of rights and maritime zones in the Convention and
concluded that to the extent China had historic rights to resources in
the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished by
the entry into force of the Convention to the extent that were
incompatible with the Convention’s system of maritime zones.
Claims over Benham Rise/Philippine Rise- The Philippine Rise,
formerly called the Benham Rise, is a seismically active undersea
region and extinct volcanic ridge located in the Philippine Sea
approximately 250 km (160 mi) east of the northern coastline of
Dinapigue, Isabela. The Rise has been known to the people of
Catanduanes as Kalipung-awan since pre-colonial times, which
literally means 'loneliness from an isolated place'.
Under the Philippine Sea lie a number of basins including the West
Philippine Sea Basin, inside of which is located the Central Basin Fault
(CBF).The Benham Plateau is located in the CBF and its basement
probably is a micro-continent. Several scientific surveys have been
made on the feature to study its nature and its impact on tectonic
subduction, including one about its effects on the 1990 Luzon
earthquake. The Philippines claimed this feature as part of its
continental shelf in a claim filed with the United Nations Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on April 8, 2009, and which was
approved under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in 2012.
It is designated as a "protected food supply exclusive zone" by the
Philippine government in May 2017. Mining and oil exploration is
banned in the Benham Plateau as a protected area. On May 16, 2017,
President Rodrigo Duterte signed Executive Order No. 25 renaming
the feature to “Philippine Rise”, and later allowed international vessels
to conduct research on the Rise.
Despite its proximity to the archipelago, the plateau was previously not
included in the territory of the Philippines. On April 8, 2009, the
Republic of the Philippines lodged a partial territorial waters claim with
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
in relation to the continental shelf in the region of Benham Rise. It was
submitted as part of petition expanding the archipelago's baselines
and exclusive economic zone through a law that also included other
claims involving disputed territories of the Kalayaan Islands (Spratly
Islands) and Scarborough Shoal. Although the landform, in itself, is not
disputed, the petition still received some criticism from China.
According to the government's claim, based on a set of guidelines by
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the area
satisfies the 350-mile constraint line since the outer limits of the
continental shelf are located landward of the constraint line, which is
located 350 miles from the baselines where the measurement of the
breadth of the territorial sea begins.
The Philippines filed its claim for Benham Rise in 2008 in compliance
with the requirements of the [[United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Seas. The UN officially approved the claim in April 2012, the first
claim of the Philippines approved by an international body since the
colonial era.China released a statement saying that they do not
recognize the ruling and that China seeks to claim the Benham Rise
in the near future as it is part of a so-called 'Chinese second-chain
islands'. However, there are no existing islands within the Benham
Rise.
Basis of claim over Sabbah: under Section 2 of RA 5446-The
definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
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Bangsamoro Juridical Entity Concept (Province of North
Cotabato vs. GRP, G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008)-The
provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any
rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is
not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as
a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in
this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other
states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily
sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which
has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs
counter to the national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
Republic.
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Republicanism
Immunity of the State from Suit
Exceptions: with its Consent: expressly or impliedly
Express: by law: general (CA 327 as amended by PD 1445) or
special
Implied:
1. Initiates filing of a complaint
2. Engages in business
3. Enters into commercial contracts
(What is the Restrictive Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit?-
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contracts relate to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part
of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.” (Department of
Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug])
4. EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566, March 16, 2001
[The doctrine should not be used to perpetrate an Injustice on a
citizen.] – you need not make any prior claim with COA, you may
file your case in court.
Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102 (2014)-A petition filed for the issuance
of a Writ of Kalikasan directed against the Commander of the US
Pacific Fleet for the destruction of our corrals in Tubbataha reef (a
protected area system under the NIPAS [National Integrated Protected
Areas System] and a UN declared World Heritage Site because of its
rich marine bio-diversity) in the Sulu Sea caused by the USS Guardian,
an American naval vessel when it ran aground there in the course of
its voyage to Indonesia from its base in Okinawa, Japan, will not
prosper for lack of jurisdiction following the doctrine of sovereign
equality of all States. In effect, the suit is a suit against the US
government and, therefore, should be dismissed.
The waiver of immunity from suit of the US under the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) applies only to waiver from criminal jurisdiction,
so that if an American soldier commits an offense in the Philippines,
he shall be tried by Philippine courts under Philippine laws. The waiver
did not include the special civil action for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan.
Also, the demand for compensation for the destruction of our corrals
in Tubbataha reef has been rendered moot and academic. After all,
the US already signified its intention to pay damages, as expressed by
the US embassy officials in the Philippines, the only request is that a
panel of experts composed of scientists be constituted to assess the
total damage caused to our corrals there, which request is not
unreasonable.
Government Funds may not be subject to Garnishment- The funds
of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They
include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the
UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional
objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly
made the subject of writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse
judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the
UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its
liability. (UP v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 679 SCRA 54, 23 August
2012, 1st Div. [Bersamin])
Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws.[Tanada vs.
Angara, May 2, 1997]
Incorporated:
1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs.
Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of customary law
(Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no obligatory
rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines
to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive
from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the
combination two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as
to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 -
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under
the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
3
civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as
binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on
principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," such as
"general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is
embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education,
the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation." These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights
The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel, GR No. 183591, October
14, 2008)- The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples- has gone
beyond mere treaty or convention. In fact, it has now been elevated
into the status of a generally accepted principle of international law.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582, April 8,
2010- At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), contain norms
that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlines in said Principles which are not reflective of the
current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the
sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Xxx Using even the most
liberal lenses, these Yogyarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are – at best - de
lege refenda- and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full
of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and
respect for human rights, most of which amounts to no more than well-
meaning desires, without support of either State practice or opinio
juris.
Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 – generally accepted principles of
International Law, the provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject
to the police power of the State.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should
first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since
it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance
of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to
be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957];
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA
984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law
and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap,
op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing
with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect – a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such
as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Sec. of
Justice vs. Lantion]
Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22,
2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend “compelling state interest”.
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the
threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society
with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its
interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
The Filipino First Policy-In the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos (Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII
of the Constitution)
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997) (Bellosillo)- In
this case, the SC ruled that this provision is self-executing. It was also
in this case where the Court clarified that the rule now is that all
provisions of the Constitution are presumed to be self-executing,
rather than non-self-executing. Elaborating, the Court explained that
if a contrary presumption is adopted, the whole Constitution shall
remain dormant and be captives of Congress, which could have
disastrous consequences. Also, in this case the SC held that
“patrimony” simply means “heritage.” Thus, when we speak of
“national patrimony,” we refer not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines but as well as the cultural heritage of the Filipino
people.
Filipinization of Public Utilities- Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance
Secretary Margarito B. Teves, et al., G./R. No. 176579, June 28,
2011, En Banc (Carpio) Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and
Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of
public utilities.
The 1987 Constitution provides for the Filipinization of public utilities
by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public
utilities should be granted only to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. The provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive and
vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for
national security. The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement
is to prevent aliens from assuming control of public utilities, which may
be inimical to the national interest. This specific provision explicitly
reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an
overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to conserve and
develop our patrimony and ensure a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must
therefore meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to
be granted authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its
capital must be owned by Filipino citizens.
The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term capital. Does
the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to
common shares or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined
total of common and non-voting preferred shares)?
4

To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding capital
stock, including both common and non-voting preferred shares,
grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the
State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition unjustifiably
disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily
equates to control of the public utility.
Indisputably, construing the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in
the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners,
amounting to a clear abdication of the States constitutional duty to limit
control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation
certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain
areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the exploitation of
natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational
institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never open
to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to
Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the
national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend
and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure x x x a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the
Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of
investment, such as the development of natural resources and
ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising
business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. X x x
[We] rule that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus in the present case only to
common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
(common and non-voting preferred shares.)
The Right to Life of the Unborn from Conception- The Philippine
national population program has always been grounded on two
cornerstone principles: “principle of no-abortion” and the “principle of
non-coercion.” These principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection which expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
When Does Life Begin?- Majority of Members of the Court are of the
position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing
and evidence. During the deliberations, however, it was agreed upon
that the individual members of the Court could express their own views
on this matter. In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view
that life begins at fertilization.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is
no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when
life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are
quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view
that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of
the word “conception” which, as described and defined by all
reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization. From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that
the framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide
equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the
earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union
of the male sperm and the female ovum. X x x
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. From
the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible. (James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc [Mendoza])
Section 7 of RH law which excludes parental consent in cases where
a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
miscarriage is anti-family and violates Section 12 of Art. II. Also,
Section 23(a)(ii) is unconstitutional as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures”.
Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This right implies,
among other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country’s resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov.
of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)
The precautionary principle applies when the following
conditions are met:
1. There exist considerable scientific uncertainties
2. There exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are
scientifically reasonable (that is based on some scientifically
plausible reasoning);
3. Uncertainties cannot be reduced in the short term without at
the same time increasing ignorance of other relevant factors
by higher levels of abstraction and idealization;
4. The potential harm is sufficiently serious or even irreversible
for present or future generations or otherwise morally
unacceptable;
5. There is a need to act now, since effective counteraction
later will be made significantly more difficult or costly at any
later time.
The Rules (of Procedure for Environmental Cases) likewise
incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Sec. 1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental
effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it. The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
SEC. 2. Standards for application. – In applying the precautionary
principle, the following factors, among others, may be considered: (1)
threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future
generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal
consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.
Under this Rule, the precautionary principle finds direct application in
the evaluation of evidence in cases before the courts. The
precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases where scientific
certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. By applying the
precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of facts as
warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of preserving
and protecting the environment. This may be further evinced from the
second paragraph where bias is created in favor of the constitutional
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In effect, the
precautionary principle shifts the burden of evidence of harm away
from those likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change the
status quo. An application of the precautionary principle to the rules
on evidence will enable courts to tackle future environmental problems
before ironclad scientific consensus emerges. (Annotation to the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases)
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications. Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et
al., December 8, 2015- Precautionary Principle- expressing the
5
normative idea that governments are obligated to “foresee and
forestall” harm to the environment. Under this rule, the precautionary
principle finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence in cases
before the courts. Bias is created in favor of the constitutional right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. It shifts the
burden of evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer harm and
onto those desiring to change the status quo. For purposes of
evidence, the precautionary principle should be treated as a principle
of last resort of the regular Rules of Evidence would cause in an
inequitable result for the environmental plaintiff when: 1. Settings in
which the risks of harm are uncertain; 2. Settings in which harm
might be irreversible and what is lost is irreplaceable; and 3.
Settings in which the harm that might result would be serious.
When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., et al., GR No. 189185, August 16, 2016- The
Supreme Court did not find the presence of the elements for the
precautionary principle to apply
Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local government
to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which
Congress may provide by law. The principle of local autonomy under
the 1987 constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make
local governments sovereign within the state of an “imperium in
imperio” (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing
or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is
the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.
Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591,
Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate any state in
this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of the
Philippine territory for independence.
An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily
establish durable links. Xxx In international practice, the associated
state arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of
former colonies on their way to full independence. Xxx The concept of
Association is not recognized under the 1987 constitution.
Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270- It should
be emphasized that autonomy granted to local governments is not to
be understood as independence.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity
that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the
State to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. (Casan Macode
Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, En
Banc [Sereno, CJ])
The Jus Sanguinis Principle on Citizenship- The Philippine law on
citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
(Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc
[Purisima])
Natural-born Citizens- Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Section 2, Article IV,
1987 Constitution)
In general, there are only two (2) kinds of Filipino citizens, i.e., natural-
born and naturalized. There is no third category. If one did not have
to undergo the cumbersome process of naturalization, it means that
he is natural-born. (Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840,
May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])
Is a Foundling a Natural-born Citizen? To deny full Filipino
citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because
there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of
these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners
is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn’t make
any sense. Given the statistical certainty 99.9% - that any child born
in the Philippines would be a natural-born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There
is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire
class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and
the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of fact, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the numeration
with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. X x x
[T]he deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that
the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. X
xx
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of “unknown
parentage” are not citizens but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. X x x
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of
linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is
clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos, under Article
IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is
carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. X x x
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino
in the first place to be adopted. X x
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the
1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. X x x
The common thread of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human
Rights), UNCRC (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) and
ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) is to
obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that
no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of
birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and
R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet ungratified by the
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The
first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,” x x x.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been
born on the territory of the State in which it was found.
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the
1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness x
x x.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the
matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight
6
of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their
making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC,
G R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, En Banc [Perez])
Natural born: Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the
first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of
foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.
Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to
acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., GR No. 195649,
April 16, 2013-The act of using a foreign passport is not one of the
acts enumerated in CA No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the
very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position. Xxx The citizenship requirement for elective public
office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of
the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens citizenship issue to
attack.
Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007-
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the
political body of a nation by clothing him or her the privileges of a
citizen. Xxx Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by
which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to RA No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to CA No. 473 , as amended; and (c) legislative
naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien
R.A. No. 9139 may be availed of only by native-born aliens who lived
here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country
and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated
love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and
traditions of the Filipino people. To reiterate, the intention of the
legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature.
What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another
mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by
native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has
the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject
to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a person’s citizenship may
be done through a direct action for its nullity.
Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order
that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective:
1. the mother of the person making the election must
be citizen of the Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon reaching the age
of majority.
Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the “evolvement
from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the
election requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express
classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987
Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941
statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election
should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.
The Court concluded that, “having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is
the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship.
Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the
election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to
the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.”
Republic of Phil vs. Nora Fe Sagun (Feb 15, 2011)- there is no
specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing
of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before
the courts. CA 625- election within reasonable time is 3 years from
reaching the age of majority
Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1)
desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied forces
in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage
of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity.
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an
act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
the children must be of minor age at the time of the petititon for
repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14,
1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing
that Tabasa’s parents lost their Philippine citizenship “on account of
political or economic necessity”].
Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of
the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation
of a citizen.
Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of one’s application
for repatriation. Supra.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If
he was originally a natural born citizen before he lost his citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino.
NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225, amending
CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens
repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those
repatriated.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630-
The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens). In
filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual citizenship
effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of
allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes
sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
The phrase “dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) of the LGC
must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently,
persons with dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. It
should suffice if, upon filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship.
Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009- The
Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who also
possesses American citizenship having been born of an American
father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of
swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act (RA 9225) before running for public office. The Supreme Court En
Banc held that that it has applied the twin requirements to cases
7
“which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized
citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the
Philippines. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.]
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in
RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.
LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 – Valles and
Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his citizenship
under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply with the
provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that the
candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms
that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 –
Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual
allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.
Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19,
2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the
manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and
provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch
on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage
of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency
requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship;
nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with
the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a
natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-
born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office. Under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19,
2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention
of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country.
The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225
imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek
elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of
candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo
and Mercado are not applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides for
more requirements.
BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law,
Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens may
practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court and upon
compliance with the requirements, which will restore their good
standing as members of the Philippine Bar.
Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The Nottebohm
case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of
effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at
bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention
of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a
third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated
as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in
matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State
shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize
exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which
he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country
with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely
connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of
Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired
naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World
War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were
in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on
Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on
the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon
filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The
International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of
Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with
Liechtenstein.
*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989
AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007-
It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225
is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear
out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was
not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section
5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not
a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers
were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate
to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including the Supreme
Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier
vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a
“citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The
term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2)
an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an
inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April
1899. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en
masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
8
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless
of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not
distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a
Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil status
of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of the
Philippine citizenship.
Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292-
When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not
considered as res judicata in any subsequent proceeding
challenging the same.
Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata
principle) 1.) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or
his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof;
and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) – grants Philippine
citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing
in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications
and disqualifications.
Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau
of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father.
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120,
April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it is the -
State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization
proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons in
an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.
Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizen’s
acquisition of permanent resident status abroad constitutes an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The
“green card” status in the USA is a renunciation on one’s status as a
resident of the Philippines.
ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)
The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied
in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain
procedural requirements he must undergo, among others the process
of registration under RA 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996).
Kabataan Party-list, et al., v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
221318, December 16, 2015, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe)- “With
these considerations in mind, petitioners’ claim that biometrics
validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, 10013, must perforce fail. To
reiterate, this requirement is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the
right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of
which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was
institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution
and is a mere complement to the Existing Voter’s Registration Act of
1996. X x x
“Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the
level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution – that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational
basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the
public good – the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as
in this case.”
Applying the Strict Scrutiny Test to RA 10367, “Petitioners assert that
biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering
that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with compelling
reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of
the right to suffrage.
x x x. “Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the regulation passes the strict
scrutiny test.” “In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances,
strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the
amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity
of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well
as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications
to equal protection. X x x the United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as
suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel.
“Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling,
rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of
less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the burden
befalls upon the State to prove the same.
“In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation
requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It
was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and
credible elections by containing – if not eliminating, the perennial
problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple
registrants. X x x the objective of the law was to cleanse the national
voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the
results of the elections were truly reflective of the genuine will of the
people. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling
state interest.
“Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for
achieving the above-said interest. Section 6 of Resolution 9721 sets
the procedure for biometrics validation x x x. It is, in effect, a manner
of updating one’s registration for those already registered under RA
8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The re-registration
process is amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting
a novel technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of
electoral fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in
this country. While registrants may be inconvenienced by waiting in
long lines or by not being accommodated on certain days due to heavy
volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that are remedied
by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC
as an administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC has not
turned a blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for the
exigencies x x x.
“That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage
was sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was
demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that
interest.
Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of
residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains attached
to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is considered
synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an individual’s
permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent for business
or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.
Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile: 1) a
man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once
established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; (3) a man can
have but one residence or domicile at any given time.
Absentee voting – under Section 2 of RA 9189 – is an exception to
the six-month/one-year residency requirement.
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Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in the
dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225,
in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents,
grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189 (election for president,
v-pres., senators). It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims,
in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Residence is equated with domicile. In election law, residence is
synonymous to “domicile,” not necessarily with a person’s home
address. A man may have several places of residence but has only
one domicile. Or he may be a nomad or travelling salesman with no
permanent home. Nonetheless, the law recognizes one domicile for
him.
There are three kinds of domicile: 1) domicile of origin—that is, a
child follows the domicile of the parents; 2) domicile by operation of
law; and 3) domicile of choice made freely by a person of legal age.
Domicile of choice “imports not only the intention to reside in one
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent for business or pleasure
or for like reasons, one intends to return.” Makalintal vs. COMELEC,
July 10, 2003. In short, domicile of choice is a question of fact. One
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent (animus revertendi).
Settled jurisprudence recognizes three rules to determine a person’s
domicile: First, everyone must always have one of the three kinds of
domicile; second, once established, a domicile remains the same until
a new one is acquired; and third, a person can have only one domicile
at any given time.
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC- There are three requisites to acquire a
new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an
intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Applied to Poe. As a foundling found in Jaro, Iloilo, she acquired the
domicile (and citizenship) of her parents who, according to “generally-
accepted principles of law,” are presumed to be Filipinos. So, her
domicile of origin is Jaro, Iloilo. After she married an American and
moved to and worked in the United States, she lost her domicile of
origin and followed the domicile of her husband in America. When she
and her husband moved back for good here after the death of
Fernando Poe Jr., she acquired a new domicile of choice in the
Philippines. As to when she acquired it depends, on her clear
intention, conduct and physical presence in the new location.
In Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995), the Supreme Court held that
“the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, [is]
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
Constitution’s residence qualification requirement.” The Supreme
Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos made an honest mistake in writing
“seven months residence” in her certificate of candidacy for a
congressional seat, a period less than the constitutional requirement
of “not less than one.
Recent jurisprudence. Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009) held that
residency is not dependent on citizenship because even a foreigner
can establish a Philippine domicile.
More clearly, Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009) ruled that a former
Filipino who was naturalized abroad may choose to reestablish his/her
domicile here even prior to the reacquisition of citizenship under the
Dual Citizenship Law.
Said the Supreme Court: “[I]n order to acquire a new domicile by
choice, there must concur: 1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, 2) an intention to remain there, and 3) an intention
to abandon the old domicile. “The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.”
Moreover, Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010) ruled that the
abandonment of a home in Australia, renunciation of Australian
citizenship, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and settling down in
Zamboanga Sibugay show an “intent to change domicile for good.”
Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013) clarified, though, that the use
of an American passport after a renunciation of American citizenship
effectively reverses such renunciation and disqualifies one who
reacquired citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law from being
elected to a public office.
(References: Columns of Fr. J.Bernas and Justice A. Panganiban)
Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizen’s
acquisition of permanent resident status abroad constitutes
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The
green card status in the USA is a renunciation of one’s status as a
resident of the Philippines.
But: Q. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225
have the effect of restoring his Philippine domicile?
A. No. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to stay in
the Philippines. After he does that, his occasional absence from the
recovered domicile does not have the effect of removing him from the
domicile for as long as he manifests animus manendi et revertendi
(Japzon vs. Ty, January 19, 2009)
ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro Party List vs.
Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005; Epira case-Gerochi vs.
DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007).
Permissible delegation:
1. Tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. Emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of Art. VI
3. People (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2 of Art.
XVII; RA 6735)
4. Local governments (Art X)
5. Administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation
Tests of valid delegation:
1. Completeness test
*Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
2. Sufficient standard
*Santiago vs. COMELEC, 3/19/97; Abakada
Guro Party List vs. Exec. Sec.
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, GR
No. 203335, February 11, 2014- In order to determine whether there
is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two
tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the
only thing to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to prevent the delegation from
running riot.
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Garcia vs, Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013- the issuance of
Barangay Protection Order by the Barangay officials is purely
executive in nature, consistent with his duty under the LGC to enforce
all laws and ordinances and to maintain public order in the barangay.
Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008- in
elections for President, V-President, Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-
proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with other general rules,
there are recognized exceptions to he prohibition namely: (1)
correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition
of proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the
authenticity and the due execution of certificates of canvass as
provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.
Non delegation of legislative power
Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in
its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential
terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In
the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law
and order;" "adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;"
"justice and equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity,
economy and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices." Provisions
of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total electrification
of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of
the supply of electric power” and “watershed rehabilitation and
management” meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they
provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These
are sufficient standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent unit
of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not
promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule making
authority under RA No. 8177.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-
Power of Subordinate Legislation – with this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
“filling” the details which Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what
are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing
rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of legislative power. It is
simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12%
rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the President.- The
intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress
and the task of the President is simply to execute the legislative policy.
Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement that
the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress
as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional
principles of bicameralism and the rule of presentment. A valid
exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers. It can
be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a
committee of either or both chambers.
The President’s Ordinance Power is the Executive’s rule-making
authority in implementing and executing constitutional or statutory
powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers vested in the
Executive that are self-executory.
Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No. 166498,
June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to
reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of the Legislature
which cannot be usurped by the former.
Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No.
180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or delegated
legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008- Congress
cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion
legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No.
1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-
list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of
their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The last
sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: “[T]he names of the party-
list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list” is certainly not
a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To
us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is
limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the
certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the
polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the
prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not
intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the “Certified List” the names of the party-list
nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure
aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before
the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec
virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups
Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October
6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006 –
Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely
provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and
RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20%
allocation: the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives;
(2) the 2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2%
of the total votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a
seat in the House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and
(4) proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total
number of votes”.
BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%
threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
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In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections. (2)The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit
our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered
by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next
in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The
Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed
all political parties to participate in the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted
down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining
a “party” that participates in party-list elections as either “a political
party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not
be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus
organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To
further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk
wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang
Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-
up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found
in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of
Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the
House of Representatives to Congress: “The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.” The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-
list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives
from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a
valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the
party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April 2,
2013- In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013
and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-
defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong
to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-
defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall
not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
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 provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013
partylist elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all
national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, and (2)
all nominees must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the
COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not
organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented.” Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong
to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although
they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because
they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even
if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed
above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under
such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.
Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC- The
religious sector is expressly prohibited from participating in
party-list elections (Sec. 5, 2nd par., Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
Religious denominations and sects are even prohibited from being
registered as political parties in the COMELEC (Sec. 2, par. 5, Art. IX-
C, 1987 Constitution).
However, the Supreme Court clarified, based on the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, that what is prohibited is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party; there is no
prohibition against a priest running as a candidate.
Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, 618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010- The act of the COMELEC of not
allowing the registration of Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party as a political party
to participate in party-list elections on the ground that its members are
“immoral,” citing verses from the Bible and the Koran, is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion as it violated the non-establishment clause
of freedom of religion and, therefore, should be nullified. Under this
non-establishment clause of freedom of religion, the COMELEC, as an
agency of the government, is not supposed to use religious standards
in its decisions and actions.
Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no
specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum
population that must compose legislative district. For while a province
is entitled to at least a representative with nothing mentioned about a
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly situated.
Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010- In
this case, there is no official record that the population of the City of
Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected prior to the May
2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a
legislation district of its own under Section 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8,
2010 - that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women
who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting standards
that the “marginalized and underrepresented sector must demonstrate
(1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an
immutable or distinguishing characteristic, attribute, or experience that
define them as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or
economic powerlessness.”
The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown “that the LGBT sector has
been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against because of
negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of violence
perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by reason of
their sexual orientation and gender identity.” It added that the
magnitude of opposition against petitioner’s participation in the party
list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sector’s lack of political
power; so, too, is the fact that proposed legislations seeking to prohibit
discriminatory treatment against LGBTs have been languishing in
Congress.
LEGISLATIVE PERKS – (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) – The
history of the provision granting Senators and Congressmen
immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense.
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of innocence
does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and politicsl
rights.
Trillanes vs. Marigomen, G.R. No. 179817, March 14, 2018-
Parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the
lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or
debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of the
(legislative) process." To participate in or respond to media interviews
is not an official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his
sworn duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws.
Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and
legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's
participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political
in nature," outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the
Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution. Contrary to
petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary
immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint.
The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a
lawmaker, but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.
Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom
of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecnoming of a
member thereof (Osmeña vs. Pendatun).
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard Gordon
did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and
acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a “private organization merely
performing public functions”, and that the “PNRC Chairman is not a
government official or employee.” Not being a government office, the
PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a
Senator or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is “autonomous,
neutral and independent” of the Philippine Government. It is a
voluntary organization that “does not have government assets and
does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress”. The
PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC
Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution.” Senator Gordon
can validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his
senatorial position.
Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the
members. The base in computing majority is normally the total
membership of the body, within the coercive power of the House.
Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority simply
means the greater number or more than half. Who shall sit as
officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note: splitting of term
between Senate President Drilon and another Senator). When the
Constitution provides that the Senate President shall be elected by
the majority it does not delineate who comprises the majority or
the minority. The defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate
presidency are not necessarily the minority.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA
268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in enacting a law,
a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the absence
of showing that there was violation of a constitutional provision or
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private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere procedures which may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Baguilat vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017- Under Section
16 of Article VI, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be
elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also
states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how
these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. In the
case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, which involved a dispute on
the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-
2001), the Supreme Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is
explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of
Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting
the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that
'[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.' [As such], the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
[House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court.”
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
the House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia,
"determine the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules,
unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of the
House of Representatives]." Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has
no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm, without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
the Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of
Representatives]."
DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmeña vs Pendatun, The House of
Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior.
The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case which will amount
to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature.
People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as congressman
did not thereby amount to a condonation of his offense; neither does it
entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to be free from confinement
and to be allowed to attend sessions of congress, for the people
elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action and movement.
It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to shield a
member of congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. A
member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for
relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties.
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress to a
colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019
which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed for
misbehavior as a member of Congress.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of the
Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators elect. This
does not fall within the powers of the electoral tribunal. The latter has
jurisdiction only over electoral contests in which contestant seeks
not only to oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted into
office.
LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs.
Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over the election contests relating to his election, returns and
qualifications, ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. The
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation.
RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al. - clearly
under law and jurisprudence, it is the State thru its reps.
Designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly
procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. HRET no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it authority to delve into the legality
of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible.
(Aug. 23, 2011).
Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in the
congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one’s
eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to file before
the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo
warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules.
Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002- Since
petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of the Second Division suspending the proclamation and
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the 2nd Division.
The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality,
the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends the
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in
office of the respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of
the 4th District of Leyte.
At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division was seasonably challenged
by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for reconsideration. The issue
was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to
resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase “election, returns
and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that “election” referred to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
“returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board
of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and
“qualifications” to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive
jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective
officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-
proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, V-
President, Senator and Members of the House of
Representatives.
What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors” in the
certificate of canvass or election returns”. To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election
returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have
been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in
the minutes of their respective proceedings.
Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass, COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it calls for
the re-opening and appreciation of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal
has jurisdiction.
This Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions
of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
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arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).
Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of
congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just
as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution.
Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not lost
upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated.
Tañada vs. HRET, GR 217012 March 1, 2016-HRET lacks the
authority to rule whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance candidate.
xxx Under the HRET Rules, the electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction
over two types of election contests: election protests and quo warranto
cases. xxx An election protest is the proper remedy against acts or
omissions constituting electoral frauds or anomalies in contested
polling precincts, and for the revision of ballots. xxx On the other hand,
the eligibility of a member representative is impugned in a quo
warranto case. But the HRET Rules do not prescribe procedural
guidelines on how the COC of a political aspirant can be
cancelled on the ground that he or she is a nuisance candidate.
Rather, this remedial vehicle is instituted in the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, particularly Rule 245 thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
xxx HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over rulings on
cancellation cases promulgated by the COMELEC en banc. It is the
SC which has jurisdiction and the power to review such rulings from
the Commission. xxx The jurisdiction of the HRET, as circumscribed
under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, is limited to the
election, returns, and qualification of the members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election protest involving
a non-member. xxx To be considered a member of the Lower House,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only
upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of
discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of
power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.
Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506,
respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list nominees are
considered as “elected members” of the House, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808, June 26,
2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) vested the COMELEC with
“jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and
prescribing the qualifications of each nominee” and that no grave
abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELEC’s First Division
and COMELEC En Banc which had declared President Villanueva the
proper party to submit CIBAC’s Certificate of Nomination instead of
Perla, who allegedly served as acting secretary-general. As provided
in Atienza v. Commission of Elections, COMELEC also possesses the
authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its
constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register
political parties. “The power to rule upon questions of party identity and
leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its
enforcement powers,” the Court declared
Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the SET
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel
involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a
member of the Senate.
DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of Representatives
is authorized to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. The changes must be
PERMANENT and do not include temporary alliances or factional
divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party
to another.
The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political party
must have at least two senators to be able to have a representative
in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2
will not entitle such party a membership in the CA. (Guingona v.
Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).
Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even
assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number
and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and
the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18,
Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show
to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be
entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to
comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional
representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the
party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power
of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the
instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to
this Court is premature. The discretion of the House to choose its
members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
APPROPRIATION- it is vested in the Legislature, subject to the
requirement that appropriations bills original exclusively in the House
of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur
with amendments.
While there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-
ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by
Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President,
the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA
may be properly sourced from the President's own office
budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After
all, there is no usurpation of the legislature'ʹs power to
appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the
existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his offic
e (Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for L
egal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication
Division, 667 SCRA 408).
The “Pork Barrel” System:
Considering petitioners’ submission and in reference to its local
concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as
the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by
which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local
projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its
members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-
sum, discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined
as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through
various post-enactment measures and/or practices; and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined
as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President
to determine the manner of its utilization. X x x the Court shall delimit
the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 710
SCRA 1, 105-106, Nov. 19, 2013, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe])
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In Philconsa, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of individual
menbers of Congress to propose and identify priority projects because
this was merely recommendatory in nature and is also recognized that
individual members of Congress far more than the President and their
congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the
needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
project (LAMP vs. DBM Secretary, GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012)
Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November 19,
2013- Pork barrel- commonly referred as lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Legislature, although its usage would
evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive. Xxx declared
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within
which it operates. Insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in
varying gradations, non-oversight, post enactment authority in vital
areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto the legislators
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary
funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system
of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriation
bills, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and,
in the process denied the President the power to veto items;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight
by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an
aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to
intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy; and again insofar as it has conferred to the President the
power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure
development projects”, it has once transgressed the principle of non
delegability.
The Power of Augmentation- Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No. 209287,
July 1, 2014- the transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under
section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (1) there is law authorizing the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice
and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer
funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to be
transferred are saving generated from the appropriations of their
respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. The following were declared unconstitutional: 1)
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments
and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the GAA; 2) the cross-border transfers of the savings of
the executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside
the Executive; 3) The use of unprogrammed funds despite the
absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue
collections exceeded the revenue targets for non compliance with the
conditions provided in the relevant GAA (Araullo, MR Feb. 3, 2015).
The Secretary of Budget shall recommend to the President th
e year’s program of expenditure for each agency of the gover
nment on the basis of authorized appropriations. The approved
expenditure program shall constitute the basis for fund releas
e during the fiscal period, subject to such policies, rules and r
egulations as may be approved by the President. [TECHNICA
L EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (T
ESDA), v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNA
LDO A. VILLAR; COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.
; AND
COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No.
196418, February 10, 2015]
Impoundment- refusal of the president for whatever reason to spend
funds made available by Congress.xxx there was no instance of
executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment is prohibited by the
GAA, unless there will be an unmanageable government budget
deficit.
Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14,
2008- Any government expenditure without the corresponding
appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no
dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or not,
cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior
appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a
loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds
enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the
government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds to
fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan
proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan falls
due, Congress must make another appropriation law authorizing the
repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National
Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is
covered by the automatic appropriation.
Congressional Investigations: There are two (2) kinds of
congressional investigations, i.e., inquiry in aid of legislation (Section
21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); and the question hour (Section 22,
Article VI, 987 Constitution).
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon (203
SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the determination whether a
law has been violated is not in aid of legislation but in aid of
prosecution, and therefore, violative of separation of powers. To allow
the Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of
conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiceable
controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of
judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier (investigation was not
in aid of legislation).
Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice (Romero II vs.
Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009).
Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR
No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint.
The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power to
punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation as the
branch of government vested with the legislative power, independently
of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish
contumacious acts against it. Except only when the Congress and/or
its Committee exercise the power of contempt, it cannot penalize
violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability.
It can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it
may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment
of persons who may appear liable.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the
President to withhold information requested by other branches of the
government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to
the President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential
powers if “necessary and proper” in carrying out powers and
functions expressly granted to the Executive under the
Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several decisions have
recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of Almonte
v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.
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As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive,
the President is ultimately responsible for military and national
security matters affecting the nation. In the discharge of this
responsibility, the President may find it necessary to withhold
sensitive military and national security secrets from the
Legislature or the public.
As the official in control of the nation’s foreign service by virtue of the
President’s control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices,
the President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy relations of
the State. The President’s role as chief implementer of the State’s
foreign policy is reinforced by the President’s constitutional power to
negotiate and enter into treaties and international agreements. In the
discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to
refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or
the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with
considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will not
imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with it.
There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal
deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and advisers. To
encourage candid discussions and thorough exchange of views, the
President’s communications with his Cabinet and advisers need
to be shielded from the glare of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and
other presidential advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the
President policy issues and executive matters knowing that their
discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of
candid advice.
Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of
protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as
well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against
other constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared
state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest, the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the
power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure
testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.
The balancing of interests – between executive privilege on one
hand and the other competing constitutionally recognized
interests on the other hand - is a function of the courts. The courts
will have to decide the issue based on the factual circumstances of
each case. This is how conflicts on executive privilege between the
Executive and the Legislature, and between the Executive and the
Judiciary, have been decided by the courts.
Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -Applying the
principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final
text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since
there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
“historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these
offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with
Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations. xxx Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however,
that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita
holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean
that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a
consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be
determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of
the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.
“Operational Proximity Test” (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R.
No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications elicited by the
three (3) questions [a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN)
project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether
the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received”
by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing
of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with
published rules.
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the Philippines,
GR No. 180308, June 19, 2012- the wide latitude given to the
Congress in the conduct of legislative inquiries and would not fault the
Senate for approving the resolution on the very same day that it was
submitted. The court also held that the petitioners were invited as
resource persons at the inquiry, and as such, they do not have
the constitutional right to counsel.
In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus
of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- The Congress’
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created
by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power
of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this
class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by
respondent Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them
in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative
action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees,
and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper
investigation
Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a mere
provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.
Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the power
of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the
principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-
equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information.
Varieties of Executive Privilege
1. State secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would
subvert crucial military or diplomatic objective.
2. Informer’s privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with the enforcement of that law.
3. Generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive
branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
executive privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefore and why it must be respected.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested,
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hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be
construed as limited in its appearance of department heads in the
question hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function.
The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to
determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
What is a Legislative Veto? A disapproval by Congress, or by an
oversight committee of Congress, of an administrative regulation
promulgated by an administrative body or agency.
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny;
investigation and supervision.
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE – Abakada Guro Party List, et al. vs.
Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 – the signing of a bill by the Speaker
of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent and the certification od the
Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive of its due enactment.
A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the Senate to
propose amendments, it cal propose its own version even with respect
to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.
Principle of Bicameralism: BICAMERAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE- It is a mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House of Representatives. By the nature
of its function, a Bicameral Conference Committee is capable of
producing unexpected results – results which sometimes may even go
beyond its own mandate. (Philippine Judges Association v.
Secretary Prado; Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance) The Supreme
Court recognizes the long standing legislative practice of giving said
conference ample latitude for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House. It can propose amendment in the nature of
a substitute, so long as the amendment is germane to the subject
of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but
needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as
an act of the legislative department.
Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 –
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be
entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear
and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its
real properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. “Exclusive” is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the
exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and
exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege
exclusively. The words “dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be
substituted for the words “used exclusively” without doing violence to
the Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively
ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)
It has already been established that there is one repository of
executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This
means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Chief Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Section 18, Article VII thereof.
(Jamar Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakur Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3,
2012, En Banc [Sereno, CJ]),
The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried out
earnestly and effectively throughout the whole territory of the
Philippines in accordance with constitutional provision on national
territory. Hence, the President of the Philippines, as the sole
repository of executive power, is the guardian of the Philippine
archipelago, including all the islands and waters embraced
therein and all other territories over which the Philippines and
sovereignty or jurisdiction. X x x To carry out this important duty,
the President is equipped with authority over the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state.
X x x. In addition, the Executive is constitutionally empowered to
maintain peace and order, protect life, liberty, and property, and
promote the general welfare. In recognition of these powers,
Congress has specified that the President must oversee, ensure, and
reinforce our defensive capabilities against external and internal
threats and, in the same vein, ensure that the country is adequately
prepared for all national and local emergencies arising from natural
and man-made disasters. To be sure, this power is limited by the
Constitution itself. X x x (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
The Faithful Execution Clause- This Court has interpreted the faithful
execution clause as an obligation imposed on the President, and
not a separate grant of power. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, expresses this duty in no uncertain terms and
includes it in the provision regarding the President’s power of
control over the executive department x x x. Hence, the duty to
faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power
and is intimately related to the other executive functions. X x x
These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a President cannot
function with crippled hands, but must be capable of securing the rule
of law within all territories of the Philippine Islands and be empowered
to do so within constitutional limits. Congress cannot, for instance,
limit or take over the President’s power to adopt implementing rules
and regulations for a law it has enacted.
More important, this mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being
inherently executive in nature. xxx The import of this characteristic is
that the manner of the President’s execution of the law, even if not
expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only
by law, since the President must “take necessary and proper steps
to carry into execution the law.” X x x
In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President’s prerogative to do
whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests. It is
no coincidence that the constitutional provision on the faithful
execution clause was followed by that on the President’s commander-
in-chief powers, which are specifically granted during extraordinary
events of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this duty of
defending the country is unceasing, even in times when there is no
state of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such times, the
President has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.
It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the
faithful-execution clause of the Constitution to do nothing when the call
of the moment requires increasing the military’s defensive capabilities,
which could include forging alliances with states that hold a common
interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit against an
offending state.
This approach of giving utmost deference to presidential initiatives in
respect of foreign affairs is not novel to the Court. The President’s act
of treating EDCA as an executive agreement is not the principal power
being analyzed x x x. Rather, the preliminary analysis is in reference
to the expansive power of foreign affairs. We have long treated this
power as something the Courts must not unduly restrict. X x x
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Understandably, this Court must view the instant case with the same
perspective and understanding, knowing full well the constitutional and
legal repercussions of any judicial overreach. (Rene A.V. Saguisag,
et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting
president evolved through case law.
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity
from suit during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbe
ncy. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot
be invoked by a non-
-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her te
nure (Lozada v. Arroyo, 670 SCRA 545; Estrada v. Disiert
o, 356 SCRA 108).
Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue
of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative.
Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the
immunity of the President extends to the end of the term to which he
was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear that the
immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure (representing the period during which the incumbent actually
holds office) and not his term (the time during which the officer may
claim to hold office as a matter of right).
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive immunity
applied only during the incumbency of a President.
David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 – It is not proper to
implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that
the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law.
Former President cannot use the presidential immunity from sui
t to shield himself/herself from judicial scrutiny that would asse
ss whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she wa
s responsible or accountable for the abduction of a person (R
odriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84).
Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the
actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity
to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination
of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain
responsibility and accountability within these.
Doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in amparo
proceedings. The president, as commander--‐‐in--‐
‐chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable f
or extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. To hold s
omeone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, th
e following elements must obtain: a.
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate; b.
the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was a
bout to be or had been committed; and c.
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable meas
ures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators th
ereof (Ibid). Commanders may therefore be impleaded – not a
ctually on the basis of command responsibility – but rather o
n the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability (
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 662 SCRA 312).
SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL-
Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law grants the Supreme
Court the power to resolve an election contest between or among
presidential candidates, no new or separate court is created. The law
merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for
President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number of
votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the
jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793.
Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers, charged
with the ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration,
on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial
and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the
Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to determine
whether or not said duly certified election returns have been
irregularly made or tampered with or reflect the true results of the
elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount the
ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of
each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and,
in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power
to do.
In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election protestee Ramos
as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA 559).
Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda
effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in the
Senate, which term coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency
2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda v. De Castro,
February 12, 2008.
Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain reading
of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein,
although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not
contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The
Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the
Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves
a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism
by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a
definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935
Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power
found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions contemplated in
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are post election remedies,
namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The word
“contest” means that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only be
invoked after the election and proclamation of the President or Vice-
President – there can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed.
TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988, August
31, 2010)- Estrada was not elected President the second time he ran.
Since the issue will be premised on the second election as President,
there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case.
VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- Estrada vs.
Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read: TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF
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PRESIDENT- The question whether the claimed temporary inability of
Estrada is a political question beyond the Supreme Court’s power of
review. The decision that President Arroyo is the dejure President
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court.
POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE) - The
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency- Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably
the acts of the Chief Executive. (Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al. v. Secretary Angelo
Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and 181527, April 21, 2015, En Banc
[Leonardo-De Castro])
Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005-
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the
Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an agent
or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena,
makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may
seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that
there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated
by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are
certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive
of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount
of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those
powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3,
SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of
mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These distinctions hold true to this day.
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all
fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means
exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in
question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot
conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee
foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the
decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public
interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the
sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from
the established functions of governance.
Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes GR No. 180771, April 21,
2015- The doctrine of qualified political agency may not be validly
invoked if it is the Constitution itself that provides that the act should
be performed by the President no less, especially since what are
involved are natural resources.
APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs. Mison;
Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs. Carale-
Congress cannot expand the constitution by increasing those
officers who need prior confirmation by the CA.
Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De Castro
v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057,
PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re Applicability of Sec.
15, Art. VII of the Constitution to Appointments to the Judiciary;
GR No. 191149, Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v.
JBC; GR No. 191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC;
March 17, 2010, April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the term of the outgoing President does not apply to vacancies in the
High Tribunal. “Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition
covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the
Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the
JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this
Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the
prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the
Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned,
should prevail.“ Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
Province of Aurora vs. Marco, GR 202331 April 22, 2015-The
prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential
appointments, and not to those made by local executives. In this case,
the appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of
his/her tenure.
Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once an appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject
to confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is
effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next
adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a recess of
Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer be
extended a new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free
to renew the ad-interim appointment.
Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622,
July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to make such acting
appointment. The President may even appoint in acting capacity a
person not yet in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.
Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy
in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary
before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. It
may be extended any time there is vacancy, given while Congress is
in session.
Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21¬ 2006- Under Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive
departments," ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by
the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers
to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a
fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. xxx The President appoints the first group
of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is
the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared
unconstitutional.
Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position of
department manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is not a
third level position and does not require presidential appointment.
CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding multiple
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positions and receiving compensation therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA,
425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.
CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule has always been
that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices
in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of
control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President.
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935,
December 7, 2010- The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission
finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. The President's power to conduct investigations to
aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency - is
inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. Suffice it to
say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there
is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress
to appropriate funds.
Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines,
Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007 – The
President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the
Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This
authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII,
Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution. The President’s
power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292
which grants the President broad organization powers to implement
reorganization measures. Be that as it may, the President must
exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or
agency of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in
good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient.
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree
No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the
Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and activities and to
standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two
decrees [is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides
that “all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked.
Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 – The
President’s power (EO 292) to reorganize offices outside of the
Office of the President Proper is limited merely transferring
functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The DECS is indisputably
a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part
of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly
authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the
DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the Philippine
Sports Commission (PSC), is attached to the Office of the President.
Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the “functions,
programs and activities of DECS related to sports development” to the
PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.
Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The presidential
power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to
all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest
clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and
does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or
curtail the President’s power of control over the Executive branch. xxx
In mandating that the President “shall have control of all executive x
x x offices,” Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office — one performing executive functions
outside of the independent constitutional bodies — from the
President’s power of control. xxx The President’s power of control
applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch.
This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power
of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions
of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP– (Lacson vs. Perez, May 10,
2001)- The declaration by the President of ‘state of rebellion” during or
in the aftermath of the May 1, 2001 seige of Malacanang is not violative
of the separation of powers doctrine. The President, as Commander
in chief of Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call upon such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February 3,
2004- The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs
in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time
draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers pursuant to her
calling out power.
Calling out power of the president. President as Commander-
in-chief has a vast intelligence network
to gather information, some of which may be classified
as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions
may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great
loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were
to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we
consider the present
situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could
spill over the other parts of the country. The determination
of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to
unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for
disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction
or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised
(Integrated Bar of The Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81).
Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011- The President
does not need any congressional authority to exercise his calling out
power.
While it is true that the Supreme Court may inquire into the factual
bases for the President’s exercise of these powers it would generally
defer to her judgment on the matter. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme
Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
Is the President’s power to call out the armed forces as their
Commander-in-Chief in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion subject to judicial review, or is it a
political question? When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text
of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to
overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view
of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power
to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge
such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion
that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. There
is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse
was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a
manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy
over the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of “purposeful
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hesitation” before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment. To
doubt is to sustain. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
Ronaldo B. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc
[Kapunan])
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negoti
ations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority. Similarly, the President's power to conduct
peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in‐Chief. As Chief Executive, the
President has the general responsibility to promote public peace,
and as Commander‐in‐‐Chief, she has the
more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawle
ss violence (The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of
the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,
568 SCRA 402).
Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- It is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate
that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the
armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer
is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the
Supreme Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the
President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a
member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body
seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the
attendance.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora – The President has
full discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is necessary
to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. There is no equivalent provision dealing with the revocation
or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces.
David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006- PP 1017
constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving
the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to
direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the president; and
(3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the absence of
legislation, the President cannot take over privately-owned public
utility and private business affected with public interest.
The President can validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of congressional enactment. But the
exercise of emergency powers requires a delegation from Congress.
Colmenares, et al. vs. Department vs. National Defense Secretary,
et al., GR No. 212426-212244- January 12, 2016- Under the calling-
out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves
ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s
calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot
invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power.
There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the
greater are the limitations.
EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT- Requisites: 1)
there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the delegation must be for
a limited period only; 3) the delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as Congress may prescribe and 4) the emergency powers
must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to
other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare
a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided
so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize
the President before he can declare a state of national
emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in
the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of
emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest, is different matter. This
requires a delegation from Congress.
Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 - the calling out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President of
the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief and that a provincial governor
is not endowed with the power to call upon the Armed Forces at its
own bidding. It ruled that only the President is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI and the
calling out powers under Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
While the President exercises full supervision and control over the
police, a local chief executive, such as a provincial governor, only
exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise
control only in day-to-day operations. As discussed in the deliberation
of the Constitutional Commission, only the President has “full
discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do
so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion,” the Court stressed.
To Declare martial Law/Suspend the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus- Lagman vs. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No.
231658- The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in
an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of
sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data
available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is
not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration
not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court, it which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress
could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the
facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by
the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On
the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense
that it, may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.
The Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any
perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive
or deny the Court of its power to review.
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the
most benign and involves ordinary police action. The President may
resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he
power to call is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations
being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a
manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact, "the actual
use to which the President puts the armed forces is xx x not subject to
judicial review.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by
Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from
each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which
is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say,
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the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from
the power of revocation of Congress.
The Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any
perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive
or deny the Court of its power to review.
The three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most
benign and involves ordinary police action. The President may resort
to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to
call is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being
that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner
not constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact, "the actual use to
which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial
review."
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only
when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it.
The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of
these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible
revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by
the Supreme Court."
The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the
phrase "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.
They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with
possibilities of abuse;" besides, the calling out power of the President
"is sufficient for handling imminent danger."
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil
rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law
serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has
called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order,
and while the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of
arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more
difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As such, their exercise
requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by
the Court.
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time,
exercises police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature.
In particular, the President exercises police power, with the military’s
assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government
agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition
in a locality, which remains under the control of the State.
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court, quoting Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate
Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid
declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may
order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on
public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x".
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President
may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the
rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant
the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the
guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its
pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to
those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with
invasion.
This so called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the
manner by which the President decides which power to choose. It is
thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to
calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary
power to avail given a set of facts or conditions.
The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on
the determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact
done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.
The parameters for determining the sufficiency the/actual
basis/or the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ habeas corpus: 1. Actual invasion or
rebellion; 2. public safety requires it; the two requirements must
concur; and 3. there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration
and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement
or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually.
Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts
stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President
could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts
reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision
in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a
requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the
ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him
within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to
dictate.
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to
convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing
that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being
committed.
Lagman vs. Pimentel, GR Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, 236155
February 6, 2018- The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules
promulgated by Congress on the manner re President’s request for
extension in the absence of any constitutional violation.
What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension
are (1) that the extension should be upon the President’s
initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the persistence of the
invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and (3)
that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its
factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
The Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the
provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period to be
determined by the Congress.
PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The
pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective,
and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon
is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the petition for
disqualification filed by Risos‐Vidal against former
President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13‐‐211 (DC), was
anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section
12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime puni
shable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving mo
ral turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified
to run for and hold public elective office
notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that
includes a statement expressing "ʺhe is hereby restored to hi
s civil and political rights."ʺ Risos--‐
‐Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified fr
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om running for Mayor of Manila in
he May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold a
ny local elective post despite the presidential pardon extended
to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason tha
t it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the re
storation of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and b
e voted upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her theory.
(ATTY. ALICIA RISOS‐VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, G.R.
No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13, 2009.- The
text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by President Fidel V. Ramos
covered the members of the AFP- it extends to all persons who
committed the particular acts described in the provision, and not just
rebels or insurgents.
TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449-It is
inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass.
v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the field of negotiation, the Senate
cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the
treaty-making power is exclusive to the President, being the sole organ
of the nation in its external relations, was echoed in BAYAN v.
Executive Secretary where the Court held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the
President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the
chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in
the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast
powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the
nation, as Jefferson describes, is “executive altogether.”
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all
the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA
and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts
which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast
executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x
x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v.
Executive Secretary where the Court ruled:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state,
is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President
is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered
into by him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is
vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for
the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President
to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided
under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a
power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis
to hold the President or its representatives accountable to
Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into
treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence,
since the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively
conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It follows
from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast
legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty
negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has
been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-
making power of the President, but only the Senate.
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject
to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however,
is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to
refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent
for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step
that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by
this Court via a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue
the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
The terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been
used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form
executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action.
On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by
the President sometimes take form of more formal documents
denominated “agreements” or
“protocols”. Under international law, there is no difference
between treatises and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long
as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
power (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244).
An executive agreement, according to the Supreme Court,
is a treaty within the meaning of that word in international law
and constitutes enforceable domestic law (Nicolas v. Romulo,
578 SCRA 438). Unlike a treaty though, an executive
agreement does not require legislative concurrence, is usually
less formal and deals with a narrower range of subjects
(China Machinery and Equipment Corporation
v. Sta. Maria, 665 SCRA 189). All that
would be required for its efficacy would be the agreement
must be between states; it must be written; and it must be governed by
international law (Ibid).
An executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the
Senate for its ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that, under
the Constitution, is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive
and the Senate (Ibid).
POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE SAME-
The power to classify lands as alienable belongs to the President. Only
lands, which have been classified as alienable, may be sold. There
must be a law authorizing its sale or alienation by the President or by
another officer before conveyance can be executed on behalf of the
government (Section 48, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code).
Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797- The President may not convey
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valuable real property of the government on her sole will. Conveyance
must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress.
POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS- to
ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. xxx Insofar
as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary
of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively.
ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)
JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona;
Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP
vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private
citizen not proper party).
A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act compla
ined of directly involves the illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to the
assertion of JKG-Power Plates, MVPSP clearly involves the
expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle
registrants will pay for the
license plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate,
that the government shall bear the burden of paying for the project.
Every portion of the national treasury, when
appropriated by Congress, must be properly allocated and disbursed.
Necessarily, an allegation that public funds in
the amount of P3.851 billion shall be used in a project that has
undergone an improper procurement process cannot be
easily brushed off by the Court. (Reynaldo M. Jacomille vs. Hon.
Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, in his capacity as Secretary of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), et.al.,
G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)
Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally recognized
the extent of the power of judicial review and the great responsibility
of the judiciary in maintaining the allocation of powers among the three
great branches of the government.
The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April 24,
2009- Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters
over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government and are not
empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of
Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve
questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave
abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or
when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill
will or personal bias.
Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered, under
the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes
between the legislative and executive branches of government on the
proper constitutional parameters of power.
Ocampo vs. Enriquez, GR No. 225973, November 8, 2016-
Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.
The High Court also said the petitioners failed to show that they have
suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of Marcos'
burial at the heroes' cemetery. They likewise violated the doctrines of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts; the SC
said the petitioners should have sought reconsideration of the order
for Marcos' burial with the defense department, or to file the petitions
first with the proper regional trial court.
PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts the
“DIRECT INJURY” test. In People vs. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement
of locus standi may be waived by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its discretion. Even when the petitioners have failed to
show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the “principle
of transcendental importance”; of overreaching significance to
society or of paramount public interest. DAVID, ET AL VS.
ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739; Biraogo vs. Philippine
Truth Commission, December 7, 2010.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of
obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a
showing that the issues are of
transcendental importance which must
be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim
that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a citizen
to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party
1. registered voter – must show that the action concerns
his right of suffrage
2. taxpayer – he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial
relation to the third party; the third party cannot assert
his constitutional right; the right of the third party will
be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to
espouse the third party’s constitutional claim.
As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court is
not concerned with whether the petitioners are real parties in interest,
but whether they have legal standing. LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL
ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.
Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department of
Energy, GR 180771 April 21 2015- The Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen’s suit. A citizen’s suit
under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations
yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons
who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the
real party in interest.
Arigo vs. Swift- The public right of citizens to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.
Ocampo vs. Enriquez, GR No. 225973, November 8, 2016-
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. As concerned
citizens- the issues are of transcendental significance or of paramount
public interest. In cases involving such issues, the imminence and
clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence.
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EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the Court
still entertains to adjudicate the substantive matter if there is a grave
violation of the constitution; to formulate controlling principles to guide
the bench, bar and public and capable of repetition, yet evading review
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27,
2004.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is
grave violation of the constitution, second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and
the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.; SANLAKAS
VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS. GUINGONA, JR., 383
SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98; Belgica vs.
Ochoa, Nov. 19, 2013.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. QUESTIONS
REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES will not preclude the
SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of judicial review to
determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing
authority under its EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS.
COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.
KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 -
Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s
organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the
qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a
member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As
the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting
claims under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the proper
forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial
competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore, that from the records
of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the
Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final
decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.
Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative or
Executive Act- The doctrine operative fact doctrine recognizes
the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but
sustains its effects. xxx It applies only to cases where extraordinary
circumstances exist and only when the extraordinary circumstances
have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. Xxx
Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The
consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could
not be ignored or could no longer be undone. (Araullo vs. Aquino)
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The general rule
is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which
provides. “Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or
non‐observance shall not be excused by
disuse or custom or practice to the contrary”
(Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No. 179532, May
30, 2011). The doctrine of operative fact serves as an
exception to the aforementioned
general rule. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to
the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recogni
zing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequ
ences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot alway
s be erased by a new judicial declaration (Ibid). The doctrine
is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impo
se an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid l
aw. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaratio
n of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopar
dy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in r
eliance upon a law creating it (Ibid). The Operative Fact Doctr
ine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwis
e would be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an
act may be justified when based on an unconstitutional provisi
on of law (Ibid).
The Doctrine of Operative Fact Extends as well to a Void or
Unconstitutional Executive Act: The term executive act is broad
enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those
that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation (G.R. No. 187485, October 8, 2013), the Supreme
Court likewise declared that “for the operative act doctrine to apply,
there must be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’ meaning a law or
executive issuance.” Thus, the Court opined there that the operative
fact doctrine did not apply to a mere administrative practice of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation
of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts. The DAP
itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice
especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by
issuing various memoranda and circulars. (Maria Carolina P.
Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No.,
209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of
members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC fr
om having its own set of rules and procedures and provid
ing policies to effectively ensure its
mandate. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting
are necessary and incidental to the JBC'ʹs principal function of
choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the j
udiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Consti
tution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the
JBC shall follow in determining applicants'ʹ qualifications. In car
rying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set
the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qua
lifications required by the Constitution and law for every p
osition. The search for these long held qualities necessarily r
equires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is mo
st fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but n
ot unbridled license to act in performing its duties. (FERDINA
ND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC,
COMPOSTELA‐NEW BATAAN,
COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL, G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015)
Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBC’s principal
function is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary. For every
vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three
nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in
the list. Any vacancy in the SC is required by the Constitution to be
filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore,
be compromised only because the constitutionally named Chair could
not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if the membership
of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its
mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even
if the constitutionally named ex-officio Chair does not sit in the JBC,
the Court stressed.
The Court held that considering that the complete membership in the
JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power over the JBC,
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it should not be deprived of representation. It ruled that the most Senior
Justice of the High Court, who is not an applicant for the position of
Chief Justice, should participate in the deliberations for the selection
of nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings
in the absence of the constitutionally named ex-officio chair, pursuant
to Section 12 of RA 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, which reads: “In
case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they
shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence,
until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed
and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice
who succeeds to the office of the Chief Justice.”
Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court held that
the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of
Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. The word
“Congress” is used in its generic sense. Considering the language of
the subject constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, there is
no need to resort to extrinsic aids such as the records of the
Constitutional Commission.
The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended to create
a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the public clamor in
favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the
Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic
approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an active role and equal
voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. “To allow the
Legislature to have more quantitive influence in the JBC by having
more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half a
vote each, would, as one former congressman and member of the JBC
put it, ‘negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution,’” declared the
Court.
The Court also held that the JBC’s seven-member composition “serves
a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a
stalemate in voting.” It further held that under the doctrine of operative
facts where actions prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized as a matter of equity and fair play, all JBC’s prior
official acts are valid.
The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to who should
remain as sole representative of Congress in the JBC and that such is
best left to the determination of Congress.
Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In cases
where an objection to an applicant’s qualification is raised, the
observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the
fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to recommend. The “unanimity rule”
of the JBC-009 resulted in the deprivation of his right to due process.
Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017-
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint
members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th,
17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice,
consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative,
to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37
qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not
violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires
the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees
submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum
requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per
vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the
six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum
requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted
for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All
the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the
requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity.
FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15
April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150)- the Judiciary has "full flexibility to
allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that
(its) needs require". The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on
how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. the
Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who,
what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend
to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms,
conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided
in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its
discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement
privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on
how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed
of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the
Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and
privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to
manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.
AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and the
Supreme Court en banc determine and decide the who, what, where,
when and how of the privileges and benefits they may extend to the
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the court’s granted power.
PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven members.
IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines – is justiciable- the problem
being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.
FARIÑAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are not
the concern of the Supreme Court- government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.
CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A motion to
change the venue of (and authority to conduct) preliminary
investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the courts for lack of
jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of
the Executive department and not of the judiciary.
PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should be
resolved in favor of change of venue.
PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006- In view
of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should
be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby
repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-
Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law
and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code; or (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Rule Making Power- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
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practice and procedure in all court, the admission to the practice
of law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform; not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14, 2010- Unlike
the 1935 and 1973 constitutions, which empowered Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, the 1987 constitution removed this
power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court has now the sole
authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, viewed from this perspective, the claim of
legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under
Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Estipona vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679; August 15, 2017- Section
23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reason. First, it violates the
equal protection clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.)
are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not, considering that
rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching
upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the
constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is
within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.
WRIT OF AMPARO – The right to enforce and protect a person’s
rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of rights. It is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has
been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof.
Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court,
justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon
motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved
party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a
government agency or by an accredited person or private institution
capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the
Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved. The
Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that
shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved
party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with
guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private
institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. ” The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or
control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall
state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of
the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If
the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the
privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is
necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person
or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place
and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order
shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended
for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession,
custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in
digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence
relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their
inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of
the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice
or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of
the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon
motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of
Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or
judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or
to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and
securing their safety.
Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A petition for a
writ of amparo is improper remedy to regain parental authority and
custody ove a minor child who was legally put up for adoption.
Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008- To
start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as
a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty
or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Where, as in this
case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment,
we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ
of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that
the right to life, liberty or security – the personal concern that the
writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or
threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no
legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a
proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari,
applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with
a separately filed criminal case.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the
following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how
it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data
or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept
by the respondent.
Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule requires
that the petition must sufficiently allege the manner in which the right
to privacy is violated or threatened with violation and how such
violation, or threats affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party.
Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24, 2012- The
forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zenarosa Commission
was not unlawful act as that violates or threatens to violate the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security as to entitle the petitioner to the writ of
habeas data.
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Vivares vs. St. Therese College, GR No. 202666, September 29,
2014- petitioners have no reasonable expectation of privacy that would
warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas data when their daughters
shared the incriminating pictures with their Facebook Friends. Before
one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social
Network activity, it is necessary that the user in this case, the
sanctioned students, should manifest the intention to keep certain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or limit its visibility.
Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC cannot
adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular
courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.
Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005-
Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence of the
Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as meaning there
is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974 which requires
full payment before the State may exercise proprietary rights, contrary
to Rule 67 which requires only a deposit was recognized by the
Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 – While the fundamental law
requires mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere
however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. The Supreme Court
deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by
the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within
the rule making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law
making power of Congress. The rule allowing an intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before
the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, is
such a procedural matter.
MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604- does not
violate Section 14. Resolutions are not decisions within the
constitutional requirement; they merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained and the petition to review decision of the CA
is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence, there is
no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts
and the law are already mentioned in the CA decision.
German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329- The
mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution is applicable
only in cases “submitted for decision”, i.e, given due course and after
the filing of the briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and
stating the legal basis thereof.
Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The constitutional
mandate that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is bases”, does not preclude the validity of “memorandum decisions”,
which adopt by reference the finding of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107- The
Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion to decide whether a
“minute resolution” should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in
any particular case. Further, the Supreme Court explained that the
grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error
committed by the CA, there is no need to fully explain the Court’s
denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the
findings and conclusions of the CA. “There is no point in reproducing
or restating in the resolution of denial the conclusions of the appellate
court affirmed”.The constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII
of a clear presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions,
where the petition is given due course, but not where the petition
is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal basis
for the dismissal.
Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does not
preclude the validity of “Memorandum Decision” which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended to avoid cumbersome
reproduction of the decision (or portions thereof) of the lower court.
ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service
Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to
decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the authority to
see that what has been decided is carried out.
Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC is the
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the
responsibility of the establishment, administration and maintenance of
qualification standards lies with the concerned department or agency,
the role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department agency with
respect to these qualification standards and approving them.
CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution
grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As
defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision,
and instrumentality of the government, including every government-
owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and
non-career service positions. Career service positions are those
where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical
qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A state university
president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing
board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service
officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the
governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent
is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the
CSC.
CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the
CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by
government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a complaint
may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the authority to
hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to
deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as
provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The Supreme Court also
ruled that since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC and the
CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s
exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no “report, no
release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with
fiscal autonomy. Being automatic connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. It means that no condition to fund
releases to it may be imposed.
Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a
general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But a distinction
of the manner the GOCC was created must be made. If the GOCC
was established through an original charter (or special law), then it falls
under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and SSS. However, corporations
which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel,
is excluded from the coverage of the civil service.
Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government refers
to any of the various units of the government, including a department,
bureau, office, instrumentality or government-owned or controlled
corporation or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special
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functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, institutes and government-owned or controlled corporations,
MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in a
GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil service law applies. It is not
true either that with respect to money claims, the Labor Code applies.
Regardless of the nature of employment or claim, an employee in a
GOCC with original charter is covered by the Civil Service Law.
Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) – the appointment
to the positions in the Career Executive Service may be considered
permanent in which the appointee enjoys security of tenure.
Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent appointment
can be issued only to a “person who meets all the requirements for
the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed.” The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to “depend on the nature of appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it.
Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer of
the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a violation of the
security of tenure clause in the Constitution.
Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims by
indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation constitutes
removal.
Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 – In the area of religious exercise
as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric
of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a
showing such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe
to the Infinite.
Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party aggrieved by
a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government
involving termination of services may appeal to the CSC within 15
days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of
the CSC.
PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28, 2001-
The CSC is expressly empowered by the Administrative Code of 1987
to declare positions in the Civil Service primarily confidential. (Read:
Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on two instances when a position
may be considered primarily confidential: (1) President declares the
position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation of of the
CSC; (2) when by the nature of the functions, there exists close
intimacy between the appointee and appointing authority which
ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom
from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state.
HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily
confidential.
PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of Casino
Operations Manager is not primarily confidential.
Funa vs Agra, GR 191644 Feb 19 2013-The designation of Agra as
Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article
VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary
capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of
the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and
the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or employments
in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against
dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as
to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials,
specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members
and their deputies and assistants.
Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex
officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office
being the consequence of holding the other.
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra
cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in
Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as
Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting
Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that
his holding of the other office was “allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position.” To claim the exemption of his concurrent
designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section
13, he needed to establish that his concurrent designation was
expressly allowed by the Constitution.
RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There must
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can
be express. It can implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must
be given legal effect.
To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office,
there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (2) an
act of relinquishment; and (3) an acceptance by the proper authority.
The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal
Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284
SCRA 276, 1997)
Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman as
board member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is
unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the CSC, and for
violating the rule against holding of multiple government positions as
well as the concept ex-officio positions.
Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) – rule on double compensation
not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving pension or gratuity after
retirement can continue to receive such pension or gratuity if he
accepts another government position to which another compensation
is attached.
PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 – PCCG Chair
Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution from
simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The
position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices since the
CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the
general rule to hold more than one office is “allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position”/
Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997- When
an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is later
ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is
considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the
silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back salaries.
DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 –The Supreme Court
follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination with
bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can be awarded in his
favor.
David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil service
officer or employee, who has been found illegally dismissed or
suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to back wages and
other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal or
suspension up to his reinstatement, and if at the time the decision
of exoneration is promulgated, he is already of retirement age, he shall
be entitled not only to back wages but also to full retirement benefits.
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CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 – The CSC as an aggrieved party,
may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a civil service employee
of administrative charges.
CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of an
act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil service system,
and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec.
47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative
cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect
its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by
removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings
intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or
omissions that constitute violations of the law or the rules of the
service.
SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the Constitution
and the Labor Code are silent as to whether government employees
may strike, they are prohibited from striking by express provision
of Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as
implied in E.O. 180.
COMELEC
REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs. Benipayo,
April 2, 2002- The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one
who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes
his term of office which could be seven, five or three years. There must
be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can
apply.
ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.
Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The
COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an
adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election
laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified
into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-
judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be
the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the
election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function
refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and
the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC
to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is
to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court,
in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the
following manner, viz:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand
is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which
is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power
to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary
that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must
be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
Task Force Maguindanao’s fact-finding investigation – to probe into
the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said
province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of
canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense
had possibly been committed – could by no means be classified as a
purely ministerial or administrative function.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was
exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the
allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To
achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required
the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give
them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.
The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a
government institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of
the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.
In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish
individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation,
despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory
the COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to
its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible
elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however
derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said
hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election
documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his
possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish
petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board
of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the
Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of
canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-
judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether
the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by
the proper officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province
of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various
candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass
brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to
appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the
election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not.
When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC
undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed resolutions.
Grace Poe vs. COMELEC- The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from
those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified
in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the
Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a
candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
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candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a
public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice
versa.
Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC, GR 222731, March 8 2016- The
minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of
Republic Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory. xxx The law is clear
that a “voter verified paper audit trail” requires the following: (a)
individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to
count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be
paper based. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is
empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of election, and one of the laws that it must
implement is RA 8346 which requires the automated election
system to have the capability of providing a VVPAT. The
COMELEC’s act of not enabling this feature runs contrary to why
the law requires this feature in the first place.
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271.
October 18, 2011- The power to fix the date of elections is essentially
legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following
provisions of the Constitution:
- Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature,
provides:
Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of
the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall
be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to
the President and Vice-President, states:
xxx xxx x x. Section 4.. . . Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the
second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours while Section 3, Article X, on
local government, provides:
Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for . . . the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, terms, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials[.] [Emphases ours]
Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not have
the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary
legislative power.
LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 - The
COMELEC correctly stated that “the ascertainment of the identity of
[a] political party and its legitimate officers” is a matter that is well within
its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the
fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and
function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the
discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
“wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives
for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.
LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007 –
COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership within a
party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and leaders. xxx The
COMELEC is endowed with ample “wherewithal” and “considerable
latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to
promote free and orderly honest elections.
Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010- While
the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELEC’s
performance of its functions under Section 2 of Art. IX-C of the
constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to
Ateinza, et al.’s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the
moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the
COMELEC cannot interfere, given the limited scope of its power over
political parties.
Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793, February 22,
2011)- In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or
regional trial court, petition for certiorari shall be filed exclusively with
the COMELEC, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005-
Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the
procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there
is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering
that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to
review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided
by a division. Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending
his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc
was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the
said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second
Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It
cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte.
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en banc
does not have the authority to hear and decide cases at the first
instance. Under the COMELEC Rules, pre-proclamation cases are
classified as Special Cases and in compliance with the provision of the
Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC are vested with the
authority to hear and decide these special cases.
Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A.
No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or
(b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the “completeness” and the “sufficient standard” tests.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only
after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The
only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of
such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to
assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of
plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case
involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has
the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related
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laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.
Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 – Contests
involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC.
Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may validly
order a manual count notwithstanding the required automated
counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law authorizing the commission
to use an automated election system, if that is the only way to count
votes. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision
a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise
of the COMELEC’s constitutionally mandated power to promulgate its
own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the elections. In
adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding
the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and fair
play. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are
still pending at the time of the elections, should they obtain the highest
number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765- The 1987 constitution
vests COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
barangay officials decided by the trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011- Final orders
of a COMELEC Division denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner
cannot be questioned before the Supreme Court even via a petition for
certiorari.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COA’S AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs. Tantuico-
Corporations covered by the COA’s auditing powers are not limited to
GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity handles public funds, it
falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-
governmental entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or indirectly
from or through the government are required to submit to post audit.
DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private auditors
may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power
to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is
neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA
will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and
conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds
or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly, the
express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its
framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not
have the exclusive power to examine and audit government
agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the
need to allow independent private audit of certain government
agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private
investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case
at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.
BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing to a
public officer may not, without his consent, be withheld and applied to
his indebtedness to the government.
MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by
himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a decision for the
commission. The power to decide on issues relating to audit and
accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial body which has
the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it.
PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868, COA’s
power over the settlement of accounts is different from power
over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is within the ambit of
judicial power.
Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the proper
officer to withhold a municipal treasurer’s salary and other emoluments
up to the amount of her alleged shortage but no to apply the withheld
amount to the alleged shortage for which her liability is still being
litigated.
NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the approval
of excess or unnecessary expenditures.
DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February 7,
2012]- There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to
conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a
post audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with
state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of
an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may
adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct
the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this
Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in
line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.
When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision
be unduly enlarged by this Court.
GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The
appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the
first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven
years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional;
the appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven
years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the
distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution;
Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessors, but such appointments cannot
be less than the unexpired portion as this will disrupt the staggering of
terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D);
Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of
seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission;
A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less
than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chair
for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chair. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that
the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioners and
the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
seven years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of
Char resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment; and that
Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity.
Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18 of RA
6758 prohibits officials and employees of COA from receiving salaries,
honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any
government entity, except compensation paid directly by COA out of
its appropriations. This prohibition is mandatory.
ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
Local Autonomy-
Local Autonomy means that local governments have certain po
wers granted by the Constitution which may not be curtailed by
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the National government, but that
outside of these, local governments may not enact
ordinances contrary to statutes (Bernas, 1987
Philippine Constitution, Reviewer, 2011).
Veloso, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 16, 2011-
LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit
jurisdiction of the COA.
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified
"a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy
is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over
the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of
partnership and interdependence between the central administration
and local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments
are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the purpose of
enhancing self-government.
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national
administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials remain
accountable to the central government as the law may provide. The
difference between decentralization of administration and that of
power was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin[16] as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive
and accountable.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions.
The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable
the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President
and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national
government.
Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014- At
any rate, LGUs must be reminded that the local autonomy granted to
them does not completely severe them from the national government
or turn them into impenetrable states. Autonomy does not make local
governments sovereign within the state. Notwithstanding the local
fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the
supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws. “Supervision is not
incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the
President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local
officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
Pimentel vs. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012- While the
aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions
and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services
and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally funded projects, facilities, programs and services. The
essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under
the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU. xxx The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking
a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national
development programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.
Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014- The essence of
this express reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency,
it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided
by the national government under the annual general appropriations
act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself
weighs against it. xxx The national government still has the say when
it comes to national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law. Moreover, from the use of
the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide
these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can
be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory
for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law
amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon
the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271.
October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of local officials, their term
has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no
vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new
term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view — like
the extension of the elective term— is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in
a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed,
if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then
all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of
the President. Hence, holdover — whichever way it is viewed — is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the
question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of
approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly
from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v.
COMELEC, Adap v. Comelec, and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where
the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions
in a hold over capacity.
The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office
of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of
barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress
itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution
shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, and
extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President in order to
synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power.
The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be
changed by mere statute. More particularly, not even Congress and
certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective
local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the
constitutionally mandated three years as this tinkering would
directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled
in Osmeña.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake
the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:
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 It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588
and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the
President is empowered to make temporary
appointments in certain public offices, in case of any
vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only
with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision
in the Local Government Code and in the best
interest of public service, we see no cogent reason
why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws
may not be similarly applied in the present case.
The respondents contend that the provincial board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no
merit. As between the President who has supervision
over local governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the
constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their
chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the
management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor
or the Vice-Governor is missing. (Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice
Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant
for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and
delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper
management of the affairs of the regional government, and in
responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in
this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in
our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS- Socrates vs.
COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-
election for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately
after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way
in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009-
The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their
term for purposes the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code. Preventive suspension, by its nature
does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.
The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-
term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary loss of the title
to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official
is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not
vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that
only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009- Bolos
was serving his third term as punong barangay when he ran for
Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the position
of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as punong
barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation of said
office.
Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the recall
election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years
for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s
terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a candidate loses in an
election to gain a third consecutive term but later wins in the recall
election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two
consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the recall term, when
another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in the
continuity of service.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation of
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the
three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule to
apply, the local official concerned must serve three consecutive terms
as a result of election. The term served must be one for which he was
elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of succession, the
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.
Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis Ong, “service for the full term”, and should
be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term
limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring
local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive terms for the same position. His continuous exercise
of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally
be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-
term rule, notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his
proclamation. There was actually no interruption or break in the
continuity of Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001 term.
Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed
of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic
Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is
declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of
the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof
are declared VALID.
League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No.
176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for cityhood
from P20 million to P100 million in sec. 450 of the , explicitly exempt
the respondent municipalities from the said increased income
requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending cityhood bills before
the passage of RA 9009 and that the year before the amendatory RA
9009, respondent LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted
for cityhood under the LGC of 1991.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its
function is limited to the delivery of basic services. RA 7924 does not
grant the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. The
MMDA is a development authority. It is not a political unit of
government. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances
and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by
the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any
other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police
power. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-
wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail
huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with
regard to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of the
valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-
snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are
limited by the MMDA’s enabling law, which we can but interpret, and
petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be
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authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a
legitimate source (MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).
MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009-
MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards and other forms of
advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3
(MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDA’s powers were
limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a
system and administration, and therefore, it had no power to dismantle
the billboards under the guise of police and legislative power.
MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657, August
15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its powers and
functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project
(Greater Manila Transport System) as envisioned by E.O 179; hence,
it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake
the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the
elimination of respondents’ terminals. Even the MMDA’s claimed
authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance
with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc. and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with
police power.
INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695).
LGUS’ SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY
RELEASED WITHOUT ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM
ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the
1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them. When passed, it would be readily see that such
provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the
national taxes; and (2) “just share” shall be determined by law; (3) that
“just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. PROVINCE
OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.
(ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)
AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that
“pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local
government units shall be withheld” is declared in contravention of
Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art X of the constitution
(Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).
LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of local
autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is
mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments, and local
governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that
accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and
limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing
dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves
respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSIS’s tax-
exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local
Government Code but
restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject
real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against
GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and,
thus, may be collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC,
Br. 12, August 18, 2005).
G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of
Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial
Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from paying
franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax, the
enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such
exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in National Power
Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.
MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is
primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may
be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of
a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred
by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An “agency” of the
Government refers to “any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-
owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct
unit therein;” while an “instrumentality” refers to “any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-
owned and controlled corporations.” It had already become, even
if it be conceded to be an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the
Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the
withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the
payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies
to MCIAA.
PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the port
and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the general
public does not exempt it from the payment of real property taxes. It
must be stressed that the said port facilities and appurtenances are
the petitioner’s corporate patrimonial properties, not for public use, and
that the operation of the port and its facilities and the administration of
its buildings are in the nature of ordinary business.
MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAA’s Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and
thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA
are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from
real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property
of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are
devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The Airport
Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are
properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the
Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of
man. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed
and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any
doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved
against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local
governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the
taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants
an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local
taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the
national government instrumentality.
PRESIDENT’S SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes,
September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga
Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter
ego.
The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos
cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity
because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
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powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing
municipal corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).
Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of LGUs to
grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount
of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of
local funds, the genuine and meaningful local autonomy is ensured.
Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power
to grant franchises.
ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of
Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of an
impeachment judgment. Conviction in the impeachment
proceeding is not required before the public officer subject of
impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for criminal
offenses committed.
REPUBLIC VS. SERENO (G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)- Quo
warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed
of when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the
time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications
to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or
omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot
be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the
public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative
or criminal action, if otherwise.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue
the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation
of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when
there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case,
direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed
against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of
transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the
Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To
exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is
a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. An outright dismissal of the
petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on
impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings
are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and
settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other
branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as
an impeachment court through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a
judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election
or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules
while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation
of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices
filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested
collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation
of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public
interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given
permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo
warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the
government policy on the matter at hand.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of
each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2)
grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant
who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The
test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more)
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action,
and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto
proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally
holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable
officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for
respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply
put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo
warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that
Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable
officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed
impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public
office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a
conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the
removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from
an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold
or occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment
proceedings before the House is not the impeachment case
proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no
pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the
House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a
person may be reasonably charged with a crime.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not
foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section
2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The
provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it
has been held that “the express provision for removal by impeachment
ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods
when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express
provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable
officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with
it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the
Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with
disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing
the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies.
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility
of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are
impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made
absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as
grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes
of removal from office. If other causes of removal are available, then
other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside
judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any
possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where
the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even
when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign
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nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when
he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction
over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto
involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had
it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively
tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the difference between quo
warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce
such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its
own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to
craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude
Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even
principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an unqualified
public official should be removed from the position immediately if
indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or
breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply
because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case
impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process
specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire
membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their
legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the
possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be
unqualified under existing laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed
prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that
the requisites for the commencement thereof are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of
integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action,
if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the
State. The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in
this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public
officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the
right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously,
the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where
private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case
where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice.
Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present
petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the
person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when
upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any
case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof
must commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes
of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or
prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there
be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and
prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the
Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from
the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto
serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies
to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow
an unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest
position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for
questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery of the
cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been
candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on
Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the
contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over
the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own
rules. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform
their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its
non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore
not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty
to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of
discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically
equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale,
the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and
corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in
screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled
discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the
nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or
wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the
Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the JBC, and one of
which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely
related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good
reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and
fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise
imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity
with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary.
Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the
Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and
statutory requirement. Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution
states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This
has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to
comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of
the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for
public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important
for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply
with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public
service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even
provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only
punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and
statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his
assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting
opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere,
or with a burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens and
obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject
themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating
thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The
public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More
importantly, while every office in the government service is a public
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trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects
on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a formal
requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect
Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and
RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the
omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs
and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and the Code of
Judicial Conduct. In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP
Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have easily
dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs
by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold
such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The
Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the
Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the
branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly
transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In
Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the
records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by
the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these
SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct
proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference.
Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on
records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years
1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the
Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof
with the certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it
becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of
evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is
different when it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon the
respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not
exempt her from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to
separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not
receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her
a government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted
from the SALN laws on RA 6713.
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in
favor of Sereno. During the period when Sereno was a professor in
UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the
Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the
review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and
Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such,
the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial
duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not
yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not
substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to
clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities,
money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges
as of the date of her resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with
complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC
confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice
does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity.
She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC
En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible
because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs
was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of
nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop
the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily,
no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party
sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent
mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly
file her SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional and
statutory requirements. Failure to file a truthful, complete and
accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false
statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being
accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN
only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were
the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases,
2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from
PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000
in personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate
Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in
complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty
betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not
hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against public
officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies,
inconsistencies and non-disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required
SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those
applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the
applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the
JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of the
applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her
years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with
the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance.
Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able
to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of
complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she
should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from
U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus
her government service is not continuous; that her government records
are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that
U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and
charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that
Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in
U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply.
Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file
several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such
failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the
JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the
Supreme Court.
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the
submission of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all.
Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is
dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to
public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance
with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act
that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the
integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.
For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno
for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private
practice while in UP, her false representations that she was in private
practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the
government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is
proof of her compliance with SALNs requirement, her commission of
tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the
years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at
least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite
public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel
accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd
ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC
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contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the
disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute
cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with
respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay
to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges
and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then
SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential
document involving national security against the latter among others,
all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC
her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not
established at the time of her application. The requirement to
submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing
the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc
meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement
of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona
had gone through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs
means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to
consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the
confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the
years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify
whether the same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of
proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. Well-settled is the rule
that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s
entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC
nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that
Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position
of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a
matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the
necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice
of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in
a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further
judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office,
position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno.
Although the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the participation
of the President in the selection and nomination process is evident
from the composition of the JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the
Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the
exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal
requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment
is susceptible to attack.
Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable
through quo warranto. The effect of a finding that a person appointed
to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of
a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is
ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the
status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other
than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo
warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the
appointive position of Chief Justice.
READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November
10, 2003- definition of “TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT”-
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice.
Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.
A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee or override its contrary resolution, De Castro vs.
Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995.
Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond
the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached.
Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010- The
doctrine of condonation cannot be extended to reappointed
coterminous employees like petitioners as in their case, there is neither
subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the
electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would
set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide
civil servants, particularly local government, with blanket immunity
from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse of
bureaucracy.
The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of
constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).
Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of bank
accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.
OMB’S POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March 20,
2001- The power to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is
plenary and unqualified. The law does not make a distinction between
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by
regular courts.
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231,
September 4, 2012 January 28, 2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 providing
that the President may remove a deputy ombudsman is
unconstitutional because it would violate the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over her deputies.
Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear
constitutional design, the Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is separate from the Office of the Ombudsman. The
inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of the
Ombudsman does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded the
same levels of constitutional independence as that of the Ombudsman
and the Deputy Ombudsman.
Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has
consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under
the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. xxx
However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively
suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special
Prosecutor. The obvious import of this exclusion is to withhold
from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.
Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, April
13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors.
DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then
respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
take over at any stage.
Pichay vs. IAD-ODESLA- Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-
ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him
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notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases
involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative
cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being
conducted by another investigatory agency. xxx While the
Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of
probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal
accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited
to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As
such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional
duties.
Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority to
determine the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and com the head of the office or
agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other
words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s
functions and not its jurisdiction.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June 16,
2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The
exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770. xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No.
6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the
Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative
disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty
of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution
of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers
envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be “an activist watchman,”
not merely a passive one.
No Writ of Injunction shall be issued by any Court to delay an
Investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman:
“No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure question of law.” (Sec. 14, R.A. No. 6770)
Caveat: The second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No.
6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against
the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than
the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said
provision is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the
same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor. (Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court
of Appeals [Sixth Division], GR Nos. 217126-27, November 10,
2015, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe]).
Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011- Appeals
from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases do not
stay the execution of the penalty imposed.
Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the
respondent is absolved of the charge or in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, or suspension for
the period not more than one month or a fie equivalent to one month’s
salary, the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor and
unappelable, subject to judicial review.
Doctrine of CONDONATION:
Ombudsman vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015- In
this case, the Court agrees x x x that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was
a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated
provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino people under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in
setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious re-
examination.
Pascual’s ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts: First,
the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which
the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct x
x x.
Second, an elective official’s re-election serves as a condonation of
previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor;
and
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are ssumed to have
known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect
officers x x x.
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor (577 Phil. 52, 72
[2008]), also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to
appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to
disenfranchise x x x.
A thorough review of the cases post-1987 x x x would show that the
basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory
framework was never accounted for. What remains apparent from the
text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential
doctrine, was – and still remains – the above-cited postulates of
Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation
was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its
applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation
- that is, an elective official’s re-election cuts off the right to remove
him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term – was
adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because
the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal
norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is – as it should be
– dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction.
Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our current laws in
order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application
of the doctrine of condonation.
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959.
Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution
which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature
of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935
Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section
2, Article II which states that “[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty
of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be
required by law to render personal military or civil service.” Perhaps
owing to the 1935 Constitution’s silence on public accountability, and
considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well
as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring
objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation
doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with
public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter
introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found
in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged,
and declared that “[p]ublic office is a public trust.” Accordingly,
“[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain
accountable to the people.”
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People
have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that “[t]he
State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.”
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Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the
regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the
public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State
policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and
solidified what have been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all
times.
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under
the section of the Civil Service Commission, and also, in the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to
discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office
are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the “Local Government Code of 1991” (LGC), which
was approved on October 10, 1991, and took effect on January 1,
1992.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that
those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall
be disqualified from running for any elective local position.
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the
penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local
official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets
the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the
provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on
the official’s candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative
liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election x x x.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the
idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light
of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted
in Llamas v. Orbos (279 Phil. 920, 937 [1991]) to apply to
administrative offenses x x x.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds
for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against
an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is
re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes
condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is
meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an
elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for
such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an
accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by
US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of
administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or
statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot be removed
by a misconduct committed during a previous term, or that the
disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term in
which the official’s delinquency occurred. X x x. Hence, owing to
either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used
as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under
our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the
penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective
local official’s term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-
election. X x x. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66
(b) states that the elective local official’s administrative liability is
extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal
provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Relatedly, it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual’s
postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their
right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In
political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular
constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this
jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election
automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to
say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime
of condonation. If condonation of an elective official’s administrative
liability would perhaps be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same
should have been provided by law under our governing legal
mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no
means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional
or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest
absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will has been
abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual’s proposition that the electorate, when re-
electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge
of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults
or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no
such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. Besides, it
is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full
knowledge of a public official’s misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly
points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are
shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct
committed by an elective public official is easily covered up, and is
almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.
At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has
actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no
condonation of an act that is unknown. X x x.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this
discourse, it was a doctrine from one class of US rulings way back in
1959 and thus out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by – the
current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to
abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by
the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of
the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
Philippine legal system. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority
to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to
follow its interpretation. X x x
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it
should be, as a general rule, recognized as “good law” prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should
be respected. X x x
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly
benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is
truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal
anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable
length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the
cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.
Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances of the
Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before the
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Supreme Court. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong (March
12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office
of the Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule
65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the
Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to
grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."
The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated
under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that
an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability
arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction,
liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative
offenses.
Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26, 2011- The
decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases may be executed
pending appeal. This is pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly states that an appeal shall
not stop the decision from being executory. Also, the power of the
Ombudsman to implement the penalty is not merely
recommendatory but mandatory.
Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584,
January 22, 2008 – Supreme Court reiterated this ruling in Office of
the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that “the
Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or
recommendatory but is actually mandatory.” Implementation of the
order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the
proper officer.
Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in
accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due
process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that
R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS
over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in
administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was
approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution
was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770
was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987
Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier
enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite
explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints
against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials
who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of
Congress and the Judiciary.
QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is
originally created by charter or not. What is decisive is that it has
been acquired by the government to perform functions related to
government programs and policies.
JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376
SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15
of RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or
employee of government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters to perform any act or duty required by law or to stop
any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee on
Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272- Section 15 of Article XI
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to
criminal cases.
ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881, July
31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere
license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or
exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State
has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or
mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere
permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded,
cancelled, amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public
interest so requires. The determination of what is in the public interest
is necessarily vested in the State as owner of the country's natural
resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract
that enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment
clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege
is in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must
yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of
the State. Such a privilege or license is not even a property or
property right, nor does it create a vested right; as such, no
irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. Xxx
The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to
recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen
by many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a
long and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social
justice, abhors a further delay in the resolution of this controversy and
brings it to its fitting conclusion by denying the petition.
CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371 categorically
declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never
to have been public land. Domains and lands under native title are,
therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands
and are private. The right of ownership granted to indigenous peoples
over their ancestral domains does not cover the natural resources. The
right granted to IP to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration to ensure ecological
and environmental protection.
Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 – recognized the
existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of possession
under a claim of ownership since time immemorial as an exception to
the theory of jus regalia.
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable.
Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas are also form
part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the
public domain may only be leased and not sold to private parties.
These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain which the government
could not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes a
law authrizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public service. xxx The ownership
of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian
Doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters of the public domain
belong to the State.
But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable
lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to private
corporations which can only lease the same. The State may only sell
alienable public land to Filipino citizens.
Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar private
corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid
for their services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits,
following the explicit constitutional mandate, is for private corporations
to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of private
corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public
auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. They can
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acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus
acquired becomes private land.
Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property, can
be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by the
government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which even
private corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or
municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become
patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal
corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the land may
be sold by the public or municipal corporation to private parties,
whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR No.
179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become patrimonial
property or private property of the government only upon a declaration
that these are alienable or disposable lands, together with an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or
no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain
begin to run.
In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that “those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of,
and registrable title, to such lands based on the length and quality of
their possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land Act merely
requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that
the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession. The possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of title as soon as the land it covers is declared alienable
and disposable. This is, however, subject to the December 31, 2020
deadline imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 9176.
Fortun vs. Republic- applicants must prove that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of
acquisition or ownership for at least 30 years or at least since May 8,
1947.
DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No. 17775,
October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the State except for the
lot areas with existing titles. The continued possession and
considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give
them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply
a title to the land they are presently occupying. The present land law
traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme Court
said that Boracay was unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400 hecs of reserved forest
land and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural land). Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705. Forest lands do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered
by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No. 16678, April
24, 2009 – The classification of lands of the public domain is of two
types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The
primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. The agricultural lands of the public domain
may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is
referred to as secondary classification. Congress, under existing laws,
granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the
secondary classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial
or industrial or other urban uses.
Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014- The
DENR Secretary is empowered by law to approve a land classification
and declare such land as alienable and disposable.
Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009- While
the acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the country by a
foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the Constitution, the
subsequent acquisition of the said properties from the foreigner by a
Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the
title of the transferee is valid.
Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by PEA
or through a contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed
lands still remain alienable lands of public domain which can be
transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private
corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is
tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it
is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes
patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA is a government
agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charter—
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA is an “end-
user agency” authorized by law to administer and dispose of
reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based
on the special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register
of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial
properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and
private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The
reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial
land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to
the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public
domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and
goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the
SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-
hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been
reclassified as patrimonial property.
Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable
or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the
Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.
JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the prohibition
in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not
extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article 415
of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation
where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and
growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and
Filipino corporations only.
Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and those
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. A homestead patent, such as the subject of the
instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable
for agricultural purposes.
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1, 2004 –
Foreign corporations are confined to technical and financial
assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or utilize the
country’s natural resources by entering into the necessary agreements
with individuals or entities in the pursuit of visible operations. Service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control
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and supervision of the State. Control by the state must be on the
macro level, through the establishment of policies, guidelines,
regulations, industry standards and similar measures that would
enable the government to control the conduct of the affairs in
various enterprises and restrain activities deemed not desirable
or beneficial.
Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department of
Energy- As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words
“service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on
them per se. In fact, the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission show that in deliberating on Art XII Sec
2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in
the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short, used the term “service
contracts” in referring to agreements involving technical or financial
assistance.
GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association,
Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al., March 30, 2006-
the Constitution expressly allows service contracts in the large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
mineral oils via “agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance” as provided by law. The Court
said that these agreements with foreign corporations are not
limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with
foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full
control and supervision of the State.
GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No. 152619-20, Balite
Communal Portal Mining Cooperative v. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR No. 152870-71, The Mines
Adjudication Board and its Members, et al. v. Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining
operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within the full
control of the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining operations
in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full
control of the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5
of RA 7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration,
development, and utilization of the area or it can enter into agreement
with qualified entities.
Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426 SCRA
517 – Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution does not apply
retroactively to a “license, concession or lease” granted by the
government under the 1973 constitution or before the effectivity
of the 1987 constitution.
Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of law that
possession, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA 316 – The
operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.
Gamboa vs. Teves, GR No. 176579, October 9, 2013- Both voting
control test and beneficial ownership test must be applied to determine
whether a corporation is a Filipino national.xxx The term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock
that can vote in the election of directors. Thus, 60 percent of the capital
assumes, or should result in, controlling interest in the corporation. Full
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock
must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the
constitutional mandate.
Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, February 23,
2015- a franchise is not required before each and every public utility
may operate. There is no law that states that a legislative franchise is
necessary for the operation of toll facilities. What constitutes a public
utility is not their ownership but their use to the public.
Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc., 556
SCRA 742)- doctrine states that the public utility has the imperative
duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and
equipment to ensure they do not malfunction.
FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum, it
does not appear that, in approving §23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress
intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of
laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory
provisions on municipal taxing powers, we hold that §23 of R.A. No.
7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's
franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local
franchise taxes.
Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not authorized to cancel
the certificates of public convenience (CPCs) and other licenses it had
issued to the holders of duly issued legislative franchises on the
ground that the latter had violated the terms of their franchise. As
legislative franchises are extended through statutes, they should
receive recognition as the ultimate expression of State policy.
City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353- Under
the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the condition that
it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when the public interest so
requires. Franchises are also subject to alteration by the power to
tax, which cannot be contracted away.
Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 – The constitution
is emphatic that the operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.
Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7, 2003 -
The constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It mandates the
State to regulate them when public interest so requires.
ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)
SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have
revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo v.
Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).
HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs. Com. on
Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of civil and
political rights only either by government official or private individual.
Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial powers
to the CHR re violations of human rights.- refer to Section 5- perform
such other functions and duties as may be provided by law.
CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although admittedly
a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus
of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that the
eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a
just and humane manner does not mean validity or legality of the
demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of resettlement area
designated or earmarked by the government.
ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)
Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No.
180046, April 2, 2009- A “review center is not an institution of higher
learning as contemplated by RA 7722…[i]t does not offer a degree-
granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.”
Moreover, “[a] review course is only intended to ‘refresh and enhance
the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees,’” and it does
not require enrollment, attendance, a grade or submission of a thesis
in order to complete the review center course requirements or take the
licensure examination.
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ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational institution
and the members of the academe. The Supreme Court sustained the
primacy of academic freedom over Civil service rules on AWOL,
stressing when UP opted to retain private petitioner and even
promoted him despite his absence, the University was exercising
its freedom to choose who may teach or who may continue to teach
its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, - The right of
the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot
function in an atmosphere of anarchy. The school not only has the right
but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no
less imposes such duty.
University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 360. - The power of
the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after
graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto.
Cudia vs. Superintendent of PMA, G.R. No. 211362, February 24,
2015- The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational
institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic
freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which
are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral
principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as
the guiding spirit behind each cadet’s action. It is the cadet’s
responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout a
cadet’s stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds
as well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member
of the so-called “Long Gray Line.”
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets’
character development. It defines the desirable values they must
possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of
trust so essential in a military organization; and it makes them
professional military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it
should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It is best adopted
by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an officer
of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means
of achieving the cadets’ character development and as ways by which
the Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in
conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet
Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have
strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards of the
highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system
as a whole is characterized as "correctional and educational in nature
rather than being legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the
cadets "to be prepared to accept full responsibility for all that they do
or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service above self-interest or
loyalty to friends or associates."
Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The Show
Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondnets’ academic
freedom as it does not dictate upon the law professors the subject
matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. They are
free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will
teach. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for the Supreme Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with
undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity
as teachers. The right to freedom expression of members of the BAR
may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due
respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal
profession and the justice system.
Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As
enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos v.
Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion may
not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not disturb the
University’s decision not to confer honors to petitioner.
Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with academic
freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning
has the prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and determine
whether these standards have been met. At the end of the probation
period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation, belongs to
the university as the employer alone.
UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic freedom
to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”
Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who
should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its
rolls of professors and other academic personnel. This Court declared
in Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong: “As corporate entities,
educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with
the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure.”
De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2),
Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims
and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls
for some restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic
freedom encompasses the independence of an academic
institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may
be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to
study.
It cannot be gainsaid that “the school has an interest in teaching the
student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field
of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise
finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.” Indeed, while it is
categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that
students have a right “to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation,” such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its
academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for
admission to its school.
ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)
NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs. Executive
Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion, January 28, 2000,
the new PNP absorbed the members of the former NAPOLCOM, PC
and INP, all three of which accordingly abolished.
Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or
indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. They cannot
be appointed to a civilian position in the government, including GOCCs
or their subsidiaries.
IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a
civilian position to speak of.
OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.
MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership
ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY – 70%
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools established
by religious groups and mission boards.
ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)
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The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591,
183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008- The Court noted
that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is itself a
violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover,
it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither
the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make
such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.
IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting as a
Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers to propose
amendments or to call a convention. The grant to Congress as a
Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority includes, by virtue of
the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary to the
effective exercise of principal power granted, such as the power to fix
qualifications, apportionment, etc..
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is insufficient
in providing for mechanism to govern initiatives for constitutional
amendments. While the Constitution recognizes the right of citizens to
propose amendments, the people cannot exercise such until Congress
provides for its implementation.
LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -Clearly,
the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and
shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown
to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign
on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.” The essence of
amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS.
COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the Constitution or to
propose amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative
power to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people as
the repository of sovereignty in a republican state. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is
said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act,
not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
Constituent Assembly.
When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals
for amendments, it does not have the final say on whether or not its
acts are within constitutional limits- an issue which is clearly subject to
judicial review.
There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times
necessary in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be
validly held together with general elections.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no piece
meal ratification.
Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of
amendment/revisions. UNLESS, the proposed amendments/revisions
so provide.
ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)
LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April 11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory
Provisions show a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence
in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops
are allowed entry into the Philippines only be way of direct exception.
Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from engaging in
an offensive war on Philippine territory. The Supreme Court, however,
cannot accept the bare allegations that the Arroyo administration is
engaged in double speak in trying to pass off as a mere training
exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil.
Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA
449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status
as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said
State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be
taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of
submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are
policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further
implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to
Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act,
within sixty days from ratification. The second reason has to do with
the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the
United States Senate.
Saguisag, et al. vs. Ochoa, GR No. 212426-212444, January 12,
2016- The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ
in the conduct of foreign relations. The role of the President in foreign
affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief Executive must
give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the
integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign
Filipino people to self-determination. In specific provisions, the
President's power is also limited, or at least shared, as in Section 2 of
Article II on the conduct of war; Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII on
foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements; Sections 4(2)
and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII on the judicial review of executive acts;
Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and international
agreements entered into prior to the Constitution and on the presence
of foreign military troops, bases, or facilities.
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and
conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It
was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding
that to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy
exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the completion of all
necessary internal requirements for the agreement to enter into force
in the two countries.
Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole
authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his
ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases,
troops or facilities. The initial limitation is found in Section 21 of the
provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The specific limitation is
given by Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions.
The constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is
authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the
limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law,
and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
Executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not
affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. Xxx Under international law,
the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or
even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining
international rights and obligations. xxx Executive agreements may
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cover the matter of foreign military forces if it merely involves detail
adjustments.
AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al.,
Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No. 170516, July
16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has
been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-
making power of the President, but only the Senate.
Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith, et
al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al., G.R.
No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but
the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are
DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate
with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement
on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art.
V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be
maintained until further orders by this Court.
ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of
notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings,
but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these
rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be
notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice,
they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and
to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Philippine
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64). (Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, 186-188, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])
Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052,
February 13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their
right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if
forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence
over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s
exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to
property, the former should prevail”.
Procedural Due Process- Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca
Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the
constitution is a limitation on government powers. It does not apply to
the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment
under the Labor Code.
Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs, et al., GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012- Pichay’s right to due
process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of
the administrative complaint against him. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of the charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,
which simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side.
Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is
neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested
right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of one’s residence maybe
revoked at anytime.
MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to
operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted
by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the State in the
exercise of police power.
Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process
suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity.
INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:
1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-
legislative functions;
2. Abatement of nuisance per se Art. (704, NCC);
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers. Sec. 63 of LGC;
BP 337);
5. Removal or replacement of temporary employees in the
government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR
Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling
abroad;
10. Suspension of bank’s operations by the Monetary Board
upon a prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such
bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice
vs. Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000);
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13. TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013);
SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., April 23,
2014- Prior notice and hearing, as elements of due pocess of law, are
only required in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, not when the
government agency is engaged in the performance of quasi legislative
or administrative functions.
Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that they
were denied due process during the NBI Investigation. The functions
of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in nature. The
NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting
any relief to any party, it cannot even determine probable cause.
Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41, January
21, 2015- there is no law or rule that requires the Ombudsman to
furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.
The Void-for-vagueness Doctrine
The law should be declared void as it is vague, i.e., it lacks
comprehensible standards so that men of ordinary intelligence will
probably have to guess as to its meaning and differ in its application.
Such vague law is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects:
one, it violates due process as it fails to afford persons fair notice of
the conduct to avoid and; second, it gives law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out provisions and, therefore, in effect, it
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government’s muscle.
However, for this to be validly invoked, the act or law must be utterly
vague on its face that it cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or
by statutory construction.
Equal Protection of the Law
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
The guarantee of equal protection secures every person within the
State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the State’s duly constituted authorities.
The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State
governs impartially and not to draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental
objective.
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The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In
other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of
the class. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin])
The Three (3) Levels of Scrutiny to Determine the Propriety of the
Classification under the Equal Protection Clause
To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three
levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny
and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or
rational basis test) demands that the classification reasonably relate
to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in
cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not
involving a suspect class.
When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage,
it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review.
Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate
scrutiny. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only
further an important governmental interest and be substantially related
to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be
genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations.
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The
Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda, et al. v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])
In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., et al., (G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En
Banc [Bersamin]), the Court, applying the rational basis test, ruled that
the ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying in all
agricultural entities therein as the practice produces pesticide drift
causing inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the
environment, violates the equal protection clause, hence, should be
declared unconstitutional.
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that
are the only ideal venues for the investment of machineries and
equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected
individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective
operations and cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well.
The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the
operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology
to arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces
that threaten their production and harvest. X x x the effect of the ban
will not be limited to Davao City in view of the significant contribution
of banana export trading to the country’s economy.
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and
unreasonable in light of the existence and availability of more
permissible and practical alternatives that will not overburden the
respondents and those dependent on their operations as well as those
who stand to be affected by the ordinance. X x x
Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the strict
scrutiny standard, an American constituted construct, useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of
things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantaged of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess
the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or
race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier
application to equal protection. In the cases, the Supreme Court finds
nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is
involved in punishing what is essentially condemnable act- accessing
the computer system of another without right. It is universally
condemned act.
Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010- the Arroyo administration is but just a member of
a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement
as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a
Congressman is not reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all
those belonging to the same class.
Fariñas vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10,
2003, Substantive distinctions exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the people while the latter hold their office by virtue of their
designation by an appointing authority.
Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures
The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs.
Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of
protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ
of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and
liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.
Vivares, et al. vs. STC, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014- the
concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements having an influential part therein. This
evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained
the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the
three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.
It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many Online
Social Network (OSN) users are said to have a subjective expectation
that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto. Utilization of these privacy
tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his
or her right to informational privacy.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children
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positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-
Perez is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends
to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly
under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not
employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled
access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
Also, United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open the method
of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is
forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance
of privacy."
Is there a constitutional right to privacy?
The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” In the 1965 case
of Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479, 14 L. ed. 2D 510 [1965]),
the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of
privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It
held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments x
x x. In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc (22 SCRA 424, 444-445), we
adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy
x x x.
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of
privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. (Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 444 [1968]; Cortes, The
Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, p. 18 [1970]). It is expressly
recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights x x x. Other facets of
the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights (viz: Secs. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 17. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685,
July 23, 1998 [Puno])
What are the zones of privacy recognized and protected in our
laws?
The Civil Code provides that “[e]very person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons” and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes
the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised
Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
Wiretapping Law (R.A. 4200), the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A.
1405) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. 8293). The Rules of
Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of
certain information (Section 24, Rule 130[c], Revised Rules on
Evidence). (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al.,
G.R. No,. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc (Abad) The right to privacy,
or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. But the Court acknowledged its
existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to
privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself
fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known
as the “Zones of Privacy.” The Court explained in “In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator
Gordon” the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within
these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by
law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most
valued by civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis
of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication
and correspondence.
In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded
into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether
that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.
SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870,
November 3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office and persons accused of crimes. However, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the said RA insofar as
random drug testing for secondary and tertiary school students, as well
as for officials and employees of public and private offices is
concerned. The need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug
use is substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy interest
under the premises.
Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998- The right to privacy
is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.
The threats emanate from various sources — governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the
threat comes from the executive branch of government which by
issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy
by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of
the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O.
No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating
dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the
well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that
everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and
his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-
keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."
Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too
quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close
with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our
Constitution for flattery.
KMU v. NEDA, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006- On its face, EO 420
shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the
data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the
existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides
strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in
contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of
reasonable ID systems by government entities. With the exception of
the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected
and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under
Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential
but also personal matters. The disclosure requirements under EO 420
are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to
privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure of 14 personal data that are
routine for ID purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or
humiliate anyone.
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID
systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any
power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In
contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to
establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a
national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive
issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation
because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance
system where none existed before.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing
sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS,
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Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-
friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive
issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over
government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the
Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012- The
confiscated items having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to warrantless
search conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible in evidence
since a barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority under the
Revised Penal Code
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES & SEIZURES:
1. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405
SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553);
2. Search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
3. Seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The
counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent
and established until after they have been turned over to the
Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration for
verification. Hence, not considered as evidence in plain
view);
4. Customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
5. Waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2.
person waiving has knowledge of such right, actually or
constructively; and 3. he/she has actual intention to
relinquish the right.) Silahis Int’l Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20,
2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is the State
which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that
it was freely and voluntarily given;
6. Stop & frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search –
(Terry vs, Ohio, 1968; Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a
stop of a person by law enforcement officer based upon
“reasonable suspicion” that a person may have been
engaged in criminal activity, whereas an arrest requires
“probable cause” that a suspect committed a criminal
offense;
7. Armed conflict (war time);
8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escaño, GR
No. 129756-58, January 28, 2000);
9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia,
233 SCRA 716), where a warrantless search was allowed
where there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder
because of an ongoing coup;
10. Conduct of “Area Target Zone” and “Saturation Drives” in the
exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs.
Villa, 181 SCRA 623);
11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October
23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18,
2000).
Valmonte v. De Villa: For searches at checkpoints to be valid, the
following must be observed:
1. The checkpoint must be pre-announced;
2. It must be stationary; and
3. The search at checkpoint must be limited to visual
search only. An intrusive search is not allowed
People v. Doria
The requisites for the “plain view” doctrine to be validly invoked are:
1. The law enforcement officer must have a valid justification
for an intrusion, or is in a position where he can view a
particular area;
2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view must be
inadvertent; and
3. It is immediately apparent to him that the thing he sees is
object of a crime, contraband, or subject to seizure.
It is clear that if the object is inside a closed container, “plain view” may
not be invoked. However, even if it inside a closed container but if due
to the configuration of the container, or due to its transparency, it can
still be seen from the outside what is inside, “plain view” may still be
invoked.
Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain
view is justified only when:
1. There is prior valid intrusion based on a valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who had the right to be there
where they are;
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent;
and
4. Plain view justified the seizure without further
search conducted- Manalili vs. CA, 280
SCRA 400
WARRANTLESS ARREST
Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the Rules,
a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was
filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. As a corollary, neither can
a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. xxx In this case, the
officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:
1. The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be
continuous from the time of the commission of the offense
to the time of the arrest.
2. There must be no supervening event which breaks the
continuity of the chase.
Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest
proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully
arrested without warrant.
PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be
availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime.
(2) such commission of a crime must be done in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officer.
PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure
of immediacy between the time of the offense was committed and the
time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an appreaciable lapse of
time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured.
Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited to
actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of the
law is complied where the arresting officer was within an earshot from
the scene although he did not personally witness the commission of
the crime.
PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against
the State. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. Right applies only against the government and agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By administrative
authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of carrying out a final
finding of violation of law.
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Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the
Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner who has
been ordered to be deported.
SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to
more than one offense.
PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE
SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT
REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to no room
for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be
reasonable certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to
be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.
Administrative Warrantless Arrest – Causes:
a. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can
be arrested but only if it is absolutely necessary to do so.
You will be freed as soon as you no longer represent a threat
to public security.
b. If you disrupt a court hearing;
c. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
d. In case of brawling;
e. If you block traffic without authorization;
f. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are
questionable;
g. If you are in the country illegally.
Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-
In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano, et al.
vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters alleged
to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential
letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their
counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case,
since the letters were not confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention
officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law is required
before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is
a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to
persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy rights.
Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from
attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech
and privacy of communication. The invocation of these rights will not,
however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained
defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed
against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an
abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right
cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or
public respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must
not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.
Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the
right to be let alone is not an absolute right where the person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character.
Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition
in the constitution is if there is a “lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law”.
A violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which prohibits
not only the unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also: (a)
the possession of such tapes with the knowledge of their nature as
illegal wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to
communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in writing, such as
the provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if convicted, ranges
from six months to six years.
Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code
RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to the
contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and
members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals, listen to intercept, and record, with the use of any mode,
form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or
intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable
ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion or spoken or written words between
members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons or any person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Provided, that surveillance, interception and recording of
communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients,
journalists and their sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.
Section 4- Freedom of expression-
Content-based restrictions on free speech, and content-neutral
regulations
Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the content of the
speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear-and-present danger
test. For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v. Comelec,
prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from
campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have
compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a
heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be
tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.
Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A.
No. 6646, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air
time to political candidates during the campaign period, are not
concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need
only a substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential
standard of review will suffice to test their validity. The clear-and-
present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the
constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which
are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their
incidents. To apply the clear-and-present danger test to such
regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a
nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.
The test for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction
of speech is that content-based restrictions distort public debate, have
improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how
people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie
content-neutral regulations, like regulation of time, place and manner
of holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly
Act of 1985. (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998
[Mendoza])
What is the most influential test for distinguishing content-based
from content-neutral regulations?
The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. O’ Brien:
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 - [A] a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified (1)
if it is within the constitutional power of the government;
(2) if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; (3) if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms (of speech, expression and
press) is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest (391 U.S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 2df 692, 680
[1968] [bracketed numbers added])
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based
from content-neutral regulations and is said to have “become
canonical in the review of such laws.” (G. Gunther & K. Sullivan,
Constitutional Law 1217 [13th ed. 1997]). It is noteworthy that the O’
Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases (Adiong
v. Comelec, 207 SCRA 712 [1992]; Osmena v. Comelec, supra.).
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental
interest is “not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”
Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on
freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the
governmental purpose in question. (Social Weather Stations, Inc. v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, En Banc [Mendoza]) Chavez
v. Secretary Gonzales
Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of speech
may either be content-based (the subject of the speech or utterance is
sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it regulates only the
conduct associated with speech, such as the time, place and manner).
To pass constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must
show that the government has a compelling or overriding interest in
the subject regulation. A content neutral restriction, on the other hand,
need only show an important government interest, as long as it leaves
open alternative channels of communication.
Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15,
2008- The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning
television stations against playing the “Garci tapes” under pain of
revocation of their licenses, were content-based restrictions and
should be subjected to the “clear and present and danger test”.
Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR
No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate
implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the
burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to prove
that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights.
As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling
reason to infringe the right to free expression.
The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop
Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January
21, 2015, En Banc (Leonen) This case defines the extent that our
people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and
of first impression. We are asked to decide whether the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) has the competence to limit expressions
made by the citizens – who are not candidates – during elections.
All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression.
The prohibition against the abridgment of speech should not mean an
absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and incidental
burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest
clearly allowed in the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant
theory of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our
Constitution.
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of
expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech and of
the press provided in the US Constitution. The word “expression” was
added in the 1987 Constitution x x x for having a wider scope x x x.
Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as “[t]he
right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be
protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
thought.” (Freedom of Speech and Expression, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 272,
277 [2002], quoting Justice Kennedy in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1403 [2002])
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.
Communication exists when “(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others,
uses conventional actions because he or she reasonably believes that
such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and
(2) the audience so takes the actions.” (Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in
Silence, 99 Yale L. J. 945, 954 [1990]) “[I]n communicative action[,]
the hearer may respond to the claims by x x x either accepting the
speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for
justification.” (Hugh Baxter, System and Lifeworld in Haberma’s
Theory of Law, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 473, 499 [2002])
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. “[C]onduct is treated as
a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’
(Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 1844, 1847 [1997]) such that “’when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’
elements are combined in the same course of conduct,’ the
‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into
play the [right to freedom of expression].’” (Id., citing US v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376 [1968])
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire
continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and
even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
Even before freedom “of expression” was included in Article III, Section
4 of the present Constitution, this court has applied its precedent
version to expressions other than verbal utterances.
1 Utak vs COMELEC, GR 206020 April 14 2015- The COMELEC
may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. The posting of
election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on
transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also
an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit
to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine
may not be justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid
exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the commuters are
not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials
posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find
the same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom
of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such
as the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals to express their
preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their
property, and convince others to agree with them.
The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-
neutral regulations since they merely control the place where election
campaign materials may be posted, but the prohibition is repugnant to
the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a
valid content-neutral regulation.
The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport
terminals is not necessary to a stated governmental interest. First,
while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on
posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport
terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there are more than
sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure
equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence,
one of the requisites of a valid content-neutral regulation was not
satisfied.
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited commercial ads; and the State cannot rob him of his right
without violating his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.
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GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when the
COMELEC drastically reduced the airtime within which national
candidates and political parties may air political advertisements on
television and radio, it unduly restricted and constrained the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the
people.
Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election
surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of expression as they
refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters as
regards to a candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the
voter’s preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during
the campaign period.The prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 of RA
9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior restraint
on the freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and total suppression of
a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period; and 3) the government interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression.
The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for
testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict scrutiny,
overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing
"on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.
A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-applied”
challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation
is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on
the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by
the aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise
of which should not at all times be abridged. As reflected earlier, this
rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an
“in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected
to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to
a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism
against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if
the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the
doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before
judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge
against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It
would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not
before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial
challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s
ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can
hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a
mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is
vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to
him.
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial
type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
applied to the litigant.
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court,
in at least two cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment, and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely,
if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-
related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
“transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression.”
American jurisprudence instructs that “vagueness challenges that do
not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the
specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's
facial validity.”
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the
due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality
of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the Court brought the
doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-
payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment
punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy
provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably,
the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two
Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein
assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section
3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender
commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal
laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must
first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an “unlawful demand.”
Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech vis-a-vis
Section 4©(3) of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
if unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech
is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level
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of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms
of expression, but is nonetheless is entitled to protection. The State
cannot rob him of his right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitmate forms of expression.
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The prohibition of
publication of exit poll or electoral survey would be unreasonably
restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not
only for election day projections, but also for long term research.
MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives
petitioner “the power to screen, review and examine “all television
programs,” emphasizing the phrase “all television programs”. Thus,
when the law says “all television programs,” the word “all” covers all
television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news
documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative body
made no qualification in the use of general word or expression. It then
follows that since “The Inside Story” is a television program, it is within
the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.
Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No.
165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said that Soriano’s
“statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as
protected speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a “G” rating
for general viewership. The Supreme Court said the MTRCB
suspension was limited only to the show Ang Dating Daan, not
Soriano, as the MTRCB “may not suspend television personalities, for
such would be beyond its jurisdiction.”
Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is
essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not necessary that
he be named. It must also be shown that a third party could identify
him as the object of the libelous article. Every defamatory imputation
is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following:
1. private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty;
2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceeding which are not confidential in nature
including any statement made therein or act performed
by public officer.
A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged (those
which are not actionable or even if author acted in bad faith, e.g.
speech by member of Congress therein or any committee thereof) or
qualified privileged (those containing defamatory imputations which
are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention or justifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair
and true reports without any comments/remarks).
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine
of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved.
Freedom of the Press
Four (4) Aspects of Press Freedom
Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935
Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press.
These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from
punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to
information; and (4) freedom of circulation. (Francisco Chavez v. Raul
M. Gonzales, et. al., G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, En Banc
[Puno, CJ])
Freedom of Assembly
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm
of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis
of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would be meaningless and unprotected. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et
al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 – The Public Assembly Act of 1985
Meaning of Public Assembly- “Public assembly” means any rally,
demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass
or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting
a lawful cause, or expressing an opinion to the general public on any
particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether
political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress
of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings
and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local
ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as
provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other
concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting
from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing
rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(Section 3[a], B.P. Blg. 880)
Permit when required and when not required- A written permit shall
be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in a private property, in which case
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession
is required, or in the campus of a government–owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies
held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are
not covered by this Act. (Section 4, B.P. Blg. 880)
Freedom Parks- Every city and municipality in the country shall within
six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least
one suitable “freedom park” or mall in their respective jurisdictions
which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any
time without the need of any prior permit. (Section 5, B.P. Blg. 880)
Action to be taken on the application (Section 6, B.P. Blg. 880)
i. It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.
ii. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall
act on the application within two (2) working days from
the date the application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason
the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to
accept the application for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the
office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
iii. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on
the matter.
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iv. The action on the permit shall be in writing and
served on the applicant within twenty-four hours.
v. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in
his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an
appropriate court of law.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Mayor Jose “Lito”
Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, 24 February 2010, 1st Div. (Carpio
Morales) Section 6(c) of the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) provides
that “If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit,
he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the
matter.”
In modifying the permit outright, Atienza gravely abused his discretion
when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been
heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.
Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of
the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test
which x x x is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing
in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when
granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory
any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not,
however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be
a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may
probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a
specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being
held there. It smacks of whim and caprice for Atienza to impose a
change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public
place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have
found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit “in terms satisfactory to the
applicant.”
Meaning of Maximum Tolerance- “Maximum tolerance” means the
highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same. (Section 3[c], B.P. Blg. 880)
B.P. No. 880 is merely a “content-neutral” regulation
It is very clear that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmena v.
Comelec (G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, 288 SCRA 447), where
the Court referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the time,
place, and manner of holding public assemblies (Ibid, p. 478).
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it
refers to all kinds of public assemblies (except picketing and other
concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting
from a labor dispute, which are governed by the Labor Code and other
labor laws, political meeting or rallies held during election campaign
period, which are governed by the Election Code and other election
related laws, and public assemblies in the campus of a government-
owned and operated educational institution, which shall be subject to
the rules and regulations of said educational institution [Sec. 3(a) and
Sec. 4 of B.P. No. 880]) that would use public places. The reference
to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
“peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,”
“protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly
content-based, since they can refer to any subject. The words
“petitioning the government for redress of grievances” come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefits of all rallyists and
is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights x x
x. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, En
Banc [Azcuna])
The Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) Policy adopted by the
Arroyo Administration in dealing with public assemblies: The Court
now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor
General has conceded that the use of the term should now be
discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum
tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit
of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the
Solicitor General.
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance
mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means
the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means
something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be
that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the
fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly.
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a
darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P.
No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail
or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places
as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government., The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
“permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound
“clear and present danger” standard. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])
Section 5- Freedom of Religion-
Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, 618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010, En Banc (Del Castillo) The
decision of the COMELEC not to allow the Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party to
participate in party-list elections because its members are “immoral,”
citing verses from the Bible and the Koran, was ruled by the SC to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, nullified, as it
violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of religion. In effect,
the COMELEC used religious standard in its decision by using verses
from the Bible and the Koran. The COMELEC, as a government
agency, is not supposed to be guided by religious standards in its
decisions and actions.
What is a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State can not
meddle following the Separation of Church and State Doctrine?
An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form
of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a
religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed not worthy of membership.” Based on this
definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the
church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be
concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the
State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication,
ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and
other activities with attached religious significance. (Pastor Dionisio
V. Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999, 1st Div.
[Kapunan])
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Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals- Under the non-establishment
clause of freedom of religion, when it comes to religious differences,
the State enjoys no banquet of options – neutrality alone is its fixed
and immovable stance. It is not its task to defend one religion against
an attack by another religion. After all, the remedy against bad
theology is better theology. Let them duel in the market place of ideas.
The marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by
more speech, for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding
ideas, that can fan the embers of truth.
James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR
No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc (Mendoza) - Wherefore, THE
PETITIONS ARE partially granted. Accordingly, the Court declares
R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, except with respect
to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in RH-
IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities
And non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer
patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act no. 8344, to another
health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;
- 4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures;
- 5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
- 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
- 7) Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing Philhealth
accreditation; and
- 8) Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra
vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.
Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA
256 - members of Jehovah’s witnesses may validly refuse participating
in flag ceremonies (singing the national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.)
on account of their religious beliefs.
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated when it will bring about clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which the State has a duty to prevent.
However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas does not
constitute clear and present danger.
Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 – Freedom of religion
does not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax
on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. For the
purpose of defraying cost of registration.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive
Secretary, 405 SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards are drawn from the Qur’an
and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of the Muslim Affairs exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached on
the religious freedom of Muslim organization to interpret what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. The State has in effect forced
Muslim to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah on
halal food.
Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that “[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Thus, it found a grave violation
of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. The Court held that
moral disapproval “is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party list system.”
Upholding equal protection, the Court ruled that from the standpoint of
the political process, LGBTs have the same interest in participating in
the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. As such, laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there was a
transgression of AngLadlad’s fundamental right of freedom of
expression since, by reason of the COMELEC action, the former was
precluded from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other party-
list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
COMELEC, April 8, 2010)
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court declared
that the COMELEC order to remove the tarpaulin did not violate
freedom of religion, It does not convey any religious doctrine of the
catholic church.
Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that the
obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis
of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005-
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.
Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel
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Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CA-
Relate to suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected
countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs.
Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.
Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The
person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by
the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. Whether the
accused should be permitted to leave the country for humanitarian
reasons is a matter addressed to the court’s discretion. (Yap vs. CA,
GR No. 141529, June 6, 2001).
Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that
everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM NO. MTJ-
10-1770-July 18, 2012- OCA Circular No. 49-2003- does not restrict
but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges
and court [personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To
“restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to
“regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule.
Section 7- Right to Information
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The
constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract is consummated. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under Section
17, Art. XI has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a
matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a “duty to
disclose” sprang from the “right to know”. Both of constitutional origin,
the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there
is a duty on the part of members of the government to disclose their
SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law. xxx While public
officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion
to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined
or copied by interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it
the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of
the records. After all, public office is a public trust.
Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC
Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official
records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.
Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector
- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma,
288 SCRA 15- Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor
Code, validly prohibited supervisors from forming labor
unions. the right to strike does form an integral part of
the Right to Association.
Section 9- Expropriation
Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the
procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary
guideline through which the State may expropriate private property.
For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to
the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent
domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No.
8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national
government infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in
instances when the national government expropriates property “for
national government infrastructure projects”.
Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA
303- There are at least two crucial differences between the respective
procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the
government is required to make immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to
make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary, and
Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974
which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the
market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the
current relevant zonal value of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the
value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement
cost method.
LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29,
2012- When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of its agrarian program, the constitutional provision
which governs is Section 4 Article XIII of the constitution which
provides that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of the farmers and regular farm workers
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in
the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. Notably, the provision also imposes upon the State the
obligation of paying landowner compensation for the land taken, even
if it is for the government’s agrarian reform purposes. It pertains to the
fair and full price if the taken property.
LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust
account to provisionally pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, we struck
down as void the DAR administrative circular that provided for the
opening of the trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds
contemplated in Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657. We pointedly declared
that the explicit words of Section 16(e) did not include "trust accounts,"
but only cash or bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the government’s
payment of just compensation.
Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process, the
Court determined that the legal interest should be 12% after
recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a
forbearance on the part of the government. Had the finality of the
judgment been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should have
been imposed from the time the RTC decision fixing just compensation
became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed from the time
that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took
the property.
LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015- the Court
has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where
there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the
landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of
the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest
p.a. from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or
beginning July 1, 2013 until fully paid, interest shall be at 6% p.a..
Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015- As often
ruled by this Court, the award of interest is imposed in the nature of
damages for delay in payment which, in effect, makes the obligation
on the part of the government one of forbearance to ensure prompt
payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the
owner. However, when there is no delay in the payment of just
compensation, the Supreme Court has not hesitated in deleting the
imposition of interest thereon for the same is justified only in cases
where delay has been sufficiently established.
Secretary of DPWH vs. Heracleo, GR 179334 Apr 21 2015- The
government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation
proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the State’s
exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject
of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy
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imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to
the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of
due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s
inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater
good. Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not
necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What
is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an
outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent
of a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at
the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just compensation’
is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate
him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for
what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the
property at the time it is taken.
The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental
duty is the application of the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called for only when such literal application is
impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just
compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence,
would open varying interpretation of economic policies – a matter
which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and
equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the
law and jurisprudence.
For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be
determined from the time the property owners filed the initiatory
complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would
validate the State’s act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural
infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part.
To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government
to continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking
private property.
Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a)
of Rule 39 simply does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.
Since PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties,
they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment
or pending appeal.
It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued
by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the
claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments. This is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public Highways vs
San Diego, 1970).
The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner
of payment thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a
substantive, not merely a procedural, matter. This is because the right
of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of
possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right. RA 8974,
which specifically prescribes the new standards in determining the
amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national
government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the
provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession, is a substantive law. Further, there is nothing in RA No.
8974 which expressly provides that it should have retroactive effect.
Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any
of its provisions. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively in relation
to this case.
RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only
with regard to the expropriation of right-of-way sites and locations for
national government infrastructure projects. On the other hand, in all
other expropriation cases outside of right-of-way sites or locations for
national government infrastructure projects, the provisions of Rule 67
of the Rules of Court shall still govern.
Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011- The twin
elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves,
direct limitations to the exercise of eminent domain, arguing, in a way,
against the notion of fee simple title. The simple fee does not vest until
payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private
property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance
to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in
expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will.
Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly
followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine
need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose
to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the
complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now
acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public necessity the very reason
or condition as it were allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation
of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent
point for the governments retention of the expropriated land. The same
legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to
another public use very much different from the original or deviates
from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has
been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige
landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen,
who will use it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is
offensive to our laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing
which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep
the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the
process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping
with the idea of fair play
ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners
who were able to prove the commitment of the government to allow
them to repurchase their land.
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State,
through expropriation proceedings may take private property even if,
admittedly, it will transfer this property again to another private party
as long as there is public purpose to the taking.
Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a
property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.
MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16,
2009 - For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two
requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors
passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by
the LWUA.
Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against
the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the
individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore
be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and
liberally in favor of the property owner.
While the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the government
cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the
five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just
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compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity.
After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just
compensation.
Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent
domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community).
Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity
(patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must be paid just
compensation. If the property owned is public or otherwise held in trust
then no compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs. NAWASA).
To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).
GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land
Incorporated, September 18, 2009- The Court said that the total
prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added that
the State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally
invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.
Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June
26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083,
July 21, 2006 – The tax credit given to commercial establishments for
the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a form
of just compensation for private property taken by the State for public
use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come
directly from the State, but from private establishments concerned.
Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then power of eminent domain comes into play.
It is inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long as in the
end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).
Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of
property for socialized housing is for public use.
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order:
1) government lands; 2) alienable lands of the public domain; 3)
unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands within the declared
areas for priority development, zonal improvement program sites, slum
improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired;
5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-
owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).
Section 10- Non-impairment clause
There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate
transactions entered or perfected even prior to its imposition. The
contract clause is not a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power
of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a
valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)
The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that
impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)
Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, GR No.
195540, March 13, 2013- Section 47 of RA 8791 did not divest
juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but
only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the
one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new
redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and
expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive
application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts
from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and
whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Sections 11 & 12 – Custodial Investigation Rights
Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.
People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010- Barangay
based organizatios in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of
bantay bayan, are recognized by local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken
by Banting and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect
to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, section 12 of
the constitution. The Supreme Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial
confession of Lauga which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible
in evidence.
Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under
custodial investigation, nor it can be considered a formal arrest,
by the very nature of the questioning, the expectations of the
motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
conducted.
Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624
PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer
need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client.
The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel should not
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the
constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not
been formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning.
PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person
is admission in evidence.
PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is
inadmissible.
A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).
Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court
sustained the admissibility of the sworn statements of the other
accused, explaining that the investigations performed by the PNP were
administrative and not custodial in nature.
Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an
administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent’s
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel.
Section 13- Bail
In bail application where the accused is charged with a capital offense,
will it be proper for the judge to grant bail without conducting hearing
if the prosecutor interposes no objection to such application?
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct
the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands
charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the
prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the
judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is
doing on account of familiarity with the case. “Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial
discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition
for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.”
Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to conduct a
hearing despite the prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in
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opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. (Joselito V. Narciso
v. Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000,
3rd Div. [Panganiban])
Is a condition in an application for bail that accused be first
arraigned before he could be granted bail valid?
In the first place x x x in cases where it is authorized, bail should be
granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of
the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the
presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and
ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, Sec. 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that “the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or
these Rules,” while under Rule 116, Sec. 1(b) the presence of the
accused at the arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to
choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released
on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
(Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321, Feb. 1, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza])
Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v.
Judge Olalia- The decision of the SC in Government of the USA v.
Judge Purganan which says that “no bail rule applies in extradition
since bail is available only to one who had arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws” was re-examined and, after re-
examination, the rule now is that an extraditee may be allowed to post
bail during the pendency of an extradition proceeding. However, for
him to be allowed to post bail, still he must prove that (1) once granted
bail he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
that there exists special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
that will justify the grant of bail to him, by a clear and convincing
evidence.
The reason why the Purganan ruling was re-examined is because of
the modern trend in public international law where an individual person
is no longer considered a mere object of international law but rather as
a subject thereof, and the primacy given to human rights, among which
is the right to liberty.
Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Div.), G.R. No. 213847,
August 18, 2015, En Banc (Bersamin) A close reading of the ruling of
the SC in this case allowing former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to post
bail although he was charged of plunder, a non-bailable offense, was
because of the Olalia ruling.
In this case, former Senator Enrile was shown not to be a flight risk or
a danger to the community (his voluntary surrender to the authorities
and his record of respect for court processes in earlier cases), and that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances (his
advanced age, fragile state of health and medical predicament that will
require the services of doctors of his choice) that will justify the grant
of bail to him. After all, the main purpose of bail is to assure the
presence of an accused during the trial of the case as required by the
court.
“Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to
his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling hid health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.
“It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will
then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed
and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his
choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense
but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.
“On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish
before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had
is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail x x x that the courts can already consider
in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.
The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest
of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial,
and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process
as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.”
Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but
later convicted of non-capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be
granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266 SCRA 281).
The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.
The right is not available in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature. In the absence of any provision in the constitution,
the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not granting bail, as a
general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming
to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
Section 14- Rights of accused
1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.
2. The right to be heard
The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of
certainty for the law to be upheld- not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto, November 19, 2001).
Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused appellant
may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the failure of the
information to allege relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him
and, consequently, a denial of due process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348
SCRA 476).
A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign
State is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui
generis. It is not criminal proceeding which will call into operations all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The
extraditee’s right to notice and hearing is present only when the
petition for extradition is filed in court- it is only then when he has the
opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of Justice vs.
Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000).
Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February 11,
2014- the burden of demonstrating political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present
evidence.
3. Right to public trial
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe trial
(Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29, 2001).
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE
MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO
GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]-
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom
that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private
complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the
right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public
be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
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courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the
inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a
transparent, open and public trial. Thus, the Supreme Court
PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast
by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines outlined
therein.
Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right to speedy
trial maybe waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law.
One's right to speedy disposition of his case must, therefore, be
asserted. Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert his right, he is
considered to have waived it.
4. Right to face to face confrontation
The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the
supervening death of plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render the
deceased’s testimony inadmissible. Where no fault can be attributed
to plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike out all that
has been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA
696).
Section 16- Speedy disposition
Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for
preliminary investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3 years
and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature and was prosecuted
for political reasons, it is held that there was violation of the accused’s
right to speedy disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition extends
to preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA
70).
N. B. Recent decision of the Supreme Court on the Inordinate delay
Doctrine (Cagang case)- The Supreme Court interpreted the
reckoning period for the right to ‘speedy disposition of…cases’ under
Article III, Section 16, to start from the preliminary investigation of
cases, and not before the preliminary investigation and not from the
fact-finding stage,”
Section 17- Against Self-incrimination
It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions,
what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For
instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be
received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness (US v.
Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) and morphine forced out of the mouth
of the accused may also be used as evidence against him (US v. Ong
Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]). Consequently, although accused-
appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may
be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use
of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress. (People v. Rondero, 320
SCRA 383, 399-401, Dec. 9, 1999, En Banc [Per Curiam])
Does the right against self-incrimination extend to administrative
proceedings?
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]),
we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which
possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality,
which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if
found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal v. Kapunan (6
SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one’s license as
a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of
property. (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, 184, Jan.
18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])
May the Right against Self-incrimination be validly invoked
during Inquiries in Aid of Legislation?
[I]t has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is
‘subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action,’ including ‘the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights’.”
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual
is the right against self-incrimination. (Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767, Nov. 20, 1991, En Banc
[Padilla])
What are the two types of immunity statutes? Which has broader
scope of protection?
Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States,
there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They
are the transactional immunity and the use-and-derivative-use
immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its
protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any
offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. In contrast,
by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only
assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from
it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
(Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, 797-798, April 26,
1994, En Banc [Puno])
Is the grant of immunity to an accused willing to testify for the
government a special privilege and, therefore, must be strictly
construed against the accused?
[W]e reject respondent court’s ruling that the grant of section 5
immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. It
simplistically characterized the grant as a special privilege, as if it was
gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread
the raison d’ etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-
incrimination vis-à-vis immunity statutes.
The days of inquisition brought about the most despicable abuses
against human rights. Not the least of these abuses is the expert use
of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To
guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right
against self-incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of
all civilized countries. Over the years, however, came the need to
assist government in its task of containing crime for peace and order
is a necessary matrix of public welfare. To accommodate the need,
the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness.
Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow
government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right
against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as
transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity x x x. Quite clearly,
these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those
given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it – the surrender
of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands
that the right against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should
be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode
the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal
interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a right to
solve crimes but it must do it, rightly. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
231 SCRA 783, 805-806, April 26, 1994, En Banc [Puno])
Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541
SCRA 456- The right against self incrimination is extended in an
administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are
analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently
been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and all cases
in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a
party of not.
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The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of
documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).
In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19,
2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and probative
value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first ever Supreme
Court decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v.
Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court,
in Yatar, held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: “how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests”
In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant
contended “that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA
tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as
his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of
the Constitution”.
The Court rejected the argument. It held that “the kernel of the right is
not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion”, citing
Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held
that “the right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt”
and that “it does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence”.
Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320
SCRA 383, the Court held that “although accused-appellant insisted
that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the
National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.”
Hence, according to the Court, “a person may be compelled to submit
to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is
no testimonial compulsion involved”. It cited People v. Gallarde, G.R.
No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where immediately
after the incident, “the police authorities took pictures of the accused
without the presence of counsel”. In that case, the Court ruled that
“there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination”. It further
stated that “the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical
examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is
accused”.
Section 18 – Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised
Penal Code)
Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime;
2. service in defense of the state
3. naval enlistment;
4. posse commitatus;
5. return to work order;
6. patria potestas
Section 19- Death penalty
The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total
abolition of the death penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper for
Congress to determine its reimposition because of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. (PP v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682).
Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt
The civil liability from a crime is not “debt” within the purview of the
constitutional provision against imprisonment for non payment of
“debt”.
Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the
Constitution, refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a criminal
offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is covered by the
constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
Section 21- Double Jeopardy
The Two (2) Kinds of Double Jeopardy:
Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first
sentence of Clause 20, Section 1(now Sec. 21), Article III of the
Constitution ordains that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.” The second sentence of said
clause provides that “if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” Thus, the first sentence prohibits
double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the
second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does
not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence
applies, even if the offense charged are not the same, owing to the
fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same
act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall
bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment or the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been
attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the
defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either
case.
Elsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only
where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged. The question of identity or lack of
identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements
of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in
the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. (People
v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24, 1996)
To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be
proven: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
Legal jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. (Cuison v. CA, 289
SCRA 159, April 15, 1998 [Panganiban])
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
places the accused under double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs.
People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).
The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not
concluded as a series of events prompted the Senate to declare the
impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither acquitted nor was
the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent.
Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the claim of double
jeopardy must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).
Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal
of a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one year for offenses
punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six years or a lapse of
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two years for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six
years.
For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the
accused, the following must be established: 1) the provisional
dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2) the provisional
dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party;
3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no
justification to file a subsequent case beyond the period of one or two
years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).
The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment
of conviction. It merely approved the agreement between the parties
on the plea to a lesser offense by the accused and the condition
attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)
Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging the
offender under both section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article 353 of RPC
is unconstitutional because it constitutes a violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy. Same with charging the offender under
section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 (Anti Child Pornography
constitute double jeopardy.
Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is double
jeopardy if the subsequent information charges the accused with
different offense, even if it arises from the same act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same act is not proscribed; what is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense.
Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder
What is a bill of attainder? Is P.D. 1866 a bill of attainder?
[T]he Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a
legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of
a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder
are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the
imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial
trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding
of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is
the most essential. P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of
a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a
judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an
imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is
to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed,
specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the
offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to
determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of
firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstances
attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as
the Constitution and judicial precedents require. (Misolas v. Panga,
181 SCRA 648, 659-660, Jan. 30, 1990, En Banc [Cortes])
regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory
right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto
laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being
merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex
post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not
come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules
of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved
at the time of their passage.
At any rate, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to appeal to
the Supreme Court to review questions of law. On the removal of the
intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of
review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been
convincingly overcome. (Panfilo M. Lacson v. The Executive
Secretary, et. al., G.R. No. 128096, Jan. 20, 1999 [Martinez])
RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law on jurisdiction
whose retroactive application is constitutional (Lacson vs. Exec.
Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).
Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be
considered ex-post facto law as long as it operates prospectively since
its stricture would cover only offenses committed after and not before
its enactment.
The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to
court doctrines pursuant to the maxim “legisinterpretatiolegis vim
obtinet”- the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).
The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying
circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc, 398
SCRA 62).
Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto was tantamount to
the application of an ex-post facto law- Describing the argument as
specious, the Supreme Court held “no ex-post facto law was involved
in the case at bar”. It added that “the science of DNA typing involved
the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained
under the Rules of Court”. Whereas, “an ex-post facto law referred
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented”. (PP
vs. Yatar, May 19, 2004)

What is an ex post facto law? Is R.A. No. 8249 an ex post facto

law?

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.

R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide
for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal
law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application
of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-tiered
appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has
already been rejected by the court several times considering that the
right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be
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