CASE DIGEST: People of the

Philippines VS. Reynaldo Santos,

Maria Ressa, and Rappler, Inc.
 FACTS OF THE CASE

 Reynaldo Santos and Maria Ressa of Rappler, Inc., were charged with the
violation of Section 4(c)(4) of the The Cybercrime Prevention act of 2012 - This
is what is known as Cyberlibel
 Rappler published the article in question originally on 29 May 2019. This article
was written by accused Santos.
 In sum, the article stated that Rappler got a hold of an intelligence report states
that private complainant, Keng was surveilled for his alleged involvement in
illegal activities, namely human trafficking and drug smuggling. The article
further cites the document saying that Keng was also involved in a murder, which
could refer to the death of Manila Councilor Chika Go. The article also made
reference to a 2002 Philippine Star Repor where Keng was stated to be accused of
smuggling and granting special investors residence visas to the Chinese.
 ISSUES

I. Whether Accused Santos, and Ressa are

liable for the violation of Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cyber Crime Prevention Act of 2012
(Cyberlibel);

II. Whether the offense has already prescribed.

 RULING OF THE COURT
First Issue
Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that after a careful evaluation of the evidence
presented by both parties, the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient in establishing
the guilt of Accused Santos and Ressa beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, using Libel under the Revised Penal Code as bais, ruled that the elements
of cyberlibel are as follows: a.) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; b.) publication of the charge; (c) identify of the person defamed;
and d.) existence of malice. In addition, the said elements, this act must be committed
through the use of a computer system.
 RULING OF THE COURT
First Issue
 First Element: The allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another.

The Court ruled that subject article was defamatory.

A thorough reading of the article reveals that the writer, Accused Santos, ascribed
several crimes to Keng, such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, murder,
smuggling of cigarettes, and his involvement in illegal transactions granting special
visas to Chinese nationals. Thus, creating in the minds of ordinary readers that Keng
has a disgraceful reputation.
 RULING OF THE COURT
First Issue
 Second Element: Publication of the charge.

During the proceedings, it was stipulated that the subject article was published in
Rappler, Inc’s website on 29 May 2012 and was updated on 19 February 2014.
The Court then ruled that the publication on 19 February 2014 was actually a
republication. Citing the cases of Brillante v. CA and Soriano v. IAC, the Court
explained that a single defamatory statement, if published several times, gives rise to
as many offenses as there are publications. This is known as the “Multiple
Publication Rule”. Thus, the update done on 19 February 2014 as a republication of
the article, putting it within the ambit of the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
 RULING OF THE COURT
First Issue
 Third Element: Identity of the person defamed.

The Court explained that there is no doubt that the subject article was referring to
Wilfredo Keng as he was particularly named therein as the person who allegedly
committed the crimes therein.
 RULING OF THE COURT
First Issue
 Fourth Element: The existence of malice.

The Court found that malice in fact is present in the case. It discussed that “actual malice” is present when
the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused
in fact entertained serious doubts at to the truth of the statement he published.
The Court ruled that Accused Santos, Jr. wrote the subject article without any verification as to the truth of
the allegations therein. In fact, the various crimes imputed to Keng in the article was sufficiently proved to
be false. As such, the Court found that accused Santos, Jr. did not bother to verify with any law
enforcement agency whether Keng was actually involved in the any of the crimes it imputed upon him
before publishing the article.
The Court further stated that a news organization that claims to adhere to accuracy, fairness and balance in
reporting, would have retracted, or at the very least, issued a clarificatory article. As such, the Court found
that the subject article was republished with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Thus, it was
convinced of the malice attendant in this case.
 RULING OF THE COURT
Second Issue
As regards the second issue, the Court ruled that the crime charged against the accused had not yet
prescribed and reiterated that the reckoning period for the determination of whether the offense has
already prescribed was on the date of republication, 19 February 2014.
The Court then cited the case of Panaguiton, Jr. vs. Department of Justice wherein the Supreme
Court has held that Act No. 3326( An Act to Establish Prescription for violations of Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide when Prescription Shall Begin) applies to offenses
punishable by special laws. Which do not provide for their own prescriptive periods.
The Court explained that the Cybercrime Prevention Act does not provide for its own prescriptive
period thus calling for the application of the provisions of Act No. 3326. Particularly, the Court
cited section 1 thereof:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: a.)
after a tear for offences punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; b.) After four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; c.) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or
more, but less than six years; and d.) after twelve years for any other offence punished by imprisonment for six years or o\more, except the crime
of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. violations penalized by municipal ordinance shall prescribe after tow months.
 RULING OF THE COURT
Second Issue
The Court explained that the Cybercrime Prevention Act does not specifically
provide a penalty for cyberlibel and the penalty provided in the said act must be
referred to which is one degree higher than that prescribed under the RPC for
ordinary libel, which is punished by prison correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, which is likewise validated bythe IRR of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012.
Given this, the Court, considering that the penalty imposed for prison correctional in
its maximum period and prison mayor in its minimum period is imprisonment of 4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years, ruled that cyberlibel prescribes after 12years,
following the provisions of Act No. 3326.
As the case was filed in court on 05 February 2019, which is well within the period
of 12 years, The court states that clearly, prescription has not yet set in.