CONSTI 1 Notes/Doctrines (Tonio)
adjacent to the coastal state but outside the territorial sea
ARTICLE I: NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises:
• The Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein,
• And all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction
Consisting of its:
• Terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains
Including:
• Its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other
submarine areas
Archipelagic Doctrine: The waters around, between and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the Philippines + Straight Baseline Method.
Baselines: Lines drawn along the low water mark of an island or group of
islands which mark the end of the internal waters and the beginning of the
territorial sea.
Straight Baselines: Drawing straight lines connecting appropriate points on
the coast without departing to any appreciable extend from the general
direction of the coast. These baselines divide the internal waters from the
territorial waters of an archipelago.
United Nationals Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
• The Constitution for the oceans and seas of our planet; governs
maritime disputes among member-states
DIFFERENT MARITIME ZONES
(1) Territorial Sea: 12nm from the baseline (there is a right of innocent
passage)
o The state enjoys absolute sovereignty
(2) Contiguous Zone: 24nm from the baseline
o The state exercises limited jurisdiction to prevent infringement
of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations
(3) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): 200 nm from the baseline
o Specific sovereign rights and jurisdiction only within the area
o The EEZ is a legal concept based on distance from the
baselines and does not depend on the geomorphology of the
continental shelf
(4) Continental Shelf: The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
(5) Extended Continental Shelf: the outer limits of a coastal state’s
continental shelf beyond 20 nm
(6) High Seas: Beyond the EEZ; its living resources belong to all of
mankind
Magallona v. Ermita (valid law: RA 9522 is constitutional)
RA 9522 demarcates the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic state. It amended RA 3046 to comply with the terms of UNCLOS
III, thus RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely the Kalayaan Island Groups (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal,
as “regime of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.
Petitioners assailed its constitutionality because it allegedly reduced the
country’s maritime territory and the reach of the state’s sovereign power and it
opens the country’s waters landwards of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security.
However, the Court ruled that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquiring or
losing territory. It is a treaty regulating sea-use rights over maritime zones and
continental shelves. UNCLOS III and its baseline laws play no role in acquiring,
enlarging or diminishing territory.
Under the law, the Scarborough Shoal and KIG lie outside of the baselines
drawn around the Philippine Archipelago. RA 9522 did not effect a loss of
about 15,000 sq. nm of territorial waters as petitioners claimed; it actually
optimized the location of basepoints, increasing the total maritime space by
145,216 sq. nm.
Had Congress enclosed the KIG and Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, the Philippines would have committed a breach of 2
provisions of UNCLOS III. Thus, Congress’ decision is consistent with the
State’s observance of “pacta sunt servanda”.
In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration
Main Rulings of the Tribunal:
(1) China’s claim to historic rights under the “nine-dash line” is contrary to
UNCLOS
(2) No geological feature in the Spratlys is capable of human habitation
or economic life of its own
 (3) Scarborough Shoal is a rock entitled only to a 12-nm territorial sea.
Filipino fishermen have traditional fishing rights in the territorial sea of
Scarborough Shoal
(4) China caused severe harm to the environment
(5) China committed unlawful acts against the Philippines within the EEZ
1. China’s claim to historic rights under the “nine-dash line” is contrary
to UNCLOS
The Philippines, if the nine-dash lines had basis, would lose about 80% of its
EEZ, including the entire Reed Bank and 100% of its ECS. Its national interest
is to protect its EEZ from Chinese encroachment. Thus, China’s nine-dash line
claim is bereft of basis under international law. There is no legal basis for
Chinese historic rights.
Any historic rights China may have had were superseded by the limits of the
maritime zones provided for by the Convention. China relinquished the
freedoms of the high seas which the international community had collectively
determined to place within the ambit of the EEZ of other states.
Any historical navigation and fishing by China in the South China Sea
represented the exercise of high sea freedoms, rather than a historic rights,
and that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive
control over the waters of the South China Sea.
China’s claim to historic rights is contrary to UNCLOS and without lawful effect
to the extend that they exceed geographic and substantial limits of China’s
maritime entitlements under the Convention.
2. No geological feature in the Spratlys is capable of human habitation
or economic life of its own
(1) LOW-TIDE ELEVATIONS
• A feature that is exposed at low tide but covered water at high
tide
• A naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and
above water at low tide but submerged at high tide
• Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland,
it has no territorial sea of its own
(2) ISLANDS
• Features that are above water at high tide
• An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by
water, which is above water at high tide
(3) HIGH-TIDE ELEVATIONS
• Rocks which are fully entitled islands
• Entitled to 12 NM of territorial sea if it is a low tide elevation
• Entitled to 12 nautical miles of territorial sea
The Tribunal notes that the inclusion of the term “naturally formed” in the
definitions of these islands and elevations indicates that as a matter of law,
human modification cannot change the seabed into a low-tide elevation or a
low-tide elevation into an island.
Thus, despite the substantial human modification made on some of these
islands, the Tribunal considers that UNCLOS requires that the status of a
feature be ascertained on the basis of its earlier, natural condition
RULING:
(1) None of the geological features in the Spratlys capable of human
habitation or economic life of its own
(2) The Spratlys cannot be taken as a single unit to determine capability
to sustain human habitation or economic life
To be entitled to a 200 NM EEZ, there must be:
a) Objective capacity of a feature
b) In its natural condition
c) To sustain a stable community of people
d) Economic activity that is neither dependent on outside resources nor
purely extractive in nature
• The use of the word “rock” does not limit the provision to features
composed of a solid rock.
• Maritime features will ordinarily possess an economic life of its own if
it is inhabited by a stable human community
• The evidence of physical conditions alone is insufficient to determine
whether the features are capable of sustaining a human habitation or
economic life
• Satellite imagery, nautical surveying and sailing directions have been
used as evidence to determine the status of these features
HIGH TIDE FEATURES
1. Scarborough Shoal
2. Cuarteron Reef
3. Fiery Cross Reef
4. Johnson Reef
5. McKennan Reef
6. Gaven Reef (North)
LOW TIDE ELEVATIONS 5. China committed unlawful acts against the Philippines within the
1. Hughes Reef EEZ
2. Gaven Reef (South)
3. Subi Reef China violated the exclusive rights of the Philippines to its EEZ when
4. Mischief Reef China:
5. Second Thomas Shoal • Interfered with fishing activities of Filipino fishermen within
Philippine EEZ, including imposing a fishing moratorium within
ROCKS THAT CANNOT SUSTAIN HUMAN HABITATION OR ECONOMIC Philippine EEZ
LIFE OF THEIR OWN (NO EEZ or CS) • Interfered with petroleum activities of Philippine-
1. Scarborough Shoal commissioned vessels within Philippine EEZ
2. Cuarteron Reef • Failed to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within the
3. Fiery Cross Reef Philippine EEZ
4. Johnson Reef • Constructed an artificial island and structure on an LTE
5. McKennan Reef (Mischief Reef) within Philippine EEZ
6. Gaven Reef (North)
7. Spratlys China violated its obligation not to aggravate the dispute during the arbitration
when China:
ELEVATIONS WHICH FORM PART OF THE EEZ AND CS OF THE • Dredged the reefs, reclaimed and built the islands while the
PHILIPPINES proceedings were ongoing
• Mischief Reef • Destroyed the evidence of the natural condition of the
• Second Thomas Shoal geological features at issue when China dredged and
reclaimed the proceedings were ongoing
3. Scarborough Shoal is a rock entitled only to a 12-nm territorial sea.
Filipino fishermen have traditional fishing rights in the territorial sea China violated its obligation to observe maritime safety when Chinese coast
of Scarborough Shoal guard vessels crossed the path of Philippine vessels at high speed.

Scarborough Shoal is a high-tide elevation entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea

but not a 200 NM EEZ because it is not capable of human habitation.

Its territorial sea is a traditional fishing ground of Filipino, Chinese, and

Vietnamese fishermen. China cannot prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing
in the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal.

4. China caused severe harm to the environment

The Tribunal ruled that China violated its obligation to “protect and preserve
the marine environment” when China:
1. Dredged and built islands on seven reefs
2. Failed to prevent its fishermen from harvesting endangered species
like sea turtles, corals and giants claims in the Spratlys and
Scarborough Shoal.

China caused permanent and irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem.
China dredged ten other reefs for filling materials for the seven reefs it
reclaimed
CONSTI 1 Notes/Doctrines (Tonio)
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Legal Value of Article II
Article II provisions are not self-executing provisions. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. They
are merely statements of principles and policies. To give them effect,
legislative enactment is required. (Kilosbayan v. Morato)
They are used by the judiciary as aids or guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws (Tondo Medical
v. CA)
They are statements of general ideological principles and policies, thus not a
source of enforceable rights. (BCDA v. COA)
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its
entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed
Marcos Burial at the LNMB. (Ocampo v. Enriquez)
Section 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
“Democratic”: a type of government where all the citizens of the country have
a say in the governance of the country – typically by majority vote to elect
representatives who have their best interests in mind.
• Example: initiative and referendum
“Republican”: a form of government where governing the country is a matter
of public interest instead of the private concern. People in power get there
through a system that is meant to include the interests of every citizen.
“State”: a community of persons more or less numerous, permanently
occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control, and
possessing an organized government to which great body of inhabitants
render habitual obedience. (Montevideo Convention) Hence, commentators
break down the concept into the following four elements:
(1) People
o A community of persons sufficient in number and capable of
maintaining the continued existence of the community and
held together by a common bond of law.
(2) Territory
(3) Sovereignty
o Legal sovereignty: the supreme power to affect legal interests
either by legislative, executive or judicial action. This is lodged
in the people but is normally exercised by state agencies.
o Political sovereignty: the sum total of all the influences in a
state, legal and non-legal, which determine the course of law.
(4) Government
o Institution or aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those rules of
action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social
state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them.
Functions of Government:
1. Constituent
2. Ministrant
CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS: constitute the very bonds of society, such as:
• Keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery
• Fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children
Constituent functions are functions which our government is required to
exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which
are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty.
MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS: optional functions of government. The principles
for determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these
optional functions are:
• That a government should do for the public welfare those things which
a private capital would not naturally undertake
• That a government should do those things which by its very nature it
is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals
In ACCFA v. CUGCO,
Although the ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental,
not proprietary functions, these functions may not be strictly what is described
as “constituent”.
• The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
In VFP v. Reyes,
The VFP is a public corporation, evident from the definition of the power to
control.
• CONTROL: The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter
• SUPERVISION: overseeing, or the authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties
The Constitution prohibits the regulation by special laws of private
corporations, with the exception of GOCCs.
A public character can be understood as that of exercising a sovereign
function. In this case, which deals with activities not immediately apparent to
be sovereign functions, upheld the public sovereign nature of operations
needed to promote social justice
• The protection of the interests of war veterans is not only meant to
promote social justice, but to reward patriotism
“The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative, continue
to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity”
Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs)
A GOCC refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation
vested with functions relating to public needs whether government or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government of the Philippines directly
or through its instrumentalities. Its funds are in the nature of public funds. It
performs proprietary functions (sovereign functions).
In Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan,
The AFP-RSBS is a GOCC. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes.
In Javier v. Sandiganbayan,
The petitioner was appointed as a private sector representative to the
Governing Board of the NBDB, which is created by virtue of RA 8047. She was
issued a travel authority by the President to attend a Book Fair in Spain and
was paid her travelling expenses. The Court held that she is a public officer to
the extend that she was performing her duty for the benefit of the public. She
performed her functions as a member of the Board when she traveled abroad
and was given government money to travel, to the extent the private sector
representative is a public official performing public functions.
Government Instrumentalities
These are agencies of the government not integrated within the departmental
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually though a charter.
In MIAA v. CA,
MIAA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor non-stock corporation.
It is a government instrumentality because it exercises not only governmental
but corporate powers. The MIAA exercises governmental powers of eminent
domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time,
it exercises “all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code”
In FUNA v. MECO,
An instrumentality is held to follow this rubric:
1. Regulatory agencies
2. Chartered institutions
3. Government corporate entities (GCEs)
4. Government instrumentalities w/ corporate powers
5. GOCCs
Sui Generis
In FUNA v. MECO,
MECO was held to be sui generis because it is neither an instrumentality nor
a GOCC. Its special duty and authority to exercise certain consular functions,
up to the oversight by the executive department over its operations – all the
while maintaining its legal status as a non-governmental entity. It was
entrusted by the government with the “delicate and precarious responsibility of
pursuing unofficial relations with the people of a foreign land whose
government the Philippines is bound not to recognize”.
Public and Quasi-Public Corporations
Quasi-public corporations are private corporations that render public
service, organized for the benefit/gain of its members.
Examples: utility, railroad, telephone companies, banks and private schools.
Public corporations are corporations treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of
ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to
their public purposes/interests.
In Boy Scouts of the PH v. COA,
The Court held that the government still has control over BSP. BSP is a public
corporation with a public purpose whereby the purpose is for the wellbeing of
the youth, the future leaders of the country. It is under the Admin Code of 1987
and includes the Department of Education, Culture and Sports pursuant to its
charter. Thus, it does not mean that if a corporation is not government-owned
then it automatically means it is a private corporation. Under Art. XII of Sec.
16, there are public corporations that are not judged based on ownership or
economic viability.
The Charter Test is the test to determine whether a corporation is
government-owned or private in nature.
• Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function? Or
by incorporation under the corporation law?
• The TRUE CRITERION is found in the totality of the relation of the
corporation to the State
• If the corporation is created by the State as the latter’s own agency or
instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions,
then it is PUBLIC
• Otherwise, it is PRIVATE
In Serana v. Sandiganbayan,
The administration of UP is a sovereign function since UP is performing a
legitimate government function by providing advanced instructions in different
educational fields and is also maintained by the government.
Postliminy and De Jure/De Factio Governments
The well-known international principle of postliminy traces back to when the
governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of
the courts of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were
good and valid.
• The fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes
again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, “does
not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by
an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence
to do so.
The return of occupied territory to its rightful owner does not mean give the
former owner the right to wipe out the effects done by the former invader as
long as there is no political complexion in the decisions and administrative
acts.
De Jure Government: established by authority of a legitimate sovereign
• Aquino’s revolutionary government was de jure since it was
established by the authority of the legitimate sovereign, the people.
• Arroyo’s government was also de jure
De Facto Government: established in defiance of a legitimate sovereign
KINDS OF DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS:
1. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps by
force or by the voice of the majority the rightful legal government
and maintains itself against the will of the latter.
2. That which is established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war
3. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of
a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state.
Revolutionary Government
A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it,
or a sudden radical and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.
In Letter of Associate Justice Puno,
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to
constitutional processes; in fact it was achieved in violation of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier
declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus, it
can be said that the organization of her government which was met by little
resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the
Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the
Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the
point where the legal system then in effect had ceased to be obeyed by the
Filipino.
The status of a government in international law depends on the recognition it
receives or does not receive from the community of nations. It is clear now that
nations accept the government of President Aquino as the legitimate
government of the Philippines.
• The people had accepted the Aquino government and the community
of nations had recognized its legitimacy
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
There was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum (a period when
government is suspended, where the Constitution and the supreme law is the
directive order of the revolutionary government). Nevertheless, the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR and the UDHR, almost the same
rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s
good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
Auto-Limitation
Auto-limitation is the principle that states that through the consent of the
state, express or implied, it can restrict sovereign rights.
In People v. Gozo,
The Mayor still had jurisdiction even if inside a US military base because
Philippine sovereign power is still present. The Philippines has not abdicated
its sovereignty but has consented to the US to have preferential, but not
exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
Section 2: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law
Section 2 states that the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land”
G.A.P.I.L.
Norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states
TREATIES
Written agreement between two or more states and governed by international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two ore more related
instruments, and whatever its particular designation.
DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION
International law forms part of the law of the land and no legislative action is
required. The Philippines is bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law.
DOCTRINE OF TRANSFORMATION
International law can only be part of the law of the land through a constitutional
mechanism such as legislation. Treaties become part of the law of the land
through Sec. 21, Art. 7 which provides that “no treaty shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate”
PACTA SUNT SERVANDA
International agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
In Kuroda v. Jalandoni,
The Military Commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war
continues. Even if the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, these treaties still form part of the law of the land as generally
accepted principles of international law.
In Tanada v. Angara,
The WTO was not absolute but only regulates some commercial restrictions
and that the WTO was the only viable structure for multilateral treaty. By the
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of state power in exchange
for greater benefits granted or derived from convention or pact. Sovereignty
can still be subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed upon so it
is not isolated from the rest of the world.
In Bayan v. Zamora,
Ratification is an executive act undertaken by the head of state or the
government through which formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. The
State may provide other means as when the State may provide in its domestic
legislation the process of ratification of a treaty.
Executive agreements in international law are binding as a treaty. Thus, in the
Philippines, we recognize the binding effects of executive agreements. The
Courts have long never questioned the validity of executive agreements.
In Bayan Muna v. Romulo,
The RP-US Agreement does not undermine the Rome Statute. In fact, they
complement each other. However, there is a difference in obligations between
signatory parties and state parties. The signatory state is only precluded from
acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. A State-Party is
legally obliged to follow all the provisions of the treaty in good faith. The
Philippines is only a signatory state since the Senate did not ratify the treaty
yet.
In Saguisag v. Executive Secretary,
The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without
Senate concurrence is already well-established in this jurisdiction. He/she is
the sole organ of our foreign relations and is the assigned chief architect of our
foreign policy. This constitutional mandate emanates from the inherent power
of the President to enter into agreements with other states, including the
prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not require
further Senate concurrence.
The President can enter into executive agreements on foreign military bases
troops or facilities:
1. If such agreement is not the instrument that allows entry of such
2. If it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty
In Deutsche Bank v. CIR and CBK Power v. CIR,
Tax treaties are entered into “to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the
contracting parties and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations
in two different jurisdictions”. The country is bound by pacta sunt servanda.
The objectives of RMO No. 1-2000 is superseded by the treaty. The obligation
to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over RMO No. 1-2000.
In Mijares v. Ranada,
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties that requires the Philippines
to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for its enforcement.
However, generally accepted principles of international law form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. International
law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the
combination of two elements:
1. Established, widespread and consistent practice
2. Opinio Juris (obligatory)
Soft Law
Soft law is an expression of non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior. While it does not fall under international law, it is still
an expression of principles that influence state behavior.
In Pharma v. DOH,
The subsequent WHA resolutions absolutely prohibiting advertisements and
promotions of breast-milk substitutes have not been adopted as domestic law.
The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the
law of the land but just soft law. It cannot be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by legislature.
In Knights of Rizal v. DMCI,
The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable
as law. The Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact,
these are not directives but mere guidelines – a set of the best practices and
techniques that have been proven over the years to be most effective in
preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and buildings. It is just
merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration
of ancient monuments, sites and buildings.
Section 3: Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and
the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the
integrity of the national territory.
Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military. The Armed Forces
of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
In IBP v. Zamora,
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause.
It is a permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The limited
participation is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently
provided the metes and bounds of the Marine’s authority. The local police
forces are the ones in charge; the real authority belonged to the PNP. The
police forces were tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol
procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of
the Marines.
Section 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State
and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
Section 5: The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Section 6: The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
STATE POLICIES
Section 7: The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its
relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.
Section 8: The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts
and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
Section 9: The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that
will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
improved quality of life for all.
Section 10: The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Section 11: The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Right to Life
In Roe v. Wade,
For the stage prior to the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
physician.
For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related
to maternal health.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.
In Imbong v. Ochoa,
The framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity
of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum.
They did not intend to ban all contraceptives. Contraceptives actually prevent
the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take
action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible. The RH Law is in line with the intent of the Framers
as it actually proscribes abortion.
Compulsory Education
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,
The State’s interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing
process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as the tradition
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
The Amish have presented that if the State would impose such compulsory
education, the consequences are the destruction and harm of the Amish
community, and the destruction of the Amish way of succeeding the way of life
and the productivity of the members of their community.
Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.
Section 14: The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.
In Garcia v. Drilon,
The Senate believed in the Deliberation of RA 9262, that if they broadened the
scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the
women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult
situation for women. No matter if we like it or not, no matter how empowered
the women are, women are still not given equal opportunities especially in the
domestic environment where the Macho Filipino Man would always feel that
he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. There is also various
research and evidence internationally of a “gender-based violence” where
societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are to take dominant
roles while women are only subordinates. The DSWD found out that female
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and
more than 90% of these were committed by their intimate partners.
Section 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
Intergenerational Responsibility
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
A minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment, at the same time, is
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Sec. 16, Art. II: The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is SELF-
EXECUTING.
While this right is to be found under Art. II and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. It belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation.
In Oposa v. Factoran,
The minors’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR’s
duty to protect and advance the said right. Their personality to sue in behalf of
their own as well as future generations’ behalf can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility.
In Arigo v. Swift,
As a matter of long-standing policy, the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified
in the UNCLOS. Therefore, the US is liable for the damage of the Tubbataha
Reefs. Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal
waters and territorial sea. The Court expects the US to bear intergenerational
responsibility in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affect affected the Reefs.
In Resident Marine Mammals v. Sec. Reyes,
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases was approved, where it
allowed for a “citizen suit” and permitted Filipino citizens to file to courts
violations of the environmental laws basing on the reasoning that humans are
“stewards of nature”.
The need to give animals legal standing has been eliminated, however, any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, is allowed to bring a suit to enforce
environmental laws. RMM and their stewards has locus standing to file this
petition.
Writ of Kalikasan
The following are the requisites to avail of the extraordinary Writ of Kalikasan,
as provided by Section 1 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities.
In Paje v. Casino,
The witnesses failed to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology was violated or threatened. They are not experts on
technology or on environmental matters. Moreover, they cited scientific studies
culled from the internet, thus are “hearsay” in nature. Furthermore, the alleged
thermal pollution was already extensively addressed in RP Energy’s
Environmental Management Plan.
In LNL v. Agham,
The Writ of Kalikasan was properly availed of. However, LAMI was given a
tree cutting permit by the DENR. The provisions of the Mining Act were not
violated. Furthermore, as to the allegation that LAMI was destroying the
environment by cutting down trees and leveling the mountain, there was no
mountain to speak of; it was only an elongated mound. It also did not cause
any environmental damage that prejudiced the life, health or property of the
inhabitants residing in the municipality of Sta. Cruz, province of Zambales, or
in the province of Pangasinan.
Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle provides that:
• When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal
link between human activity and environmental effect, the Court shall
apply the principle in resolving the case before it”
Furthermore, it is when there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The precautionary principle is applied when the following conditions are met:
1. The risk of harm is uncertain
 2. Where the harm might be irreversible and what may be lost is
irreplaceable
3. When the harm that might result will be serious
In West Tower v. PIC,
The issue is detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the
WOPL is different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous
materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm
human health or that of other organisms. Thus, the precautionary principle is
not applicable.
In International Service v. Greenpeace,
Precautionary principle is applied in this case. Independent scientific studies
revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from BT Crops and
plants. There are adverse effects on the environment associated with use of
GE technology in agriculture and serious health hazards from consumption of
GM food. There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of GMOs
into the environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the
field trial sites, and eventually the health of the people once the BT eggplants
are consumed as food.
Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
Section 18: The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 19: The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
In Garcia v. BOI,
BPC specified Bataan as the plant site for its production and investment of
petrochemicals and the use of “naptha cracker” and “naptha” as fuel for its
petrochemical plant. It then submitted an amended application to change the
site to Batangas, citing insurgency and labor situation, as well as the presence
in Batangas of a LGP Depot owned by the PH Shell Corp. The BOI approved
the amended application, respecting the principle that the final choice is still
with the proponent who would provide the funding or risk capital for the project.
However, the Court held that the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan.
Naptha as feedstock has been exempt from tax, not so with LPG. Naptha is
also more economical and more readily available than LPG. The BRC, which
is located in Bataan, produces 60% of national output of naptha.
If the plant site is maintained in Bataan, PNOC will be a parter in the venture,
which is a great benefit and advantage of the government in managing the
project because the petrochemical industry is essential to the national
interest.
The transfer to Batangas is a repudiation of the independent policy of the
government expressed in the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it
deems best for national interest. The government has surrendered its power
to make a company abide by its initial choice, which is in the best interest of
the Filipino people.
Section 20: The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to
needed investments.
Section 21: The State shall promote comprehensive rural development
and agrarian reform.
Section 22: The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development.
Section 23: The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-
based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Section 24: The State recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation-building.
Section 25: The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 26: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Political Opportunities: MERE PRIVILEGE
Section 26 of Article II, guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service, neither bestows a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. It may be subjected to limitations such as practicality, costs,
etc. as long as the limitations apply to everyone without discrimination, then
the equal access clause is not violated.
In Pamatong v. COMELEC,
Pamatong has no constitutional right to run or hold public office. What is
recognized here is a mere privilege subject to limitations. The provision is not
intended to compel the State to enact positive measures to accommodate as
many people to the public office.
The right to equal access into public office is subject to valid limitations, found
in the Omnibus Election Code on “nuisance candidates”.
agencies enjoy confidentiality to protect the integrity of their mandated tasks
under the Constitution and the laws. It is necessary for the Court’s records to
remain confidential because it needs to ensure the integrity of the Court’s
decision-making function which may be affected by the disclosure of
information.

Section 27: The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public To qualify for protection, the agency must show that the document is both pre-
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and decisional and deliberative.
corruption.
a. PREDECISIONAL
Section 28: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State o Communications are considered such if they were made in the
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its attempt to reach a final conclusion
transactions involving public interest. b. DELIBERATIVE
o Does the disclosure of information discourage candid
Privacy Right Requirements discussion within the agency?
o If the disclosure would expose the government’s decision-
In Pollo v. Constantino-David, making process in a way that discourages candid discussion
Pollo did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not among the decision-makers.
share to anyone neither did he allege the use of passwords to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. Thus, there is no expectation of
privacy because Office Memo. No. 10 states that employees have no
expectation of privacy in their office computers and that the CSC may monitor
the use of the computer resources.

Investigations of work-related misconduct should be judged by the standard of

reasonableness.
• JUSTIFIED AT ITS INCEPTION: investigation was prompted because
of the anonymouse letter of the alleged “lawyering”
• PERMISSIBLE IN ITS SCOPE: computers were subject to a justified
search since these furnished the easiest means to encode and store
documents for an employee, and would likely be a starting point in
incriminating evidence

In PSB v. Senate Impeachment Court,

The SC held that there is a clear right to maintain the confidentiality of foreign
currency deposits of the Chief Justice as provided by the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act, which establishes absolute confidentiality of such deposits.
• Sec 8 of the Act: no instance shall foreign currency deposites be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, gov’t official, bureau
or office unless there is a written permission of the depositor
(exception to the secrecy rule)

In In Re: Production of Court Records,

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized, however it is NOT ABSOLUTE. Government departments and
CONSTI 1 Notes/Doctrines (Tonio)
ARTICLE VI: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
Non-Delegability
Kinds of Legislative Power:
1. ORIGINAL: possessed by the sovereign people
2. DERIVATIVE: the sovereign delegates it to Congress
3. CONSTITUENT: the power to amend or revise the Constitution
4. ORDINARY: the power to to pass ordinary laws
Legislative power is generally non-delegable. Congress cannot abdicate itself
of this mandate by further delegating this power to another body. However,
there are three exceptions:
1. Delegation to local government units by immemorial practice (Rubi
v. Provincial Board)
2. Delegation of rule-making powers to administrative bodies
3. Constitutionally recognized exceptions
● In times of war
● In times of national emergency
● Appropriation/Tariff
In Rubi v. Provincial Board,
An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits
the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers
In Social Justice v. Dangerous Drugs Board,
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the
constitutional landscape. In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of
the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power,
or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate
Completeness Test and Sufficient Standard Test
Completeness Test
● A law must be complete in itself and sets fourth the
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate.
Sufficient Standard Test
● A law must provide adequate guidelines or limitations
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority.
● Must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority
announce the legislative policy, and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In Araneta vs. Gatmaitan
The court held that the Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent.
In Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board
Sec. 36 is complete in itself and provides that drug testing for students/ officers/
employees shall be conducted. But in the case of the students it must not be
contrary to the school’s rules on the handbooks and as for the employees it
must be in accordance with the company’s rules.
In Tablarin v. Guttierez,
RA 2382 created the Board of Medical Education for purposes of regulating
the medical education by determining and prescribing requirements for
admission into a recognized college of medicine and accepting applications for
certification for admission. The Court ruled that the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power must be applied in respect of statutes, which like the
Medical Act, deals with complex and technical subjects. While the power of
legislation is non-delegable, the Congress may still allow administrative
agencies to promulgate its rules and regulations in implementing a certain
legislation in order to effectuate its policies. Thus, there is a sufficient standard
found in the law’s desire for the “standardization of medical education”.
In Agustin v. Edu,
There was no transgression of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power because the LOI is compliant to the Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals of 1968 as international law becomes part of the law of the land.
A standard defines legislative policy and it marks, limits and maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The said administrative
order of LTO was also done in compliance of a fundamental policy laid by the
legislature that the executive then promulgates and if necessary, they also lay
down supplemental rules and regulations. Also, the standard of “safe transit
upon the roads” is sufficient.
In People v. Maceren,
The regulation of penalizing electro-fishing was invalid because it is not one of
the forms punished in the Fisheries Act. It went beyond the scope.
Contingent Legislation
Contingent legislation is where the effectivity of the law is made dependent on
the verification by the executive of the existence of a certain condition.
While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as
to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be
left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which
its operation depends, the rationale being that the preliminary ascertainment
of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative
function but is simply anciliary to legislation.
In People v. Vera,
Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies. The legislature may
delegate a power not legislative in nature which it may itself rightfully exercise.
There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
In Abakada v. Ermita,
The case at hand is not a delegation of legislative power but more of an
ascertainment of facts. The power to impose the 12% VAT is contingent of set
of specified facts or conditions that are outside the control of the executive.
The power to ascertain facts is valid.
Filling in the Details
There is no undue delegation of legislative power when there is only a grant of
power to filling up the details or providing the details of legislation because
Congress did not have the facilities to provide for them.
However, if an act of legislature is incomplete, rule is invalid if it does not lay
down any standard that serves to guide the administrative body.
In Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas,
An examination of the Admin Code of 1987 shows that OPIA and OPR are
under the CSC. It also provides that changes can be done if the necessity
rises. Thus, in the case, there is necessity to streamline services that
compelled the rearrangement of offices. The Commission has the power to re-
arrange the offices similar to the powers exercised by the COMELEC and the
Office of the President, as stated in Sec. 17.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos,
The President has the power to merge administrative regions. RA 5435
authorizes the President to reorganize the different executive departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of government including
financial institutions and corporations owned and controlled by it. The purpose
was to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the Government. Thus,
the power of reorganization has been and still is vested within the President
and that the ARMM merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation.
In Pichay v. Office of the Exec. Secretary,
The President has continuing authority to reorganize the executive under the
Admin Code of 1987. It vested in the President the authority to reorganize
offices of the Executive Department for efficiency and economy.
In Arroyo v. DOJ,
The power of both the COMELEC as well as the DOJ to engage in a
preliminary investigation is well founded in the Constitution, existing statutes,
and the Rules of Court. With such power already pre-existing prior the creation
of the said joint team, there can be no basis when claiming that a new office
vested with new powers is created.
In La Suerte v. CA,
To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the scope of statutory
authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the regulation
must:
1. Be germane to the object and the purpose of the law
2. Not contradict, but conforms to, the standards the law prescribes
3. Be issued for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general
provisions of our tax laws.
Legislative Veto
After enacting a law, congressional oversight is limited only to scrutiny and
investigation.
Legislative veto requires the President or an administrative body/agency to
propose IRRs of a law to Congress, wherein Congress retains the right/power
to approve/disapprove such regulations.
Legislative veto is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Congress, in the guise of assuming
the role of an overseer, may not pass upon the legality of IRRs by subjecting
them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of
powers established by the Constitution. The discretion to approve or
disapprove is a judicial power. (Abakada v. Ermita)
IRRs have the force of penal law
Rules and regulations by administrative agencies may have the force of penal
laws if:
 a. The delegating statute itself must specifically authorize the
promulgation of penal regulations
b. The penalty must not be left to the administrative agency but provided
by the statute itself
c. The regulation must be published in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation
In US v. Barrias,
The necessity of confiding to some local authority the framing, changing and
enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each
region and each harbor requires peculiar rules more minute than could be
enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within their
proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue
grant of legislative power.
In US v. Panlilio,
The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to
have the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and
a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself
somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in
Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a
penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.
In People v. Dacuycuy,
The issue in the case at bar is that Sec. 32 of RA No. 4670 provides that the
court may have discretion to the penalties of such law. However, the Court
held that two alternatives and distinct penalties are imposed: (a) a fine ranging
from P100 to P1000; and (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no
prescribed period of term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. Sec. 32
provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment with neither a minimum
nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The
Courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard.
Section 2: The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may
be provided by law.
Section 3: No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-
five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the
day of the election.
Section 4: The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Section 5: (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
Parameters of a Partylist
In VFP v. COMELEC,
HOW TO CALCULATE THE NUMBER OF SEATS
1. Rank all organizations from highest to lowest number of votes. Only those
who reached 2% are qualified
2. Determine the number of seats of the party that achieved the highest
number of votes (first party)
3. Determine the number of seats the other parties are entitled to
In BANAT v. COMELEC,
The Court held that:
 1. The 20% is merely a ceiling, thus filling up the 20% is not mandatory
2. The 3-seat limit is constitutional as it remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections
3. The 2% threshold is constitutional for the first seat, but
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for the additional seats because it makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party-list seats when the number of available party-list
exceeds 50, thus preventing the attainment of the “broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives”
How party-list representatives should be allocated based on BANAT:
1. The parties shall be ranked from the highest to lowest based on the
number of votes
2. The parties receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast shall be entitled
to one guaranteed seat each
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated
4. Each party shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats
5. If there are 55 seats available and there are 15 2%-ers, that leaves 40
seats remaining
● STAGE 1: If Party-List A has 6% of the TPLV, multiply 6% x
40 = 2.4. Thus, it is given 2 additional seats
● STAGE 2: One seat is awarded to the highest ranking (%
share) party-list group that did not receive any additional seat
in the first stage; if there are still vacant seats, then one seat
is awarded each to the next party-list groups until all the
vacant seats are given; apply the three seat limit
Thus, the four parameters of a party-list system based on the BANAT ruling:
1. 20% of the total number of membership of the House is the maximum
number of seats available to party-list organizations (1:4 ratio with
legislative districts)
2. 2% of the total votes guarantees a party-list organization one seat
3. The additional seats after allocating the guaranteed seats, shall be
distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received
less than 2% of the total votes
4. The 3-seat cap is constitutional to prevent any party from dominating
the party-list system
New Guidelines for Partylists
1. 3 different groups may participate (national, regional and sectoral)
2. National and regional parties do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and represent the marginalized
3. Political parties can participate provided that they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections (if it fields a candidate in the legislative district, it may also
field in the party-list elections provided that it only fields a candidate
from its sectoral wing separately registered)
4. Sectoral parties may either be marginalized and underrepresented in
well-defined constituencies, with a political advocacy pertaining to the
special interest and concern for their sector such as labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous people, elderly, women and the
youth
5. A majority number of sectoral parties that represent the marginalized
sector must belong to the marginalized sector they represent; they
must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sector, and
must be bona fide members of said parties
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified
National, Regional and Sectoral (meaning)
National
● when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions.
Regional
● when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
Sectoral
● refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated (That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.)
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector
In Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC,
The Court held that “Ang Ladlad”’s application should be granted on the
ground of public morals. The Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct. COMELEC’s claim of homosexuality being against
“generally accepted public morals” has not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law. Mere attraction to the same gender does not translate to
immorality. The Court recognizes the principle of non-discrimination as it
relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR.
In MAGDALO v. COMELEC,
The COMELEC has the constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the
eligibility of parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests.
Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization
or coalition when it is registered. Considering the authority of the COMELEC
to ascertain the eligibility of parties or organizations seeking registration and
accreditation, in view of the facts available to COMELEC, there was no grave
abuse of discretion. MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it
took over Oakwood, but the Constitution provides that parties, organizations
and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means shall be denied registration.
In Dayao v. COMELEC,
The COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint for cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a party-list organization
on the grounds that it does not represent a marginalized sector of society
because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or
underrepresented citizens. A party-list organization may be disqualified on the
ground that its officers and members do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
In Lico v. COMELEC,
The COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in declaring the Rimas
Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for he simple reason that the
amendments to the by-laws of Ating Koop were not registered with the
COMELEC. The party-list organization owes its existence to the State, and the
latter’s approval must be obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. There
being no showing that the amendment on the by-laws of Ating Koop were filed
with and subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted
may not be considered valid.
In Tobias vs. Abalos,
The present limit of 250 is not absolute. It can be adjusted accordingly because
of the wording of the constitution “unless otherwise provided by law”. The
composition of the Congress could be increased if it mandates through
legislative enactment.
Gerrymandering is the formation of one legislative district out of separate
territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. It is NOT
ALLOWED.
In Mariano vs. COMELEC,
Reapportionment of a legislative district may be made through a special law,
such as a charter of a new city. The constitution did not preclude the congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law.
ARMM RLA Power
In Sema vs COMELEC,
ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province because there is a
need to comply with the plebiscite requirement. Creation of local government
units is governed by Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. In the creation of the
four local government units (province, city, municipality, barangay) the
following conditions must be complied:
● The creation of local govt. Unit must follow the criteria in the LGC
● Must not conflict with any provision of the constitution
● There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first
creating a legislative district, but it can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what
ARMM can create are barangays and not cities and provinces
Redistricting
RULES ON APPORTIONMENT
1. Redistricting
2. Contiguous, Compact and Adjacent Territory
3. Population Size
In Montejo vs COMELEC,
Powers of reapportionment strictly lies to the Congress, therefore the
ordinance mentioned in this case only gave the COMELEC the power to make
minor adjustments and did not authorize them to transfer municipalities from
one legislative district because minor adjustments do not involve change in the
allocations per district. It only includes change in the number of members not
municipalities.
In Herrera vs COMELEC,
Municipalities belonging in each district must be compact, contiguous and
adjacent. COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion because the
map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are
contiguous and/ or adjacent.
Population Size
In Samson vs. Aguirre,
Requisites for creation of local govt.:
● Income- must not be less than 20M for the immediately preceding 2
consecutive years
● Population- must not be less than 150K inhabitants as certified by
NSO
● Land area- must be contiguous and not less than 100km as certified
by LBM. the territory need not be contiguous if it is comprised of two
or more islands or separated by a chartered city not contributing to the
income.
In Aquino vs. COMELEC,
It is not necessary to comply with the 250,000 requirement of population for a
province unlike if city it must first be proven.
In Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC,
Legislative Apportionment
● The allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population
Reapportionment
● The realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement
of equality of representation
**Reapportionment does not call for a plebiscite.
Section 6: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Citizenship, Domicile and Residence
In Bengson v. HRET,
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen,
a status which he acquired via repatriation. Repatriation results in the recovery
of the original nationality, meaning that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino. Thus,
Bengson was qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives
as he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
In Aquino v. COMELEC,
To qualify as a candidate for Rep. of Makati, Aquino must prove that he has
established not just a residence but a domicile of choice. The requirements
were hardly met as his 2 year lease agreement of a condominium in Makati
shows his lack of intention to permanent residence, as well as his COC
indicating that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for 52 years.
The COMELEC stated that he changed his domicile since changing it is hard
and absence of any proof, given the facts does not help the case of Mr. Aquino.
The residence requirement is needed to allow the voters to exclude those who
are not sensitive to the needs of the community.
In Marcos v. COMELEC,
Domicile or origin is not easily lost. Even if she married Pres. Marcos and thus
relinquishing her residence, does not mean her domicile is lost. She merely
gained a new home.
Domicile is the permanent home or a place to which one returns to - it includes
the elements of residing in a fixed place.
Residency is the physical presence of a person and implies a factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place.
In Domino v. COMELEC,
Domino did not reside in Sarangani for at least 1 year. Records show that his
domicile of origin is Condon, Ilocos Sur, and he acquired a new domicile in Old
Balaro, Quezon City. There must be a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.
There must be:
1. Purpose to remain in; or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time
2. The change of residence must be voluntary
3. The residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual
Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence does not result in
acquisition of domicile nor does the physical presence without intention. The
Lease of Contract does not adequately support change of domicile; it only
conveys intention to reside but not to stay. Domino’s lack of intention is
strengthened by the fact that he is still a registered voter of Quezon City.
In Perez v. COMELEC,
Aguinaldo was held to have the residency qualification because he changed
his residence from Gattaran to Tugegarao, the capital of Cagayan, based on
the residential apartment where he lived in Tugegarao, the contract lease of
the residential apartment, marriage certificate registered in Tugegarao, etc.
The fact that he voted in Gattaran is not proof of his domicile.
Three Standards to show an ACTUAL CHANGE of Domicile:
1. One must prove an actual change of domicile
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
of establishing a new one
3. Unequivocal acts which correspond with the intention
In Fernandez v. HRET,
It was seen that Fernandez has the intention to return to his residence in Sta.
Rosa even though the house was leased because he has business interests
in Sta. Rosa which is comprised of restaurants and a residential property for
lease. His children also study in schools located in Sta. Rosa. Leasing a
residence should not be a barrier to run in that district. There is no
Constitutional requirement or in the election laws that require a candidate to
sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the place
where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that district.
In Tagolino v. HRET,
A candidate disqualified under Sec. 68 of the OEC can be validly substituted
because he remains a candidate until disqualified. However, a person whose
COC itself has been denied due course and/or cancelled cannot be substituted
because he is not considered a candidate. There would be no candidate to
speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a COC case,
then there would be no candidate to be substituted. Art. 68 talks about
qualifications and disqualifications. Art. 78 talks about misrepresentation within
a COC that renders it void. Thus, under Art. 78, the lack of COC because it
is void may not be grounds for substitution.
In Reyes v. COMELEC,
The petitioner did not fulfill the one-year requirement because she lost her
natural-born status and that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile or origin. The only proof
presented by petitioner to show that she has met the residency requirement is
her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from
January to July of 2011. Such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year
residency. She never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to
be an American citizen. No amount of stay can substitute the fact that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in the US.
Section 7: The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected
for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 8: Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held
on the second Monday of May.
Section 9: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in
the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
In Lucero vs. COMELEC,
Lucero and Ong were 2 of the 5 candidates for the 2nd legislative district of
Northern Samar, where Ong won by 204 votes according to the Canvass of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar. Such results, however,
did not tally the results from Precinct No. 7 of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos,
which were held to be illegible; Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, because the
ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held; and Precinct No. 16,
because all copies of the election returns were actually missing. COMELEC
then ordered a counting of the ballots in Precinct 7 and 16, and a special
election for Precinct 13, if necessary.
SC ordered a recount of all the ballots, except for Precinct 13. If the difference
in the total number of votes between the two congressmen is less than the
total voters of precinct 13, there would be a special election because the
results can affect the winner.
Two Requisites for Special Election:
● Failure of election
● Such failure would affect the results of the election
Section 10: The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
Section 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Privilege from Arrest
This can only be invoked by members of the congress if it is civil arrest. Not
applicable to criminal offenses.
In People vs. Jaloslos,
Not covered by privilege of arrest because statutory rape is criminal in nature.
Cannot assail that he is privileged from arrest because of being re-elected
because despite re-election the people are aware of the limitations for being
convicted for such crime.
In Trillanes vs. Pimentel,
Jalosjos case is applicable. Trillanes was charged with rebellion and taken in
custody. The doctrine of condonation cannot be applied to criminal offenses.
Section 12: All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial
and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a
potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed
legislation of which they are authors.
Section 13: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
Disqualifications
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
In Dante vs. Liban,
PNRC is a member of National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and is guided by fundamental principles. It should remain
autonomous, neutral and independent from the state therefore it is not
considered a GOCC. Gordon is allowed to be part of the Senate and hold office
as chairman of PNRC.
Section 14: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Prohibitions of Lawyers
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals,
or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies
In Puyat vs. De Guzman,
Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as a counsel in behalf of Acero’s party
and used his purchase of shares as way to justify such act, however, the court
ruled that it is still an indirect appearance and his intervention would enable
him to appear actively in proceeding in some other capacity and if upheld
would render the constitutional provision as ineffective.
Section 15: The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth
Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by
law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it
may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.
Section 16: (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,
but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such
penalties, as such House may provide
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment,
affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the
Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the
consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Officers of Congress
In Baguilat v. Alvarez,
The Speaker shall be elected by a majority vote of the HOR’s membership and
the HOR may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and its methods
and manners as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole
control. The Constitution is dead silent on the manner of selecting other
officers, beside that “each House shall choose such other officers as may
deem necessary”. As such, the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is prescribed by the HOR, not the Court. Also, the Constitution states
that the HOR has the sole authority to determine the rules of its proceedings.
These legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprint of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity, and are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
Therefore, the Court has no authority to interfere with this Constitutional
principle.
Quorum
Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) states that: “A majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
Thus, with the composition of 24 senators, 13 senators constitute a quorum.
(½ + 1)
In Avelino v. Cuenco,
The Court held that 12 constitutes a quorum; normally 13 would be the number
of majority in the Senate, but since Senator Confessor was out of the country,
there was a change to the number of majority. When the Constitution declares
that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does
not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of the members constitute “the
House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the
House” and “a majority of the House”, the latter requiring less number than the
first. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
one (23) constitutes a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of
a quorum.
In Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate,
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No.
9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054. has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as
long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate
are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and
hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact
laws or approve acts. In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively
amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what
the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation
in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
Internal Rules and Discipline
The house may have their own set of internal rules and the court cannot
intervene. It is upon their discretion to discipline their members and have
jurisdiction over them.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia,
Internal rules of procedure were violated not constitutional requirements. It was
established that there was a quorum and interpellations were made, however,
the yeas and nays during the last call for objections was no longer given
importance by the speaker of the house therefore is in violation of their internal
procedure.
In Osmena v. Pendatun,
The act done is covered by parliamentary immunity because the contents of
the letter was delivered during the session and in relation to the performance
of his functions and duties, however, the manner of how it was written was
against the honor of the president for he is being accused of bribery and
corruption in his administration. Therefore, the house may discipline his
members for their disorderly behavior.
In Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,
Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members
for disorderly behavior and with ⅔ concurrence may expel or suspend a
member. In this case, Santiago was in violation of RA 3019 (graft and
corruption) and is suspended. Being a public official is under the authority of
Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal
mandate of law.
Journals and Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The Constitution provides that each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as
may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered
in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
In US v. Pons,
The Courts have two choices in determining the date of the adjournment of the
Philippine legislature: (1) by extraneous evidence; or (2) by taking judicial
notice of the legislative journals. The Court ruled that it will not go behind the
legislative journals, not taking in extraneous evidence such as saying that the
public knows for a fact that the Assembly’s clock was stopped on Feb. 28,
1914 midnight. The Court rules that it will take judicial notice of the legislative
journals, which shows that the Philippine Legislature did adjourn at 12 midnight
on Feb. 28, 1914. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to
question its truthfulness would be to violate both the letter and the spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine government was brought into
existence, and to invade a coordinate and independent department of
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of
the legislature.
In Casco v. Gimenez,
What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is
well settled that the enrolled bill - which uses the term “urea formaldehyde”
instead of “urea and formaldehyde” - is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified
by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
The enrolled bill doctrine is the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that such bill was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment.
In Astorga v. Villegas,
The enrolled bill was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the
jurisdictional question the reasoning of which if that “if a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly
certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the enrolled bill born of
that respect”. Signatures of presiding officer in the bill are merely modes of
authentication to signify that the bill was approved by the Congress and is
ready to be approved or rejected.
The Constitution does not express that signatures are mandatory such that
their absence would render a bill invalid. In the case of the Senate President
declaring his signature to be invalid thus ultimately rendering the bill invalid is
inconclusive. As far as Congress is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in
the certification made by the Presiding Officer. It is merely a mode of
authentication.
It is the approval of the Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. The Cort resorts to the Senate journal for the purpose
of deciding on the issue. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. Thus, the Court declares that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore
did not become a law.
Section 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal v. COMELEC
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,
Nature and Power; the electoral commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for
purposes of classification to the legislative than to any ot the other two
departments of the government. They are the SOLE JUDGE of all contests
relating to the National Assembly.
** court can interfere and only if there is showing that HRET acted with
GADALEJ.
COMELEC JURISDICTION: for as long as the 3 requirements has not been
completed the authority that can decide on candidates regarding issues on
elections will be the COMELEC.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL JURISDICTION: only after the candidate has
become a member of the HOR can the HRET have jurisdiction.
● Must be proclaimed as the winner
● Taken his oath
● Assume office
Election Contest
In Vera v. Avelino
**When a defeated candidate challenges the qualification and claims the seat
of proclaimed winner, the respective electoral tribunal of each house is the sole
judge. SC, each hour of Congress or COMELEC can interfere.
** each house has the power to defer the oath taking of members until the final
determination of election contests filed against them.
In Guerrero v. COMELEC
In this case, he cannot validly substitute Chevylle because Farinas was not the
nominated candidate for the party list and cannot substitute an independent
candidate. Moreover, there was no COC filed on the part of Farinas therefore
COMELEC cannot cancel an inexistent COC. however, the jurisdiction of
COMELEC ceased after the assumption of office of Farinas the the authoroty
now lied with HRET.
In Abayon v. HRET
** COMELEC has jurisdiction over party-list (who are qualified to be a party-
list and who can be part of the house)
**HRET has jurisdiction over party-list REPRESENTATIVES.
Composition of the SET and HRET
Under the Constitution, the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of their respective members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of NINE MEMBERS:
a. THREE: Justices of the Supreme Court
b. SIX: Members of the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein.
The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
In Abbas v. SET,
The Constitution states that a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate intended that both those judicial and legislative
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the
proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the SET is
2 to 1 - an unmistakable indication that the “legislative component” cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election
contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. The
SET cannot legally function when absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the 3 Justice-Members
alone on the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
In Lerias v. HRET,
In an election contest, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots
themselves, but where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the
election returns would be the best evidence. Case in point, the COMELEC and
HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so only
upon exhaustive investigation as to the authenticity of the said document.
“There can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry, other than the original writing itself”.
Non-Partisan
In Bondoc v. Pineda,
The Tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-
thirds of its members are politicians. The purpose was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to that
tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members. The independence of the
HRET would be a farce if it may shuffle and manipulate the political component
of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. The
resolution of the HOR on removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET
for disloyalty is a clear impairment of the prerogative of the HRET to be the
sole judge of the election contest between Bondoc and Pineda. Its members
must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and
independence from the political party to which they belong. “Disloyalty to party”
and “breach of party discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the Tribunal.
Section 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of
the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
Commission on Appointments
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of:
a. President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman
b. 12 Senators
c. 12 Members of the House of Representatives
They are elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein.
The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session
days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the members.
In Daza v. Singson,
The House of Representatives may change its representation in the COA to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of
its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and
do not include temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.
In Coseteng v. Mitra,
The apportionment of the House membership in the COA is done on the basis
of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Even if KAIBA
were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents .4% or less
than 1% of the House membership and hence, does not entitle her a seat in
the 12 House seats in the COA. To be able to claim proportional membership,
a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership.
In Guingona v. Gonzales,
The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a
whole membership of one senator to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In doing
so, it reduced one party’s fractional membership leaving it to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. It is a clear violation of Sec. 18
because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. For LP-PDP Laban that garnered only .5 percentage, the Court finds
it in violation as well of the same Constitutional provision. No party can claim
more than what it is entitled to under such rule; to allow it to elect more than
its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater
share in the membership in the COA and more power to impose its will on the
minority, who by the same token, suffers a dimunition of its rightful membership
in the Commission. The Constitution does not contemplate that the COA must
necessarily include 12 senators and 12 members of the HOR. What it requires
is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership.
Section 19: The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and
the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election
of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments
shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.
Section 20: The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such
books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for
each Member.
Section 21: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Power of Inquiry
Section 21 is about legislative investigations in aid of legislation.
In Senate v. Ermita,
Sec. 3 requires all officials in Sec. 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior appearing to the Congress. It claims that various officials who in the
judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section are covered
by the executive privilege. This includes the officers that may be determined
by the President. However, in the letter given by Exec. Sec. Ermita, he does
not specify under what subject does the executive privilege is considered that
is whether the secret that is kept is for whether military, diplomatic, etc.
purposes.
Thus, the Congress needs to know why such invocation are proper and
deprives of the Congress of its processes to investigate. There must be formal
claims since an improper claim is like no claim at all. Thus, the claim of
privilege under Sec. 3 in relation to 2(b) is invalid as it only requires that there
be consent without the necessity of a rationale on why it must be considered
as confidential. It severely frustrates the power of the inquiry of the Congress.
Under Sec. 21, even a Department Head who is an alter ego of the President
may be summoned.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for Department
Heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They
are not exempt by the mere fact that they are Department Heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power—the President, on whom
executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. Basically, the infirmities in EO 464 boil
down to its blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials.
In Gudani v. Senga,
The Court held that the President has constitutional authority to issue an order
to the members of the AFP preventing them to testify before legislative inquiry
by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence, a
military who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. However, the
ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s
power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members
of the AFP.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military
to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. Inasmuch as it is ill-
advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-
in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress’ right to conduct legislative inquiries. The duty falls on the shoulders
of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the
military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief
Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
In Neg. O v. Sangguniang Panlungsod,
The power of inquiry is an essential legislative function and a legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is
not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it.
However, the same cannot be said to LOCAL legislative bodies. To begin with,
there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local
Government Code granting local legislative bodies the power to subpoena
witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Additionally,
the power to issue a subpoena is judicial in character. To allow local legislative
bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express
statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
There should be a distinction between the powers of Congress and those that
may be exercised by the legislative bodies of LGUs. The latter are mere
creatures of law that possess delegated legislative power.
Requisites of Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
(1) In aid of legislation
(2) In accordance with duly published rules of procedure
(3) Respect for the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries
IN AID OF LEGISLATION
In Standard v. Senate,
An inquiry in aid of legislation commenced after Enrile’s privilege speech,
“Arrogance of Wealth” which denounced Standard Chartered for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code.
The Court held that the Senate Committee can still proceed with the inquiry
despite the cases pending in court because such is important as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.
In De La Paz v. Senate,
De La Paz was issued a subpoena from the Senate after he was apprehended
by local Moscow authorities for failure to declare certain sums of money found
in his possession. He assails that the Senate cannot validly investigate the
Moscow incident. However, the Court ruled that the Senate Committee can
investigate it because it affects the Philippines’ international obligations and
could reflect on our country’s compliance with these obligations required of
state-parties under these conventions.
In Romero v. Estrada,
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice. Courts and juries should be immune from
extraneous influence. The Court held that the Senate Committee’s inquiry for
possible amendments in the Migrant Workers Act is not inquiry sub judice
because the case was already decided with finality and when the case was
decided again in 2009, even assuming that there is pending final adjudication
by the SC, still, the circumstance would not bar the Senate Committee’s
investigation.
IN ACCORDANCE WITH DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE
In Garcilliano v. House,
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published Rules of Procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement. Such requisite is intended to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS APPEARING IN OR
AFFECTED BY SUCH INQUIRIES
In Neri v. Senate,
The Court held that holding Neri in contempt is unconstitutional, as the three
questions are indeed covered by executive privilege. The context in which
such privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China.
Power to Punish a Person under Investigation
In Arnault v. Nazareno,
Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not
to approve, it cannot say that the information sought from a witness which is
material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed
or possible legislation. It is not within the province of the Court to determine or
imagine what legislative measures Congress may take after the completion of
the legislative investigation.
There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish
for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of
Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited.
The Senate is a continuing body which does not cease to exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.
In Sabio v. Gordon,
A mere provision of law cannot impose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, especially in the absence of constitutional basis. The power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.
Section 22: The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with
the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the
rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Congress and Heads of Departments
In Senate v. Ermita,
Sec. 21 and 22, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. The former
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the
aim of which is to elicit information which may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which
is to obtain information in the pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. For under
Sec. 22 Art. VI, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part.
Section 23: (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Delegation of Emergency Powers
In SANALAKAS v. Executive Secretary,
The President does not need to make a declaration of a state of rebellion to
exercise the calling out power, the criterion needed for the President to call out
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, among others, is
that it should be done whenever it becomes necessary.
The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the Armed
Forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers – which are purely executive powers, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers.
In David v. Arroyo,
The President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest. The exercise of emergency powers,
such as taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest requires delegation from Congress. These conditions must
concur prior to the grant of emergency powers to the President:
(1) There must be war or other emergency
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress
In Ampatuan v. DILG Sec. Puno,
The Court held that the President validly exercised her emergency powers as
what was proclaimed was not a national emergency, but only a state of
emergency. The calling out of the AFP was to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, which is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President,
specifically in Sec. 18, Art. 7 of the Constitution. As such, she need not be
given congressional authority to exercise the same.
In Lagman v. Medialdea,
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most
benign and involves ordinary police action. The President may resort to this
extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The power to call is fully discretionary
to the President, the only limitations being that he acts within permissible
constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of
discretion.
Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In Tolentino v. SOF,
It is the bill that is required to originate from the House of Representatives.
Even if such bill was completely revised by the Senate, so long as it originated
from the House, it is valid. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill
which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law
must substantially be the same as the House Bill would deny the Senate’s
power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose”.
In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. Thus, incidental to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the
use public money the donation to the Government, over 5 months after the
approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the
purpose of giving a “semblance of legality” or legalizing, the appropriation in
question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect.
The test of constitutionality is whether or not the statute is designed to promote
public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each advantage to individuals may incidentally serve the public.
Section 25: (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of
the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall
strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified
by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposed therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass
the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Prohibition on riders in appropriation bills
In Garcia v. Mata,
A rider in an appropriation act is that provision inserted that is totally irrelevant,
as it is completely not an appropriation item. Such provision shall be
inoperative and shall confer no right and shall afford no protection; as if it has
never been passed.
In Farinas v. Executive Secretary,
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
Special Purpose Fund
In Belgica v. Ochoa,
An appropriation made by law exists when a provision of law allocates the
determinate or determinable amount of money for a particular public purpose.
An appropriation may be as detailed as Congress wants it to be for as long as
the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
Transfer of Funds
In Demetria v. Alba,
A statute empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment,
without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to
be made, is void and unconstitutional.
In Liga v. COMELEC,
The Congress assessed that the P137,878,00 appropriated for the Barangay
elections would be insufficient. Petitioners alleged that COMELEC was about
to effect a transfer of re-allocation of appropriations from the DILG,
Countryside Development Fund, Senate and the House of Representatives. If
the public respondents are attempting, or intending to effect the transfer of
funds would be in direct contravention of Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution.
In Sanchez v. COA,
For an augmentation to be valid, the following requisites must concur:
1. There must be savings in the programmed appropriation of the
transferring agency
2. There must be an existing item, project or activity with an
appropriation in the receiving agency to which the savings will
be transferred
Discretionary Fund
In Belgica v. Ochoa,
The Pork Barrel was held to be unconstitutional. Section 25(6) requires that
funds “shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law”. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79B only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based
on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the
actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill.
In Araullo v. Aquino,
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the
DAP were not savings, in violation of Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution.
The requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds are:
 (1) There is a law authorizing the President, Senate President, Speaker
of the House, Chief Justice, and the heads of the constitutional
commissions to transfer funds within respective offices
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the GAA for their
respective offices.
The DAP funds came from:
(1) Unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services
(2) Unprogrammed funds
(3) Carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year
(4) Budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to
support faster-disbursing projects
“To augment any item in this Act” is textually unfaithful to the Constitution for
not carrying the phrase “for their respective offices” contained in Sec. 25(5).
There are no savings from which funds from which funds could be sourced for
the DAP. Savings from unreleased appropriations are not considered savings
because they have not ripened yet into categories of items from which savings
can be generated.
Savings:
• Still available after the complete or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized
• From appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and
related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay
• From appropriations balances realized from the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus
enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets,
programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost
When the President augmented funds to the legislature and to non-executive
agencies, it violated the rule on Sec. 25(5) as it is beyond his office, or of the
executive, and is therefore tantamount to a cross-border augmentation. It is
likewise vital to note that such funds were augmented from slow-moving
projects – not from savings, which is unconstitutional.
Section 26: (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in
its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
Prohibition on Riders
In Cordero v. Cabatuando,
It is sufficient if the title to be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of the
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.
In Philconsa v. Gimenez,
The Court held that such law is indeed unconstitutional, as CA 186 establishes
the GSIS and provides for retirement and insurance benefits to its members –
and that since RA 3836 is extended to all elective officials, even those not
members of the GSIS. This is held by the Court to be not germane to the
subject of the law, and is therefore a rider.
In Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board,
The express purpose of the decree to include taxation of the video industry in
order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is
evident in the preambular clauses of the law. A tax provision is not inconsistent
with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the
decree.
Section 27: (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same,
he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In
all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
Passage of Bills
In Abakada v. Ermita,
The Court held that the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) did not
exceed its authority, as such bill passed by the said body is well within the
internal rules of the Congress. It is in this light that the SC said that such
changes or modifications made by the BCC were germane to the subjects of
the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. To reconcile or harmonize
disagreeing provisions, the BCC may:
(1) Adopt the specific provisions of either the House Bill or the Senate Bill
(2) Decide that neither provisions in the House Bill or Senate Bill would
be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or
(3) Try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions
Presidential Veto
In CIR v. CTA,
The Court does not agree with the CTA’s opinion that the President could not
veto words or phrases in a bill but only an entire item. An ITEM in a revenue
bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but
rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. The Court ruled that if the
President would be granted the power to veto the entire section would be
giving the President the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be
perpetrated rendering that power of the President inutile of choosing which
portions he wants vetoed. He only has a choice to approve or disapprove a
section and not just a particular item.
In Gonzales v. Macaraig,
A general provision in an appropriation bill may be validly vetoed by the
President despite it not being an “item”.
In Philconsa v. Enriquez,
In an appropriation bill, Congress is bound to include provisions that relate
specifically to some particular appropriation and that it be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates. Necessarily, any provision
which does not relate to a particular item can be vetoed separately from an
item.
In Belgica v. Ochoa,
The Court held that this indeed hinders the President’s item veto, as it only
gives him the option of either accepting the entire amount, which may or may
not be consistent with his national agenda, or rejecting the entire PDAF which
endangers legitimate projects to take effect.
Section 28: (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Uniform and Equitable Taxation
In CIR v. Lingayen Gulf,
A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place
where the subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging
to the same class shall be taxed alike.
In Abra Valley College v. Aquino,
Exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school
building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence.
In John Hay v. Lim,
The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEX would circumvent the
Constitution’s imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress. It is the legislature,
unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has full power to exempt
any person, or corporation or class of property from taxation. Other than the
Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, or
local governments may pass ordinances on exemptions only from local taxes.
 In Lung Center v. QC,
The Court held that while it is a charitable institution, only the following portions
are exempted from real property tax: portions occupied by the hospital, and
those portions used for paying or non-paying patients. The rest, which refer to
the portions leased to private entities and private individuals shall be subject
to real property tax.
In CIR v. DLSU,
While the SC generally respects the factual findings of the CTA, it does not
mean its conclusions are binding. To be exempt, DLSU has the burden to
prove that the proceeds of its rental income were used for educational
purposes.
Section 29: (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds
of the Government.
Automatic Debt Service Appropriation
In Guingona v. Carague,
Automatic appropriation provides flexibility for the effective execution of debt
management policies. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, if the
Philippine government has to await and depend upon Congressional action,
by the time it comes, it may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions.
Coco Levy as Public Fund
In Phil Coco v. Republic,
The Court held that PD 755, which authorized the Philippine Coconut
Administration (PCA) to utilize collections and to acquire a commercial bank
and to deposit the levy collections in the said bank, which was withdrawable
only when the bank attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital,
as invalid as it is as if the coco levy funds were not treated as taxes – which is
the very nature of the said funds. The Court took note that the coco levy was
imposed in the exercise of the State’s inherent power of taxation and should
only be used for such public purpose. It cannot be used to purchase share of
stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
Section 30: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice
and concurrence.
Section 31: No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
Section 32: . The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve
or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters thereof.
INITIATIVE
• The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose.
REFERENDUM
• Power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
In Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC,
RA 6735 intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
however it is inadequate. The word “Constitution” was not germane to Sec. 2
of such law because the law is silent as to amendments to the Constitution.
In Lambino v. COMELEC,
An initiative that gathers signatures from people without showing to the people
the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, a gigantic
fraud on the people. This is why the Constitution requires that an initiative be
directly proposed by the people in a petition.
CONSTI 1 Notes/Doctrines (Tonio)
ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1: The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Executive Power
• The President remains and will always be the ceremonial head of the
government and must take part with real or apparent enthusiasm in a
range of activities
• The Cabinet: an institution that is extra-constitutionally created,
consisting of heads of departments who through usage have formed
a body of presidential advisers who meet regularly with the President.
They possess no authority over the President and serve at his
pleasure and behest
Express Powers of the President (Constitution)
(1) Power to Appoint
(2) Power to enter into treaties
(3) Power to grant pardon
(4) Commander-in-Chief powers
(5) Power of control
(6) Power to impose customs/tariff duties
(7) Power to execute/implement laws
(8) Power to submit the budget to Congress
Implied Powers
In Marcos v. Manglapus,
The President has residual powers, those that are not specifically provided for
in the Constitution, but he may avail of, for purposes of keeping the peace of
the nation. The President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect
the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. Thus, the
President has the residual power to bar the Marcoses from returning.
Valid Exercise of Legislative Power
In Webb v. De Leon,
The Court held that the DOJ has the power to determine who may qualify as a
witness to be protected in the Witness Protection Program, and likewise who
may be granted immunity from the prosecution. Prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute its
violators.
In Djumantan v. Domingo,
The right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. Since aliens are not part of the
nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and
simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the Philippine
government to permit them to stay.
In Pontejos v. Ombudsman,
The Court held that the Ombudsman can grant immunity to Atos, as such
power is an executive function and the Ombudsman is vested with such power.
The question on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in
character this prosecutorial power necessarily includes the direction of
granting immunity to an accused in exchange for his testimony against
another. The power to grant immunity is essentially a tactical decision to forego
prosecution of a person for the government to achieve a higher objective.
In Banda v. Ermita,
EO No. 378, amending EO No. 285 by removing the exclusive printing
jurisdiction of the NPO over printing services requirements of government
agencies and instrumentalities was held to be within the executive power of
the President, with the said entity part of the Office of the President, she
essentially has the power to reorganize the same to address current situations
and to improve the services of the government. Besides, there was neither an
abolution of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power
to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with
the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive
offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to
reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Invalid Exercise of Legislative Power
In Laurel v. Garcia,
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government
on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence.
In Review Center v. Ermita,
The Court ruled against the constitutionality of EO No. 566 due to its
unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power in expanding
CHED’s jurisdiction. There is no law granting the President the power to
amend the functions of CHED. Even if the President can issue administrative
orders or acts which relate to particular aspects of government operation in
pursuance of his duties as the administrative head, these must be in harmony
with law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law.
In Biraogo v. Truth Commission,
The EO was held to be unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection
clause, as it only focuses on the Arroyo Administration, which is equally part
of a class. The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed is well recognized by Sec. 17, Art. VII. This is not a
quasi-judicial power and is very different from the power to adjudicate, which
leads to a judicial determination of a fact.
Executive Privilege
In US v. Nixon,
The Court held that the subpoena duces tecum shall prevail as is. To read the
powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a
subpoena essential to the enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of non-military and
non-diplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of a
workable government and gravely impair the roles of the courts. Absent any
claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets, it is difficult to accept the argument that even the very important
interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly
diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the
protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.
In Almonte v. Vasquez,
The petitioners cannot be directed to produce the documents that are
confidential in nature, however, since what was requested are those relating
to the personnel of EIIB, there is an absence of any military or diplomatic secret
that will be disclosed in the production of such records. If the claim of
confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic, or other
national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality
of his conversations, courts have declined to find the Constitution an absolute
privilege.
In Senate v. Ermita,
The Congress needs to know why such invocation of EO 464 is proper. In this
absence, the Congress is deprived of its processes to investigate. There must
be a formal claim. With EO 464 requiring consent of the President as to what
information is protected by privilege without any rationale behind it, such EO
must be struck down as unconstitutional.
In Neri v. Senate,
Elements of presidential communications privilege before its exercise can be
said as valid:
(1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power
(2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President
(3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought likely contains important evidence, and by
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority
In Akbayan v. Aquino,
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to
public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly
expressing their views during negotiations. By hampering the ability of our
representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing higher national goals
for the sake of securing less critical ones. Diplomatic negotiations shall be
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and shall continue to be privileged
even if they do not involve national security.
Immunity from Suit
In Soliven v. Makasiar,
Immunity from suit vested to the President alone by virtue of her office, may
only be invoked only by her as the holder of the office, and not by any other
person in her behalf.
In Clinton v. Jones,
Presidential immunity is given to the Office and not to the person.
In Gloria v. CA,
The Court held that since the petition is directed against Gloria and not the
President, the case shall nevertheless push through. The immunity from suit
is enjoyed by the President and himself alone. He is the only person vested by
the Constitution of the same, and therefore when a suit is directed against a
member of the Cabinet, he cannot invoke such immunity in order to get away
from it.
In Estrada v. Desierto,
The Court held that Erap isn’t covered by such immunity because the
termination of the impeachment trial and its non-resolution does not bar
ERAP’s prosecution. Presidents, while incumbent, are immune from suit, but
only there – it does not extend to post-Presidency.
In David v. Arroyo,
The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case. It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such. It is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance
or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions.
Section 2: No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write,
at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Citizenship of a Foundling
In Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC,
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. Natural-
born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
“Having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this case, the determination of foundling status is done by the
authorities, not by the child. Foundlings are likewise citizens under
international law (UDHR, ICCESCR). Domestic laws on adoption also support
the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
Section 3: There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same
manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the same
manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such
appointment requires no confirmation.
The Vice-President: Exception to the General Rule of Prohibition to Hold
Other Government Offices
In Funa v. Executive Secretary,
The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are:
(1) Sec. 3, Art. VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member
of the Cabinet
(2) Sec. 13, Art. VII, those without additional compensation in ex officio
capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of the officials’ offices.
Section 4: The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and
shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President
shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number
of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority
of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
Congress as National Board of Canvassers
In Pimentel v. Joint Committee,
The legislative function of the 12th Congress may have come to a close upon
the final adjournment of its regular sessions but this does not affect its non-
legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers.
The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express
directive of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to
proclaim the newly elected President and ice-President has not, and cannot
adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks.
In Lopez v. Senate,
It is expressly provided in the Constitution that the Congress has the power to
promulgate its rules for canvassing the certificates.
Need For Post-Election Issue
In Tecson v. Lim,
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the cases filed against FPJ, as
only a registered candidate for President and VP who received the 2nd or 3rd
highest number of votes may contest the election with the SC acting as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which may be done only after the election has
been conducted. In this case, the elections have barely started, and the
petitions were not even filed by the candidates.
Contest refers to a post-election scenario, to which the SC shall acquire
jurisdiction on such cases only after the elections are held. It shall be the
COMELEC where the cases shall be filed if there are any contentions as far
as the qualifications are concerned, should it be challenged prior to the election
proper.
Constitutionality of PET
In Macalintal v. PET,
The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the SC, albeit it has functions
peculiar only to the tribunal. It is evident that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies
– not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive.
Section 5: Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the
following oath or affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously
fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of
the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws,
do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the
Nation. So help me God.” (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.)
Section 6: The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of
the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall
not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent
during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during
their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other
source.
Section 7: The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume
office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as
President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect shall
act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall
have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice-
President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall
have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently
disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a
President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is
to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President
shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of
the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Section 8: In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and
Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President
until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case
of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He
shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been
elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers
and disqualifications as the Acting President.
Filling a Vacancy in the Presidency
In Estrada v. Desierto,
The court held that Estrada resigned as President. While he didn’t write such
formal letter, the totality of the prior, contemporaneous, and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence show that he actually resigned. This in turn points to
the constitutional character of the succession of GMA from Vice-President to
President.
Section 9: Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President
during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a
Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
Section 10: The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third
day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President
occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a
President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days
nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such
special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election
shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor
the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election.
Section 11: Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as
Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of
the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the
Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours,
in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to
assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President;
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office.
Section 12: In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be
informed of the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge
of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the
President during such illness.
Section 13: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as
members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
Prohibition Against Holding Another Office or Employment
In Rafael v. Embroidery,
RA 3137 specifically provides that they only sit in ex-officio capacity, therefore
no new appointments are really made. Those composing of the Board must
already be holding positions in the offices mentioned. When a person is asked
to sit in an ex-officio capacity, it is not equivalent to an actual appointment,
where he is required to relinquish his old post for the new one. The duties
performed in ex-officio capacity are only in addition to those they perform
under their original appointments.
In CLU v. Executive Secretary,
The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to
abuses by public officials who took advantage of it for purposes of self-
enrichment. The more strict prohibition is based on the fact that the President
and Members of his Cabinet exercise more powers, so more checks and
restraint on them are called for.
In De La Cruz v. COA,
If the principal is absolutely barred from holding any position in and absolutely
prohibited from receiving remuneration from the NHA or any government
agency for that matter, so must the agent be.
The employment of the Executive officials into the NHA Board is primarily a
function attached to the office of said officials and hence, they need not be
compensated independently for such employment. The reason is that these
services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office.
In Funa v. Ermita,
Bautista’s designation in the MARINA as OIC is not in an ex-officio capacity,
so she cannot fit under the exception as provided for in Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B. To
hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession
and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge or the
functions and duties of the office.
In Espiritu v. Lutgarda,
The decision promulgated by Gaite is effective and binding, due to the lack of
proof presented before the Court as to when he accepted the appointment,
when he took his oath of office, or when he assumed the position. Still, he can
still be considered as a de facto officer at the time he rendered the decision.
Other Prohibitions
In Doromal v. Sandiganbayan,
Indirect participation in any business and holding any position is prohibited.
The President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants shall not during their tenure directly or indirectly participate in any
business.
Section 14: Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain
effective, unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days
from his assumption or reassumption of office.
Section 15: Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
Appointments by Acting President
In De Castro v. JBC,
The Court held initially in “Valenzuela” that the President cannot fill any
vacancy in the RTC during the prohibition period. However, this is now
overturned by the present case, wherein the Court recognized the premium
that Art. VII played in terms of it essentially referring to the executive, rather
than to the judiciary. The Court held that the incumbent President can appoint
the successor CJ Puno upon his retirement on the ground that the prohibition
against presidential appointments under Sec. 15, Art. VII does not extend to
judiciary appointments. Had it been otherwise intended by the framers of the
Constitution, they would have made the provision applicable to the judiciary as
well, which in this case, didn’t apply.
Section 16: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Nature of the Appointing Power
In Government v. Springer,
EO 37 was upheld by the Court, stating that the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives cannot be given the power to vote
as it will be tantamount to the power to appoint, which is essentially executive
in nature. The general rule is that the appointing power is vested in the
Executive Department alone, with some exceptions as provided for by law.
In Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate,
The Court held that the President may validly appoint officers, with his
appointment in this case falling squarely in the group that refers to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. As to the second issue, the
Court held that what the President merely appointed are OICs, which is very
different from appointing ARMM officials. OICs are officers who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected shall
have qualified and assumed office.
In Velicaria-Grafel v. OP,
For an appointment to be valid, it must be made outside the prohibited period,
or failing that, fall under the specified exception of temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
In Pimentel v. Ermita,
The Constitution provides that such ad interim appointments, which are
essentially temporary in nature, are only effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments.
Ad-Interim Appointments
• Extended only during a recess of Congress
• Submitted to the COA for confirmation or rejection
Acting Appointments
• May be extended any time there is a vacancy
• Not submitted to the COA
• A way of temporarily filling important offices but if abused, it can be a
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the COA
Scope of the Power of the Commission on Appointments
4 Groups of Officers whom the President shall appoint:
(1) The Heads of Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of
Colonel or Naval Captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution
(2) All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law
(3) Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
(4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress made by law
vest in the President alone
Only the first group of officers are required to obtain consent from the COA
In Sarmiento III v. Mison,
The appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is being
assailed because it was not confirmed by the COA. The Court upheld the
appointment of Mison, as it falls squarely in the third group, which covers those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. It is clear that such
appointments need not require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
In Bautista v. Salonga,
Bautista cannot be required to submit her appointment as Acting Chairman of
the Commisison of Human Rights for confirmation before the CA; as there is
no provision in the Constitution that provides for such rule. This being said, the
appointment in this case belongs to the second group.
In Quintos-Deles v. CA,
The Court ruled against Quintos-Deles, who was among those appointed as
sectoral representatives by the President. It emphasized on the fact that the
seats reserved for the sectoral representatives may be filled by the President
upon the express provision under Sec. 7, Art. XVIII, hence considered as part
of the first group of officers who need to be confirmed by the COA. “Those
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,
whose appointments are subject to confirmation”
In Pobre v. Mendieta,
The Court held that such vacancy, if filled by succession or by operation of
law, will deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC
Commissioner- which is an encroachment of the executive power to appoint.
Thus, Pobre’s appointment was held to be valid.
In Flores v. Drilon,
The Court held that the appointment of Gordon, Olongapo City Mayor, as
Chairman and Chief Executive officer of the SBMA, is unconstitutional. The
Court debunks the “ex-officio” argument, as such post is not even
automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor. When it is the law who
determines who the President shall appoint, it shall be struck down as
unconstitutional as it precludes the President from exercising his discretion to
choose the appointee. The power of appointment with no power to choose is
no power at all, which goes against the very nature and essence of
appointment.
In Rufino v. Endriga,
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, and Congress cannot
determine the manner of appointment of the President. The power to appoint
is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the
Constitution provides otherwise.
Appointment of Officers “lower in rank”
In Calderon v. Carale,
The appointments of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the NLRC were
still valid despite the absence of the consent from the Commission because
the list enumerated by the Constitution cannot be expanded by Congress.
In Tarrosa v. Singson,
The appointment of Singson was held to not require any confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The Congress cannot by law expand
confirmation powers to the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Section 17: The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Power of Control
It is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for the latter.
In Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano,
Since the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President,
he may act on and behalf and by the authority of the President and corollary
has the jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order. It is not correct
to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary
such acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person,
for the President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious
executive and administrative functions.
In Ang-Angco v. Castillo,
The President cannot, by virtue of the Civil Service Act of 1959, take direct
action of the case of Ang-Angco who belongs to the classified service. The
Commissioner of Civil Service has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide
administrative cases of all officers and employees in the classified service. The
power of control of the President over the employees under classified service
only goes as far as setting aside the judgment or action taken by the
subordinate in the performance of their duties, and not the removal of such
person from office.
In Villaluz v. Zaldivar,
The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, and since a
Presidential appointee is well within the jurisdiction of the President, after
investigation and due hearing, should the Chief Executive find grounds to do
so, he may remove the said appointee from office.
In Joson v. Torres,
The DILG’s delegation of power is valid, thus not imparing the President’s
Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the
power to discipline. As disciplining authority, the President has the power
derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials. However, AO No. 23 delegates the power to investigate
to the DILG, which is still valid.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the Heads of the
various Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or by law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
In KMU v. Dir. Gen. of NEDA,
The Court upheld the EO’s constitutionality and held that it is a purely
administrative matter which does not involve the exercise of legislative power
at all. It applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
functions, which aims to adopt a uniform data collection and format to reduce
costs, among others. Pursuant to Sec. 17, the President can, in the exercise
of functions under the law, adopt a uniform data collection and ID format to
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability and convenience. This is an avenue for
the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Power of Supervision
It is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law, and if the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
In Drilon v. Lim,
The assailed provision does not give the Secretary of Justice the power to
control, but merely the power to supervise. It merely authorizes the SOJ to
review an assailed tax ordinance when questions on its constitutionality and
legality arises, and if warranted, to revoke it. There was no power vested in the
SOJ to replace such enacted measure with his own.
Faithful Execution Clause
In National Artist for Literature,
The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. A
mere administrative regulation has the force and effect of law, binding upon
executive and administrative agencies, including the President as Chief
Executor of Laws, until set aside.
In Ocampo v. Enriquez,
The duty of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executive is not
violated by public respondents, as such is consistent with Pres. Duterte’s
mandate. The burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene RA No. 289
(Construction of a National Pantheon), RA No. 10368 (HRVV Reparation and
Recognition Law) and international human rights laws.
Section 18: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least
a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from
its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,
nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.
**refer to Bernas Green Book/Primer for more doctrines/concepts
Commander-in-Chiefship
In Lansang v. Garcia,
The Court may take cognizance of the validity of the proclamation of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the findings of the
executive as to the basis for the suspension is not conclusive, and may be
reviewed. With the existence of rebellion being obvious, the Court upheld the
validity of Proclamation No. 889.
Sec. 18 vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under specified conditions. What goes hand in hand with the
system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Constitution, and the authority to determine
whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in
this respect is constitutionally supreme.
In David v. Arroyo,
The exercise of emergency powers, such as taking over of privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest requires delegation from
Congress. Framers of the Constitution have provided conditions that must
concur prior to the grant of emergency powers to the President:
(1) There must be war or other emergency
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe
The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
The Court held that the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
In Ampatuan v. DILG,
The President validly exercised her emergency powers and did not go beyond
her powers as what was proclaimed was not a national emergency, but only a
state of emergency. The calling out of the AFP was to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, which is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President specifically in Sec. 18, Art. 7 of the Constitution. As such, she need
not be given congressional authority to exercise the same.
In Kulayan v. Tan,
There is only 1 executive and commander-in-chief that the Executive powers
shall be vested upon and it is just the President. Thus, Governor Tan does not
have the power to issue a proclamation declaring a state of emergency in his
province.
In Lagman v. Medialdea,
Was the petition proper for the SC to review? Yes, Art. VII(18) merely requires
that it be made in an appropriate proceeding, that is, it is filed by any citizen.
Since such is present in this case, the SC may now determine the sufficiency
of factual basis of the Martial Law proclamation.
Is the SC’s review power independent of Congress’ power to revoke? Yes.
Although it is in the same trajectory, that is to nullify the proclamation, both can
simultaneously be done. The significant distinction from the two is that the
former is a passive duty, which can only commence upon a citizen filing a case,
while the latter is automatic.
Does judicial power of review to extend to President’s decision which of the 3
graduated powers he will avail of? No. Such graduation is only based on scope
and effect. It does not in anyway restrict the President as to which of the three
he chooses to perform.
Calling Out Power: necessary + lawless violence/invasion/rebellion
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: public safety +
invasion/rebellion
Declaration of Martial Law: public safety + invasion/rebellion
Can Proclamation 216 be void for being vague? No. That challenge only
applies to free speech cases. Moreover, even assuming that it can be looked
into, the context provides that looking “at other rebel groups” is not vague, as
it is surrounded with the context in this case.
Will the nullification of Proclamation 216 also nullify Proclamation 55? No. The
two have independent powers. If you would like to nullify Proclamation 55, file
a separate proceeding.
What is the scope of the SC in the review or declaration of Martial Law or
Suspension for privilege of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus? SC is
only limited to ascertaining the sufficiency of factual basis. This is to ensure
that the President complied with Constitutional guidelines, that he didn’t act
arbitrarily. In using sufficiency of factual basis test, the SC acknowledges that
the President has sole discretion as to the facts written in the Proclamation.
He cannot be forced to divulge information that will compromise our military
efforts. In determining the sufficient factual promise, the entirety of the
Proclamation is be considered, and absolute correctness is not necessary,
given the urgency of the situation.
What are the parameters of the sufficiency of factual basis? The Court
enumerated such parameters as follows:
a) Actual invasion or rebellion – as defined by the RPC, an uprising
against the government to remove allegiance or deprive the
government of its powers
b) Public safety requires it
c) Concurrence of requirement A and B.
d) Probable cause for the President to believe there is actual rebellion/
invasion
Did SC find sufficient basis for Proclamation 216? Yes. President, in
consideration of the facts, had probable cause that rebellion was committed
and that public safety required such declaration. Once again, there is no need
for absolute correctness of the facts, as such mandate will only frustrate the
President’s decision-making regarding the urgent matter at hand.
Does public safety require such proclamation? Yes. Marawi provides easy
access to other parts of Mindanao, lawless groups used provinces adjourning
Marawi as escape routes. Marawi is a vital cognizance attaining the long-
standing goal that is the absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.

Section 19: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in

this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Purpose of Executive Clemency

• Tacit admission that human institutions are imperfect and that there
are infirmities in the administration of justice
• Instrument for correcting these infirmities and for mitigating whatever
harshness might be generated by a too-strict application of the law
• Non-delegable power and must be exercised by the President alone

Limits on Executive Clemency

• It cannot be exercised over cases of impeachment
• Reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remission of fines and
forfeitures can be given only after final conviction by final judgment
• Grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of Congress
o Art. IX, C, Sec. 5 also states that no pardon, amnesty, parole
or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules
and regulations shall be granted without the favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC
In Diego v. People,
The RTC does not have the authority to impose a penalty which precludes
pardon. The exercise of pardoning power is discretionary in the President and
may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the Court, save only
when it contravenes the limitations set forth by the Constitution.
Constitutional Limits on Executive Clemency

Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects In Llamas v. Orbos,

• An act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed
• No legal power can compel the Executive to give such
• Two types of pardon: Absolute and Conditional
• Pardons can only be extended to one whose conviction is final, pardon
has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows
his conviction to be final (People v. Salle, Jr.)
The Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative
cases, and that the President has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.
In Torres v. Gonzales,
In a proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and
who is alleged to have breached the conditions, the Executive Department has
2 options:
(1) Sec. 64(i) of the Revised Administration Code: no need of a judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime, much less a conviction
 by final judgment, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his pardon
(2) Sec. 159 of the RPC: the convict must be charged, prosecuted, and
convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the
penalty prescribed
In People v. Casido,
The Court held that while pardon in this case was void for having been
extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final
judgment, their application for amnesty and the grant thereof was still valid.
PARDON
• A private act granted by the Chief Executive which must be pleaded
and proven by the person pardoned because the courts do not take
cognizance
• Granted to one after conviction
• Looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives
the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of
the rights to hold public office, among others
AMNESTY
• A public act by proclamation of the Chief Executive which the
concurrence of Congress is needed, which the courts should take
judicial notice
• Granted generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution
• Looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself,
it also overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he did not commit an offense
In Cristobal v. Labrador,
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the convictions. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction.
In Monsanto v. Factoran,
The Court held that Monsanto must go through the process and apply for
reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction.
While pardon may remit all penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only
to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, the same does not blot out
the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as
if he were innocent. It cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity
and fair dealing.
In Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC,
The Court held that by the pardon extended to Erap, his civil and political rights
are fully restored. The whereas clauses of the pardon which indicated that
Erap committed to no longer seeking any elective position or office is not at all
binding which makes the pardon a conditional one. The whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself
operate to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfillment of the
aforementioned commitment. The right to seek public elective office is
recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Both law and jurisprudence maintain that the right to seek public elective office
is unequivocally considered as a political right.
Section 20: The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of
the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every
quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report
of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed
by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations
which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided by law.
Power to contract or guarantee foreign loans
In Hontiveros v. TRB,
The approval of the ASTOA was being assailed, on the ground that the DOTC
has no power to be involved in a contract granting the loan agreement. The
Court held that by virtue of the qualified political agency, the approval of the
DOTC Secretary had the same effect as the approval by the President.
In Land Bank v. Atlanta,
Since the SLA is an accessory contract of the Loan Agreement, it is from there
which it receives life, it cannot be under the scope of RA 9184, rather, it should
be in accordance with the IBRD Guidelines – so in simpler terms, the MTC
incorrectly held the rebidding null and void. An international agreement is one
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in 2 or more related instruments
and whatever its particular designation.
In In Re: Contracts with Artes,
Artes requested payment for allegedly unpaid balances from its contracts with
the Court. However, subsequently they submitted a Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim to the effect that “it was waiving any and all its rights and interests in
the claim; and expressly stated that it was releasing the Court from any further
financial liability.
The Court could not simply authorize and justify the release of funds to pay
Artes’ demand in view of the many questions that were raised against the
contracts entered into with Artes. The Loan Agreement in this case is in the
nature of an executive agreement. It was entered into by the Philippine
government, as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-making
capacity, and the IBRB, which, as an international lending institution organized
by world governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of
repayment by the borrowing government, is also regarded as a subject of
international law and possessed of the capacity to enter into executive
agreements with sovereign states.
The Court resolves to consider the claim of Artes International for payment
extinguished in accordance to the unilateral Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
executed by Artes International.
In Mitsubishi v. CIR (newly assigned case by Dean Cande),
The governments of Japan and the Philippines executed an Exchange of
Notes, whereby the former agreed to extend a loan amounting to Forty Billion
Four Hundred Million Japanese Yen (¥40,400,000,000) to the latter through
the then Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF, now Japan Bank for
International Cooperation) for the implementation of the Calaca II Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant Project (Project). In Paragraph 5 (2) of the Exchange of
Notes, the Philippine Government, by itself or through its executing agency,
undertook to assume all taxes imposed by the Philippines on Japanese
contractors engaged in the Project.
Consequently, the OECF and the Philippine Government entered into Loan
Agreement No. PH-P768 dated September 25, 1987 for Forty Billion Four
Hundred Million Japanese Yen (¥40,400,000,000). Due to the need for
additional funding for the Project, they also executed Loan Agreement No. PH-
P1419 dated December 20, 1994 for Five Billion Five Hundred Thirteen Million
Japanese Yen (¥5,513,000,000). Meanwhile, on June 21, 1991, the National
Power Corporation (NPC), as the executing government agency, entered into
a contract with Mitsubishi Corporation (i.e., petitioner's head office in Japan)
for the engineering, supply, construction, installation, testing, and
commissioning of a steam generator, auxiliaries, and associated civil works for
the Project (Contract). The Contract's foreign currency portion was funded by
the OECF loans. In line with the Exchange of Notes, Article VIII (B) (1) of the
Contract indicated NPC's undertaking to pay any and all forms of taxes that
are directly imposable under the Contract.
Petitioner completed the project on December 2, 1995, but it was only
accepted by NPC on January 31, 1998 through a Certificate of Completion and
Final Acceptance. On July 15, 1998, petitioner filed its Income Tax Return for
the fiscal year that ended on March 31, 1998 with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). Petitioner included in its income tax due the amount of P
44,288,712.00, representing income from the OECF-funded portion of the
Project. On the same day, petitioner also filed its Monthly Remittance Return
of Income Taxes Withheld and remitted P 8,324,100.00 as BPRT for branch
profits remitted to its head office in Japan out of its income for the fiscal year
that ended on March 31, 1998.
In a Decision dated December 17, 2003, the CTA Division granted the petition
and ordered the CIR to refund to petitioner the amounts it erroneously paid as
income tax and BPRT. It held that based on the Exchange of Notes, the
Philippine Government, through the NPC as its executing agency, bound itself
to assume or shoulder petitioner's tax obligations. Therefore, petitioner's
payments of income tax and BPRT to the CIR, when such payments should
have been made by the NPC, undoubtedly constitute erroneous payments
under Section 229 of the NIRC.
The CIR moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated April
23, 2004; thus, the CIR elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc. In a Decision
dated May 24, 2006, the CTA En Banc reversed the CTA Division's rulings and
declared that petitioner is not entitled to a refund of the taxes it paid to the CIR.
Petitioner sought reconsideration, but the CTA En Banc denied the motion in
a Resolution dated December 4, 2006.
Issues:
Whether or not Mitsubishi Corporation – Manila Branch is entitled to a refund.
Whether or not the Bureau of Internal Revenue should be the authorized
government agency where the tax refund be claimed.
Held:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to a refund. The CIR subsequently affirmed
petitioner's non-liability for taxes and entitlement to tax refunds by issuing
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 24-200547 addressed to specified
BIR offices. The RMO provides: Pursuant to the provisions of RMC No. 32-99
as amended by RMC No. 42-99, Japanese contractors and nationals engaged
in OECF funded projects in the Philippines shall not be required to shoulder
the fiscal levies or taxes associated with the project. Therefore, the concerned
Japanese contractors are entitled to claim for the refund of all taxes paid and
shouldered by them relative to the conduct of the Project. Also, considering
that petitioner paid the subject taxes in the aggregate amount of P
52,612,812.00, which it was not required to pay, the BIR erroneously collected EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
such amount. • International agreements embodying the implementation or
adjustments of detail, in carrying out well-established national policies
On another issue, yes, the Bureau of Internal Revenue should be the and traditions
authorized government agency where the tax refund be claimed. The Supreme • Agreements involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
Court held that in Sections 204 (C) of the NIRC grants the CIR the authority to nature
credit or refund taxes which are erroneously collected by the government. The • Does not require concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the Members of
authority of the CIR to refund erroneously collected taxes is likewise reflected Senate
in Section 229 of the NIRC.

In this case, it is fairly apparent that the subject taxes in the amount of P
52,612,812.00 was erroneously collected from petitioner, considering that the
obligation to pay the same had already been assumed by the Philippine
Government by virtue of its Exchange of Notes with the Japanese
Government. Case law explains that an exchange of notes is considered as
an executive agreement, which is binding on the State even without Senate
concurrence.

Hence, the petition is GRANTED.

Section 21: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.

Senate Concurrence in International Agreements

• Treaties of any kind, whether bilateral or multilateral, require Senate
concurrence
• Treaties are not only forms of international agreements the President
can enter into
• The authority to enter into executive agreements without concurrence
of the legislature has traditionally been recognized in jurisprudence
• Treaty-making involves 2 phases: negotiation and the actual making
of the treaty
o NEGOTIATION: The President excludes the legislature In Gonzales v. Hechanova,
• Requires concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate The Court held that such contracts to import are not executive agreements
because the parties to the contracts do not appear to have regarded the
TREATIES contracts as executive agreements. Even assuming that they are, it is still
• International agreements involving political issues or changes of inconsistent with RA 3452. Altough the President may enter into executive
national policy and those involving international arrangements of agreements, without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
permanent character agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted
• Requires 2/3s concurrence by all the Members of Senate prior.
The executive cannot defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
status of law by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

In Vinuya v. Romulo,
The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of discretion for not
forwarding the claims of the petitioners against Japan, for the reason that such
claims were already waived in the Treaty of Peace of 1951 and that, such
decision was not for the courts to question. The Executive Department
determined that to espouse the claims of the petitioners would be inimical to
the foreign policy interests and could disrupt the country’s relations with Japan.

Section 22: The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days
from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

Section 23: The President shall address the Congress at the opening of
its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
CONSTI 1 Notes/Doctrines (Tonio)
ARTICLE VIII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Grave Abuse of Discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:
• Such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction
• It must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
Essence of Judicial Duty
In Marbury v. Madison,
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule.
If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each. So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the
Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to
the Constitution, disregarding the law; the Court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is the very essence of judicial duty.
Concept of Judicial Function
In Santiago v. Bautista,
The Committee on Ratings of Students or Honor does not exercise judicial
power, which is an essential requisite for a certiorari to even be considered in
the first place. Judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers;
the exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the
action of the court.
The following circumstance must exist:
(1) There must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or
property; and said controversy is brought before a tribunal
(2) The tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce
judgment and render a decision
(3) The tribunal board, or officer must pertain to that branch of sovereign
power which belongs to the judiciary
Implied Powers
In Radiowealth v. Agregado,
The power to determine what is essential and what is not essential for the
administration of justice lies within the judiciary and not in any other branches
of the government.
Power to Preserve its Honor
In In Re Laureta,
The Court must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks
of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and
ethics of the legal profession.
Contempt Power
In In Re Borromeo,
Borromeo is liable for contempt for his abuse of and interference with judicial
rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges, and improper
conduct directly impeding, obstructing, and degrading the administration of
justice. Even without the power of a public prosecutor, the power or duty of the
court to institute a charge for contempt against itself is essential to the
preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and
the public.
In Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty,
When the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and
behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same,
the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of
justice.
Power to Delay Execution of Sentence
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,
The Supreme Court does not lose its jurisdiction over Echegaray’s case, and
that it may still restrain the execution of the final judgment. The rule on finality
of judgment cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce
the same judgment – finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court lost
all its powers over the case.
In Pichay v. ODES,
Fact finding is different from adjudication; it cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy may be decided or determine authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law.
In Tan v. Matsura,
The SC held that such act of the CA is valid, as it only exercised its power to
review, it being the proper and most prudent course to take after the SOJ has
successively issued several resolutions with varying findings of fact and
conclusions of the law on the existence of probable cause. Although the
determination of probable cause is an executive function vested in the SOJ, it
is equally settled that the courts retain the power to review findings of
prosecutors in preliminary investigation in a mere few exceptional cases
showing grave abuse of discretion. Courts should not shrink from exercising
their power when the circumstances warrant to determine whether the
prosecutor’s findings are supported by facts or by the law.
In Garcia v. Drilon,
The Court upheld the issuance of the TPO, and held that besides it being
necessary to prevent further acts of violence against women, etc. Further, such
issuance is purely executive in nature and in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to maintain
public order in the barangay.
JUDICIAL POWER
• Includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
EXECUTIVE POWER
• The power to enforce and administer laws. It is the power of carrying
the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,
The CTA indeed has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari in
assailing an interlocutory order. Since RA 9292 grants appellate jurisdiction on
local tax cases to the CTA, it is deemed implied that petitions for certiorari shall
be filed there, and not with the CA. Conferring such power to the CA would
create a split-jurisdiction situation, which is anathema to the orderly
administration of justice.
In Re: Show Cause Order of Sereno,
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice. Court has emphasized the high sense
of morality, honesty, and fair dealing expected and required of members of the
Bar. Lawyers must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior
must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times, whether they are dealing
with their clients or the public at large. Lawyers may be disciplined for acts
committed even in their private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach
on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.
There can be no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in
lawyers' private lives or in their professional capacity, for a lawyer may not
divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
For the same reasons, judges or Justices are held to a higher standard for they
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence,
hence, their conduct should be above reproach.
In Noblejas v. Teehankee,
The legislature did not indent to grant executive officials such privileges of
being under the disciplinary powers of the Supreme Court when it granted
them the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as to that of a judge
of the CFI. Thus, the SC cannot discipline Noblejas as he is subject to the
President’s power to discipline and remove administrative officials as he is a
presidential appointee. The Court can only exercise those powers over
members of the judiciary, to which a Commissioner of Land Registration is
clearly not.
Advisory Opinions
In Director of Prisons v. Ang Chio Kio,
The Court ruled that the CA erred when it made a recommendation to allow
respondent Ang Chio Kio to leave the country on the first available flight. It is
not the function of the judiciary to give advisory opinions.
In Corpuz v. People,
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice
and colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial
legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is
truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power
belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut
divide.
Justiciable Controversy
In SBMA v. COMELEC,
The Courts may decide only on actual controversies. It cannot determine grave
abuse of discretion when it comes to an absence of such controversies.
In Southern Hemisphere v. ATC,
Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. An
actual case or controversy means a case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion.
In In Re Save the Supreme Court,
The Court held that it cannot speculate on the constitutionality of a bill that the
Congress may or may not pass. No rights arise from a bill, therefore there is
no justiciable controversy present in this case – therefore, this must be
dismissed.
The power of judicial review is subject to certain requirements before the Court
may take cognizance of a case:
(1) Actual case or controversy which is ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise it will just be an advisory opinion
(2) Standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement
(3) Constitutionality issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity
(4) Constitutionality issue must be the lis mota of the case
Hierarchy of Courts
In Tano v. Socrates,
The Court dismissed the case as it was held to be premature, and that even
granting that the petitioners have a cause of action ripe for certiorari, there is
a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important
reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced why
direct recourse to the SC should be allowed.
Section 2: The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines
the security of tenure of its Members.
In Malaga v. Penachos,
The Court held that although it is true that PD 1818 is applicable, such
prohibition only applies to administrative acts in controversies involving facts
or the exercise of discretion in technical cases, not to questions of law. PD
1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed
by administrative agencies.
In Carpio-Morales v. CA,
The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked to insulate the
Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. This
is because the courts are apolitical bodies which may apply justice to all. Thus,
the Ombudsman is not exempt from judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, judicial power is allocated to
the Supreme Court and all such lower courts. It also empowers Congress to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts except that it may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 of the same Article.
The Constitution also gave the Court the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. An example of this is
the promulgation of the Rules of Court where the provisional remedies of TROs
and writs of preliminary injunction (WPI) were provided.
In this case, the Court ruled that when Congress passed the first paragraph of
Section 14 of Rule 6770, it took away the courts’ power to issue a TRO or WPI
to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, the Congress
encroached upon the courts’ constitutional rule-making authority. The same
act does not allow a court to exercise its full functions.
The condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the
present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust
and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times. The
doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense
of elective officials to escape administrative liability.
The Court found no legal basis to continue to adopt the condonation doctrine
in our jurisdiction yet this abandonment was deemed prospective in its
application which means that only cases after this one would be affected by
the abandonment. This was also done for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution until reversed shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Section 3: The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for
the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
In Marina v. COA,
The general rule is that all allowances are deemed included in the
standardized salary while Sec. 12 enumerates non-integrated allowances (i.e.
transportation, clothing, hazard pay, etc.) Other than those enumerated in Sec.
12, other incentives bay be granted to employees but these cannot be granted
indiscriminately. Additional allowances may be awarded to certain gov't offices
because of the unique nature of their office and the work performed by their
employees. It is the Secretary of the DBM, as the alter ego of the President,
who identifies and grants additional allowances. This rule does not apply to
Constitutional bodies. The grant of allowances to members of the
Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group must be differentiated. The
Judiciary, CSC, COA, COMELEC, and Ombudsman are granted fiscal
autonomy by the Constitution in order to protect its independence. The
Constitution provides for fiscal autonomy and grants the judiciary to use its
funds at will free from outside control or interference. The executive cannot
interfere with how funds are to be disbursed without violating the principle of
separation of powers. Nonetheless, expenditures of by the CFAG are still
audited by the COA.
In this case, the disallowed allowances were not excluded by law thus
tantamount to double compensation. Notwithstanding, only those who acted in
bad faith are required to refund the disbursed amounts
Section 4: (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court
en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required
to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with
the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When
the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
Filling-in Vacancy in Supreme Court
In De Castro v. JBC,
As can be seen, Art. 7 is devoted to the Executive Department, and among
others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Secs. 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article. Art. 8 is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties
and qualifications of Members of the SC, among others. Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 9
of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of
SC Justices. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court.
Paragraph 3 Doctrines
In Fortich v. Corona,
The Court held that there was no necessity to have the case referred to the
SC En Banc, such is only required when the required number of votes per
division are not obtained. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision –
this then shows no other way but to refer the case to the SC En Banc. On the
other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and a losing
party files a MR, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a
tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision
which must stand in the view of the failure of the members of the division to
muster the necessary votes for this reconsideration.
CASES: “decided”
MATTERS (motions): “resolved”
In Republic v. Garcia,
The Court held that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
when it rejected the claim of exemption from the filing of an attachment bond.
The case of Tolentino produced the doctrine that the State, as represented by
the government, is exempt from filing an attachment bond on the theory that it
is always solvent. The Constitution mandates that only the SC sitting en banc
may modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in
a decision rendered en banc or in division. Any court, the Sandiganbayan
included, which renders a decision in violation of this constitutional precept
exceeds its jurisdiction.
Section 5: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.
Quo Warranto
In Republic v. Sereno,
The origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are
materially different. Impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while quo
warranto is judicial. Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative,
as representative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach
of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by
determining the public officer’s fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an
action for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or
avlidity of the election or appointment of a public official based on
predetermined rules.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as
these remedies are distinct as to:
• Jurisdiction
• Grounds
• Applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal
• Limitations
• Thus, there is no forum shopping in the instant case, and there
is no impeachment trial yet.
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. Art. XI, Sec.
2 of the Constitution uses the permissive term “may”, which, denotes discretion
and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.
To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers
are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any
possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications
which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.
The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is
not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court’s exercise of
its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress
from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it
preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment. An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as
to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo
warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof
are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity,
being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either
be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or
criminal action, if otherwise.
The failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public
are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity
to commit corruption or dishonesty. Respondent’s disposition and propensity
to commit dishonesty and lack of candidness are manifested through her
subsequent acts committed during her incumbency as Chief Justice, which are
now matters of public record and also determined to be constituting probable
cause for impeachment. Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity
cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief
Justice.
Ripe for Adjudication
In PACU v. Secretary of Education,
The Court held that PACU does not have standing; mere apprehension that
the Secretary of Education, might, under the law, withdraw the permit of one
of the petitioners does not constitute justiciable controversy. Petitioners have
permits to operate private schools and they did not show that the Secretary
would unduly invoke it. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional
arises only when the interests of a litigant to require the use of that judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference; a hypothetical threat
is insufficient.
In Tan v. Macapagal,
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Since the amendments were just on
its proposal stage, there is no justiciable controversy yet.
In Suplico v. NEDA,
The Court agreed that since what were prayed for were already complied with
when the CTCs of the contract was made available in the Senate hearings on
the project, and when PGMA informed China’s President of such
discontinuance, the case is indeed moot. Its fundamental task as the ultimate
citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciary’s role of strengthening political
stability indispensable to progress and national development. Resolving on
issues that no longer constitute an actual case or controversy will do more
harm than good to the nation as a whole.
Standing
In Concepcion v. COMELEC,
The Court held that Concepcion did not have standing as he was not an
aggrieved party to the present case. In the absence of personality to file, the
Court held it proper to dismiss the case.
In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury in the consequence of its enforcement. Thus, Gov. Pascual is not just
any other taxpayer contesting constitutionality of an act which can constitute
misapplication of public funds. He is the Provincial Governor, representing the
state’s most populated political subdivision, and the taxpayers bear a
substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the Philippines.
In Galicto v. Aquino,
The Court ruled that Galcito did not have locus standi. Him being an employee
of PhilHealth does not demonstrate that he has a personal stake or material
interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative
and based on a mere expectancy. As to the element of injury, such aspect is
not something that somebody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has
to be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s time, as well as the
effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another department or
government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely
superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to
decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional
adjudication.
In Legaspi v. CSC,
The SC granted the petition, because Legaspi’s request for information on the
civil service eligibilities on certain persons employed as sanitarians is a public
concern and thus his right to information may be invoked by mandamus. Thus,
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is, by
its very nature, a public right. In recognizing the right of the people to be
informed, the Constitution expressly mandates the duty of the State and its
agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers, and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
In Joya v. PCGG,
The Court held that the petition does not comply with the legal requisites for
the court to exercise its power of judicial review. While it is claimed that the
paintings were donated by private persons to the Museum, and that the
silverware were given to the Marcoses as gifts, the petitioners are not the legal
owners, or that such property has become publicly owned – hence they do not
have any legal right to question its allegedly unauthorized disposition.
In Board of Optometry v. Colet,
For a party to have locus standi to question the validity of a statute, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained
or will sustain direct injury of its enforcement. The Court ruled that the
respondents are not duly registered optometrists, thus have no legal standing.
In Tondo Medical v. CA,
Constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be
invoked where a party’s substantive claim is without merit. The Court ruled that
the petitioners do not have standing to file the case, none of the petitioners
were removed from public service, nor did they identify any action taken by the
DOH that would unquestionably result in their dismissal.
In Anak Mindanao v. Executive Secretary,
MDOI did not have locus standi. Its claim that there is a negative impact of
NCIPs being an attached agency of the DAR is vague, and it cannot afford
MDOI with standing.
To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, the
following requisites must be satisfied:
(1) Public character of the funds or assets involved
(2) Presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of
government
(3) Lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised
In Resident Marine Mammals v. Sec. Reyes,
The need to give animals legal standing in environmental cases has been
eliminated by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases since any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, is allowed to bring a suit to enforce
environmental laws. So since we have these Rules, there’s no need to give
animals standing. They don’t have standing, but since humans are stewards
of nature, humans can file for the proper environmental case.
In International Service v. Greenpeace,
In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial to the public to stay a verdict on
the safeness of BT Talong or GMOs, for that matter - until an actual and
justiciable case properly presents itself before the Court. Resolving the
petition for Writ of Kalikasan would unnecessarily arrest the results of further
research and testing on BT Talong, and even GMOs in general, and hence,
tend to hinder scientific advancement on the subject matter.
Exception to the Rule on Earliest Opportunity
In People v. Vera,
The Court ruled that it can still act on the matter, recognizing that it cannot
decide on questions of constitutionality unless it was properly raised and
presented in the proper courts, however, there are certain exceptions, such as
in the case at bar. Where the Act seriously affected numerous persons and
extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the
Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the Act’s validity promptly
before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice.
Although the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined
by the Courts unless that question is properly raised and not presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, there is an
admission of certain exceptions, where the Court may exercise sound
discretion to determine when a constitutional question of a statute should be
presented:
(1) Criminal Cases – constitutional question may be raised for the first
time at any stage of the proceedings, either in trial court or on appeal
(2) Civil Cases – constitutional question may be raised for the first time
on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the question is
necessary to a decision of the case
(3) Other Cases – constitutional question may be raised by an appellate
court at any time, where it involves jurisdiction of the court below
In Narra Nickel Mining v. Redmont,
A case is said to be moot and/or academic when it “ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value”. Thus, the courts generally
decline jurisdiction over a case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness.
However, the “mootness” principle, does accept certain exceptions. The Court
provided four instances where courts can decide an otherwise moot case:
(1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution
(2) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public
interest is involved
(3) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public
(4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
In Torrecampo v. Metropolitan,
The Court held that since the petition of Torrecampo would be tantamount to
the Court delving into matters that are exclusively within the wisdom of the
executive branch, it cannot propser. The determination of where between the
two possible routs, to construct a road extension is obviously not within the
province of the Court. Judicial review of a question of executive policy is a
matter entirely outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Proper recourse
should be made before the executive department, and its offices.
Operative Fact Doctrine
In De Agbayani v. PNB,
The existence of a statute prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidity may have to be considered
in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official.
In Phil Coco v. Republic,
The SC held PD 755 to be invalid, however, such unconstitutionality shall not
retroact due to its adverse effects to the farmers, such that it would be
prejudicial to those who contributed to the fund but was not able to receive a
share. As a general rule, statutes which are rendered unconstitutional cannot
be a source of legal rights, with an exception that is the operative fact. But, this
exception cannot apply if it would be grossly unfair or immoral.
In CIR v. San Roque,
The Court held that the 120-day period is mandatory, and that any petition
made in violation of such shall be rendered void. Further, effect of the BIR
ruling is set aside because even prior to that, the violation was already
committed by the said companies. It is important to note, that the BIR ruling is
merely an administrative issuance, which hinders the benefit accorded to by
the doctrine of operative fact, that requires it to be in the form of a law or
executive issuance.
For the doctrine of operative fact to apply, there must be a legislative or
executive measure that is invalidated by the Court. An administrative issuance
does not count.
In Araullo v. Aquino,
The DAP was held to be unconstitutional but declaring it as such without
recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that
produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the government
and the nation is to be impractical and unfair. In this case, it will only apply to
programs, activities, or projects that can no longer be undone, and whose
beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP.
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded.
In Katipunan v. Robredo,
The Court held that informal settlers may be summarily ejected and that
eviction and demolition orders may be validly carried out even without a judicial
order.
Courts will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless the following
requisites are present:
(1) The existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of
legal rights susceptible of judicial determination
(2) Existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party
raising the constitutional question
(3) Recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity
(4) The resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
decision of the case
In Sameer v. Cabiles,
The Court held that the reincorporation of a previously declared
unconstitutional law cannot be upheld in a new law. Hence, the declaration of
the particular clause as unconstitutional in the Serrano case is binding, and its
reinstatement by RA 10022 is deemed a nullity. When a law or provision of law
is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, its nullity cannot be cured
by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or similarlaw or provision.
In Film Dev. Council v. Colon Heritage,
The Court maintained the unconstitutionality of Sections 13 and 14. But all
amusement taxes remitted to petitioner FDCP prior to the date of finality of this
particular SC decision shall remain legal and valid under the operative fact
doctrine, for reason that it was deemed as a compliance in good faith while the
law is valid.
When a declaration of unconstitutionality of a particular law or executive
issuance will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law/executive issuance, the doctrine of operative fact is applied as a matter of
equity and fair play. Hence, what was deemed compliance during the assailed
law/executive issuances’ effectivity prior its declaration of unconstitutionality
need not be undone.
Automatic Review
In People v. Mateo,
By virtue of the automatic review as provided for in the Constitution, the SC
took cognizance of the case, but found it necessary to remand it to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition. Although the Constitution provides for in
Sec. 5, Art. VIII that the Court has the power to review, revise, modify or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, it does not preclude the court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favor of the accused (which in turn, in this case, was the reason why
the Court remanded the case to the CA)
Change of Venue
In People v. Gutierrez,
The Court held that the Judge failed to consider the contention of the witnesses
that the case should be transferred to the CCC because a miscarriage of
justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to
testify in the court sitting in Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be
endangered. Thus, it is proper to transfer the cases. One of the power of the
Courts is the transfer of the trial of cases from one court to another of equal
rank in a neighboring site, whenever imperative of securing a fair and impartial
trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.
Power to Promulgate Rules
In Santero v. CFI-Cavite,
In consideration of the two provisions of law (Rules of Court and Civil Code),
the Civil Code shall govern. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive
law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support
during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be
impaired by Sec. 3 Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, which is merely a procedural
rule.
In Damasco v. Laqui,
The Court ruled in Damascor’s favor, that he cannot be adjudged to be guilty
of a lesser offense includible within a graver offense originally charged against
him if such lesser offense has already prescribed. While the Court has the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, such rules
shall however not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
In Baguio Market Vendors v. Hon. Cortes,
The Court ruled that BMV cannot be held exempt from payment of legal fees,
even on the basis of the Cooperative Code. The payment of legal fees is a vital
component of the rules promulgated by the Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure; it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
the Congress.
In In Re: In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption,
Since payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by
the SC concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly
annulled, changed or modified by the Congress. Such may only be amended
or revised by the Court, by virtue of its exclusive power.
Admission to the Practice of Law
In In Re: Cunanan,
The ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively
to the Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated
by the SC, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain
vested in the SC.
In In Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty,
Through the years, the Court has held that the right to criticize the courts must
be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of
the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. Jurisprudence
has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
“Not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights”
In PNB v. Asuncion,
To require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition
precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper,
would deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Art. 1216 of the New
Civil Code. Procedural law cannot be made to prevail over substantive law.
In People v. Lacson,
Time Bar Rule: A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. A
provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent 1 year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to
offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived.
The Court held that the time-bar rule does not apply in this case as Lacson
failed to satisfy the requisites provided for. Such law cannot retroactively be
applied to his case for reasons that it would work injustice and would involve
intricate problems of due process. To apply it retroactively so that the 20-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor
received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir dismissing the criminal
cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Essentially, it would
lessen the period with which the Court will have to revive the criminal cases.
In Estipona v. Lobrigo,
The Court held that indeed, the plea bargaining is a procedural rule, since the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is in the
exclusive domain of the SC, any form of legislation can in no way trump such.
The SC asserts its discretion to amend, repeal, or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government.
Supervision over the Judiciary
In Ampong v. CSC,
While the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service, the
Constitution provides that the SC is given exclusive administration and
supervision over all courts and personnel. Administrative jurisdiction over a
court employee belongs to the SC, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment in the judiciary.
In In Re: Letter of Resignation of Atty. Mendoza,
Sec. 5(6), Article 8 vests the power of appointment of officials of the judiciary
in the SC. The SC in which the appointing power is conferred is the Court en
banc. The Court as a collegial body requires that appointing power be
exercised by the Court en banc. Each justice has equal power and authority
and all justices must act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. The only
exception is when the Court en banc delegates the exercise of some of its
powers. In this case, the Court has resolved to delegate the disposition of
certain matters to the Chairpersons of the 3 Divisions or to the Chief Justice
alone.
Under the Administrative Circular, the CJ with the concurrence of the Chairs
of Divisions may select the appointees for Assistant Chief of Office and higher
positions. This Court issued another Resolution referring administrative
matters to the Divisions of the Court, the CJ, and to the Chairmen of the
Divisions. Among matters which may be referred to the Chairpersons are the
appointment of personnel to the SC, CA, CTA, the PHILJA, the JBC, etc.
However, the extent of the appointments whether regular or casual was not
defined.
In this case, the appointment of Atty. Mendoza was done by the CJ and the
concurrence of the Chairpersons of the Divisions. Her recommendation to the
position was not made by the PHILJA Board of Trustees. Atty. Mendoza was
appointed as PHILJA Chief of Office through a memorandum signed by CJ
Sereno, Justices Carpio and Velasco.
As the appointment of previous PHILA Chief of Office has had contrary
interpretations in the past, it should now be delegated to Court en banc. As the
PHILJA Chief of Office is equal in rank as a CA AJ, and consistent with the
Resolutions of this Court, the PHILJA Chief of Office shall now be appointed
by the Court en banc.
Section 6: The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof.
Administrative supervision of inferior courts
In Maceda v. Vasquez,
The Ombudsman cannot entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge’s certification of service submitted to the SC. This
provision exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk.
When a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the OMB must defer action on the said
complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether the said
Judge or court employee acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Section 7: (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty
years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower
courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a
citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence.
In Fernandez v. CA,
Justice Bato had authority to act on the urgen motion to resolve the application
for WPI. Justice Bato won the case by raffle as a senior member of the 14th
Division vice Justice Lantion who went on a wellness leave. The raffle was
witnessed by the CA's Raffle Committee. Furthermore, the application for the
WPI was filed with Justice Bato now sitting as acting member.
Complainants argue that under the Internal Rules of the CA, it should have
been Justices Dicdican and Peralta who should have acted on the application
during Justice Lantion's leave. However, because of the urgent nature of the
application, the Clerk of Court transferred the case to Justice Bato. There is
nothing in the IRCA which requires for the urgent motion to be attended by the
present members of a division.
A WPI is merely an ancillary or preventive remedy adjunct to a main suit. On
the other hand, a ponencia refers to the rendition of a decision based on merits.
As a provisional remedy, the issuance of a WPI is clearly time sensitive. As
such, while the ponente was on leave, Justice Bato had to act urgently
Section 8: (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the
Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three
years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments
as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall
provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Composition of the JBC
In Chavez v. JBC,
The Constitution mandates that the JBC shall be composed of 7 members
only. As for the representative coming from the Congress, he may either be
from the HOR or from the Senate; in no way can there be 1 representative per
House.
In Jardeleza v. Sereno,
The JBC’s provision on the unanimity rule is vague and unfair and therefore,
can be used or abused resulting in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to
due process. Its invocation is effectively a veto power over the collective will
of the majority. It should also explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground.
On top of it all, it shall meet the minimum requirements of due process.
In Villanueva v. JBC,
The Court held that JBC’s policy on the 5-year requirement is constitutional.
The Constitution does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules
and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. A
specific set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets
the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities
expected of him in his officer is may be validly promulgated by the JBC.
In Aguinaldo v. JBC,
The Court held that, the clustering of nominees for the 6 vacancies in the
Sandiganbayan by the JBC indeed impaired the President’s power to appoint
members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Why does cluserting impinge upon the President’s appointing power?
(1) Once the President had appointed a nominee from one cluster, he is
proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster
for the other vacancies
(2) All the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for
appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice Positions in the
Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee should
be considered for appointment to the position assigned to one specific
cluster only
(3) Correspondingly, the nominees’ chance for appointment was
restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which they were
included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified for
all the vacancies
Section 9: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list.
Section 10: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
In Nitafan v. CIR,
The Court held that deductions of withholding tax from salaries do not
constitute diminution of salaries. There was actually an intent by the framers
to make the salaries of the members of the Judiciary taxable. The Constitution
authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to
those appointed after its approval.
Section 11: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached the age
of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.
Security of Tenure
In Vargas v. Rilloraza,
To disqualify any of the constitutional component members of the Court is
nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Further, with Sec. 14 likewise gives the
President power to designate justices to temporarily sit as Justice of the SC –
this fails to meet the Constitutional requirement of appointment. There is
nothing which authorizes by mere legislation any change in the constitutional
composition of the SC, or the performance of its functions by any but its
constitutional members.
In People v. Gacott,
Gacott claims that it is the SC en banc and not the division that should hear
and decide on his case. The Court held that the Constitution does not provide
of such rule. Only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the
need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against
members of the judiciary.
Section 12: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Section 13: The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted
to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation
before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of
the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall
be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and
served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or
abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor.
The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Section 14: No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.
Decisions expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based
In Air France v. Carrascoso,
The CA failed to make complete findings of facts on all the issues properly laid
before it, because it did not state the contentions of Air France as well as the
reasons as to why it was not deemed sufficient. The Court held that the CA did
not fail to make complete findings of fact, a court of justice is not hidebound to
write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence presented by one party and
the other upon the issues raised.
A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not
confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the CA contains the
necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to
withhold therefrom any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for
the defense because there is no law that so requires.
In Francisco v. Permskul,
The RTC merely affirmed the MTC decision through a memorandum decision.
The Court ruled that such decision did not at all contain the legal basis as to
how the RTC arrived with their judgment on the case at bar. The parties are
entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the court
rendering the decision actually studied the case before pronouncing its
judgment.

In Deutsche Bank v. CIR,

A minute resolution is signed only by the Clerk of Court by authority of the
justices. It forms no binding effect when it is used as precedent by other
parties.

In Salazar v. Marigomen,
The Court held that Marigonem’s decision was not based on factual and legal
bases that were shown in the decision he promulgated. Time and time again,
the Court has instructed judges to exert effort to ensure the decisions would
present a comprehensive analysis or account of the actual and legal findings
that would substantially address the issues raised by parties.

Section 15: (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months
from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by
the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution

upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this

effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith
be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter,
and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision
or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,
without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter
submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

Section 16: The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening
of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the
Judiciary.