ARTICLE 1: National Territory

1. MAGALLONA v. ERMITA

August 16, 2011 | RA 9522 (New Baselines Law of 2009)

GIST: Petitioners Magallona et al assailed RA 9522’s constitutionality as it reduces PH maritime territory, which is a violation of Art I
of the 1987 Constiutiton. That, even what was set by the Treaty of Paris was abandoned in adopting the said Baseline Law. More
importantly, petitioners forward that 9522’s classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as well as the Scarborough Shoal as a
“regime of islands” results in the loss of a large maritime area which essentially prejudices the livelihood of fishermen living along the
waters. SC dismissed the petition, ruling that such baseline law is not a means to acquire or lose territory.

DOCTRINE: What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on:

1. Occupation – territory may have never belonged to any state abandoned by any previous state or sovereignty. There should be
an intention to occupy in a peaceful and continuous manner
2. Accretion – added through natural causes
3. Cession – state transfers its territory from one state to another
4. Prescription – continued and long time possession (peaceful, public, and long time)

Regarding the KIG, SC held that with these islands being able to generate their own maritime zones, they in fact contributed to the
increased maritime area of the PH in consonance with RA 9522.

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to
UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446,
correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to
shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the
other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely
notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental
coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime
space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration
of the archipelago.

2. IN THE MATTER OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION

July 12, 2016 | Sovereignty over Several Maritime Features in the South China Sea

GIST: This case revolves around the dispute between PH and China on the legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements in the South
China Sea, the geographic features found in the maritime area, and the lawfulness of certain actions performed by China in it’s exercise
of “sovereignty” over the South China Sea, as far as the following are disputed:

1. China’s historic right claim (nine-dashed line) – Tribunal ruled that China’s historic right claim is bereft of legal basis
2. Geologic Features in the Spratlys – Tribunal ruled that none of the geologic figures (rocks and islands) in the Spratlys are
capable of human habitation or economic life of its own so as to be entitled to a 200nm EEZ
3. China-Occupied Geologic Features in Spratlys – Tribunal ruled that:
1. High tide elevation reefs are entitled to 12nm territorial sea
2. Low tide elevation reefs are not entitled to territorial sea
4. Scarborough Shoal – Tribunal ruled that, the Scarborough Shoal is a high tide elevation and as such, is entitled to 12nm
territorial sea; it is a traditional fishing ground of various fishermen from the region and China CANNOT prevent Filipino
fishermen from fishing
5. Harm to the Environment – Tribunal ruled that China violated its obligations under UNCLOS for having dredged and built
islands on reefs, having prevented harvest of endangered species, which essentially caused permanent and irreparable harm to
the coral reef system

DOCTRINE: UNCLOS comprehensively governs parties’ respective rights to maritime areas in the South China Sea. Any claims
contrary to UNCLOS is deemed invalid.

FACTS:
On 22 January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against China in a dispute concerning their respective “maritime
entitlements” and the legality of Chinese activities in the South China Sea. In response, by a diplomatic note dated 19 February 2013
addressed to the Philippines, China expressed its rejection of the arbitration. In China’s view, the Arbitral Tribunal did not have
jurisdiction in the case because China’s acceptance of dispute settlement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
[UNCLOS] – the basis put forward by the Philippines – was limited and excluded sea boundary delimitations and the determination of
historic titles. Since then, China has continuously refused either to accept or to participate in the arbitral proceedings initiated by the
Philippines. The tribunal, however, did not see this as an obstacle: on 29 October 2015, it delivered its first award finding that it had
jurisdiction, and, on 12 July 2016, its award deciding on the merits of the dispute.

THE 12 JULY 2016 AWARD

The award addresses three main substantive issues: (a) the so-called “Nine-dash line” and China’s claim to historic rights in the South
China Sea, (b) the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea and (c) the legality of Chinese activities in the South China
Sea. Because of jurisdictional limits, however, the Arbitral Tribunal did not deal with matters related to territorial sovereignty over the
disputed maritime features between the parties. That means that the tribunal did not decide who owned the maritime features located
in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands that are claimed by both China and the Philippines or any other coastal state in the
region. Similarly, the tribunal did not delimit any maritime boundaries between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea.

THE “NINE-DASH LINE” AND THE ALLEGED CHINESE HISTORIC RIGHTS

The tribunal dealt with the question whether China’s claims to historic rights within the “nine-dash line” were in conformity with
UNCLOS. It first observed that this area – in which China claimed rights, “formed in the long historical course”, to living and non-living
resources (i.e. fisheries and petroleum resources) – partially overlaps with areas that would otherwise comprise the Exclusive economic
zone [EEZ] or the continental shelf (CS) of the Philippines. In the view of the tribunal, UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive maritime
zones regime and allocates rights in these areas to the coastal state and other states: in the areas of the EEZ and the CS, the coastal state
enjoys exclusive sovereign rights to the exploitation of living and non-living natural resources. Concerning the rights of other states in
these areas, the tribunal found that UNCLOS does not permit the preservation of historic rights of any state within the EEZ or the CS of
another state. Therefore, after the entry into force of UNCLOS, the historic rights that might have existed for China within the “nine-
dash line” in areas that would otherwise include the EEZ or the CS of the Philippines were superseded by the maritime zones regime
created by UNCLOS. That means the pre-existing historic rights no longer exist as they are not compatible with UNCLOS. Accordingly,
the tribunal concluded that China’s claims were contrary to UNCLOS and exceeded the geographic limits imposed by it.
THE PRE-EXISTING HISTORIC RIGHTS NO LONGER EXIST AS THEY ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH UNCLOS.
ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIBUNAL CONCLUDED THAT CHINA’S CLAIMS WERE CONTRARY TO UNCLOS AND
EXCEEDED THE GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS IMPOSED BY IT.

THE STATUS OF MARITIME FEATURES

In a next step, the tribunal determined the legal status of certain maritime features occupied by China in the South China Sea.
Determining whether these are “islands”, “rocks”, “low-tide elevations” (LTEs) or “submerged banks” is important because, unlike fully
entitled islands, rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own do not generate an EEZ and a CS.
Consequently, rocks do not give rights to resource exploitation beyond their territorial sea. Furthermore, LTEs or submerged banks do
not generate any maritime zone. The tribunal found most disputed maritime features not to be capable of generating an EEZ or CS: it
classified Scarborough Shoal as a rock, and among those features in the Spratly Islands, it found Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal to be LTEs, and Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef to be mere rocks. However, contrary to the
Philippines’ position, the tribunal concluded that Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef are rocks that are not capable of generating
an EEZ or a CS.The tribunal assessed the status of these features taking into consideration their natural condition, prior to human
modifications. In this respect, the Tribunal emphasised that China’s construction of installations and significant reclamation work as
well as its maintenance of military or governmental personnel or civilians cannot enhance a feature’s status from rock or a LTE to a fully
entitled island capable of generating an EEZ and a CS.
THE TRIBUNAL EMPHASISED THAT CHINA’S CONSTRUCTION OF INSTALLATIONS AND SIGNIFICANT RECLAMATION WORK
AS WELL AS ITS MAINTENANCE OF MILITARY OR GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL OR CIVILIANS CANNOT ENHANCE A
FEATURE’S STATUS FROM ROCK OR A LTE TO A FULLY ENTITLED ISLAND CAPABLE OF GENERATING AN EEZ AND A CS.

CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The tribunal also ruled on the legality of activities of Chinese officials and Chinese vessels in the areas of the South China Sea located
within the Philippines’ EEZ and CS. It concluded that China breached the provisions of UNCLOS, in particular by (a) temporarily
prohibiting fishing in areas of the South China Sea falling within the Philippines’ EEZ, (b) failing to prevent Chinese vessels from fishing
in the Philippines’ EEZ at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal and (c) preventing Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional
fishing at Scarborough Shoal. Regarding China’s construction of artificial islands, installations and structures at Mischief Reef – a LTE
which is part of the Philippines’ EEZ and CS – without the authorisation of the Philippines, the tribunal also found China to have
violated UNCLOS.In addition, with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment in the South China Sea, the
tribunal found that China breached UNCLOS since it failed to prevent fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels from harvesting (a)
endangered species on a significant scale and (b) in such a manner as to destroy the coral reef ecosystem. Furthermore, the tribunal
held that China’s land reclamation and construction of artificial islands, installations and structures in the Spratly Islands caused
severe, irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem.

Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies

KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO (MR)

November 16, 1995| Legal Value of Article II

GIST: In a previous ruling of the SC, the Contract of Lease for certain equipment between the PCSO and the PGMC was invalidated, for
reasons that it was in contravention with the PCSO charter.

Now, an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) was entered instead, but was likewise assailed as being the same as the former Contract of
Lease. Petitioners invoked Article II Sections 5 (maintenance of peace and order), 12 (rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development), 13 (vital role of the youth in nation- building, and 17 (promotion of total human liberation and development) as ground
to render the said ELA as unconstitutional. SC denied the MR, the provisions of the Constitution being invoked by the petitioners are
not self- executing, they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights, and they merely serve as guide for the legislature in
their lawmaking.

DOCTRINE: Whether or not a provision in itself is self-executing depends on the way it is formulated. Time and again, the Court has
ruled that generally, provisions of Article II are not self-executing. They are merely statements of principles and policies. To give them
effect, legislative enactment is required. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation

Facts:
As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of
Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the...
ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that
would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."
On January 25, 1995, the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (hereafter called ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line
lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales derived
by the PCSO from... the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00 per
terminal in commercial operation.  The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly.  In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall
short of the annual... minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current
ticket sales.
Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is allotted to charity.  (R.A. No. L169, §6 (B))
A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior case.
On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract
of Lease nullified in the first case.

Issues:
WON THE ELA IS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 2(2), ARTICLE IX-D OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO COA CIRCULAR
NO. 85-55-A.

Ruling:

In the new contract the rental is also expressed in terms of percentage of the gross proceeds from ticket sales because the allocation of
the receipts under the charter of the PCSO is also expressed in percentage, to wit: 55% is set aside for prizes; 30% for contribution to...
charity; and 15% for operating expenses and capital expenditures.  (R.A. No. 1169, §6) As the Solicitor General points out in his
Comment filed in behalf of the PCSO:

In the PCSO charter, operating costs are reflected as a percentage of the net receipts  (which is defined as gross receipts less ticket
printing costs which shall not exceed 2% and the 1% granted to the Commission on Higher Education under Republic Act No. 7722).
The... mandate of the law is that operating costs, which include payments for any leased equipment, cannot exceed 15% of net receipts,
or 14.55% of gross receipts.

In G.R. No. 113375 it was held that the PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which would involve
it in any form of "collaboration, association or joint venture" for the holding of sweepstakes races, lotteries and
other similar activities. 
This interpretation must be reexamined especially in determining whether petitioners have a cause of action.
We hold that the charter of the PCSO does not absolutely prohibit it from holding or conducting lottery "in collaboration, association or
joint venture" with another party.  What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is to invest in a business engaged in sweepstakes races,...
lotteries and similar activities, and it is prohibited from doing so whether in "collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or
"by itself." The reason for this is that these are competing activities and the PCSO should not invest in the business of a... competitor.
When parsed, it will be seen that §1 grants the PCSO authority to do any of the following:  (1) to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries ands similar activities; and/or (2) to invest - whether "by itself or in collaboration,... association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity" - in any "health and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may
be profit oriented," except "the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," i.e.,... sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar
activities.  The PCSO is prohibited from investing in "activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" because, as already stated,
these are competing activities.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold:

(1) that petitioners have neither standing to bring this suit nor substantial interest to make them real parties in
interest within the meaning of Rule 3, §2;

(2) that a determination of the petitioners' right to bring this suit is not precluded or barred by the decision in the
prior case between the parties;
(3) that the Equipment Lease Agreement of January 25, 1995 is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is
not contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
(4) that under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a
contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with
another party, so long as it... itself holds or conducts such lottery; and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement in question did not have to be submitted to public bidding as a condition
for its validity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition, Review and/or Injunction seeking to declare the Equipment Lease Agreement between the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. invalid is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

OCAMPO v. ENRIQUEZ

November 8, 2016 | Faithful execution clause

GIST: In line with Duterte’s campaign promise to allow the burial of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), preparations were
then held regarding the former dictator’s interment.

This was assailed by the petitioners, on the ground that there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President when he
allowed the such thing, because it is in violation of the AFP Memorandum Circular G 161-375, the Constitution, the law, and
jurisprudence.

SC held that there was an absence of grave abuse of discretion by Duterte, because Marcos was apparently qualified and has met what
was enumerated in G 161-375 (being a medal of valor awardee, a veteran, among others). For the Constitutional issue, the SC
held that such violations had no relation at all to the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

As for the Human Rights Violation Victims, it was held by the Court that extending the effect of the said law (RA 10368) to the
prohibition on Marcos’ interment at the LNMB would be tantamount to extending the law beyond what it actually contemplates. Marcos
is not disqualified from being interred at the LNMB, the claims of the petitioners of his dismissal from office and removal as President,
among others, “have no basis.” The ouster of Marcos during the EDSA is not tantamount to dishonorable separation, reversion, or
discharge from the military service.

DOCTRINE: Faithful execution clause is not violated when the President or any other government officer acts within the limitations of
the Constitution and other pertinent laws.
 

FACTS:  President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani (LNMB). He ordered herein respondent's superior to prepare the burial. 
ISSUE:  [1] Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the
LNMB?
[2] Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence and the law? 

DECISION:  Dismissed 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents. It is the President's
discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can enact a
law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority of the AFP and the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's discretion to allow or
disallow the burial of anyone in the LNMB. The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely
a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence, anyone buried therein would not be
treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth emulating or who is an inspiration to
the youth. 

ACCFA v. CUGCO

November 29, 1969 | Unincorporated Government Function

GIST: ACCFA, a government agency, entered into a CBA with the Supervisor’s Association (ASA) and the Worker’s Association (AWA),
but a protest occurred when there were alleged violations and non-implementation of the said agreement.

Eventually, the Union filed a complaint against petitioner for unfair labor practices, violation of the CBA, the right to self- organization,
discrimination against members in the matter of promotions and refusal to bargain. With CIR’s grant that the Union be an Exclusive
Bargaining Unit (EBU), ACCFA (now ACA) assailed its jurisdiction.

SC ruled that, with the ACA performing government functions now and not ministrant, then it cannot have an EBU, as Sec 11 of RA 876,
the governing law for ACA, prohibits strikes against the government.

DOCTRINE: The growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional classification of government functions
(constituent or ministrant) quite unrealistic. The difference between constituent and ministrant:

1. Constituent (required) – compulsory functions which constitute the very bonds of society (8 were enumerated in Bacani v.
NACOCO); such as determination of contractual rights of individuals
2. Ministrant – optional functions of government intended for achieving a better life of the community; such as public works

On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement, which was to be effective for a period of one (1) year from July 1, 1961, was
entered into by and between the Unions and the ACCFA. A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged
violations and non-implementation of said agreement. Finally, on October 25, 1962 the Unions declared a strike, which was ended
when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on November 26, 1962.

Facts
The confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO) filed a complaint against Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) before the Court of Industrial Relations on the ground of alleged acts of unfair labor
practices; violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions and refusal to bargain
Issue
Whether or not ACCFA is a government entity
Ruling
Yes.

ACA was established to carry out its purpose. The land reform program contemplated in the said code is beyond the capabilities of any
private enterprise to translate into reality.

The decision appealed from are set aside and /or modified in accordance with the foregoing pronouncements.
No costs.

We hold, therefore, that insofar as the fringe benefits already paid are concerned, there is no reason to set aside the decision of the
respondent Court, but that since the respondent Unions have no right to the certification election sought by them nor, consequently, to
bargain collectively with the petitioner, no further fringe benefits may be demanded on the basis of any collective bargaining
agreement.

Note: The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as given by Section 113, is in
the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may
legally exercise.

VFP v. REYES

February 28, 2006 | Government; sovereign function

GIST: VFP assails the control and supervision that DND exercised over them and claims that it is not a GOCC under the DND, but a
private one.

VFP further claims that it does not possess elements to qualify as a public office, their funds are not public funds, VFP is a private,
civilian federation for veterans voluntarily formed by veterans themselves, the Admin Code did not mention VFP as a public
corporation, and that DBM declared it as a non- government organization and that they are not given funds from it. SC dismissed the
case, citing constitutional provisions and the fact that RA 2640 itself mentions that it is in fact, a public corporation. As regards its
sovereign function, which is the most important characteristic in determining if an office is public, the SC ruled that VFP’s core duty of
protecting war veterans being that of promotion of social justice, is a sovereign function, hence VFP is a public corporation. (in short, it
may be controlled and supervised by the DND)

DOCTRINE: Such delegation of sovereign function is the most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public
office or not. Such portion of sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, must attach to the office for the time
being, to be exercised for the public benefit.

Facts

On June 10, 2002 respondent Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary issued the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04
entitled “Further Implementing the Provisions of Section 12 and 23 of Republic Act No. 2640” which stipulates the details of the
Department’s exercise of control and supervision over the Veteran’s Federation of the Philippines (VFP)

Issue

Whether VFP is a private corporation

Ruling

No. The protection of interests was veterans is not only meant to promote social justice but is also intended to reward patriotism. All of
the functions in Section 4 of RA 2640 concern the well-being of war veterans. It would be an injustice of catastrophic proportions to say
that it is beyond sovereignty’s power to reward the people who defended her.

The petition is dismissed and the validity of DND Department Circular No.04 is affirmed.

Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
2006
 
Fact:

The Petitioner In pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to “prosecute and/or cause the prosecution of
Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, in relation to the anomalies occurred in the AFP-RSBS.

The Ombudsman found that the culpability of petitioner, Quilicot, Bello and Satuito is evidenced by the fact that they signed documents
in manifest bad faith, with full knowledge of the anomalous transactions.

The bilateral deeds of absolute sale were prepared by the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS where Bello and Satuito were assigned, later
enabling them to amass enormous profits. The investigating panel “confirmed” the observations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

Criminal Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner avers that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged as provided in Section 4 of R.A. 8249.

He insists that the AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that he does not fall under Salary Grade 27 as
required in Section 4 of the law, inasmuch as his position as AFP-RSBS President is not even included under the Compensation and
Classification Act of 1989.

Issue:

Whether Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of authority in denying his motion to quash the Information and in exercising
jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

No, the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its authority vested in it. The SC ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the nature of public funds.

Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents,
directors, trustees or managers of government owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes.

As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge against petitioner is estafa through
falsification of public document in the performance of his duties and in relation to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.

MIAA v. CA

July 20, 2006 | Government instrumentality vested with corporate powers; not GOCC

GIST: MIAA assails the removal of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) of their real estate tax exemption provided
for under Sec 21 of the Local Government Code (LGC). SC held that MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers to perform efficiently government functions, and not a GOCC. It is not organized as a stock or a non-stock corporation and has
no capital dividends. Moreover, the real property of MIAA are owned by the Republic; it is a property of public domain. MIAA does not
have members, which is required, if it were to be considered as a non-stock corporation. Despite MIAA being a juridical person, subject
to the withdrawal of tax exemptions per Sec. 193 of the Local Government Code, they are still exempted from real estate tax, as such
taxing powers do not extend to the national government, its agencies, and instrumentalities.

DOCTRINE: A GOCC has the following characteristics:

1. Organized stock or non-stock corporation

2. Has capital dividends
3. Has members required in a non-stock corporation
4. Property is not owned by the Republic
MIAA vs CA Case Digest

Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in
Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903, otherwise known as the  Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport
Authority (“MIAA Charter”). Executive Order No. 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Subsequently, Executive Order Nos. 9091  and 2982  amended the MIAA Charter.
As the operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The
MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,3 including the runways and buildings (“Airport Lands and
Buildings”) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation.4 The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred
to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.

Facts
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real
estate tax delinquency has ballooned to Php 624, 506, 725.42. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the City of Parañaque saying that
MIAA is a government-owned and controlled corporation and therefore not exempted from real estate tax.

Issue
WON MIAA is a GOCC

Ruling

No. MIAA is an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA
are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
Wherefore, We declare the Airport Lands and Buildings of the MIAA EXEMPT from the real estate tax.

FUNA v. MECO

February 4, 2014 | Sui generis entity

GIST: Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) is a corporate entity entrusted by the PH Government to foster friendly relations
with Taiwan. Upon Funa’s request that the same be audited by the COA, the latter issued a memorandum stating that MECO is not
audited by the same. Funa went to court, claiming that COA neglects its constitutional duties of not auditing GOCCs and government
instrumentalities (according to him, MECO is a GOCC). SC ruled in the negative. MECO is a sui generis entity, it has consular function
and corporate objectives in relation to our OFWs in Taiwan. A non- stock corporation and the mere performance of public functions is
not sufficient to consider MECO a GOCC. One vital requirement is that it has to be owned by the government, which in this case, is not
present.

Facts: On 23 August 2010, petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a “copy of the latest financial and audit report” of the
MECO invoking, for that purpose, his “constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.” The petitioner made the
request on the belief that the MECO, being under the “operational supervision” of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is a
government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
Petitioner’s letter was received by COA Assistant Commissioner Jaime P. Naranjo, the following day. On 25 August 2010, Assistant
Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum referring the petitioner’s request to COA Assistant Commissioner Emma M. Espina for
“further disposition.” In this memorandum, however, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo revealed that the MECO was “not among the
agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector.”
Issue: Whether or not MECO is a GOCC covered by the auditing power of COA.
Held: No. Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by reason of some “special function or
jurisdiction” they perform or exercise, are allotted “operational autonomy” and are “not integrated within the department framework.”
Subsumed under the rubric “government instrumentality” are the following entities: 
1. regulatory agencies,
2. Chartered institutions,
3. government corporate entities or government instrumentalities with corporate powers (GCE/GICP), and
4. GOCCs
The Administrative Code defines a GOCC:
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent
of its capital stock: . . . .
The above definition is, in turn, replicated in the more recent Republic Act No. 10149 or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011 m, to wit:
(o) Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporation (GOCC) refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested
with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock: . . . .

GOCCs, therefore, are “stock or non-stock” corporations “vested with functions relating to public needs” that are “owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities.” By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization
as stock or non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its function; and third, government ownership over the same.
Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.
In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and second attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO
lacks.
The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted by the government with
the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful commitment to the One
China policy of the PROC. However, despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
“verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects under Section 2 (6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence,
under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees” and “consular fees” should be
audited by the COA.

PHIL SOCIETY v. COA

September 25, 2007 | Quasi-public corporation; private but with public character; charter test not applicable
GIST: Phil Society, created by Act No. 1285, is created for protecting animal rights and welfare, and is authorized to arrest people who
display cruelty to animals, as well as entitle them to a 50% share of the collected penalty imposed to those arrested. Commonwealth Act
148 lessened their arrest power, as well as their privilege to retain portion of the penalty. EO 63 was later issued by Quezon, which
completely removed their arresting power. When COA moved to audit the petitioners, they filed a case claiming that it is a private
corporation and therefore not within the ambit of the COA. SC ruled that Phil Society is indeed a private corporation. The charter test is
not applicable to them as the same is not retroactive, and shall not be applied in determining whether or not a corporation was public or
private. Likewise, it is clear that a corporation or entity is public just because it is impressed with public interest. Such is called a quasi-
public corporation.

DOCTRINE: Charter test – the test used to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature.
Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law?

The fact that a corporation is created for the public good does not render its privacy it might be considered a quasi-public corporation
that render public services and supply public wants.

FACTS:
The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905,
by the Philippine Commission.  The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal
propagandists.  The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted
upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any
way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.  
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence.  Act No. 1285
antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the SEC.
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the petitioner
was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws.  In addition, the petitioner was to
share 1/2 of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.           
Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of
animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is now an offense against the State,
penalized under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound to enforce;
When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a private entity and not under the said
commission. It argued that COA covers only government entities. On the other hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.

RULING:
YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot be applied.   Essentially, the “charter test” provides that the
test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are compulsory
members of the GSIS.

CO KIM CHAM v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

September 27, 1945 | Government; de facto

GIST: Following Gen. Douglas McArthur’s proclamation that invalidates and nullifies laws, regulations, and processes of any
government in the PH, the court refused to take cognizance of the case under the defunct state of the Republic of the PH in absence of a
law granting such authority.

A case was therefore filed to question whether the proceedings during the Japanese period would still apply or continue after the said
occupation. SC ruled in the affirmative, and said that governments established in the PH under the names of the PH Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. It is
classified as a de facto government of the second kind or a government of paramount force. Judicial acts and proceedings of courts of
justice of those governments, were good and valid, and with respect to the international law principle of postliminy, it remained good
and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines.

DOCTRINE: Kinds of de facto government:

1. That Government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by voice of majority, rightful legal government and
maintains itself against the will of the latter

2. That which is established and maintained by the military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war

3. That which is established as an independent government by inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against a parent state

Facts of the case:

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the
Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of
the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

The court resolved three issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the
American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending
before them.
Ratio:

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually
remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state
of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws.
And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.

The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not
he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid
even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes,
which would be in violation of international law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be
avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.”

Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore
what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other
governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and
derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of
nations, laws and courts of Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative
power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates
a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had
become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it
follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said
government.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
Based on the mandate of President Corazon Aquino’s E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government which was
tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, the AFP Anti-Graft Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. The AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas, finding ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of
₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 against Ramas. The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military
Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas. It alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by
taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. It prayed for forfeiture of respondents’
properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at
₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City
and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of
the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground that there was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal
search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under
the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the
monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents
did not enjoy any constitutional right.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that
is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist
forces up to 24 March 1986, immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution.
2. Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

RULING:

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a
person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during
the interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during theinterregnum would render void all
sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the
freezing and even the takeover of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and
search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could
validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to
the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution

TAÑADA v. ANGARA

May 2, 1997 | Tax and treaties; GATT-WTO

GIST: Petitioners assail the validity of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT-WTO) as it requires the placement of
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products. In the same manner, the claim that
such agreement violates the mandate of the Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos (aka Filipino First Policy). SC upheld the agreement’s validity, following the doctrine of incorporation. GATT-
WTO, being an international agreement, must be complied with by the PH in the virtue of pacta sunt servanda.

DOCTRINE: By the doctrine of incorporation, a country is bound by the generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda (international agreements must be performed in good faith). A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on parties.

BAYAN v. ZAMORA

October 10, 2000 | Tax and treaties; VFA

GIST: The US and the PH entered into the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) after conducting the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and
the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Note, the VFA was approved by FVR together with Ambassador Hubbard, after the exchange of
notes of US Defense Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific and the Foreign Affairs Secretary of the PH. Estrada ratified the treaty during
the same year through the Secertary of Foreign Affairs. Petitioners now assail the binding effect of such treaty. SC held that by virtue of
Art. 2 Sec. 2, upon ratification of the VFA, such treaty is binding. With the generally accepted principles of international law rendered to
be part of the law of the land, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, every treaty in force is binding upon parties to it, and must be
complied with in good faith.

DOCTRINE: Ratification is generally an executive act undertaken by the head of state or of the government, as the case may be,
through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A state may provide in its domestic legislation the process of
ratification of the treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

Facts:

1. United States of America and the Philippines discussed about the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which provides for the
mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be
present in the Philippines. President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent
Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
2. On October 5, 1998, the new president, Joseph E. Estrada, through the country’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.
It was then officially transmitted to the Senate for concurrence, pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate
thereafter gave its concurrence to the VFA by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members.
3. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between the Philippines Foreign Affairs
Secretary and the United States Ambassador.
4. Petitioners question the validity of the VFA on the ground that Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution and not Section 21,
Article VII which applies on treaties that involve presence of foreign military troops in the country. It is also argued that the President
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ratified the VFA, a treaty, as the power to ratify is the same is lodged with the Senate and
not with the chief executive.
5. For respondents, only Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution applies as the VFA is a mere transient agreement and is just
about troops, not bases.

• Issues: 1. WON Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution and not Section 21, Article VII is the applicable provision on
treaties that involve presence of foreign military troops in the country? 2. WON the power to ratify treaties, like the VFA, is lodged with
the Senate? Ruling:
1. Section 25, Article XVIII and Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution are both applicable on a treaty, like the VFA, which involves
the presence of foreign military troops in the country.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds
(2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the same valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. However, Section
25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in
the Philippines. Herein, concurrence of Senate, in the number so provided Section 21, Article VII, is only one of the requisites to comply
with the constitutional requirements and to make the agreement binding on the Philippines.

A special provision prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment
and a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment
must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within
the provision of the particular enactment.

It cannot be said that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to transient agreements. The Constitution makes no distinction between
transient and when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
Also, it cannot be contended that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops
and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Said constitutional provision covers foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. It provision
contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c)
foreign facilities.
Given that Section 25, Article XVIII, such provision disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting state. All the aforesaid elements were met here.
On the first two requisites, the concurrence of 2/3 of the member of Senate is sufficient. There is no need for ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a national referendum as Congress did not require it.
However, on the third element, petitioners argue that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the VFA should have the advice and
consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it should not be considered merely an executive
agreement by the United States. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, however, said phrase only means that the other contracting party
accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international
law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. In fact, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under
international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an international instrument concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and
whatever its particular designation. There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, like act, protocol,
agreement, compromis d arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi.
These terms may be useful, but they furnish little more than mere description and are all under the general term “treaty”.
Also, records reveal that the United States Government has stated that it is fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as
long as America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself to comply with its obligations under the same, there is
compliance with the mandate of our Constitution.
2. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of a
treaty is proclaimed. Hence, the power to ratify treaty is vested in the President and not in the legislature. The role of the Senate is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification, in accordance with the principle of and healthy
system of checks and balances. However, per the principle of separation of powers, into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.

SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

January 12 and July 26, 2016 | Tax and treaties; EDCA

GIST: Petitioners assail the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), entered into by both PH and the US, for being violative
of certain Constitutional provisions. EDCA entails the use of US of the agreed locations of the PH territory. In such areas, the US shall
conduct security operation exercises, joint and combined training activities, and humanitarian disaster relief activities.

Such agreement is being assailed due to the fact that the Senate did not concur to ratify the said agreement. SC held that EDCA is
constitutional, it is an executive agreement. As such, it need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence, as compared to such
requirement for a treaty. EDCA merely involves adjustments in the detail in the implementation of the MTD and the VFA—existing
treaties between the PH and the US, which were accordingly concurred by the Senate and have met the requirements as mandated by
the Constitution.

DOCTRINE: Executive Agreements need not be concurred by Senate. The President can enter into executive agreements on foreign
military bases troops or facilities:

1. If such agreement is not the instrument that allows entry of such

2. If it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty

FACTS:  EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the Philippines and America wherein it
authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. After eight
rounds of negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the
agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The resolution
expresses the "strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for
deliberation and concurrence 

ISSUE:  Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. 

DECISION:  Dismissed 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified by
necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law”. It is the
President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests (commander-in-chief powers). EDCA is
considered an executive agreement, therefore may be bound through the President without the need of senatorial votes for its execution.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage  

Lim v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002

Facts: Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in
Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1.” These so-called “Balikatan” exercises are the
largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States
in 1951.
Prior to the year 2002, the last “Balikatan” was held in 1995. This was due to the paucity of any formal agreement relative to the
treatment of United States personnel visiting the Philippines. In the meantime, the respective governments of the two countries agreed
to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale. The lack of consensus was eventually cured when the two nations concluded the Visiting
Forces Agreement (V FA) in 1999.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-
Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.

Issue: Whether or not Balikatan 02-1 in accordance with the VFA is valid.

Held: Yes. The holding of “Balikatan 02-1” must be studied in the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines bound
itself. The first of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, for brevity). The MDT has been described as the “core” of the defense
relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological
capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the largest such training
exercise directly supporting the MDT’s objectives. It is this treaty to which the V FA adverts and the obligations there under which it
seeks to reaffirm.
The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in US Philippine defense
relations, that is, until it was replaced by the Visiting Forces Agreement. It should be recalled that on October 10, 2000, by a vote of
eleven to three, this Court upheld the validity of the VFA. The V FA provides the “regulatory mechanism” by which “United States
military and civilian personnel [may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine
Government.” It contains provisions relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal
jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement and its
termination. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the
promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.
The first question that should be addressed is whether “Balikatan 02-1” is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement. To resolve this, it is
necessary to refer to the V FA itself: Not much help can be had therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the
source of the problem. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning
of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the
Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must
“abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.” All other
activities, in other words, are fair game.

Pharmaceutical v. DOH

Under the Incorporation Clause, generally accepted principles of international law are those customary rules accepted as binding and
established in different jurisdictions. They are not recommendatory but are part of the general and consistent practice of states from a
sense of obligation.

FACTS

Petitioner Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines sought to nullify Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Executive Order No. 51 or the Milk Code (RIRR). The Petitioner alleged that
the RIRR is invalid because it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement.
Specifically, the RIRR prohibits advertising, promotion, sponsorships, or marketing breastmilk substitutes for infants and young
children. Through the RIRR, the Respondents Department of Health officials amended and expanded the Milk Code.

In its defense, the Respondents countered that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code, but also various international agreements
and instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition, specifically Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS) adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). For them, these international agreements are deemed part of the
law of the land under the Doctrine of Incorporation as provided by the Constitution, and therefore must be implemented through the
RIRR.

ISSUE

Whether or not the international agreements as mentioned by the Respondents are part of the law of the land and may be implemented
through the RIRR.

HELD
No. The Supreme Court held that international law could become part of the law of the land either
by transformation  or incorporation. In the transformation method, an international law can be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as legislation. An enabling law is required in order for international law to become effective.
In the incorporation method, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Thus, under the Constitution, treaties or
international agreements shall become valid and effective upon concurrence of two-thirds of all members of the Senate. Further, the
Court held that under the Incorporation Clause, generally accepted principles of international law are those customary rules accepted as
binding and established in different jurisdictions. They are not recommendatory but are part of the general and consistent practice of
states from a sense of obligation. If they are recommendatory, these international laws are called soft law or non-binding norms,
principals, and practices that influence state behavior, as opposed to hard law which are binding rules of international law.

In the present case, the ICMBS and subsequent resolutions are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding because the
WHA Regulations provides that recommendations of the assembly do not come into force for members, unlike conventions,
agreements, or regulations as they may be deemed as such. In fact, the WHA recommendations are generally not binding but merely
carry moral and political weight on certain health issues, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The ICMBS itself
provides that the code on the marketing of breastmilk substitutes was adopted in the form of recommendation rather than a regulation.
Thus, though the Milk Code adopted most of the provisions under the ICMBS, the subsequent WHA resolutions, which includes the
non-promotion or advertisement of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law, and cannot be considered as part
of the law of the land.

Further, the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as customary international law because the Respondents have not presented
evidence that the said resolutions were enforced or adopted by at least a majority of the members-states. They also failed to prove that
any compliance by member-states was obligatory in nature. Hence, they cannot be considered as generally accepted principles of
international law which shall form part of the law of the land through the Doctrine of Incorporation, and may not be used by the
Respondents as basis for the RIRR.

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL vs. DMCI HOMES, INC., et.al.

G.R. No. 213948 EN BANC, April 18, 2017

FACTS:

A Resolution was issued to temporarily suspend the building permit of DMCI-PDI, citing that the Torre de Manila Condo will rise up
high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, Jose Rizal, and would certainly ruin the line of
sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project.

(A writ of mandamus is an order from a court to an inferior government official ordering the government official to properly fulfill
their official duties or correct an abuse of discretion.)

RULING:

No. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. The Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not
expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that
upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the controversy. 

There is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is “contrary to morals, customs, and public order” or that it brings harm,
danger, or hazard to the community. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the
background “view, vista, sightline, or setting” of the Rizal Monument.

MIJARES v. RANADA

GIST: After a class suit (over 10,000 HR victims) was instituted in the District Court of Hawaii against the Marcos Estate for human
rights violations in relation to the Alien Torts Act, a final judgment of over $2B was awarded. With claims that such decision must be
recognized and enforced in the PH pursuant to Sec 50 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC for its
enforcement.

The same was assailed by respondents for failure to pay the correct filing fees. SC ruled that judgment of the said decision may be
enforced here. Regarding the filing fees, the case is incapable of pecuniary estimation forjudgment, hence filing fees are not based on
the amount of damages.

This case is not grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. SC advto the internationally recognized policy of preclusion as well
as principles of comity, utility, and convenience of nations as basis for the evolution of the rule for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments.

DOCTRINE: There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires PH to recognize foreign judgments, or allow
a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the law of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The principle recognizing
foreign judgments has attained the status of opinion juris in international practice.

Lessons Applicable: In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation

FACTS:

 May 9 1991: a complaint was filed by ten Filipino citizens representing a class of 10,000 members who each alleged having
suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during
the Marcos regime with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of
former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate)
 US District Court and Affirmed by US CA: awarded them $1,964,005,859.90
 Petitioners filed Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment
 Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees paying only
P410
 Petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation
  RTC: estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately P472 and dismissing the case without prejudice
  Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
 
ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of a foreign judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation

HELD: NO. (But belongs to "other actions not involving property") petition is GRANTED.

 There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem,
the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title
 However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign
judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should
be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the
losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.  Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-
judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.
 There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment.  They may pertain to the
same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated.
Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On
 the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not
the facts from which it prescinds.

IBP v. ZAMORA

August 15, 2000 | Civilian Supremacy

GIST: In the light of the alarming increase of violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President issued a verbal directive ordering the PNP
and marines to conduct joint visibility patrols to prevent and suppress crime. PNP formulated a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to detail the
manner by which the joint visibility patrols would be made. President directed AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for proper deployment and utilization of marines in assisting the PNP.

Such deployment is being assailed by the petitioners for being a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.

SC disagreed and ruled that the deployment of marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. Such
deployment does not destroy the civilian character of the PNO, as the AFP chief does not exercise power and authority over the PNP.
Real authority still lies with the PNP, as stated in the LOI

DOCTRINE: Marine deployment does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious
incursion of the military task of law enforcement.

Facts:

a.) As the alarming increase of the happenings of violent crimes continues in Metro Manila like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings,
the President of the Philippines (Joseph Estrada), ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols aiming to
suppress and prevent violent crimes from occurring.

b.) In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief (Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay), formulated a Letter of Instruction
that named the joint visibility “Task Force Tulungan”, which tackles the details on how the joint visibility patrol would be conducted.

c.) The president’s desire to improve the peace and order in the streets of Metro Manila is proven by issuing a memorandum which is
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and to the PNP Chief stating that he wants to have an effective crime prevention program and
to increase police patrols and police visibility in the metropolis.

d.) Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the president invoked his powers as Commander-in-Chief and directed the Chief of
Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief to have coordination with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines in
order to assist the PNP in the suppression of crimes and lawless violence.

e.) On January 17, 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed a petition in order to annul the said Letter of Instruction and
declaring that the deployment of the Philippine Marines should be considered null and void and unconstitutional. It argues that the
deployment is violative of the constitution for the reasons of: 1.) that the said deployment would not be a justifiable act in emergency
situations even to have law enforcement work because it will derogate Art. 2, Sec. 3 of the Constitution; 2.) that said deployment
constitutes an insidious excursion by the military in a civilian function of government for it will derogate Art. 16, Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution; 3.) that said deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform the civilian functions of the
government and; 4.) that in militarizing law enforcement in the metropolis, the president’s administration is making the military a more
powerful force than what as really stated and should be under the Constitution.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

2.) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that when the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Also under Art 7, Sec. 18 of the Constitution, the Congress
may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out
the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three
powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the
Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition
fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the
armed forces.

The Court also disagrees to the contention that the deployment of the Marines that will make the civilian task of law enforcement to be
militarized which will violate Art. 2, Sec. 3 of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause because the calling of the Marines makes permissible use of the military assets for civilian law enforcement.

Because the local police are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belongs to the PNP.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it
amount to an insidious incursion of the military task of law enforcement in violation of Art.16, Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution. The real
authority in these operations, as stated in the Letter of Instruction, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not the
military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position
that would occur. Thus, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Petition was dismissed.

IMBONG v. OCHOA

April 8, 2014 | RH Law; family life and right of the unborn

GIST: With the RH Law being enacted by Congress came the petitioners who assail the constitutionality of the same, for being violative
of the rights of the mother and the unborn, in light of Art II Sec 12, as far as abortion is concerned. In ruling this matter, SC
differentiated implantation, which is the entry of the fertilized ovum to the uterus and fertilization, or the meeting of the female ovum
and the male sperm. Such is important to be discussed as the question of where life begins is being debated on. And with the SC being of
the opinion that life begins at fertilization, it consequently ruled that contraceptives mentioned under the RH Law are not violative of
the constitutional right to life of the mother and the unborn, and is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.

DOCTRINE: By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb, RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life begins only at implantation.

 FACTS:  On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make
effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because
according to them, it violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.
The proponents of the RH law, however, assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the
RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not the RH Law cannot be challenged “on its face” because it is not a speech regulating measure
 
RULING:  While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by
the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.

WISCONSIN v. YODER

May 15, 1972 | Compulsory education

GIST: Respondents Yoder et al are members of the amish religion, and as practiced, they refuse to enroll their children aged 14 and 15
in public or private schools upon completion of Grade 8. This was assailed as in violation of the Wisconsin Statute, which provides for
compulsory attendance of children until the age of 16. SC held that such compulsory education statute violates the rights of the
respondents under the 1st and 14th amendment of the US Constitution. The SC arrived with such ruling after conducting a balancing of
interest test, for the compelling state interest, for education, as against the religious upbringing of the children insofar as their Amish
religion is concerned.

DOCTRINE: The State’s power is subject to a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as that of the Free Exercise
Clause and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.

Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting them of failing to send their children to school until the
age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to send their children to public school until the age of 16 is unconstitutional as
applied because it impermissibly interferes with the Amish religious beliefs.

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish religion. Wisconsin’s compulsory school-
attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to
send their children to public school after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5
each.
Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution?

Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.

The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked variance from the Amish values and way of
life. It places Amish children in an environment hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community during a crucial
period in their life. The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance
could result in not only great psychological harm to Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church
community.

The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. Previous precedent has held
that this power must yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. The State’s power is
subject to a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as those protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.

In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief
by its requirement or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free
Exercise Clause. This Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious beliefs that directly conflict with
the compulsory school attendance law.
The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system. Second, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in
society. We accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced shows that an additional one or two years of formal high school
would do little to serve those interests. Such education may be necessary for preparation for the modern society in which we live, but is
not for the separated agrarian community of the Amish faith.

The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must be protected by the State. However, the record
shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society, producing productive and law-abiding
citizens. The State also supports its position on the possibility that some children will choose to leave the Amish community. This
argument is highly speculative on the record, and the practical agricultural training and habits of industry would support children that
did choose to leave.

The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development, designed to not only provide educational
opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced idleness. In these terms, Wisconsin’s interest in compelling school attendance is
less substantial for Amish children than for children generally.

The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the children’s substantive right to a secondary education,
giving due regard to the power of the State as parens patriae. On this record there is no need to decide an issue in which the Amish
parent’s are preventing children who wish to further their education from attending school.

Dissent. The majority assumes that the interests at stake are only those of the parents and the State. The children also have a
legitimate interest in their education. The inevitable effect of the decision is to impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their
children. It is the future of the student, not the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision. The views of the two children in question
were not canvassed, and should be on remand.

Discussion. The majority’s decision did not determine that the statute would violate Constitutional rights if the children wanted to
pursue further education, but found that such a decision was unnecessary because no such claim was made on the record. The dissent
suggested that the cause should be remanded to determine the desire of the children.

SPARK V. QC (G.R. NO. 225442. AUGUST 08, 2017)

This petition assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas.

FACTS: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were
publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."[3]

Petitioners,[9] spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young adults and minors that
aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors[10] - filed this
present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.[11] In addition,
petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.[12]

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no
clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.[13] They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective
and based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.[14]

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the
imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not
cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair
the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.[15]

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process;[16] and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.[17] They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during
curfew hours will not per se  protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.[18]

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4[19] thereof, contravenes Section 57-A[20] of RA 9344,
as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They
contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for
curfew violations.[21]

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose
them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less
restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs
(closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and
preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions,  i.e., mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a
penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.[22]

ISSUE: The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.

HELD: The petition is partly granted. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance
No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

Void for Vagueness. The assailed pieces of ordinance are NOT void for being vague.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle."[48]

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly identify any
provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public
of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.[49] The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due
process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of
suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not
prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of
the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the
objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show
that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities
to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited.

The pieces of ordinance have sufficient standards as provided by special law.

Petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the
Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures
found in statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the
child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
(Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all
ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.[53] Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,[54] minors caught
in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.[55] It is a long-standing
principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance."[56] Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory
law.

Right of Parents to Rear their ChildrenPetitioners are NOT CORRECT that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they
assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to
stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in
imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.[57]

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their
children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development
of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only
given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously.
The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into
free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional
obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of
moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."[58] "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and
inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens."[59]

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children."[67]

[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position,  vis-a vis other parties. Unable
as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the
state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This
prerogative of parens patriae  is inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."[69] (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their children's well-
being.

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether actually or
constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference
to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered
authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only
aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public
places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.[73]

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at home. Consequently,
this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their children's upbringing.

Petitioners are partially correct that the Curfew Ordinances violate the people's right to travel.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right[88] under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
[89] It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.[90] Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of
locomotion[91] and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where
they can best pursue the ends of life.[92]

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion.[93]

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not
absolute.[95] As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State[96] may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that
they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.[97]

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably
serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and
their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is
replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,[98] as amended, RA 9775,[99] RA
9262,[100] RA 9851, [101] RA 9344,[102] RA 10364,[103] RA 9211,[104] RA 8980,[105] RA 9288,[106] and Presidential Decree (PD)
603,[107] as amended.

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and enforce
the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to
restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this
Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,[108] but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive
as those of adults.[109] They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and
the State.[110] Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally
apply to adults.

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out
on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications.
[122] The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the
basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.[123]The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based
on gender and legitimacy.[124] Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.[125]

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny
test[126] is the applicable test.[127] At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional
rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the
application of a lower level of scrutiny.[128]

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors  entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors  vis-a-vis the State's
duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government
act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.[131] Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.[132]

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised
minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm,
and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves as denoted in the "whereas clauses"
of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors.

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the
general welfare clause.[140] In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a
compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in the
Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the
second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from
pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be
so narrowly drawn.[141]

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom
to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.[142] Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances
must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional
rights.[143]

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
 The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides
more exceptions. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, etc.[147]

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore,
run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to
education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work.[148] However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas
Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas
Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient
safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or
non-church activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It
bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors'
social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits
minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the
scenario depicted in Mosier.[149] This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore
effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to
voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no
reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the
State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal
activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas
Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned
fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence[150] of any separability clause.[151]

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the
minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:
Section 4.  EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance; 
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or
guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party,
graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or
other extra-curricular activities of their
school or organization wherein their
attendance are required or otherwise
indispensable, or when such minors are out
and unable to go home early due to
circumstances beyond their control as
verified by the proper authorities concerned;
and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an
emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized
employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity without
any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other
travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of
this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence
attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, communitv
or other similar private activity sponsored by
the city, barangay, school, or other similar
private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that
supervises the activity or when the minor is
going to or returning home from such
activity, without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that
he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her
class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working
student.[152] (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time
where danger is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate
activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an
exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance,  i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian",
as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this
should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State
interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents'
right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors
who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import and
consequences of their actions.

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon
City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions
are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting,
adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as
applied in this case.

Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised- to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions
in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parentis or guardian under Section 8 thereof,[154] does not impose any
penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render
social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine
imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.[155] Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to
the minor based on the age and frequency of violations.

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community service;
(b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations.

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of
adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of  penalties on
minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for
violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are
without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such
as community-based programs[161] recognized under Section 54[162] of the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA
9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally
defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."[163] Notably, the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or
admonition shall not be considered a penalty."[166]

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not
punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally
inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on
the minor.  Reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to
sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public
against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted
censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,
[170] hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed
on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or
imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with
the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community
service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the
State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned
localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the
three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides
for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and
therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents
or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable
exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is
declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on
minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the
law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.
 Principles

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PREAMBLE

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity
the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

ARTICLE I

National Territory

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,
consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.

ARTICLE II

Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Principles

SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

SECTION 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the
State and the integrity of the national territory.

SECTION 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government
may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.

SECTION 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.

SECTION 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

State Policies
SECTION 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the
right to self-determination.

SECTION 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity
and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all.

SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.

SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

SECTION 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

SECTION 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and
sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development.

SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.

SECTION 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

SECTION 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

SECTION 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and development.

SECTION 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral

organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

SECTION 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.

SECTION 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.

SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.