Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof.

Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping &
Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr.

 
-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the
government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with
UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the
other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:-
it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to
maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty,
national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands
would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be
directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate
the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is
not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-
lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over
maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their
archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The
contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid
of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total
maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the
Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be
violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125
nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades,
had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they
had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.  

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of
the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of
internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to
archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages,
exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether
internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its
obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international
law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed
incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of
archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the
demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.v
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a
law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS
III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to
freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it
will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas,
as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest.
 SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION
(PCA Case Number 2013–19)
Between The Republic of the Philippines and The People’s Republic of China
Before An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
Registry: Permanent Court of Arbitration                     Date of Award: 12 July
2016

The South China Sea has, especially in contemporary times, emerged as a region of great interest to
global players, in terms of strategic and economic interests of the competing States. As Foreign Policy
puts it, “There’s no tenser set of waters in the world than the South China Sea. For the last few years,
China and its neighbors have been bluffing, threatening, cajoling, and suing for control of its
resources.”[2]

To best understand the current situation in the South China Sea from a legal point of view, it is
imperative to refer back to the judgment passed by the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration last year, in response to the claims brought by Philippines against China, primarily regarding
maritime rights, entitlements and zones in the South China Sea, as well as for the protection of the
marine life and the environment of the region, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 1982.

China has always argued for historic rights, as demarcated by the ‘Nine Dash Line’ on its official maps of
the region in question; other stakeholders, however, dispute this claim, as shown in the arbitral
proceedings. As is noted:

… While it was the Philippines which brought the case, it wasn’t the only interested party in the Asean.
Three other members have claims to parts of the South China Sea or the Spratly Islands or the Paracels
that conflict with China’s expansive nine-dash theory: Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Indonesia, Asean’s
largest economy, has continuing run-ins with Chinese fishing vessels and occasionally with the Chinese
Coast Guard in its exclusive economic zone.[3]

Now, as the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) heads towards working on the enforcement of
this arbitration award from last year (2016), and attempting to employ a code of conduct for the South
China Sea, it becomes even more important to look at the arbitral ruling from an objective vantage
point.
Case Brief

The South China Sea Arbitration was conducted between the Republic of the Philippines and the
People’s Republic of China by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), under the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The arbitration is related to disputes between the Parties
regarding the legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements, the status of certain geographic features,
and the lawfulness of certain actions taken by China in the South China Sea; in particular, the following
four issues, as raised by Philippines:

To resolve a dispute between the parties regarding the source of maritime rights and entitlements in the
South China Sea;

To resolve a dispute between the parties concerning the entitlements to maritime zones that would be
generated under the Convention by Scarborough Shoal and certain maritime features in the Spratly
Islands that are claimed by both the parties;

To resolve a series of disputes concerning the lawfulness of China’s actions in the South China Sea, vis-à-
vis interfering with Philippine’s rights, failing to protect and preserve the marine environment, and
inflicting harm on the marine environment (through land reclamation and construction of artificial
islands);

To find that China has aggravated and extended the disputes between the Parties by restricting access
to a detachment of Philippines Marines stationed at Second Thomas Shoal.

While China and Philippines are both parties to the UNCLOS, China specifically made a declaration in
2006 to exclude maritime boundary delimitation from its acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement.
In addition, China has shown disagreement with Philippines’ decision to take the matter to arbitration
and has decided neither to agree with the decision of the Tribunal nor to participate in the proceedings.

The Tribunal, on its end, has taken cognizance of these factors and has purported to not deal with
delimiting maritime boundaries. Furthermore, the Tribunal did not bar the proceedings, on the basis of
Article 9 of Annex VII of UNCLOS[4]. In addition, the Tribunal also noted that despite China’s absence
from the proceedings, since it is a party to the UNCLOS, the decision of the Tribunal would, in fact, be
binding upon it, pursuant to Article 296 (1)[5] and Article 11 of Annex VII[6].

China’s Foreign Ministry, further, stated its position with regard to the proceedings by publishing a
Position Paper in 2014[7]. It claimed that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the matter because:
The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over the relevant
maritime features in the South China Sea;

China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through negotiations;

Philippines’ disputes would constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between the two
countries.

The Tribunal considered China’s Position Paper as a plea on jurisdiction, and conducted a separate
hearing on the issue of jurisdiction and admissibility. Additionally, the Tribunal also declared that it
would honour China’s declaration of 2006 and the UNCLOS and would neither delve into issues of
maritime boundary delimitation or questions of sovereignty. The Philippines also stated that it, “does
not seek in this arbitration a determination of which Party enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed
by both of them. Nor does it request a delimitation of any maritime boundaries.”[8]

Pursuant to this, the Tribunal issued its Award on Jurisdiction[9] in October 2015, in which it concluded
that it did indeed have jurisdiction in the case, as per Philippines’ Final Submissions[10], and that China’s
lack of participation would not prove to be a bar to its proceedings. It, further, concluded that the
treaties China was relying on were either political in nature and not legally binding[11], or that they did
were legally binding and yet did not bar either Party from alternative means of dispute resolution[12]. In
accordance with Article 283 of the UNCLOS[13], the Tribunal found that this requirement was met in the
diplomatic communications between the Parties and that Philippines’ initiation of proceedings under
the UNCLOS did not constitute an abuse of of process as claimed by China.

The Tribunal, proceeding with the first two submissions made by the Philippines, considered the validity
of China’s claim to historic rights in the maritime region of the South China Sea and the ‘Nine-Dash Line’.
Through a lengthy analysis of the text and context of the Convention, in line with the principles set out
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Tribunal established that the Convention
supersedes any treaties in force before its coming into force. It questioned China’s claim to historical
rights in the region, and established that China’s state practice does not show that China had been
enjoying any historical rights in the South China Sea; rather, it was enjoying the freedom of the high seas
and since it did not create bar to other states’ usage of the same, it could not be understood as being a
historical right. Furthermore, since China’s publishing of the same in its Notes Verbales in 2009, many
states have objected to its claim as well. “The Tribunal concludes that the Convention superseded any
historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.”[14]
However, the Tribunal also concluded that its jurisdiction was limited to the claims of historic rights on
the maritime region and not to the land masses in the South China Sea, i.e. if it can claim historic rights
on any of the islands, then it may also be able to claim maritime zones (as per the Convention) on the
basis of these islands.
Next, the Tribunal looked at Philippines’ submissions 3 to 7, concerning the nature of the features in the
South China Sea. It differentiates between low-tide elevations[15], high-tide features[16] and rocks[17].
In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal clarified that:

This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty over the features, notwithstanding any possible question
concerning whether low-tide elevations may be subjected to a claim of territorial sovereignty. Nor is this
a dispute concerning sea boundary delimitation: the status of a feature as a “low-tide elevation”,
“island”, or a “rock” relates to the entitlement to maritime zones generated by that feature, not to the
delimitation of such entitlements in the event that they overlap.[18]

The Philippines put forward three categories for classifying low-tide elevations: where a low-tide
elevation is located within 12 miles of a high-tide feature[19], where the low-tide elevation is beyond 12
miles but within the state’s exclusive economic zone or continental shelf[20], and where the low-tide
elevation is located beyond the areas of natural jurisdiction[21].

For the purpose of identifying the nature of the features in the South China Sea, the Tribunal relied upon
satellite imagery that had been conducted on the area and direct surveys that had been carried out, by
navies or otherwise, in the area, and relied upon maps that were sufficiently detailed. They chose a
certain tidal height to maintain uniformity across the features, and decided to rely, in cases where there
had been significant man-made changes, alterations or construction on the features, upon
maps/imagery/surveys that depicted the features as they had been in their original form.[22]

Again the Tribunal relied upon statements previously made by China to obtain their stance on the
nature of the features, since China had neither submitted any document to the Tribunal nor had it
discussed these in its Position Paper.

The Tribunal concluded that Scarborough Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson Reef,
McKennan Reef and Gaven Reef (North) were all found to be high-tide features. The Tribunal further
noted that for the purposes of Article 121(3), the high-tide features at Scarborough Shoal and the reefs
were rocks that cannot sustain human human habitation or economic life of their own and so have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The Tribunal found the same to be true of the Spratly
Islands and so concluded that China, therefore, has no entitlement to any maritime zone in the area of
Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal; they do, however, form part of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the Philippines as they lie within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines’ coast and
there are no overlapping entitlements in the area with respect to China.

On the contrary, Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal
were all found to be low-tide elevations, of which Hughes Reef lay within 12 miles of McKennan Reef
and Sin Cowe Island, Gaven Reef (South) lay within 12 miles of Gaven Reef (North) and Namyit Island,
and Subi Reef lay within 12 miles of the high-tide feature of Sandy Cay on the reefs to the west of Thitu.

In the issue of Chinese interference with the living and non-living resources (primarily concerned with
fishing practices in the South China Sea and oil and gas exploration and exploitation) of the Philippines,
the Tribunal considered diplomatic statements from China to the Philippines and regulations related to
the matter that China had passed domestically. The Philippines put forward four contentions related to
living resources: China’s prevention of fishing by Philippine vessels at Mischief Reef since 1995, and at
Second Thomas Shoal since 1995, China’s revision of the Hainan Regulation[23] and China’s moratorium
on fishing in the South China Sea in 2012[24]. The Tribunal finds that China had breached Articles 77[25]
and 56[26] of the Convention through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels (which interfered
with Philippines’ oil and gas exploration) and through its moratorium on fishing which interfered with
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, respectively.

The Tribunal also found China in breach of Article 58 (3)[27] of the Convention, due to its failure to
prevent fishing by Chinese flagged ships in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, failing to
respect the sovereign rights of the Philippines over its fisheries in its exclusive economic zone.

Submission 10 of the Philippines related to China’s interference with Philippines’ fishing vessels and
practices in the Scarborough Shoal. While both the states had conflicting views on the situation (China
believed that it was Philippines who was causing the interference) and both claimed historic rights
(Philippines distinguished this by clarifying that it only referred to historic fishing rights) to the region,
the Tribunal opined that China was, in fact, in contravention of the Convention by interfering with the
traditional fishing practice of the Philippines in its exclusive economic zone through the deployment of
its official ships in the region. The Tribunal also noted that this decision does not depend on the question
of sovereignty, and that the Tribunal once again refrained from commenting on the matter.

Philippines’ successive contention related to China’s activities on the reefs in the South China Sea, with
regards the practices it had adopted for the purpose of large-scale construction and reclamation at
seven locations in the Spratly Islands[28], and its practices with regards to fishing[29] in the South China
Sea. Philippines claimed that China had been harming and causing damage to the marine environment
of the South China Sea through these practices and despite objections from the surrounding states,
China had not ceased its actions. It was also noted that while some of the fishing ships were not state-
appointed ships and were being manned by non-state actors, the Chinese government had neither
condemned their actions nor made any efforts to stop them from proceeding. The Tribunal, assisted by
three independent experts on coral reef biology, expert briefs and satellite imagery, found that China
was in breach of the Convention for failing to stop the fishing vessels from engaging in harmful
harvesting practices[30] and also for its island-building activities[31]. The Tribunal further opined that
China’s construction on Mischief Reef, without authorization from Philippines was in violation of
Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and a breach of the
Convention[32].

The next consideration before the Tribunal was the demeanour of China’s law enforcement vessels at
Scarborough Shoal[33] and the lawfulness of these actions. The Philippines also raised the issue under
the relevant provisions of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing of Collisions at
Sea, 1972 (COLREGS). The Tribunal found that China, through the actions of its law enforcement vessels,
endangered Philippine vessels and personnel and created a serious risk of collision and found China in
breach of Article 94 of the Convention[34].

The Tribunal, in response to Submission 14 of the Philippines, opined that China had, in the course of
the proceedings of this arbitration, aggravated and extended its disputes with Philippines, through its
actions of dredging, artificial island-building and construction activities[35].

Lastly, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to make any further declaration, owing to the fact that both
the parties are already parties to the Convention and are already obliged to comply with it.
 Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Morato Digest

Facts

The SC invalidated the Contract of Lease between PCSO and Phil Gaming Mgt Corp (PGMC) on the
ground of violation PSCO’s charter. Then, the parties negotiated a new agreement that would be
consistent with such a charter.

(Jan 1995) The parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) where PGMC leased online lottery
equipment and accessories to PCSO. Rental is 4.3% of the gross ticket sales of PCSO. Term is 8 years.

A month after, this case was filed by Kilosbayan et al. that described themselves as “taxpayers and
concerned citizens.”, composed of civic-spirited citizens and religious people committed for the truth
and renewal.

They are seeking to declare ELA as invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract
of Lease nullified in the first case – still violative of the PCSO’s Charter.

PCSO and PGMC questioned their standing to bring this suit.

Issue

Are Petitioners Kilosbayan Inc., and certain persons and politicians entitled to bring this suit or to be a
party to this case?

Ruling

No. Because the issue, in this case, is no longer about “standing” (which was the standing in the previous
case) but WON they are “real parties in interest” within the meaning of Section 2.

This case involves an action for annulment of contracts, hence, the parties must be those who will be
prejudiced in their rights with respect to the contract.

Parties in interest require that “Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest.”

The question as to the real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefitted or
injured by the judgment or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’

The kind of interest that is concrete and will entitle him to recover (if the evidence is sufficient) must
be→present substantial interest.

Kilosbayan et al have legal standing but are not a real party in interest. The former is sufficient legal
interest and injury. The latter is present substantial interest (injury or benefit) in the contract.
 Ocampo v. Enriquez | Case Digest

FACTS:

Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte.

Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA)
Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their
capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members of the
Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member
of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and families of enforced
disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several
others, in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during
the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino
citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional
Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the
Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts.

4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic and international laws.

RULING:

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion
of the last two superfluous.

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference
or dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the
assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.
Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.cralawred As they are concerned with questions of
policy and

issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be
beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred
at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) to
allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national
military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on
his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi

Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.

Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act
complained of, such proper party has no standing.

Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their
capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers,
have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will
suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially being assailed is
the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that
Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the
Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes
available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed
to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this
case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such
petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve
questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven
necessary.

Constitutionality

The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence.

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect
of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but
also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For
them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.”
To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art.
VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.

There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a
people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything
remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing.
Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by
Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of
its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.”

xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.

Note:

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, C.J.:

The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’ enduring values, which this Court must
zealously protect.

Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987 Constitution embodies the Filipinos’
enduring values. The protection of those values has consequently become the duty of the Court. That
this is the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly comported itself in its
constitutional role has been declared in various fashions by the Court itself.

See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the environment, women, children,
labor, the indigenous people, and consistently, those who have been or are in danger of being deprived
of their human rights.

Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the protection
of human rights, and how the Court in turn described this duty when it promulgated the writs of
kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.

Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part of this Court to protect the
cherished values of the Constitution would be a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is designed to be
passive relative to the “active” nature of the political departments is a given. But when called upon to
discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986 Supreme Court has shown zealousness in the
protection of constitutional rights, a zealousness that has been its hallmark from then up to now. It
cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of protective activism.
 ACCFA v Cugco

FACTS:

ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery
was reorganized and its named changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land Reform
Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association were referred to
as Union in the ACCFA.

The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of one year.
Few months have passed, however,The Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint against the
ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practices and non implementation of said
agreement. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from committing further acts tending
to discourage the Union members in the exercise of their right to self-organizatoin, to comply with and
implement the provisions of the CBA, and to bargain with good faith with the complainants. ACCFA
moved to reconsider but it was turned down in a resolution. ACCFA appealed by certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental functions.

RULING:

Yes. The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act No.
3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose Executive Order
No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration.

The law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and
programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land
Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service
laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the
governmental character of its functions disappears.
 VFP vs Reyes Case Digest – G. R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006

This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with a
prayer to declare as void Department Circular No. 04 of the Department of National Defense (DND),
dated 10 June 2002.

Petitioner in this case is the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP), a corporate body organized
under Republic Act No. 2640, dated 18 June 1960, as amended, and duly registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Respondent Angelo T. Reyes was the Secretary of National Defense (DND
Secretary) who issued the assailed Department Circular No. 04, dated 10 June 2002. Respondent
Edgardo E. Batenga was the DND Undersecretary for Civil Relations and Administration who was tasked
by the respondent DND Secretary to conduct an extensive management audit of the records of the
petitioner.

Facts

On June 10, 2002 respondent Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary issued the assailed DND
Department Circular No. 04 entitled “Further Implementing the Provisions of Section 12 and 23 of
Republic Act No. 2640” which stipulates the details of the Department’s exercise of control and
supervision over the Veteran’s Federation of the Philippines (VFP)

Issue

Whether VFP is a private corporation

Ruling

No.The protection of interests was veterans is not only meant to promote social justice but is also
intended to reward patriotism. All of the functions in Section 4 of RA 2640 concern the well-being of war
veterans. It would be an injustice of catastrophic proportions to say that it is beyond sovereignty’s
power to reward the people who defended her.

The petition is dismissed and the validity of DND Department Circular No.04 is affirmed.

In sum, the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 does not supplant nor modify and is, on the
contrary, perfectly in consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640. Petitioner VFP is a public corporation. As such,
it can be placed under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense, who
consequently has the power to conduct an extensive management audit of the petitioner corporation.
 Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the
rank of Brigadier General. when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS).

During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the
acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing
projects.

AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual
vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors.

Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The
unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the
actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter.

Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the
basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-
RSBS.

Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which
includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with
27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
documents.

After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.

THE Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and
12 informations for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the
informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA) recommended the contrary, stressing
that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale,
and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property.

The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). The OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP
recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito
Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the
OMB-Military was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s first
motion for reconsideration.

A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. It found that petitioner indeed
participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various
agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per
square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the
execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of P3,000.00 per
square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s
continued prosecution.

Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors.

The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan
explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the
case.

ISSUE:

Did the Sandiganbayan err in denying petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending
resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause
against?

HELD:

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman sanction the immediate filing of an information
in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15,
Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of
probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the
Rules, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –

a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be
allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman,
or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where
the information has already been filed in court;

b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the
motion.
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing
of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the
normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information.

Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court
must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or
from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is
later, thus:

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and
Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be
held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
xxx

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same
thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court.

Furthermore, Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it
proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
 MIAA v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA)

As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,...
The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of
through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.

The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax
granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with... respondent City
of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax
already due.

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque

The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings
should MIAA fail to pay the... real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction

The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying... against,
and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary period.

Court of Appeals also denied... motion for reconsideration... the present petition for review.

MIAA insists that it is... exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 of the Local Government Code
because the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by... the Republic.

To justify the exemption, MIAA invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself.

Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled corporations" upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code.
Issues:

whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws.

MIAA are exem... e of whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax
under existing laws. If so exempt, then the real estate tax asse

Ruling:

We rule that MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments.

First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines and thus... exempt from real estate tax.

There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate
tax. However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.

Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation, MIAA does not qualify as a government-
owned or controlled corporation.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that
MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not
become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only... governmental but also
corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,... police
authority... and the levying of fees and charges.

At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the... powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar
as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order."

When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power
is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must
be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person,... article or activity is taxable
is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax
national government instrumentalities.

Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption.
However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local
taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national... government instrumentality.
There must be express language in the law empowering local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local... governments.

FUNA v. MECO

Facts:

On 23 August 2010, petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a “copy of the latest financial and
audit report” of the MECO invoking, for that purpose, his “constitutional right to information on matters
of public concern.” The petitioner made the request on the belief that the MECO, being under the
“operational supervision” of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC) and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

Petitioner’s letter was received by COA Assistant Commissioner Jaime P. Naranjo, the following day. On
25 August 2010, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum referring the petitioner’s
request to COA Assistant Commissioner Emma M. Espina for “further disposition.” In this memorandum,
however, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo revealed that the MECO was “not among the agencies
audited by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector.”

Issue: Whether or not MECO is a GOCC covered by the auditing power of COA.

Held:

No. Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by reason of some
“special function or jurisdiction” they perform or exercise, are allotted “operational autonomy” and are
“not integrated within the department framework.” Subsumed under the rubric “government
instrumentality” are the following entities:

1. regulatory agencies,

2. Chartered institutions,

3. government corporate entities or government instrumentalities with corporate powers (GCE/GICP),

and

4. GOCCs

The Administrative Code defines a GOCC:

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of
its capital stock:
The above definition is, in turn, replicated in the more recent Republic Act No. 10149 or the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011 m, to wit:

(o) Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporation (GOCC) refers to any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to
the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock: . . . .

GOCCs, therefore, are “stock or non-stock” corporations “vested with functions relating to public needs”
that are “owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities.” By definition, three
attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock or non-stock corporation; second,
the public character of its function; and third, government ownership over the same.

Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.

In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and second attributes. It is the
third attribute, which the MECO lacks.

The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially
entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan
without jeopardizing the country’s faithful commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However,
despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
“verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects under Section 2 (6)
of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection
of such “verification fees” and “consular fees” should be audited by the COA.
 PSPCA VS. COA

FACTS:

The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No.
1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was
created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner,
as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or
the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may
tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.

At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in
existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the SEC.

For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the
protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend
violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and
collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.

Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the
fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the
cruel treatment of animals is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the
Government is duty bound to enforce;

When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a
private entity and not under the said commission. It argued that COA covers only government entities.
On the other hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.

RULING:

YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot be applied. Essentially,
the “charter test” provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or
controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public
function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the
CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS.

And since the “charter test” had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows
that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted
on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the
purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the
retrospective effect.

Second, a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any
agency of the State, unlike GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the
petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and
solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally
accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a
common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be
managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its by-laws in force.”

Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS at the latter’s initiative,
and not through the GSIS, which should be the case if the employees are considered government
employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private entity.

Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body politic” because its primary purpose is
to secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This
argument, is not tenable. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does
not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be
private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the public
good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private
corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives.
While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge
functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse,
telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that
a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of
service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public
corporation.

Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide,
for the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the interest, good, or
convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a private corporation; yet, it is created for a public
benefit. Private schools and universities are likewise private corporations; and yet, they are rendering
public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so with
all common carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with
gifts or donations from private individuals.
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the
totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the
latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that
corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered
cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by the State as its own
device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.

Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter to render
periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the President, the
petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality.

This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence and
powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature,
whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporations—as creatures of the State, there is a
reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it
acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the
State may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it.
 Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012, which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the islands.

Facts

When the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila they proclaimed among other things
that “all laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as the executive and judicial institution, shall
continue to be effective for the time being as in the past. When General Mac Arthur returned in Leyte,
he proclaimed that “the laws existing in the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines are
in all full force and effect and legally binding” and that “all laws, regulations, and processes of any other
government on the Philippines than that of the said commonwealth are null and void without legal
effect.

Issue

Whether the government established during the Japanese occupation was a de facto government.

Ruling and Analysis

Yes.

The government established under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic
of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was a civil government and a de facto government of
the second kind: that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of the war. The distinguishing characteristics of this kind of de facto
government are;

that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government; and
that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration
of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the
warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon
proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect
to the items specifically described in the warrant.

FACTS:

Based on the mandate of President Corazon Aquino’s E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government which was tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, the AFP
Anti-Graft Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas. The AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas, finding ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of
₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 against Ramas. The Amended
Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the
other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as
a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas. It alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate
of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. It prayed for forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds
and equipment in favor of the State.
In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications
equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only,
Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken
from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground that there was an illegal search
and seizure of the items confiscated. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to
Elizabeth Dimaano.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Petitioner argues that the
exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had
already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may
confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at
the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

ISSUES:

Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986, immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution.

Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

RULING:

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the

interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the takeover of
private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and
search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the
Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or “Freedom” Constitution recognizes
the power and duty of the President to enact “measures to achieve the mandate of the people to
recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect
the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.” And as also
already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the
“authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.”

Even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed

responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend
it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the Declaration. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum. The Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international
law laid down in the

Covenant. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for
the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. Clearly, the raiding
team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void,
and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person
from whom the raiding seized them, Dimaano.
 Kuroda v. Jalandoni

FACTS:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944, who
is now charged before a Military Commission with having unlawfully disregarded and failed “to
discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war” — comes before
this Court seeking to establish the illegality of EO No. 68, which established a National War Crimes
Offices and provides that persons accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commission; and to
permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.

Kuroda argues that EO No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our
constitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a
signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare
and, therefore, petitioner is charged of `crimes’ not based on law, national and international. Hence,
petitioner argues — “That in view of the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an
unconstitutional law and an illegal order, this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein
petitioner.”

ISSUE:
WON the Philippines can adopt the rules and regulations laid down on The Hague and Geneva
Conventions notwithstanding that it is not a signatory thereto and whether it can create a Military
Commission to try violations of the Hague Convention?

HELD:

Yes. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and
regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines
on the 29th day of July, 1947. This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our
Constitution provides in its section 3, that

“The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”

In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including
the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization, are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.

“War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities, incidents
of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. `An important incident to a
conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the
enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart
or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.’ (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an
aspect of waging war. And, in the language of a writer, a military commission `has jurisdiction so long as
a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice, or military occupation, up to
the effective date of a treaty of peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty agreement.’ (Cowls, Trial of
War Criminals by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)”

Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished
aspect of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement
of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is
not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such
rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law
as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was
under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together with the United
States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all,
our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those
who committed crimes against our people.
 Tanada v. Angara

Facts:

Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith.

They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits
and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict
and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.

Held:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty,
particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the
proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level,
it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a
hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity,
with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles
of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest
and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements
must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and
in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the
sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation
of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules
governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a
state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2)
limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build
its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination”
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply
to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the
fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor
of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy
of laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Bayan v Zamora

Facts:

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized... the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel.
To further strengthen their defense and security... relationship, the Philippines and the United States
entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.

In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and
the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On

1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of

Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military
bases in the Philippines.

With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted
between the two... countries were held in abeyance.

Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of
America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
On... the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr.,
to exchange notes on "the complementing strategic interests of... the United States and the Philippines
in the Asia-Pacific region." Both sides discussed... the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA for brevity).

Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States

Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on

1998

, President

Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.

the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to
the Senate... the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President... nd the VFA,... for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.

The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating
the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present
in the Philippines

Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable... considering that the VFA has for its subject
the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is
not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the... temporary visits of United
States personnel engaged in joint military exercises.

Issues:

Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA?

Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?

Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?

Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military
personnel?

Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or
higher?... whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its
concurrence to the VFA.

Ruling:

A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that
the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not... merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute complained... of.

inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any
allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended,... petitioners, as
taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the
VFA.

Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Tañada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators,
do not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit.

In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases.

the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of
Governors... authorizing its National President to commence the present action.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues
raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural
barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:

"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate."

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly... concurred in by the senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."

Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the
concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject
treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of... the Philippines.
All treaties or... international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter,
coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid
and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.

the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render... compliance with the
constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25,
Article XVIII further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred... in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such
by the other contracting state.

concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so... required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international
agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII... simply provides that the treaty be "duly
concurred in by the Senate."

As noted, the "concurrence requirement" under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate
contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least... two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an... agreement under international law, the
said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers.

International law continues to make... no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they
are equally binding obligations upon nations.

In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even with... out the
concurrence of the Senate or Congress.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.

For as long as the united States of America accepts or... acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds
itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with
the mandate of the Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the
Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said
treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and... responsibilities embodied thereunder.

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not... in the legislature. The role of
the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes
between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on
our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the... terms of the agreement.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

Saguisag v. Executive Secretary

Facts:

petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its
Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated petitions
by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for
the Philippine government, with the United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to
permanently enjoin its implementation.

petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional
restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation,
and nuclear weapons.[7]

Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to
the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the
provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except
under a treaty concurred in by the Senate

Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the
plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been established
by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the
Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines.

Issues:

constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)

Ruling:

we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized
under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA
along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an
executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both
treaties.

Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines'
legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to
enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.
This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting
the Decision.

Principles:

On verba legis interpretation... verba legis

Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity,
which legal construction strictly abhors.

The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial entry"
mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional
provision.

Lim v. Executive Secretary

Facts:

Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1."
These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined... training operations involving Filipino
and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the
Mutual Defense Treaty,[1] a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United
States in

The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism
campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on
September 11, 2001.

On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.

Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO,
on the other hand, aver that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and
Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted... in Mindanao.
Issues:

whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement

Ruling:

The Solicitor General asks that we accord due... deference to the executive determination that
"Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the VFA, considering the President's monopoly in the field of foreign
relations and her role as commander-in-chief of the Philippine armed forces.

The holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the framework of the treaty antecedents to which
the Philippines bound itself.

The MDT has been described as the "core" of the defense relationship... between the Philippines and its
traditional ally, the United States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of
our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the "Balikatan" is the largest
such training exercise directly... supporting the MDT's objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA
adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.

In this manner, visiting US... forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military.
As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to
protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in... distress,
disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and
humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to
assume that "Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls
under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the... context of the agreement. Both the
history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-
related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized.

The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive
war on Philippine territory.
From the facts obtaining, we find that the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" joint military exercise has not
intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for correction on our part. In other
words, respondents in the case... at bar have not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to
the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.

Principles:

The VFA provides the "regulatory mechanism" by which "United States military and civilian personnel
[may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine

Government."

Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine
military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.

The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact
meaning of which was left undefined.
 Mijares v Ranada

FACTS:

May 9 1991: a complaint was filed by ten Filipino citizens representing a class of 10,000 members who
each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the
hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime with the United States District Court (US
District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos Estate)

US District Court and Affirmed by US CA: awarded them $1,964,005,859.90

Petitioners filed Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment

Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing
fees paying only P410

Petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary
estimation

RTC: estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately P472 and dismissing the case
without prejudice

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of a foreign judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation

HELD: NO. (But belongs to "other actions not involving property") petition is GRANTED.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For
an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an
action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title

However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the
grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy even if such
judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the
losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. Consequently, the party attacking a
foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Absent perhaps a
statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be
brought before the regular courts.

There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the
foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the
right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the
facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action
to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts
from which it prescinds.

As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction
of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The
limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect
party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants,
to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in
a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law:
"rest and quietness." If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation.

Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a
foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts

The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at
the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit
of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not
involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse
of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the
complaint.

Pharmaceutical v DOH
FACTS : Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of
the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of
the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued
by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held:YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that
conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of
the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect
to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it
obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

Knights of Rizal v DMCI

FACTS:

A Resolution was issued to temporarily suspend the building permit of DMCI-PDI, citing that the Torre de
Manila Condo will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of
our hero, Jose Rizal, and would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas
Boulevard vantage point.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de
Manila project.

(A writ of mandamus is an order from a court to an inferior government official ordering the
government official to properly fulfill their official duties or correct an abuse of discretion.)

RULING:

No. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. The Court has allowed or upheld
actions that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not
contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more
equitable solution to the controversy.
There is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is “contrary to morals, customs, and
public order” or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. There is no law prohibiting the
construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background “view, vista, sightline, or setting”
of the Rizal Monument.

IBP v Zamora

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.