Hermida, Rona Joy P.

2022-0266
Statutory Construction
Friday, 7:30-9:30PM

Case Title: BANAWA vs MIRANO

G.R. No. 24750
[Date of the Decision: May 16, 1980]

Facts: Maria Mirano a niece of appellant Juliana Mendoza, and who was then about nine
years old, was taken in by the appellants-spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, in
the latter’s house in Taal Batangas. Appellants spouses being childless, treated and reared
her up like their own child.

A few years later, spouses acquire several parcels of land which 2 of them are Iba Property
(Parcel 1) and Carsuche Proprety (Parcel2). On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria
Mirano died in Taal, Batangas while still living with the spouses. At the time of her death she
left as her only nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs, namely Primitiva Mirano (surviving
sister) and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano (children of a deceased brother, Martin Mirano)

The plaintiff claimed the ownership of Iba and Carsuche properties on the following basis:

Iba Property- A deed of sale amounted to Php2,000 in favor of Maria Mirano,

acknowledged before notary public.

By contrast, the defendant claimed the ownership over Iba property upon their assertion
that the money used in buying said land pertained to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and
Juliana Mendoza. Placido Punzalan (original owner) has a loan from the spouses amounted
to Php4 080 but upon failure to discharged said obligation, he agreed to sell the land for
Php3 700 and to reimburse the difference of Php380.

Defendants likewise maintain that the sale was made to appear in favor of Maria Mirano
because said spouses being already old, they want to leave something to Maria Mirano for
her to lean upon when they would have been gone. They, however, made Maria understand
that although the property was placed under her name, they would continue to be the
owners thereof, to administer and enjoy the fruits of the same as long as they live, and that
she would become the owner of the land only after their death.

Carsuche Property– The plaintiff claim that the sale was evidenced by public instrument
executed before and ratified by Notary public Vicente Ilagan and the vendee in the said
document was Maria Mirano.

The defendant on the other hand assert that the sale was evidenced by private writing
prepared in the writing of Roman Biscocho (original owner) and that it was in favor of
spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
Issue #1: W/N court of appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that the placing of iba
property in the name of the late maria mirano was in the nature of a donation inter-vivos.

Held #1:

Issue #2: W/N the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that
petitioners’ interpretation of article 632 of the old civil code is too literal and ignores the
rationale of the legal provision.

Held #2:

Issue #3: W/N the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that the
‘exceptive’ clause’ of article 1448 of the civil code is applicable in the present case.

Held #3:

Issue #4: W/N the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that section 5,
rule 100 of the old rules of court does not apply in the instant case because Maria Mirano
was not legally adopted.

Held #4:

Issue #5: W/N the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in law in ruling with respect to
the carsuche property (lot no. 2) that the deed of sale executed in 1940 in favor of the
petitioners Doroteo banawa and his wife Juliana Mendoza and which was duly registered did
not impair the pretended sale to maria Mirano

Held #5:
 DEL MAR vs PAGCOR
G.R. No. 138298
[Date of the Decision: November 29, 2000]

SUMMARY 
PAGCOR requested legal advice from the Secretary of Justice
if it’s authorized under its charter to operate
 jai-alai games (a form of sport). The Secretary of Justice said that PAGCOR has the
authority; hence PAGCOR has thepower under its charter to operate. Petitioner del Mar filed
a petition for prohibition preventing PAGCOR from managing jai-
alai since its illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own
Charter. However,
PAGCOR still entered in an agreement with BELLE and FILGAME, hence, del Mar filed a
Petition for Certiorariquestioning the validity of the agreement. Members of the House of
Representative also filed a petition stating thatoperation of PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal
because it is not included in its scope. Respondents then questioned the
locusstandi
or legal standing of petitioners filing as taxpayers and members of the House of
representatives. As stated by theCourt, they have legal standing to the case since it affects
public interest (involves taxes) and affects the powers of thelegislative.

F A C T S .
 PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not
it is authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country
in relation to Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869.
 The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate
and maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of
sport or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a
legislative franchise for the purpose.
 On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a Petition for Prohibition to prevent PAGCOR
from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games on the ground
that the act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or
PAGCOR’s own Charter.
 On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR entered into an agreement with BELLE and
FILGAME wherein the latterparties would provide all the required facilities and
requirements for the establishment and operation of jai-alai.
 On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
questioning the validity of the agreement stating that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction,
authority, legislative franchise, or authority to enter into such agreement for the
operation and establishment of jai-alai games.
 A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed
a Petition for Injunction. APetition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri
alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included
in PAGCOR’s scope.
 Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor, and intervenor Zubiri are suing as taxpayers
and in their capacity as the members of the House of Representatives.
  Respondent questions the locus standi  or the standing of the petitioners to file the
petition at bar as taxpayers andas legislators because the operation of jai-alai does
not involve the disbursement of public funds.

I S S U E S & R A T I O
.1. WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal standing to file the petition
 –
 YES.
As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is without an “oven ready” legal support. A part
y suing as taxpayer must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation. Inessence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public moneyis being deflected to any improper
purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public fundsthrough
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. The record shown under their
agreement is barren ofevidence that the operation and management of jai-alai by the
PAGCOR involves expenditure of public money. The Courtalso holds that as members of the
House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to file the petition at bar. The
operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive
power to grant franchise.
Hence, powers of Congress are being impared, so as the powers of each of its members.

D E C I S I O N  
Petitioners have legal standing to file the petition
 PEOPLE vs MAPA
G.R. No. 22301
[Date of the Decision: August 30, 1967]

Facts:

Defendant Mapa was caught having in his possession a home made revolver, caliber .22
without serial number and with six rounds of ammunition, without any license. Thus, he was
charged and convicted with the crime of illegal possession of firearms by the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

According to the defendant, he was a duly appointed secret agent of Honorable Feliciano
Leviste, the then Governor of Batangas, and that he was directed by the latter to proceed to
Manila, Pasay and Quezon for a confidential mission. These statements are corroborated by
proper document exhibits.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant's appiontment to and holding a position of secret agent to the
provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to the prosecution for the crime of
illegal possession of fire arms and ammunition.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. No
provision was made for a secret agent to be exempted from the licensing of firearms. The
law is explicit and it specifically stated that it is unlawful for any person to possess any
firearms, detached parts of firearm and ammunition. However, there are exceptions which a
secret agent is still not included. Officers, Soldiers, Sailors or Marines of AFP, Philippine
Constabulary, Guards employed by the Bureau of Prisons, Municipal Police, Provincial
Governors, Lieutenant Governors, Provincial Treasurers, Municipal Treasurers, Municipal
Mayor and Guards of Provincial Prisoners and jails are exempted from this provision when
such firearms are in possession for use in the performance of their official duties.

No Provision is made for secret agent. Thus, he is not exempted. The first and fundamental
duty of the court is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation comes only after it has
demonstrated that the application is impossible or inadequate.
 JOYA vs PCGG
G.R. No. 96541
[Date of the Decision: August 24, 1993]

Facts: Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by
then Pres. Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York to
auction off Old Masters Paintings and the 18th and19th century silverware alleged to be part
of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf of RP. 35
petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG from proceeding
with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule. Petitioners claim that,
as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth and that the
paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and the
people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art alleging that they have been
deprived of their right to public property without due process of law, they have the legal
personality tor e strain the respondents who are acting contrary to their public
duty toc on serve the artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the
Constitution and RA 4846.

Issue: Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its
power of judicial review over this case.

Held: NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, because they are
not the legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation established to promote non-
Philippine arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to the Marcos couple on their silver
wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the petitioners
seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed not
because they are after the fulfilment of a positive duty required of the
respondent public officials which is the only ground for a writ of mandamus to be issued.
The taxpayers’ suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy – one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and
academic when its purpose has become stale, such as this case. Since the purpose of this
petition for prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from holding the auction sale of the
artworks on a particular date which had long past, the issues raised have become moot and
academic. Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing
when paramount public interest is involved. However, there is no such justification in this
petition.

Petition dismissed.

CASCO PH CHEMICAL CO INC vs GIMENEZ

G.R. No. 17931
[Date of the Decision: February 28, 1963]
Facts:

On July 1, 1959, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2609 (Foreign Exchange margin Fee Law),
the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% foreign exchange
transactions. Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., a manufacturer of resin glues,
had bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde – raw materials
for the said glues – and were thus paying for the margin fees required.

Relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said bank declaring that the
separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee, the petitioner
sought for a refund of the margin fees that had been paid. This was denied by the Auditor
of the said Bank stating that the claim was not in accord with the provisions of section 2,
paragraph XVIII of R.A. 2609.

ISSUE: Whether “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee

HELD/RULING:

 “Urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from law.

 The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
o The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for
the importation of the following:
 XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and
hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
(Emphasis provided.)
 Urea formaldehyde is different from urea and formaldehyde, the
former being a finished product. It is well settled that the enrolled bill
– which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and
formaldehyde” – is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. The
courts cannot speculate that there had been an error in the printing of
the bill as this shall violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall
there have been any error in the printing, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
 ENDENCIA vs DAVID
G.R. No.
[Date of the Decision: August 31, 1953]
FACTS:

Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and
Jugo’s salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the
constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries
and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from
the compensation received by judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

RULING:

No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial
officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the
Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their
service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the
republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary
with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.
 PEOPLE vs JABINAL
G.R. No. 30061
[Date of the Decision: February 27, 1974]
Facts:

 The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of
Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.

 As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on
September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however,
contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was
likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the
authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

 Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court
nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.

Issue:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

HELD:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
 PEOPLE vs JABINAL
G.R. No. 30061
[Date of the Decision: February 27, 1974]

FACTS
Eugenio Garcia was found guilty of the crime of robbery. He was 17 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime. The lower court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prison correctional to 8 years
of resonator for the crime of robbery of which he was found guilty. He was also sentenced
to pay the offend ed party, jointly and severally with the other accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity.
Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing from 18 to 16 the
age below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or care of a public or private,
benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison,
has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication
has also amended paragraph 2 of article 68of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that when the
offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period."

ISSUE
Whether or not Garcia being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to
the privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Article 68, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING
No. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given
to each and every part thereof, and conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or
so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language." An amended act is
ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute has been repealed, and anew and independent act in the
amended form had been adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated byt he courts, so far as regards
any action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted
in its amended form. The amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always been
contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations between the
state and others. Where an amendment leaves certain portions of the original actinic hanged, such portions
are continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they had before the amendment. So where
an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in
the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or substantially, are
regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment. "There is no irreconcilable
conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it now stands and article 80as amended. There is no
incompatibility between granting accused of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged
 VERA vs AVELINO

Case. Petition for mandamus compel Senate to let petitioners take seat as Senators

Facts. The nation had an election. Vera et al won in said election. COMELEC submitted a
report to the Senate and the President about the acts of terrorism in certain provinces that
precluded a clean election. Acting on COMELEC’s submission, the Senate issued the
Pendatun Resolution which prohibit Vera et al from assuming office.

Vera et al filed the present petition.

Issue. Has the Senate gravely abused its discretion? -No

Ratio. Senate has not because the present case is well within its mandated powers, and not
in ET. Section 17, Art. VI provides that ET is “the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly”. A correct interpretation of the
provision, however, denotes that the tribunal has jurisdiction over all “contests” relating to
election, returns, and qualifications. Gleaning on the framers’ intent, they had no intention
of putting all powers on ET but power over “contests” only. Contest are herein defined as
“statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to
have himself inducted into the office.”

To illustrate the residual power on Senate. Suppose, the Court says, that a former convict is
elected as Congressman. No opponents, hence no protest. But, any member of the House
can prompt an investigation on the Congressman. This does not constitute election protest,
but the power of the House relating to qualification standards.
 INCHIONG vs HERNANDEZ

Facts:

RA 1180 – An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was enacted to nationalize the retail trade
business in the Philippines. The law prohibits persons not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade and
other prohibitions and regulations.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents
the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law. SolGen content that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police
power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of
national economic survival.

Issue:

Whether or not the Act is unconstitutional because it denies alien residents the equal
protection of the laws.

Held:
No.

Ratio:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and
unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate
prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution.