CONSTI2

Imbong v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 204819
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca

G.R No. L-11390
FACTS: Engracio Palanca mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco
Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810
without returning again to the Philippines. As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the
institution of the present action, it was necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure of the
proceeding to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of
the summons the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China.
It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement.
After publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by
default was rendered. The decision was published for sale by public auction and was held with
the bank as the highest bidder.
On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. After 7 years after the confirmation of
sale a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto.
The order of default and the judgment rendered was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered theron were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter
of the action
2) Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
1) YES. The SC held that jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may
result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, where it is brought into actual
 custody of the law, or may result from the institution of legal proceedings which gives the court
the power over the property under special provisions of the law.

Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the
property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.

- The Jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive object of such an
action, is evidently based upon the following conditions:
1) Property located within the district
2) Purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it
by the mortgage
3) The court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into its custody, if
necessary, and exposes it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt.
- Failure of clerk to send notice by mail: Does not defeat the jurisdiction of the court over the
mortgaged property.
2) The making of the order by the court constituted a compliance with the law, in so far as
necessary to constitute due process of law, and that if the clerk failed to send the notice, his
dereliction in the performance of his duty was an irregularity which did not constitute an
infringement of the Philippine Bill declaring that no person shall be deprived of property without
due process of law.
- due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a
court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
-

Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations

G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940, En Banc.

FACTS: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a
new trial. It avers that Teodoro’s claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY
making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union
Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.
ISSUE:
RULING:
 Ichong v. Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995
FACTS: Petitioner Ichong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180,
brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin
the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasures, from enforcing its provisions. Ichong attacks the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that: 1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the law and deprives
them of their liberty and property without due process of law; 2) the subject of the Act is
not expressed or comprehended in the title; 3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; 4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, (violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Art. 13, Sec 8, of Art. 14)
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: 1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; 2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; 3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; 4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s rights to
due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution
RULING:
NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police power
of the State. It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and
danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and control of retail business and free
citizens and country from the said dominance and control.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. So the State can deprive persons of life,
liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into
classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.

 Prospective
  In equal protection, u have to be civilly situated.
 National trade = ichong doctrine
 State will never prohibit trade unless it is illegal = City of Manila vs . Laguio
 Reasonableness: (1) Valid exercise of authority 2)Meron bang bad faith) it involves the
proper use of validly delegated given authority.
 When an act is mala prohibita = offense prohibited by statute but not inherently
evil/wrong
 Right to be heard is inviolable

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No. 74457, 20 March 1987, En Banc

FACTS:
Former President Marcos has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos
and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of EO no. 626, effective
Oct. 25, 1980.
On January 13, 1984, petitioner Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo,
for violation / not complying with the requirement of EO no. 626 “no carabao regardless of age,
sex, physical condition, or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another.”
(registered in the municipal treasurer and cert of transfer secured) (Art. 2140 – CHATTEL
MORTGAGE LAW)
The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the exec order and the recovery of the
carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained, and the court
declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC and has come to petition for
review on certiorari.
Petitioner claims that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a
right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE:
Is E.O 626-A constitutional?

RULING:
The SC found E.O 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. The carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

Tanada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915
FACTS: The petitioners (Lorenzo Tanada) filed for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent
(Juan Tuvera). (remedy that can be used to compel respondents to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations, and administrative orders.
Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided”, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not; - that publication means complete publication. – that the publication must be
made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the presidential
issuances in question

RULING: Court orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances. The publication of presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first
be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Court declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate information
against President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest ranking official, for violation of the
Plunder Law, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and employyes, Perjury, and Illegal use of an Alias.

On April 11, 2001, petitioner, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition
of the terms “combination” and “series” in the kay phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts”. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional
for being impermissibly vague and overboard and deny him the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is vague or ambiguous, thus denies the petitioner of
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
RULING: NO. The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation; As long as the law affords some
comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City

FACTS: President Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s campaign of “Oplan Rody” to implement curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations nationwide.
Respondents Navotas, Manila and QC started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances.
Petitionrs, SPARK (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan) – an association of young adults
and minors that aims to forward a free and just society. They argue that: Curfew Ordinances
are unconstitutional because they a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, as
it falls under the void for vagueness doctrine, b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; c) deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel w/o substantive due process; d) deprive parents of
their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.
Petitioners proffer that the Curfew Ordinances fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being
narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their
purpose arguing that the prohibition of minors will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of children of the community.
Petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to
the parents’ prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right
in the rearing of the youth.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional

RULING: Petition is partially granted, Ordinance No. 8046, issued by local government of City
of Manila, and issued by local government of Navotas City declared unconstitutional and thus,
null and void. While Ordinance no. SP-2301, issued by local government of Quezon City
declared constitutional, and thus, valid.

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567

FACTS:
Feb 1, 1988, Ronnie Javelon (fictitious name) listed in the hospital records, a member of New
Peoples Army (NPA) sparrows was being treated for a gunshot wound, It was found out his real
name was Rolando Dural, and is responsible for the murder of 2 CAPCOM Soldiers.
As a consequence of the identification, Rolando was charged with the crime of “Double Murder
with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” No bail was recommended.
As to Rolando, he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM Soldiers nor was
he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said
shooting incident. His warrantless arrest is unjustified. HOWEVER, he was arrested for being
a member of NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
8 petitioners filed habeas corpus (writ requiring a person under arrest to secure release).
Respondents assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid information
filed in court against them.
Petitioners counter their detention is unlawful as their arrests were 1) warrantless and 2) no
preliminary investigation was conducted, thus, null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dural and the other petitioners were lawfully arrested
RULING: YES. As to crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes or offenses against the State are in the nature of a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is JUSTIFIED as it can be said that the was committing an
offense when arrested. Hence, Habeas corpus is NOT ALLOWED.

IF I WERE THE JUDGE,

PRIVACY IN GENERAL
ARTICLE 3, SECTION 2-3:
Sec 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec 3: (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Grisworld v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965)
FACTS: Appellants were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and
medical advice on how to prevent conception, and, following examination, prescribing a
contraceptive device or material for the wife’s use.
A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent
conception.
Appellants claimed that the accessory statute violated the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution
ISSUE: Does the US Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples?
RULING: The 1st Amendment of the US Constitution has a penumbra where privacy is
protected from governmental intrusion. The association of marriage is a privacy right older than
the Bill of Rights, hence, not specifically protected in either the Bill of Rights or the
Constitution. Nonetheless, it is aright rooted in its protection mandated by (1st, 9th, 14th) US
Constitutional Amendments.
Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, En Banc.
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Morfe filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance (CFI)
questioning the provision under RA 3019 “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” whereby fov’t
officials are required to periodically file a sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income,
and liabilities. Claiming that it is unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional rights to due
process, right to privacy, right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and right against self-
incrimination. As it compels him to disclose his assets and liabilities while holding a position in
public service.
CFI declared that the provision is unconstitutional because the requirement exceeded the
permissible limit of police power, and offensive to the due process clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision is unconstitutional
RULING: NO. As the relationship between the requirement of the law and its objective is not so
far reach because it emphasizes that in subjecting him to such compulsory revelation of his
assets and liabilities, there is no constitutional intrusion in a private sphere.
SC held that the Constitution provides freedom from unlawful governmental restraints, which
necessarily includes the right to privacy or be let alone in a civilized society.

Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, Third Division.
FACTS: Petitioners are both minors and graduating hs students of STC. They took pictures of
themselves dressed only in brassieres. It was uploaded by one of their friends on facebook.
Escudero, a computer teacher at STC learned from her students about the photos on facebook.
Escudero reported the matter and showed the photos to Tigol, STC’S Discipline-In-charge, for
appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the student handbook.

1. Possession of alcoholic
drinks outside the school
campus;
2. Engaging in immoral,
indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking
alcoholic beverages in public
places;
4. Apparel that exposes the
underwear;
5.Clothing that advocates
unhealthy behavior; depicts
obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages,
language or symbols; and 6.
Posing and
uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body
exposure.
1. Possession of alcoholic
drinks outside the school
campus;
2. Engaging in immoral,
indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking
alcoholic beverages in public
places;
4. Apparel that exposes the
underwear;
5.Clothing that advocates
unhealthy behavior; depicts
obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages,
language or symbols; and 6.
Posing and
uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body
exposure.
1. Possession of alcoholic
drinks outside the school
campus;
2. Engaging in immoral,
indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking
alcoholic beverages in public
places;
4. Apparel that exposes the
underwear;
5.Clothing that advocates
unhealthy behavior; depicts
obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages,
language or symbols; and 6.
Posing and
uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body
exposure.
1. Possession of alchoholic drinks outside campus
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene, or lewd acts
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places
4. Apparel that expose the underwear
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behavior; contains sexually suggestive messages, language
or symbols
6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure

STC’s principal informed the parent that they cannot join the commencement exercises as
scheduled as punishment.
Angela’s mother, Tan, filed a petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC. RTC issues a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the grad ceremony, Still,
STC proceed with barring the students to attend.
Due to the action of STC, petitionet files at RTC for the ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA. Saying, the photos accessed belong to the girl, thus, it cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, violated their rights by saving copies and showing them to
STC’s officials.
ISSUE: 1) WON the writ of habeas data should be issued, 2) WON the Respondents violated the
right to privacy in the liberty or security of the minors
RULING:
NO. The writ will not be issued on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information. (AS the writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty, or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of an
entity engaged in the matter.)
NO. As FB has different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as
well as information uploaded by the user. Court rule that STC did not violate the petitioner’s
privacy since the manner on which they acquired was not illegal. The setting of photos privacy to
“Friends Only” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who isn’t FB
friends with the source content. The user’s own FB can share said content or tag others which
Escudero is FB friends with.

VI. SEARCHES
A. Searches under Warrant
Stonehill v. Diokno
G.R. No. L-19550
FACTS: Respondents secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search the premises of their offices to seize and take
possession of their “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,..” and papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
cigarette wrappers, which are the subject of the offense.
Petitioners contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant is valid
RULING: YES. AS the documents seized under the alleged authority of the warrants may be
split into 2 groups, 1) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations (which the
searches are valid as the corporations have their respective personalities that are separate from
the personality of the petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of interest of
each of them has, 2) those found and seized in the residences of the petitioners.
The right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in their individual capacity.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff
G.R. No. L-64261
FACTS: 2 Warrants issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan
mail and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of equipment alleged be in the possession and
control of Jose Burgos, were seized.
Petitioners filed for a certiorari of the warrant’s validity and so that the articles and equipment
may be returned to the petitioners.
Petitioners claim there is no sufficient basis for finding probable cause which the warrant may
validly issue in accordance with (Article 4, Sec 3, OF 1987 Consti)
ISSUE: WON the warrant of arrest is valid to justify the seizure of the items
RULING: NO. As the law provides that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause…” The two search warrants were without probable cause. To satisfy
the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application.

Nolasco v. Pano
G.R. No. L-69803
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking
officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the
same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2
boxes were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-
Roque’s leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the
basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were
filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of
subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the
ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a
general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject
of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established
for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid

RULING: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It is thus in the nature of a
general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description
of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general.

Roan v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 71410
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

People v. Huang Zhen Hua

G.R. No. 139301
FACTS:
ISSUE
RULING

B. Warrantless Searches
1. Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
2. Plain View
Padilla v. CA and People
G.R. No. 121917
FACTS: Padilla, was involved in a hit and run accident and was later apprehended by the
police after he was chased. During the arrest, Padilla was found to have 2 different
firearms (a revolver and a rifle magazine) in his possession and another 2 firearms were
found inside his vehicle. Petitioner then argues that he has legal papers for it.
Petitioner was then convicted of illegal possession of firearms. Hence the present petition

ISSUE: 1) WON the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner’s firearms were valid.
2) WON the warrantless arrest was valid

RULING: 1) Yes. The seizure of revolver and rifle magazine was justified for they came
within “plain view” of the policemen which they discovered tucked in padilla’s waist and
back pocket when he raised his hands. The same justification applies to the confiscation
of the armalite rifle which was apparent to the policemen when they saw the rifle lying
near the driver’s seat. Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search. 2)

3. Search of a Moving Vehicle

People of the Philippines v. Sapla

G.R. No. 244045

FACTS:

ISSUE:
RULING: