G.R. No.

L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner PBMEO, a labor union composed of the employees of the

respondent, decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang, in
protest against alleged abused of the Pasig police. The respondent asked the
PBMEO to cancel the plan, however, continue the demonstration and argue
that it has nothing to do with the respondent.

PBMEO proceeded, thus the respondent file a charge against PBMEO for
violation of the provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement or the “No
Strike and No Lockout” and because of the strike it prejudice the normal
operation of the respondent’s company. The PBMEO argued that the said
mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of
speech.

The CIR found the PBMEO guilty of bargaining. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the

rights of free expression

Ruling:

Yes, the collective bargaining agreement inhibits the constitutional right of

free expression of the petitioner.

Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity."

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government
and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political,
economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of

assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such

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priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."

In the case at bar, the demonstration of the PBMEO is completely an

exercise of their freedom to redress grievances of the police officers. As a
matter of fact, it was the duty of respondent to protect their employees from
the harassment of local police officers.

Note: Human right is more important than property right.

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 G.R. No. L-3962  February 10, 1908
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LING SU FAN, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

The Lower court found Ling Su Fan guilty for violation of Act No. 1411 of the
Philippine Commission, for exporting 20,600 pesos silver coins from the
Philippines. Defendant appealed the decision and contends that the said law
is contrary to the provision of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution
and to the Act of Congress particularly Paragraph 1 Section 5 which states
that:

That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws.

Defendant question the said act, seeking if the proceeding is in accordance

with due process of law

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 1411 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

No, Act No. 1411, prohibiting the exportation of Philippine silver coins is not
in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and proceedings had in accordance with its provisions constitute
"due process of law”

Judge Cooley define Due Process as an exertion of the powers of the

government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under
such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims
prescribed for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs.

Furthermore, due process can be defined as a process or proceedings

according to the law of the land. "Due process of law" is not that the law
shall be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but simply
—

First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the Government;

Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;

Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of

procedure prescribed; and

Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class.

In the case at bar, these requirements has been complied with by the court
and the decision of the court is valid
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 G.R. No. L-11390            March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Engracio Palanca was indebted to petitioner bank in the amount of

P218,294.10. He mortgages his property as security for a debt. However,
Engracio returned to China and eventually died there. The petitioner then
instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident,
Petitioner notify Palanca by means of publication in a newspaper.

The defendant not having appeared, the court eventually granted El Banco’s
petition to execute Engracio’s property. Seven years later, Respondent filed
a motion requesting to set aside the order on the basis that the court never
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant and there had been no due process
as Engracio never received the summons.

Issue:

Whether or not due process was not observed.

Ruling:

No, the court observed the due process.

As applied to judicial proceedings, the requirements of due process is satisfied

if the following conditions are present, namely;

(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to

hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding;
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

In the case at bar, we can conclude that the failure of the clerk to send the
notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court
and that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of
law.

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 G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Respondents filed a motion to reconsider the Supreme Court decision dated

July 15,2003 which ordered the forfeiture in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines of the Swiss deposits in escrow at the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) respondents contend that summary judgment denies them their right
to a hearing and to present evidence purposely granted under Section 5 of
RA 1379.

They further contend that RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence
they are entitled to the constitutional safeguards enjoyed by an accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Summary Judgment in forfeiture proceedings a violation of

due process.

RULING:

No, Summary judgment does not deny the right of the respondents to due
process. Summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions
or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.

In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due
process clause, there must be compliance with both substantive and the
procedural requirements thereof.

Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that

interferes with the rights of a person to his property. While procedural due
process means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods,
prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and
without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer
it.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair, unreasonable

or unjust. Forfeiture proceedings in the Sandiganbayan did not violate the
substantive rights of respondent Marcoses. These proceedings are civil in
nature, contrary to the claim of the Marcoses that it is penal in character.

Furthermore, Respondent Marcoses erroneously understood “hearing” to be

synonymous with “trial.” We have to emphasize that a due process does not
therefore always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. What
the law prohibits is not merely the absence of previous notice but the
absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. This opportunity
was made completely available to respondents who participated in all stages
of the litigation.

Thus, there is no violation of respondent constitutional rights of due process.

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 G.R. No. 167011             April 30, 2008
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R.
ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.

Facts:

Private respondent filed a Complaint with the COMELEC charging petitioners

with violation of Section 261 (y)(2) and (5) of Omnibus Election Code and
Section 12 of RA 8189 or the Voter’s Registration Act. In its complaint, he
alleged that the petitioners made false and untruthful representations by
indicating in the sworn application that they are residents of Burauen, Leyte
when in truth they were still resident of Quezon City.

The complaint affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation

be conducted by the COMELEC and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same

The COMELEC ordered to file appropriate information against petitioners

before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was
denied. On their appeal they contend that they were not accorded due
process because the charged ordered by the COMELEC to be filed before the
RTC is entirely different from the resolution 1 given by the COMELEC en banc
and that they were deprived of their right to submit documentary evidence
against the new charges against them.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners were denied of due process

Ruling:

No, the court ruled that they were not denied of due process.

Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that
the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are
entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the
RTC, as charged by the COMELEC.

In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as

contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the
RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged
violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189.

Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against

petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the
same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit.
MORTEL v. KERR
1
Resolution by the EN Banc: they were charged for violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section
45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act
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 G.R. No. 156296 | November 12, 2012

FACTS:

Salvador Kerr instituted a complaint for foreclosure of Mortgage against

Mortel. The pre-trial was reset 4 times but on the 5th setting, Mortel and his
counsel were not present. Hence, the trial court upon motion of respondent
set Mortel in default and eventually ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioner
was directed to pay his obligation to respondent, Atty.’s fees etc.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the negligence of Mortel’s counsels was so gross and

palpable as to deprive him of his property without due process of law.

RULING:

Yes, the negligence of Mortel’s counsels was so gross and palpable that
deprive him of his property without due process of law.

In Apex Mining Inc. v. CA, it was held that When the incompetence,
ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the result is so serious
that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his
day in court, the client deserves another chance to present his case; hence,
the litigation may be reopened for that purpose.

In the case at bar, Mortel did not have his day in court, because he was
unable to submit his evidence to controvert the claim of Kerr about his
contractual default after the RTC declared Mortel as in default due to his
counsel’s failure to appear at the fifth setting of the pre-trial.

Therefore, the Petitioner deserves another chance to present his case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA

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 GR NO. 138874-75 FEBRUARY 3, 2004

Facts:

On July 16, 1997, respondents were found guilty for kidnapping and illegal
detention of Chiong sisters.

During the trial, the prosecution centered in the testimony of Rusia wherein
he admitted that he participated in the said abduction and identified that all
the appellants are the perpetrators. Larrañaga in his defense claim that he is
not involved in the commission of the crime against the Chiong sisters.

The trial court grants to discharge Rusia as an accused and be a state

witness. However, the cross-examination was provisionally terminated due
to the report of bribery, which prompted the defense lawyers to withdraw as
the counsel for appellants declaring that they would no longer attend the
trial.

Larrañaga moved for the postponement of the hearing to enable them to

hire the services of new counsel. The trial court denied the request and
directed PAO to act as counsel de oficio and continue the cross-examination.
Larrañaga objected the continuation of the direct examination as he was not
represented by his counsel de parte. The trial court overruled his objection
and the prosecution witnesses testified continuously.

Issue:

Whether or not the court violates the right of due process as embodied in
Article 3, Section 14 of the Constitution.

Ruling:

No, the court did not violate the constitutional rights of the appellants.

Appellants cannot feign denial of their right to counsel. We have held that
there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused’s counsel  de parte, pursuant to
the court’s desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the
continuous trial system.

The right of the accused to select his counsel must be exercised in a

reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.

In the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month or three (3)
weeks to look for new counsel. Such periods are unreasonable. Appellants
could have hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they wanted to. They
should have been diligent in procuring new counsel.

Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel does not mean

that accused may avoid trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of
counsel and by refusing to participate in his trial. It has been held that
where the accused declined the court's offer to appoint counsel and elected
to defend himself, the denial of his motion made toward the end of the trial

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for a continuance so that he could obtain counsel of his own choice was not
an infringement of his constitutional rights.

While the accused has the right to discharge or change his counsel at any
time, this right is to some extent subject to supervision by the trial court,
particularly after the trial has commenced. The court may deny accused's
application to discharge his counsel where it appears that such application is
not made in good faith but is made for purposes of delay.

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 Perez v. Estrada
AM NO. 01-4-03-SC Jun 29, 2001

FACTS:

The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), sent a letter

requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The request was
seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter to the Chief Justice and, still
later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. the
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.

HELD:

No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of judicial

proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal
defendant:

Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They

are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect
their testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid
actual prejudice to the defendant.

For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects

him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective
presentation of his defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful
weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his
case in the eyes of the public.

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 A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA

BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO,
and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Facts:

This pertains to the Motion for Reconsideration in AM NO. 01-4-03-SC on

June 29, 2001. Petitioner in this case requested to the Supreme Court to
televise the trial of plunder and criminal case filed against President Estrada
in order to have a transparency in the proceedings.

Estrada on his part argued that it will violate the sub judice rule and that the
right of the people to information may be served through other means than
the TV or Radio coverage.

Issue:

Whether or not the live broadcast of the hearing should be permitted

Ruling:

No, live broadcast should not be permitted. However, audio-visual is

permitted not to broadcast but for documentary purposes only.

In the case of Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong, the court held that a
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought
to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a
public character.

In the present case, the reasons why the court ordered to have an audio-
visual are the following:

1. Hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our

commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God
and the law."

2. Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a
fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right
can be enhanced by audio visual presentation.

3. Audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training

of the people.

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 G.R. No. L-46496             February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR
UNION, INC.,

Facts:

Petitioner in this case claim that there was a shortage of Ang Tibay leather
shoes, thus he laid off the members of the National Labor Union. NLU claim
that the petitioner was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the National
Workers’ Brotherhood.

The case reached the CIR, eventually respondent went to SC requesting for
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not there should be a new trial.

Ruling:

Yes, There are cardinal primary rights which must his character.

1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.

2 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision.

4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion,

but the evidence must be substantial.

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,

or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The
Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision.

The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,

render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
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 G.R. No. 182573 April 23, 2014
RAY SHU, Petitioner,
vs.
JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY
MACILLAN, AND EDWIN SO, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate
mortgage submitted to Metrobank. Both deeds of real estate mortgage were
allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other was
on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation.

According to the Petitioner, the signature of respondent Larry Macillan,

appeared in the deeds of real estate mortgage.

After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of
Makati, charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of
public documents. The NBI supported the complaint with the questioned
documents report issued by its Questioned Documents Division. The
questioned documents report states that the signatures of the petitioner
which appear on the questioned deeds are not the same as the standard
sample signatures he submitted to the NBI.

The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied

their right to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency
never required them and Metrobank to submit the standard sample
signatures of the petitioner for comparison (One sided investigation).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the investigation of NBI deny Respondent’s right to due

process

RULING:

No, the investigation of NBI did not deny Respondent’s right to due process.

The Supreme Court Held in the case of Cabarrus Jr. v. Bernas: The functions
of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no
judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any
party. It cannot even determine probable cause.

In the case at bar, the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, there
was no denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken place
because the NBI has no Quasi-judicial power. The NBI’s findings were still
subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for
purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.

Therefore, Respondents were not denied of due process during the NBI
investigation

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 Adm. Matter No. MTJ-00-1241. January 20, 2000
ATTY. NAPOLEON S. VALENZUELA, Complainant
v.
JUDGE REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO, respondent

Facts:

Respondent Judge was charge for the alleged gross violation of the
constitutional right to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross
misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not

being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears
that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record; Atty.
Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be replaced by
another counsel.

Subsequently, Atty. Valenzuela files a Notice of Withdrawal with conformity

of Ms. Colapo. He also filed a complaint against respondent Judge attached
the affidavit of Ms. Colapo to testify, however, she was not presented
because she was in Brunei.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be find guilty for the charges against him.

Ruling:

No, Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges

against him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness. The
employment or profession of a person is a property right within the
constitutional guaranty of due process of law.

In the case at bar, Apart from his testimony and affidavit-complaint,

complainant did not adduce enough evidence to prove his charges. He did
not even present his primary witness, Meriam Colapo, to support the charge
that respondent Judge Bellosillo pressured the latter to replace him as
defense counsel. The affidavit of Meriam Colapo cannot be given credence
and is inadmissible without the said affiant placed on the witness stand to
give the respondent Judge an opportunity to test the veracity of affiant’s
allegations. An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented for cross-
examination.

Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges

against him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness,
Meriam Colapo; otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.

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 G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR — CAR,
Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued,
Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX
T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by
DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF
Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent,
respondents.

FACTS

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of

Agrarian Reform — Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President
Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993, finding Lumiqued administratively liable
for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts. In view of
Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for
certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.

Petitioner alleged that the investigating committee failed to inform Lumiqued

of his right to counsel during the hearing. Petitioners maintain that his right
to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

Issue:

Whether or not the investigating committee deny Lumiqued’s right to

counsel

Ruling:

No. the investigating committee did not deny Lumiqued’s right to counsel.

In Nera v. Auditor General, the Court said: There is nothing in the

Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to
be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall
not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the
due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that
helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his
side.

In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal

proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings. The
investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No.
145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively
liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.
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Therefore, Lumiqued was not denied of his right to counsel.

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 G.R. No. 110379 November 28, 1997
HON. ARMAND FABELLA
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-

work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs
and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to
October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of
13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill
in Congress, among other things.

On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against the
teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
teachers to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having
taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and
regulations.

Secretary Cariño ordered teachers to be placed under preventive

suspension. Teachers counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the
committee and demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines
adopted by the committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties.
The trial court ruled in favour of the teachers which were subsequently
affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not due process of law was observed in the administrative

proceedings against teachers?

Ruling:

No, the teachers were denied of due process of law.

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include

the following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of

proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights;

(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the

assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's
favor, and to defend one's rights;

(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so

constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and

(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial

evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected

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In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.

Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent

jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.

They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in
these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was
this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right
to be heard.

Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is

embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
18 of 32
 G.R. No. 173918 April 8, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY (DOE), petitioner,
vs.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:

The Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) now Department of Energy, informed

Respondents that the latter’s contributions to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) were insufficient. As a consequence, a surcharge was imposed upon
Respondent. The surcharge was imposed pursuant to Ministry of Finance
(MOF) Circular No. 1-85 as amended by Department of Finance (DOF)
Circular No. 2-94. Respondent challenged the said circular and refused to
pay the surcharges, claiming the payments it made were based on
interpretation of a Department of Finance Order and Department of Energy
Circular. However, the DOE only reiterated its demand for Respondent to
settle the surcharges due. Respondent then filed a Notice of Appeal, The
Office of the President affirmed the DOE. CA reversed, ruling that the
Department of Finance Circular was ineffective for failure to comply with the
requirement to file with Office of National Administrative Register (ONAR).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DOF Circular complies with the requirements for
publication and filing?

RULING:

No, the DOF Circular did not comply with the requirements for publication
and filing.

Under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987

requires the publication and filing in the Office of the National Administration
Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances for it to become effective.

In the case at bar, the Certifications dated 11 February 2004 and 9

February 2004 issued by ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its
amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said
office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondent’s allegation
that neither of the aforementioned circulars were published in the Official
Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation.

Therefore, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing of

administrative issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended,
ineffective.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
19 of 32
 G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION
vs
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Facts:

Philcomsat by virtue of RA No 5514 was granted the authority to construct

and operate facilities to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal.

Under Section 5 of RA 5514 petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of

the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, pursuant to
EO 196 petitioner was now placed under the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of respondent NTC, including its facilities and services and the
fixing of rates.

Philcomsat filed an application for authority to continue operating; the NTC

granted but directed the Philcomsat to reduce rates up to 15%. This is
pursuant to EO 546.

Philcomsat assails the order and argued that EO 546 that fixes rates for
public service communications does not provide the necessary standards
constitutionally required. It violates procedural due process for having been
issued without prior notice and hearing and the rate reduction it imposes is
unjust unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of
substantive due process.

Issue:

Whether or not rate reduction violates procedural and substantive due

process

Ruling:

Yes, temporary rate fixing order is not exempt from the procedural
requirements of notice and hearing.

Temporary fixing of rates does not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of
reasonableness.

Immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and
the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance
requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC
based its order.

On the issue of substantive due process, NTC prescribing reduced rates are
unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during
the prescribed period. Such reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly
deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property.
Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
20 of 32
G.R. No. 96266 July 18, 1991
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner,
Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
21 of 32
 vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX (Philippines), INC.,
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)

Orders dated December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings
conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow him
substantial cross-examination, in effect, allegedly, a denial of due process.

On the Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced on

November 21, 1990 with ERB ruling that testimonies of witnesses were to be
in the form of Affidavits .ERB subsequently outlined the procedure to be
observed in the reception of evidence, as follows:

CHAIRMAN FERNANDO:

Well, at the last hearing, applicant Caltex presented its evidence-in-chief and
there is an understanding or it is the Board's wish that for purposes of good
order in the presentation of the evidence considering that these are being
heard together, we will defer the cross-examination of applicant Caltex's
witness and ask the other applicants to present their evidence-in-chief so
that the oppositors win have a better Idea of what an of these will lead to
because as I mentioned earlier, it has been traditional and it is the intention
of the Board to act on these applications on an industry-wide basis, whether
to accept, reject, modify or whatever, the Board win do it on an industry
wide basis, so, the best way to have (sic) the oppositors and the Board a
clear picture of what the applicants are asking for is to have all the
evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first and then the examination will
come later, the cross-examination will come later. (pp. 5-6, tsn., November
23, 1990, ERB Cases Nos. 90-106, 90382 and 90-384). (p. 162, Rollo)

Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right
to finish his cross-examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right
to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out
that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process.

Issue: Whether or not the relaxed procedure deny petitioner’s due process

Ruling:

No, the relaxed procedure did not deny petitioner’s due process.

Under, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing

Hearings Before the ERB provides that :These Rules shall govern pleadings,
practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of
inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within
the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the
Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply
such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
22 of 32
In this case, the order of testimony both with respect to the examination of
the particular witness and to the general course of the trial is within the
discretion of the ERB and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be
introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper.

Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as

the ERB which in matters of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a
quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function As such administrative agency,
it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court
proceedings.

Therefore, the relaxed procedure did not deny petitioner’s due process.

G.R. No. 130442 April 6, 2000

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
23 of 32
 THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE
BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY
vs.
C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA

Facts:

Puey filed a verified complaint against Torcita for conduct unbecoming police
officer.

It was happened on April 26, 1994, when a Mazda pick-up driven by Consejo
overtook a red Cortina Ford driven by Torcita. Torcita signalled the
passengers of Mazda pick-up to stop, but did not abide on it and it
accelerated to Hacienda Aimee without stopping. Upon reaching the
Hacienda Torcita approached and entered the compound very drunk, with
back-up vehicle full of armed policeman.

Respondent admit that he entered the premises of the complainants but it

was done on a regular, lawful and proper way for he was in the performance
of his official duties in pursuing the suspect who committed a crime in his
presence. He also not deny that he took alcoholic drink but not to the point
of drunkenness.

The Board found Torcita was in the performance of his official duties when
the incident happened; however, he committed a breach of internal
discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same, thus
he was suspended.

Torcita appealed his conviction but it was dismiss. Torcita also filed a petition
for certiorari in the RTC questioning the legality of the conviction for lack of
procedural due process of law. The RTC granted the petition, hence this
appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Torcita should be suspended for breach of internal discipline

when the original charges against him were conduct of unbecoming a Police
Officer

Ruling:

No, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually
found guilty is not a proper observance of due process.

Notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the

specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being
charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could
traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense.
Although he was given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad
charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense
for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due
process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process.

G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
24 of 32
 ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-
SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD
NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA
PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, Respondents.

FACTS

The Court promulgated its Decision in “People of the Philippines v. Romeo G.

Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final judgment of two counts of statutory
rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. The said conviction carried the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article
41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen years, three months
and three days (Order of Commutation). After serving the same, he was
issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison

Petitioner filed a CoC seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the
upcoming local elections.

Five petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and Second Divisions
(COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. Pending resolution, the COMELEC En Banc
issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY
due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor
of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to
his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with
the voter registration requirement.

Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’
jurisdiction by cancelling motu proprio petitioner’s CoC through Resolution
No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which reads:

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two

divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided
in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued
motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right
to due process.

Ruling:

No, the COMELEC did not act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu
proprio (dismiss the case without the hearing) Resolution No. 9613.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
25 of 32
In Villarosa vs. COMELEC: The term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to
‘administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting,
directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons
or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and
weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-
judicial function’ is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.

In this case, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-
judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume
jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it
or any of its divisions.

Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws
in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute
disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final
conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its
administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for
reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.

Therefore, the COMELEC did not act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued
moto proprio Resolution No. 9613.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
26 of 32
 G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ

Facts:

Munoz was charge before Hong Kong Court for violation of the Prevention
Bribery Ordinance and conspiracy to defraud. Hong Kong Department of
Justice sent a letter to DOJ requesting for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. NBI arrested and detained him.

Munoz filed with CA a petition for certiorari and writ of habeas corpus
questioning the validity of the arrest. DOJ filed a petition to review and it
was granted. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed a petition for
the extradition of Munoz. In the same case, a petition for bail was denied by
petitioner holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that Munoz is a high flight risk.

Munoz filed a motion for reconsideration and it was granted subject to the
following conditions;

1. Bail is set at P750,000.00 in cash and he should undertake to

appear and answer the issued raised in the proceedings;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport
3. DOJ is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion
4. Require that all assets of accused, be filed with the court

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that
a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to
criminal proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not an extradite has the right to bail

Ruling:

Yes, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in
the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.

The court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public

international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually
attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere;

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
27 of 32
G.R. No. 81798 December 29, 1989

LAO GI alias FILOMENO CHIA, SR., his wife, ONG UE, and his children
FILOMENO, JR., MANUEL, ROSITA VICENTA and DOMINGA, all
surnamed CHIA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.

Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioners.

FACTS:
Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the
Secretary of justice. However, this was revoked when his father’s citizenship
was cast aside due to fraud and misrepresentation.
Charges of deportation were filed against the Petitioners. Charges also
alleged that they refused to register as aliens and they committed acts of
undesirability.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) set the deportation
case against respondents for hearing and Acting Commissioner Victor G.
Nituda gave respondents three (3) days to move for reconsideration of the
order directing them to register as aliens and to oppose the motion for their
arrest.
Petitioner argued that they weren’t subject to immediate deportation. And
the order for the arrest of petitioners in case of failure to register as aliens
was premature since there was no competent determination yet that their
citizenship was indeed procured by fraud.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner was denied of Due Process.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner was denied of Due Process.

The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. Although a deportation

proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such
person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the
Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings.
Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
28 of 32
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended,
it is provided:

c. No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds

for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure
to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

In the case at bar, the charge against Petitioner must specify the acts or
omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise
language to enable them to understand what ground they are intended to
be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.

Also, before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation
must be conducted to determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the
petitioners for deportation.  The issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests
without warrant, service of warrants and search warrants issued by the CID
should be in accordance with Rules of Criminal Procedure. All of these
procedures were not observed in this case.

Therefore, Petitioner was denied of due process.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
29 of 32
 G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL
RAMACULA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as
President of National University, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners were students of Respondent University. In their complaint they

claim that they were denied of their constitutional and human rights when
the University refuse to allow them to enrol due to their participation in mass
actions within the premises of the university.

Respondent University on their part argued that petitioner’s failure to enrol

is due to their own fault. They sought to re-enrol only when the enrolment
period was closed. Respondent also add that the petitioner is facing criminal
charges for malicious mischief before the MTC and that his records are not
good scholastic standing

Issue:

Whether or not the students were denied of due process

Ruling:

Yes, the students were denied of due process

It was ruled that no disciplinary action may be imposed on students without

abiding by the requirements of due process. A school cannot refuse to re-
enrol a student it believes guilty of acts inimical to the school, without first
conducting an investigation.

There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and

cause of any accusation against them;

(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating

committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
30 of 32
Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27,
1993.
Facts:
Aguila Legis, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites upon
neophytes. As a result thereof, one neophyte named Leonardo "Lennie" H.
Villa, a first year law student, died of serious physical injuries. Dean del
Castillo created an investigating committee which was tasked to investigate
and submit a report regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lennie Villa. The respondent students were asked to submit their written
statements but failed to do so. In the meantime, they were placed in
preventive suspension. The investigating committee, after receiving
the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found
a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then
required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean
created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3
of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr.
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students.
Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a temporary restraining
order(TRO) since they are currently enrolled.
Judge Capulong, upon student’s appeal, ordered Ateneo to reverse its
decision and reinstate the said students.
Respondent Argues that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J.,
then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived
at without affording them their right to procedural due process.
Issue:
W/N Respondents were denied of procedural due process.
Ruling: No. respondents were not denied of procedural due process.

The SC held in Guzman case that the minimum standards to be satisfied in

the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions:(1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

In the Case at bar, all the minimum standards to be satisfied in the

imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions have been
satisfied.

Therefore, Respondents were not denied of procedural due process.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
31 of 32
 G.R. No. 169391, October 10, 2012
GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO, REV. FR.
JOSE RHOMMEL HERNANDEZ, ALBERT ROSARDA and MA. TERESA
SURATOS, Respondents.

Facts:

Chester Kim Go (Kim), a high school student at Letrans, was named as a

senior member of Tau Gamma Fraternity and were present in the hazing rite
conducted to the newly recruit high school students.

Based on the disciplinary rules, the students involved in the fraternity,

should be suspended. Letran conferred with the parents to discuss the
extension classes the students would as make up class for classes missed
during their suspension.

Letran also proposed that the students and their parents should sign a pro-
forma agreement to signify their conformity with their suspesnsion. Sps. Go
refused to sign and accept that their child, Kim, was a fraternity member.
They likewise insisted that due process had not been observed. They claim
that Kim was unlawfully dismissed by (a) not conducting a formal inquiry
charged against Kim (b) by not giving them any written notice of the charge
(c) by not providing them with the opportunity to cross examine students
who identified Kim as member of fraternity.

Issue:

Whether or not disciplinary action for students should heard similar to the
court proceedings?

Ruling:

No, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice.

In the case of Guzman vs National University, laid down the minimum

standards in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic functions. It
bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions
and proceedings in courts of justice.

The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-

examination is not, contrary to petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
32 of 32
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

In the case at bar, these requirements were met by respondents. The

records shows that the parents were notified in writing about the disciplinary
actions charge against their son for being a member of fraternity. They were
also given an ample time to participate in the proceedings but they failed to
do so.

Therefore, they cannot complain of deprivation of due process

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
33 of 32
 G.R. No. 185668 December 13, 2011
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MIA MANAHAN, Respondents.

Facts:
Mia Manahan as a Treasury Officer of CF Pavilion of Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) handles the fund transfer requests. On
April 14, 2004, Manahan received a fax from Casino Filipino-Laoag
requesting for the fund transfer worth P4,200,000.00, it was approved and
release to certain David Fuentabella. CF-Pavilion informed CF-Laoag about
the transfer, but it was denied by the latter. Manahan was interrogated and
a notice of preventive suspension for serious procedural deviation/gross
negligence was presented to her by the Senior Branch Manager. The
Corporate Investigation Unit did not allow her to be assisted by counsel
instead she was directed to submit a written statement.

On June 2, 2004, PAGCOR sent a decision dismissing Manahan from her

service. The latter filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that she was
deprived of her constitutional right to due process when she was dismissed
from her service without informing her of the formal charges. CSC reversed
the decision of PAGCOR. Hence, this petition

Issue:
Whether or not Manahan was deprived of her constitutional right to due
process

Ruling:
Yes, Manahan was deprived of her constitutional right to due process

Under CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 Section 16 clearly provides, to wit:

Section 16. Formal Charge. - After a finding of a prima facie case, the

disciplining authority shall formally charge the person complained of. The
formal charge shall contain a specification of charge(s), a brief statement of
material or relevant facts, accompanied by certified true copies of the
documentary evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the testimony of
witnesses, a directive to answer the charge(s) in writing under oath in not
less than seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice for the
respondent to indicate in his answer whether or not he elects a formal
investigation of the charge(s) and a notice that he is entitled to be assisted
by a counsel of his choice.

In the case at bar. What PAGCOR claims to be the formal charge it issued in
compliance with the CSC rules was the memorandum addressed to Manahan
under the subject "Preventive Suspension issued by a senior branch
manager which is not among the company's disciplining authority. Also
private respondent Manahan was not informed that she has the right to
counsel during the investigation. Without proper investigation and,
thereafter, a decision that clearly indicated the facts constituting the offense
imputed upon the respondent and the company rules she supposedly
violated, the respondent did not get the chance to sufficiently defend herself.

Hence, Manahan was deprived of her constitutional right to due process.

Constitutional Law 2
Article 3 Section 1
34 of 32
Salaw vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 90786,
September 27, 1991.

Facts:
Petitioner Salaw, a credit investigator-appraiser Associated Bank, on a Sworn
Statement extracted from him without a counsel, which said that he stole 20 sewing
machines and electric generators foreclosed by the company in collusion with a
coworker.

the petitioner was requested by private respondent Tuazon to appear before

the bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC).

When petitioner Salaw signified his readiness to appear before the PDIC,
private respondent Rollie Tuazon sent him a letter which states that the
request of Salaw to appear before the PDIC has been accepted and Salaw is
requested to attend without counsel or representative.

the petitioner was then terminated from his employment for alleged serious
misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust
reposed on him by the private respondents.
Petitioner filed for illegal dismissal, which the Labor Arbiter granted, and the NLRC
reversed.
Petitioner argues that he was illegally dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner was deprived of due process.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner was deprived of due process.
Under Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code governing the dismissal of employees. Section 5 of the said Rule
requires that "the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so desires." And also under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
specifically provides: "Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. To underscore the inviolability this provision,
the third paragraph of the same section explicitly states that, "any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible evidence against him.

In the case at bar, records clearly show, Petitioner was denied that
constitutional right when his subsequent request refute the allegations
against him was granted and a hearing was set "without counsel or
representative as can be gleaned on the letter of Private respondent Tuazon
to Petitioner Salaw. Also the admission by the petitioner which was extracted
from him by the Criminal Investigate Service of the Philippine Constabulary
(National Capital Region) without the assistance of counsel and which was
made the sole basis for his dismissal, cannot be admitted in evidence against
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him, then, the finding of guilt of the PDIC, which was affirmed by the public
respondent NLRC; has no more leg stand on. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity.

Hence, the Petitioner was deprived of due process.

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 G.R. No. 110590 May 10, 1995
ZORAYDA AMELIA C. ALONZO, in her capacity as Chief Executive Officer of
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, petitioner
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG et al. respondents.

Facts:

Alonzo wrote a complaint before the Chief Executive Officer of Pag-ibig Fund
Foundation against Fajardo for the alleged contracting loans of money. This
complaint was directed to legal department to investigate the allegation, they found
prima facie case against Fajardo and recommend for her preventive suspension.

A formal charge was filed against Fajardo and she was required to answer the
allegation and indicate therein whether she desired to have a formal investigation.
Fajardo argued that the said preventive suspension was issued without giving her
the right to be heard.

RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from "executing

and/or enforcing the order of preventive suspension. Alonzo moved for
reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in stopping the preventive suspension of Fajardo

Ruling:

Yes, the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the
case and stopping the preventive suspension of Fajardo.

Pursuant to Administrative Code of 1987 which provides to wit:

“Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may

preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation xxx”

In the case at bar, Chief Executive Officer of the Home Development Mutual Fund,
is the proper disciplining authority within the meaning of the above provision. The
preventive suspension was issued upon recommendation of the legal department of
the Pag-ibig Fund which found prima facie case against Fajardo.

It must be noted that preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer

can be ordered even without a hearing as such suspension is not a penalty but only
a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

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ALBA VS. HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 120223,
MARCH 13, 1996.

Facts:

Private respondents were among the twenty five (25) graduating students of
the Arriesgado Institute of Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI) who
sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute with the said school
arising from the implementation of certain school policies.

Petitioner scheduled a meeting with the respondent students. However,

petitioner instead met with the Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI.
Thereafter petitioner presided over the conference between the Arriesgados
and the aggrieved students. Petitioner then submitted to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao (Office of the Ombudsman), a report on the said
conference wherein he claimed that he had succeeded in facilitating an
amicable settlement between the parties. However, petitioner's claim of
having settled the dispute between the Arriesgados and the complaining
students is belied by private respondents affidavit-complaint attesting to the
fact that as a result of the said dispute, they were barred from taking the,
final examinations and participating in the graduation rites. In the same
affidavit-complaint, private respondents pointed out petitioner's evident bias
and partiality in favor of the Arriesgados in the conduct of the conference.

A preliminary conference was scheduled by the Graft Investigating Officer of

the Office of the Ombudsman between the respondents and petitioner.
However, both parties failed to attend. Thereafter a resolution was rendered
finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713.

For such gross misconduct, petitioner was meted a suspension of thirty (30)
days without pay and warned that any other instance of non-observance of
the Code of Conduct will result in graver punishment.

Petitioner filed a MR but was denied. Thereafter filed an appeal/ Petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC), the petition was dismissed for
being moot and academic. Hence this MR which rectifies and set aside the
dismissal of the said petition.

Petitioner alleged that Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (otherwise known as the

Ombudsman Act of 1989) which states that “Findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.
Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary (sic) shall
be final and unappealable” and Section 7, Rule III, of Administrative Order
No. 07, date April 10, 1990 (otherwise known as the RULES OF PROCEDURE
OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN which states that “Finality of decision.
- Where the respondent is absolved of the charged (sic) and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for
certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA

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6770.” constitute an undue curtailment or deprivation to DUE PROCESS and
a denial of Petitioner’s constitutional right to property.

Issue:

W/N Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of

1989) and Section 7, Rule III, of Administrative Order No. 07, date April 10,
1990 (otherwise known as the RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN constitute an undue curtailment or deprivation to DUE
PROCESS and a denial of his constitutional right to property.

Ruling:

No, the said provisions does not deprived petitioner the right to due process.

The SC held in Villanueva vs CA that the right to appeal is not a natural right
nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with" the provisions of the
law.

In the case at bar, the constitutional requirement of due process has been
satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal for the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in
support of ones case.

Hence, the said provisions does not deprived petitioner the right to due
process.

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