SARCEDA, PRINCESS CZARINA ARAGON

Juris Doctor - 1st Year

CASE DIGEST:

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners, vs.

EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
G.R. No. 118295 , May 2, 1997

FACTS:

In this case, the Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional

grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement) and for the prohibition of its implementation
and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of
government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith.

They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution which is to “develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods” because (1) the WTO
requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-countries
on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO
“intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress
and the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically
the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine
Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.

HELD/RULING:

No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the
Philippine sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the
Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it
concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.

Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation. By

the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national
treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply
to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality
and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are
“competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor
of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the
best in the foreign markets.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), respondent.
G.R. No. 122156 , February 3, 1997

FACTS:

Respondent, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell

through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation

(MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the
execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price  in a letter to
GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which
GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
are self-executing.

HELD/RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to

enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
OH CHO, applicant and appellee, vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor and appellant.
G.R. No. 48321 , August 31, 1946

FACTS:

Arguments arose when Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, applied for a land

registration on January 17, 1940. It is a parcel of land he purchased from the
Lagdemeos, which is located in Tayabs. They have openly, continuously and
adversely possessed it since 1880.

However, the Solicitor General opposed it on the grounds that: (1) Oh Cho
lacked title of the said land and (2) he was an alien.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration.

HELD/RULING:

According to the Supreme Court, Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to
the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.

It was reiterated that all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to
the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part
of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession
of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration
of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of

registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration
of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the
Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This
possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is
an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription.
As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by
prescription.

DIRECTOR, LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and Aquilino L. Carino, respondents.
G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000 (381 Phil. 761)

FACTS:

In this case, Respondent Aquilino Cariño, filed a petition for registration for
Lot 6 which is a sugar land claimed to be owned by his mother of whom after
she died he became the administrator of the property in behalf of his brothers
and sisters. By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the
sole owner of the property. Report from the land investigator showed that the
lot is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that the improvements
introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango trees
with the house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict and
is not covered by existing public land application and no patent or title has
been issued to it; that the respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive
possession of the land as inherited from his deceased mother. Respondent is
the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the Bureau of Lands.

The court granted the petition of the respondent. The petitioner filed a review
for certiorari contending that the respondent failed to submit proof of his fee
simple title and has not overthrown the presumption that the land is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the state.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the respondent established proof of his muniment of title to

merit registration of land in his favor?

HELD/RULING:

The petition of the respondent is covered by the Land Registration Act

providing that a person alleging in his petition or application ownership in fee
simple must present muniments of title to substantiate his claim of ownership,
presenting evidence of his possession in the concept of an owner in a manner
and number of years required by law. The manner shall be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property known as agricultural land
of the public domain for 30 years preceding the filing of application for
confirmation (Commonwealth Act No. 141).

Possession of public land however long never confers title upon the possessor
unless occupant of the same is under claim of ownership for the required
period. Even in the absence of opposition the court can deny registration of
land under the Torrens System on ground that an applicant failed to establish
his ownership by a fee simple on the property sought to be registered.
The respondent only traced his own possession in the land in 1949 by virtue
of extrajudicial settlement and order and at the same time he filed his
application for registration in 1975 thus he was in possession of said land only
for 26 years. His mere allegation that his mother was in possession of the
land since 1911 is self serving and hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence.
The tax receipts and tax declaration he offered as evidence do not
substantiate clear proof of ownership. Thus, with his failure to prove that his
predecessor-in-interest occupied the land under the condition laid down by
law, he can only establish his possession of the land from 1949. Respondent
failed to prove his muniment of title for the registration of the land under the
Registration Act with failure to present convincing and positive proof of his
continuous, open, uninterrupted and notorious occupation of lot 6 in the
concept of an owner for at least 30 years.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
TRI-PLUS CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 150000 , September 26, 2006 (503 SCRA 91)

FACTS:

On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation filed with the MTC an Application for
Registration of Title over two parcels of land designated as Lots 1061 and
1062 of the cadastral survey of Consolacion, Cebu and located at Barangay
Tayud, Consolacion.

Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of
land, including the improvements thereon, having acquired the same through
purchase; and that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and
peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.

The Republic opposed the application stating that the tax declarations and
receipts of tax payments, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the claim of ownership in fee
simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant may no longer be availed of by
the applicant because it failed to file an appropriate application for
registration in accordance with the provisions P.D. No. 892; and that the
subject parcels of land are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to private appropriation.

The MTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioner contends that a
mere notation appearing in the survey plans of the disputed properties
showing that the subject lands had been classified as alienable and disposable
on June 25, 1963 is not sufficient to establish the nature and character of
these lands. Petitioner asserts that there should be a positive act on the part
of the government, such as a certification from the DENR, to prove that the
said lands are indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner further contends
that even if the subject properties were classified as alienable and disposable
on June 25, 1963, the law, nonetheless, requires that such classification
should have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the lands in question are alienable or disposable.

HELD/RULING:
No. Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as

alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain. In the present case, the only evidence
to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by
law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified
by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only
to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed
alienable and disposable.
SECRETARY OF DENR, petitioner, vs.
MAYOR JOSE S .YAP et. Al, respondents.
GR No. 167707 , October 8, 2008

FACTS:

This is a petition for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan,
which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No.
1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the
petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,”
which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705
or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE/S:

Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed

agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD/RULING:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is

alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In

keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such
as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as
part of the inalienable public domain.
HEIRS OF MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 179987, August 6, 2017

FACTS:

On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original

registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he
purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors in interest
had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the said
land for more than 30 years.

Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-
grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons
became the administrator of the properties which the son of the latter
succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by the
Velazco.

They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable

and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.

The RTC ruled in favor with them, but then the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision citing the case of Republic vs. Hebierto.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the registration of the property should be allowed.

HELD/RULING:

No. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of
PD 1529 along with CA 141.

It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the
right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec
14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the other.

It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable”
from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we may
take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.

The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit,
not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:
The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when
at the time of the application, the land is already classified as alienable and
disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the

right nugatory and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at
the time the Philippine is still not an independent state.

The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application
is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation
or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If
the reverse is true, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.

It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men
and the patrimonial property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no
longer in use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in
Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the
executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.

Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive
act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and disposable, that the
land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.

Applying to the case at bar:

Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948.
No other substantive evidence was presented.

Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as

alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

Petition Denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR,
REGION IV, petitioner vs. THE HEIRS OF MEYNARDO CABRERA,
respondent.
G.R. No. 218418 , November , 2017

FACTS:

Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free Patent concerning

an 8,0726 square-meter parcel of land situated in Pining, Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro.7 In said application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in
possession of such parcel of land since 1936, through his predecessor-in-
interest Marcelo Cabrera.

In the same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued Free Patent No. 516197
in favor of Meynardo, covering two (2) lots denominated as: (i) Lot 1 with an
area of 3,591 square meters, and (ii) Lot 2, with an area of 4,481 square
meters. On the basis of said patent, the ROD issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. RP-132 (P-9193) covering both lots in Meynardo's name.

Thereafter, a 2,445-square-meter portion of Lot 1 (Lot 1-A 11 ) was transferred

to Consolacion. Thus, on April 6, 1982, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
16580 covering Lot 1-A was issued in Consolacion's name. Later still,
Consolacion sold portions of Lot 1-A to several purchasers namely: Dy,
Agbayani, Soriano, Calma, and Liwanag.

Learning of the issuance of TCT No. 16580, Jose and Leticia De Castro (De
Castros), claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A, filed before the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) a petition urging
DENR to conduct an investigation to determine Lot 1-A's land classification
status.

Consequently, in the DENR Final Investigation Report (DENR Final Report)

dated November 9, 1994 issued by Erwin D. Talento of the DENR Land
Management Office (LMO), Free Patent No. 516197, covering Lots 1, 1-A, and
2 (collectively, Roxas Properties), was declared null and void for having been
issued over land forming part of the public domain.

The RTC found that the Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas
Properties (including Lot 1-A) have been reclassified as forest land.
Citing Republic v. Animas, (Animas) the RTC held that in order to prove
reversion of alienable and disposable land to forest land, a positive
government act evincing the same is necessary.

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in the
RTC's Order dated October 18, 2011.

Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case to the CA via petition for review
under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 (Appeal). In the Appeal,
the Republic argued that the Court's ruling in Animas cannot be applied to the
present case, since, in the former, the fact sought to be established was the
classification of forest land to alienable and disposable land, and not the other
way around, as in this case. Further, the Republic averred that fraud must
have necessarily attended the issuance of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No.
RP-132 and TCT No. 16580, owing to the status of the Roxas Properties as
forest land.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the CA erred when it held that a positive act of government is

necessary to evince the reclassification of land from alienable and disposable
to forest.

HELD/RULING:

The Petition should be denied for lack of merit. The CA did not err when it
affirmed the RTC Decision, as the Republic failed to establish that the Roxas
Properties were classified as forest land at the time Free Patent No. 516197
was issued.

In this case, the Republic presented the [NAMRIA certifications], the [DENR
Final Report] and [LC Map 209] dated March 6, 1924, with an inscription that
the [Roxas Properties] [were] reverted x x x to the category of forest land on
November 24, 1949. However, it appears that the findings of the CENRO and
the NAMRIA are based solely on such mapping [LC Map 209] where eighteen
(18) hectares, including the location therein of the [Roxas Properties], [were]
reclassified as forest land.

Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the Roxas Properties (including
Lot 1-A) were classified as forest land when they were decreed in Meynardo's
favor in 1971. Thus, in accordance with the Court's ruling in Development
Resources Corporation and Espinosa, the present Petition must be, as it is
hereby, denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is

DENIED. The Assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 18, 2014
and Resolution dated May 20, 2015 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 are hereby
AFFIRMED.