Politicbbval Law Review Survey of Cases Jan2018 June2020 Sedfrey M. Candelaria 01.19.2022

Sedfrey M. Candelaria_draft as of 01.19.
2022
Political Law Review Survey of Cases

(January 2018-June 2020)
Article II, Section 1 (Government Instrumentality; Test)
Laya, Jr. v. Philippine Veterans Bank

G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018
J. Bersamin, En Banc
Facts:
• Laya is an employee of Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) as Chief Legal Counsel.

PVB has its retirement plan rules which provide an early retirement. Laya was made
aware of this retirement plan only after he had been long employed. Pursuant to the
early retirement plan, i.e., upon attainment of age 50 and completion of at least 10
years of credited service, Laya was informed of his retirement on July 1, 2007. He
sought reconsideration and requested for extension of 2 years. The request was
denied. He sued PVB for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, who ruled
against Laya. The NLRC affirmed the decision. On appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA), the latter ruled that Laya could not have been unaware of the retirement plan
since January 1, 1996 and that lowering the age of retirement was a recognized
exception under Article 287 of the Labor Code.
• On petition before the Supreme Court (SC), the 1st Division denied the petition but
Laya moved for reconsideration arguing that to allow the adverse rulings to stand
would be to condone the creation of a private corporation by Congress other than
by a general law. The motion for reconsideration was denied and entry of judgment
was issued. A second motion for reconsideration was filed by Laya further arguing
that the SC should declare PVB as a public instrumentality and, therefore, the law
applicable to him was P.D. 1146 (GSIS Law), which stipulated the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years and this may not be “contracted out.”
The SC En Banc accepted a referral.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the referral to the En Banc violated the “principle of immutability
of final judgment,” under Section 3, Rule 15 of the SC Internal Rules.
(2) Whether or not PVB is a government instrumentality.
(3) Whether or not Laya was illegally dismissed.
Ruling:
(1) The SC has recognized exceptions to the principle of immutability of final

judgments.
(2) PVB is a private entity.
(3) Laya was illegally dismissed.
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Sedfrey M. Candelaria_draft as of 01.19.2022
Reasoning:
(1) The SC has granted exception to Section 3, Rule 15 “in the higher interest of
substantial justice,” when a decision is legally erroneous, patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to
the parties.
(2) PVB is a private entity, although it has an original charter. It is governed by the
Labor Code.
(3) Laya was not validly retired at 60. The mere mention of a retirement plan in Laya’s
letter of appointment did not sufficiently inform Laya. Passive acquiescence will
not suffice. It must be a bilateral act. The plan was in existence more than 5 years
prior to Laya’s employment but it was solely established by PVB. This is akin to a
contract of adhesion, wherein Laya became a member automatically.
[Note: Carpio, J. – “constitutional right to security of tenure” cannot be waived except in a

clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent manner.]
Article II Section 16 (Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology)

Article III, Section 1 (Police Power of LGU; Equal Protection)
Philippine Plastics Industry v. Mayor San Pedro of Muntinlupa City

G.R. No. 231030, January 17, 2018
Resolution, Third Division
Facts:
• Muntinlupa City enacted an ordinance prohibiting the use of plastic bags on dry
goods, regulating its utilization on wet goods and prohibiting the use of styrofoam
in the city.
• Philippine Plastics Industry (PPI) questioned the ordinance before the Supreme
Court (SC) but it referred the factual issues to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
dismissed the petition.
Issue:
• Whether or not the ordinance was an invalid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
• The petition has no merit.
Reasoning:
• The tests of a valid ordinance have been complied with. There are two classifications
of the tests: (1) formal – consistent with LGU’s corporate powers and observation
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of proper procedure; and, (2) substantive – consistent with the Constitution and
statutes; fair and reasonable; and, not contrary to public policy. The ordinance was
passed to protect the environment.
• There is a valid classification of plastic bags used for secondary packaging materials
on wet goods and as primary packaging materials on dry goods and the use of
styrofoam as containers as distinguished from packaging materials for wet and dry
goods or wrappers of these goods done by the producers or manufacturers.
Article III, Section 2 (Search and Seizure)
Saluday v. People
G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018
J. Carpio, En Banc
Facts:
• Petitioner Saluday was on board Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle on May 5,
2009 when it was flagged down by Task Force (TF) Davao of the Philippine Army
at a checkpoint near Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. Only male passengers
were ordered to disembark.
• Buco, a member of the TF, checked all the baggage and personal effects of the
passengers, but a small gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught
his attention. The bag felt heavy for its size. Buco looked at the male passengers
lined outside and saw a man in a white shirt (Saluday) peeping through the window
towards the direction of the bag. Buco asked who the owner of the bag was. The
conductor answered that Saluday and his brother were the ones seated at the back.
Buco requested Saluday to board the bus and open the bag which contained a
carbine, live ammunitions, one hand grenade, and a knife. When asked for proof of
authority to carry firearms and explosives, Saluday could not produce any. He was
arrested and informed of his rights by Buco.
• Saluday was subjected to inquest and the Davao City Prosecutor found probable
cause to charge him with violation of P.D. 1866. Saluday pleaded not guilty. The
trial court found him guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the
conviction. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
• Whether or not the search was illegal.
Ruling:
• The search was valid.
Reasoning:
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• In Katz v. U.S., the two-part test used in the application of the Fourth Amendment,
which is the equivalent of Article III, Section 2 of our Constitution is as follows: (a)
a person exhibited an actual (substantive) expectation of privacy; and, (b) the
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
• In the Philippines, the following have been declared as outside the protection of the
search and seizure clause:
(1) Airport search (People v. Johnson) – x-ray scans

(2) Seaport search (Dela Cruz v. People) – port security with state-related functions
and deemed agents of government
(3) Bus search (People v. Breis) – public transportation
(4) Shopping malls – metal detectors
• When private premises are accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner,
can impose non-intrusive security measures. Thus, the only difference in the
imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is that the former
emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code,
while the latter stems from the exercise of police power.
• The bus inspection by TF Davao in the present case is valid and a reasonable search.
Saluday consented to the baggage inspection. Buco asked if he could open Saluday’s
bag and the latter answered, “yes, just open it.”
Distinction:
Reasonable Search Warrantless Search

• Airport • Search incidental to a lawful arrest
• Seaport • Plain view
• Bus terminal • Consented search
• Shopping malls • Moving vehicle
Standards of bus search:
Prior to Entry While in Transit

• Passengers may be frisked • If information is received that a
passenger is carrying a contraband, bus
may be stopped
• Bags and luggage are subject to routine • If passengers are picked up, he/she may
inspection be frisked and bags/luggage inspected
• Refusal to be inspected may lead to • At checkpoints, military or police may
refusal of entry into terminal do routine inspection
• The guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars and moving vehicles dedicated
for private or personal use (e.g., taxis – hired by only one or a group of passengers).
Article III, Section 6 (Right to Travel) in relation to Article VI, Section (Non-delegation of
Legislative Power)
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Genuino, et al. v. Hon. De Lima
G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
Macapagal-Arroyo v. Hon. De Lima
G.R. No. 199034
Arroyo v. Hon. De Lima
G.R. No. 199046
J. Reyes, Jr., En Banc
Facts:
• Pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41, s. of 2010 (Consolidated

Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure
Orders (HDOs)), petitioners were denied to leave the country citing pending
investigation of various cases filed against GMA and her husband, Miguel Arroyo.
GMA requested the issuance of an Allow Departure Order (ADO) to seek medical
attention in various countries.
• The Supreme Court (SC) issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of DOJ Circular
No. 41 and the Waitlist Order (WLO) subject to the posting by GMA and Miguel of
a cash bond of 2 million; appointment of a legal representative; and, a commitment
to inform our embassy or consulate abroad of their whereabouts. The Bureau of
Immigration (BI) officials refused to process their travel documents. Meanwhile, an
electoral sabotage case was filed by COMELEC, upon recommendation of the Joint
DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee, before the RTC of Pasay
City. A warrant of arrest was filed against GMA.
• On the other hand, the Genuinos were the subject of complaints for malversation
and plunder. The DOJ similarly issued an HDO.
Issue:
• Is DOJ Circular No. 41 constitutional?
Ruling:
• No.
Reasoning:
• The filing of the information for electoral sabotage against GMA did not render the
case moot. There are exceptional circumstances, such as, the imputation of the
violation of her right to travel.
• The right to travel may only be impaired if either a law or the Rules of Court allow
it, and under 3 considerations, namely: national security, public safety or public
health.
• Some valid examples of impairment pursuant to law are as follows: Human Security
Act, Passport Act, Migrant Workers Act, VAWC and Inter-Country Adoption Act.
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• DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. The Administrative Code of 1987 did not
authorize DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs but merely grants DOJ power to
investigate the commission of crimes and prosecution of offenders.
• The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the executive
department to adopt rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO
is not DOJ’s business. Neither may it be justified under the police power of the state
in the absence of a law delegating such power to the President.
• By requiring an ADO before the subject of a HDO or WLO is allowed to leave the
country, the only plausible conclusion that can be made is that its mere issuance
operated as a restraint on the right to travel.
• As regards the Court’s authority, the power to issue HDO is inherent to its grant of
judicial power. No legislative enactment is necessary. The Court may also restrict
movement of its personnel pursuant to its power of administrative supervision.
Article III, Section 1 (Equal Protection Clause)
Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
J. Peralta, En Banc
Facts:
• Marilyn Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in San Juan,
Metro Manila by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) questioned the petition and argued that it
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
• The trial court denied the petition stating that under Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippines does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country and that unless Filipinos are naturalized as citizens of another country,
Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos’ family rights and
duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter
into contracts and civil relations, including marriages.
• The Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the trial court’s decision, reasoning that the
Family Code is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband.
Issue:
• Whether under paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, Manalo has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law (after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment)?
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Ruling:
• Manalo is capacitated to remarry.
Reasoning:
• Paragraph 2 of Article 26 on plain reading only requires that there be a divorce

validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish. Assuming for the sake of argument that the word
“obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature.
• The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino

spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Blind adherence to this principle would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law.
• Therefore, under the test of valid classification under the equal protection clause,
paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates an essential requisite of reasonableness of the
classification when it limited the provision to a foreign divorce decree initiated by
the alien spouse. A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly
situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
[Note: Did the Court declare paragraph 2 of Article 26 unconstitutional? Or did it merely
say that by interpretation of the law, the case of Manalo is covered?]
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) (Quo Warranto) and Section 7 (3) (On Proven Integrity) in
relation to Article XI, Section 3 (Impeachment)
Republic v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 and June 19, 2018 (MR)
J. Tijam, En Banc
Facts:
• Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno was a member of the U.P. College of Law for 20 years
(1986-2006). She was concurrently employed as legal/counsel of the Republic in 2
international arbitrations (related to the PIATCO cases). Incidentally, the U.P.
Human Resource and Development Office (HRDO) certified that there was no
record on Sereno’s 201 file of any permission to engage in limited practice. Further,
the only SALNs Sereno filed at U.P. were for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, and 2002. Similarly, despite having been employed as legal counsel of
various government agencies from 2003-2009, there was no showing that Sereno
filed her SALNs.
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• In July, 2010, Sereno filed her application for Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court. She submitted her SALN for 2006 which bears no stamp received by U.P.
HRDO. Later, she explained that such SALN was intended to be as of July 27, 2010
and that she merely downloaded the SALN form and forgot to erase the year “2006”
printed thereon. In sum, she only submitted 11 out of 20 SALNs.
• Sereno was appointed Associate Justice on August 13, 2010. Thereafter, when the
position of Chief Justice was vacated in 2012, Sereno applied for the position. The
JBC required the submission of all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011. The
Executive Officer of JBC informed the Council that Sereno had not submitted her
SALNs for a period of 10 years. However, on the interview date, despite Sereno’s
submission of only 3 SALNs, the Chief of Office of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination (ORSN) of the JBC annotated on Applicant No. 14 slot in the list that
Sereno had “COMPLETE REQUIREMENT” and a note stating “Letter 7/23/12 –
considering that her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old,
it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.”
• Sereno was appointed Chief Justice on August 24, 2012.
• On August 30, 2017, Atty. Larry Gadon filed an impeachment complaint against
Sereno. During the House Committee hearing, acting ex-officio Chairman of the
JBC, Justice Diosdado Peralta, claimed that he was never made aware that Sereno
submitted incomplete SALNs. Thereafter, the House Committee proposed to the
Court to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC, which was docketed as A.M.
No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC. Later, a letter from one Atty. Eligio
Mallari was sent to the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) requesting that the
Republic initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno.
• The OSG argued the timeliness of the petition and, alternatively, that the Republic
has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition. Further, the Republic
sought to oust Sereno for having failed to show that she is a person of proven
integrity, an indispensable qualification under Article VIII, Section 7 (3) of the
Constitution. According to the Republic, because Sereno failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven.
• Sereno, on the other hand, argues that the use of the phrase “may be removed from
office” in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution does not signify that members of
the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
Issues:
(1) May the SC assume jurisdiction?

(2) May the case be dismissed on the ground of prescription?
(3) Is Sereno eligible for the position of Chief Justice?
(4) Is Sereno a de jure or de facto officer?
Ruling:
(1) Yes – Article VIII, Section 5 in relation to Rule 66, Section 7.
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(2) No, prescription does not lie against the State. One year period only applies to an
individual petitioner, not the State.
(3) No, the SC has supervisory authority over JBC.
(4) De facto officer, holding a colorable right or title who never attained a status of an
impeachable official, removable through other means.
Reasoning:
Impeachment Quo Warranto

• Political • Judicial
• To vindicate breach of trust reposed by • To determine eligibility or validity of
the people (“eisangelia”) in a public election or appointment of a public
officer and to determine his/her fitness official (“by what authority”)
to stay in the office
• Cause of action – commission of an • Cause of action – usurping, intruding or
impeachable offense unlawfully holding or exercising of a
public office
• Relief – removal • Relief – ouster or exclusion
• Impeachable officers cannot be • PET Rules allow an election protest or
criminally prosecuted which may lead quo warranto to question a winner
to a penalty of removal and if they are based on ineligibility or disloyalty to
required to be members of the the Republic may be filed by any
Philippine Bar to qualify for their registered voter within 10 days after
positions, in which case, one cannot be proclamation
charged with disbarment
• Filing of SALN – constitutional • Article XI, Section 2 does not foreclose
requirement quo warranto against an impeachable
officer
• Cannot rule on validity or • Other grounds: nationality or Bar
constitutionality of a Chief Justice’s membership as qualification for the
appointment office
• *Can have jurisdiction on “integrity” as • *Filing of SALN – “non-filing” goes
a continuing requirement if official into qualification of integrity
commits an act or omission which (constitutional qualification of proven
constitutes an impeachable offense, or competence, integrity, probity and
disciplinary, administrative or criminal independence, Article VIII, Section 7
action (where he/she is validly elected (3)), where the act or omission was
or appointed) committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an
official’s qualifications to hold office
• Failure to file SALN is a violation of the
law, malum prohibitum in character
• Burden of proof of title – rests upon the
official concerned, unless the official
made out a prima facie right to office, in
which case, burden shifts to the State
RE: Show Cause Order in the Decision dated May 11, 2018 in G.R. No. 237428
(Republic v. Sereno)
Resolution/Decision:
9
• Sereno was found in violation Canon 13, Rule 13.02 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Sections 3, 7, and 8 of Canon 1, Sections 1 and 2 of
Canon 2, Sections 2 and 4 of Canon 3, and Sections 2 and 6 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct. She is meted the penalty of REPRIMAND. (In relation
to public appearances transgressing the sub judice rule and casting aspersions and
motives to members of the SC.)
Article X, Section 6 (Just Share in National Taxes; IRA)
Mandanas v. Executive Secretary Ochoa

G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018
Facts:
• Pursuant to Article X, Section 6, commanding the allocation to the LGUs of a just

share in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them, the Local
Government Code (R.A. 7160) was passed with the following contentious
provision:
“Section 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes – Local government

units shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the
collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as
follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and,
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).
x x x”
• Mandanas, et al. filed a petition seeking the issuance of writs of certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus arguing that certain collections of the NIRTs by the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) (esp. excise taxes, VAT and DST) should form part of
the base amounts for the computation of the IRA and, consequently, the release of
the additional amount of Php 60,750,000,000,000.00 to the LGUs as their IRA for
FY 2012 should be ordered. For the same reason, the LGUs should also be released
their unpaid IRA for FY 1992 to 2011 totaling Php 438,103,906,675.73.
• Similarly, Garcia seeks a writ of mandamus and maintains that the respondents must
compute the just share of the LGUs based on all national taxes and that the insertion
of the phrase internal revenue caused the diminution of the base for determining the
just share of the LGUs. He adds that the exclusion of certain taxes and accounts
pursuant to special laws was unconstitutional. Finally, he cited that the VATs and
excise taxes collected by BOC should be included in the computation of the IRA,
based on all national tax collections.
• The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that mandamus will not lie
because Congress may not be compelled to appropriate the sums allegedly illegally
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withheld for to do so will violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Substantively,
OSG avers that Congress has the authority to exclude certain taxes from the base
amount in computing the IRA; that there is a distinction between the VATs, excise
taxes and DSTs collected by the BOC. Besides, the development Budget
Coordination Committee limited the base amount for the computation of the IRA to
the “cash collections based on the BIR data reconciled by the Bureau of Treasury.”
OSG insists on the exclusion of the collection of such national taxes by the BOC.
Issues:
(1) Will mandamus lie?

(2) Is Section 284 of the LGC unconstitutional?
(3) Are the existing shares given to the LGUs consistent with the constitutional standard
of “just share” to national taxes?
Ruling:
• Petitions are partially granted. The decision shall have PROSPECTIVE

APPLICATION.
Reasoning:
(1) Mandamus is an improper remedy. The determination of what constitutes the just
share of the LGUs in the national taxes under the 1987 Constitution is an entirely
discretionary power, thus, Congress cannot be compelled by writ of mandamus.
(2) Section 284 of LGC is unconstitutional. The phrase “internal revenue” is deleted
from Sections 284, 287 and 290 of LGC, including Articles 378, 382, 409 and 461
of the IRR of LGC.
(3) GR: Include all collections of national taxes in the computation of the base of the
just share of LGUs.
Exceptions:
(a) special purpose fund; and,
(b) special allotments for utilization and development of the national wealth
Inclusions:
(a) National Internal Revenue Taxes in Section 21 of NIRC collected by BIR and
BOC;
(b) Tariff and Customs Duties collected by BOC;
(c) 50% of VATs collected in ARMM;
(d) 30% of all other tax collected in ARMM;
(e) 60% of National Taxes collected from the exploitation and development of
national wealth; (note: 40% of national taxes collected from exploitation and
development of national wealth shall exclusively accrue to the host LGUs)
(f) 85% of the Excise Taxes collected from locally manufactured Virginia and other
tobacco products;
(g) 50% of the National Taxes under Sections 106, 108 and 116 of NIRC as provided
under Section 283 of NIRC; and,
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(h) 5% of the 25% Franchise Taxes given to the National Government under R.A.
6631 (Manila Jockey Club) and R.A. 6632 (Philippine Racing Club).
Other exclusions: proceeds from sale of former military bases converted to alienable
lands.
Article VI, Section 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) in relation to Article VIII, Section 1
(Expanded Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court)
Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. Hon. Farinas

G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018
J. Tijam, En Banc
Facts:
• An inquiry in aid of legislation related to the use by the Provincial Government of

Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on locally manufactured Virginia-
type cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided by law was conducted upon
initiative of Congressman Rodolfo C. Farinas. The Provincial Government of Ilocos
Norte purchased vehicles amounting to P66,450,000.00.
• Petitioners, employees of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, were invited

to attend as resource persons. After failing to attend, a show cause order was issued.
When petitioners later on appeared, they alleged that they were subjected to threats
and intimidation. Under similar circumstances, all of them were cited in contempt
and ordered detained when they refused to answer questions related to the purchases
of the vehicles.
• Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals (CA). An
order of release upon bond was issued but attempts to serve the order failed.
Thereafter, the House Committee conducting the inquiry issued a show cause order
against the three CA Justices. In turn, the CA Justices wrote the Supreme Court En
Banc deferring action on certain pending motions and administratively referring the
same to the Court for advice and appropriate action.
• Meanwhile, co-petitioner Imee Marcos, incumbent Governor of Ilocos Norte, filed

an omnibus petition before the Supreme Court similarly seeking the issuance of a
writ of prohibition for the purpose of declaring the legislative investigation illegal.
They further prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo because of alleged violation
of their rights to liberty and personal security, while Gov. Marcos was allegedly
being threatened of arrest. Finally, they pray for the Court to assume jurisdiction
over the case.
Issues:
• Whether or not the case is moot.

• Whether or not the SC can assume jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the legislative inquiry may be enjoined.
• Whether or not the writ of amparo may issue.
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• Whether or not Congress may cite the CA Justices in contempt, notwithstanding the
existence of judicial privilege.
Ruling:
• The case may proceed.

• Yes. The SC can assume jurisdiction.
• Prohibition is a proper remedy but, in this case, the SC finds no justification to
enjoin the legislative inquiry.
• Amparo cannot issue.
• Judicial privilege is not availing under this case.
Reasoning:
• The exceptional character of the situation and the fact that the case is capable of
repetition warrants the SC to proceed.
• While the CA and the RTC, together with the SC, have concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus, the CA has acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
others.
• Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to raise constitutional issues and to review

and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. But, in the
present case, the Court finds no justification for the issuance thereof. The cause of
petitioners’ detention was the unusual inability of petitioners to recall the
transactions, while co-petitioner Marcos merely anchored her plea on her
apprehension that she, too, will be arrested.
• The peculiarity of the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before the CA renders
the direct resort to the SC for the issuance of a writ of amparo inappropriate or
improper. Besides, co-petitioner Marcos admitted that the petition does not cover
extra-legal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
• CA Justices are non-impeachable officers. As such, authority over them primarily

belongs to the SC. Judicial privilege is unavailing on matters external to the
Judiciary’s deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties. It is only limited to
matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court. If the
matter upon which the members of the Court, court officials and employees privy
to the court’s deliberations are called to testify do not relate to and will not impair
the Court’s deliberative adjudicatory judicial power, then the privilege may not be
successfully invoked.
Article VI, Section 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation)
Balag v. Senate
G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018
J. Gesmundo, En Banc
Facts:
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• Balag was implicated in the death of 1st year law student Horacio Tomas T. Castillo
III during initiation rites of their fraternity of UST. During an inquiry in aid of
legislation before the Senate, Balag did not attend the hearing, so, he was directed
to appear in the next hearing. Meanwhile, a criminal complaint had already been
filed for murder and violation of the anti-hazing law. Several anti-hazing bills were
also for consideration by the Senate in the course of the inquiry.
• During the hearing, Balag was asked by Senator Grace Poe if he was the president
of the fraternity but he refused to answer and invoked his right against self-
incrimination. Senator Poe moved to cite Balag in contempt and to place him in
detention. Balag brought action before this Court. Pending resolution of this
petition, Balag was released in the interim.
Issue:
• Did the Senate commit grave abuse of discretion?

• How long may Balag be detained?
Ruling:
• The petition is denied, however, while the case is moot, it is capable of repetition.
• The inherent power of contempt should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry.
Reasoning:
• The release of Balag in the interim rendered this case moot, but the issue is capable
of repetition and paramount public interest dictate that the SC proceed with the case
to ensure that the constitutional rights of persons appearing before a legislative
inquiry are protected.
• The contempt order issued against Balag simply stated that he would be arrested
and detained until such time that he gives his true testimony. Citing precedent cases
in the United States and the Philippines on the subject matter, the SC distilled the
following:
United States Philippines

Anderson v. Dunn – punishment need not Lopez v. delos Reyes – there was no valid
be indefinite as the legislative body exercise of the inherent power of
ceases to exist from adjournment or contempt because the House of
periodical dissolution. Representatives already adjourned.
In re Chapman – a statutory power to Arnault v. Nazareno – made a distinction
contempt is valid. between the Senate and House of
Representatives’ power of contempt.
There is the possibility that Senate might
detain a witness for life.
Jurney v. MacCracken – the statutory Neri v. Ermita – clarified the “continuing
contempt, providing for fine and nature” of Senate by citing the Senate
imprisonment, supplements the inherent Rules which state that “all pending
matters… shall terminate upon expiration
14
power of Congress to punish for of (1) Congress, but may be taken by the
contempt. Congress as if present for the first time,”
include legislative investigations.
• Therefore, the legislative inquiry terminates under 2 instances:
(1) Upon approval or disapproval of the Committee Report; and,
(2) Upon expiration of (1) Congress.
• Congress, if it so wishes, may pass or amend a statutory power of contempt.
Article III, Section 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection) in relation to Section 10 (Non-
Impairment Clause) and Article VIII, Section 1 (Judicial Power and Judicial Review;
Standing; Hierarchy of Courts)
Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines (PBOAP), et al. v.

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), et al.
G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018
J. Leonen, En Banc
Facts:
• DOLE issued Department Order (D.O.) No. 118-12 (Governing the Employment
and Working Conditions of Drivers and Conductors in the Public Utility Bus
Transport Industry) while LTRFB issued a related Memorandum Circular (M.C.)
No. 2012-001 (Labor Standards Compliance Certificate).
• In brief, D.O. 118-12 and M.C. 2012-001 aimed to ensure road safety and address
the risk-taking behavior of bus drivers associated with the lack of proper training on
motor skills, safety and on traffic rules and regulations; poor health due to long work
hours; and, lack of income security under a purely commission-based compensation
scheme.
• Public Utility Bus Operators (PUBs) are required (a) to secure a certificate showing
compliance with all relevant legislations on wages, and labor standards of
employment; and, (b) to adopt a “part-fixed-part-performance-based compensation
system.” D.O. 118-12 shall apply initially to PUB in Metro Manila and, by July
2012, to other PUBs. Owners/operators of coaches, school, tourist and similar buses
who are holders of public convenience are not covered by the operational guidelines
issued by the National Wages and Productivity Commission.
• Petitioners argue that D.O. 118-12 and M.C. 2012-001 violate their right to (1) due
process; (2) equal protection; and, (3) non-impairment of obligation of contracts.
• Respondents, on the other hand, contend that (1) petitioners do not have legal
standing and violated the hierarchy of courts; (2) that the government issuances
were in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers; (3) that certificates of public
15
convenience are not property; and, (4) that all PUBs around the country were
covered.
Issues:
• Whether or not petitioners possess legal standing.

• Whether or not petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Whether or not the government issuances violated:
(a) the due process clause;
(b) the equal protection clause; and,
(c) the non-impairment of obligation of contracts clause.
Ruling:
• Petitioners lack legal standing.

• Petitioners failed to respect the hierarchy of courts.
• Petitioners’ right to due process, equal protection and non-impairment of obligation
of contracts were not violated.
Reasoning:
• Petitioners did not present any actual case or controversy because there were only
bare allegations that the government issuances “may result in the diminution of
income of bus drivers and conductors;” and, “that the part-fixed-part-performance-
based payment scheme is unfit to the nature of operation of public transport system
or business.” These are purely speculative in nature.
• Petitioners do not have legal standing. As associations, they failed to establish who
their members are if these members allowed them to sue on their behalf. MMDA
also intervened to show that the certificates of public convenience of petitioners
were revoked by SEC for failure to submit the required general information sheets
and financial statements for the years 1996-2003.
• Notice and hearing are not required when an administrative agency exercises its
quasi-legislative power because the administrative agency makes no determination
of past events or facts (unlike in the exercise of quasi-judicial power).
• Reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is read into contracts (e.g.,

police power). Certificates of public convenience are franchises always subject to
amendment, repeal, or cancellation. There can be no violation of due process when
a franchise is cancelled for non-compliance with the new requirement.
• In Hernandez v. Dolor (479 Phil. 593 [2004]), it has been observed that the
“boundary system places the riding public at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible
drivers – reckless because the measure of their earnings depends largely upon the
number of trips they make and, hence, the speed at which they drive.” Behavioral
economics explains this phenomenon. The boundary system puts drivers in a
“scarcity mindset.” This is eliminated by providing drivers with a fixed-income plus
viable income-based performance.
16
• Franchises are in the nature of a mere privilege subject to the police power of the
State as in the case of social legislations (e.g., labor contracts).
Article III, Section 1 (Due Process) in relation to Article III, Section 14 (Rights of the
Accused)
Labay v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 235937-40, July 23, 2018
J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division
Facts:
• Petitioner Labay, with other co-accused, was implicated in the alleged anomalous
utilization of the PDAF of former Representative Marie Douglas C. Cagas IV. The
Ombudsman (OMB) directed Labay and his co-accused to file counter-affidavits.
Efforts to serve copies of the OMB order failed since Labay, in particular, was no
longer employed at the National Anti-Poverty Commission and he was unknown at
the given residential address. OMB proceeded with the preliminary investigation
and found probable cause to indict Labay and his co-accused.
• It was only sometime in October 2016 that Labay learned of the cases when his
lawyer-daughter came across press releases of the OMB. On October 3, 2016,
Labay’s daughter attempted to secure information from OMB but was advised to
submit a written request. In response to a letter-request, OMB served on Labay’s
daughter copies of the May 10, 2016 Resolution and even directed her to file a
motion for reconsideration on behalf of her father.
• An Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information

with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents was
filed on November 16, 2016. This was denied. A second motion for reconsideration
was filed, but the same was also denied.
• On March 24, 2017, OMB filed four (4) Informations before the Sandiganbayan.
Four days after the Informations had already been filed, Labay was furnished a copy
of the Complaint-Affidavit and supporting evidence. On April 5, 2017, Labay files
an Extremely Urgent Motion with the Sandiganbayan that he is entitled to a
reinvestigation. This was denied.
Issue:
• Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner to due process was violated.
Ruling:
• Yes. Petitioner is entitled to a reinvestigation.
Reasoning:
17
• The right to have a preliminary investigation is a substantive right. While the OMB
was correct in resolving the complaint based on evidence presented in accordance
with paragraph (e), Section 4 of the OMB Rules of Procedure, the situation,
however, effectively changes when petitioner made himself available to the OMB
when he requested access to the case records. Instead, the OMB merely decided to
furnish petitioner with a copy of the May 10, 2016 Resolution.
• The Sandiganbayan should have recognized these patent violations and ordered the
remand of the case.
(Note: J. Leonen dissented stating that the right to a preliminary investigation is merely
statutory in character.)
Article VII, Section 20 (Loan Agreements) in relation to Article VII, Section 21 (Executive
Agreements)
RE: Contracts with Artes International, Inc.

A.M. No. 12-6-18-SC, August 7, 2018
Facts:
• The Republic of the Philippines and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) signed on October 2, 2003 to fund the Judicial Support Project
(JRSP) “to assist the Borrower in developing a more effective and accessible
Judiciary…”
• Part of the JRSP is “Enhancing Institutional Integrity.” Then Chief Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban initiated the “Globalization Lecture Series – Forum with Chief
Justice.” To facilitate timely procurement of Goods, Works, and Services, the
Supreme Court issued, through SC Administrative Circular No. 60-2003, the
“Procurement Policy and Procedures for the JRSP.”
• The JRSP procurement rules were culled out from the IBRD Guidelines and R.A.
9184 (Government Procurement), which applied suppletorily. The JRSP Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) was tasked to conduct procurement activities.
• However, the Administrator of the SC Program Management Office (PMO), Ms.

Evelyn Toledo-Dumdum, entered into several contracts with Artes International,
Inc. using the “shopping” method of procurement in canvassing three suppliers for
goods and supplies intended for the National Forum, ignoring the IBRD Guidelines
requiring a purchase order. Instead, Ms. Dumdum relied on letter-quotations. There
were doubts that the actual canvass had been conducted.
• The SC found that Ms. Dumdum used “splitting of contracts.” It appeared that Artes
had always been the favored bidder. Using the letter-quotations with Artes, Ms.
Dumdum merely affixed her signature to validate various contracts amounting to
millions of pesos covering various phases of the events, instead of conducting a
public bidding for two events in an apparent ploy to avoid the control measures.
18
• Artes waived its existing claims against the SC pursuant to the contracts.
Issues:
• What is the legal characterization of the loan agreement between the SC and IBRD?
• Does the public bidding in R.A. 9184 apply to the loan agreement?
• What is the personal liability of Ms. Dumdum?
• What is the personal liability of the Chief Justice?
• Were the disbursements of funds valid?
Ruling:
• The loan agreement is in the nature of an executive agreement.

• R.A. 9184 does not apply.
• Ms. Dumdum is released from personal liability but should be investigated from any
administrative or criminal liability.
• The Chief Justice is not personally liable, having merely relied in utmost good faith
on his subordinates.
• There were violations of law in disbursements of funds.
Reasoning:
• Landbank of the Philippines v. Atlanta Industries, Inc. held that public bidding
under R.A. 9184 does not apply to the procurement of goods to be financed from
the proceeds of a loan agreement between IBRD and the Landbank.
• The loan agreement subject of this case is governed by international law. Therefore,
the SC is obligated to comply with the terms and conditions of the loan agreement
under the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
• Although the violations would have resulted in the nullification of the contracts, the
SC resolved to pay the unpaid balance to Artes on the equitable principle of quantum
meruit.
Article VI, Section 1 (Undue Delegation of Legislative Power) and Section 16 (4) (Enrolled
Bill) in relation to Article II, Sections 13 and 17 (Patriotism and Nationalism); Article XIV,
Sections 1 (Quality Education), 2 (2) (Free Elementary and High School Education;
Compulsory Elementary Education), 3 (1) (Study of the Constitution), 3 (2) (Patriotism
and Nationalism), 4 (1) (State Supervision of Educational Institutions; External
Governance), 4 (2) (Control of Educational Institutions; Internal Governance), 5 (2)
(Academic Freedom), 5 (3) (Right to Select a Profession), 5 (4) (State Protection), 6
(Filipino as Medium of Official Communication), 7 (Regional Languages), 14 (National
Culture), 15 (Arts and Letters), and 16 (State Protection of Cultural Treasure); Article 13,
Section 3 (Rights and Welfare of Workers); and, Article III (1) (Substantive Due Process
and Equal Protection)
Council of Teachers, et al. v. Secretary of Education, et al.
19
G.R. No. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218045, 218098, 218123, 218465, October 9,
2018
J. Caguioa, En Banc
Facts:
• Pursuant to the 2000 World Education Forum (WEF), the Philippines pledged to
achieve the goals of the Education for All (EFA) platform of WEF by providing
“basic competencies for all that will bring about functional literacy.” The following
legislations were passed accordingly:
(1) Kindergarten Education Act (R.A. 10157, 2012) – one (1) year mandatory and
compulsory for entrance to grade 1; and,
(2) K to 12 Law (R.A. 10533, 2013) – expanded basic education from ten (10) years
to thirteen (13) years, inclusive of one (1) year Kindergarten education, six (6)
years of elementary education, and six (6) years of secondary education, wherein
secondary education is divided between four (4) years of junior high school
(JHS) and two (2) years of senior high school (SHS) education (these last two
(2) years of education will allow students to choose among academic, technical
– vocational, or sports and arts, as specialization).
• Graduates of SHS are envisioned to already be prepared for employment,

entrepreneurship, or middle-level skills development should they opt not to pursue
college education.
• Various agencies, such as, DepEd, DOLE, CHED and TESDA were tasked to
promulgate rules, regulations, or issuances, among which were the following:
(1) Voucher system – a government tuition subsidy to students to enable them

to enroll in eligible private education institutions or non-DepEd public
schools of their choice;
(2) Joint Guidelines on the Implementation of the Labor and Management

Component of R.A. 10533 – to protect the rights, interests, and welfare of
teaching and non-teaching personnel; and, to optimize employment retention
or prevent displacement of faculty and non-academic personnel
• Under D.O. No. 31 policy guidelines were set to implement the K-12 curriculum,
effective SY 2012-2013.
• The first batch of Grade 6 and Grade 12 students are set to graduate by 2018.
• Finally, CHED Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 20, series of 2013, after public
consultations, provided changes to the General Education Curriculum (GEC)
through an outcome-based education (OBE) categorized into: (a) Intellectual
Competencies; (b) Personal and Civic Competencies; and, (c) Practical
Responsibilities. It takes 36 units (compared to the previous 65/51 units) distributed
as follows: 24 units of core courses; 9 units of elective courses; and 3 units on the
20
life and works of Rizal. The GE core courses consist of: (1) Understanding the Self;
(2) Readings in Philippine History; (3) The Contemporary World; (4) Mathematics
in the Modern World; (5) Purposive Communication; (6) Art Appreciation; (7)
Science, Technology and Society; and, (8) Ethics. Elective courses, on the other
hand, allowed the students to choose from: (1) Mathematics, Science and
Technology; (2) Social Sciences and Philosophy; and, (3) Arts and Humanities.
• Several petitions questioned the validity of the passage of the K to 12 Law and the
constitutionality of the law, including the rules, regulations, and issuances
promulgated by the different agencies of the government.
Issues:
• Is judicial review proper?

• Was K to 12 Law duly enacted?
• Did K to 12 Law constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
• Did the K to 12 Law, IRRs, D.O. No. 31 and the Joint Guidelines violate pertinent
provisions under Article 2 (Sections 13, 17 and 18), Article 13 (Section 3), Article
14 (Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 and 16)?
• Did CMO No. 20 violate existing laws (R.A. 7104, B.P. Blg. 232 or R.A. 7356)?
Did the K to 12 Law violate the right to substantive due process and equal protection
of the laws?
Ruling:
• Judicial review is proper.

• K to 12 Law was duly enacted.
• K to 12 Law is complete and provide sufficient standards. The fact that it did not
have any provisions on labor does not make the law incomplete.
• D.O. No. 31 is valid and enforceable. It is an administrative regulation addressed to
DepEd personnel and duly filed with the U.P. Law Center in accordance with
Sections 3 and 4 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
• The provisions under Articles 2 and 14 are not self-executory.
• There was no inconsistency between CMO No. 20 and existing laws.
• There was no violation of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws.
Reasoning:
• The fact that the assailed laws and executive issuances did not involve the exercise
of judicial or quasi-judicial function is of no moment. Petitioners are concerned
citizens asserting public right, sufficiently clothes them with legal standing.
• There were prior consultations from February to March 2011 and regional public
hearings between March 2011 to February 2012 in the course of drafting the K to
12 Law. And even assuming that no consultations had been made prior to the
adoption of the K to 12 Law, it has been held that the “penalty for failure on the part
of the government to consult could only be reflected in the ballot box and would not
nullify government action.” (citing Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Ermita, 558
Phil. 338, 363 [2007])
21
• The enrolled bill applies in this case. Reliance on Astorga case is misplaced.
• Scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards to guide DepEd, CHED and
TESDA. As regards labor implications of the K to 12 Law, the purpose of
permissible delegation to administrative agencies is for the latter to implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress
may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
• DO No. 31 in adding two (2) more years to basic education was issued in accordance
with the DepEd’s mandate to establish a complete and integrated consultations. DO
No. 31 is an interpretative regulation and is merely internal in nature which is not
required to be published. But DO No. 31 was nevertheless published.
• The provisions in Articles 13 and 14 are not self-executory.
• There is no conflict between K to 12 Law and related issuances and the Constitution
when it made Kindergarten and SHS compulsory. Only a minimum standard was
set by the Constitution making elementary education compulsory. Even Article 41
of CRC states that “nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions
which are more conducive to the realizations of the rights of the child.” The SC
cannot question the wisdom of the K to 12 Law.
• As regards existing laws, B.P. Blg. 232 does not confer any vested right to four (4)
years of high school education.
• Students may choose from the four (4) strands, consistent with their right to choose
their profession.
• There is no conflict between the use of the mother tongue as a primary medium of
instruction and the Constitution (Article 14, Sections 6 and 7). Regional languages
may be used as a medium of instruction.
• The academic freedom of faculty from higher educational institution (HEI) is not
lost when they are transferred to SHS level. Civil servants may be removed from
service for a valid cause, such as when there is a bona fide reorganization.
• The establishment of the voucher system is the way of tapping the resources of the
private education system.
• The study of Filipino, Panitikan and the Constitution are found in the basic
education. The Constitution does not specify the educational level in which these
subjects may be taught. CHED is authorized to determine the general education
distribution requirements.
• There is no violation of substantive due process because the objectives of the law
serve the interest of the public and not only of a particular class. The Manila Science
High School students did not offer any substantial basis for the Court to create a
valid classification between them and the rest of the high school students. Their
assertions of being “gifted,” not in need of decongesting their curriculum, and that
22
they are not in need of immediate employment, are not enough bases to distinguish
them from the rest of the students subject to the revised curriculum. Therefore, the
petitioners’ remedy is with MSHS and/or DepEd for purposes of modifying their
curriculum subject to the minimum requirements of the K to 12 Law.
• DepEd’s Basic Education Sector Transform Program (BEST), supported by

Australian Aid and managed by CardNo, a foreign corporation listed in the
Australian Securities Exchange, does not violate the power of the State to supervise
and regulate educational institutions, including the power of control and
administration of educational institutions which shall be vested in the citizens of the
Philippines. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the State to forge a partnership
with a foreign entity in the exercise of this supervision and regulation of educational
institutions.
• Other policy issues on resource gaps, funding, student-teacher ratio, salaries or

assurance of employment are not the concern of the Court.
Article VI, Section 17 (Electoral Tribunal) in relation to Article III, Section 1 (Equal
Protection)
Reyes v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018
J. Carpio, En Banc
Facts:
• Reyes has two pending quo warranto cases before HRET. She questions
constitutionality of various provisions of the 2015 Revised Rules of the HRET,
namely:
(1) Rule 6 (a): “The presence of at least (1) Justice and (4) Members of the
Tribunal shall be necessary to constitute a quorum.” She argues that this
gives the Justices, collectively, denial or veto powers over the proceedings
by simply absenting themselves from any hearing.
(2) Rule 69: “xxx the concurrence of at least five (5) members shall be necessary
for the rendition of the decisions and the adoption of formal resolutions,
provided that, in cases where a member inhibits or cannot take part in the
deliberations, a majority vote of the remaining members shall be sufficient.”
She argues that the quorum requirement (in relation to Rule 69) is ambiguous
because it requires only the presence of at least one Justice and four members
of the Tribunal. In case of inhibition, a mere majority of the remaining
members shall be sufficient to render a decision, instead of the majority of
all the members.
(3) Rule 15 (in relation to Rule 17 and 18): “xxx to be considered a member of
the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of
23
office.” She argues that Rule 15 expanded the jurisdiction of COMELEC
because under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution as well as the 2011
Rules of HRET, a petition may be filed within 15 days from the date of the
proclamation of the winner, making such proclamation the operative fact for
the HRET to acquire jurisdiction. Further, under Rule 17 of the 2015 HRET
Rules, an election protest should be filed within 15 days from June 30 of the
election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later,
while Rule 18 provides that petitions for quo warranto shall be filed within
15 days from June 30 of the election year of the date of actual assumption of
office, whichever is later.
Issues:
• Are the questioned rules unconstitutional?
Ruling:
• No.
Reasoning:
• The ratio of three Justices to six legislators in the HRET is a guarantee to ensure
impartiality in the judgment of cases.
• Members from both Judicial and Legislative departments become indispensable to

constitute a quorum. Only a Justice can chair the Tribunal, as such, there should
always be one member who is a Justice.
• If all three Justices-members inhibit themselves in a case, the SC will designate

another Justice to chair the Tribunal. A member of the Tribunal who inhibits or is
disqualified from participating in the deliberations cannot be considered present for
the purpose of having a quorum.
• Rule 69 shows that the SC and the House of Representatives have the authority to
designate a special member or members who could act as temporary replacements.
• Rule 6 (b) and 6 (c) allow for the constitution of an Executive Committee. Even if
only three members of the HRET acted as an Executive Committee, and even if all
these three members are Justices, their actions are subject to the confirmation by the
entire Tribunal or at least five of its members who constitute a quorum.
• There is no room for COMELEC to assume jurisdiction. The reckoning event under
Rule 15, being dependent on the taking of an oath and the assumption of office of
the winning candidate, is indeterminable. The date, time, and place of the taking of
oath depend entirely upon the winning candidate. The Court takes judicial notice
that in its Resolution No. 16, series of 2018, dated 20 September 2018, the HRET
amended Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules, thus, today, the losing candidate
can determine with certainty when to file his election protest.
24
Article III, Section 6 (Right to Travel)
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 205904-06, October 17, 2018
J. A. Reyes, Jr., Second Division
Facts:
• Governor Gwendolyn F. Garcia was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. Three (3) Hold Departure Orders
(HDOs) were issued against her by the Sandiganbayan. Meanwhile, she filed a
motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman. On the basis of this pending
motion, Garcia argued that the HDOs cannot be issued without a final determination
of a probable cause, and, therefore, there is as yet “no pending criminal case” against
her. She added, that the Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 39-97 provides that only
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) can issue HDOs.
Issue:
• May HDOs be issued by the Sandiganbayan even pending a motion for

reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause?
Ruling:
• Yes.
Reasoning:
• SC Circular No. 39-97 was not meant to declare RTC as the sole and exclusive
authority in the issuance of HDOs. The point of distinction is not the type of court
but the kind of cases involved, by excluding less grave and light offenses from the
instances when the gravity of the offenses is not serious enough to warrant a
restriction.
• The issuance of the HDO is a process complementary to the granting of bail since
it puts the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on notice that a certain person is charged
before the court of law and must not be allowed to leave our jurisdiction without the
permission of the court.
• Garcia is not absolutely prohibited from travelling abroad. When she filed a motion
for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the HDOs, she argued against the
validity on the ground of prematurity and that the Sandiganbayan has no authority
to issue the same. She never questioned the necessity or sufficiency of the basis of
its issuance. She failed to prove the circumstances that would warrant her prayer.
• In Crespo v. Mogul, it has been held that once the case had already been brought to
court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the court.
25
Article III, Section 1 (Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection) in relation to Article
III, Section 14 (Presumption of Innocence); Article III, Section 18 (2) (Involuntary
Servitude); and Article VIII, Sections 1 and 5 (5) (Requisites of Judicial Review)
Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PHAPI) v. Executive

Secretary Medialdea
G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018
J. Tijam, En Banc
Facts:
• R.A. 10923 was passed making it unlawful to request, solicit, demand, or accept
deposit or advance payment as a prerequisite not only for confinement or medical
treatment but also for administering basic emergency care, including treatment of a
woman in active labor. In case a transfer to another hospital is deemed appropriate,
the local government unit where the hospital or medical clinic is located is mandated
to allow free use of its emergency medical vehicle. Penalties, such as, imprisonment
of not less than six (6) months and one (1) day but not more than two (2) years and
four (4) months, or a fine of not less than P100,000 but not more than P300,000, or
both at the court’s discretion, may be imposed upon an erring official, medical
practitioner, or employee. When the violation was made pursuant to an established
hospital policy, the penalties are increased as against the director or officer to four
(4) years to six (6) years, or a fine of not less than P500,000 but not more than
P1,000,000, or both, without prejudice to an award for damages.
• The law further introduces the “three-strike rule” upon repeated violations pursuant
to established policy. As a consequence, the health facility’s license to operate shall
be revoked and the president, chairman, board of directors or trustees and other
officers shall be solidarily liable for damages.
• A presumption of liability against the health facility applies.
• PhilHealth reimbursement is mandated for the cost of basic emergency care

rendered to poor and indigent patients. PCSO shall provide medical assistance also.
• DOH issued Administrative Order No. 2018-0012 to implement the law.
• PHAP, a non-stock, non-profit organization is the sole national organization of

purely private owned health facilities. Through a Board Resolution, PHAP stated
that “the members of PHAP view R.A. 10932 as unconstitutional with respect to its
penal provisions xxx, the same being oppressive and confiscatory; and with respect
to its provision on ‘Presumption of Liability’ xxx, is utterly against the xxx
‘Presumption of Innocence.” PHAP was not given any authority to file the necessary
petition to question the constitutionality of the law before any court.
Issue:
• Will the case prosper?
Ruling:
26
• No.
Reasoning:
• To fall under the third-party exception on locus standi, an association filing a case
on behalf of its members must not only show that it stands to suffer direct injury,
but also that it has been duly authorized to represent them or sue in their behalf.
Article II, Section 1 (Government Instrumentality) in relation to Article XII, Section 16

(Creation of Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporation)
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Quezon City

G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018
J. Leonen, Third Division
Facts:
• On June 19, 1971, R.A. 6234 created MWSS to ensure adequate supply of potable
water. It exercised supervision and control over waterworks and sewerage systems
within Metro Manila, Rizal and a portion of Cavite.
• Initially created without capital stock, President Marcos issued P.D. 425 authorizing
it with a capital stock of P 1,000,000,000.00.
• Quezon city issued notices of real property delinquency. MWSS claimed

exemption.
• MWSS filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The CA ruled that the properties of
MWSS were held in the exercise of its proprietary functions subject to real property
tax.
Issue:
• Is MWSS exempt from real property tax?
Ruling:
• The CA decision is reversed. MWSS is tax-exempt as a government instrumentality

with corporate powers.
Reasoning:
• Citing MIAA v. CA, the SC affirmed that it is still a good law. Thus, a government
instrumentality must not have been organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
even though it exercises corporate powers, administers special funds, and enjoys
operational autonomy, usually through its charter. Its properties are exempt from
real property tax because they are properties of the public dominion.
27
• A government-owned and -controlled corporation, on the other hand, is not exempt

from real property tax under the Local Government Code.
• Applied to MWSS, its Charter explicitly declared it exempt from real property tax.
While P.D. 425 amended MWSS’ Charter converting it into a stock corporation, it
is an attached agency of DPWH. In 1995, R.A. 8041 reorganized MWSS and
privatized the “financing, construction… operation of water supply… distribution
of facilities…” Any contract undertaken by MWSS with private concessionaires
must be assessed for its market competitiveness.
• Under the MIAA parameters, MWSS is a government-owned and -controlled

corporation. Under the LGC, only its machinery and equipment actually, directly,
and exclusively used in the supply and distribution of water can be exempt from real
property tax (similar to the National Power Corporation).
• However, after MIAA, E.O. 596 reorganized the Court’s categorization of

“government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers.” MWSS is now
categorized with other government agencies exempt from real property tax.
• In 2011, R.A. 10149 or the GOCC Governance Act adopted the same categorization
and listed MWSS as exempt from real property tax.
• Therefore, the Executive and Legislative branches have categorized MWSS not as
a government-owned and -controlled corporation but as a government
instrumentality with corporate powers/ government corporate entity exempt from
real property tax. The following are examples similar to MWSS: MIAA and
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority.
• MWSS’ real property tax exemption under R.A. 6234 is still valid as the proviso of
Section 234 of the LGC is only applicable to government-owned and -controlled
corporations, except if beneficial use of its properties is extended to a taxable
person.
Article III, Section 5 (Free Exercise and Non-Establishment of Religion) in relation to

Article III, Section 4 (Freedom of Speech and Expression)
Celdran v. People
G.R. No. 220127, March 21, 2018 and November 21, 2018 (MR)
First Division
Facts:
• Celdran was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila,
Branch 4 for the offense of Offending the Religious Feelings under Article 133 of
the RPC. The incident took place on September 30, 2010 while Brother Edgar J.
Tria Tirona was reading a passage from the Bible around 3:00 p.m. Celdran entered
the Manila Cathedral clad in a black suit and a hat, went to the center of the aisle
and in front of the altar suddenly brought out a placard emblazoned with the word
28
“DAMASO.” Commotion ensued when Celdran shouted, “Bishops, stop involving
yourself (sic) in politics.”
• Celdran argued that the incident did not happen during the celebration of the mass
and nothing happened that disturbed the proceedings.
• The MeTC found him guilty while the RTC approved the conviction. On appeal
before the CA, the findings of the MeTC and RTC were affirmed.
• The Supreme Court dismissed Celdran’s petition stating that the question of whether
petitioner offended the religious feelings of those present during the celebration is
a question of fact. Celdran filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the
constitutionality of Article 133 of the RPC.
Issue:
• Whether or not Article 133 of the RPC violates the constitutional right of freedom
of speech and expression.
Ruling:
• Motion for reconsideration is denied.
Reasoning:
• As a general rule, facial invalidation of penal statutes is disfavored.
• The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application only to free
speech cases, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process are invalidated
only “as applied” to a particular defendant.
• As an exception, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine

may be allowed when the subject penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of
speech, as found in Disini, Jr. et al. v. The Secretary of Justice.
• Article 133 of the RPC does not encroach on the freedom of expression as it does
not regulate free speech but “conduct” offensive to religious feelings. There is no
criminal liability on anyone who wishes to express dissent on another religious
group.
• Neither does Article 133 of the RPC violate the non-establishment clause.
Article III, Section 5 (Non-Establishment Clause) in relation to Article VI, Section 29 (2)
(Use of Public Funds in Support of Any Sect or Church)
Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corporation

G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018
J. Tijam, En Banc
29
Facts:
• On May 10, 2014, PhilPost issued a stamp commemorating Iglesia ni Cristo’s (INC)
centennial celebration, showing a photo of INC founder, the late Felix Y. Manalo
with a designation on the left side containing the words “Felix Y. Manalo, 1886-
1963 First Executive Minister of Iglesia ni Cristo,” with the Central Temple of INC
at the background. At the right side of Manalo’s photo is the INC’s centennial logo
containing a torch enclosed by two concentric circles with the words “IGLESIA NI
CRISTO CENTENNIAL 1914-2014.”
• Peralta questioned the issuance of the stamps allegedly paid for by PhilPost. The
latter denied the allegation and cited a Memorandum of Agreement with INC where
it was provided that INC will pay for the costs of printing of 50,000 pieces. (PhilPost
printed 1,200,000.) The proceeds of the sale of the stamps will not redound to the
sole benefit of INC as PhilPost claimed that the printing is part of PhilPost’s
“philatelic products” which will promote tourism in the country. There is merely an
incidental benefit to INC according to PhilPost.
• The RTC denied the injunctive relief prayed for and the CA likewise found for
PhilPost hence, the present petition.
Issue:
• Did PhilPost violate the non-establishment clause?
Ruling:
• The petition is denied.
Reasoning:
• There is no law mandating anyone to avail of the INC stamps, nor is there any law
purporting to require anyone to adopt the INC’s teachings.
• The printing of the stamps is no different from other stamps acknowledging persons
and events of significance to the country (e.g., National Artists, past Philippine
Presidents, Heritage Churches, Eucharistic Congress, Pope Francis, 300 years of
Islam, etc.).
• “Culture” and “national development” are secular. The use of the façade of the
Church and the image of Felix Y. Manalo is nothing more than an acknowledgment
of a historical milestone.
Article X, Section 7 (Local Government Equitable Share) in relation to Article I (National

Territory)
Republic, et al. v. Provincial Government of Palawan, et al.

G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018
J. Tijam, En Banc
30
Facts:
• On December 11, 1990, the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into Service
Contract No. 38 with Shell Philippine Exploration for the conduct of petroleum
operations in the “Camago-Malampaya” natural gas reservoir about 80 kms. from
the main island of Palawan and 30 kms. from the platform.
• A production sharing scheme was entered into between the National Government
(60%) and Shell (40%) of the net proceeds from the sale of petroleum (including
natural gas) produced from the petroleum operations.
• On February 17, 1998, A.O. No. 381 was issued by President Ramos stating that the
Province of Palawan was expected to receive USD 2.1 Billion from the estimates
USD 8.1 Billion total government share.
• On June 10, 1998, DOE Secretary Viray wrote Palawan Governor Socrates,
requesting for deferment of payment of 50% of Palawan’s share in the project for
the first seven years of operations.
• Palawan claims 40% of the National Government’s share since the reservoir is
located within its territorial jurisdiction. It further bolsters this claim pursuant to
Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The National Government maintains
that the reservoir is within the national territory of the Philippines.
• A suit for declaratory relief was filed in 2003. The RTC ruled in favor of Palawan
stating that it is unthinkable to limit Palawan’s territorial jurisdiction to its landmass
and municipal waters (15 kms.). In 2006, the Republic challenged the RTC ruling
before the SC.
Issue:
• Is Palawan entitled to an equitable share from the proceeds of the sale of petroleum
from the Camago-Malampaya reservoir?
Ruling:
• Palawan is not entitled to share in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural

gas project.
Reasoning:
• A local government’s territorial jurisdiction cannot extend beyond the boundaries

set by its organic law.
• An LGU’s territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-extensive with its exercise or

assertion of powers. Thus, the LGU’s authority to adopt and implement measures
to protect the environment under R.A. 7611 does not determine the extent of its
territorial jurisdiction.
31
• The LGC deferred to the Court’s ruling in Tan v. COMELEC which excluded the
marginal sea from LGU territory.
• The Camago-Malampaya reservoir is located in the continental shelf. If the marginal

sea is not included in the LGU’s territory, with more reason should the continental
shelf be deemed excluded.
• Accordingly, only the natural resources found within the land area as delimited by
law is subject to LGU’s equitable share under Sections 290 and 291 of the LGC.
• Palawan is merely comprised of islands. P.D. 1596 which constituted Kalayaan as

a separate municipality of Palawan cannot be basis for holding that Camago-
Malampaya reservoir form part of Palawan’s territory. The delineation of territory
in P.D. 1596 refers to Kalayaan alone. The inclusion of the seabed, subsoil and
continental margin in Kalayaan’s territory cannot, by simple analogy, be applied to
Palawan.
• The letter of President Ramos and A.O. 381 acknowledging Palawan’s share were
based on mistaken assumption. Estoppel does not lie against the State.
Article III, Section 2 (Search and Seizure of an Illegal Drug at the Airport)
People v. O’Cochlain
G.R. No. 2229071, December 10, 2018
J. Peralta, Third Division
Facts:
• On July 14, 2013 at around 7:00 p.m., Security Screening Officer (SSO) Suguitan,
assigned at the initial security screening checkpoint of the Laoag City International
Airport, was told by CAAP Security and Intelligence (CSI) Tamayo that the parking
space in front of the departure area smelled like marijuana and suspected
O’Cochlain, a 53-year old Irish national, was one smoking the illegal drug whom
he saw a little earlier lighting something unrecognizable as he was covering it with
his palm. CSI Tamayo shared the information to SSO Bal-ot manning the final
screening area.
• When SSO Suguitan returned to his post at the initial check-in area, he was
instructed by SSO Bal-ot to conduct a “pat down” search on O’Cochlain, who
agreed. When something was felt inside the pocket of his upper garment, he was
asked to take it out and a pack of Marlboro Red from his left pocket, including a
matchbox. He took another pack of Marlboro Red from his right pocket which
contained two (2) rolled sticks of marijuana. The 2 sticks were put by SSO Suguitan
on the nearby screening table. The seized items were brought by PO3 Javier to the
PNP-Aviation Security Group office. SSO Suguitan and O’Cochlain accompanied
PO3 Javier.
• The confiscation receipts were signed by PO3 Javier and SSO Suguitan together
with two (2) Barangay Kagawad and an ABS-CBN cameraman. PO3 Javier marked
32
the 2 rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves and placed them inside a Ziploc
resealable plastic bag while PlSupt. Apias prepared requests for the medico-legal
examination of O’Cochlain and the laboratory examination of the 2 rolled sticks of
dried marijuana leaves. Later on, all examination results showed positive presence
of marijuana.
• The RTC upheld the search and arrest of O’Cochlain as “an exception to the
proscription against warrantless searches and seizure.” It was satisfied as to the
chain of custody procedure, noting that it was PO3 Javier who brought the 2 sticks
of marijuana to the crime laboratory. The 2 sticks were duly received by PO3
Padayao who turned them over to the forensic chemist. An Acknowledgment
Receipt was later on issued by the RTC Branch Clerk of Court. O’Cochlain was
convicted.
• The CA affirmed the RTC decision of conviction. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
• Whether or not the search and seizure were valid.
Ruling:
• The search and seizure were valid as there was a valid consented warrantless search.
Reasoning:
• Search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made
pursuant to the aviation security procedures has been sustained as held in People v.
Johnson as a recognized exception to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
Airport searches have received judicial sanction essentially because of the
magnitude and pervasiveness of the danger to the public safety.
• Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not specifically held that airport screening
searches are constitutionally reasonable searches, it has suggested that they qualify
as such but it is not limitless. The individual screener’s actions must be no more
intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or absence of explosives. Once
conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified and
takes it away from the exception to the warrant requirement. Davis provides a
guidepost:
(1) The search is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current
technology, to satisfy the administrative need that justifies it, that is to detect the
presence of weapons or explosives;
(2) The search is confined in good faith to that purposes; and,
(3) A potential passenger may avoid the search by choosing not to fly.
• Currently, U.S. Courts are of the view that the constitutionality of a screening search
does not depend on the passenger’s consent once he enters the secured area of an
airport. If a potential passenger chooses to avoid a search, he must elect not to fly
before placing his baggage on the x-ray machine’s conveyor belt.
33
• The instant case does not qualify as a legitimate administrative search in an airport
because what was seized were 2 rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves, not
explosives or other items which may be used to conduct hijacking or acts of
terrorism.
• Unlike a routine search where a prohibited drug was found by chance, a search on
the person of the passenger or on his personal belongings in a deliberate and
conscious effort to discover an illegal drug is not authorized under the exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirement.
• Nevertheless, the SC finds that there is a valid warrantless search based on express
consent when O’Cochlain readily agreed to the “pat down” search. Corollarily, his
subsequent arrent without warrant was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of an illegal drug in his person in flagrante delicto.
• Assuming there is truth to the failure to mark immediately the 2 sticks of marijuana,
non-compliance with Section 21 (1) of R.A. 9165 and its IRR may be excused.
Hence, the reason for non-observance with the rule on immediate marking, physical
inventory, and photograph of the confiscated drug was that the final checkpoint area
started to become crowded. Unlike in buy-bust operation, which is pre-planned and
already coordinated in order to ensure the instant presence of necessary witnesses,
arrests and seizures in airport due to illegal drugs are almost always spontaneous.
The period of waiting for the witnesses did not affect the integrity and evidentiary
value of the subject illegal drug.
• People v. Agulay ruled that failure to comply with the procedure in Section 21 (a),
Article II of the IRR of R.A. 9165 does not bar the application of presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.
[NOTE: Compare this with the standards applied in People v. Saluday, G.R. No.
215305, April 3, 2018.]
Article III, Section 6 (Right to Travel) in relation to Article III, Section 1 (Due Process),
Article VI, Section 1 (Undue Delegation of Legislative Power), Article VII, Section 1
(Executive Power) and Article VIII, Section 1 (Judicial Power) and Section 5 (Judicial
Review)
Zabal v. President Duterte, et al.

G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019
J. Del Castillo, En Banc
Facts:
• Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte issued

Proclamation 475 declaring a state of calamity in Boracay and ordered its closure
for six months from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018.
34
• Petitioners Zabal and Jacosalem are residents of Boracay earning a living from
tourist activities. Petitioner Bandiola is not a resident of Boracay but occasionally
visits the island for business and pleasure.
• Petitioners argue that their right to travel and property rights (i.e., the right to work
and earn a living) have been violated. Furthermore, they maintained that the
President exercised a law-making power.
• Respondents asserted that the President is immune from suit. Besides, prohibition
does not lie to restrain an act that is fait accompli, since the Proclamation has been
issued by the President. They viewed the petition as a Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation (SLAPP) under Rule 6 of A.M. 09-6-08-SC (Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases). The Proclamation is anchored on R.A. 10121, Section 16
(Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act) giving the President the
power to declare a state of calamity.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners’ right to travel and property rights have been violated.
(2) Whether or not the President may be sued.
(3) Whether or not Proclamation 475 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
(4) Whether or not the President infringed upon the power of the local government.
Ruling:
(1) The constitutional rights of petitioners have not been violated.

(2) The President is dropped as respondent.
(3) There is no undue delegation of legislative power.
(4) The President did not intrude into the autonomy of the local government.
Reasoning:
• Zabal and Jacosalem only stand to lose projected earnings which are mere
expectancies, while Bandiola, a non-resident, occasionally goes to Boracay for
business and pleasure. All petitions are not clothed with legal standing. However,
the SC allowed the petition due to its transcendental importance.
• The President is immune from suit.
• SLAPP does not apply in this case since the ultimate issue is the constitutionality
of Proclamation 475.
• There is a valid exercise of police power. Any bearing that the Proclamation may
have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban
of tourists and non-residents were necessary incidents of the island’s rehabilitation.
The closure is merely temporary.
• Since the Proclamation does not actually impose a restriction on the right to travel,
its issuance did not result to any substantial alteration of the relationship between
35
the State and the people. The Proclamation is therefore not a law and conversely,
the President did not usurp the law-making power of the legislative.
• R.A. 10121 puts a premium on the role of LGUs in disaster risk reduction and
management. The issue involved requires the joint effort of other government
agencies and LGUs.
Article VIII, Section 1 (Expanded Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) and 5 (Original and
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; Hierarchy of Courts; Rule-Making) in
relation to Article XII, Sections 11 (Public Utilities) and 12 (Monopolies)
Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)

and Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP)
G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019
J. Jardeleza, En Banc
Facts:
• DOTC and CAAP posted an Invitation to Pre-Qualify and Bid on the airport
development, operations, and maintenance of Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo,
Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), Puerto Princesa Airports.
• The projects, later on, were bundled into two groups: Bundle 1 – Bacolod-Silay and
Iloilo; and, Bundle 2 – Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol.
• Gios-Samar, Inc., invoking transcendental importance, filed a petition for

prohibition arguing that bundling of the projects were in violation of the following:
(a) Article XII, Section 11 (prohibition on anti-dummy and the grant to the general
public to invest in public utilities);
(b) Article XII, Section 12 (prohibition on monopolies); and,
(c) Prohibition on undue restraint of trade.
• Respondents denied that the bundling was contrary to the Constitution and R.A.
10667 (Philippine Competition Act).
• CAAP specifically asserted that the petition violated the principle of hierarchy of
courts.
Issues:
(1) Was the bundling contrary to Article XII, Sections 11 and 12, and the Philippine
Competition Act?
(2) Did the petitioner violate the principle of hierarchy of courts?
Ruling:
(1) No, the bundling was valid.

(2) Yes, the petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.
36
Reasoning:
• Petitioner’s arguments against the constitutionality of the bundling of the projects

are inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the determination of
which requires reception of evidence.
• The Constitution does not prohibit the operation of monopolies per se. Petitioner
failed to point to any provision of law which prohibits the bundling. It also failed
to allege ultimate facts that the bundling will create a monopoly. Finally, petitioner
did not state a cause of action to show that the bundling constituted anti-competitive
agreements prohibited by R.A. 10667.
• Executive Order No. 65 exempts contracts for infrastructure covered by the BOT
Law from the 40% foreign ownership limitation.
• The questions of fact which petitioner failed to prove were as follows: (a) simulated
composition of stock ownership; and, (b) shady companies’ direct access to the
projects. These require determination not within the jurisdiction of the SC.
• Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts have purely legal issues, not
contentious factual issues. The use of “transcendental importance” would show that
resolution of factual issues was not necessary for the resolution of the constitutional
issues. Trial courts or the CA are better equipped to determine factual issues.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) (Mandamus) in relation to R.A. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act)
Ha Datu Tawahig v. Cebu City Prosecutor, et al.

G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019
J. Leonen, Third Division
Facts:
• Ha Datu Tawahig, a tribal chieftain of the Higaonon Tribe, was charged with Rape
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 12. The alleged victim is also a member of
the tribe.
• A warrant of arrest was issued by the judge but Ha Datu would not be arrested until
much later. Following his arrest, Ha Datu moved to quash the warrant of arrest
invoking Sections 15 and 65 of IPRA and argued that “the controversy is purely a
dispute involving indigenous cultural communities over which customary laws must
apply in accordance with their tribal justice and under the jurisdiction of the
National Commission on Indigenous People.”
• It appeared that the victim brought her accusations also before the concerned
Council of Elders and that the Dadantulan Tribal Court was formed. The Tribal
Court issued a Resolution clearing him and that “he should [be spared] from
criminal, civil[,] and administrative liability.”
37
• A petition for mandamus was filed before the SC by Ha Datu to compel the RTC
Judge, et al. to desist from proceeding with the Rape case.
Issue:
• Whether or not mandamus may lie.
Ruling:
• No.
Reasoning:
• Mandamus will lie when the following concur: (1) a clear, duly established legal
right of the petitioner; and, (2) a correlative ministerial duty imposed by law upon
respondent.
• The various provisions of IPRA are instructive. Section 15 allows the use of
indigenous justice system if compatible with the national legal system and
internationally recognized human rights. Section 65, on the other hand, recognizes
the primacy of customary laws and practices in regard to disputes involving
indigenous peoples. Section 66 builds on Section 65 indicating that disputes still
unresolved despite exhausting customary laws governing the parties belonging to
the same indigenous cultural community may be brought to the NCIP. Thereafter,
under Section 67, an appeal may be taken to the CA by way of a petition for review.
• Section 65 is clearly qualified by Section 15. With respect to dispensing justice,

resolving conflicts, and peace-building, the application of customary laws and
practices is permissible only to the extent that is it in harmony with the national
legal system.
• To yield criminal prosecution would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people
as the objects of criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable
a measure of reparation of private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it
will never enable to consummate recompense owed to the State and the Filipino
people. Yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscarriage of justice.
• Thus, Ha Datu does not derive any right from the Tribal Court to be spared from
criminal liability. IPRA does not compel courts of law to desist from taking
cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples.
• On hierarchy of courts, the SC declared that it did not escape its attention that an
equally effective relief is the recourse to the CA. However, in the interest of
addressing the novel issue, it took cognizance of the petition.
Article XII, Section 19 (Monopolies) in relation to Article XII, Section 6 (Social Function
of Property) and Article VI, Section 1 (Quasi-Judicial and Quasi-Legislative Power of
Administrative Agencies)
38
Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas v. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 227670, May 3, 2019
J. Carpio, En Banc
Facts:
• On June 11, 2015, the DOE issued the 2015 DOE Circular entitled, “Mandating All
Distribution Utilities to Undergo Competitive Selection Process (CSP) in Securing
Power Supply Agreements (PSAs).” Section 3 of the Circular mandates CSP,
whenever DUs secure PSAs. It took effect on June 30, 2015 upon publication. After
its effectivity, all DUs shall procure PSAs only through CSP.
• On October 20, 2015, Joint Resolution No. 1 was executed by DOE and ERC to
adopt a “regime of transparent process in securing PSAs.” On the same date, the
ERC issued CSP Guidelines directing all DUs to conduct CSP in the procurement
of their power supply for their captive markets. However, the CSP Guidelines fixed
a new date of effectivity for compliance with CSP. This first instance of unilateral
fixing of a different date was followed by another postponement of the date of
effectivity of the CSP.
• ABP filed this petition to direct ERC to disapprove the PSAs of DUs submitted after
November 7, 2015 for failure to conduct CSPs. The second postponement of the
effectivity of CSP from November 7, 2015 to April 30, 2016 allowed DUs to enter
into contracts in avoidance of the CSPs.
• ABP argues that ERC does not have statutory authority to postpone the date of
effectivity of the CSP thereby amending the 2015 DOE Circular requiring CSPs to
take effect on June 30, 2015.
• The urgency of the petition is underscored by the great prejudice to be caused to the
public considering that the purpose of the CSP to compel DUs to purchase their
electric power at a transparent, reasonable and least-cost basis, since this cost is
entirely passed on to consumers, will be put to naught. ERC’s postponements
unconscionably placed this public purpose in freeze for 20 years.
Issue:
• Whether or not ERC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
• Yes, consequently, all PSA applications submitted by DUs after June 30, 2015 shall
comply with CSP.
Reasoning:
• Under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), the DOE
supervises the restructuring of the electricity industry. It is empowered to formulate
rules and regulations pursuant to this mandate, among which is the 2015 DOE
39
Circular mandating the conduct of CSP. This is a requirement to protect the
consuming public from exorbitant or unconscionable charges by DUs. Competitive
bidding is the most efficient and transparent guarantee that there will be no price
gouging by DUs.
• The ERC, on the other hand, was empowered by EPIRA to enforce the
implementing rules and regulations under the law, including the function of
ensuring that the allocation or pass through of bulk purchase cost by distributors is
transparent, non-discriminatory and that any existing subsidies shall be divided pro-
rata among all retail suppliers.
• There is nothing in the ERC functions that grants it rule-making power to supplant
or change the polices, rules, regulations, or circulars prescribed by DOE.
Article XII, Section 2 (Jura Regalia and “Public Trust Doctrine”) in relation to R.A. 9275
(Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004), Article II, Section 12 (Parens Patriae) and Article
III, Section 1 (Procedural and Substantive Due Process)
Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources, et al.
G.R. No. 202897, 206823 and 207969, August 6, 2019
J. Hernando, En Banc
Facts:
• The Regional Offices of DENR – Environmental Management Bureau – Region III

(EMB-RIII), NCR and Region VI-A, filed complaints before the DENR’s Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) charging MWSS and its concessionaires, Maynilad and
Manila Water, with failure to provide, install, operate, and maintain adequate
Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in the
degraded quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water leading to
Manila Bay.
• Prompted by these complaints, the Sec. of DENR (SENR) issued a Notice of

Violation (NOV) under Section 8 of R.A. 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004).
• Respondent MWSS and concessionaires argued that under Section 7 of the law, the
DPWH is first required to prepare a national program on sewerage and septage
management (NSSMP) to guide MWSS and the concessionaires.
• The SENR ruled that the law providing a period of five years to connect the existing
sewage lines is mandatory and should been factored into the Agreements between
MWSS and the concessionaires. Petitioners were accordingly fined P29,400,000.00.
• On appeal to the CA, the latter dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration, rebuffing the petitioners’ invocation of the MMDA v. Concerned
Citizens of Manila Bay ruling which, Maynilad asserts, supersedes the five-year
compliance set by the Clean Water Act. The CA ruled further that the “five years”
should be reckoned from the effectivity of the law and not from the formulation of
40
the NSSMP or within five years from the preparation of the compliance plan for
mandatory connection by the DPWH.
Issue:
• Whether or not petitioners violated the Clean Water Act.
Ruling:
• Yes.
Reasoning:
• The SC dismissed the petitions on both procedural and substantive grounds.
• Procedurally, petitioners failed to exhaust an administrative remedy, i.e., an appeal

of the SENR’s decision to the Office of the President. The SENR also acted in
accordance with procedural due process in imposing the fine. The NOV stated the
charges, gave the directive to attend the technical conference and apprised them of
the liability. In fact, petitioners even wrote to the PAB and SENR to formalize their
positions and the Regional Directors commented. The SENR then acted upon
recommendation of the PAB. Petitioner concessionaires failed to show proof to
support their position that their non-compliance was on account of the fact that
several customers refused to connect.
• The SC resolved the substantive ground due to the transcendental issues involved.
It introduced the Public Trust Doctrine to emphasize the constitutional and statutory
obligations of the petitioners. The doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State
and its representatives of continuing supervision over the taking and use of
appropriate water. Parties who acquired rights in trust property could assert no
vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust. This affirms that
certain natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately owned or controlled.
The State is a trustee which manages the natural resources for benefit of current and
future generations – the beneficiaries. Petitioners, on the other hand, are the
protectors of the public interest and the citizenry under the Clean Water Act.
Article III, Section 4 (Free Speech and Expression) in relation to Article III, Section 1 (Due
Process) and Article V, Section 2 (Overseas Absentee Voting)
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019
J. J.C. Reyes, Jr., En Banc
Facts:
• Section 36.8 of R.A. 9189, as amended by R.A. 10590 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2013), prohibited “any person to engage in partisan political activity
abroad during the thirty (30)-day overseas voting period.”
41
• Petitioner, possessing dual citizenship (Filipino and American), alleged that she and
the other dual citizens were prohibited by different consulates from conducting
information campaigns, rallies, and outreach programs in support of their candidates
during the 2016 Elections. Presumably, these prohibitions were based further on
Art. 64 of Rule 15 of the IRR of R.A. 9189 that there shall be no partisan political
activity… within the premises of the embassy, consulate and other foreign service
establishment during the campaign period, including the day of the election.
Issue:
• Whether Section 36.8 of R.A. 9189, as amended by R.A. 10590 violates Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
• Yes.
Reasoning:
• The questioned provision of the law failed the fourth criterion of the content-neutral
test.
• When speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a

substantial government interest is required for its validity. Only the “intermediate
approach” (heightened review) to judicial scrutiny is to be applied using the
following criteria: (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
such governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of the free expression;
and, (4) the incidental restriction on the alleged freedom of expression is no greater
than what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.
• The prohibitions cited are sweeping and leaves no ample alternative means for one
to freely exercise one’s fundamental right to participate in partisan political
activities as part of the exercise of freedom of speech and expression.
• The use of the unqualified term “abroad” would bring an intelligible reader to the
conclusion that the prohibition was intended to also be extraterritorial in application.
It should be understood to include any and all locations abroad. The OSG’s
argument that prohibitions only applied to candidates whose right to campaign may
be regulated as to time, place, and manner, citing Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
is unacceptable. The overbroad language is “any person.”
• Thus, a facial invalidation of the questioned statute is warranted to counter the

“chilling effect” on protected speech.
Article XI, Sections 1 (Family) and 2 (Marriage) in relation to Articles 1, 2, 46 (4) and 55
(6) of the Family Code, Article VIII, Sections 1 (Judicial Power) and 5 (1) (Judicial
42
Review), Article III, Section 1 (Equal Protection) and Article II, Section 12 (Sanctity of
Family Life)
Falcis III, et al. v. Civil Registrar General

G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019
J. Leonen, En Banc
Facts:
• Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III, an open and self-identified homosexual, sought to

declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a
consequence, nullify Articles 46 (4) and 55 (6) of the same code.
• Falcis argues that a facial challenge on Articles 1 and 2 is permitted as these regulate
fundamental rights, such as, “the right to due process and equal protection, right to
decisional and marital privacy and the right to found a family in accordance with
religious convictions.”
• Petitioners LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church), et al., whose counsel
was Falcis himself, filed a petition-in-intervention. Reverend Agbayani, Felipe and
Ibanez were supposedly denied marriage license. LGBTS Church claims third-party
standing.
• The Civil Registrar General, through Solicitor-General, commented that Falcis

failed to show injury-in-fact and is merely seeking an advisory opinion. On the
petition-in-intervention, the Solicitor-General claims that it is in the nature of a
political question considering that marriage’s legal definition is a policy issue for
Congress to address.
• A group of intervenors-oppositors, on the other hand, claims possessing legal

interest since the grant of the petition would run counter to their religious beliefs.
Issues:
• Do petitioners have standing?

• Are the provisions of the Family Code on marriage unconstitutional?
Ruling:
• Petitioners have no legal standing to sue.

• There is no actual case or controversy to be able to rule on the constitutional validity
of the questioned provisions of the Family Code.
Reasoning:
• Procedurally, the petition cannot be entertained as a facial challenge to the

questioned provisions of the Family Code.
43
• The need to demonstrate an actual case or controversy is even more compelling in
cases concerning minority groups as the Court is not the final authority on
disciplines.
• Petitioner Falcis has no actual facts that present a real conflict. His choice of the
Civil Registrar General as respondent is misguided because he never applied for a
marriage license.
• Ruling on the petition will have far-reaching consequences that extend beyond the
specified provisions challenged. There is a litany of laws wherein marriage is a
factor or an element in their application (e.g., criminal law, labor law, special laws,
etc.). Petitioner would have the Court amend these laws by the mere declaration of
unconstitutionality of the two articles in the Family Code.
• Petitioner Falcis’ being an “open and self—identified homosexual” with a “personal

stake” in the outcome of the case does not constitute a legally demandable right.
Insofar as LGBTS Church is concerned, there is no legally demandable right for a
sect or denomination’s religious ceremonies to be given imprimatur by the State.
• Petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Substantially, the Constitution does not define or restrict marriage on the basis of
sex, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression. Lacking a
manifestly restrictive textual definition of marriage, the Constitution is capable of
accommodating a contemporaneous understanding of sexual orientation, gender
identity and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC).
• As a social institution, the family is shaped by economic forces and other structural
forces, such as ideologies and politics. Further, the reorganization of work in the
industrial economy disrupted the gender order of many families by pulling women
into the paid labor force and spawning new visions of gender equality. The evolution
of the social concept of family reveals that heteronormativity in marriage is not a
static anthropological fact. To continue to ground the family as a social institution
on the concept of complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination
faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold.
• A common position taken by those who socially disapprove the LGBTQI+

community is that this community violates the complementarity of the sexes.
Relying on natural law, the concept asserts that the sexual differences between a
man and a woman are constitutive of one’s identity, out of which the family is
created. However, contrary to this view, same-sex conduct is a natural phenomenon.
Homosexuality has been observed in most vertebrate groups. At the moment, there
is no consensus among scientists about the exact reasons as to how an individual
develops a particular sexual orientation.
• In the realm of social sciences, early psychoanalysts viewed homosexuality as

pathological. This attitude or understanding changed through time. U.N.
instruments have legally recognized same-sex relations, such as, the UNHRC
Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) in
2011 and the UNHRC Core State Obligations on LGBT Human Rights in 2012.
44
• In the Philippines, accounts on the pre-colonial Philippine society report that

different SOGIESC expressions were recognized. It was only during the arrival of
the Spanish colonizers that activities engaged in by asog, bayoguin, and binibayi
became suppressed. In contemporary times, there is no penalty in the Philippines
for engaging in “homosexual” conduct. However, discrimination remains.
• Some protective measures exist to prevent discrimination based on sexual

orientation (e.g., Philippine HIV and AIDS Policy Act and the Safe Spaces Act).
• The SC, finally, sanctioned petitioner Falcis for his negligence and incompetence in
pursuing this litigation. A penalty of fine was imposed on petitioner. The SC
reminded petitioner of a lawyer’s duty to a client, especially a minority or
marginalized group that petitioner purported to represent.
Article II, Section 26 (Equal Access to Public Service) in relation to Article VIII, Section
5 (1) (Judicial Review)
Marquez v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 244274, September 3, 2019
Facts:
• Norman Cordero Marquez, the co-founder and sole administrator of Baguio Animal
Welfare (BAW), filed his CoC for the position of Senator in the May 13, 2019
Elections. COMELEC declared Marquez a nuisance candidate on the ground that
he was virtually unknown to the entire country and though a real estate broker, he
will not be able to sustain the financial rigors of a nationwide campaign.
• COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, cited the Pamatong and
Martinez III cases in support of its decision.
• Marquez argued that the power of social media has emerged as a potent, yet cost
effective element in the candidate’s ability to wage a nationwide campaign.
• Meanwhile, the May 13, 2019 Elections had concluded while this case was pending
before the SC.
Issue:
• Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
• Yes.
Reasoning:
45
• On mootness, the SC cited the fourth exception, i.e., the case is capable of repetition,
thus, it proceeded to decide the case on the merits.
• As early as Maquera v. Borra, the SC had ruled that the right to vote and to be voted
for shall not be made to depend upon the wealth of the candidate. Property
qualifications (e.g., surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary of the position
sought) are inconsistent with the nature of the Republican system and the principle
of social justice.
• Under Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, there is no right to run for public
office.
• Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 1, Rule 24 of COMELEC

Resolution 9523 (on nuisance candidates) are silent as to the requirements of proof
of financial capacity before an aspirant may be allowed to run in the national
elections.
• Neither Section 13 of R.A. 7166 (on authorized expenses of candidates) provide a

financial capacity requirement. It merely sets a limit on expenses of candidates.
• A candidate’s financial capacity to sustain the rigors of a nationwide campaign does

not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to run for public office. Merchants
have been known to run for public office simply to make their names known to the
public.
• On the Pamatong case, there is nothing which suggests that the Court permitted the
cancellation of his CoC on the ground that he had no financial capacity to sustain
the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign.
• Martinez, on the other hand, involved an issue of 2 candidates with similar names
vying for the same position. It was only in view of the “dirty” practice by
unscrupulous politicians of fielding nuisance candidates with the same surnames as
leading contenders that the SC proceeded to consider the financial capability of a
nuisance candidate.
Article X, Section 8 (Three-Term Limit for Local Officials)
Tallado v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019
C.J. Bersamin, En Banc
Facts:
• Petitioner Governor Edgardo A. Tallado of Camarines Norte ran for 3 consecutive

terms (2010, 2013 and 2016) and fully served his first 2 terms.
• However, during his 3rd term (2016-2018), he was beleaguered with suits before the
Ombudsman.
46
• On September 13, 2016, the OMB adjudged petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
and ordered his dismissal. Although petitioner appealed to the CA, the DILG
implemented the OMB decision on November 8, 2016 (pursuant to Section 44 of
the LGC) ordering him to vacate while the incumbent Vice-Governor Pedro G.
Pimentel was directed to assume Governor. The latter assumed office as Governor
accordingly. However, the CA enjoined the DILG to implement the OMB decision
and, so, petitioner reassumed his post.
• On January 11, 2018, the OMB rendered another decision finding petitioner guilty
of grave misconduct (in relation to another case) and ordered his dismissal.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. Meanwhile, the DILG implemented the OMB
decision on March 14, 2018 (pursuant to Section 46 of the LGC) ordering Pimentel
to assume as Governor. The latter assumed as Governor again. On September 26,
2018, the CA modified the penalty of dismissal to six months suspension. The DILG
reinstated petitioner as Governor on October 29, 2018.
• Meanwhile, on October 15, 2018, before his reinstatement, petitioner filed his CoC
for Governor for the May 2019 Elections.
• Respondents Norberto B. Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgalado moved to cancel

petitioner’s CoC on the ground of the three-term limit.
• COMELEC’s First Division granted the petition for cancellation considering that
the suspension and dismissals from the service were not interruptions of petitioner’s
term because the OMB’s decisions on dismissals were not final. Neither were there
vacancies of a permanent character nor any succession in accordance with Section
44 of the LGC. Later the COMELEC en banc declared petitioner’s dismissal as
temporary inasmuch as he had appealed the OMB decision. They also took the view
that Section 46 of the LGC applied in this case and not Section 44.
Issue:
• Whether or not the three-term limit barred petitioned from the 2019 Elections.
Ruling:
• No, petitioner is not barred.
Reasoning:
• Based on past rulings, there is an “involuntary interruption” when there occurs a

break in the term as a result of the official’s loss of title to the office.
• The present case presents a novel question on “whether or not an elective local
official’s dismissal from the service pursuant to the executory decision of the OMB
may be considered as an effective interruption in the official’s term.”
• The OMB Rules mandate that decisions handed down in administrative cases should
be immediately executory. Even the “2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
47
Civil Service” imposes this effect of dismissal as the permanent separation of the
guilty civil servant from his or her title to the office.
• The length of time of the involuntary interruption is immaterial.
• The period during which petitioner was not serving as Governor should be
considered as a rest period in his service because he had then ceased to exercise
power over the people of the province. Pimentel held title to the office and exercised
the functions thereof.
Article VI, Section 1 (Undue Delegation of Legislative Power) in relation to Article XIV,
Section 5 (Academic Freedom and the Right to Select a Profession or Course of Study)
Pimentel, et al. v. Legal Education Board

G.R. No. 230642 and 242954, September 10, 2019
J. Reyes, Jr., En Banc
Facts:
• Petitioners, are mostly law school administrators, faculty and students who
questioned various provisions of the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993 (R.A.
7662), including the Legal Education Board (LEB) issuances, among which is the
Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT).
• The following pertinent provisions of R.A.7662 and LEB issuances were challenged
as unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power and in
violation of the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education:
(a) Section 2 – declaration of policy on continuing legal education;

(b) Section 3(a)(2) – objective of legal education to increase awareness among
members of the legal profession;
(c) Section 7(c) and (e) – accreditation of law schools; prescribing standards for
qualifications and compensation of faculty members, including law admission;
(d) Section 7(g) – law practice internship;
(e) Section 7(h) – adopting a system of continuing legal education and making
attendance of practicing lawyers mandatory; and,
(f) PhiLSAT
• In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the Court’s
power to regulate admission to the practice of law does not include regulation of
legal education. Besides, LEB exercises regulatory power, justifying the (a)
prescription for minimum standards for law admission; (b) establishment of legal
internship in relation to the law school curriculum; (c) adoption of a system of
continuing legal education; and, (d) conduct of PhiLSAT.
Issue:
• Are the cited provisions under R.A. 7662 and LEB issuances related thereto
constitutional?
48
Ruling:
• The following are constitutional:
(1) Section 7(c) – power to accredit law schools.

(2) Section 7(e) – power to prescribe minimum requirements for admission to legal
education and minimum qualifications of faculty members.
• The following are unconstitutional:
(1) Section 2, par. 2 – insofar as it unduly includes “continuing legal education” as

an aspect of legal education.
(2) Section 3(a)(2) and Section 7(2) of LEB MO No. 1-2011 – on the objective of
legal education to increase awareness among the members of the legal profession
on the needs of the poor.
(3) Section 3(g) and Section 11(g) of LEB MO No. 1-2011 – on the establishment
of a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar.
(4) Section 7(h) and Section 11(h) of LEB MO No. 1-2011 – on the adoption of a
system of mandatory continuing legal education and mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers.
(5) Paragraph 9 of LEB MO No. 7-2016 – requirement to pass PhiLSAT for
admission to law school.
(6) LEB MC No. 18-2018 – passing of PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to
law schools.
(7) Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEB MO No. 1-2011.
(8) On qualifications and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of
graduate schools of law:
(a) Section 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEB MO No. 1-2011.

(b) Resolution No. 2014-02.
(c) Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEB MO No. 2.
(d) LEB MO No. 17-2018.
(9) On the establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs:
(a) Resolution No. 2015-08.

(b) Section 24(c) of LEB MO No. 2.
(c) Section 59(d) of LEB MO No. 1-2011.
Reasoning:
• The SC’s exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the study
of law. The SC does not impose upon law schools what courses to teach but only
prescribes the core academic courses which it finds essential for an applicant to be
admitted to the bar. Thus, Sections 5, 6, and 16 of Rule 138 related to the Bar do
not infringe on the autonomy of law schools. Even the Revised Law Student Practice
Rule is intended to regulate the law student practitioner’s limited practice of law.
49
• In the exercise of the State’s police power, it may supervise and regulate legal
education. This includes setting minimum standards to be met by educational
institutions.
• Academic freedom is associated with the broader area of freedom of thought,

speech, expression and the press. It is enjoyed by both faculty and students,
including the institution itself.
• In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, the internal conditions for

institutional academic freedom consist of the academic staff’s de facto control over:
(a) the admission and examination of students; (b) the curricula for courses of study;
(c) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and, (d) the allocation of
income among the different categories of expenditure.
• The right to receive higher education is not absolute. It should also be read in
conjunction with the right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study.
Institutions of higher learning may assess the merit and capacity of an individual to
be admitted to a course of study.
• LEB encroached on the rule-making authority of the SC (e.g., increasing awareness

among the legal profession of the needs of the poor; legal apprenticeship; and,
continuing legal education).
• There is no conflict with the rule-making authority of the SC insofar as the power
of LEB to prescribe minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of the
law is concerned. Consequently, PhiLSAT cannot be voided on this ground.
• The law did not allow LEB to impose minimum standards for law admission in an
exclusionary and qualifying exam. Neither did it prevent law schools from imposing
their respective admission requirements. But LEB may prescribe an aptitude test.
PhiLSAT is not per se unconstitutional.
• To determine the reasonableness of PhiLSAT, the concurrence of a lawful subject

and lawful means is applied. Tablarin v. Gutierrez is instructive on the NMAT as a
valid exercise of police power.
• On the contrary, PhiLSAT’s exclusionary, restrictive and qualifying character

negates the concept of a mere aptitude exam meant to be used as a tool that should
only help law schools in gauging aptness of the applicants. This is a violation of the
academic freedom of the school.
• While both NMAT and PhiLSAT prescribe a “cut-off” score, the NMAT score is
evaluated by the medical schools in relation to their own cut-off scores.
• There is no reason to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety. LEB MO No. 7-2016
is partially nullified insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT
and the taking thereof within two years as a prerequisite for admission are
concerned.
• The right to education is not necessarily violated by PhiLSAT.

50
• LEB MO No. 1-2011 Section 15 (an applicant from a foreign institution to be

assessed eligibility), Section 16 (units in English, Math and Social Science subjects)
and Section 17 (LL.B. and J.D. degrees required for graduate program in law)
encroach upon the law school’s freedom to determine for itself its admission
policies.
• The LEB’s authority to review the strength or weakness of the faculty on the basis
of experience or length of time devoted to teaching violates an institution’s right to
set its own faculty standards. LEB may only set minimum standards and
qualifications, such as, master of laws degree for deans and law professors.
• It is the manner by which the LEB had exercised its power to set minimum
requirements which have proven to be unreasonable, such as, downgrading, phase-
out and closure of the law school for non-compliance with the various requirements
(e.g., gross incompetence of the dean and professors). Assessing teaching
performance usurps the law school’s right to determine for itself the competence of
its faculty.
• The manner by which LEB exercised its power as regards legal apprenticeship and
internship show that LEB “controls” law schools, thus, unduly interfering in the law
schools’ curriculum.
Article III, Section 4 (Freedom of Speech and Expression; Obscenity) in relation to Article
8, Section 1 (Judicial Power) and 5 (Judicial Review and Mootness)
Madrilejos, et al. v. Gatdula, et al.

G.R. No. 184389, September 24, 2019
Facts:
• Some pastors and preachers filed a complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) against publishers of men’s magazines and tabloids, pursuant to
Articles 200 and 201 of the Revised Penal Code and Ordinance No. 7780 of the City
of Manila (related to obscene publications), arguing that the contained materials
were clearly scandalous, obscene and pornographic.
• A panel of prosecutors was constituted to conduct the preliminary investigation.

Respondent publishers filed a bill of particulars instead of their counter-affidavits
because the complaint failed to apprise them of the specific acts they allegedly
committed, among others.
• Pending the resolution of the motion for bill of particulars, the present petitioners
(respondents-publishers a quo) filed the present action on the ground that Ordinance
No. 7780 is invalid on its face for being patently offensive to their right to free
speech and expression, repugnant to due process and privacy rights, and violative
of the constitutionally established principles of separation of church and state.
51
• Subsequently, the OCP Manila dismissed the charges (under Article 200 of the RPC
and Ordinance No. 7780) but nevertheless ordered the filing of charges under
Article 201(3) of the RPC.
• Despite the dismissal of the charges under Ordinance No. 7780, petitioners insisted
that the Ordinance violates free speech and expression, due process and privacy
rights.
Issues:
• Whether or not the case is rendered moot and academic; and,

• Whether or not Ordinance No. 7780, an anti-obscenity law, may be facially
challenged on the ground of overbreadth because obscenity is unprotected speech.
Ruling:
• Petition is dismissed.
Reasoning:
• In light of the dismissal with prejudice of all criminal charges, the case is now
rendered moot and academic. Petitioners could not invoke the fourth ground of the
mootness principle, i.e., “the case is capable of repetitive yet evading review,”
which requires two conditions to concur, namely: (a) the duration of the challenged
action must be too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and,
(b) there must be reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be
subjected to the same action again.
• There is a consensus that the fourth exception on mootness is not meant to be applied
literally. In the cases where the exception was applied, time constraint was a
significant factor. This time constraint, unfortunately, does not obtain in this case.
• Petitioners’ purpose is to stop the conduct of the preliminary investigation. An order

arising from this action is not of such inherently short duration that it will lapse
before petitioners are able to see it challenged before a higher prosecutorial
authority. Besides, the criminal charges were dismissed with prejudice. These may
no longer be refiled.
• A facial overbreadth challenge as against an anti-obscenity statute is improper.

However, a litigant who stands charged under a law that regulates unprotected
speech can still mount a challenge that a statute is unconstitutional “as it is applied
to him or her.”
• Were we to declare Ordinance No. 7780 unconstitutional and impose the Miller
standards on Congress and the City of Manila, the SC may be faulted for engaging
in judicial legislation. Whether a material is obscene or not is still for the Court to
declare as it applies or construes a specific statute in a particular case. Prudence
dictates that the Court should exercise judicial restraint.
52
Article XII, Section 5 (Ancestral Domain)
Republic v. NCIP, et al.

G.R. No. 208480, September 25, 2019
A.C.J. Carpio, Second Division
Facts:
• Private respondents (Pirasos and Abanags) are the heirs of Ibaloi natives who
occupied ancestral lands located in Baguio City. They filed petitions with the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) for identification, delineation
and recognition of their ancestral lands pursuant to R.A. 8371 (the Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act). NCIP granted the petition and ordered the issuance of 28
Certificates of Ancestral Land Titles (CALTs).
• The Republic sought to enjoin the NCIP decision before the CA. The CA agreed
with the NCIP finding that Baguio City is no different from any part of the
Philippines and that there is no sensible difference that merits the city’s exclusion
from the coverage of IPRA.
• Hence, this petition.
Issue:
• Whether the CALTs issued by NCIP are valid.
Ruling:
• The petition is granted. The CALTs, including the corresponding TCTs and all
derivative titles thereto are null and void.
Reasoning:
• Section 78 of IPRA provides that “the City of Baguio shall remain to be governed
by its charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its Townsite Reservation shall
remain as such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation.” It further
provided that prior land rights and titles recognized and/or acquired through any
judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall
remain valid. The provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part of
Baguio City after the effectivity of this Act.
• NCIP is devoid of any power to reclassify lands previously included as part of the
Townsite Reservation of Baguio City before R.A. 8371 was enacted.
• Absent any legislation passed by Congress, the Baguio City Townsite Reservation
shall belong to the public (e.g., Wright Park, Secretary’s Cottage, Senate President’s
Cottage, Mansion House and public roads therein).
• For prior land rights, the afforded remedy to indigenous cultural communities is Act
No. 926 allowing patents to be issued to natives occupying unreserved,
53
unappropriated agricultural public land who have continuously occupied and
cultivated such land through his ancestors since August 1, 1899, or who, prior to
August 1, 1898, continuously occupied and cultivated such land for 3 years
immediately prior to said date.
• Baguio City was incorporated in 1909 and Baguio City Townsite Reservation was
established in 1912.
• The Townsite Reservation allowed any declared private land to be registered under
the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) pursuant to the Public Land Act (Act No.
926).
• In 1912, Civil Registration Case No. 1, General Land Registration Office

Reservation Record No. 211 was filed with the Land Registration Court to resolve
which lands were declared public and private.
• Under Act No. 627, a landowner affected by the declaration of military reservations
must register their titles within the period stated in the Land Registration Act,
otherwise, any claim shall be barred. In 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued
an Order to segregate from the Townsite Reservation claimed lands by native
residents of Baguio City. Private respondents herein were not among the original
and additional claimants. Finally, in Republic v. Fañgonil (218 Phil 484 [1984]), the
alleged claims were not previously claimed by the predecessor-in-interest. Thus,
private respondents’ rights over the subject properties were never recognized in any
administrative or judicial proceedings prior to the effectivity of IPRA.
Article VI, Section 1 (Undue Delegation of Legislative Power; Lump-Sum Discretionary

Funds) in relation to Section 27(2) (Item Veto)
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, et al.

G.R. No. 210503, October 8, 2019
Per Curiam
Facts:
• Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of “lump-sum discretionary funds” in the

2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA) as follows:
(1) Unprogrammed Fund – for lacking the requirements of a valid item of

appropriation and has no discernable purpose.
(2) Programmed Special Purpose Fund
(a) Contingent Fund – for failing to identify the kinds of contingencies for which
the fund may be used and precluded the President from exercising his line-
item veto power.
(b) E-government Fund – instead of enumerating the strategic information and
communication technology projects to be financed, it simply identifies a
lump-sum amount.
(c) Local Government Support Fund – for failing to provide legislative
guidelines.
54
Issue:
• Whether these “lump-sum discretionary funds” are unconstitutional pursuant to the

standard in the 2013 Belgica case.
Ruling:
• The petition is dismissed. All the questioned funds are constitutional.
Reasoning:
• All the assailed appropriations comply with the rule on “singular correspondence”
in the 2013 Belgica case.
• (1) Unprogrammed Fund – there are identified purposes found in Annex “A” of the
2014 GAA, such as: (a) support to foreign-assisted projects; (b) support to
government-owned and/or controlled corporations; (c) general fund adjustments;
(d) support for infrastructure projects and social programs; (e) AFP modernization
program; (f) debt management program; (g) risk management program; (h) disaster
relief and mitigation fund; (i) reconstruction and rehabilitation program; (j) total
administrative disability pension; and, (k) people’s survival fund.
• (2) Programmed Special Purpose Fund
(a) Contingent Fund – The purposes is to cover the funding requirements of new
or urgent projects that need to be implemented during the year. These new or
urgent projects and the level of travel expenses that will be incurred during
the year are necessarily unknown at the time the budget is prepared the year
prior. The language of the Contingent Fund appropriation in the 2013 GAA
found by the Court as a valid line-item appropriation in the 2013 Belgica case
was adopted as the language of the Contingent Fund appropriation in the
2014 GAA.
(b) E-government Fund – The Commission on Information and Communications

Technology (CICT) under the Office of the President issued Memorandum
Order No. 001-10 entitled, “Guidelines on Projects to be Funded by the E-
government Fund” which serves as reference for proposals of government
agencies. These are discernible standards in the form of rule-making by the
executive agency.
(c) Local Government Support Fund – The “completeness” and “sufficient

standard” tests for purposes of rule-making authority have been satisfied. It
is clear from the 2014 GAA that the policy consideration for the institution
of the fund is “genuine local development and the assistance of LGUs”.
Guidelines have been provided to map out the boundaries of the Executive’s
authority (e.g., maintenance and other operating expenses). DBM Local
Budget circulars are in place and identify the programs and projects for which
the fund may be expanded.
55
Article VI, Section 26(2) (Procedure on Passage of a Bill into Law)
Ang Nars Party-List, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.

G.R. No. 215746, October 8, 2019
J. Carpio, En Banc
Facts:
• R.A. 9173 provided that “the minimum base pay of nurses working in the public
health institutions should not be lower than salary grade 15 prescribed under R.A.
6758, otherwise known as the ‘Compensation and Classification Act of 1989’…”
• In 2008, Congressional Joint Resolution No. 4 was approved authorizing the

President “to Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of
Civilian Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel
in the Government…”
• In 2009, PGMA approved Joint Resolution No. 4 (paragraph 16 of which amended

existing laws inconsistent with the Joint Resolution). PGMA signed EO No. 811 to
implement the Joint Resolution. Section 6 of EO No. 811 modified the salary grade
assignments of various government positions, among which is “Nurse 1 - from 10
to 11”.
• Rep. Paquiz of the Ang Nars Party-List wrote letters to DOH, DBM and DOJ
inquiring into the matter of non-implementation of R.A. 9173. Finding the replies
of the departments unsatisfactory, this petition for certiorari and mandamus was
filed.
• Petitioners assert that Joint Resolution No. 4 did not authorize the President to revise
the salary grade system under R.A. 6758, amended by R.A. 9173 which provided
that the minimum base pay for government nurses, except for those employed under
the Local Government Code, would be Salary Grade 15.
Issue:
• Whether or not Joint Resolution No. 4 and EO No. 811 are constitutional.
Ruling:
• Paragraph 16 of Joint Resolution No. 4 and Section 6 are void. The petition is
partially dismissed insofar as the prayer to compel the executive agencies to
implement Section 32 of R.A. 9173 is concerned.
Reasoning:
• Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. The Senate Rules of Procedure
which characterizes a joint resolution having “the force and effect of law” is
inconsistent with the Constitution. A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage
56
does not enact the joint resolution into a law. But the joint resolution may be treated
as a recommendation to the Executive on how the law can be implemented.
• The practice in the United States which does not distinguish between a bill and a
joint resolution cannot be applied here. While Section 19(a) of the Jones Law on
Procedure for Law-Making referred to both bill and joint resolution, the 1935
Constitution did not adopt the term “joint resolutions” in the process of law-making.
Neither the 1973 nor the 1987 Constitutions adopted the term “join resolutions”.
• R.A. 6758 provides for periodic review of compensation rates. Any change
thereafter should be done by enacting a new law, not through a joint resolution.
• The case of Joint Resolution No. 1 in 1993 is different. When it was passed, the
compensation adjustments contemplated were already fully funded by law under the
1994 GAA. Thus, the existing law authorized payment of the compensation
adjustments for 1994, and such payment could be triggered by a joint resolution.
• R.A. 6758 only created a benchmark to guide DBM in preparation of the Index of
Occupational Services, which may be amended by law. As regards the salary grade
of nurses, the change was done under R.A. 9173 (setting salary grade 15). R.A. 9173
cannot be amended by a mere joint resolution.
Article VII, Section 1 (Executive and Presidential Immunity)
De Lima v. President Duterte

G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
C.J. Bersamin, En Banc
Facts:
• Senator Leila De Lima filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data to
enjoin President Duterte from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life,
liberty and security.
• The petition was preceded by the following events:
(1) On August 2, 2016, Sen. De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the Senate
floor calling a stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings.
(2) In response, President Duterte issued a number of public statements against Sen.
De Lima, including denunciations of her corruption and immorality.
• Sen. De Lima argues that the denunciations by President Duterte do not constitute
official acts worthy of protection by presidential immunity from suit. Besides,
habeas data proceeding does not involve determination of civil or criminal liability.
Issue:
• Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

57
Ruling:
• Yes. The President is immune from suit.
Reasoning:
• In a long line of decisions by the SC, the latter has consistently maintained that the
President is immune from suit during his incumbency in office.
• Sen. De Lima’s invocation of Clinton v. Jones which distinguishes official from

non-official acts of the President does not obtain in this jurisdiction.
• Presidential immunity from suit as recognized and applied in the USA differs from
the doctrine in this jurisdiction.
• Presidential immunity is not intended to immunize the President from liability or

accountability. This ruling will not deny Sen. De Lima any available remedy.
Zomer v. Special 20th Division of the Court of Appeals (CA), et al.

G.R. No. 194461, January 7, 2020
J. Leonen, En Banc
Facts:
• Zomer Development Company (Zomer) owned 3 parcels of land in Cebu City which
it mortgaged to International Exchange Bank (IEB) as security for its loan. When
Zomer failed to pay its indebtedness, IEB foreclosed on the properties. During the
auction, IEB emerged as the highest bidder. The Certificates of Sale provided for a
period of redemption of 12 months from registration, “or sooner and/or later, as
provided for under applicable laws.”
• Zomer filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the sale on the ground that
Section 47 of R.A. 8791 (General Banking Act) of 2002 is unconstitutional in
violation of the equal protection clause since the law provides a shorter period for
redemption of 3 months or earlier to juridical entities compared to the 1-year
redemption period given to natural persons.
• The RTC dismissed the complaint. On the other hand, the CA dismissed the appeal
“without prejudice to appellants’ filing of the case before the Supreme Court.”
Issue:
• Is there a violation of the equal protection?
Ruling:
58
• No. The petition is denied.
Reasoning:
• The issue has been previously resolved in Goldenway v. Equitable PCI Bank, White
Marketing v. Grandwood Furniture and Spouses Limso v. Philippine National Bank.
• The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based
on the nature of the properties foreclosed – whether these are used as residence, or
used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of the property and
enable the banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets.
• Juridical entities enjoy certain advantages that natural persons do not. A corporation
has a separate and distinct personality from its corporate officers or stockholders. It
may incur its own liabilities. In contrast, natural persons are directly responsible for
the liabilities they incur.
• There is also an underlying legitimate government interest in the protection of the

banking industry and the shorter redemption period is a reasonable means for the
protection of both these interests.
Article III, Section 14 (Rights of the Accused) in relation to 19 (1) (Cruel, Degrading or
Inhuman Punishment) and 22 (Bill of Attainder)
Fuertes v. Senate, et al.

G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020
J. Leonen, En Banc
Facts:
• Fuertes is among the 46 accused in a criminal case involving the death of Chester
Paolo Abracia of Manuel S. Enverga University Foundation during initiation rites
of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. Fuertes herself is a member of the Tau Gamma
Sigma, the sister sorority of Tau Gamma Phi.
• Fuertes filed a petition for certiorari before the SC raising the unconstitutionality of
Section 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law in violation of the res inter alios acta rule,
the prohibition on cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. She further argued
that Sections 5 and 14 are a bill of attainder.
• Fuertes particularly referred to the presumption in Section 4 – that the presence of

persons during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation, unless they
prevented the commission of punishable acts – as violative of the res inter alios acta
rule while the penalty of reclusion perpetua as cruel and inhuman punishment.
Finally, Sections 5 and 14 in immediately punishing members of a particular group
as principals or co-conspirators, regardless of actual knowledge or participation
constitute a bill of attainder.
59
Issue:
• Are the questioned provisions unconstitutional?
Ruling:
• No. The petition is denied.
Reasoning:
• Procedurally, the SC will not entertain direct resort to it, but regardless of
petitioner’s remedial errors, the SC acknowledges that the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts is not ironclad whenever transcendental interest is involved.
• The SC has upheld the constitutionality of disputable presumptions considering that

it does not preclude the presentation of contrary evidence. Certain facts still have to
be proved.
• The SC acknowledged that the secrecy and concealment in initiation rites would
make the prosecution of perpetrators difficult.
• Res inter alios acta provides that a party’s rights cannot be prejudiced by another’s
act, declaration, or omission. Under Rule 130, Section 30, an exception to this rule
is an admission by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy.
• The SC has found that the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua does
not violate the prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment because this
provision of the Constitution is aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than the severity.
• The mere filing of an Information against Fuertes and her fellow sorority members
is not a finding of their guilty. The prosecution must still prove the offense and the
accused’s participation.
Kondo v. Civil Registrar General

G.R. No. 223628, March 4, 2020
J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division
Facts:
• Edna married Katsuhiro Kondo in Japan. Edna filed a petition for judicial
recognition of the divorce citing paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. She
asked the trial court to direct the Civil Registrar to annotate the same in her Marriage
Certificate. During the trial, she informed the court that Katsuhiro will be divorcing
her to marry a Japanese woman. The Republic did not present its own evidence. The
trial court denied the petition, noting that the foreign divorce should have been
obtained by the alien spouse, not by mutual agreement. Edna moved for new trial to
60
present an (unauthenticated) copy of Katsuhiro’s Report of Divorce and requested
for thirty (30) days to get the authenticated copy. The motion was denied.
• Before the Court of Appeals (CA), the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued
that the second Report of Divorce cannot be considered newly discovered. The CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision. It did not consider the second Report of Divorce,
but disagreed with the trial court’s ruling on the supposed inapplicability of the cited
provision of the Family Code.
Issue:
• Whether or not the case should be remanded to the trial court for reception of
evidence.
Ruling:
• Case is remanded for presentation of evidence.
Reasoning:
• Two requisites for allowing a newly discovered evidence were missing. Edna
admitted that the second Divorce Report was already existing during the
proceedings below. Besides, she, too, has remarried in Japan. Citing the Manalo
case, the Court exercised liberty and remanded the case for further proceedings. In
Manalo, the Court found that the Japanese law on divorce was not duly established.
• The SC does not see any reason why procedural rules could not be relaxed to secure
and obtain substantial justice. Edna presented an authenticated Report of Divorce
and the OSG noted the concerns related to Edna’s status. OSG did not object to
Edna’s prayer.
• At any rate, res judicata shall not apply in this case and Edna may refile the case.
To do so would be a waste of time and resources.
Article X, Section 10 (Division of LGUs) in relation to Section 7 (Share in National

Wealth) and Section 12 (Highly Urbanized Cities)
Del Rosario, et al. v. COMELEC, et al.

G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020
J. A.B. Reyes, Jr., En Banc
Facts:
• R.A. 11259 was passed creating the Charter of the Provinces of Palawan del Norte,
Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur. Section 54 states that, “The residents of the
City of Puerto Princesa, as a highly urbanized city, shall not be qualified to vote in
the plebiscite and for provincial elective positions.”
61
• Section 53 of the law mandates the conduct of a plebiscite for the purpose of seeking
“approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas…”
• Petitioners argue that the disqualification of the residents of Puerto Princesa City
from voting in the plebiscite violates Article X, Section 10 (requisites in division of
local government units) and Article X, Section 7 (share in national wealth).
Issue:
• Is the law valid?
Ruling:
• The law is valid. The petition is dismissed.
Reasoning:
• Puerto Princesa City is a highly urbanized city which has attained a level of
population growth and economic development which the legislature has deemed for
devolution of governmental powers as self-contained political units. Article X,
Section 12 provides that “cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law,
shall be independent of the province.”
• The SC explained in Umali v. COMELEC, the administrative supervision of the

province over the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion.
• The SC emphasized that in the case of Puerto Princesa City, while Section 89 of the
City Charter allows its residents to vote for provincial officials of Palawan, the
declaration of the city as a highly urbanized city by the President, and the subsequent
approval thereof in a plebiscite, Article X, Section 12 became applicable. Therefore,
its political ties with the province were effectively severed.
• Correspondingly, Puerto Princesa City is no longer considered a “political unit

directly affected” by the proposed division of Palawan into 3 provinces. Petitioners
are, thus, properly excluded from voting in the plebiscite.
Article XII, Section 19 (Anti-Trust Principle) in relation to Sections 10 (Reserved Areas of

Investment) and 14 (Practice of Professions)
Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board (PCAB) v. Manila Water Company

G.R. No. 217590, March 10, 2020
J. Gesmundo, En Banc
Facts:
• Respondent Manila Water Company sought accreditation of its foreign contractors

to undertake its contracts for the construction of necessary facilities for its
waterworks.
62
• PCAB replied that under Section 3.1 of the IRR of R.A. 4566 (Creating the
Philippine Licensing Board of Contractors), regular licenses are reserved for, and
issued only to, contractor-firms of Filipino sole proprietorship or
partnership/corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity participation and duly
organized and existing, under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.
• Respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief for the determination of the validity
of Section 3.1, Rule 3 of the IRR claiming that the provision is unconstitutional
since it creates restrictions on foreign investments, a power exclusively vested on
Congress by the Constitution.
• The Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 ruled in favor of Manila Water Company and
declared the questioned provision void.
Issue:
• Is Section 3.1 of the IRR of R.A. 4566 constitutional?
Ruling:
• Yes. The petition is denied.
Reasoning:
• The intention of PCAB in imposing the assailed section of the IRR is to protect the
interests of the Filipino construction industry, but the manner in which it was done
raises issues on its validity.
• PCAB is authorized to effect classification of contractors but Congress, under the

law, did not intend to discriminate against foreign contractors as there is no
restriction found in the law.
• Article XII, Section 14 limiting the practice of professions to Filipinos has been
improperly applied by PCAB because the provision only pertains to natural persons.
Construction by itself is not considered a profession.
• Only Congress has the power to determine certain areas of investments which must
be reserved to Filipinos.
• On the other hand, Manila Water Company’s argument that there was unfair
competition has no merit. Fundamentally, the Constitution was enacted for the
protection of the Filipinos. Nevertheless, the SC is not unaware of the economic
benefits of opening the construction industry to foreigners. This is clear in Tanada
v. Angara.
• The evil sought to be prevented by PCAB may be addressed with some form of
regulation other than restricting the contractor’s license which leads to deprivation
of economic growth of the construction industry. For instance, it is a standard
practice in construction industry that contractors are required to post or put up a
performance bond to endure faithful compliance under their contract.
63
Article III, Section 2 (Searches and Seizures)
People v. Sapla
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020
J. Caguioa, En Banc
Facts:
• On January 10. 2014 at 11:30 a.m., an officer on duty at the Regional Public Safety
Battalion (RPSB) at Tabuk City received a phone call from a concerned citizen
informing the office that a certain male individual would be transporting marijuana
from Kalinga into Isabela. On the basis of this information, police operatives were
mobilized in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agancy (PDEA).
An arresting team was organized to proceed to the detachment at Talaca.
• At 1:00 p.m., the RPSB received a text message stating that the subject male person
was wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a
blue sack on board a passenger jeepney with plate number AYA 270 bound for
Roxas, Isabela.
• The passenger jeepney arrived at around 1:20 p.m. at the Talaca checkpoint. When
flagged down, the police officers approached the jeepney and saw accused Sapla
seated at the rear side of the vehicle. Then the officers asked Sapla if he owned the
blue sack in front of him, which which the latter answered in the affirmative. Sapla
was asked to open the sack which revealed 4 bricks of marijuana leaves.
• Sapla was subsequently charged and convicted. On appeal to the CA, it found that
although the search and seizures conducted was without a warrant, it was considered
lawful as a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.
Issue:
• Was the search and seizure valid?
Ruling:
• No.
Reasoning:
• The rule on search of a moving vehicle does not apply here. Peace officers are only
limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual
inspection.
• An extensive search of a vehicle is permissible only when the officers made it upon
probable cause.
64
• In People v. Comprado, the SC distinguished the target of the rule on search of a
moving vehicle, i.e., referring to the vehicle, and not a specific person.
• The present case targets a person as subject of the search.
• Sheer unverified information from an anonymous informant does not engender

probable cause warranting extensive and intrusive search of a moving vehicle. A tip
is hearsay. It does not constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion.
• Following U.S. jurisprudence (Aguilar v. Texas), a two-pronged test is used to

determine whether an informant’s tip is sufficient in engendering probable cause:
(1) the informant’s basis of knowledge must be revealed; and, (2) sufficient facts to
establish either the informant’s veracity or the reliability of the informant’s report.
The totality of circumstances principle dictates a need to have a balanced assessment
of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability attending an
informant’s tip (Illinois v. Gates).
• The SC compared the present case with Saluday v. People and concluded that the
latter case was a “visual and minimally intrusive inspection” – simple lifting of the
bag that noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. The present case entailed
probing the contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by Sapla. In Saluday, the
authorities never received an information by way of a tip.
• In re-examining the divergent line of jurisprudence, the SC observed that the great
majority of cases upholding a warrantless search and seizure based on a tip did not
rely exclusively on the information.
Article XII, Sections 10 (Areas of Investment), 1 (Foreign Investments in Local Markets),

13 (Forms of Exchange) in relation to Article II, Section 20 (Private Sector Role)
National Federation of Hog Farmers (Federation), et al. v. Board of Investments

(BOI), et al.
G.R. No. 205835, June 23, 2020
J. Leonen, En Banc
Facts:
• Charoen, a 100% foreign-owned company from Thailand, duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, filed 3 separate applications for registration,
namely: (1) new producer of different products and services; (2) new producer of
aqua feeds; and, (3) new producer of hog parent stocks and slaughter hogs.
• All applications were approved by BOI’s Board of Governors.
• Subsequently, some members of the local swine, poultry and aquaculture industries
wrote the BOI asking for copies of the documents Charoen submitted. The BOI
denied the request stating that these documents are confidential.
65
• The Federation sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order arguing that the
BOI committed grave abuse of discretion for having infringed upon their
constitutional right to be protected against unfair competition and trade practices. It
further alleged that Charoen was given preferential treatment and, consequently,
enjoyed undue advantage to significantly lower its prices.
Issue:
• Was there a justiciable controversy?

• Did BOI commit grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling:
• None.
• No. The petition is dismissed.
Reasoning:
• The Federation failed to show that the results of the case will affect its vital interests
and that their members have suffered or will stand to suffer from the application of
the assailed governmental acts. Thus, it has no third-party standing.
• The claim of unfair competition is primarily factual in nature.
• The SC identified acts of an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-

legislative and quasi-judicial powers as far as BOI is concerned, including the
corresponding remedies against these:
Quasi-Legislative Act Quasi-Judicial Act

• Preparing an annual investment • Processing of applications for
priorities plan registration
• Promulgating rules and • Deciding controversies
regulations • Cancelling registrations
• Suspending entitlement to
incentives of registered
enterprises
Remedy Remedy
• SC may review whether it • Jurisdiction primarily lies with
contravenes the law or the the administrative agency and
Constitution the court dismisses a case when
brough to it
• Under the Omnibus Investments Code, 2 avenues of appeal from a BOI decision or
action are available: (1) appeal to the Office of the President (e.g., controversies
concerning implementation of the law between registered enterprises and
government agencies; and an action over the applications for registration under the
investment priorities plan); and, (2) review by the judicial tribunals on matters
related to the issuance of a license to do business in favor of an alien or a foreign
firm or direct appeal to the SC involving provisions of the law.
66
• In the present case, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOI
because the Constitution does not proscribe the entry of foreign investments.
Agribusiness and fishery were included in the BOI Investments Priorities Plan. It
was never included in the Negative List. Finally, it was not a nationalized or partly
nationalized industry.
• All the applications by Charoen went through the required process.
• The appreciation of an administrative agency’s findings of fact in regard to the

applications are entitled to respect.
67

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Political Law Review Survey of Cases

Article II, Section 1 (Government Instrumentality; Test)

Laya, Jr. v. Philippine Veterans Bank

• Laya is an employee of Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) as Chief Legal Counsel.

The SC En Banc accepted a referral.

(1) The SC has recognized exceptions to the principle of immutability of final

[Note: Carpio, J. – “constitutional right to security of tenure” cannot be waived except in a

Article II Section 16 (Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology)

Philippine Plastics Industry v. Mayor San Pedro of Muntinlupa City

• Whether or not the ordinance was an invalid exercise of police power.

• The petition has no merit.

Article III, Section 2 (Search and Seizure)

• Whether or not the search was illegal.

• The search was valid.

(1) Airport search (People v. Johnson) – x-ray scans

Reasonable Search Warrantless Search

Standards of bus search:

Prior to Entry While in Transit

• Pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41, s. of 2010 (Consolidated

• Is DOJ Circular No. 41 constitutional?

Article III, Section 1 (Equal Protection Clause)

• Manalo is capacitated to remarry.

• Paragraph 2 of Article 26 on plain reading only requires that there be a divorce

• The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino

• Sereno was appointed Chief Justice on August 24, 2012.

(1) May the SC assume jurisdiction?

(1) Yes – Article VIII, Section 5 in relation to Rule 66, Section 7.

Impeachment Quo Warranto

Article X, Section 6 (Just Share in National Taxes; IRA)

Mandanas v. Executive Secretary Ochoa

• Pursuant to Article X, Section 6, commanding the allocation to the LGUs of a just

“Section 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes – Local government

• Mandanas, et al. filed a petition seeking the issuance of writs of certiorari,

(1) Will mandamus lie?

• Petitions are partially granted. The decision shall have PROSPECTIVE

Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. Hon. Farinas

• An inquiry in aid of legislation related to the use by the Provincial Government of

• Petitioners, employees of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, were invited

• Meanwhile, co-petitioner Imee Marcos, incumbent Governor of Ilocos Norte, filed

• Whether or not the case is moot.

• The case may proceed.

• Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to raise constitutional issues and to review

• CA Justices are non-impeachable officers. As such, authority over them primarily

Article VI, Section 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation)

• Did the Senate commit grave abuse of discretion?

United States Philippines

• Therefore, the legislative inquiry terminates under 2 instances:

(1) Upon approval or disapproval of the Committee Report; and,

(2) Upon expiration of (1) Congress.

• Congress, if it so wishes, may pass or amend a statutory power of contempt.

Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines (PBOAP), et al. v.

• Whether or not petitioners possess legal standing.

• Petitioners lack legal standing.

• Reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is read into contracts (e.g.,

• An Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment of Filing of Information

• Yes. Petitioner is entitled to a reinvestigation.

RE: Contracts with Artes International, Inc.

• However, the Administrator of the SC Program Management Office (PMO), Ms.

• The loan agreement is in the nature of an executive agreement.

Council of Teachers, et al. v. Secretary of Education, et al.

• Graduates of SHS are envisioned to already be prepared for employment,

(1) Voucher system – a government tuition subsidy to students to enable them

(2) Joint Guidelines on the Implementation of the Labor and Management