Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Consolidated Presentation - 16th Airworthiness Consultative Committee Meeting - 01NOV16 PDF
Consolidated Presentation - 16th Airworthiness Consultative Committee Meeting - 01NOV16 PDF
AIRWORTHINESS
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
WORKSHOP
Abu Dhabi
01 NOV 2016
CONTENTS:
MORC SCHEME:
MORC Technical Committee - Planned MORC TC meeting
To report & update progress
Discuss relevant implementation issue:
Feedback from Training of MORC-AS
Enhancing communication with individual MORC-AS
“Commercial pressure” affecting MORC-AS
AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145
MORC SCHEME:
ICAO Working Paper:
MORC Scheme has been chosen as one of the GCAA projects pesented to
ICAO assembly.
Purpose - Sharing of innovative idea amongst member states for the benefit of
the other CAA and their industry.
AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145
01 Nov 2016
ACC meeting 01Nov. 2016
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
ACC meeting 01NoAv. 2016
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
VORSY Implementation.
Regulation: CAR M.201 (a) The owner shall ensure that no flight takes
place unless the aircraft is maintained in an airworthy condition.
Non-airworthy Operation
Airworthy Unsafe
Envelope Operation
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Maintenance Over Run
Consequence:
Enforcement Action:
Any certification beyond the privileges granted, shall be liable to
disciplinary action and likelihood of loss of license of those involved.
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO
Airworthiness Review Responsibility
Compliance:
• Organization need to encourage voluntary reporting either through
the VORSY process or company’s internal reporting system.
• The Organization must ensure that all staff are to be made aware of
VORSY.
Effective date:
GCAA will issue an NPA and operators will need to respond accordingly
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
Thank You
AMMROC – An Overview
November 2016
Thomas L Holmes Jr
VP Aviation Quality & Safety Standards
Legal Notice
This presentation is provided with the express understanding that it contains technical, business, and/or
financial information which is disclosed in confidence; and no disclosure or use of the information in any media
is permissible without the prior written consent of AMMROC (Advanced Military Maintenance, Repair and
Overhaul Center) LLC.
This material is provided for informational purposes only, and AMMROC (Advanced Military Maintenance,
Repair and Overhaul Center) LLC and its affiliates make no warranty, representation, or guarantee with respect
to the information contained herein, or the results of the use of, or reliance on, such information.
© COPYRIGHT 2016 AMMROC (ADVANCED MILITARY MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND OVERHAUL CENTER) LLC
Component Services
• Established capability
• Engine Services
– Repair & Overhaul
• GE F110
• GE CT7-9C
• GE T700-701C/D
• R-R Adour 861 & 871
• Snecma M53-P2 Module 07
• PT-6A and PT6T
• Component Services
– Repair & Overhaul of Components for various types of military aircraft
• Strategic OEM partners
• Hydraulics, pneumatics, wheels & brakes, flight controls, avionics, electrics,
landing gear components, fuel components (multi-platform)
Grob 115 – Training C-130 – Airlift C-17 – Airlift F-16 – Air Defence AW109 – Special Mission Cessna 208 – Special Mission AS332 – Naval Operations
PC-7 – Training CN-235 – Airlift Hawk 102 – Training Mirage – Air Defence AW139 – Special Mission AT802 – Special Mission AS656 – Maritime Patrol
PC-21 – Training Da-42 – Vip Hawk 61 – Target Towing MPA – Maritime Patrol AS550 – Special Mission Dash-6 – Special Mission AS365 – VIP
King Air – Cloud Seeding Avanti II – VIP MB339 – Air Display King Air – Special Mission CH-147 – Special Mission UH-60 – Special Mission AW139 – SAR
MRTT – Refuel/Transport Seeker – VIP Skyhawk – VIP AS350 – Special Mission Bell 407 – Training
AH-64 – Attack
Introduction
Objective
Method
Risk Calculation
Implementation of ORS
Interfacing
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope - ORS
Introduction
SMS
5 ROS
4.5
AUD
4
3.5 IT
3
ORP
2.5
2 OR
1.5 S
1
0.5
0
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope - ORS
Introduction
Organization
Risk
Profiling
Risk
Based
Oversight
Organization
Risk Scope
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx Risk Scope - ORS
xx
Introduction
Organiza Organiza
tion Risk tion Risk
Profiling Scope
Organization
Risk Scope
Multiplicat
ion Factor
V2 V1
Findings
V3
R
I
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization
xxxx
Risk Scope Program-
xx ORS
Risk Severity
Glob
al
V3 =
𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶 𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉𝒉 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬.𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨.𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟑
𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝑶𝑶𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓
•
CAR M.101 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Immediate Long-term
Enhanced Training to
GCAA audit based enhance
Organizatio on RI standardiz
n with Review
ation
of
identified Regulat
Risk Area ions
Airline Continual
Operat proactive assessment
or action through
Audits
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Organization Risk Scope Program-
xxxx
xx ORS
Implementation
When Risk Index identified is ≥ 5
• The risk profile of each organization will be
shared by the PI in order to proactively initiate
review and appropriate actions by the operator.
• ROSI
• VORSY
• Internal audits
• External audits
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope
Program- ORS
s
Xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xx Organization Risk Scope
Program- ORS
Thank You
SMS
Enhancement Working Group
An open forum for approved organizations to propose and recommend potential improvements to
the SMS implementation programme, and possible amendments to CAR X
Nadia Algosaibi
SMS Manager, Etihad Airways Engineering
nalgosaibi@etihad.ae
SMS
Enhancement Working Group
‘Maintenance Error’
• An SPI with agreed alert levels and targets for 2017
• In accordance with CAR-X which required an established safety performance monitoring
and measurement system
47
NEW ALoSP SPI: Maintenance Error
Agreed Elements
Maintenance error will be limited to the below items only
– Installation Failure – Fault Isolation/Test/Inspection failure
– Servicing Failure – Foreign Object Damage/Debris
– Repair Failure – Airplane/Equipment Damage
48
Installation Failure Servicing Failure Repair Failure Fault Isolation/ Foreign Object Airplane/
Test/Inspection Damage/ Equipment
Failure Debris Damage
Equipment/part not Not enough fluid (e.g. component or Did not detect fault Tooling/equipment left Tools/equipment use
installed structural repair) in aircraft/engine improperly
Wrong equipment /part Too much fluid Incorrect Not found by fault Debris on ramp Defective
installed isolation tools/equipment sued
Wrong orientation Wrong fluid type Unapproved Not found by operational/ Debris falling into Struck by/against
functional test open systems
Improper location Required servicing Incomplete Not found by task Other Pulled/pushed/drove
not performed inspection into
Incomplete installation Access not closed Other Access not closed Fire/smoke
Mis-rigging
49
NEW ALoSP SPI: Maintenance Error
• SPI formally proposed at 3rd SMS Enhancement Working Group, 25th August
50
Safety Promotion
Safety Communication
Provide lines of communication at all stages of SMS implementation
• Improving safety performance by communicating lessons learned
• Distributing safety procedures in the organisation
• Raising awareness of potential hazards and risks
• Fostering a learning and ongoing reporting culture
52
Safety Communication: Safety Briefings
Advantages of Briefings
• SMS team see the reaction from staff
• Opportunity for staff to ask questions and get them answered immediately
• Instant feedback regarding questions and other discussion issues
• Helps prevent misinterpretation
• Suitable for staff with limited computer aptitude
Challenges
• Staff availability at scheduled briefings
• Does not manage the ‘quality’ of reports Next Stage of Briefings
53
Thank-you
Nadia Algosaibi
SMS Manager, Etihad Airways Engineering
nalgosaibi@etihad.ae
ROSI Management & Processing
Update
Eng. Khalid Saud Al Humaidan
Senior Specialist – Safety Policy & Regulation
2
What is Safety Intelligence ?
3
Search for precursors of
Risk Based Oversight
accidents
“Know where to look”
“See it coming”
4
What is Safety Intelligence ?
knowledge gained through the analysis and study of available data and
information
Identify
Safety Issues
Safety
Performance Assesment
Monitoring
(assurance)
Safety of Safety
Issues
Risk
Portfolio
Implementat Definition of
ion & follow Safety
up Actions
6
Safety Action
Safety Issue Safety Issue Programming Safety
Identification Assessment and Performance
Implementation
Analysis of Scope
MOR/VOR Data Decision on
Actions Indicators relevant
Causes
for measuring
Emerging Safety Consequences efficiency of
Issues based on Risk Controls actions
safety research Impact
assessment,
Analysis of prioritization
Audit/Inspection
Indicators relevant
Data for monitoring the
Analysis of Risk Assessment safety issue
Follow-up of
operational data implementation
(FDM/Radar/Health
Monitring)
7
Intelligence Sources
Safety
Safety Recommend
Research & ations
Study
Occurrence
Reliability Reporting
Internation
FDM AHM Audits al Exchange ATM Data
& Sharing
8
ROSI Management & Processing
Prior to 2010, GCAA didn’t have a mandatory occurrence system proportionate with the
size and the complexity of the UAE Civil Aviation System
• ROSI Management transfer from the SRM “ Safety Risk Management “ section to the
Aviation Safety Affairs Sector
9
10
ROSI Management & Processing
Composed of SME’s from FO, AWR & ANA domain. The group will be the central
point for receipt of Occurrence Report.
• Airworthiness
• Flight Operations
• Air Navigation & Aerodrome
• Air Navigation & Aerodrome
11
ROSI Management & Processing
Category 1
Category 2
Category 2 reportable incidents are occurrences which are were not considered as
Category 1 and are to be reported to the GCAA within 15 days from date of
occurrence with an investigation/initial investigation report as necessary
12
ROSI Management & Processing
Category 1 Occurrences
13
ROSI Management & Processing
Category 2 Occurrences
14
ROSI Management & Processing
15
ROSI Management & Processing
16
ROSI Management & Processing
17
ROSI Management & Processing
Thank You
18
Avisa Gulf Aviation
Advisory Service & Consultancy.
Commercial, Operations & Technical.
56
Developing a Reliability Programme to
Support the AMP for Small Fleet.
57
MAIN POINTS OF THIS PRESENTATION:
1. To review & obtain an understanding on the requirements of an AMP as per the UAE
CARs.
2. To review & obtain an understanding on the requirements of a Reliability Programme
as per the UAE CARs.
3. To consider the most effective & applicable method of developing a Reliability
Programme for a small fleet of aircraft (Commercial, Private or Business aircraft.)
4. To consider ETOPs implications in Reliability Programmes.
58
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP)
CAR M.302
59
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP)
The AMP is developed with the function of ensuring that the continued
integrity & airworthiness of design is maintained to the same level of resistance
to failure of the initial airworthiness in the Type Certificate.
The OEM with the NAA & Operators develop the MRBR using MSG3 analysis to
identify the tasks & instructions for continued airworthiness of the type.
The MRBR is developed in to an MPD then the Operator develops their AMP
with local conditions in consideration.
60
AIRWORTHINESS & MAINTENACE
61
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP) REVIEW
2. Each task interval should appropriate in its unit of measure & its interval
time.
1. UOM: a/c cycles, engine cycles, landings, flight hours, calendar time,
2. Time interval with consideration to the MSG3 analysis & failure data.
62
IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY
63
IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY
64
THE 4 ACTIONS OF A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME
1. Data collection;
2. Data analysis;
3. Corrective action;
4. Data storage & retrieval.
65
RELIABILITY DATA SOURCES
Reliability programmes can get data from a few sources in the daily operation
of the aircraft,
66
RELIABILITY DATA SOURCES
Reliability programmes can get data from a few sources in the daily operation
of the aircraft,
67
RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES
Line Operation:
68
RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES
Flight Line:
69
RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES
Maintenance Engineering:
1. Non Routine Cards & Findings
1. Linked to the parent AMP task.
2. Found with no parent AMP task.
2. Component removals & shop reports
1. No Fault Found NFF
3. AD & SB analysis
1. Addressing type design faults & giving improvements
4. Modification analysis & their Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA)
1. STC`s, Part 21 etc.
70
ADDITIONAL RELIABILITY for ETOPs
71
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME
1. Line Reliability
2. Maintenance AMP Reliability
3. Engine / Systems Condition Trend Monitoring
4. Component Reliability Monitoring
72
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME
73
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME
74
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME
75
A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME
76
IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY & ITS ROLE IN THE ARC
77
Thank you for listening & participating.
78
.
79
Background
• Final report of AAIS case AIFN/0016/2012
80
Relevant contributing factors
81
Safety recommendations.
GCAA should;
• Issue guidance to the industry regarding man-hour
. methodology, duty times, including maximum days on
duty, working hours, shift patterns, working beyond
normal duty times, minimum rest between shifts and
rest days.
• Issue guidance to the industry for workers involved with
safety sensitive jobs regarding fatigue risk management.
82
Way ahead?
83
What is fatigue?
84
Safety Alert Likely Recommendations
85
• Absolute maximum of seven successive work days before a break
of at least two rest days.
.
• (7 successive 12 hour days may not be acceptable, 7 successive
7/8 hour days may be).
86
Background to recommendations:
87
Fatigue Risk Management Scheme
.
When a Fatigue Risk Management Scheme is implemented,
the organisation should establish, document and maintain
the FRM scheme as an integral part of its Safety
Management System.
88
Fatigue Risk Management scheme-requirements:
(a) incorporate scientific principles and knowledge;
(b) manage the operational risks of the organisation arising from fatigue of
personnel on an ongoing basis;
(c) ensure that actions necessary to effectively mitigate the organisation’s
. risks arising from fatigue are implemented promptly;
(d) provide for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the
mitigation of fatigue risks;
(e) be supported by the organisation’s just culture policy to ensure
confidence in reporting fatigue related hazards;
(f) include a set of procedures that aim to ensure that personnel involved in
aircraft maintenance are appropriately rested and fit to perform their
duties safely.
89
Thank you for your attention.
Questions?
90
Manufacturing Organization Approval
92
MOA Scope
Organization:
• Organization within the physical boundaries of UAE
Components Manufactured:
• Components for UAE-registered aircraft only
• Non-critical components with no airworthiness impacts
– Examples: small plastic components, seat covers, carpets, side panels
– Expansion of the list shall be considered on case to case basis
93
Scopes
94
MOA Eligibility
• Application shall be made in a form and manner established by the GCAA and
shall include; the Exposition Manual, Scope of Approvals applied and the
payment of applicable fee
95
MOA Quality Management System
A Quality System is required:
96
MOA Exposition Manual
Organization Setup:
• Management commitment
• Organization chart showing chain of responsibilities
• Certifying personnel
• Facility setup
Process Setup:
• Organizational capabilities and scope of approval
• Details of quality system and procedures
• Description of products and processes control
• Amendment procedures for organizational and process changes
97
MOA Form 299
98
MOA – Airworthiness Release Form 299
Contents:
• Organizational data
• Released component information
• Endorsement and certification details
Completion Instruction:
• Provided in the MOA regulations
99
Advantages: MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G
The MOA Regulations are introduced with the intent of:
100
Advantages – MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G
Minimal setup and operating cost due to:
• Simpler components requires less complex processes and facility
• Fewer certifying personnel with overlap of non conflicting roles
permissible
• Minimal migration cost as existing facility can and will be able to be used
101
Advantages – MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G
Minimal setup time and approval time:
• Simpler initial facility setup compared to POA setup, speeds up operational
readiness
• Less migration cost from CAR 21 Subpart G and CAR 145 categories
• Minimal organizational setup compared to POA (minimal manpower & certifying
staff)
• More focus on operational requirements, further leads to increase productivity
102
Advantages – MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G
Allows gradual expansion of facilities and operational undertakings.
103
MOA Certification Implementation (1/2)
Potential organizations:
• New organizations
• Part 145 Approval Holders
Expected Timeframe:
• Expected implementation by end of the year
• Already receiving applications, three applications being processed
104
MOA Certification Implementation (2/2)
105
Questions / Discussion
106
New Concept For Safety Occurrence
Report Management
The knowledge gained via a robust intelligence system can enable the
GCAA to perform its State Safety Management functions
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
• Re-design organizational structures to integrate RBO & PBO into the SSOS CE-8
3
• Upgrade and improve the State safety reporting programme to be harmonized with international standards
4
• Development of the necessary human resources to fulfill new positions and competencies
5
• Agreement on safety performance indicators and safety performance targets for key industry stakeholders as well as for the State
8
• Definition of procedures and mechanisms for risk and performance based oversight
10
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
Identify Safety
Issues
Safety
Performance Assessment of
Monitoring Safety Issue
(Assurance)
Implementation Definition of
& Follow Up Safety Actions
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
1. MOR
2. VOR
3. Audits
4. Inspections
5. FDM/Reliability
6. Other
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
ACT
Current Occurrence Management Process
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
Goals:
• Quality Assurance
Composed of SME’s from FO, AWR & ANA domain. The group will be the
central point for receipt of Occurrence Report.
Airworthiness Representative
Flight Operations Representative
Air Navigation & Aerodrome Representative
Air Navigation & Aerodrome Representative
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
Taking in to account historical data of occurrences assigned to ASAS in 2015.
ANA: 5442
AWR: 447
FO: 1415
Category 1 Occurrences
Operation of Aircraft:
- Take-offs, rejected take-offs, landings or attempted landings on a closed, occupied or incorrect runway.
- Critically low fuel quantity or inability to transfer fuel or use total quantity of usable fuel.
- Loss of control (including partial or temporary loss of control) from any cause.
- Depressurization
Aircraft Technical:
- Damage to or defect exceeding allowed tolerances of a structural element which failure could reduce the
structural stiffness to such an extent that the required flutter, divergence or control reversal margins are
no longer achieved.
- Loss of any part of the aircraft structure in flight.
- Leakage of hydraulic fluids, fuel, oil or other fluids which resulted in a fire hazard or possible hazardous
contamination of aircraft structure, systems or equipment, or risk to occupants.
- Flameout, shutdown or malfunction of any engine.
Occurrence Classification
- ASMI CAT A, B, C, D
- Loss of Runway separation CAT A, B, C, D
Aerodromes:
Operation of Aircraft:
- Laser incident
- Wake turbulence encounters (depends on severity)
- Aircraft Ground Handling and Servicing
Technical:
- Failure or defect of passenger address system resulting in loss or inaudible
passenger address system.
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
What We Expect
ASAS Safety Occurrence Reporting
Your Thoughts
Process
ASAS Safety Occurrence Management
Thank You