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Asian Philosophy: An International

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Karma and Rebirth in Alberuni's

India
a
Arvind Sharma
a
Faculty of Religious Studies, William and Henry Birks
Building , McGill University , 3520 University Street,
Montreal, PQ, H3A 2A7, Canada
Published online: 16 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: Arvind Sharma (1991) Karma and Rebirth in Alberuni's India , Asian
Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East, 1:1, 77-91,
DOI: 10.1080/09552369108575337

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 Asian Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1991 77

Karma and Rebirth in Alberuni's India

ARVIND SHARMA

Albïrûnï (973-1048 AD) is one of the leading non-Hindu scholars of Hinduism [1]
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and his famous work, known as Tahkīk-i-Hind for short [2], is one of the major non-
Hindu sources of our knowledge about Hinduism. What Albïrûnï has to say about the
doctrine of karma and rebirth, therefore, cannot be without interest for a student of
Hinduism, especially as Albīrūnī is regarded as the first Muslim scholar to write about
Hinduism objectively [3].

II
Albīrūnī identified the doctrine of karma and rebirth as the distinguishing feature of
Hinduism. His statement on this point is comparative, explicit and unequivocal. He
writes:
As the word of confession, 'There is no god but God, Muhammad is his
prophet', is the shibboleth of Islam, the Trinity that of Christianity, and the
institute of the Sabbath that of Judaism, so metempsychosis is the shibboleth
of the Hindu religion. Therefore he who does not believe in it does not
belong to them, and is not reckoned as one of them. [4]
Some modern scholars follow Albīrūnī in identifying belief in metempsychosis as the
hallmark of Hinduism [5] but others have tended to be more cautious [6]. Not only do
all systems of belief and practice at least now characterised as Hindu not share this
doctrine [7], it is doubtful if all Hindus as such subscribe to it [8]. Recent anthropolo-
gical studies have also raised doubts about the inalienable association between Hindu-
ism and karma [9].
It could, of course, be argued that Hinduism in Albīrūnī's time was doctrinally
definable in terms of belief in karma and rebirth, though Basava was to challenge it in
Karņātaka within a century [10]. But the difficulty in regarding karma and rebirth as
the hallmark of Hinduism without some measure of caution is that the "cycle of rebirth
is also accepted by Buddhists, Jains, [ a n d ] . . . sporadically in quite separate religious
traditions, such as Orphism and Neoplatonism, the Kabala and the Doukhobars" [11].
Interestingly, Albīrūnī is aware of some of these parallels, and mentions them. Thus
there is a problem in defining Hinduism in terms of the acceptance of the doctrine of
karma and rebirth even in Albīrūnī's time. On the one hand such a definition is too
narrow and on the other too broad. It is too narrow because he is concerned not with
what all Hindus but what "the Brahmans think and believe " [12] and there is no way
of knowing if all Hindus, as distinguished from the Brahmins, subscribed to the view.
It is too broad because the belief was also found outside Hinduism.
Albīrūnī does not, one may note, distinguish between karma and rebirth. The two
concepts dovetail neatly but it is important to remember that they are both analytically
 78 Aroind Sharma

[13] and historically [14] distinguishable. Thus the two concepts are regarded as
"logical corollaries" [15] and it has even been suggested that "belief in rebirth came
first and the law of karma was produced as an explanation of this belief rather than
that the Hindus came to believe in rebirth because the law of karma required it" [16].
But both the concepts appear tied up together in classical Hinduism and likewise
Albīrūnī does not distinguish between the two. However, Albīrūnī may have been
closer to the mark if he had identified rebirth and karma as the 'dogma' of Hinduism.
But even then problems surface immediately. Albīrūnī refers to both Hinduism and
Buddhism [17] but treats them sometimes along similar lines and sometimes as
distinct. In fact he refers to the Buddha as an incarnation of God though his account
differs somewhat from the Puranic ones. His comments on the relationship between
the Hindus and the Buddhists are revealing. He states that though the Buddhists
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"cordially hate the Brahmans, still are nearer akin to them than to others" [18]. It
appears that by the time of Albīrūnī the distinction between Hinduism and Buddhism
re the doctrine of karma, i.e. whether a soul was involved in the process or not, had
faded to the point of not being perceived by Albīrūnī at all [19]. The implication of
Albīrūnī's doctrinal definition of Hinduism makes it inclusive of Buddhism and one
wonders whether he realised this implication.

Ill
The point is important as there is probably no Hindu philosophy, rather there are
Hindu philosophies ranging from the six orthodox systems to the many more men-
tioned in the Sarvadarsanasangraha. It will, therefore, be useful to identify the
philosophical roots of Albīrūnī's presentation of the Hindu doctrine of karma.
The initial statement of the doctrine by Albīrūnī possesses a clearly Sankhyan
flavour. Not only does he refer to [20] and claim to cite from a Sarikhya text, [21]
there are at least two aspects of his description which possess a distinctly Sankhyan
flavour. First, he describes the involvement of the soul in the world of matter not in
negative but rather evolutionary terms. The soul is seen as gaining experience and
knowledge which leads towards release. Of all the schools of Hindu philosophy such a
view is best represented by Sankhyk [22]. Secondly, he refers to the operation of the
"three primary forces" [23] or the guņas in this context and finally the conclusion of
the soul's journey is described thus: "Then the soul turns away from matter; the
connecting links are broken, the union is dissolved. Separation and dissolution take
place . . . " [24]. This is a typically Sankhya-Yoga idea, wherein "Yoga" really "stands
for vi-yoga or separation—separation of the Purusa from Prakrti" [25].
Another Hindu source which Albīrūnī uses is the Book of Patanjali. One would
assume this book to be the Yoga-Sutra although the identification is not without
problems. Whatever this 'Book of Patanjali' may be, the material presented by Albīrūnī
from it is of great interest.
The description is couched in the form of a dialogue and the core idea of karmic
connection between rebirths is clearly presented.
The following passage is taken from the book of Patanjali: 'The soul, being
on all sides tied to ignorance, which is the cause of its being fettered, is like
rice in its cover. As long as it is there, it is capable of growing and ripening in
the transition stages between being born and giving birth itself. But if the
cover is taken off the rice, it ceases to develop in this way, and becomes
 Karma and Rebirth 79

stationary. The retribution of the soul depends on the various kinds of

creatures through which it wanders, upon the extent of life, whether it be
long or short, and upon the particular kind of its happiness, be it scanty or
ample.'
The pupil asks: 'What is the condition of the spirit when it has a claim to a
recompense or has committed a crime, and is then entangled in a kind of new
birth either in order to receive bliss or to be punished?'
The master says: 'It migrates according to what it has previously done,
fluctuating between happiness and misfortune, and alternately experiencing
pain or pleasure.' [26]
It is in the next passage, however, that one encounters really interesting material, for
two reasons: (1) it raises the issue of absence of memory of previous lives at the
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beginning and (2) towards the end it offers an argument in support of rebirth through
the behaviour of children.
The pupil asks: 'If a man commits something which necessitates a retribution
for him in a different shape from that in which he has committed the thing,
and if between both stages there is a great interval of time and the matter is
forgotten, what then?'
The master answers: 'It is the nature of action to adhere to the spirit, for
action is its product, whilst the body is only an instrument for it. Forgetting
does not apply to spiritual matters, for they lie outside of time, with the
nature of which the notions of long and short duration are necessarily
connected. Action, by adhering to the spirit, frames its nature and character
into a condition similar to that one into which the soul will enter on its next
migration. The soul in its purity knows this, thinks of it, and does not forget
it; but the light of the soul is covered by the turbid nature of the body as long
as it is connected with the body. Then the soul is like a man who remembers
a thing which he once knew, but then forgot in consequence of insanity or an
illness or some intoxication which overpowered his mind. Do you not observe
that little children are in high spirits when people wish them a long life, and
are sorry when people imprecate upon them a speedy death? And what would
the one thing or the other signify to them, if they had not tasted the
sweetness of life and experienced the bitterness of death in former genera-
tions through which they had been migrating to undergo the due course of
retribution?' [27]
The interesting point to note here is that even though loss of memory is mentioned, it
is not used as an argument against rebirth as is commonly done in the West [28]. Belief
in rebirth is axiomatic. The question being asked is: How does karma operate if the
memory of the act done is lost. Belief in the doctrine of rebirth, therefore, one will be
tempted to say is now a dogma, yet towards the end of the passage the behaviour of
children is referred to as evidence of rebirth. That some effort is made to vindicate
rebirth in empirical terms is interesting, in view of the paucity of such evidence
(though not total absence) [29].
Another source Albīrūnī draws upon for the exposition of the doctrine is the
Bhagavadgītā [30] or what we might identify as a Vedāntic source in view of the fact
that it is a member of the triple canon of Vedānta [31]. The quotations cited by
Albīrūnī in relation to the text of the Gitā have been recently examined in detail [32].
Here one would like to confine one's attention to some of the passages from the Gitā
 80 Arvind Sharma

cited by Albīrūnī in the present context. First, Alblrūnī cites verses which in general
uphold the doctrine of rebirth:
Vâsudeva speaks to Arjuna instigating him to the battle, whilst they stand
between the two lines: 'If you believe in predestination, you must know that
neither they nor we are mortal, and do not go away without a return, for the
souls are immortal and unchangeable. They migrate through the bodies, while
man changes from childhood into youth, into manhood and infirm age, the
end of which is the death of the body. Thereafter the soul proceeds on its
return.'
Further he says: 'How can a man think of death and being killed who
knows that the soul is eternal, not having been born and not perishing; that
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the soul is something stable and constant; that no sword can cut it, no fire
burn it, no water extinguish it, and no wind wither it? The soul migrates
from its body, after it has become old, into another, a different one, as the
body, when its dress has become old, is clad in another. What then is your
sorrow about a soul which does not perish? If it were perishable, it would be
more becoming that you should not sorrow about a thing which may be
dispensed with, which does not exist, and does not return into existence. But
if you look more to your body than to your soul, and are in anxiety about its
perishing, you must know that all that which is born dies, and that all that
which dies returns into another existence. However, both life and death are
not your concern. They are in the hands of God, from whom all things come
and to whom they return.' [33]
The citations from the Bhagavadgītā agree reasonably well with verses 12-13, 20,
22-23 and 26-28 of its Second Chaper, though not exactly [34]. An important element
introduced by Albīrūnī is the idea of predestination in presenting these verses.
Although it can be argued, though the point is a contested one, that the Bhagavadgītā
upholds predestination (prārabdha) [35] it is clear that these verses of the Gītā
enunciate no such doctrine. One must wonder whether Albīrūnī has been influenced by
the Islamic doctrine of predestination here [36]. Secondly, he uses the famous simile
wherein worn-out clothes and dead bodies are compared. The simile is striking and can
be traced at least as far back as the fourth century BC [37]. Thirdly, in the same
chapter although in a garbled way, Albīrūnī refers to Krsna's claim in the Gītā that
Kŗsņa knows his past lives but Arjuna does not.
In the further course of conversation Arjuna speaks to Vâsudeva: 'How did
you dare thus to fight Brahman, Brahman who was before the world was and
before man was, whilst you are living among us as a being, whose birth and
age are known?'
Thereupon Vâsudeva answered: 'Eternity (pre-existence) is common to
both of us and to him. How often have we lived together, when I knew the
times of our life and death, whilst they were concealed from you! When I
desire to appear in order to do some good, I array myself in a body, since one
cannot be with man except in a human shape.' [38]
The idea of this passage corresponds to the fifth and seventh verses of the Fourth
Chapter of the Gitā but with a twist. The verses seem to imply that Arjuna and Krsņa
have lived together in previous lives. This statement obviously supports the doctrine of
rebirth but the problem is that this is not what the text of the Gitā says as we have it.
It runs as follows:
 Karma and Rebirth 81

For Me have passed many

Births, and for thee, Arjuna;
These I know all;
Thou knowest not, scorcher of the foe.
For whenever of the right
A languishing appears, son of Bharata,
A rising up of unright,
Then I send Myself forth. [39]
Finally, Albīrūnl explains why the soul is not liberated at death and this explanation is
avowedly drawn from the Gitā. He cites Vāsudeva as saying that the spiritual aspirant
"at last obtains salvation in an uninterrupted series of new Births" [40].
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Further, Vāsudeva says: 'If the soul is free from matter, it is knowing; but as
long as it is clad in matter, the soul is not-knowing, on account of the turbid
nature of matter. It thinks that it is an agent, and that the actions of the
world are prepared for its sake. Therefore it clings to them, and it is stamped
with the impressions of the senses. When, then, the soul leaves the body, the
traces of the impressions of the senses remain in it, and are not completely
eradicated, as it longs for the world of sense and returns towards it. And
since it in these stages undergoes changes entirely opposed to each other, it is
thereby subject to the influences of the three primary forces. What, therefore,
can the soul do, its wing being cut, if it is not sufficiently trained and
prepared?'
Vāsudeva says: 'The best of men is the perfectly wise one, for he loves
God and God loves him. How many times has he died and been born again!
During his whole life he perseveringly seeks for perfection till he obtains it.'
[41]
With some reservations, these statements can be connected with Bhagavadgttā
111.27, XV.8-10, VI.38b and V.19, and VII.19.
Up to this point the philosophical sources cited by Albīrūnī were examined. These
pertained to Sarikhya, Yoga and Vedānta. These, however, are not the only sources
cited by Albīrūnī. Albīrūnī also refers to what may be called non-philosophical sources.
These are the Purāņas and work of Varāhamihira. The Puranic sources refer to the
metempsychosis of not merely human but also celestial beings. First the humans. The
following passage is cited by Albīrūnī as belonging to the Visnupurāņa:
Maitreya asked Parâsara about the purpose of hell and the punishment in it,
whereupon he answered: 'It is for distinguishing the good from the bad,
knowledge from ignorance, and for the manifestation of justice. But not
every sinner enters hell. Some of them escape hell by previously doing works
of repentance and expiation. The greatest expiation is uninterruptedly think-
ing of Vishnu in every action. Others wander about in plants, filthy insects
and birds, and abominable dirty creeping things like lice and worms, for such
a length of time as they desire it.' [42]
Albīrūnī also draws upon the Visņudharma, which refers to the rebirth of not merely
human but celestial beings.
In the Vishņu-Dharma, Mârkandeya, speaking of the spiritual beings, says:
'Brahman, Kârttikeya, son of Mahâdeva, Lakshmî, who produced the Amŗita,
Daksha, who was beaten by Mahâdeva, Umâdevî, the wife of Mahâdeva, each
 82 Arvind Sharma

of them has been in the middle of this kalpa, and they have been the same
already many times.' [43]
It must be noted here that Albīrūnī probably treated the Purāņas as of inferior value
as a source of Hindu doctrines. This would seem to be the natural implication of the
following comment: "The educated among the Hindus abhor anthropomorphisms of
this kind but the crowd and the members of the single sects use them most extensively.
They go even beyond all we have hitherto mentioned, so as to speak of wife, son,
daughter, of the rendering pregnant and other physical processes, all in connection
with God. They are even so little pious, that, when speaking of these things, they do
not even abstain from silly and unbecoming language. However, nobody minds these
classes and their theories, though they be numerous" [44]. As such stories are by and
large found in the Purāņas and as the Purāņas also tend to be sectarian in nature it is
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more than likely that Albīrūnī had the Purāņas in mind here.
Another Hindu source Albīrūnī draws upon to elaborate the doctrine of karma and
rebirth is Varāhamihira.
Varâhamihira speaks of the influences of the comets, and of the calamities
which befall men when they appear. These calamities compel them to
emigrate from their homes, lean from exhaustion, moaning over their mishap,
leading their children by the hand along the road, and speaking to each other
in low tones, 'We are punished for the sins of our kings'; whereupon others
answer, 'Not so. This is the retribution for what we have done in the former
life, before we entered these bodies.' [45]
As with the Purāņas, Albīrūnī is more critical of Varāhamihira in general than his
philosophical sources [46], but this point will be considered later. What must hold our
attention at this moment is the fact that Varāhamihira was an astrologer as much as a
polymath, that the same is true of Albīrūnī and that from this point of view the use of
Varāhamihira by Albīrūnī is significant in that it is in the works of Varāhamihira that
the coupling of karma and astrology is really consolidated [47].
This survey of the source material used by Albīrūnī may now be brought to a
conclusion—or rather to two conclusions, one textual, the other doctrinal. The textual
conclusion has already been hinted at. The various sources Albīrūnī draws upon to
expound the doctrine of karma and rebirth in Hinduism can broadly be classified into
(1) philosophical sources and (2) non-philosophical sources. Although Albīrūnī draws
on both, and does not offer a relative assessment of their value as sources in the
context of the karma-rebirth doctrine, in general he holds the philosophical sources in
higher esteem than the non-philosophical ones. At the doctrinal level the presentation
of Hindu views on karma enable an interesting conclusion to be drawn. Two
formulations of the karma doctrine can be identified within Hinduism [48], namely
that "the necessity involved in karma is absolute" or that "Karma is only one of the
causes that explain the course of events in a man's life". Albīrūnī's presentation of
karma proceeds along the first version, consistently with the understanding that even
the first implies freedom "in the matter of ethical advance".

IV
Now that the Hindu sources Albīrūnī draws upon to elaborate the doctrine of karma
and rebirth have been identified, one may examine some of the salient features of his
presentation of the doctrine.
 Karma and Rebirth 83

Albīrūnī is quite conversant with the idea of the lokas and their association with the
doctrine of karma. His discussion of the point shows that the Hindus were not
unanimous in their view regarding the range of transmigration.The most general view
seems to have been that creatures underwent experiences in four lokas or realms in
accordance with their karma: (1) heaven (svarloka); (2) hell (nāgaloka, patāla or
nara(ka)lokà); (3) human beings (madhyaloka, manusyalokd) and (4) animals and
plants (tiryagloka) [49]. According to a dissenting view noted by Albīrūnī some people
regarded being consigned to animal or plant life as hell. "People who hold this view do
not know of another hell, but this kind of degradation below the degree of living as a
human being" [50].
Another aspect of the metempsychotic process on which Albīrūnī notes differences
of opinion among the Hindus is the relationship between body and soul. The issue is:
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must the soul always possess a body or can creatures exist as an incorporeal being?
Albīrūnī notes that in Hindu traditional lore two kinds of views are met with: that the
soul can exist without a body and that it cannot. On the former view one can exist as
an incorporeal being in heaven and hell [51], according to the latter one cannot. Now
Albīrūnī associates this latter view with the "lower classes and those who cannot
imagine the existence of the soul without a body" [52]. On this view there is always a
body to receive the soul "either as an embryo in a mother's womb or as a seed in the
bosom of the earth" or "another b o d y . . . prepared for it [the soul] out of the
elements" called ativāhika in which the soul stays for a year. This latter is connected
by Albīrūnī with the šrāddha rite: "For this reason the heir of the deceased must,
according to Hindu use, fulfil the rites of the year for the deceased, duties which end
with the end of the year, for then the soul goes to that place which is prepared for it"
[53].
Albīrūnī's comment here is of great interest, as it enables the doctrine of karma and
practice of šrāddha to be reconciled after a fashion, which are often considered
discrepant [54].
These points mentioned by Albīrūnī are of eschatological interest but there is one
which is of considerable philosophical significance. To gauge its significance one may
ask the question: what constitutes karma—mental intention or physical action? Now
Albīrūnī remarks very briefly but unequivocally: "the retribution, however, is not
according to the deed, but according to the intention which a man had in doing it"
[55].
Such a statement has major implications for the Hindu doctrine of karma as it
reflects an essentially Buddhist standpoint. This calls for some elaboration, and "the
Buddha's own definition of karma should be remembered here: " O Bhikkhus, it is
volition (cetanä) that I call karma. Having willed, one acts through body, speech and
mind" [56]. Such a view was severely criticised by the Jainas in the Sūtrakŗtānga. A
Buddhist is made to remark: "If a savage throws his spear through the side of a corn-
stack, believing it to be a man, or through a pumpkin, believing it to be a child, and
roasts it, then he is guilty of murder, according to our view. But if a savage spears a
man and roasts him, believing him to be a part of corn-stack, or a little child, believing
it to be a pumpkin, then he is not guilty of murder, according to our view" [57].
The Hindu position on karma is not capable of such a caricature and Albīrūnī seems
to be somewhat off the mark here. In claiming that retribution is according to intention
and not deed Albīrūnī does not correctly reflect the classical standard Hindu doctrine
of karma. On the Hindu view the "sum total of a man's thoughts, feelings, desires and
actions... constitutes his karma [58]. That karma in Hinduism operates at all
 84 Arvind Sharma

Ievels—mental, verbal and physical—and not primarily or solely at the mental level of
intention is clearly demonstrated by a study of its operation according to the Dharma-
šāstras [59].
Albīrūnī's treatment of the doctrine of karma also reveals a few other interesting
aspects. He cites the following illustration to explain the relation between the soul and
karma.
The book of Sâmkhya brings action into relation with the soul, though the
soul has nothing to do with action, only in so far as it resembles a man who
happens to get into the company of people whom he does not know. They are
robbers returning from a village which they have sacked and destroyed, and
he has scarcely marched with them a short distance, when they are overtaken
by the avengers. The whole party are taken prisoners, and together with them
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the innocent man is dragged off; and being treated precisely as they are, he
receives the same punishment, without having taken part in their action. [60]
The reader will note the example relates to an 'innocent man' being punished with the
guilty as an illustration of the soul's involvement in karma. And yet how karmically
just is it that an innocent man be punished?
A more substantial issue relates to the relationship between karma and the varna
system. It is a matter of some interest that Albīrūnī, in discussing the caste system,
does not so much emphasise the relationship of caste to past karma as to 'present
karma'—occupation—and mode of life. And although it is clear that one is born in a
caste, Albīrūnī explains the hierarchy of the varņa system in terms of the Purusa-sūkta
and not directly in terms of deeds performed in past lives, although one must take this
as implied. This is a point worth remarking for it could be argued that the varna
scheme historically precedes the emergence of the doctrine of karma if the former is
associated with the Ŗg Veda (X.90) and the latter with the Upanisads.
At this point reference must be made to a remark by Albīrūnī which is often cited as
contrastive of Islamic egalitarianism with Hindu casteism. While remarking on the
profliferation ofjātis in Hinduism Albīrūnī says:
Among the Hindus institutions of this kind abound. We Muslims, of course,
stand entirely on the other side of the question, considering all men as equal,
except in piety; and this is the greatest obstacle which prevents any approach
or understanding between Hindus and Muslims. [61]
Two points are worthy of remark here. The first is that just as Muslims distinguish
among themselves on basis of piety so do the Hindus—for after all birth in a particular
caste represents the degree of piety achieved in the previous life. The real difference
between Hindu and Muslim viewpoints is the time horizon involved and not the fact of
piety. The Muslims consider it over a span of one life and the Hindus over that of
several lives. Secondly, although all Muslims are equal, Muslims and non-Muslims are
not. Non-Muslims are kāfirs in Islam just as non-Hindus are mlecchas in Hinduism.
Hence when Albīrūnī says 'all men are equal' he really means Muslims. The point he
draws attention to, subject to these caveats, is very significant, namely, that Hindus
internally designate members by caste while Islam does not—and that this discrimina-
tion is connected with karma [62].
Albīrūnī also makes a few sundry observations about caste which are of interest. He
notes that "much as these classes differ from each other, they live together in the same
towns and villages, mixed together in the same houses and lodgings" [63]. However,
each "of the four castes, when eating together, must form a group for themselves"
 Karma and Rebirth 85

[64]. On a more spiritual plane, the question of the eligibility of castes to salvation is
also examined. Albïrûnî remarks:
Hindus differ among themselves as to which of these castes is capable of
attaining to liberation; for, according to some, only the Brâhmana and
Kshatriya are capable of it, since the others cannot learn the Veda, whilst
according to the Hindu philosophers, liberation is common to all castes and
to the whole human race, if their intention of obtaining it is perfect. This
view is based on the saying of Vyâsa: 'Learn to know the twenty-five things
thoroughly. Then you may follow whatever religion you like; you will no
doubt be liberated.' [65]
Several distinguishing features of Albīrūnī's presentation of the Hindu doctrine of
karma and rebirth were described above. The more striking passages of his presenta-
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tion may next be quoted, especially as they bring into sharp focus aspects which are
not always clearly associated with the current standard versions of the doctrine.
According to this generally prevalent view the journey of the soul through samsara is
not inherently progressive, man is 'trapped' in samsara, the world of matter, and the
end of the journey represents an individual consummation, freedom of a soul from the
thraldom of matter. The passages cited below from AlbīrūnI present the doctrine in a
somewhat different light.
The migration begins from low stages, and rises to higher and better ones,
not the contrary, as we state on purpose, since the one is a priori as possible
as the other. The difference of these lower and higher stages depends upon
the difference of the actions, and this again results from the quantitative and
qualitative diversity of the temperaments and the various degrees of combi-
nations in which they appear.
This migration lasts until the object aimed at has been completely attained
both for the soul and matter, the lower aim being the disappearance of the
shape of matter, except any such new formation as may appear desirable; the
higher aim being the ceasing of the desire of the soul to learn what it did not
know before, the insight of the soul into the nobility of its own being and its
independent existence, its knowing that it can dispense with matter after it
has become acquainted with the mean nature of matter and the instability of
its shapes, with all that which matter offers to the senses, and with the truth
of the tales about its delights. Then the soul turns away from matter; the
connecting links are broken, the union is dissolved. Separation and dissolu-
tion take place, and the soul returns to its home, carrying with itself as much
of the bliss of knowledge as sesame develops grains and blossoms, afterwards
never separating from its oil. The intelligent being, intelligence and its
object, are united and become one. [66]
Another passage explains that this evolution may not proceed in a straight line. "All
these degrees of retribution are necessary for this reason, that the seeking for salvation
from the fetters of matter frequently does not proceed on the straight line which leads
to absolute knowledge, but on lines chosen by guessing or chosen because others had
chosen them. Not one action of man shall be lost, not even the least of all; it shall be
brought to his account after his good and bad actions have been balanced against each
other" [67].
The significance of such passages has been discussed in detail elsewhere [68]; these
results may be summarised here. Thus "the soul may go through heaven or hell in a
 86 Arvind Sharma

disembodied form. On the earth it may take on a human or a non-human body. In

these details, however, one should not lose sight of the fact that the soul is journeying
upward. It may occasionally relapse and fall back but the whole cosmic scene is best
compared not to a treadmill as is often done in modern writings but to an escalator
wherein, too, one may slip back, but the general upward movement continues".
Moreover, the "careful reader will note that this is a very different vision of the Hindu
process of samsara that one meets with sometimes in some Hindu writings themselves
and often in Christian writings about Hinduism where the samsāric process is
described in thoroughly negative terms" [69]. It should further be noted that according
to Albīrūnī the end of the goal represents a personal consummation with a universal
dimension.
This last point is not immediately obvious but can be teased out from the
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comparisons Albīrūnī institutes between some of the Hindu doctrines with those of the
Sūfīs. Albīrūnī remarks that according to some Sūfīs God is immanent in the world
and to them "the entering of the souls into various beings in the course of metempsy-
chosis is of no consequence" [70]. The Hindu view, however, does combine reincarna-
tion with God's universal immanence in view of its occasionally pantheistic penchant,
a penchant also recognised by Albīrūnī [71].

Thus an interesting aspect of Albīrūnī's discussion of karma and rebirth is provided by

parallels he draws between Hindu and Islamic doctrines on the point. Some of these
Islamic doctrines Albīrūnī specifies as Sūfi while to others he refers more generally. He
writes:
A theosoph who inclines towards metempsychosis says: 'The metempsychosis
has four degrees:
1. The transferring, i.e. the procreation as limited to the human species,
because it transfers existence from one individual to another; the opposite of
this is—
2. The transforming, which concerns men in particular, since they are
transformed into monkeys, pigs, and elephants.
3. A stable condition of existence, like the condition of the plants. This is
worse than transferring, because it is a stable condition of life, remains as it is
through all time, and lasts as long as the mountains.
4. The dispersing, the opposite of number 3, which applies to the plants
that are plucked, and to animals immolated as sacrifice, because they vanish
without leaving posterity.'
Abû-Yackûb of Sijistân maintains in his book, called The disclosing ofthat
which is veiled, that the species are preserved; that metempsychosis always
proceeds in one and the same species, never crossing its limits and passing
into another species. [72]
The two central ideas in the above passage: (1) that there are degrees of metempsycho-
sis and (2) that on one view "metempsychosis always proceeds in one and the same
species", are not without relevance to the Hindu doctrine of karma and rebirth. The
idea of degrees of metempsychosis is shared by Hindu thought but differences emerge
when the degrees are spelled out. First, whether plants are to be included within the
range of transmigration in Hinduism is in some doubt. Secondly, the plants that are
 Karma and Rebirth 87

plucked and animals that are sacrificed do not 'vanish' on the Hindu view but would
pass on to another existence, that is, if one includes plants within the range of
transmigration. Moreover, what happens to the plants and animals is also relevant. For
instance, plucked flowers offered in worship {püja) or animals immolated in sacrifice
(yajnd) would be accorded a divine destiny in the Hindu schema. Indeed, the idea that
animals killed in sacrifice go to heaven is a standard belief in Hindu ritualism which
has even been held up to ridicule [73].
The idea that metempsychosis may not cross the limit of a species is an interesting
one. Though not consistent with the general framework of Hindu doctrines of karma
and rebirth, it is suggestive of a perhaps useful reflection even in traditional terms. If
according to the doctrine of karma we reap as we sow, then it is very likely that we will
tend to reap in the kind of embodiments in which we sow. For instance, human
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emotions or situations generated by us as human beings are likely to require rebirth as

human beings for their fulfilment. Thus one could assert, without denying that
particularly virtuous or vicious karma may require superhuman or subhuman births,
that normally the tendency could well be to reincarnate in the same species.
Albīrūnī also cites specifically Sufi doctrines as convergent with the Hindu ideas of
karma and rebirth. One of these comparisons is rather circuitous. While discussing the
manner in which the soul moves in the realm of samsara, Albīrūnī first says the
"ancient Greeks agreed with the Hindus in this belief" [74] and then he says, after
citing Proclus:
The same doctrine is professed by those Sûfî who teach that this world is a
sleeping soul and yonder world a soul awake, and who at the same time admit
that God is immanent in certain places—e.g. in heaven—in the seat and the
throne of God (mentioned in the Koran). But then there are others who
admit that God is immanent in the whole world, in animals, trees, and the
inanimate world, which they call his universal appearance. To those who
hold this view, the entering of the souls into various beings in the course of
metempsychosis is of no consequence. [75]
If the whole universe is viewed as an incarnation of God, Albīrūnī seems to say
towards the end, then on this view the fact that creatures reincarnate is of no
consequence. This is not so in the case of standard Hindu thought. First, in Hindu
thought even God may incarnate Himself in the universe even if the entire universe
may in some sense be his incarnation, i.e. manifestation. Secondly, even if God is
incarnated in the entire universe, this does not preclude the reincarnation of creatures
within it. The point raised by Albīrūnī, however, is philosophically very significant in
the context of the relationship between the true self and the transmigrating self. The
point cannot be pursued here but has been examined by A. K. Coomaraswamy in some
detail [76].
The other comparison which Albīrūnī institutes between Hindu and Sūfī doctrines
is more direct. While commenting on the view that entry into paradise is not to be
counted as a special gain because it is a temporary gain and "resembles the life of this
our world" he remarks:
Therefore the author of the book Sâmkhya does not consider the reward of
paradise a special gain, because it has an end and is not eternal, and because
this kind of life resembles the life of this our world; for it is not free from
ambition and envy, having in itself various degrees and classes of existence,
whilst cupidity and desire do not cease save where there is perfect equality.
 88 Arvind Sharma

The Sūfī, too, do not consider the stay in paradise a special gain for
another reason, because there the soul delights in other things but the Truth,
i.e. God, and its thoughts are diverted from the Absolute Good by things
which are not the Absolute Good. [77]
Albīrūnl's comparison here is potentially misleading. First, the gaining of paradise in
Islam on the Day of Judgement is not a temporary affair as it is in Hinduism, wherein
its attraction may divert one's attention from God. Secondly, in theistic Hinduism,
winning the paradise of Visņu or Šiva is a permanent gain, as that of Amida is in
Buddhism, and that would seem to constitute the proper point of comparison.
One must no doubt give credit to Albīrūnī for broadmindedness in instituting
comparison between Hindu and Sūfī doctrines. But his comparisons are somewhat
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puzzling in that he does not cite Islamic and Sūfī doctrines which, with greater
specificity, conform to Hindu ideas. The explanation may lie in the fact that Albīrūnī
probably wanted to restrict his comparisons to only some forms of Islam and Sūfism
for reasons unknown. After all, the Mu'talizites maintained that those excelling in
virtue and vice will be consigned to heaven and hell respectively but that God's justice
required that those who qualified for neither be allowed to reincarnate, and 'Abdallah
Ansārī (1006-1089 AD), a senior contemporary of Albīrūnī's, anticipates the essential
message of a passage associated with the name of Rūmī, which is often cited in Hindu
circles as proof of the existence of the idea of reincarnation in Sūfism.
I died a mineral and became a plant,
I died a plant and rose an animal,
I died an animal and I was man.
Why should I fear? When was I less by dying?
Yet once more I shall die as man, to soar
With the blessed angels; but even from angelhood
I must pass on. All except God perishes.
When I have sacrificed my angel soul,
I shall become that which no mind ever conceived.
O, let me not exist! for Non-existence proclaims,
'To him we shall return'. [78]
The idea thus could well have been in the air in Albīrūnī's time but was perhaps
confined to certain esoteric circles.
The points mentioned hitherto may now be put in their full perspective. The Arabic
word which incorporates the idea of rebirth is tanāsukh [79]. The problem is that the
same term is used to cover a vast range of assorted phenomena. For instance, it occurs
five times in a brief passage of Shahrastānī (1086-1153 AD) and Bruce B. Lawrence
notes:
Including its occurrence in the title, the word tanāsukh is used five times in
this brief passage. In the first paragraph it may mean 'metempsychosis', i.e.
the movement of the soul from one body to another at death, while in the
second paragraph it clearly means 'transference', i.e. the cyclical recurrence
of similar phenomenal patterns. [80]
Hindu thought, however, restricts punarjanma and karma to the first sense and would
probably use the term niyati for the second. Similarly, tanāsukh can also be used to
refer to the immanence of the spirit for which Hindu thought would probably use the
term antaryàmî. Hence although Albīrūnī's comparative approach in dealing with
 Karma and Rebirth 89

Hindu material is to be commended, the historical and conceptual difficulties involved

must be fully recognised.

It is clear, therefore, that Albīrūnī draws on diverse strands within the Hindu religious
tradition in his presentation of karma and rebirth within Hinduism; that his presenta-
tion possesses certain features which a modern student of Hinduism might find striking
and that he imparts to his discussion a comparative religion dimension which is capable
of being exploited to further advantage.

Arvind Sharma, Faculty of Religious Studies, William and Henry Birks Building,
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McGill University, 3520 University Street, Montreal, PQ H3A 2A7, Canada.

NOTES
[1] See EDWARD C. SACHAU, tr. & ed., Alberuni's India, Vol. I & II (Delhi, S. Chand & Co., 1964) [first
Indian reprint], Preface. Also see AINSLIE T. EMBREE (Ed.) Alberuni's India (New York, W. W. Norton
& Co., 1971).
[2] SPEAR, PERCIVAL (Ed.) The Oxford History of India (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 209 fn. 1. For
the full title of Albīrūnl's work see BRUCE B. LAWRENCE, Shahrastāni on the Indian Religions (The
Hague: Mouton, 1976), p. 200. On Islamic sources of the knowledge of Hinduism and the strand
represented by Albīrūnī see BRUCE B. LAWRENCE, ibid., p. 17ff.
[3] RAHMAN, FAZLUR Islam (New York, Anchor books, 1968), p. xix.
[4] SACHAU, EDWARD C., tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 50.
[5] ZAEHNER, R. C. Hinduism (London, Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 4, BOUQUET, A. C. Hinduism
(New York, Hutchinson's University Library, 1948), p. 52; MORGAN, KENNETH W. (Ed.) The Religion
of the Hindus (New York, Ronald Press Company, 1953), p. 22.
[6] BROCKINGTON, J. L. The Sacred Thread (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1981), p. 5.
[7] Significantly, when Louis Renou describes karma as one of the concepts which 'most resemble religious
dogmas', he qualifies the statement with the remark 'at the esoteric level' (Louis Renou, Hinduism,
New York, George Braziller Inc., 1961, p. 43).
[8] ASHBY, PHILIP H. Modem Trends in Hinduism (Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 64-65; SHARMA,
ARVIND The Hindu Scriptural Value System and India's Economic Development (New Delhi, Heritage
Publishers, 1980), p. 94.
[9] KEYES, CHARLES F. & DANIEL, E. VALENTINE (Eds) Karma: An Anthropological Inquiry (University of
Chicago Press, 1983), passim.
[10] BROCKINGTON, J. L. op. cit., pp. 5,145-146.
[11] Ibid., p. 5.
[12] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 31.
[13] BOWES, PRATIMA The Hindu Religious Tradition: A Philosophical Approach (London, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 55.
[14] OBEYESEKERE, GANANATH 'The Rebirth Eschatology and its Transformations: A Contribution to the
Sociology of Early Buddhism', in: WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY (Ed.) Karma and Rebirth in Classical
Indian Traditions (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980), p. 137ff.
[15] MAHADEVAN, T. M. P. Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay, Chetana Limited, 1971), p. 61ff; HIRIYANNA,
M. Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy (Mysore, Kavyalaya Publishers, 1952), pp. 43-48.
[16] BOWES, PRATIMA, op. cit., p. 55.
[17] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. xiv. For similar treatment of Hindus and Buddhists see
Vol. I, pp. 40, 119, 121, 158, 243; for distinct treatment see Vol. II, p. 169.
[18] Ibid., p. 21.
[19] On how this situation might have developed see EDWARD CONZE, Buddhism: Its Essence and Develop-
ment (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 169-170. Also see KENNETH K. S. CHEN Buddhism: the
Light of Asia (Woodbury, New York, Barren's Educational Series, Inc., 1968), pp. 142-143.
[20] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. at., Vol. I, p. 62.
 90 Arvind Sharma

[21] Ibid., p. 64. The question of the extent to which Albīrūnl knew the sources he was citing from is a vexed
one and awaits satisfactory resolution. I am not aware of any source-criticism of Albīrūnī's use of
Sānkhya texts; on his use of Patañjali see H. RITTER (Ed.) 'Al-Bīrūnī Übersetzung des Yoga-Sūtra des
Patanjali', Oriens (9), p. 165ff.
[22] LARSON, GERALD JAMES Classical Sāmkhya (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979) [First edition 1969], p.
176; HIRIYANNA, M. Essentials of Indian Philosophy (London, Allen & Unwin, 1949), pp. 119-120.
[23] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 50.
[24] Ibid., p. 51.
[25] MAHADEVAN, T . M. P. op. cit., p. 130.
[26] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 57.
[27] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 55-56.
[28] HICK, JOHN H. Philosophy of Religion (Third edition) (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall
Inc., 1983), pp. 133-137.
[29] WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY (Ed.) op. cit., p. xxi; M. HIRIYANNA, Popular Essays in Indian
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Philosophy, pp. 43-48.

[30] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 52.
[31] MAHADEVAN, T. M. P., op. cit., pp. 140-141.
[32] SHARMA, ARVIND Studies in 'Alberuni's India' (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1983), Chapter I.
[33] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 52.
[34] Ibid., pp. 8-10.
[35] See The Cultural Heritage of India (Calcutta, The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1962),
Vol. II, p. 142; ARVIND SHARMA 'Fate and Free Will', in: the Bhagavadgītā Religious Studies XV (4),
pp. 531-537.
[36] See H. A. R. GIBB & J. H. KRAMERS Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 200ff.
[37] MAJUMDAR, R. C. (Ed.) The Age of Imperial Unity (Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1953), p. 555.
[38] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 52-53.
[39] EDGERTON, FRANKLIN tr., The Bhagavadgītā (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1944), p. 43.
[40] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 54.
[41] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 54-55.
[42] Ibid., pp. 63-64.
[43] Ibid., p. 54.
[44] Ibid., p. 39.
[45] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 54. Compare this with the Buddhist position that these events may not be the result of
past karma, see I. B. HORNER, tr., Milinda's Questions (London, Luzac & Company Ltd., 1964), pp.
187-192.
[46] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., Op. cit., Vol. I, p. xxi.
[47] HOPKINS, THOMAS J. The Hindu Religious Tradition (Belmont, California, Dickenson Publishing
Company, Inc., 1971), p. 80.
[48] HIRIYANNA, M. Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy, pp. 30-34.
[49] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 61.
[50] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 62. Albīrūnī's comment is interesting in that it suggests a figurative interpretation of
hell. Some modern Hindu scholars carry the process forward and suggest a figurative interpretation of
rebirth as animals, see S. RADHAKRISHNAN, The Brahma Sūtra (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1971), p. 204.
[51] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 62.
[52] Ibid., p. 63.
[53] Ibid.
[54] O'FLAHERTY, WENDY DONIGER (Ed.) op. cit., pp. 9, 234. Also see J. L. BROCKINGTON, op. cit., p. 206.
[55] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol., p. 62.
[56] RAHULA, WALPOLA What the Buddha Taught (New York, Grove Press, Inc., 1974), p. 22. Also see I. B.
HORNER, 'Buddhism: the Theravāda', in: R. C. ZAEHNER (Ed.) The Concise Encyclopedia of Living
Faiths (Boston, Beacon Press, 1959), p. 283; O'FLAHERTY, WENDY DONIGER (Ed.) op. cit., pp.
181-182.
[57] GRIMM, GEORGE, in: M. KELLER GRIMM & MAX HOPPE The Doctrine of the Buddha (Berlin, Akademie
Verlag, 1958), p. 194.
[58] WALKER, BENJAMIN The Hindu World, Vol. I (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 530.
[59] ROCHER, LUDO 'Karma and Rebirth in the Dharmaśāstras', in: WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY (Ed.), op.
cit., Chapter 3.
 Kanna and Rebirth 91

[60] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 48-49.
[61] Ibid., p. 102.
[62] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 103.
[63] Ibid., p. 101.
[64] Ibid., p. 102.
[65] Ibid., p. 104.
[66] Ibid., p. 51.
[67] Ibid., p. 62.
[68] See ARVIND SHARMA Al-bīrūnī and the Hindu notion of Samsāra, Islamic Culture, LI (3), pp. 165-169.
[69] Ibid., p. 167.
[70] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 58.
[71] Ibid., p. 29.
[72] Ibid., pp. 64-65.
[73] COWELL, E. B. & GOUGH, A. E. trs. The Sarvadarśanasangraha by Mādhavācārya (London, Kegan
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Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1914), p. 10.

[74] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 56.
[75] Ibid., pp. 57-58.
[76] COOMARASWAMY, ANANDA K. 'Recollection, Indian and Platonic; and On the One and Only Transmi-
grant', in: Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXIV, Supplement no. 3.
[77] SACHAU, EDWARD C. tr. & ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 62.
[78] RADHAKRISHNAN, S. (Ed.) The Principal Upanisads (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 57 fn. 1.
[79] GIBB, H. A. R. & KRAMERS, J. H. op. cit., p. 572ff.
[80] LAWRENCE, BRUCE B. op. cit., p. 46, fn. 116.