Phil 104 N59 U.

of Connecticut, Spring 2005

XI. Lecture Notes: Mill & Kant—Comparisons and Objections

1. Objections against the Categorical Imperative
A representative sample of objections against Kant’s Categorical
2. Objections against the Principle of Utility
Imperative and Mill's Principle of Utility are first examined. Then
3. Objections against Rule-Utilitarianism
the standard objections to a revised version of Utilitarianism,
4. Comparing Kant and Mill
called Rule-Utilitarianism, will be reviewed. Lastly, we will
5. Contrasting Kant and Mill
discuss some comparisons between Kant and Mill, and some
5.1 Kantian Criticisms of Utilitarianism
criticisms that can be leveled against Mill from the Kantian
5.2 Utilitarian Criticisms of Kant
viewpoint, and vice versa.

1. Objections against the Categorical Imperative

We shall address three kinds of objections raised against the Categorical Imperative:

(a) questionable maxims;

(b) blind rule-worship;
(c) too demanding.

(a) THE FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL LAW

We will begin with some problems that arise when we
AND QUESTIONABLE MAXIMS
universalize our maxims in accordance with the Formula of Universal Law.

According to Kant, the Categorical Imperative (and all of its different formulations) is the

ultimate source of all moral obligation, and all moral obligation derives from the Categorical

Imperative. However, sometimes the Formula of Universal Law rules out perfectly harmless and

routine actions as immoral because their maxims cannot be universalized without contradiction.

For instance, suppose that you are trying to decide whether it is all right for you to switch on the

lights in the evening, say at around 6:00pm. The maxim behind that course of action will be:

Whenever I see that it is 6:00pm in the evening, I shall switch on the lights.

In order to test whether this maxim can be universalized without contradiction, you imagine a

world where your maxim has become universal law: i.e., everyone turns on the lights at exactly

6:00pm. Then you ask yourself whether you can switch on the lights at 6:00pm in such a world.

The answer will be that you cannot, because in such a world, there will be a power breakdown at

6:00pm, caused by everyone turning on the lights at exactly the same time. Hence you cannot

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imagine acting on your maxim in a world where your maxim has become universal law, and this

yields the moral duty not to turn the lights on at 6:00pm. Not only that. Since exactly the same

problem will arise if everyone simultaneously switches on the lights at any given time, it follows

that you ought never to switch on the lights!

Also, it is possible to formulate several different maxims for the same course of action,

some of which can be universalized and some of which cannot. James Rachels credits Elizabeth

Anscombe with this line of criticism. She noted that “[Kant’s] rule about universalizable

maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an

action with a view to constructing a maxim about it” (V&V, p.143).

Suppose, for instance, that you are considering whether it is morally permissible to lie on

a given occasion, e.g., to the German patrol boat in order to save escaping Jews. Let the maxim

behind the proposed action be: “Whenever I am in a situation where I can benefit myself or

someone else by deceiving others, I shall deceive others.” Can you imagine a world where

everyone acted on this maxim, or imagine acting on your maxim in such a world? No, you

cannot, because in such a world everyone would deceive others to benefit someone, whether

oneself or another. Then people will no longer trust other people’s words, and so they will never

be deceived. Hence in such a world it is impossible to act on the maxim, that is, benefit someone

(e.g., escaping Jews) by deceiving others (e.g., Nazi patrol).

But it is also possible to formulate a different maxim for the same proposed action:

“Whenever I am in a situation where I can save victims from massacre by deceiving the

victimizers, I shall deceive the victimizers.” Now it seems perfectly possible to imagine a world

where everyone acted on this maxim. It will be a world like ours, where there are occasional

victims like Jews and occasional victimizers like the Nazis, but different from our world in that

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everyone acts on the maxim just stated. In such a world, deception won’t be rampant to such an

extent that trust will completely break down, and thus it should be possible to save lives by

occasional deception.

Rachels identifies this as “a central difficulty for Kant’s whole approach”. As he puts it:

…for any action a person might contemplate, it is possible to specify more than one rule that he or
she should be following; some of these rules will be “universalizable” and some will not; therefore,
the test of “universalizability” cannot help us to establish which actions are permissible and which
are not (V&V, p.144).

Kant might respond to these problems afflicting maxims as follows. In the first place, a

general principle is not supposed to include references to particular times and places. This is

because a general principle is meant to apply to all relevantly similar situations, regardless of

time or place. A maxim is a general principle that applies to a particular person, and a universal

law is a general principle that applies to all persons. So, the maxims and their universalized

versions in the light-switch example are incorrectly stated, because they include references to

particular times (i.e., 6:00pm, 6:01pm, and so on).

Let me note, however, that these problems about maxims seem merely technical, and I

doubt that they raise a serious objection concerning the adequacy of the Categorical Imperative

as a test of right and wrong. For Kant could easily add qualifications as to what is to count as a

proper maxim. Even better, he could resort to the Formula of End in Itself instead, which does

not require us to formulate any maxims, but demands only that we never treat rational beings,

whether ourselves or others, merely as a means, but always as ends in their own right. This

would enable Kant to sidestep all the problems concerning the formulation of maxims.

(b) KANTIAN ABSOLUTISM COMMITS

“Rule worship” means the blind and inflexible
BLIND RULE WORSHIP

observance of rules without regard to the harmful consequences of following such rules in

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certain circumstances. Kant’s moral theory has often been accused of rule worship, and in my

opinion the accusation has good grounds. Namely, Kant is (i) committed to moral absolutism,

and his moral theory does not allow for (ii) exceptional circumstances and (iii) consideration of

harmful consequences. These three features conspire to brand Kantian ethics as a form of rule

worship.

Moral absolutism is the position that there are universal moral principles which are valid

regardless of (cultural, historical, geographical etc.) context. For Kant, there is one such

universal moral principle, or absolute moral standard, which is the Categorical Imperative. The

Categorical Imperative is a rational requirement that is absolutely and inescapably binding. 1

Likewise, all moral duties—which, according to Kant, can be derived from the Categorical

Imperative—are absolutely and inescapably binding. Thus, for instance, Kant says, “To be

truthful (honest) in all declarations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of

reason, limited by no expediency.”2

Since moral duties are absolutely and inescapably binding, they command absolute

obedience regardless of exceptional cases and extenuating circumstances. An apt example here

is the well-known Case of the Inquiring Murderer, with which Rachels begins his essay:

Imagine that someone is fleeing from a murderer and tells you he is going home to hide. Then the
murderer comes along and asks where the first man went. You believe that if you tell the truth,
the murderer will find his victim and kill him. What should you do—should you tell the truth or
lie? (V&V, p.140)

Kant’s response is that you should tell the truth. As Rachels rightly observes, this is because

“Kant believed that morality is a matter of following absolute rules—rules that admit no

exceptions, that must be followed come what may” (V&V, p.141).

1
As opposed to hypothetical imperatives, which are not absolutely and inescapably binding. For an explanation of
the contrast between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, please see the lecture notes on Kant. You may also
see Rachels’s own very clear explanation in V&V, pp.141~2.
2
Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Imperatives”, cited by Rachels in V&V, p.144.

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Moreover, Kant believed that the consequences of actions have no moral significance

whatsoever. Indeed, he says, “…the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected

from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected

effect” (V&V, p.132). The only thing that has intrinsic moral worth is the good will, by which

Kant means the motive of conforming to the moral law, or of doing one’s duty for duty’s sake.

But think of what this means! Even if one could save millions of people by sacrificing one

innocent person, Kant would have to insist that it is never morally permissible to use one person

simply as a means (using the Formula of End in Itself). If the road to hell is paved with good

intentions, and the road to heaven with utilitarian calculation of good consequences, Kant would

have to choose hell. This seems like blind folly, and suggests that Kantian ethics has the

following weaknesses. The Categorical Imperative neglects the moral significance of

consequences; it is insensitive to justifiable exceptions such as lying to save lives; and it is

inflexible with regard to contextual nuances that invariably arise in applying moral principles to

the everyday circumstances. In all these respects, utilitarian ethics fares much better than

Kantian ethics.

(c) THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

IS TOO DEMANDING
There is a sense in which Kant equates morality with

impartiality. One’s distinctive character traits, personal relations with other particular

individuals, race, gender, religion, economic status, individual projects and commitments, etc.—

in short, all those features that are important components of personal identity and individuality—

have no relevance or importance from the moral point of view.

According to Kant, what is morally important about us as persons is our rational nature,

that is, our capacity to reason without being biased or influenced by our personal interests and

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affections. The basic intuition which Kant is here relying upon is the idea that one should not

make oneself an exception to moral rules because of personal inclinations and prejudices. But

the Categorical Imperative also has the unfortunate consequence that it attaches no intrinsic

moral significance to our personal commitments and affection for others which are based upon

personal interests and inclinations.

On a positive note, the Categorical Imperative is sensitive to the fact that persons are

distinct and autonomous beings with inviolable rights; it accords equal respect and dignity to

each person, insofar as he or she is rational. However, some of our personal commitments and

projects are so important to us that they form an essential part of our individual character and

identity. The Categorical Imperative tells us that such personal commitments and projects which

are idiosyncratic to particular individuals do not carry moral weight in their own right, and can

be overridden by the demands of impartial morality. For instance, someone might decide to

immolate himself (= burn himself to death) to protest against war, let’s say, since he is a deeply

committed pacifist.3 This, however, comes into conflict with the perfect duty not to kill oneself,

and in such a case the perfect duty must win out over personal commitment.

A similar point arises with respect to personal relations, i.e., attachments to family and

friends. Consider the following example.

THE DROWNING CASE. Smith sees two people drowning in a lake, and runs to save them. As
he approaches the lake, he sees that one of them is his wife and the other is a stranger. He has
time to save only one of them. Who should he save?

It is obvious whom he should save, namely, his wife. But suppose that Smith is a Kantian, who

believes that he has to use the Categorical Imperative to test whether his actions are morally

permissible or not. He universalizes the following maxim:

3
I remember reading in the news about some Buddhist monks in Thailand who have immolated themselves as
means of political protest.

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Whenever I am in a situation where a stranger and my own wife are drowning, I should save my
wife rather than the stranger.

Then he determines that he can universalize the maxim without contradiction, and therefore that

it is morally permissible to save his wife instead of his stranger.

Probably all of us would agree that this was the right decision to make. The problem,

however, is that Smith has to go through the detour of the Categorical Imperative to reach this

decision, if he is to be a Kantian. He has to have at least two thoughts, first, that his wife was

drowning, and second, that it is morally permissible in situations of this kind for anyone to save

his wife. But to use a phrase made famous by Bernard Williams, Smith would then have “one

thought too many”. If Smith really loves his wife, the thought that his wife is drowning should

be sufficient motivation and justification for him to save his wife rather than the stranger. If he

had to use the Categorical Imperative to determine whether it’s ok to save his wife or not, then

this indicates that he was not genuinely devoted to his wife after all!

These problems with regard to individual character and personal relations arise for Kant,

because he maintains that personal commitments and affections are irrelevant from the moral

point of view. Kant could respond by reminding us of his distinction between perfect and

imperfect duties (for more on the distinction, see the handout “Categorical Imperative”, p.2). He

would note that imperfect duties can allow for individual initiative and discretion, because they

give individuals leeway in developing oneself or helping others. But there are certain moral

obligations, the perfect duties, which must always be obeyed, regardless of one’s personal

commitments and ties of affection. A moral agent should be prepared to give up individual

projects or discount ties of affection if these come into conflict with perfect duties, e.g., not to

kill oneself and to respect the inviolable rights of others.

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2. Objections against the Principle of Utility

Below are three kinds of objections against the Principle of Utility:

(a) too permissive;

(b) backward-looking considerations
(c) too demanding.

(a) THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

This is the kind of objection that arises when the Principle of
IS TOO PERMISSIVE
Utility tells us that such-and-such course of action is morally permissible, but our ordinary, pre-

philosophical intuition tells us that it is morally wrong, prohibited, or impermissible.

To motivate this objection, let us consider the following example:

THE ORGAN TRANSPLANT CASE. In the emergency room of a hospital, the ambulance has just
brought in five patients who are critically injured, each of them needing a different body organ in
order to survive. In the next room a perfectly healthy patient has come for a regular health
checkup. The doctor in the emergency room can either decide to sacrifice the healthy person and
use her organs to save the five critically injured patients, or he can let the five patients die.

Now most of us would feel that it is morally wrong or impermissible for the doctor to cut up the

healthy patient, without her consent, in order to save the five critically injured patients. Would

the Principle of Utility also yield this intuitively correct result?

It would not. When the Principle of Utility is applied directly to particular courses of

action, it would permit the doctor to sacrifice the life of a healthy patient to save the lives of five

patients, since that is the course of action which prevents the greatest amount of suffering for the

greatest number. From the moral point of view, we find this reprehensible.

By contrast, note that Kant would here use the Categorical Imperative, more specifically

the Formula of End in Itself, to yield the intuitively correct result. For the Formula of End in

Itself tells us that we should always treat a person as an end in her own right, and never use her

solely as a means. If we use the healthy patient’s organs in this case to save the lives of others,

we are using her solely as a means, and this course of action would be ruled out by the Formula

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of End in Itself. So the Organ Transplant case is an example where the Categorical Imperative

works better than the Principle of Utility.

These examples work against the Principle of Utility because act-utilitarianism ignores

deontological constraints on our actions. By “deontological constraints”, I mean duties which

we have to observe regardless of consequences, or obligations which outweigh any consideration

of utility. The idea here is that certain courses of action are prohibited even though performing

the actions would bring about better states of affairs. This idea is captured by Kant’s different

formulations of the Categorical Imperative, but it is ignored by Mill’s Principle of Utility.

How would the utilitarian respond to this objection that the Principle of Utility is

insensitive to deontological constraints? At least in the Organ Transplant case the utilitarian can

appeal to rule-utilitarianism, which applies the Principle of Utility to general rules of action,

rather than to particular courses of action. According to rule-utilitarianism, particular courses of

action are assessed as morally right if they are required or permitted by general rules, which in

turn are justified on the basis of the Principle of Utility. Hence the doctor, in the Organ

Transplant case, cannot sacrifice the life of a healthy patient because of the general rule that one

should not sacrifice a person’s life without her consent in order to save the lives of others.

Notice that according to rule-utilitarianism, we do not apply the Principle of Utility

directly to any particular situation, but rather to the general rules that already prevail in society.

Now, it is better for all of us if everyone observes the general rule that one should not sacrifice a

person’s life in order to save the lives of others, than if no such rule is observed. For if there

were no such rule in our society, we would feel insecure and would not be able to trust doctors,

for instance, when we visit them for regular health checkups. The violation of this rule, to the

extent that it undermines the general observance of the rule and the beneficial effects that come

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with such general compliance, would result in greater overall harm than benefit. Hence rule-

utilitarianism is sensitive to deontological constraints, for instance the duty to respect an

individual’s right to life, to the extent that such deontological constraints lead to the greater

balance of long-term benefit over harm. (Please see lecture notes on Mill’s utilitarianism for

more on rule-utilitarianism.)

(b) THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY IGNORES

BACKWARD-LOOKING CONSIDERATIONS
But let us move on to an objection that even

rule-utilitarianism is ill-equipped to handle. Now, utilitarianism is forward-looking because it

always looks at the future consequences of an action, in order to judge whether an action is

morally right or not. Therefore, the Principle of Utility only counts forward-looking

considerations as relevant for the moral assessment of right and wrong. However, in certain

cases it seems that we have to take backward-looking considerations into account when we

assess the rightness or wrongness of a course of action. To illustrate this point, consider the

following example.

THE DESERT ISLAND CASE. Paul is stranded on a desert island along with a millionaire friend.
On his deathbed, the millionaire tells Paul, “You are a dear friend of mine and I know I can trust
you. Promise me that if you ever escape from this island and go back home, you will donate all
my wealth to the Avery Point Golf Club.” Paul promises to do so. Afterwards, he is rescued by a
passing ship, and returns home. Paul sees that although he has made a promise to his friend, he
can donate his friend’s wealth to a charity organization like OXFAM, where it can prevent a lot of
human death and suffering in famine-stricken and poverty-infested areas.

In this case most of us would not be sure what Paul should do: whether he should break the

promise and donate his friend’s money to OXFAM or donate it as promised to the Golf Club.

The Principle of Utility seems to tell us that the right course of action for Paul is to break the

promise and donate the wealth to charity, because that will be more conducive to general welfare

than donating the money to the Golf Club.

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Now, the problem with this result is not simply that the Principle of Utility tells us to do

the wrong thing. (It might be the morally right thing to break the promise in the above case,

although I believe most of us will have very unclear intuitions about what to do in such a case.)

The crux of the problem is that for utilitarianism, the fact that Paul had made a promise to his

friend is not even a morally relevant consideration. This, of course, is because the Principle of

Utility only counts future outcomes as morally relevant, thereby ignoring the moral weight of

past commitments.

Let us consider a more drastic example of the same kind:

THE SHERIFF CASE. The sheriff of a small town is faced with the prospect of a violent riot
where he knows that hundreds of people will die. He also knows that he can prevent the riot by
framing an innocent man for a vicious crime he has not committed. Moreover, let us assume that
no one will ever find out that the sheriff has used an innocent man as a scapegoat. The sheriff thus
faces the following dilemma: he could kill one innocent person and save hundreds of lives, or not
frame the innocent person and let hundreds die.

This, too, is not an easy case, but I believe most of us will agree that it would be a great injustice

to frame an innocent person and sacrifice his life, even to save hundreds of lives. Now, if we

apply the Principle of Utility to the Sheriff Case, we will have to conclude that it is right to

sacrifice the life of the innocent man. The worry here, as in the previous example, is not merely

that this is the intuitively wrong decision to make. The deep problem with the Principle of

Utility is this: it is insensitive to the fact that the innocent person has not committed the crime,

because this fact lies in the past. But retributive justice4 does take such facts seriously—when a

person receives punishment or exoneration according to his guilt or innocence, we say that he

has got what he deserves.

Hence the Desert Island case and the Sheriff case bring to our attention two problems in

utilitarianism, problems having to do with past commitments and retributive justice. One

4
Retributive justice is a branch of justice, concerned with the dispensation of punishment. Distributive justice is
another branch of justice, concerned with the distribution of goods.

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interesting feature of these two examples is that rule-utilitarianism (see §3) cannot address these

problems. Rule-utilitarianism applies the Principle of Utility not to the short-term utility of an

individual’s performing this or that action, but to the overall utility of the public observance of

general rules. But notice that the Desert Island case is set up in such a way that the public would

not be aware that Paul is breaking a promise (that is the point of having the promise take place

on a desert island). Thus Paul’s breaking the promise does not undermine the general practice of

promise-keeping. Likewise, in the Sheriff case the townspeople would not know that the sheriff

is framing an innocent man, should he choose to do so. Thus the sheriff has no need to worry

about any harmful effect of executing an innocent person—e.g., the effect of diminishing

people’s trust in law enforcement and increasing their sense of insecurity. For these reasons, we

cannot use the resources of rule-utilitarianism to address the problems raised by the Desert Island

and the Sheriff examples.

So how might a utilitarian respond to these examples? In the Desert Island case, the

utilitarian may stick to his guns, and claim that the morally right thing to do is to break the

promise. If our moral intuition tells us otherwise, then our moral intuition is mistaken. Recall

that no one else knows that Paul is breaking a promise, so he cannot weaken the institution of

promising by donating all of his friend’s money to charity. In such a situation, believing that one

should keep one’s promise is rule worship, i.e., blind and irrational subservience to rules, or

“self-indulgent squeamishness”.

The Sheriff case is much more difficult for utilitarianism. In the Desert Island case no

one can be harmed by Paul’s breaking the promise other than Paul himself, if he were to suffer

from guilt for doing so. In the Sheriff case, the Principle of Utility dictates that the innocent man

be executed, and the utilitarian cannot appeal to rule-utilitarianism to avoid this assessment. The

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best that a utilitarian can do is to admit that it is reprehensible to sacrifice the life of an innocent

person, but unfortunately that is the only possible way to avoid a greater evil, namely the loss of

many lives. Our moral scruples would tell us, however, that killing an innocent man should not

even be an available option for the sheriff.

(c) THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

IS TOO DEMANDING
This objection comes in two different forms. First, the

Principle of Utility is too demanding because it ignores the distinction between obligation and

supererogation. Second, it is too demanding because it is too impartial, and ignores the

importance of personal integrity as well as personal relations.

First, let us consider the objection that the Principle of Utility ignores the distinction

between obligatory and supererogatory actions. Obligatory actions are actions required by duty,

whereas supererogatory actions are actions above and beyond the call of duty. In other words,

supererogatory actions are those that are morally admirable and praiseworthy, but not required,

while obligatory actions are those that are morally required.

Consider the following scenario:

THE GRENADE CASE. Joe is a soldier in a platoon engaged in trench warfare. In the thick of
battle, a grenade is thrown into the trench, and Joe is the only person to see it. He faces three
options: (a) run for cover, saving himself and letting the others die; (b) warn everyone, in which
case he and the others all die because the grenade explodes; or (c) cover the grenade with his own
body, sacrificing his own life and saving the others.

Now, the Principle of Utility will say that (c) is the course of action that Joe is morally required

to take, since that will prevent the greatest amount of harm to the greatest number of people. But

if Joe does opt for (c), we would say that he has done something that is heroic and morally

admirable, but not something that is required of him by duty. In other words, (c) is

supererogatory, not obligatory. We would be inclined to say that what duty requires, in this case,

is at most (b), but not (c).

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If the Grenade case does not work for you, consider moral saints like Mother Teresa.

Mother Teresa went to Calcutta and devoted her entire life to helping the poor and the sick.

Given the wretched living conditions of the present world, where there is plenty of suffering to

eliminate, the Principle of Utility requires that those who live in First World countries should

help those who are suffering in the Third World, and those who live in affluence should give all

their luxuries to those who live in poverty. According to the Principle of Utility, and given the

amount of suffering in the world, we are morally required to be saints like Mother Teresa.

However, most of us feel that being a moral saint is an admirable and praiseworthy

option, but not a requirement. To the extent that we feel this, we would also feel that the

Principle of Utility is too demanding, and that it ignores the distinction between obligation and

supererogation. Utilitarians could respond to this objection in two ways. On the one hand, they

could insist that the distinction between obligation and supererogation is not beyond criticism.

The Principle of Utility is meant to provide the ultimate criterion of right and wrong, and if it

ignores the distinction between obligatory and supererogatory acts, then so much the worse for

that distinction. (You can see Peter Singer’s essay, “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, pp.512~9,

for a powerful argument along these lines.) On the other hand, they could bring in rule-

utilitarianism. That is, particular courses of action would be assessed as right if they are required

or permitted by the general moral rules that already prevail in society. Utilitarians will then have

room for supererogatory actions, since these will be actions that are not required by the general

moral rules, but are admirable or praiseworthy according to general moral standards.

Let us now consider the second form of the objection that the Principle of Utility is too

demanding, namely that it is too impartial and thus ignores the significance of personal integrity

and personal relations.

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According to utilitarianism, individuals have moral significance in two ways, as agents

who perform actions, or as patients who receive the benefits of the actions performed. Agents

have moral significance to the extent that they are capable of producing general happiness and

eliminating general suffering, and base their actions on reasoning about what will bring about

general utility on each occasion. Patients have moral significance to the extent that they are

capable of feeling pain and pleasure, and therefore these patients include not just human beings,

but all sentient beings taken together.

These features of utilitarianism are exploited to its disadvantage in two well known and

widely discussed examples below. 5 These examples are so constructed that one’s personal

convictions and commitments come into conflict with what the Principle of Utility tells one to do.

GEORGE AND JIM. (1) George has just received his Ph.D. in biochemistry, but he finds it
extremely difficult to get a job. Meanwhile his wife is forced to work in part-time jobs to take
care of him and the children in their family. Now, a friend comes to George and tells him that a
job has opened up in a laboratory that conducts research on biochemical weapons. George has
strong moral scruples against taking up the job, because he has been a pacifist from his high
school days. But his friend tells him that if George does not take up the position at the lab, it will
be offered to another scientist who has no moral scruples whatsoever, and will pursue the research
with much greater zeal, and build weapons that could wreak greater havoc and destruction, and
cause more human suffering than the currently existing weapons. Moreover, his wife has no
problems with George taking up the job. What should George do?

(2) Jim is traveling through a small Third World country, and he comes across a city
plaza where the brutal dictator of the country has rounded up twenty of his political opponents to
be executed. The dictator is pleased to see a tourist in his country, and tells Jim, “To honor your
visit I will let you kill any one of these twenty captives with my pistol, and let the others go free.
But if you decide not to shoot one of them, I shall execute all of them as planned.” Jim has very
strong scruples against killing another human being, more so than most people. But he knows that
it is futile, for instance, to try to kill the dictator with the pistol he gives him, because there are a
lot of bodyguards protecting him. Moreover, all the natives are begging him to kill one of them
and save the rest. Hence he is confronted with the dilemma of shooting one of the captives and
saving nineteen, or not shooting one of them and letting all twenty die. What should Jim do?

These two examples have at least two important features in common. First, George and

Jim have very strong personal convictions against biochemical warfare or killing that form a very

important part of their identity and self-understanding, and define who they are as individuals. If

5
The following is a summary of Bernard Williams’s critique of utilitarianism, V&V, pp.99~104.

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they act against these convictions they would have no peace of mind—they would not be able to

live with themselves, as it were—because their personal integrity requires them to follow these

convictions. Second, there are other agents who are involved in the two situations, namely the

unscrupulous scientist and the brutal dictator. These other agents have their own individual

projects, and these projects have structured the causal scene in such a way that according to the

Principle of Utility, George and Jim would be doing the right thing to violate their personal

convictions. Moreover, in Jim’s case at least, utilitarianism dictates that Jim should become a

pawn in the dictator’s plans.

These examples are intended to show that utilitarianism does not place adequate

importance upon the personal integrity of agents. According to the Principle of Utility, agents

have moral importance only because they can calculate the costs and benefits of their actions,

and are causal links in the production of general happiness and prevention of general suffering.

Let us dub this the ‘calculator–causal link view’ of moral agency. The personal commitments

and scruples of agents are not taken to be morally relevant to action. Moreover, the Principle of

Utility requires agents to assess the rightness of actions in terms of their tendency to produce

general welfare. The agent’s own commitments and projects are no more or less important than

the commitments and projects of others who are affected by the agent’s actions. Thus it seems

that someone who follows the Principle of Utility must alienate herself from her own

commitments and projects, and sacrifice her personal integrity.

3. Objections against Rule-Utilitarianism

Unlike act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism applies the Principle of Utility to a set of

general rules, and not to particular courses of action. Rule-utilitarianism can be stated thus:

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(i) [Among the courses of action available to the individual agent,]

the right action is the one which is required or permitted by the justified set of general rules.
(ii) [And among the general set of rules that can be observed by all or most members of society,]
the justified set of rules is the one which produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

In the previous lecture notes on utilitarianism, we have seen that rule-utilitarianism can

overcome several of the objections that act-utilitarianism is incapable of addressing, and that this

is a great advantage that rule-utilitarianism has over act-utilitarianism. But rule-utilitarianism

does have some drawbacks, when compared to act-utilitarianism. First, it is more conservative

than act-utilitarianism. One attractive feature of act-utilitarianism is that it offers us an

independent standpoint from which to criticize our received moral code, and to propose reforms

or revisions in prevailing practices and institutions. Rule-utilitarianism, however, blunts the

edge of this critical stance by endorsing the received moral code and justifying conformity with

prevailing practices and institutions. This is a problem if one believes that something is wrong

with current moral practices.

Second, rule-utilitarianism occupies an unstable ground between rule worship and act-

utilitarianism. “Rule worship” means the blind and inflexible observance of rules without regard

to the harmful consequences of following such rules in certain circumstances. As we have seen,

utilitarians may accuse Kant of rule worship, when Kant argues that one should never tell a lie,

even to save a friend who is being pursued by a murderous villain. In the same manner, act-

utilitarians may accuse rule-utilitarians of rule worship, if rule-utilitarianism advocates strict

observance of rules even when it is not conducive to human happiness to observe rules.

Now, in order to avoid the accusation of rule worship, rule-utilitarians may respond that

they can allow exceptions in observing certain rules in certain circumstances. But if rule-

utilitarianism allows possible exceptions to general rules, it is in danger of collapsing into act-

utilitarianism. The argument for this is as follows. Suppose that we start off with rule R1, which

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states that one has to always do X. Now the rule-utilitarian, in order to avoid the charge of rule

worship, must allow for exceptions to R1. This yields a new rule R2, which states that one has to

always follow R1, except in circumstances of type C1. Now the act-utilitarian may level the

accusation of rule worship with respect to this new rule R2. To avoid this accusation, the rule-

utilitarian comes up with yet another rule R3, which states that one has to always follow R2,

except in circumstances of the type C2. And so on, until rule-utilitarianism collapses into act-

utilitarianism: that is, they will both tell us to do the same things in the same circumstances.

This is a very neat argument, perhaps too neat to be entirely right. But it does show that

there is an internal tension in rule-utilitarianism that is very difficult to resolve.

4. Comparing Kant and Mill

(a) Both Kant and Mill base their decision procedure (for testing actions as right or

wrong) on forms of practical reasoning.

This is because they both believe that morality should be based on practical reasoning.

Let us see how practical reasoning enters into making moral decisions for Kant and Mill.

For Kant, the idea of a maxim embodies the idea of formal consistency, that like cases

should be treated alike, and different cases should be treated differently. To act on a personal

maxim is to act in a formally consistent manner, behaving similarly in relevantly similar

situations (think of the example of King David, and the inconsistency in his treatment of Uriah

and his reaction to the rich man in prophet Nathan’s parable). By insisting that we should act on

maxims, Kant seems to take formal consistency as an essential component of practical reasoning,

and also of morality.

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Also, Kant insists that we should not act on maxims that give rise to contradictions when

they are universalized. To the extent that we are rational, we should of course avoid

contradictions. But why is it rational to universalize our maxims? Kant does argue that it is

rational to universalize one’s maxims, but we have not examined his argument to this effect due

to its complexity. (As an aside, it is important to note that contradiction in the universalized

maxim does not indicate contradiction in the maxim itself. So following a maxim that cannot be

universalized does not by itself show that one is acting irrationally.)

Mill relies upon the standards of means-end rationality or instrumental reasoning. He

takes the ultimate end of our actions to be the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Therefore it would be practically rational for us to adopt the course of action that will bring

about this end.

Kant and Mill share the common assumption that morality must have a foundation on

practical reasoning. Ever since Socrates, philosophers have sought an argument to the effect that

immoral conduct is irrational. But all arguments to that effect have tended to rely on

questionable assumptions about what practical rationality consists in.

(b) Kant and Mill each propose monistic accounts of the right and the good.

On the one hand, Kant reduces all moral duties to one fundamental principle, the

Categorical Imperative. Hence he proposes a monistic criterion of right actions. He also claims

that there is only one thing that is unconditionally good, namely the good will.

Mill says that pleasure or happiness is the only thing that is intrinsically good, or

desirable in itself. Thus he has a monistic theory of the good. And he also proposes a monistic

criterion of right actions: the right action is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness.

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But couldn’t there be several different and irreducible principles of right actions, each

principle giving rise to a different kind of duty? Likewise, couldn’t there be many different

things that are intrinsically good? If you think that a pluralistic account of the right or the good

fares better than the monistic account, you may press this point against Kant and Mill. Notice,

however, that Kant tries to account for our intuition that there are different criteria of rightness

by providing different formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Mill also tries to account for

our intuition that there are many things which are intrinsically good. He does this by claiming

that we may learn to appreciate many different things, such as money or virtue, as constituent

parts of happiness.

(c) Both Kant and Mill associate morality with the impartial point of view, which is

insensitive to special considerations that apply to particular individuals.

According to the impartial point of view, every being has equal importance to the extent

that he/she/it is capable of following reason (Kant) or capable of feeling pleasure or pain (Mill).

The impartial point of view can make demands that conflict with considerations relevant to my

personal point of view, according to which my own commitments and attachments to family and

friends have special importance. Such conflict lends weight and substance to the objection that

the Categorical Imperative or the Principle of Utility is too demanding.

Notice, however, that Kantian ethics and utilitarianism are not impartial in the same sense.

For Kant, when we view ourselves as moral agents we must regard ourselves as purely rational

beings, without letting our wants, feelings and emotional attachments get in the way of what is

rationally required. For Mill, when we view ourselves as moral agents we must empathize with

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the happiness or the suffering of all creatures capable of feeling pain or pleasure, and regard

ourselves as causal means for bringing about general welfare.

If you believe that sympathy (in the sense of “empathy”, rather than “pity”) has an

essential role to play in a system of morality, then you will find utilitarianism more appealing

than Kantianism. Kant even says that one has a duty to be apathetic.6 It is possible to read

Jonathan Bennett’s “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn” (pp.16~27) as an objection to this

Kantian view, and as an argument for the importance of sympathy.

5. Contrasting Kant and Mill

I will bring out the contrasts between Kant and Mill by considering the possible

objections that Kantians may raise against utilitarians, and vice versa.

5.1 Kantian Criticisms of Utilitarianism. (a) The idea of happiness is too indefinite even

in the case of a particular individual. This problem of indefiniteness will be multiplied in the

case of general happiness. Also, it is very difficult to predict the consequences of one’s actions,

and to know in advance which actions will have consequences that lead to the greatest happiness

of all. (To this objection Mill could admit that the idea of happiness, which includes present as

well as future happiness, might indeed be indefinite. Mill could appeal to rule-utilitarianism, or

he could propose that the Principle of Utility be limited to eliminating present suffering, but not

to promoting future happiness; this is basically the line Singer takes in “Famine, Affluence, and

Morality”, pp.512~9.)

6
In the Doctrine of Virtue (which you haven’t read), Kant speaks in favor of moral apathy, as “that freedom from
agitation which is to be distinguished from indifference, for in it the feelings arising from sensuous impressions lose
their influence on moral feeling only because reverence for the law prevails over all such feelings.”

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(b) It is the intention behind the action, rather than the consequences of action, which is

relevant to moral assessment. Intentions or motives are the only things that can be

unconditionally good or bad. (See Kant, p.131. To this objection Mill would respond by

distinguishing the motive of action from the rule [or criterion of the rightness] of action. The

goodness or badness of motives have to do with the worth of the agent—i.e., whether she is a

good person or bad—but not with the rightness or wrongness of actions. The rightness or

wrongness of actions is determined by their consequences, and not by the motives behind the

actions.)

(c) There is no room for individual freedom of choice in utilitarianism. Kantian ethics

makes a distinction between perfect duties and imperfect duties. There are, for instance, the

perfect duty not to end one’s own life and the perfect duty not to make false promises. There are

also the imperfect duties to develop oneself and to help others, but Kantian ethics allows one

latitude and freedom in carrying out these imperfect duties, and leave a lot up to individual

initiative and discretion. But no such latitude or individual freedom is provided in utilitarianism,

since it always requires the agent to choose the course of action that leads to the best outcome,

and makes it obligatory for one to act upon it. (This is related to the objection that the Principle

of Utility is too demanding, because it ignores the distinction between obligatory and

supererogatory actions. In response, Mill could appeal to rule-utilitarianism. More specifically,

he might claim that freedom of individual choice, and institutions or social practices which

guarantee individual freedoms, is conducive to greater overall happiness than the denial of such

freedom. He can try to justify an individual’s right to various freedoms on rule-utilitarian

grounds. But see the next objection.)

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(d) Utilitarianism does not secure the inviolable rights of persons. Kant’s Formula of the

End in Itself dictates that persons have inviolable rights, which are to be respected regardless of

the benefits that might result from violating those rights. But the Principle of Utility may dictate

in certain circumstances that the rights of individuals be sacrificed to swell the sum of collective

happiness, or diminish the sum of collective suffering. (See pp.136~8, 147~9 for explanations of

the Formula of End in Itself. This is probably the most difficult objection for utilitarians to

answer. They might appeal to rule-utilitarianism, and they might say that in a case where, e.g.,

one person’s right to life is weighed against preventing the great suffering of a million lives, the

reasonable course of action would be to violate the individual’s right to life, making an exception

to the general rule that one should always respect individual rights.)

5.2 Utilitarian Criticisms of Kant. (a) Kant’s Categorical Imperative, to the extent that it

actually works, must appeal to rule-utilitarianism. When Kant purports to show that immoral

maxims would not pass the test of universalizability (using the Formula of Universal Law), all he

shows is that “the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would

choose to incur” (Mill in the introductory chapter to his essay Utilitarianism, which you haven’t

read). I believe that this is quite a strong objection, especially because Kant’s arguments that

universalized versions of immoral maxims would always fail the contradiction tests are

unpersuasive. These arguments are found in Kant, pp.134~6. Kant might respond that the

Formula of End in Itself works well against immoral maxims, and makes no appeal whatsoever

to the consequences of universally adopting immoral maxims.)

(b) The Categorical Imperative may be used to settle conflicts between moral duties and

immoral inclinations, but it cannot resolve conflicts between different moral duties. For instance,

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we may construct an example where one cannot perform one perfect duty without violating

another perfect duty, such as when one must either lie to save oneself or kill oneself to avoid

lying. By contrast, the Principle of Utility can never give rise to conflict of moral duties, since

the right course of action is ultimately characterized in terms of its conduciveness to the best

overall outcome. (I believe it is true that Kant’s Categorical Imperative cannot settle conflicts

between two perfect duties. How might Kantians respond? Perhaps it is a fact about human life

that there can be real moral dilemmas and conflicts. Moral dilemmas and conflicts cannot arise

at all for utilitarians, and to that extent utilitarianism is a superficial doctrine that ignores this

deep tragic fact about human life.)

(c) Kantian ethics is socially conservative. There is much suffering in the world that can

be eliminated by diligent human effort and social reforms, but helping others is only an imperfect

duty according to Kant. (Kantians might respond by saying that utilitarianism, act-utilitarianism

at any rate, ignores the distinction between obligation and supererogation, and is therefore too

demanding. See the Grenade case.)

(d) Sympathy has no place in Kantian ethics. (Kant would reply that sympathy is not a

reliable motive in doing what is right. Only respect for the moral law, or the motive of doing

duty for duty’s sake, is a reliable motive in dutiful actions.)

* The notes in §§1~3 have been compiled from various sources, most importantly:
(1) My notes on the lectures by Kwong-loi Shun, Philosophy 104: Ethical Theories, summer 1997 at Univ. of
California, Berkeley;
(2) J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against;
(3) Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality” reprinted in Williams, Moral Luck;
(4) Christina and Fred Sommers (ed.), Vice & Virtue in Everyday Life (referred to as V&V in these notes).

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