Philosophical Review

Kant's Theory of Freedom. by Henry E. Allison

Review by: Roger J. Sullivan
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 865-867
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 BOOK REVIEWS

and the constraintson the generationand employmentof empiricalcon-

cepts,respectively.Chapter 8 is sketchy.A good deal more on the topic of
constraintscan be developed in the spiritof functionalismthat Kitcherso
helpfullyascribes to Kant. We need more details, but the argument has
been pointed in the rightdirectionby Kitcher.

RALF MEERBOTE
ofRochester
University

Review,Vol. 101, No. 4 (October 1992)

The Philosophical

KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM. By HENRY E. ALLISON. New York, Cam-

bridge UniversityPress, 1990. Pp. xii, 304.

For some twentyyears Henry Allison has been working with Kant's
doctrine of transcendentalidealism. No one knows better than he how
manywould consider thisa waste of time,arguing thatKant's theoryis so
incoherentas not to deserve serious consideration.But Allison has criti-
cally examined such attacks in numerous articlesand three books: first,
TheKant-Eberhard Controversy( 1975), thenKant'sTranscendental
Idealism:An
Interpretation and Defense(1983), and now, Kant's Theoryof Freedom.His
judgment now is thatKant's theoryof freedomis "the mostprofoundand
sustained attempt to deal with this problem in the historyof Western
philosophy."
Allison does not hold thateverydetail of Kant's idealismis defensibleor
thatKant is completelyconsistentin all his discussionsof the topic. None-
theless,he has found reason to remain appreciativeof Kant's main episte-
mic theme, and his argumentsare characterizedby lucidityand by sensi-
tivityto exceptionallydifficultand frequentlyambiguous texts.Given the
obscurityof manyof Kant's arguments,however,the depth and subtletyof
Allison's interpretationsmay require some of his readers to read various
passages several times to be sure theyhave understood them.
Allison has argued for the viabilityof Kant's transcendentalidealism in
his book of that title. Put briefly,he contends that Kant's noumenal-
phenomenal distinctionis a "two-aspect"claim, based on what Allison
refersto as the "epistemicconditions"of human knowledge,namely,those
conditionsnecessaryforus to have experienceof objects.These, of course,
are the sensible formsof space and time and the pure categories of the
understanding.They also may be considered to be "objectifyingcondi-
tions,"since theyboth constituteour knowledgeof objects and determine
the limitsof our possible knowledge of such objects. Kant's "transcenden-
tal idealism," then, claims that all the objects we experience are "mere

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 BOOK REVIEWS

representations."But from his transcendentalpoint of view, this still is

experience of reality,and Kant insiststhat this may accuratelybe called
"empiricalrealism."
By contrast,the epistemologicalconfusion into which noncriticalphi-
losophies had fallen (and, insofaras theydisagree with Kant, stilldo) is
"transcendentalrealism,"that is, the construingof appearances as things
as they are in themselves,apart from us and apart fromany conditions
affectingour knowledge of reality.
One well-knownstumblingblock to a wider acceptance of Kant's ideal-
ism is the claim thatas moral agents,each of us is a single selfthatcan be
viewed both noumenally and phenomenally.Thus, in his latest volume
Allison turns his attentionto the relationbetween Kant's transcendental
idealismand his practicaltheory,concentratingparticularlyon the concept
of rational agency and the freedom Kant thought necessary for such
agency. To set the stage for these topics, he reprises in part 1 materials
fromthe concludingchaptersof Transcendental Idealism,wherehe analyzed
the development of Kant's view of freedom in the firstCritique.
The firstmodel of rational agency is what Kant called one's "empirical
character,"thatis, a psychologicallydeterminedmode of human agencyin
whichwe take a person's priorbeliefsand desiresand relevantbackground
conditionsas explanationsof thatperson's intentionalactions.What makes
them rational actions and not just bits of behavior is what Allison calls
Kant's "Incorporation Thesis": a desire or inclinationcan functionas a
motiveor interestonly if an agent counts it as worthpursuing.
Without any need for subtle reflection,Kant writes,even those of us
with"the most ordinaryintelligence"are aware that there is more to hu-
man agency than this,and we find ourselves thinkingabout the second
model: persons considered independentlyof all epistemicconditions.Un-
derstandingthe limitsof our empiricalknowledgeleaves open a "concep-
tual space" for at least thinkingof our agency as (transcendentally)free.
This does not prove there is such freedom; it onlyopens the possibilityof
such freedom. For thisreason the titleof Allison'sbook may be somewhat
misleading,for,strictly speaking,Kant had no "theory"of freedom;as far
as theoreticalreason is concerned, freedomremains merelyemptyspace,
vacuous. Which pointof viewwe take depends upon whetherour interests
are mainly theoreticalor practical,that is, whetherwe are tryingto un-
derstand an action or whetherwe are engaging, for example, in (what
Kant calls) imputation-attributionsof praise or blame.
Unfortunately,Kant wrote,people tend to fallintothe mistakeof "tran-
scendentalrealism"by "sensifyingthisinvisiblesomething."Allison'smain
strategyin defendingKant's twomodels of rationalagency,therefore,is to
make the veryKantian move of claimingthat Kant's criticstoday also fall

866

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 BOOK REVIEWS

back into transcendentalrealismby presumingthatthe models name two

ontologicallydistinctentitieswithincompatibleproperties.
Allison spends a good deal of space comparing his interpretationswith
those of other commentators.While these oftenhelp sharpen his presen-
tation of his own views, this strategymay mean that Allison's study will
appeal primarilyto readers already well up on the professionalliterature.
It is instructiveto read Allison's study alongside of Bernard Carnois's
The CoherenceofKant'sDoctrineofFreedom.Both begin withdiscussionsof
the third antinomy,and both treat Kant's various accounts of freedom
developmentally,progressingto the notionof freedomas autonomy.Car-
nois aims to show that Kant's views in the firstCritiquecan be reconciled
withhis fullycriticalview that moralityrequires us to be transcendentally
free. Allison, by contrast,stressesthe differencesbetween Kant's earlier
and laterviews.Both investigatethe problemsinvolvedin Kant's notionof
radical evil and the moral regenerationof a noumenal self.Allisongoes on
to assess Kant's defense of moral freedom in the Groundwork and in the
second Critique.
Those already acquainted withAllison'sworkdo not need thisoverview
to recommend his book; his distinguishedrecord of scholarshipis recom-
mendation enough.

ROGER J. SULLIVAN
ofSouthCarolina
University

Review,Vol. 101, No. 4 (October 1992)

The Philosophical

IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY. By ROGER SULLIVAN. New York,

Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989. Pp. xvii,413.

Sullivan's book offersa comprehensivesurveyof Kant's moral theory.

Its aim is exposition,and it provides a good overviewforthose unfamiliar
withKant's practicalphilosophy.However, itsmain interpretiveclaimsare
not fullydeveloped, and it does littleto sortout the complexitiesof Kant's
view. Part 1, "The Nature of Morality,"discusses Kant's theoryof action,
the distinctionbetween prudence and morality,and Kant's attemptsto
establishthe validityof the moral law and the primacyof practicalover
theoreticalreason. Sullivan views Kant's principal aim as the defense of
moralityagainst radical skepticismresultingfromthe Newtonian picture
of a causally determined world (12, 56, 76ff.).At one point this requires
showingthat the question, Why be moral? has a rationalanswer and that
therecan be objectivemoraljudgments (56), though elsewhereit involves

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