Kant's Causal Conception of Autonomy (History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 11, Issue 1) (1994)

North American Philosophical Publications
Kant's Causal Conception of Autonomy

Author(s): Michael Gass
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 53-70
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
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History of Philosophy Quarterly
Volume 11, Number 1, January 1994
KANT'S CAUSAL CONCEPTION

OF AUTONOMY
Michael Gass
AS every student
rule of moral
of morality as an philosophy
unconditionalknows, Immanuel
obligation to adopt Kant regards
only those the
policies
which we can regard ourselves as legislating for moral agents generally. Less
well known is his belief that we qualify as moral agents and so are subject to this
moral law in our volition on the sole condition that our volition is free. A free will
and the rule of morality "reciprocally imply each other" (K2I29).1 Kant defends this
reciprocity thesis ? hereafter referred to as 'RT'?by claiming that (PI) a free will
is "autonomous", or "a law to itself (G:440) by its very free nature; and that (P2)
an autonomous will is subject to the moral law by its very autonomous nature.
Whether Kant is justified in making these two claims depends, of course, on
what he means by an 'autonomous'will. Several commentators have suggested
that he has in mind a condition of being required only to act rationally. But
when arguing for RT in the introduction to the third part of the Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant characterizes an autonomous will in causal
terms?i.e., as a will that is a causal law to itself because, being free, it is not
subject to the laws of natural mechanism. In what follows it is contended that
autonomy of this sort is a condition of having to honor in one's volition, not the
rule of reason, but the very freedom that one enjoys in one's volition. Kant's
argument for RT is that morality is the conduct required of us if we are to
respect the free nature of our volition. Like the natural law ethicists before
him, Kant conceives of such conduct in a humanistic vein?i.e., as a matter of
respecting the intrinsic value of a free humanity.
By a 'free will' Kant means a power of rational decision-making and acting that
is free, not just in a "psychological and comparative" sense, but also "abso
lutely]" (K2:97). The former kind of practical freedom is an ability to decide
which among several pleasant states of affairs one will make a personal end
and take the means to realize. That is to say, it is a capacity for pursuing one's
happiness as one's reason sees fit rather than by responding compulsively to
sensations and desires in the way that non-rational animals do. On the other
hand, practical freedom of the absolute variety is an ability, not only to pursue
one's happiness purposively, but also to act purposively independently of one's
regard for happiness.
53
54 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
Kant states in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten that the distin
guishing characteristic of volition as a species of efficient causality is the
unique way in which it is related to laws:
Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the
power to act in accordance with his idea of laws?that is, in accordance with
principles?and only so has he a will (G:412).
Of course, if our volition is free only in a relative sense, then the principles to
which we are subject in our volition are those specifying how to realize a desired
end, in which case our ability to act in accordance with principles is simply an
ability to act according to our idea of what the laws of nature are. For all of the
means-end reasoning that comprises the rational pursuit of our well-being is
based upon our understanding of how nature works. Kant labels this servitude
to the laws of nature a "heteronomy of the will" (G:441).
On the other hand, if our volition is free in the absolute sense, then Kant
believes we are capable of acting, not only according to our notions about the
laws of nature, but also according to the idea that the principle of our action is
itself a law that we impose on ourselves in implementing it. Indeed, he
maintains?what is PI?that a rational being who is capable of acting accord
ing to this idea is thereby required to do so. Absolute freedom is an "autonomy
of the will" (G:433), a condition of always having to "obey no law other than
that which [one] at the same time enacts [one]self (G:434).
In Kant's view, legislating a maxim to one's own will amounts to legislating
the maxim to the will of every rational being. Since the moral law is a
requirement always to act as though one were legislating one's maxim to the
will of every rational being, Kant holds?what is P2?that an autonomous will
and a will bound by the moral law are one and the same. Whereas a person
whose will is free only in the comparative sense slavishly follows the laws of
nature in her decision-making, a person whose will is completely free is
required only to act "as if the maxim of [her] action were to become through
[her own] will a universal law of nature" (G:421). That is to say, she is permitted
to adopt all and only those practical policies that she can simultaneously will
that everyone should adopt as though by causal necessity. Our knowledge of
the laws of nature allows us to formulate principles of purposive activity. But
we employ only the bare "schema of... natural law" as a heuristic "type" (K2:69),
or model, when trying to decide which of these principles qualify as a self-im
posed law for absolutely free volition.
Such is Kant's proof that absolute freedom in volition reciprocally implies a
subjection to the moral law in volition. Three questions naturally arise con
cerning this argument. The first question, which we will explore in section IV,
has to do with Kant's rationale for P2. On what grounds does he maintain that
acting as if we were legislating our maxim for our own will amounts to acting
as though we were legislating the maxim for everyone's will? There is also the
question, to be considered in section V, of how we are to decide whether we can
will that our maxim should become such a law.
KANT'S CAUSAL CONCEPTION OF AUTONOMY 55
The answers which Kant provides to these questions are intimately related
to the answer which he gives to a third question concerning his argument for
RT?namely, what is his rationale for PI? Certainly our will would be subject,
not to the necessity of imaginatively legislating to itself, but only to the laws
of natural mechanism upon which our pursuit of happiness is based, if our will
was free only in a relative sense. Our will is autonomous only if it is absolutely
free. Less obvious is the other half of PI, namely, the claim that a will is
absolutely free only if it is autonomous.
If Kant regarded volitional self-government simply as the condition of not
being subject to the laws of nature in one's decision-making, hence of being
always capable of acting on the grounds that one is thereby legislating one's
maxim to one's will, then PI would be unproblematic but unhelpful to him in
his effort to prove RT. For it would establish in conjunction with P2 only that
an absolutely free agent is subject to the moral law whenever she deigns to act
on the grounds that she is legislating her maxim to her will in acting. Since
Kant's aim in advancing PI and P2 is to demonstrate that an absolutely free
agent is unconditionally subject to the moral law in each and every action that
she takes, he must regard volitional self-government as a condition of being
always obligated to act on the grounds that one is legislating one's maxim to
one's will, not just as a capacity for always acting on those grounds. But, then,
if 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy' are not antonyms, then PI is by no means
self-evident. To make good his argument for RT, Kant must rule out on extra
definitional grounds the possibility that an absolutely free will is subject
neither to the laws of nature nor to the necessity of always legislating its
maxims to itself.
In her recent study of Kant's moral philosophy, Onora O'Neill suggests that
Kant can accomplish this task simply by appealing to the fact that an abso
lutely free agent who acts solely from a regard for his own well-being, not also
on the grounds that he can legislate his maxim to his will in acting, has
enslaved himself to the laws of nature in acting, since these laws govern his
pursuit of well-being.2 But this is to confuse the question of whether a free will
can be neither heteronomous nor autonomous with the question of whether a
free will can operate neither in the way that a heteronomous will would operate
nor in the way that an autonomous will ought to operate. Freely surrendering
oneself to the laws of nature in acting is not the same as being unavoidably
subject to the laws of nature in acting. To establish PI, Kant must prove, not
simply that an absolutely free agent must act as though she were legislating
to her maxims to her own will in order to avoid acting as if she were not an
absolutely free agent, but also that a free agent is obligated to avoid acting as
if she were not an absolutely free agent.
According to most commentators, Kant supplies this proof by appealing to
the fact that free volition is subject to norms of practical reasoning. Regardless
of whether our will is free absolutely or only in a relative sense, we always act
in the hope of realizing some end or purpose that we have set for ourselves,
and so are required by this very purposiveness to choose only those ends and
means that are rational given our wider interests, capacities, and circum
stances. But for us to judge that we ourselves are entitled rationally to adopt
a certain maxim M given our interests, capacities and circumstances is implic
itly to judge that anyone else to whom these same considerations apply is also
entitled rationally to adopt M. This, it is commonly argued, is all that Kant
means to indicate when he claims that the free will of a rational being ought
always to act as though it were legislating its maxim to both its own will and
the will of every other rational being.3
But if that is so, then P2 is false?a fact that most of the commentators who
favor this interpretation of Kant's argument for RT are quick to point out. For
Kant believes that we are morally obligated to do only what we can regard
ourselves as insuring that everyone who is similarly situated will do as well,
not simply that we are morally obligated to do only what we can also acknow
ledge that every person who is similarly situated has an equally good reason
to do. Otherwise, all the maxims that he regards as prudent but immoral would
be moral simply by virtue of being prudent.
In his recent book, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Henry Allison attempts to
salvage the rationality interpretation of Kant's argument for RT by suggesting
that Kant regards our subjection to standards of practical reasoning as extend
ing, not just to the ends and means we choose in the light of our wider interests,
but to those interests as well.4 If our volition is free only in a relative sense,
then our own well-being or pleasure would be the ultimate aim of all of our
actions, and justifiably so?since, if our freedom is not absolute, then we are
incapable of acting from any other motive. However, if our freedom is absolute,
then "if self-preservation, self-interest, or happiness is the principle of my
behavior, if it dictates maxims, it is I (not nature in me) that gives it this
authority,"5 in which case I am required rationally to justify giving it this
authority, Allison maintains. Obviously I cannot do so by appealing to the happy
consequences of making my own well-being the basis for my actions. Such an
appeal would be "question-begging at best. (At worst, it may simply be false.)"6
Thus, Allison concludes, an absolutely free agent acts rationally only if she acts
for a reason that transcends her regard for her own pleasure or well-being. What
is this disinterested consideration that rationally justifies the actions of absolutely
free agents? According to Allison, it is the thought that one can will that everyone
should act similarly. Such is how he explains and justifies Kant's derivation of RT.
Allison's interpretation is suspect for two reasons. In the first place, as
Allison himself concedes, there is no independent textual evidence for it. Kant
does believe that the moral law is a formal requirement of, hence a rational
constraint on deciding on how one is to go about, legislating to one's will. But
nowhere does he suggest that he regards the obligation to act on the grounds
that one is thereby legislating to one's own will as being itself an obligation to
act rationally. He claims, not that our maxims are moral if they are rational as
such, but instead that our maxims are moral if they are rational as pieces of
practical legislation.7
In the second place, both PI and P2 are dubious claims under Allison's
interpretation of Kant's argument for RT. Granted, a person would be acting
irrationally if she didn't insure that her lower-order maxims are justified qua
consistent with her wider values and goals. But it is far from obvious?despite
Allison's belief to the contrary?that a person whose will is absolutely free
would also be acting irrationally if her only justification for her highest-order
maxims?i.e., those expressing the most fundamental of her chosen values and
goals?was that she found them appealing. If inclination always stands in need
of further justification before our actions can satisfy norms of practical reason
ing, why wouldn't this also be true of whatever else we might appeal to to justify
our actions? Why should only the fact that we adopt a maxim on the disinter
ested grounds that we can will that everyone should adopt it constitute by itself
an adequate justification for adopting the maxim? As Philippa Foot has said:
"Irrational actions are [limited to] those in which a man in some way defeats
his purposes, doing what is calculated to be disadvantageous or to frustrate his
ends."8 For the standard of rationality which Allison proposes seems to require
an infinite regress of justification, and so would appear to be impossible to
realize, even when we are acting morally.9
But if that is so, then the volitional self-government which Kant regards as
lying behind our subjection to the rule of morality is not a subjection to the
standard of rationality which Allison proposes. Thus, unless we are prepared
to attribute to Kant an unsound argument for RT in the absence of any textual
evidence that he subscribes to that argument, then we must conclude that Kant
regards volitional self-government as a subjection to something else besides
norms of practical reasoning.
II
The key to discovering what that something else is can be found in the
introduction to the third part of the Grundlegung. There Kant describes our
obligation to legislate our maxims to our own will in the same causal terms
that he adopts earlier in the Grundlegung to explain what is involved in
willing that our maxim should become a law for everyone's volition. He believes
that a rational being who is capable of acting independently of her regard for
her own well-being is a spontaneous causal agent, and so is subject to the laws
of nature neither in acting nor in deliberating how to act. Either her will is
a causal law to itself or else it is not subject to any causal law whatsoever. But
the latter hypothesis is "self-contradictory", Kant claims, on the grounds that
even spontaneous volition is a kind of efficient causality, and that the very
concept of causality
carries with it that of laws in accordance with which, because of something we call
a cause, something else?namely, its effect?must be posited. Hence freedom of the
will, although it is not the property of conforming to laws of nature, is not for this
reason lawless: it must rather be a causality conforming to immutable laws, though
of a special kind [namely, those which a free agent imagines himself as causally
legislating to himself and others when he obeys the moral law]; for otherwise a free
will would be self- contradictory [ein Unding] (G:446).11
Commentators have tended either to ignore Kant's causal description of auton

omy in this passage or else to regard it as just a figurative way of denoting our
subjection to norms of practical reasoning. The rationale for reading the
passage in this way seems to be that a bona fide attempt to prove RT by appeal
to causal considerations is so obviously invalid as to be beneath Kant. For
example, H. J. Paton complains that such an argument trades on a false
analogy between free volition and natural causality:
The law of which Kant speaks appears, by his own account, to be a law connecting
cause and effect so that like causes necessarily have like effects. But this applies
only to natural necessity. It is hard to see how we can be entitled to pass from this
to a law of freedom, which?so far from connecting causes and effects?is a law for
causal action considered in itself. The law or principle of autonomy, as we have
seen it hitherto, in no way asserts a necessary connexion between causes and
effects.12
Certainly it is illegitimate to infer the existence of practical laws governing

free volition simply from the fact that mechanical laws govern the manner in
which free acts of volition and all other events cause changes in the world.
However, there is no reason to think that Kant is doing this when at G:446 he
dismisses as self-contradictory the proposal that a free will might be neither
heteronomous nor autonomous, and so concludes that it is autonomous, on the
grounds that free volition is a species of causality and as such is necessarily
law-governed. His argument for RT at G:446-47 is fallacious in the way that
Paton describes only against the background assumption that the mechanical
laws connecting free acts of volition to other events are the only possible laws
of cause and effect which apply to such acts. But Kant directly repudiates this
assumption. As he explains in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, "there are ... two
kinds of causality conceivable by us; the causality is either according to nature
or arises from freedom" (K1:A532=B560). The former is an empirical causal
ity?one the existence and nature of which can be discerned by means of our
senses. But absolute freedom in volition is a "power of beginning a state
spontaneously." This kind of causality is transcendental, or intelligible in
character: neither its nature nor its existence can "be determined or given in
any experience" (K1:A533=B561).
Kant's argument for RT at G:446-47 rests, not on a dubious analogy between
empirical causality and free volition (as Paton charges), but rather on the belief
that all species of causality, including the intelligible causality which is free
volition, are law-governed by their very causal nature. In the case of empirical
causality, both cause and effect are events. But in the case of free volition, the
intelligible cause would be the free agent herself and the intelligible effect
would be her action.13 Thus, the intelligible (as opposed to empirical) laws of
cause and effect that Kant believes govern free volition are laws that tie acts
of volition, not to other events, but to their agents. But this is precisely how
maxims that comply with the moral law govern an autonomous will. Kant bases
PI, not just on the fact that (Pia) spontaneous volition is governed by laws of
cause and effect by its very causal nature, but also on the consideration that
(Plb) owing to the spontaneous, or intelligible nature of its causality, these

laws of cause and effect that govern spontaneous volition consist, not of the
actual laws of nature, but instead of those maxims that a spontaneous agent
can rationally will to become a law of nature governing his volition. P2 follows
from the fact that both actual and imaginary laws of nature are universal in
their scope, governing not just one person but all persons alike.
Thus, to understand why Kant believes that a free will and a will subject to
the moral law are one and the same, we must explore what he has to say about
Pia and Plb. To do this, we must turn to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. There,
in his solution to the antinomy of freedom and determinism, Kant maintains
that "every [object which is an] efficient cause must have a character, that is,
a law of its causality, without which it would not be a cause" (K1:A539=B567).
Here he is not only declaring that, but also explaining why, a lawless species
of efficient causality is impossible. In Kant's view, the exact nature, or 'charac
ter' of a thing's causal powers serves formally as a law of its causality, regard
less of whether its causality is of the empirical variety or of the intelligible
variety. "Nature, taken adjectivally (formaliter), signifies the connection of the
determinations of a thing according to an inner principle of causality"
(Kl:A419n=B446n). Kant's thesis that a free will is subject to the moral law
because it is a law to itself, it will now be shown, amounts to the claim that a
free will is subject to the moral law because it is governed causally by its own
free nature.
Ill
Sometimes when he writes about the nature or character of an object's causal
activity, Kant is referring to its general character as either an empirical or an
intelligible kind of causality. The general character of empirical causality is
its very empirical nature; the general character of intelligible causality is its
very intelligible nature, or spontaneity. However, on other occasions when
Kant writes about the character of an object's causal activity, he is referring to
the individual character of the object qua causal agent, this being the inner
principle and modus operandi of its own causal activity.
The individual character of a sensible object's empirical causality is that
about the object which accounts for why it is related causally to other sensible
objects in the exact ways that it is. For example, the individual character of an
inanimate object's causal activity is simply the quantity of its matter, inasmuch
as its causal activity is exclusively mechanical. External forces determine the
direction and velocity of an object's movements in space, not by themselves,
but only in their dynamic relation to the object's mass. On the other hand, the
inner principle and formal law of a plant's activity is that aspect of the plant
which accounts, not just for the motive force of its physical movements, but
also for the "formative force" (K3:374) which it displays in nutritive, regenera
tive and reproductive functions. An animal, unlike a plant or an inanimate
object, acts on the basis of feelings and desires that are triggered by sense
perception. Thus, the individual character and formal law of its causal powers
is whatever it is about the animal which accounts for why it feels and desires
what it does to the degree that it does when it perceives what it does.
The empirical causality of a human being is a "causality of his reason"
(K1:A549=B577). By this Kant means that a human effects changes in the
sensible world, not by acting in the unthinking manner of inanimate objects,
plants, and animals, but by following maxims of her own choosing, each
specifying a reason why she should act in the way she does. Given, though, that
rationally-directed actions belong just as much to the world of appearances as
do the changes they produce, they too have antecedent empirical causes. In
Kant's view, the causal background to a human's action includes certain origi
nal dispositions of thought, feeling, and desire that make up the empirical
character of her will and account for why she is molded by the world in the
exact ways that she is throughout the duration of her existence and activity.
Just as external forces determine the direction and velocity of an object, not by
themselves, but only in their dynamic relation to the object's mass, a person is
motivated to decide and act in a certain way, not simply because of the things
that have happened to her in her life, but because she is naturally inclined to
respond in that way to those influences. For example, says Kant, the causal
background of a malicious lie would likely include not only such environmental
influences as a defective education and bad company, but also "the viciousness
of a natural disposition insensitive to shame" (K1:A554=B582).
Thus, as it applies to the empirical character of human volition, Kant's
principle that the character of a cause serves formally as the law of its causality
reduces to the claim that the individual personality of a human is an objective
standard for predicting and explaining her actions. Of course, the empirical
character of a will is only "the character of [a] thing in the appearance"; it is
not the "intelligible character" of the will, this being "its character as [a] thing
in itself (K1:A539=B567). Kant maintains that our purposive activity may be
spontaneous in and of itself, notwithstanding the fact that it is causally predeter
mined in the appearance. If that is indeed the case, then we not only are empirical
causes through our actions; we also are the intelligible cause of our actions.
Kant believes that an absolutely free will would have an individual character
in the intelligible as well as in the empirical sense. This would be the general
motivational orientation of a spontaneous rational agent?what it is about her
that accounts for why she responds freely to sensory stimuli in the way that
she does. Kant believes that the individual, empirical character of her will
would be the appearance, or "sensible schema" (K1:A553=B581) of this intelli
gible character of her will. Whether a person is by nature, say, a liar in the
appearance will depend on whether she is by nature a liar in reality. But
assuming that she is also by nature a free agent in reality, then she is a liar in
reality because she chooses to be. From an explanatory perspective, a person's
character is the cause of why she makes the choices she does. But from an
intelligible point of view, a person spontaneously chooses her character and
thus the actions that flow from that character.16
Because of this fact about a free will qua noumenon, Kant's views on how a
free will qua noumenon is governed causally by its own nature differ signifi
cantly from his views on how a free will qua phenomenon is governed causally
by its own nature. Since he believes that the very character of a causal agent's
causality serves formally as a law of its causality, and since he also believes
that human volition has both an empirical and an intelligible character, he
concludes that human volition is formally subject to two laws, one empirical
and the other intelligible. Although Kant maintains that the empirical law of
our volition is the individual character which our will has in the appearance,
he believes that the intelligible law of our volition is the very freedom which
is the general character of our will as it is in and of itself. Since a free agent in
the absolute sense is one who freely chooses what the individual character of
her will is qua noumenon, the law that formally governs her will qua noumenon
is a law that not only governs the choices she makes as a result of having the
individual character she does; it also governs her choice of that character.
Which is just to say that freedom by itself serves formally as the causal law of
free volition. Such a law requires of a drunkard, not that she act in keeping
with the fact that she freely chose to be a drunkard, but only that she act in
keeping with the fact that she and her fellow humans have the power of free
choice. The individual character of a free will "is the necessary antecedent of
every act apparent to the senses. But this subjective ground, again, must itself
always be an expression of freedom..." (R:21).
In taking the position that the very freedom of free volition is the causal law
of free volition, Kant does not mean to suggest that this law is simply a
requirement to act freely. If we are free agents, then we cannot help but act
freely?whether in heeding or in violating the law of our freedom. Rather, for
Kant, a free agent who acts in a manner inconsistent with the bare fact of her
absolute freedom is someone who acts freely, but in a manner that is unsuitable
for free agents just the same. That is to say, her action is an unnatural exercise
of her absolute freedom. As Kant explains in Metaphysische Anfangsgr?nde
der Naturwissenschaft, "the word 'nature' already carries with it the concept
of laws and this concept [in turn] carries with it the concept of the necessity of
all the determinations of a thing which belong to its existence..." (MN:468-69).
Certainly Kant believes this is true of the sensible nature of a thing. Inas
much as sensible objects alter (are altered by) other sensible objects in the exact
ways that they do (are) owing to their own specific nature, or individual
character, as sensible objects, the laws of nature regarded materially are
descriptions of what actions are in keeping with that character. In other words,
they are the formal laws of the sensible nature of things. Similarly, in Kant's
thinking, the causal laws to which a rational being is subject in her free volition
are the formal laws of her free nature?i.e., specifications of what qualifies as
a natural exercise of freedom. That which is natural in the formal sense is "that
which necessarily proceeds according to laws of a certain order, whatever that
order might be, thus even the moral order (therefore, not always merely the
physical)" (E:333n).17 If there is no such thing as an unnatural expression in
practice of a rational being P's free will, then there is nothing absurd or
self-contradictory about P's having a free but causally lawless will, in which
case Pia is false. But if, as Kant believes, there is such a thing as an unnatural
exercise of absolute freedom in volition, then a free but causally lawless will
would be self- contradictory given Kant's general definition of a causal law, in
which case Pia is true.
IV
Since a causal law in the Kantian sense is a specification of what actions are
in keeping with the essential nature of a thing's causal powers, every causal
agent is governed causally by the essential nature of its own causal powers.
But only a free will is governed causally by this alone. Inanimate objects and
non-rational beings necessarily act in keeping with the essential nature of their
own causal powers; but their actions always derive, not solely from their own
causal powers, but also from whatever outside forces are in commerce with
their own causal powers. In other words, they are ruled causally by other things
as well as by the essential nature of their own causal powers. But a free will,
precisely because it is free, is subject in its actions only to the necessity of acting
in keeping with its own causal powers. In short, it is a causal law to itself.
Of course, Kant argues for PI at G:446, not simply by pointing out that a free
will is governed causally only by its own free nature, but also by claiming that
this causal self-government is one and the same as the self-government in
decision-making that is governed by the moral law. In other words, he main
tains that (Plb) owing precisely to the spontaneous nature of its causality, the
laws of cause and effect that formally govern a free will consist, not of the actual
laws of nature, but of those maxims that a free agent can rationally will to
become a law of nature governing his volition.
Plb follows straightforwardly enough from reflection on how a free will could
be subject to causal laws. If, as Kant maintains, the free nature of our volition
serves as a causal law for our volition, it obviously does so in a manner quite
different from the way in which the individual character of our will serves as
a causal law for our volition in the appearance. From an empirical perspective,
we are faithful to whom we are by causal necessity, and so regardless of whether
we intend to be and certainly without being obligated to such faithfulness.
However, such is not the case with regard to our identity as the intelligible
cause of our actions. On the assumption that we are free agents, it is always
possible for us to act in a manner that is out of keeping with the free nature of
our volition. Thus, Kant concludes, the free nature of our volition is a prescrip
tive law for our volition rather than a purely descriptive law of our volition. A
free qua autonomous agent is one who ought to adopt only those maxims which
he himself judges to be in keeping with the fact that his volition is spontaneous.
But this is just to say that a free qua causally autonomous agent is one who
ought to adopt only those maxims that he can regard himself as causally
legislating to his will. Those of our maxims which describe ways of acting that
are in keeping with the spontaneous character of our volition (assuming that
our volition is spontaneous) are the laws of cause and effect that formally
govern our volition qua noumenon. Since a course of action that squares with
the free nature of one person's volition is thereby a course of action that any
free agent may undertake without acting out of character as a free agent, a
maxim that qualifies as a law of intelligible causality for one free will also
qualifies as a law of intelligible causality for every free will. What is more, a
universal law of our intelligible causality as free agents would also be a
universal law of empirical causality governing our volition in the appearance
were it the case that we acted in keeping with the free nature of our volition by
natural necessity. Thus, a person whose volition is free, hence governed causally
only by its own free nature, is a person who ought to "(a)ct as if the maxim of [his]
action were to become through [his] will a universal law of nature" (G:421).
Such is Kant's argument for RT at G.446-47. He ties absolute freedom in
volition to the rule of moral law, not on the basis of a false analogy between
causal laws and the laws enacted by a free will (as Paton charges), but rather
on the basis of an essentialistic view of causal laws according to which the laws
enacted by a free will are causal laws of a special kind. Volitional self-govern
ment as Kant conceives of it consists of being required only to respect the
essential nature of one's volitional powers in exercising those powers. A free
agent is subject to his own legislation, and so is also subject to the moral law,
because he is "subject to his own personality so far as he belongs to the
intelligible world" (K2:87). A morally good person is one "who has remained
true to his nature...[as] a rational and free being" (VR:1072).
V
Now if Kant views our subjection to the rule of our own will as an obligation
to respect the spontaneous nature of our volitional powers whenever we exer
cise those powers, then his substantive remarks about our moral duties in the
Grundlegung and elsewhere must be an attempt to explain what such conduct
involves. For, as we have seen already, he regards our subjection to the rule of
our own will and our subjection to the moral law as one and the same thing.
The criteria by which Kant believes that we decide whether a contemplated
course of action respects the free nature of our volitional powers are none other
than the criteria by which he claims that we decide whether we can will that
our maxim in acting should become a universal law of nature.
When discussing maxims that violate our duties to others, Kant maintains
that we cannot rationally regard ourselves as causally legislating such maxims
for everyone when adopting them ourselves owing to the fact that their adop
tion by everyone would frustrate our own purposes in adopting them or another
of our maxims. For example, a policy of making a false promise of repayment
to a moneylender is immoral because the universal adoption of such a policy
"would make promising, and the very purpose of promising, itself impossible,
since no one would believe he was being promised anything, but would laugh
at utterances of this kind as empty shams" (G:422).
When discussing maxims that violate our duties to ourselves, however, Kant
indicates that such maxims are immoral because their adoption by everyone
would frustrate, not our own purposes, but a purpose of nature. For example,
he declares that a policy of "do[ing] away with [one]self in order to escape from
a painful situation" (G:429) is non-universalizable, not because such an escape
would be impossible were everyone to act similarly, but because of the teleologi
cal fact that the natural realm for which we must regard ourselves as legislat
ing when engaged in the universalization procedure would aim at our
self-preservation in equipping us with both the capacity to experience pain and
the desire to avoid it.
Kant clearly patterns this account of moral decision-making after the ethical
writings of Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas and others in the natural law tradition
of ethical inquiry.18 These thinkers held that humans act in keeping with the
purposive nature of their practical powers by respecting the dignified position
which they enjoy in the purposive order of nature as a whole. God created
everything else in nature to contribute (either directly or indirectly) to the
perfected development and well-being of the beings that he created in His
image. Thus, it is only natural that humans should make free use of everything
in nature for their own benefit, provided that they don't demean themselves or
their fellow humans in the process, and provided also that they pursue not just
their own good but also the good of their fellow humans.19 Fortunately, God
created humans such that they are naturally inclined to pursue their own good
in ways that respect the dignity, and promote the good, of humanity as a whole.
Thus, they obey the moral law simply by following the laws of nature which
govern the rational pursuit of their own happiness.
Naturally, Kant rejects key elements of this ethical outlook. For one thing,
he holds that we cannot possibly know whether nature is a kingdom of ends,
much less who reigns over it. The world we inhabit may exist for our benefit.
Then again, it may not. Similarly, Kant believes that we have no way of
knowing whether we were designed to take delight in actions that respect the
dignity, and promote the good, of humanity as a whole. Certainly he denies that
we can fulfill our moral duties simply by pursuing our own well-being. Morality
consists of acting as though one were legislating one's maxim for nature, not
of conforming one's maxim to the actual laws of nature.
Just the same, although Kant declines to base his moral philosophy on a
belief that human nature and nature at large are ordered purposively by God,
Kant does base it on the traditional belief that humans (and rational beings
generally) are more perfect than beings of all other species. Like previous
writers, he maintains that morality consists of our using things and persons
(both ourselves and others) in a manner that respects the "intrinsic value"
(G:435) that persons have on account of the free and rational nature of their
practical powers. Regardless of whether humans are products of intelligent
design who have a dignified position in a system of final causes, their
"(h)umanity itself is a dignity", a natural (if not also a designed) "superiority
over all the other beings in the world..." (MS:462). All other objects and beings
possess at best an extrinsic and less than absolute value, Kant holds, by which
he means that whatever value they possess consists of (and so is conditional
upon) their being useful to (and so valued by) a rational being in his freely
chosen endeavors. But a rational being himself is valuable?not just to a
degree, but incomparably so?apart from his usefulness to another rational
being. "(M)an, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself,
not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will..." (G:428), regard
less of whether he is also the final end and sovereign of a natural kingdom of
ends. Thus, Kant concludes, we ought to respect this fact about ourselves and
other rational beings in our own decision-making. Remaining true to the free
nature of our own volition consists of our valuing the intrinsic value of a free
humanity in our decision-making.
In identifying rational beings as ends in themselves, Kant means to indicate
that the highest good both of their own existence and of the world as a whole
is their own development and well-being (rather than their contribution to the
development and well-being of some other species). Like the natural law
ethicists, he believes that the crowning perfection of a world containing hu
mans would be that state of affairs in which they come to be perfectly happy
as the result of perfecting their ability to act independently of their sensuous
nature.20 A due regard for this fact about humans is what Kant has in mind
when he writes of treating them as ends in themselves.
Some of our moral duties?Kant follows tradition and calls them "perfect"
duties?are obligations to refrain from acting in ways that are incompatible
with "the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself (G:430). Such actions
(e.g., gluttony, suicide, false promising, murder) are to be avoided, not simply
because they detract from the achievement of our highest good as free agents,
but also because they involve treating ourselves or others as though we or they
were animals or things only. The remaining, "imperfect" duties have to do with
"the promotion" of humanity as an end in itself. In other words, they are duties
to positively advance, or "harmonize with" (G:430), the highest good for hu
manity by adopting as one's life goals both the happiness of humanity and the
perfected development of the purposive powers of humanity. For Kant, a
morally good will is one that respects the intrinsic value of a free humanity in
its end-setting as well as in its attempted realization of ends.
Thus, in offering the concept of nature as a heuristic device for moral
judgment, Kant has in mind an idealized physical universe that perfectly
mirrors in its workings the intrinsic value and highest good of a free humanity.
While he appeals on occasion to alleged facts about natural purposes in his
ethical writings21, his considered position is that moral deliberation consists,
not of ascertaining how best to conform to the actual purposive organization
of nature (since we cannot determine whether it is organized purposively, much
less how it is so organized), but rather of ascertaining whether the course of
action that one contemplates taking would, if causally legislated for nature,
help transform nature into a purposive order having as its final end the
proper development and well-being of the one species which is "by [its] very
nature an end and consequently an end in [it]self (G:436). "Teleology," Kant
notes,
views nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics views a possible kingdom of ends as a
kingdom of nature. In the first case the kingdom of ends is a theoretical Idea used
to explain what exists. In the second case it is a practical Idea used to bring into
existence what does not exist but can be made actual by our conduct?and indeed
to bring it into existence in conformity with this Idea (G:436n).22
In short, the maxims which Kant claims we can rationally will to become
universal laws of nature are those specifying courses of action that we judge
to be a natural exercise of our volitional powers as free agents because of the
respect they show either for our own intrinsic value as a free agent or for the
intrinsic value of other free agents. For example, to succeed in her pursuit of
happiness, a person requires that a certain degree of trust and cooperation
should prevail in her social milieu. The highest good for humanity can be
advanced and realized only in fellowship, but "a liar destroys fellowship"
(VE:1561). Thus, a maxim of false promising cannot be one of the policies which
we would causally legislate for nature in order to bring about by natural means
the highest good for humanity. Such a maxim is immoral, not just because its
universal adoption would make promising a useless activity, but also because
rational beings have a natural right to live in a social setting in which prom
ising is a useful activity.23
This rationale also underlies Kant's claim that suicide and certain other
policies are immoral because they would violate a purpose of nature if causally
legislated for nature. He believes that a person who kills herself to avoid pain
fails to respect the intrinsic value of her own existence as a free agent (however
painful that existence might be). The happiness which is an ingredient in our
highest good is a perpetual state of well-being that we obtain by respecting the
intrinsic value of a free existence (both our own and that of others). Thus, in
his view, a policy of avoiding pain by committing suicide cannot possibly be
causally legislated for a natural realm in which the highest good for humanity
is realized by natural means. For in such a world our instinctual aversion to
pain would always take the form of a desire for continued existence. Whereas
the laws of causality that govern our volition in the world of appearances
specify only how we act as a matter of fact, the laws of causality that would
govern our volition in an ideal world of appearances describe how we ought to
act as causal agents of the intelligible variety. Such is the true meaning of
Kant's thesis that a free will is required by its very free nature to act as if the
maxim of its action were to become a universal law of nature.24
The College of Wooster

Received April 15, 1993
NOTES
1. The page numbers given in the text and notes for citations from, and references
to, Kant's writings other than the Kritik der reinen Vernunft are those of the appro
priate volume of the Prussian Academy edition (Berlin, 1914). Page numbers given for
citations from the Kritik der reinen Vernunft are those of the first and second editions
ofthat work. Listed below is the abbreviation used when referring to the work, the title
of the work, the English language translation which is used in quoting from the work,
and the number of the Academy edition volume in which the work is found:
AP: Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefast {Anthropology from
a Pragmatic Point of View). Translated by Mary J. Gregor. The Hague:
Martin NijhofT, 1974. Ak.7.
E: Das Ende aller Dinge {The End of all Things). Translated by Robert E.
Anchor in Kant on History. Edited by Lewis W. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs
Merrill/ Library of Liberal Arts, 1963. Ak.8.
FM: Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die Metaphysik seit Leibnizen
und Wolff's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? {What Real Progress
Has Been Made in Metaphysics Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?).
Translated by Ted Humphrey. New York: Abarus Books/The Janus Library,
1983. Ak.20.
G: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten {Groundwork of the Meta
physic of Morals). Translated by H.J. Paton. New York: Harper & Row,
1964. Ak.4.
Kl: Kritik der reinen Vernunft {Critique of Pure Reason). Translated by
Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. Ak.4.
K2: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft {Critique of Practical Reason). Trans
lated by Lewis W. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill/Library of Liberal
Arts, 1956. Ak.5.
K3: Kritik der Urteilskraft {Critique of Judgement). Translated by Werner S.
Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987. Ak.5.
L: Logik {Logic). Translated by Robert Harmon and Wolfgang Schwarz. In
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill/Library of Liberal Arts, 1974. Ak.9.
MA: Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte {Conjectural Begin
ning of Human History). Translated by Emil L. Fackenheim in Kant on
History. Edited by L.W Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill/Library of Lib
eral Arts, 1963. Ak.8.
MN: Metaphysische Anfangsgr?nde der Naturwissenschaft {Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science). Translated by James Ellington. Indian
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill/Library of Liberal Arts, 1970. Ak.4.
MS: Die Metaphysik der Sitten {The Metaphysic of Morals). Translated by
Mary J. Gregor. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Ak.6.
MT: ?ber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee
{On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies). Translated
by Michel Despland in Kant on History and Religion. Montreal and
London: McGill and Queen's University Press, 1973. Ak.8.
R: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft {Religion
within the Limits of Reason Alone). Translated by Theodore M. Greene
and Hoyt H. Hudson. New York: Harper & Row, 1960. Ak.6.
VE: Vorlesungen ?ber Ethik {Lectures on Ethics). Translated by Louis Infield.
New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963. Ak.27.2,2.
VR: Vorlesungen ?ber die philosophische Religionslehre {Lectures on Philo
sophical Theology). Translated by Allen W Wood and Gertrude M. Clark.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978. Ak. 28.2,2.
2. See "Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III," chapter 3 of Constructions of
Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 51-65.
3. For example, see Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1977), pp. 76-77; Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral
Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 43-45; Bernard
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1985), pp. 54-70; and Allan W. Wood, "Kant on the Rationality of Morals," Proceedings
of the Ottawa Congress on Kant in the Anglo-American and Continental Traditions,
ed. P. Laberge, F. Duchesneau, and B. C. Morrisey (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press,
1977), pp. 94-109.
4. Other commentators also make this suggestion. For example, see Bruce Aune,
Kant's Theory of Morals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 94-95; Alan
Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977),
pp. 210-43; Thomas Hill, Jr., "The Kantian Conception of Autonomy," in The Inner
Citadel, ed. John Christman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 91-105;
Thomas Hill, Jr., "Kant's Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct," Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 66 (1985), pp. 3-23; J.B. Schneewind, "Autonomy, Obli
gation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy," in The Cambridge
Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
pp. 309-41; and Roger Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1989), pp. 46-48.
5. Henry E. Allison, "Morality and Freedom: Kant's Reciprocity Thesis," The Philo
sophical Review, vol. 95 (1986), p. 414.
6. Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), p. 204.
7. Kant does claim in the Grundlegung that "(s)ince moral laws have to hold [not
simply for humans but] for every rational being as such, we ...ought never to make
[moral] principles depend on the special nature of human reason....(W)e ought rather
to derive [such] principles from the general concept of a rational being as such..."
(G:412). However, this is a far cry from saying that moral principles derive solely from
the general concept of rational agency.
8. Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives", in Virtues and
Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 162.
9. Allison has been criticized elsewhere on this score. In What Reason Demands
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) R?diger Bittner charges that Allison's
thesis regarding the rational requirement to justify one's maxims "may be very Kantian,
but is implausible" (p. 170) just the same. The position in this article is somewhat
different: Allison's thesis is not even Kantian, much less plausible.
10. See K2-.95-97; also G:455-58.
11. Kant advances this same argument for RT in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen
der blossen Vernunft: "To conceive of oneself as a freely acting being and yet as exempt
from the law which is appropriate to such a being (the moral law) would be tantamount
to conceiving a cause operating without any laws whatsoever (for determination accord
ing to natural laws is excluded by the fact of freedom): this is a self-contradiction
[widerspricht]" (R:35).
12. H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1958), p.
211. For similar versions of this criticism, see David Ross, Kant's Ethical Theory
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), pp. 70-71; and Henry E. Allison, "Morality and Free
dom: Kant's Reciprocity Thesis," op. cit., p. 398. Allison reverses himself, and deems
Kant's argument valid, in Kant's Theory of Freedom, p. 283. But, as we have seen, he
interprets the argument in that work, not as a serious appeal to causal considerations,
but simply as a grandiloquent way of appealing to the fact that a free agent must
rationally justify his maxims on disinterested grounds.
13. See K1:A541=B569.
14. See K1:A538=B566,A547=B575,A553=B581; also R:21.

15. See Kl:A539-41=B567-69,A546=B574,A549-57=B577-85; also R:21. At L.66-67
Kant calls the general character of an object its logical essence, and labels the individual
character of the object its real essence. At MN:467 he describes them as the essence and
the nature of the object, respectively. At AP:285-96 he distinguishes, not between the
individual and the general character of a person's will, but instead between the individ
ual character of a person's will in the appearance (what he calls physical character
there) and moral character, or character simply. "If we take character to mean what we
are sure to expect from a man, whether good or bad, we usually specify that he has this
or that character.. .But if we say that he has character simply, then we mean the property
of will by which he binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed
to himself irrevocably by his own reason [these being moral principles]" (AP:291).
16. That the individual intelligible character of a person qua free agent is itself a
product of the person's free agency is something which Kant takes for granted, not only
in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft but also in his major writings on morality. However,
not until his discussion of radical evil in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der
blossen Vernunft does he elaborate on this theme in any detail. See R:20-25. For an
examination of the metaphysical implications of such a position, see Henry E. Allison,
Kant's Theory of Freedom; also Gordon E. Michaelson, Jr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on
Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990).
17. Such a view of lawfulness is hardly unique to Kant. Compare, for example, this
statement by Montesquieu: "Laws, taken in the broadest meaning, are the necessary
relations deriving from the nature of things; and in this sense, all beings have their
laws: the divinity has its laws, the material world has its laws, the intelligences superior
to man have their laws, the beasts have their laws, man has his laws" [The Spirit of
the Laws, trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 3].
18. For a discussion of Cicero's influence on Kant, see Klaus Reich, "Kant and Greek
Ethics", Mind, vol. 48 (1939), pp. 338-54, 446-63. Reich presents textual and biographi
cal evidence that Kant patterned the first two chapters of the Grundlegung after the
Stoic ethical doctrines found in Cicero's de officiis, a historically influential textbook
that Christian Garve had recently translated with commentary {Ciceros Abhandlung
?ber die menschlichen Fliehten, Breslau, 1783).
19. Perhaps the earliest version of this doctrine is the Genesis account of creation,
which Kant treats as a parable of the moral vocation both in Die Religion innerhalb
der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft and in his essay, "Mutmasslicher Anfang der Men
schengeschichte". He notes that, according to the Genesis account, "man was originally
constituted the proprietor of all the goods of the earth (Genesis I, 28)." But, he adds,
man "was to possess [these goods] only in fee {dominium utile) under his Creator and
Master as overlord {dominum directusT (R:78). Humans enjoy dominion over the rest
of God's creation but, in return for this divine favor, they must respect the purposive
order of God's creation in their own purposive activity.
20. See VE.1482; Kl:B425-26; A810-14=B838-42; K2:110-ll; K3:458; MT263-64;
R:4-5; and FM:306.
21. See G:395-96,421-23; and MS:424-29.
22. See also K1:A808=B836; and K3:377f.
23. Similar considerations underlie Kant's belief in the non-universalizability of a
maxim of refusing to assist others in need when one can easily do so. Humans rely on
each other, not only to preserve the social conditions necessary for them to pursue their
private interests with a reasonable degree of success, but also to soften the blows of
misfortune. The happiness which is an ingredient in the highest good for one person is
realizable only as a collective concern, not just as the business of that person herself.
Thus, making a policy of attending only to one's own well-being a universal law of nature
is inconsistent with causally refashioning nature in such a way as to bring about by
natural means the highest good for humanity. "(A) will which decided...[to causally
legislate such a policy for everyone] would be in conflict with itself, since many a
situation might arise in which, by such a law of nature sprung from his will, [a person]
would rob himself of all hope of the help he [rightfully] wants for himself (G:423) as
an end in himself.
24. I read an earlier version of this paper at the 1991 APA Central Division Meeting
in Chicago. I wish to thank Henry Allison, Carl Posy, Roger Sullivan, Richard McCarty,
David Larson, and Linda Williams for their comments.

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KANT'S CAUSAL CONCEPTION

Commentators have tended either to ignore Kant's causal description of auton

Certainly it is illegitimate to infer the existence of practical laws governing

(Plb) owing to the spontaneous, or intelligible nature of its causality, these

The College of Wooster

14. See K1:A538=B566,A547=B575,A553=B581; also R:21.

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