Instinct of Nature: Natural Law, Synderesis, and the Moral Sense

Author(s): Robert A. Greene

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 173-198
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 Instinct of Nature:
Natural Law, Synderesis,
and the Moral Sense

RobertA. Greene

"Instinctis a great matter."

-Sir John Falstaff

This essay tracesthe evolution of the meaningof the expression instinctus

naturae in the discussion of the naturallaw from Justinian'sDigest throughits
association with synderesis to FrancisHutcheson'stheoryof the moral sense.
The introductionof instinctus naturae into Ulpian's definition of the natural
law by Isidoreof Seville in the seventh centuryposed a problemof definition
for medievalcommentators.Some said thatit meanta universaland providen-
tial natura naturans;some defined it as the urge to self and species preserva-
tion in animals,degeneratingin man into sensualand shamefulimpulses;some
advanced the humanistic and paradoxicalnotion that it referredto a unique
exercise of humanreason in coming to know the naturallaw. The contempora-
neous revival in the twelfth century of St. Jerome's puzzling new term
"synderesis,"and its gradualdefinition as the immediateapprehensionof the
first practicalmoral principles of the naturallaw, broughtthe two terms into
proximityand loose association.
A half-centurylater St. Bonaventuremade explicit what had remainedla-
tent in the thinkingof ThomasAquinasby relocatingsynderesisin the affective
ratherthanthe intellectualpartof man's nature.Accordinglythe moraldiscov-
eries of synderesiscame to be spoken of as not only non-discursivebut instinc-
tive in nature-apprehensions for which no reason could be given, apprehen-
sions somehowrootedin affectivehumanexperience.Duringthe bilingualearly
modem period an increasinglysecularized,internalized,and reified instinctus
I would like to thank my colleague Joseph Schork for his assistance in translatingcertain
passages and advice on Latin usage, and Kevin Donnelly of HarvardCollege Libraryfor his
help with electronic databases.
173
Copyright1997by Journalof theHistoryof Ideas,Inc.

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174 RobertA. Greene

naturae, together with its abbreviatedvernacularcognate, "instinct"came to

serve as a substitute and synonym for the obsolescent synderesis. Edward
Herbert'sattentionto instinctusnaturaein his De Veritate(1624), Sir Matthew
Hale's speculationsabout the place of rationalinstinct in the naturallaw, and
FrancisHutcheson'stheoryof a moralsense all exemplify this semanticlegacy.
The firstentryin Justinian'sDigest has had a disproportionateinfluenceon
later speculationabout the naturallaw. It begins a chapterthat gives pride of
place to generaldefinitionsof justice, law,jus naturale andjus gentium,and it
is drawn from the writings of the Romanjurisconsult Domitius Ulpianus (d.
223), whose work constitutes forty percent of the Digest. Ulpian defines the
naturallaw, with insistent repetition,as that which naturehas taught to, or is
common to, all animals:

Jus naturaleis that which naturehas taughtto all animals;for it is not

a law specific to mankindbutis common to all animals-land animals,
sea animals,and the birds as well. Out of this comes the union of man
and woman [male andfemale] which we call marriage,andthe procre-
ation of children,and their rearing.So we can see that the other ani-
mals, wild beasts included, are rightly understoodto be acquainted
with this law. Jus gentium, the law of the nations, is that which all
humanpeoples observe.Thatit is not coextensive with naturallaw can
be graspedeasily, since this latteris common to all animals whereas
jus gentiumis common only to humanbeings among themselves.'

Justinian'scompilers gave Ulpian's definition strikingprominenceat the

beginning of the Digest and then in the same short chapterquoted the incom-
patibleandmoretraditionaldefinitionsof his contemporariesGaiusandPaulus.
They confined the operationof the naturallaw to mankindand spoke of reason
as its source.2The compilershad been chargedto eliminatejust such conflicts;
yet here at the very outset they set a conundrumthat perplexedcommentators

'The Digest of Justinian, eds. Theodor Mommsen and Paul Krueger,tr. Alan Watson
(Philadelphia, 1985), 1.1.1.3,4. This passage was formerly thought to be of doubtful authen-
ticity because its doctrine of a law common to men and animals was considered "inconceiv-
able for a classical jurist."More recent scholarshiphas concluded that it is not an interpola-
tion. See Ernst Levy, "NaturalLaw in Roman Thought" in GesammelteSchriften (Cologne,
1963 [1949]), 16; H. F. Jolowicz, Historical Introductionto Roman Law (Cambridge, 1963
[1932]), 105 and 495-99. Tony Honor6in his Ulpian (Oxford, 1982) refersto Ulpian as "a man
of cosmopolitan ideas" (28) but "no theorist and, in the strict sense, no philosopher"(31).
2 Digest, I. 1.1.9 and 11; Watson refers to jus naturale as "A
vague expression in Roman
Law. At times it was merely a synonym for the termjus gentium."Digest, xxi. See the discus-
sions in Jolowicz, 100-105, and W. W. Buckland,A Text-Bookof RomanLawfrom Augustusto
Justinian (Cambridge, 1932), 52-55.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 175

and invited explanationfrom Isidore of Seville to Hugo Grotius.Their selec-

tion of quotationssuggests that as lawyers they regardedsuch general defini-
tions as "for legal purposes no more than ornamentto discussion."3For those
of a more speculativebent, however,the dilemmas could not have been more
fundamental.How was the naturallaw to be defined in relationto those appeti-
tive and self-preservativeurges thatman seemed to sharewith animals?Or did
the term law apply only to man's deliberate,rationallyconsideredacts? Were
animals "capableof a law,"as later centuriesput it? Was the very expression
naturallaw an oxymoron, yoking togetherin apparentharmonythe opposing
forces of natureand reason?In short,what had nomos to do with physis?4
Given Ulpian's emphasison animalbehaviorandthe primarymoder con-
notation of the English word instinct it was reasonableenough for moder
scholarsto slip into using thattermto identify his views on these questionsand
on the naturallaw, despite its absence from his definition.The Carlylesestab-
lished this tradition,with notable circumlocution,in 1903: "As Ulpian [says]
the jus naturale would seem to be something of the natureof the general in-
stinct of animals, not properly speaking rationalor ethical."Their qualifica-
tions are echoed by D'Entreves:"Ulpianconceives of naturallaw as something
like the general instinct of animals."Crow quotes Isidore's term (see below)
retrospectivelyin speaking of "The idea of a 'naturalinstinct,'which is found
in Ulpian,"and Luscombe also subscribes:"Ulpian[declares]thatnaturallaw
is the common instinct which naturehas taught all animals."Buckland says
bluntly,"Ulpianidentifiesjus naturale with instinct."5
This moder scholarly traditionundoubtedlyfinds its scrambledroots in a
second influentialdefinition of the naturallaw providedby the encyclopedist
Isidore of Seville in his Etymologies. Isidore had a genius for misinforming
when he intendedto instruct.His definitionof the naturallaw is no exception,
indeed it may be his triumphin that mode. His tinkeringwith Ulpian's defini-
tion produced a transformedand confusing new version. First, he rejected
Ulpian's emphasison animalbehaviorandendorsedthe more traditionalviews
of Gaius and Paulusby restrictingthe operationof the naturallaw to "nations"
and thereforeto mankind, thus inviting confusion with the jus gentium. He

3 Buckland, 54.
4 See Helmut Koester, "NOMOS PHUSEOS: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek
Thought,"in Religions in Antiquity,ed. Jacob Neusner (London, 1968), 521-41, and Gerald
Watson,"The Early History of 'NaturalLaw,'"Irish Theological Quarterly,33 (1966), 2, 65-
74.
5 R. W. and A. J.
Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theoryin the West(Edinburgh,
1903-36), I, 108; A. P. d'Entreves,Natural Law (London, 1951), 25; Michael BertramCrowe,
The Changing Profile of the Natural Law (The Hague, 1977), 77; D. E. Luscombe, "Natural
Morality and NaturalLaw" in the CambridgeHistory of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. N.
Kretzmann,A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg(Cambridge,1982), 705; Buckland, 53.

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176 RobertA. Greene

retainedalmost verbatim,however,Ulpian's threeexamples,while addingoth-

ers, one of which (the common possession of all things) could be readto imply
that the naturallaw governed mankindonly in its prelapsarianstate. He care-
fully and logically substitutedviri (men) for maris (male) in Ulpian's phrase
"the union of male and female." Finally, in a paradoxicaladdition, he intro-
duced the term instinctusnaturae into the definition and contrastedit with the
deliberativeprocess of enactmentor institution.More than that he made that
term the focus of his primaryclause of definition.

Jus naturaleis the law common to all nations;it is held everywhereby

instinctof nature,not because of any enactment.Examplesinclude the
union of men and women, the generation and educationof children,
the common possession of all things, and liberty as well for all in the
acquiring of those things taken from air and land and sea, also the
restitutionof things deposited or money entrusted,and the right to
repel force by force.6

There is a simple explanationfor the absence of a referenceto instinctus

naturae in Ulpian's paragraphand for Isidore's use of it in a definition that
deliberatelyomits all referenceto animals.The primarymeaningof instinctus
in classical Latin is an incitement, a stirringor impulse to human behavior.
Althoughthe incitementcan originateexternallywith anotherhumanbeing or
in an internalemotion such as love or hatred,it is often understoodto be extra-
humanin origin, frequentlydivine, at times demonic. The Thesauruslinguae
latinae echoes Renaissance dictionaries in quoting Cicero (instinctu divino
afflatusque)and Livy (divino spiritu instinctus) to illustratethis basic mean-
ing, and it associates instinctus with inspiration,vaticination,and the Greek
words it was used to translate,enthousiasmosand horme.7Classical and early
Christianwritersdo not use the word to refer to the apparentlyunreflectiveor
spontaneouslife-sustainingactions of animals.8Accordingly,Isidore's choice
of instinctusto designate a stimulus experiencedonly by humanbeings con-

6
Isidore of Seville, Etymologiarumsive Originum,ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 1911), V,
iv: "Ius naturale [est] commune omnium nationum, et quod ubique instinctu naturae, non
constitutione aliqua habetur;ut viri et feminae coniunctio, liberorumsuccessio et educatio,
communis omnium possessio, et omnium una libertas, adquisitio eorum quae caelo, terra
mariquecapiuntur.Item depositae rei vel commendataepecuniae restitutio,violentiae per vim
repulsio."
7 See Max
Seklar,Instinktund Glaubenswillenach Thomasvon Aquin (Mainz, 1961), 34-
37.
8 See Solomon Diamond, "Gestationof the Instinct
Concept" Journal of the History of
the Behavioral Sciences, 7 (1971), 323-36, and "FourHundredYearsof InstinctControversy,"
Behavior Genetics, 4 (1974), 237-52; also Boethius, Fundamentalsof Music, ed. Claude V.
Palisca (New Haven, 1989), 51; and EdwardE. Lowinsky, "MusicalGenius"in Dictionary of
the History of Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York, 1973), II, 312-26.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 177

formed to contemporaryusage by being consistent with his restrictionof the

operationof naturallaw to mankind.9
Withthe discovery of a survivingmanuscriptof Justinian'sDigest in 1070
and the repetitionand extension of Isidore's definition of the naturallaw by
Gratianin the Decretum Gratiani of 1140 the stage was set for the extensive
series of commentariesand summasby glossatorsandcommentators(civilians
and canonists) that followed.'1 It was they who consequently first faced the
task of making sense of what were now three authoritativeand apparentlyin-
compatibledefinitions, since Gratianhad addedthatthe naturallaw was what
was containedin the Law and the Gospel and had followed Hugh of St. Victor
andAnselm of Laon in citing the golden rule of Matthew7:12 to exemplify that
definition. Over a century they produced a wilderness of definitions of the
naturallaw. What was the fate of instinctus naturae in these definitions? It
survivedand indeed flourished.
Isidore's use of instinctus naturae to define the naturallaw ensured its
respectfulrepetitionby these commentatorsusually,it seems, as an unexamined
epithet ratherthan as a consideredconcept. While its ambiguityallowed it to
serve many purposes and understandingsthree main connotations dominate
the discussion. First, it is equatedwith a divine and providentialimpulse oper-
atingas a principleof orderandlaw in the entirenaturalworld(naturanaturans).
Thus,an anonymousearlycommentary,the SummaInstitutionum Vindobonensis
defines the naturallaw as

the conditionimposed upon all createdthingsby divine disposition,or

instinctof nature,not by any constitution.For it is not establishedby
man'seffort, but by thatdivine disposition.For it is the law thatnature
teaches all animals.

Having incorporatedUlpian's definitionthe passage goes on to quote Ulpian's

examples, in Isidore's words, of the "unionof men and women,"and the pro-
creationand educationof offspring.1'
Next, because of the coincidentalproximityand authorityof Ulpian'sdefi-
nition in the discussion andbecause of the confusingrepetitionof his examples
by Isidore, it was inevitable that it be set in apposition with Ulpian's quod

9 Arthur0. LovejoyandGeorgeBoas mistakenlyconflateIsidore'stermwithUlpian's

phraseto createnumber43 in theirlist of 66 meaningsof naturein Primitivism andRelated
IdeasinAntiquity (Baltimore,1935),452: "Good 'by nature'(sense18) or 'in with
accordance
the law of nature'is whateveris promptedor requiredby the instinctscommonto manandall
animals."
10 See the texts collectedin RudolfWeigand,Die Naturrechtslehre der Legistenund
Dekretistenvon Irerius bis Accursiusund von Gratianbis JohannesTeutonicus (Munich,
1967).
1Weigand,27. Cf. also 166.

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178 RobertA. Greene

natura omnia animalia docuit and identified with man's sensuality and
concupiscence. This view was favored by the civilian lawyers and probably
originatedwith the Summaof Placentinus.His ingenious recourseto a gram-
maticaldisjunctionto save the appearancesand to solve the dilemmaposed by
Ulpian's definitionwas repeatedand developed by the majorcivilian lawyers
Azo, Accursius, and Bracton.

Naturallaw is defined in many ways. It may at firstbe said to denote a

certaininstinctiveimpulse arisingout of animatenatureby which indi-
vidual living things are led to act in certain ways. Hence it is thus
defined:Naturallaw is that which natura, that is, God himself, taught
all animals. The word "quod" is then in the accusativecase and the
word "natura"in the nominative.On the other hand, it may be said
that the word "quod" is in the nominativecase, so that the definition
will be this: Naturallaw is thattaughtall animalsby nature,thatis, by
naturalinstinct. The word "natura"will then be in the ablativecase.
This is what is meant when we say that our first instinctiveimpulses
are not underour control, but our second impulses are. That is why, if
a matterproceeds only as far as simple sensual pleasure,not beyond,
only a venial sin is committed.But if it proceedsfarther,to the contriv-
ing of something,as where one puts into practicewhat he has shame-
fully thought,it will then be called a thirdimpulse and a mortalsin is
committed.And note thatfor the reason thatjustice is will, takinginto
account rationalbeings only, naturallaw is impulse,regardbeing had
to all creaturesrationaland irrational.'2

The deliberativelyvague focus of the initial definitionhere, with its "cer-

tain instinctive impulse"and "certainways" of acting, allows Bractonsubse-
quently to incorporateUlpian's definition into the discussion and to propose
two ways of readingit. The nominative-ablativealternativeis in fact a gram-
maticaldistinctionwithouta semanticdifference,butit serveda rhetoricalpur-
pose. Following Placentinus,Bractonadds a parentheticaland familiarphrase
id est Deus to ChristianizeUlpian's natura, and to explain the active nomina-
tive and providentialforce of "thatinstinctive impulse arising out of nature,"
the divine creativeand sustainingnaturanaturans.'3He then turnsto the abla-
tive sense of natura, reserving a second familiar parentheticalexpression, id

12For
Placentinus, see Weigand,43-45; Select Passages from the Worksof Bracton and
Azo, ed. F. W. Maitland(London, 1894), 32-33; the translationis from Bracton on the Laws
and Customs of England, ed. George E. Woodbine (Cambridge,Mass., 1968), II, 26, except
that I have twice substitutedanimals for Woodbine's misleading "living things."
13 See Brian
Tierey, "NaturaId Est Deus: A Case of JuristicPantheism?"JHI, 24 (1963),
307-22.

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NaturalLaw, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 179

est per instinctumnaturae, to explain his second reading, and identifies that
instinct with man's sensual and shameful impulses, equivalent to St. Paul's
"otherlaw in my members."'4
With Rufinus's Summa of 1157-59 we reach a turning point. The focal
importanceof Ulpian's ancient definition is evident in Rufinus'semphaticre-
jection of it at the very beginningof his work, "notcaring,"as he dramatically
announces, "for a generality of that kind, which includes all animals."'5His
discussion of the naturallaw also significantlyand silently excludes the term
instinctusnaturae, very probablybecause it was by now becoming identified
with the characteristicbehaviorof non-humananimals.But the idea of a "natu-
ral"or instinctive (in some sense) humanresponse as the basis of the natural
law was not so easily dismissed. Nor did Rufinus intend to dismiss it. His
thoughtful,humanistic,and eloquent defense of the place of reason and of its
productcustom in the elaborationof the naturallaw is strikinglybalancedby
his finding at the heartof that law somethingthathe calls, echoing Cicero, "a
certain force [vis quaedam] implantedin the human creatureby nature,for
doing good and avoiding the contrary."16This deceptively simple definition is
expressed in the terms which contemporariesof Rufinus were beginning to
attach to the newly reborn idea of synderesis.17Indeed this quotation might
easily serve as a popularbut accuratedefinitionof synderesis.
In the Preface which introduceshis Summahe uses a numberof the spe-
cific metaphors and expressions that were coming to be associated with
synderesis.He speaks of man's retentionafterthe fall of the knowledge "of the
naturalorderimprintedon his mind,"a knowledgeassociated with "thenatural
force deep within him which had not been extinguished,"and of those "sparks
of justice" gleaming from "dyingembers,"which he equates with "moralpre-
cepts of decent and honorablebehavior."The metaphorsof imprintingon the
mind (St. Paul's "writtenon the heart")and sparksused here to describeman's
retentionof a glimmer of postlapsarianrecognitionof and inclinationtowards
the good and the peculiar characteristicof inextinguishabilityare part of the

14 This
meaning for instinctus naturae can be traced back to Hilary of Poitiers, who
arguedin his Commentaryon the Psalms (ca. 350), Psalm 1, that men are urgedby an instinctus
naturaeto vices such as pride, greed, drunkenness,hypocrisy,and lying. St. Augustine quoted
Hilary'sargumentin his ContraJulianum,II, 28, as evidence of the Church'steaching,against
the Pelagians, that human nature was "vitiated by the transgression of the first man."The
Thesauruslinguae latinae mistakenlyattributesthis use of instinctusnaturae by Hilary to St.
Jeromeand thus frustratedone editor's efforts to trace the origins of Thomas Aquinas's use of
instinctus(see n. 27 below).
15
Weigand, 144-45; translationsof this and the following quotations from Rufinus are
from Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas (Cambridge,Mass., 1954), 37-38.
16 Cicero, De inventione,tr. H. M. Hubbell
(Cambridge,Mass., 1949), II, xxii, 65: "by a
kind of innate instinct."
17 The
present essay develops an idea proposed in my article "Synderesis,the Spark of
Conscience, in the English Renaissance,"JHI, 52 (1991), 195-219.

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180 RobertA. Greene

vocabularythatcame to be used to describe synderesis.Consequentlyit is not

surprisingto find Simon of Bisegnano, writingin 1177-79, fulfilling the prom-
ise of Rufinus's languageby equating the naturallaw with "The superiorpart
of the soul, thatis, reasonitself, which is called synderesisand which Scripture
tells us was not able to be extinguishedeven in Cain."'8
In later twelfth-centurycommentaries,however, Rufinus's solution is ig-
noredandIsidore's instinctusnaturaereintroducedin a thirdandmorehuman-
istic sense. In languagethatadumbratesthe latermoralsense theoryof Francis
Hutcheson,William of Gascoigne in 1203-8 asserts that the discovery of the
naturallaw arises from "contemplationof a unique sort,"a contemplationthat
is rooted in, guided and motivatedby, man's instinctusnaturae.

In anotherdefinitionnaturallaw is an instinctof humannaturewhich,

by contemplationof a unique sort, brings into existence in a reason-
based way, naturaldrives. I say "by contemplationof a unique sort"
because of the fact thata humanbeing is motivatedby an instinctof his
natureeither towards something that should be approvedby him or
fought againstor towardenticements of this sort.'9

JohannesTeutonicus,whose views are repeatedby Simon of Penafort,summa-

rizes three uses of natura, the last an "instinctusnatura proceedingfrom rea-
son" by which the claims of equity are recognized.

For an understandingof those matters,you must note that natura is

used in many ways: first, natura is spoken of as the force seated in
things that produceslike from like. Second, naturais said to be a cer-
tain stimulusor instinctof natureproceedingfrom sense to experience
to a desire for procreatingor rearing.Third,naturais referredto as an
instinctof natureproceedingfrom reasonand the law proceedingfrom
this sort of naturais called naturalequity and accordingto this natural
law all things are called common, that is, to be shared in a time of
need.20

Since some commentatorsalso used the term synderesisto identify this third
way of defining the naturallaw the result was that synderesis and instinctus
naturaewere being drawninto a proximitythateventuallyled to theirapposi-
tion.

18
Weigand, 173. It was Jerome, not Scripture,who told us this.
19
Weigand,234; of his threedefinitionsofjus naturaleWilliamconfines the terminstinctus
to this one.
20
Weigand, 255.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 181

One strikingexampleof whatleadsOscarBrownto referto ThomasAquinas

as "everthe ingenious synthesizer"21 is his surprisingrevivaland endorsement
of Ulpian's quod natura omnia animalia docuit as, in some sense, the most
fitting (strictissimomodo) definition of the naturallaw.22Despite the implica-
tions of this endorsementof Ulpian'sdefinition,however,Thomaswas as com-
mitted as his teacherAlbert to the view that lex necessarily entailed ratio. Ac-
cordingly,his classic descriptionof the naturallaw carefully balancesthe ratio-
nal and inclinationalforces in humannatureas having a correspondentrelation
in the discovery of that law, even while it incorporatesan unattributedquota-
tion of Ulpian's famous definition. He assertsthat "reasonof its natureappre-
hends the things toward which man has a natural tendency [naturalem
inclinationem]as good objectives,"andthatthe commandsof the law of nature
are orderedin a three-stageway correspondingto man's hierarchicalnatural
tendencies (inclinationumnaturalium):

The order in which commands of the law of nature are ranged

correspondsto thatof ournaturaltendencies.Heretherearethreestages.
There is in man, first, a tendency [inclinatio] towardsthe good of the
naturehe has in common with all substances;each has an appetiteto
preserveits own naturalbeing. Naturallaw here plays a corresponding
part, and is engaged at this stage to maintainand defend the elemen-
tary requirementsof humanlife.
Secondly, there is in man a bent [inclinatio] towardsthings which
accordwith his natureconsideredmore specifically, thatis in termsof
what he had in common with other animals; correspondinglythose
mattersare said to be of naturallaw which natureteaches all animals,
for instance the coupling of male and female, the bringing up of the
young, and so forth.
Thirdly,thereis in man an appetite[inclinatio] for the good of his
natureas rational,andthis is properto him, for instance,thathe should
know truthsabout God and about living in society. Correspondingly,
whatever this involves is a matterof naturallaw, for instance that a
man should shun ignorance,not offend others with whom he ought to
live in civility, and other such relatedrequirements.23

21 Oscar James
Brown, Natural Rectitudeand Divine Law in Aquinas (Toronto,1981), 19.
22
See Brown, 33-48, especially notes 10, 22, and 25. The enduranceof Ulpian's phrase
and definition is reflected in a comparisonof the numberof index entries for him (34) and for
Aquinas (25) in Crowe.
23 Thomas Aquinas, Summatheologiae (Blackfriars,1964-), I-II, 94, 2 (translationsfrom
this edition).

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182 Robert A. Greene

Here are the three levels of being in which human nature is participant and
to which the legal commentators had variously attached Isidore's instinctus
naturae: the ordo of all that exists in nature, what nature has taught all animals,
and the distinctive tendencies of man's rational nature. Man's conscious and
deliberative understanding of the moral implications of his three inclinationum
naturalium towards ends and goods constitutes the natural law. Such a descrip-
tion tacitly acknowledges and addresses the paradox at the heart of the term
natural law: the implications of the three-fold teleological drive of physis are
brought to conscious understanding and moral significance by reason as a foun-
dation for nomos.
Although Thomas does not explain why he substitutes inclinatio naturae
for Isidore's instinctus naturae here and generally in his discussions of the
natural law it seems likely that he chose inclinato because it did not preclude,
as instinctus did, the exercise of the discursive reason and free choice required
by any moral law.24An inclinatio is not an instinctus, despite Thomas's occa-
sional use of the first term where the second seems called for, and never the
reverse.25
Thomas's primary use of instinctus itself to mean an external supernatural
prompting or stimulus is traditional enough even if intriguing philosophical
antecedents and theological implications have been discovered in it.26Accord-
ingly, he uses it most frequently to speak of human beings experiencing an
external instinctus of the divine, of God, of the Holy Spirit, of grace, of the
devil, and of the quodam instinctus propheticus that inspires holy men and
women. His interesting substitution of it for inspiratio in his treatment of the
gifts of the Holy Spirit is consistent with these examples.27
Instinctus itself occurs 252 times in Thomas's works.28Forty percent (94)
of these occurrences are instances of instinctus naturae, which he consistently
sets in opposition to discursive reason and its attendant freedom of choice.29

24Ibid., XXX, 43: Instinctusis "an extremely importantword in St. Thomas'vocabulary,

though he nowhere analyses its meaning ... [it] articulatesin his thinking the significance of
the pre-conceptual(by no means merely biological) element in human nature."
25For example, he occasionally uses inclinatio to refer to animal behavior,ibid. (I-II, 58,
1) and to concupiscible desire (I-II, 94, 1).
26 Max Seklar's treatmentof the "non-conceptualintellectualelement in the act of faith,"
as viewed by Aquinas, including its relation to instinctus naturae, is appraised by E.
Schillebeeckx in Revelationand Theology, II, tr. N. D. Smith (New York, 1968).
27 See Appendix 5 on instinctus and inspiratio in
Aquinas, Summatheologiae, XXIV. In
the early moder period the meanings of both instinctusand inspiratio were semi-secularized,
internalizedand reified; see Owen Barfield, History of English Words(London, 1953), 208.
2X Index Thomisticus,ed. Robert Busa, S.J. (Stuttgart,1974- ), s. v.
29
Aquinas, Summatheologiae, I, 83, 1: "But man acts throughjudging that something is
to be shunned or sought after through his ability to know. Because this particularpractical
conclusion proceeds not from natural instinct but from reasoning from experience, he acts
freely, being open to several possible courses."

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 183

Consequently,its most frequentlyrecurringemploymentin his writings is to

refer to the behavior of dumb animals which, "if left to themselves, act by
naturalinstinct [instinctusnaturae],"as exemplified by the lamb's flight from
the wolf.30There are a very few occasions, however,whereThomasdoes make
use of instinctusnaturae to refer to humanbehavior,sometimes in the context
of speaking about the naturallaw. These exceptions, to which we now turn,
serve to explicate andexemplify the reasonswhy he endorsedUlpian's view of
the naturallaw, and why he acknowledgedan involuntaryand instinctive,not
merely an inclinational,element in it.
In consideringwhetherall the moralpreceptsof the Old Law come under
the law of nature,Thomasbegins by posing an objectionbased on the assump-
tion that"instructionstandsin contrastwith the law of nature,since the latteris
not learnt,but arises from naturalinstinct[ex naturaliinstinctu]."3'Laterin the
same question he asserts again, in the languageof Isidore, that "The ceremo-
nial andjudicial precepts[of the law] derivetheirforce as applicationsof those
of the decalogue from the fact of their institution,and not from [the force of]
naturalinstinct[ex vi naturalisinstinctus],as do the additionalmoralprecepts."
Accordingly,duringthe time before positive moralcodes of law existed, when
men were governed by the law of nature,it was their "interiorinstinct alone
[solo interioriinstinctu]thatpromptedthemto worshipGod,"and correspond-
ingly "it was men's interiorinstinct likewise that determinedwhich sensible
things they should use in the worshipof God."32So instinctusnaturaeoperates
in mankindas a stimulus, source, or groundof the naturallaw. It is contrasted
with discursive reason representedhere by learning and with the process of
institutingpositive law.
Instinctusnaturaealso serves to identifythe originof the basic unpremedi-
tated act of humanwill, the spontaneousimpulse of attractionthat follows but
is virtually identical with man's perceptionof the good. While we may "have
free decision with respect to the things we do not will by necessity or natural
instinct [naturaliinstinctu],"Thomas stipulatesthat"theprimordialact of will
is not ordainedand appointedby reason,but,as we have noted, springsfrom an
instinctof nature[instinctunaturae]or a highercause."33 His referenceto man's
"naturaltendencyto the good [naturaliinstinctuboni]"and "wish to be happy
by an instinctive drive [naturaleminstinctum]which is not of our own free

30 Ibid., I-II, 50, 3.

31 Ibid.,I-II, 100, 1.
32 Ibid., III, 60, 5; see also II-II, 93, 1.
33 Ibid., I, 19, 10 and I-II, 17, 5. The second quotation echoes the De bona fortuna, a
medievalcompilationof translatedextractsfromAristotle'sEudemianEthicsand Magna
MoraliawhichAquinasalso cites in I-II,9, 4 and I-II,68, 1. See XXIV,Appendix6: "St.
Thomas'sUse of the De BonaFortuna," and"Fortune, FateandChance"in Dictionaryof the
Historyof Ideas(NewYork,1973),II, 227.

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184 RobertA. Greene

choice" can be subsumedunderthis primordialact of will.34This expressionof

the "very teleology of nature itself," this spontaneousmovement of the will
towardsthe good is simultaneouswith the recognitionof the "firstillumina-
tion"of the practicalintellect, the first and basic preceptof the naturallaw: the
good is to be pursuedand evil to be avoided.35
Thomas frequentlyaffirmsthatthe divine law is providedto men as an aid
to the naturallaw. That conviction is the context in Book III of the Summa
contra gentiles for his use of instinctus naturae to describe two involuntary
impulses of the will towardsthe good that are integralto the naturallaw. He
points out "thatwe are directedby the divine law to the love of our neighbor"
and notes that "it is naturalto all men to love one another,a proof of which is
thata man, by a kind of naturalinstinct [quodamnaturali instinctu],comes to
the assistanceof anyoneeven unknownthatis in need."36 Two questionslaterin
discussing divine worship and religion he comments that man "by a kind of
naturalinstinct [quodamnaturali instinctu] feels himself obliged in his own
way to show reverenceto God, from whom flows his being and every good."37
There is an obvious accord between Christ's revealed epitome of the divine
law, to love God and to love one's neighboras oneself, and these two impulses
attributedto naturalinstinct.
In a discussion of the indissolubility of human marriage,which inciden-
tally twice links instinctusnaturaeto an echo from Ulpian'spassage aboutthe
naturallaw (marisetfeminae conjunctio),Thomasnotes thatprocreation,alone
of naturalacts, is directedto the common good, that is, to the preservationof
the species and consequently,"it is contraryto the naturalinstinctof the human
species [contranaturaleminstinctumhumanaespeciei] thathusbandand wife
be separated."38 The argumentproceeds: law is made for the common good,
thereforeprocreationshould be regulatedby laws both humanand divine.

Now positive laws shouldbe based on naturalinstinct[oportetquod ex

naturali instinctuprocedant] if they be human:even as in demonstra-
tive sciences, all human discoveries must needs be founded on prin-

34 Aquinas, SummaTheologiae, I, 113, 1 and I, 19, 10. CompareI, 18, 3: "But although
our intellect is self-actuatedin certain ways, still certain things are providedfor it by nature,
e.g. first principles, aboutwhich it has no choice, and the ultimateend, which it is not free not
to will."
35 Brown, 33-35: "But what exactly is that 'first illumination'of the
practicalmind that is
the cognitive reflection [conceptio naturalis] of the very teleology of natureitself? In the De
veritate Thomas had referredto the same reality under the rubricof synderesis...."
36 Thomas
Aquinas, Summacontra gentiles, III, 117, translationfrom The Summacontra
Gentiles of St. ThomasAquinas (London, 1923-29).
37 Ibid., III, 119.
38
Ibid., III, 123.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 185

ciples naturallyknown.And if they be divine, not only do they express

the instinctof nature,butthey also supplythe defect of naturalinstinct:
even as the things that God reveals, are beyond the grasp of natural
reason.39

This assertionthatpositive humanlaws should be based on naturalinstinct

is here supportedby a frequentlycited analogy between the operationsof the
practical and the speculative intellects both of which, Thomas says, depend
upon principles naturallyknown. An expanded version of this same analogy
plays a prominentrole in his explanationof the natureof synderesisin boththe
De veritate and more than once in the Summatheologiae.40There he explains
that in both practicaland speculativereasoning the movementof the mind is
based upon

the understandingof some few thingsknown naturallypriorto rational

analysis....Theremustbe naturallysureprinciplesgoverningour prac-
tice just as there are governing thought.... Hence the principles our
nature impartsto us in practical matters do not belong to a special
power but to a special habit thereby nature,synderesis.41

These parallel passages indicate that the "naturallysure" practicalprin-

ciples of the naturallaw recognizedby synderesisoriginate(procedant)or are
in some sense attributableto instinctusnaturae.YetThomastook care neverto
use instinctus naturae to name, define or characterizesynderesis, which re-
mainedfor him a habitof the intellect engaged in an intuitiverationalrecogni-
tion of basic moral principles. Because instinctusnaturae was, by definition,
opposedto reasonandfree choice he was unwillingto use it even of synderesis's
prediscursiveand immediatecognitivegrasp(conceptio naturalis)by the intel-
lect of practical principles.42That reluctance is not shared, however, by his
moder critics, editors and translators,who regularlydrift into employing in-
stinct to explain and interprethis views of synderesisand on occasion to trans-
late inclinatio. Thomas Gilby, for example, calls Aquinas's synderesis "anin-
stinctive habitin the practicalreason."43 Brown acknowledges"two analogous
butdistinctnotionsof naturallaw"in Thomas'sthinking,"onedeterminateand
instinctual,the otherextendedandratiocinative,and identifiessynderesisas an
instinct without explicitly saying so."44

39Ibid., III, 123.

40ThomasAquinas, Quaestionesde veritate, 17; Summatheologiae, I, 79, 12; I-II, 100, 1;
I-II, 94, 2, 4.
41 Ibid., I-II, 79, 12.
42 Brown, 34.
43Aquinas, Summatheologiae, XVIII, 157.
4 See Brown, 34-43.

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186 RobertA. Greene

The developmentsthathave led moderncritics and editors to use the word

instinctwhen speakingof Aquinas's presentationof synderesisbegan with St.
Bonaventure,his contemporary,whose revival and elaborationof an earlier
understandingof synderesis45led naturallyto its explicit identificationas an
instinctusnaturae.In a decision referredto by one of Thomas'seditors as "not
lacking in insight"46St. Bonaventureshifted the groundunder synderesis by
arguingthat it was, strictly speaking, a habit of the naturalas opposed to the
deliberativewill, ratherthan of the intellect.As such, it operatedin the sphere
of man's affective and emotional life. In attributingsynderesis to the natural
will Bonaventurewas confirming a position that had been implicit in Peter
Lombard'scitationof Jerome'soriginaluse of the term synderesisin his com-
mentaryon Ezekiel. Peter had quoted Jerome'spassage in his Sentences in a
discussion of the paradoxof man's divided will to supporthis assertion that
"Manis thereforerightly said naturallyto want what is good because he was
constructedwith a good and righteouswill."47
This notice of synderesisin the Sentences stimulateda centuryof intricate
scholastic debate:did synderesisbelong to the will or to the intellect?Was it a
power, habit or act? Was it innate or acquired?Was it affected by sin? Was it
inextinguishableor indefectible?What was its relationto conscience and the
naturallaw? The consensus thatBonaventureinheritedwas thatsynderesiswas
an intellectualhabitof primarypracticalprinciplesthatoperatedin an intuitive,
indefectible, inextinguishableand non-discursivemanner.
During this debate the operationof synderesis had been regularlyand in-
variably described as instigating (instigare) men to the good and protesting
(murmurare)against evil. These affective terms probablyowe their origin to
the rhetoricof Jerome'spassage; he quotedboth the new and old testamentsto
suggest a connection between the "ineffablegroaning"of man's spirit (Ro-
mans 8:26) and synderesisand to suggest thatits suppressionwas revealedin a
failure to experience shame and to blush (Proverbs 18:3 and Jeremiah3:3).
Bonaventurebegins his considerationof whethersynderesisbelongs to appre-
hension or desire by citing this "ineffablegroaning"of man's spirit in support
of his argumentfor desire. When he comes to state his conclusion about the
natureof synderesis, he chooses a biblical metaphoronce again over the lan-
guage of logical abstraction.Synderesis is for him a pondus or weight, a term
that implies the inexorable and directed force of gravity.The source of this
metaphoris Wisdom 11:20, where God is spokenof as arranging"all things by
measure and numberand weight." In his BreviloquiumBonaventuretells us

45
See Timothy C. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge,1980), 96, for
his translationof Philip the Chancellor (d. 1236) citing John of Damascus on synderesis and
the naturalwill.
46 Aquinas, Summatheologiae, I, 79, 12n.
47 Quoted from Potts, 93.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 187

that in this verse pondus is a figurativeexpression for the operationof final

causality in the ordainedorderof God's creation,a naturalteleological move-
ment or pressurein every creaturetowardsthe good.48

[J]ustas the intellectualpart[of the soul] has, since its very creation,a
light which is a naturaltribunalfor it, directing the intellect towards
what can be apprehended,so too desire has a certainnatural[pondusor
weight], directingit to what is desirable. ... And just as "conscientia"
only namesjudgement which is directed to behavior,so "synderesis"
only names that [pondus] of the will, or the will with that [pondus],
which makes it turnto good things which are honorable.49

Here Bonaventureretainsand acknowledgesin traditionaltermsthe dispo-

sition of the intellect to exercise the light of natureto recognize the primary
general principlesof moral action, but he reserves the term synderesisfor the
parallel naturalmovementof the will. In the same discussion he joins calor to
pondus to characterizesynderesisand elsewhere he proposesthe analogy that
synderesis is to conscience as caritas is to fidem.50So synderesis has now
become the termfor that involuntaryorientationand movementof the natural
will in the affective part of man's soul, experienced as directly as weight or
warmthand expressedas spontaneouslyas Jerome'sgroaningof the remorse-
ful spiritus hominis.
Neither the naturalrecognition by the intellect of general principles, as
opposed to its deliberativejudgment about particulars,nor the naturalmove-
ment of the will, as opposed to its deliberativemovement, are governed by
man's free will. Consequently,neitheris subject to error.It is not surprising,
then, to find Bonaventurespeaking on one occasion of a "doubleinstinct, of
appetite and cognition,"where instinctusis clearly being used of both the ha-
bitual action of the practicalintellect called synderesisby St. Thomas, and of
the habitual action of the natural will which is called synderesis by St.
Bonaventure.5More typically,however,he uses instinctusnaturaeof the natu-
ral will "bywhich we desiresomethingby naturalinstinct,"an actionhe equates
with synderesis,andto characterizethetraditionaloperationof synderesis,"mur-
muring against evil."52
The novelty of Bonaventure'srelocation of synderesis in the naturalwill
has long been noted;whathas notbeenremarkedis his coincidentalandcomple-
mentary adoption of instinctusnaturae to characterizeit. John F. Quinn, for
48
Bonaventure,Breviloquium,tr. E. E. Nemmers (London, 1946), 49-50.
49 Bonaventure,In SententiariumIV in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1882-1902), II, 910,
translationfrom Potts, 116.
50 Ibid., II, 911.
51
Ibid., II, 1003.
52
Ibid., II, 686 and 566.

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188 RobertA. Greene

example, in his meticuloussynthesisof Bonaventure'sviews on the naturallaw

gives the term instinct central prominencein explaininghis understandingof
synderesis, but is surprisinglysilent about that very fact. Quinn's choice of
instinctto translatepondusin the passageaboveaccuratelyreflectsBonaventure's
own language.53
Bonaventure'spreferencefor a biblical metaphorto define synderesis, his
transferof it from the intellect to the naturalwill, and his identificationof it as
an instinctusnaturaeare partof the generalappropriationof the termby mys-
tical writers in the later Middle Ages. In the ItinerariumBonaventureplaces
synderesis in a uniquely superiorposition at the top of the soul's six gradated
powers in its ascent towardsGod: "thesenses, the imagination,the reason, the
understanding,the intelligenceandthe apexmentisor the sparkof synderesis."54
Such placementsupportsthe analogies which had been drawnearlierbetween
synderesisand nous and hegemonikonin the effort to indicateits preeminence
in the soul. In the next century and a half a numberof mystical writers en-
shrinedsynderesisas the pinnacle of the soul, the flashpointof humancontact
with the divine, and invented a variety of metaphors,synonyms, and epithets
for it: principalis affectio (Thomas Gallus), grunt (Eckhart), viinkelein
(Ruiusbroec),scintilla (Bonaventure,Eckhart),semen (Eckhart),apex mentis
(Bonaventure),portio virginalis animae (Gerson).55
One exampleof Bonaventure'sinfluence in this mattergenerallyandespe-
cially among his fellow Franciscansmay be found in the views of Nicholas of
Ockhamwho, writinga few decades laterin 1290, welcomes bothpondus and
instinctusnaturaeintohis explanationof synderesis.Incontrastto Bonaventure's
incidental and unselfconscious use of instinctusnaturae as a designation for
synderesis,Nicholas puts it forwardas the centraltermin his formal definition
and makes explicit the implied analogy with animalbehavior.

Synderesis is a certain naturalinstinct in the soul or in the rational

mind which follows on this kind of opinion [the judgement of con-
science] andstimulatespursuingwhatis good andfleeing whatis evil....
For as we see on the partof sensitivebeings thata sheep, seeing a wolf,
flees at once by naturalinstinct and that a lamb follows its mother,so
we are able to understandthat there is such a naturalinstinct in the
rational soul stimulatingto the pursuitof honorablegood and flight
from evil. ThereforeI would say that synderesisis the direct and for-

53 John F. Quinn, "St. Bonaventure's FundamentalConception of Natural Law," in S.

Bonaventura1274-1974 (Rome, 1973), III, 571-98. Potts translatespondus as bias on 116.
54 Bonaventure, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, I, 6 in Worksof Saint Bonaventure, ed.
Philotheus Boehner and Sr. Frances Laughlin (Saint Bonaventure,1956), II, 41.
55See Dictionnairede
Spiritualite(Paris, 1932), s.v., andEndrev. Ivanka,Plato Christianus
(Einsiedeln, 1964), 315-51.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 189

mal term for that instinct,and that it operatesprincipallyin the affec-

tive partof the soul.... It is a sort of naturalweight [pondus] towards
the good.56

Nicholas goes on to say that althoughin a formal sense synderesisdesig-

nates an habitualmovementof the affective partof the soul, in a largersense
(materialiterloquendo)it refersto both the power of the intellect to recognize
the primaryprinciplesof practicalmoral action and the habitualinclinationin
the will towardsthe good. Accordingly,it is "thewhole of that supremecapac-
ity by which man naturallyapprehendsthe good, whetherit be poweror habit,
with respectto the naturallaw."The use of synderesisto cover both intellectual
recognition of practicalprinciplesand the spontaneousmovement of the will
and affections towardsthe good was widespreadin the laterMiddle Ages.
Of course the proteanterm instinctusnaturae continuedto be used to ex-
press whateverassumptionsits user had formedabouthumannature.Henryof
Freimarthe Elder57(1245-1340), for example, Preacherof the Orderof Augus-
tinian Hermits, follows Hilary,Augustine, and Bracton in inveighing against
the corruptinginfluence of instinctus naturae in his widely read Libellus de
quottuor instinctibus scilicet divino: angelico: diabolico: et humano sive
naturali.This guide for the discernmentof spiritsidentifies instinctusnaturae
with the proudand complacentself-love that turnsits back on God.
JeanGersonmay have been counteringopinions such as Henry'sa century
later when he defined various meanings of instinctusin a brief handbookfor
studentsof moraltheology. His inclusion of instinctusnaturaewith termssuch
as jus, liberumarbitrium,and lex naturae gave it the statusof a termof art in
ethics and anthropology.His definition of it, unlike Henry's, is balanced if
somewhattautological:instinctusnaturae is a divine gift guiding all creatures
to theirappointedends even if it is open, in the case of man,to distortionby the
sensuality arising from original sin.

The proper and intrinsic instinct of natureis a strong tendency of a

thing, which watches out for its own interestsfrom a gift of God, to
achieve its own goal mediatelyor immediately....An appetiteof nature
is the same thing as a naturalinstinct.... The instinct of naturewhich
has been corruptedin its sensual aspect is a strong tendency of the
sensualaspect towardsits own objects, throughnot heeding the ruleof
reason-it comes to us from the sin of our first parents.The law of

56 D. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux Xlle et Xllle siecles (Louvain, 1948), II-I,
336.
57 See Dictionnaire de Spiritualit6,s.v.

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190 RobertA. Greene

corruptednatureis the same thing, the lex membrorum,the same, the

fomes peccati, the same, the denial of originaljustice, the same.58

The influenceof Gerson'shandbookwas greatlyextendedby the incorporation

of some of its definitions, including this one, in JohannesAltensteig's Voca-
bularius theologie (1517).59
Gerson'smystical theology restedupon his theorythatthereare two paral-
lel sets of three cognitive and three affective powers in man with synderesis
placed at the peak of the affective powers, paired with intelligentia simplex,
pure intelligence.60Gerson taughtthat original sin had had a more destructive
effect upon the cognitive thanupon the affective powersof the soul. His meta-
phorical/mysticalterm for synderesis, the virginal part of the soul, reflected
that view. Given the definitionjust quoted, it is not surprisingto find him also
referringto it as an instinctumindelebitem,an indelible instinct, and as an
instinctusnaturalis in boni, a definition given currencyin Altensteig's dictio-
nary underthe entrysynderesis.
Henry'sAugustiniancoloring of instinctusnaturaelaterbecame the object
of correctivecommentaryby Denys of Ryckel (1402-71), in itself a testimony
to the popularityof Henry's book. Denys rehabilitatesinstinctus naturae by
identifying it with the biblical spiritus hominis and with synderesis, confirm-
ing their familiarassociation in the late Middle Ages. He arguesthat:

naturalreasonor the spiritof manby synderesisalwaysmurmursagainst

evil and naturallyinclines to the good.... Furthermore,according to
philosophers and theologians reason naturallytends toward the best
things.Thereforethe naturalinstinctof reasoninclines towardswhatis
true and good; it should not, therefore,be shunned.

After rehearsingthe familiar analogy between first principles in speculative

and practicalmatters,he concludes that, "Thereforethe naturalinstinctof the
soul throughthese habits naturallymoves towardthe true and the good."61
The medieval habit of linking instinctusnaturae with synderesis colored
the meaningof the English word instinct.After recordingthe primarybut now
obsolete meaningof the wordas "instigation;impulse;prompting,"the Oxford
English Dictionary then limits that concept by adding, "innate ... naturalor

58
Jean Gerson,Definitiones terminorumtheologiae moralis, in Oeuvres Completes,ed. P.
Glorieux (Paris, 1960-), IX, 140.
59 Altensteig's lexicon was republishedin 1576, 1579, 1580, 1583, and 1619.
60 See the account in Steven E.
Ozment,Homo Spiritualis(Leiden, 1969), 49-83. Gerson's
terminology led to an English epithet for synderesis, the pure part of conscience.
61 Denys of Ryckel, De discretioneet examinatione
spirituumin Opera Omnia(Montreuil,
1896-1935), XL, 297-99.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 191

spontaneous"to define a second sense of instinct, "formerlyapplicableto the

naturaltendencies of inanimatethings."It then struggles to express, in a two-
part, sixty-eight-worddefinition, a third meaning which extends the second
meaning to sentientand then intelligentbeings:

An innate propensityin organizedbeings ... varying with the species,

and manifestingitself in acts which appearto be rational,but are per-
formed without conscious design.... Also, the faculty supposed to be
involved in this operation(formerlyoften regardedas a kind of intui-
tive knowledge).

The laconic second partof this definition, with its focus on humanas distinct
from animalknowledge, bringsthe meaningcloser to synderesis:"Anyfaculty
acting like animal instinct;intuition."
Falstaff's inventivereparteein Henry IV, Part I (1596-97) is cited as the
first occurrenceof this thirdmeaning. In fact, however, a much earlieruse of
instinct in a context that clearly links it with synderesis can be found in the
MiddleEnglishDictionary.In the MappulaAngliae(1447) of OsbemBokenham
instinct of "naturallereson & kyndly gratitude"is spoken of as moving man to
the establishmentof positive laws for the ceremonial honor and worship of
God.

Very naturallereson & kyndly gratitudedetermynythetat every secte

& dyversite of namys & mannys lyf schulde alle-wey dyfferryn &
reverencycegod-heed & honorwryne& worschipynehit wt sum righte
or syngulercerymonye.Throughebe whiche ynstynnctmevid& steryd,
Molmucius, the XXIII kynge of the Brytouns ... made a statute.62

It was EdwardHerbert,eccentric cosmopolitan diplomat, poet, and phi-

losopher,who revivedthe terminstinctusnaturae and gave it somethingof the
recognized status that synderesishad enjoyed in the Middle Ages. His efforts
to combat both the growing skepticismand religious enthusiasmof the time in
his De Veritateof 1624 were read and commentedon respectfullyif critically
by Descartes, Grotius,and Gassendi.Those efforts were dedicatedto reassert-
ing a mainstreamconfidenceof past Europeanthinking:thatthe congruenceor
conformity between the spiritus hominis and external creationwas theologi-
cally and metaphysicallygiven, and that some agency, here a providential,te-
leological supra-discursiveinstinctusnaturae ensuredand mediatedthat con-

62
Osber Bokenham, Mappula Angliae in Englische Studien, 10 (1887), 14. See also
Francis Bacon's definition of the moral law, quoted in Greene, "Synderesis,"214.

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192 RobertA. Greene

formity ("it is the faculty which conforms ... independently of discursive

thought"),thus enabling the humanmind to know truth.63
His contemporariesrightly complained that turgid Latin interferedwith
the clear presentationof Herbert'sthinking,but there is no doubt that his em-
ployment and understandingof the idea of an instinctusnaturae, startingwith
the term itself ("any who find this term antiquatedmay demand anotherof
me") is directly indebted to the synderesis tradition.To cite one obvious and
unexpected example Herbert devotes two pages to emphasizing the inex-
tinguishabilityof instinctusnaturaein mankindeven afterdeath, a topic regu-
larly treatedin the medieval synderesisdebate.64
Instinctusnaturaeretainsfor Herbertits broadestequivalencewith natura
naturans-a superintendentstimulusof divineprovidencein all creation,thereby
invitingcomparisonwith HenryMore's Spiritof Natureand RalphCudworth's
plastic nature.Because his subjectis truth,however,his focus remainsepiste-
mological, and his attention is directed primarily towards the operation of
instinctusnaturae in man. As such instinctusnaturaeis both a reified faculty
of the mind "whichconforms ... independentlyof discursivethought,"and the
state of such conformity "expressedin apprehension."65
It is the "immediateinstrumentof divine Providence, some measure of
which is imprintedon our mind."The productsof this conformityof natural
instinctarecommonnotions,"sacredprinciples"-these, "farfrombeing drawn
from experienceor observation"are necessary,like those of synderesis,to ex-
perience and observation.Ourexperiencewould be meaningless "unlessthere
existed withinus, in the shapeof notions imprintedin the mind, thatanalogous
faculty by which we distinguishgood from evil."These "deliverancesof natu-
ral instinctattainthe first degreeof certainty";they areself-evident in thatthey
"standupon the conviction given directly by themselves."Naturalinstinct is
the first of human faculties, while discursive reason and free will come last.
Among the discoveries of naturalinstinct are "the Principles that there are
some actions that we ought to perform,others which we ought to shun."Re-
peating medieval convictions about synderesis Herbert asserts that eternal
blessedness or beatitudeand self-preservationof soul andbody are the "neces-
sary objects of naturalinstinct."These principles and truths shine forth "an
image of the divine wisdom."In fact in naturalinstinct and common notions
"God has bestowed on us ... some portion of His divine wisdom."66

63 Edward
Herbert, De Veritate,tr. Meyrick H. Carre (Bristol, 1937), 122. See R. D.
Bedford, The Defence of Truth(Manchester,1979), 83.
64Herbert,De Veritate,117, 123-25.
65 Ibid., 122.

66 Ibid., 122, 105, 163, 137, 120, 189, 121, 126.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 193

Sir Matthew Hale, while no philosopher,was perhaps the most learned

judge of his day.67His posthumous The Primitive Origin of Mankind(1677)
and a manuscriptentitled "Treatiseof the Nature of Lawes in Generall and
touchingthe Law of Nature"68 provideexamples of his frequentuse of the term
rationalinstinct as a synonym for both naturallaw and synderesis. Hale was
inclined both by professionaltraining69and temperamentto preservethe wis-
dom of the past, yet he had a facility for translatingthat wisdom into contem-
porary terminology. Thus as late as the 1670s Hale takes for granted the
Thomistic view that synderesisrefers to the non-discursiveintellectualcogni-
tion of moral principles, while his attention is preoccupied with explaining
how what he terms "thatrational instinct in man which we call the law of
nature"operatesas an affective synderesisof the will or a "kindof biass bind-
ing and inclining the reasonable nature to moral goodness."70The medieval
view of natureis still evidentin his referencesto sensitive instinctsin "sensible
and vegetative natures"and to the "naturalinstincts of things inanimate."He
invents the oxymoronic term rational instinct to identify the "primordialin-
stincts in the reasonable soul" which are superiorbut "analogicalto the in-
stincts of inferioranimals."7'He can move in the same sentencefrom medieval
terms such as power and habit to language that is predictiveof Shaftesbury's
and Hutcheson'smoral sense.

[T]he animalinstinctsareof an inferiorallay andnatureanddo specifi-

cally differ from the rational instincts in man. The one being only a
power of the animal soul and the other a habit or force of the intellec-
tual soul the one a sensitive or animal instinctthe other a rationaland
moral instinct.7

The late medieval hypothesis of a double synderesis seems to have led

Hale to endorse a double "Insitionof the Law of Naturein the humaneSoul."
His confident exposition of the "primaryIncision of the laws of rationalna-
ture"in his copious style providesnumeroussynonyms for the practicalmoral
principlestraditionallydiscoveredand preservedby synderesis:"commonno-
tions; anticipations; intellective Principles; connatural characters;rational

67
See Alan Cromartie,Sir MatthewHale 1609-1676 (Cambridge, 1995).
68 British Library,MS Hargrave485.
69
For other references to synderesis by lawyers see, for example, ChristopherSt. Ger-
man, Doctor and Student (London, 1528), John Marston, The Scourge of Villainie (London,
1598), Bacon, see n. 62 above, Hale and James Dalrymple Stair, The Institutionsof the Laws
of Scotland (Edinburgh,1681).
70Hargrave,ff67v and 61.
71 The Primitive Origin of Mankind (London, 1677), 353 and 61; Hargrave,f61'; The

Works,Moral and Religious, of Sir MatthewHale, ed. T. Thirlwall (London, 1805), 384.
72
Hargrave,f67.

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194 RobertA. Greene

Noemata; inscriptionsor signatures;concreatedrudiments;real Characters."

St. Paul's assurancethat such laws or notions were "writtenin the heart"led
Hale and others to use a series of inscriptionmetaphorsthat implied the exist-
ence of innate ideas. These "commonnotions of moralgood and evil, of deco-
rumand turpe"are accordingly"engraven;implanted;inscribed;characterized
and lodged,"and are therefore"congeniteand connatural,"in the naturalcon-
science "and in the synderesis,""engraven... antecedentlyto any discursive
Ratiocination."73
But Hale's acceptance of innate moral ideas is not entirely naive. Well
before Locke rejected such ideas and well before Shaftesburyhad dismissed
the entire controversyas "one of the childishest disputes that ever was,"Hale
was acknowledgingthe objections of those who believed that the mind was a
tabula rasa, and agreeingthatthe self-evidence of common notions explained
theiruniversalityas persuasivelyas their innateinscriptionin the mind.74
More importantly,he proposed a "secondaryInsition of the Law of Na-
ture"based upon naturalinstinct.Herbert'sinfluenceis evident in Hale's argu-
ment thatthis rationalinstinctis the expressionof the epistemological congru-
ity of the faculties of intellect and will with, respectively,basic intellectiveand
moraltruthsin the understandingand with "thosemental sentimentsof Good
and Evil that in their discovery concern immediately the Understandingor
Synderesis, but in their exercise concern more immediately the Will."75His
termrationalinstinctis Janus-facedin looking backto its long associationwith
synderesisand the naturallaw, and ahead, in the company of Hale's cognates
moralinstinct,moralsentiment,andmoralinclination,to the languagein which
Hutchesonpresentshis theoryof an internalmoralsense. In fact the last quota-
tion continues with analogies to the congruityof the external senses of sight
and taste with their objects:

That as we see by a certain connaturalcongruity between the visive

Faculty and the visible Object,and as we tast by a connaturalcongru-
ity between the Facultyandthe Objectof Tast;so there is a connatural
congruity between the intellective and volitive Faculties in the Soul,
and those communianoemata of these great importanttruthsboth in-
tellective and moral, whereby the Soul perceives, and relisheth, and
tastethtrue and good, and inclines to it.76

73 The terms in this paragraphare quoted from: PrimitiveOrigin, 60, 64, and 352, Works,
384 and Hargrave,f63v.
74Works,384.
75Primitive Origin, 352.
76 In
Hargrave68VHale anticipates Hutcheson in speaking of "moral beauty, sympathy
and antipathy, and connatural sympathy" which operate prediscursively and lead to moral
"approbationand disapprobation."See also James H. Tufts, "Note on the Idea of a 'Moral
Sense' in British Thought Prior to Shaftesbury,"The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods, 1 (1904), 97-98.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 195

This congruityresultsin the soul havinga "certainrationalInstinctengravenin

the very Make and constitutionof it ... wherebyit is pre-disposed,inclined and
byassed to the good and convenience proportionableto a rationaland intellec-
tual Life."77
FrancisHutchesonis rememberedandhis books readtodayfor his detailed
elaborationanddefense of the internalmoralsense thatShaftesburyhad named
anddescribedin his moreelegant and gracefulway in 1696. Hutcheson'spref-
erence for Shaftesbury'sterm has obscured the fact that "a kind Instinct of
Nature,a secret Bond between us and our Fellow-Creatures"78 is the founda-
tion for his theory of the moral sense, although his contemporaries,Balguy,
Gay, and Taylorsaw this clearly and criticizedhim on precisely this point.
Against the restrictionof the naturalmotives of man to the single instinct
of self-preservation,self interest or self love by those moder interpretersof
the naturallaw, Hobbes and Pufendorf,Hutchesonreassertsthe ancientclaims
of that"practicaldispositionto Virtueimplantedin our nature,"the "instinctto
benevolence"experiencedas "kindAffections"or "some Instinct,antecedent
to all Reason from Interest,which influences us to the Love of others."79In his
first publication,Reflections on the CommonSystems of Morality (1724) he
makespassing referenceto those "generousinstinctstowardfriendship,societ-
ies, families,"the productof the "wise orderof nature."80A few monthslaterhe
laments that "the old Notions of natural Affections, and kind Instincts, the
Sensus communis,the Decorum and Honestum,are almost banish'dout of our
Books of Morals."8'It was Hutcheson'saim to reinstatethese notions as legiti-
mate elements of the naturallaw.
His view is thatthereare two original "naturaldeterminationsof the will"
directedrespectivelytowarddisinterestedand self-interestedends, towardpub-
lic good and privategood.82

The ultimateEnd propos'dby the commonMoralists is the Happiness

of the Agent himself, and this certainlyhe is determin'dto pursuefrom
Instinct:Now may not anotherInstincttowardthe Publick,or the Good
of others, be as proper a Principle of Virtue,as the Instinct toward
private Happiness?

77 Primitive Origin, 60.

78 Francis Hutcheson,Reflections upon Laughterand Remarksupon the Fable of the Bees
in CollectedWorks(Hildesheim,1971),VII, 86.
79FrancisHutcheson,An Inquiryinto the Original of our Idea of Beautyand Virtue(Lon-
don, 1725),218, 143.
80Published firstin TheLondonJournalthisessayhasbeeneditedby ThomasMautnerin
FrancisHutcheson,On HumanNature(Cambridge,1993),99-100.
81
Hutcheson, Reflections upon Laughter,79.
82 Francis
Hutcheson,A System of Moral Philosophy (London, 1755), 9, 57.

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196 RobertA. Greene

To those who were incredulousat the supposition of "disinterestedLove to

others"or a "benevolentuniversalInstinct,"

It may be answer'd,that the same Cause which determinesus to pur-

sue Happiness for our selves, determinesus both to Esteem and Be-
nevolence on their properOccasion; even the very Frame of our Na-
ture, or a generous Instinct.83

As there is a double instinct arising from "the present Constitutionof our

Nature"toward public and privategood so there is a double instinct that ex-
plains both our attractionto, and our moralapprovalof, benevolence.The "In-
stinct to desire the Happiness of every sensitive Nature"producesin us "kind
Affections" and "a natural Propensityto Benevolence";these in turn are re-
flected on or respondedto by an internalsense-"Whoever dislikes this Name
may substitute another,"Hutcheson remarks-which he calls a moral sense
and defines as a "Determinationof our Mind to approve every kindAffection
eitherin ourselves or others."Both the originalkind affectionsandthe determi-
nation to "love and approve, or hate and despise"84them are experienced
affectively and arise from the instinctof nature.
The first definition of the moral sense offered by Hutcheson in his first
book An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue(1725)
makesno use of the terminstinct:"ADeterminationof the Mind,to receiveany
Ideafrom the Presence of an Objectwhichoccurs to us, independentlyon [sic]
our Will."85His initial reluctanceto speak of this "Determination"as an in-
stinct, later abandoned,may be due to his awarenessof the criticism the term
invitedfrom some quarters.His defensive comments at the end of the Inquiry,
as well as the parenthesiswith respect to the term internalsense just quoted,
indicate his awarenessin 1725 that skeptics viewed his theory as yet another
recourseto the discreditedauthorityof innate ideas, the instinct of nature,or
occult qualities. He freely admits that this "naturalDeterminationto approve
and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is no doubt an occult Quality" but
argues that this determinationis no more mysterious than many observable
facts of humanexistence such as that "theAct of Volition should move Flesh
and Bones."86
In 1728 JohnBalguy took Hutchesonto taskfor adoptingan explanationof
moral good based upon instinct in both the Inquiry and in An Essay on the

83
Hutcheson,An Inquiry, 175-77, and 131.
84Francis Hutcheson,An
Essay on the Natureand Conductof the Passions and Affections
with Illustrationson the Moral Sense (London, 1742), 47, 337-38; An Inquiry,252; An Essay,
5, 213; An Inquiry, 246.
85
An Inquiry, 109.
86 Ibid., 246.

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Natural Law, Synderesis,and the Moral Sense 197

Nature and Conductof the Passions and Affections with Illustrationson the
Moral Sense (1728).87In 1731 JohnGay rejectedhis theoryof the moral sense
precisely because it was presentedas an instinct:

the Moral Sense and Public Affection, he supposes to be implantedin

us like Instincts,independentof Reason, and previousto any instruc-
tion ... by calling these Instincts, I think he stops too soon ... when he
might have traced them much higher ... by showing, that our Approba-
tion of Morality,and all Affections whatsoever,are finally resolvable
onto Reason pointing out private Happiness.88

These criticismsundoubtedlyled Hutchesonto interpolatean explanatory

passage about the meaning of instinct in the fourth edition89of the Essay in
1742. Here he attemptsto clarify his use of instinct with reference to moral
merit, necessaryand free actions, determinationsof the will with and without
knowledge of any end and, finally, the lower instincts of brutes.

What then can be meant by being excited by Reason, as distinct from

all Motion of Instinctsor Affections?Some perhapstakethe Word[In-
stinct] solely for such Motions of Will,or bodily Powers,as determine
us without Knowledge or Intentionof any End. Such Instinctscannot
be the Springof Virtue.But the soul may be as naturallydeterminedto
Approbationof certainTempersand Affections, and to the Desire of
certain Events when it has an Idea of them, as Brutes are, by their
lower Instincts,to theirActions. If any quarrelthe Applicationof the
WordInstinctto any thing higherthanwhat we find in Brutes,let them
use anotherWord.90

He struggleshere to separatethe higherinstinctof naturespecific to man from

the blind instinctsof bruteanimals, to claim for it an authenticityas "natural,
necessaryand ultimateas externalSensations,"91 and a moralauthorityequiva-
lent to thatof an affective synderesis.This determinationof the soul to appro-

87
John Balguy, The Foundationof Moral Goodness (London, 1728) in L. A. Selby-Bigge
(ed.), British Moralists (New York, 1964), II, 59-101.
88 John Gay, PreliminaryDissertation concerning the FundamentalPrinciple of Virtueor
Morality.This essay was added as a preface to the first translatededition of William King, An
Essay on the Origin of Evil (London, 1731), xxxi-xxxii, originally published in 1718 as De
Origine Mali.
89 This fourth edition of 1742 is mistakenlycalled the third edition on the title page.
90Hutcheson, An Essay, 291-92. In two footnotes in the first edition, here and on 51,
Hutchesonhad praisedWilliam King's De Origine Mali. Now in this interpolationhe adds his
response to Gay's criticism of 1731.
9' Ibid., xi.

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198 RobertA. Greene

bation and desire of the good is a naturaland higher instinct, an internalmoral

sense and, by definition,an affective synderesis.92Furtherhints thatthe moral
sense is a new term for synderesis are to be found in Hutcheson's inaugural
address of 1730, in which he speaks of "that moral sense that we also call
naturalconscience"andidentifiesit, as synderesishadbeen identified,with the
Stoic to hegemonikon,the rulingprincipleof the soul.
Writing in 1734-37, a few years before he interpolatedthe passage just
quoted, he uses the word instinct at the beginning of A System of Moral Phi-
losophy to designate the two basic determinationsof the will, interestedand
disinterested.He appendsthe following footnoteof explanation.It supportsthe
conclusion thathe was attemptingto makeinstinctcarryinto English the basic
connotationsof affective synderesis."Weneed no apology, for using the word
instinct for our highest powers, to those who know the Latin language.Appe-
tite is in our languagemuch confined to lower powers, but in Latinthe word is
applied to the highest."93
Hutcheson's Enlightenmentcontemporarieswere unpersuadedby such
ancientsemanticconsiderationsand scholastic subtleties.Theirvoices are rep-
resentedby an anonymouscommentatorof 1749: "I am even aptto think, says
he, that what we call Instinct,is a mere Ens Rationis;a Name withoutReality;
a Remain of peripateticPhilosophy."94

University of Massachusetts,Boston.

92Recent discussion by philosophers about whether Hutcheson's moral sense is non-

cognitive or cognitive rivals in subtlety the scholastic debate about the natureof synderesis,
perhapswith good reason. See the bibliographicalnote in J. B. Schneewind's Moral Philoso-
phy from Montaigne to Kant (Cambridge, 1990), II, 524.
93 Hutcheson,A System,9. See his discussion and his own
frequentuse of appetitusin his
Latin inauguraladdressof 1730, De naturali hominumsocialitate oratio inauguralis in Works,
VII, 6-15. His single use of instinctusin this address(10) refers to the herd instinctof animals.
A translationof this speech is included in Hutcheson, On Human Nature.
94James
Long, An Enquiryinto the Origin of the HumanAppetites and Affections(Lon-
don, 1749), 12, 13.

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