2018 PDF

PETITIONER TC-09
TC– 09_P
LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2018
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
TRANSFER PETITION NO. ______/2018

W.P. ( PIL) No. _____/2017
DR. R.M. SWAIN (Petitioner 1)
AND
W.P. (PIL) No. _____/2018
FATIMA GHANSARI (Petitioner 2)
WITH
W.P. (PIL) No. _____/2018
WRONGRACE PARTY (Petitioner 3)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDICA (Respondent)
PETITION INVOKED UNDER ARTICLES 32 & 139A OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA
___________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S
COMPANION JU STICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................... iii
I. CASES ...................................................................................................................... iii
II. STATUTES ................................................................................................................ vi
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ......................................................................... vi
IV. ARTICLES ................................................................................................................. vi
V. BOOKS .....................................................................................................................vii
VI. REPORTS .................................................................................................................vii
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBY DEBATES .........................................................vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... ix
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ...................................................................................................... xi
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................xii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................... 1
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE

COURT? ................................................................................................................................ 1
1. The PIL filed by R.M. Swain is maintainable ......................................................... 1

2. The PIL of Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is maintainable. ................................................. 2
3. The PIL filed by Wrongrace Party is maintainable. ................................................ 3
II. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN
THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE ARBITRARY
AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY? ................................................. 3
1. Reservation of Seats for women is arbitrary in nature. ........................................... 3

2. The Amendment to Art.19(2) is arbitrary and is violative of Art.14....................... 5
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III. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION? ............................... 6
1. Amending power does not extend to the Basic Structure. ....................................... 6

2. Anti-Secular nature against Basic Structure ............................................................ 7
IV. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO
WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS
OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE
SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?. 8
1. The law and amending power smacks anti-secular motive through hate speeches. 8
2. Sting Operation proves the propagation of Hindu Agenda. .................................... 9
V. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT
SERVES THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF
COMMUNAL POLITICS? ................................................................................................. 10
1. Any law enacted under the influence of a foreign power may be struck down. ... 10
2. Any law that gives rise to communal disharmony ought to be struck down. ........ 11
VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTION
ACT, 2014 EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI? ................................................ 12
1. Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is a Whistle blower. ........................................................... 12

2. Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is entitled to be protected under the Act. ........................... 13
VII. WHETHER THE ARREST OF THE THREE LADIES WAS LEGALLY VALID?
14
1. The arrest of the three ladies was legally valid. .................................................... 14

2. Right under Art.21 of the ladies are not infringed. ................................................ 15
PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 16
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
% Percentage
¶ Paragraph
A. Article
A.I.R All India Reporter
AllHC Allahabad High Court
Bom. Bombay
BomHC Bombay High Court
CA Calcutta
CAD Constituent Assembly Debates
CEDAW Convention on The Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women.
Cri. Criminal
DLT Delhi Law Times
Dr. Doctor
Del Delhi
Edn Edition
Govt. Government
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
Ibid Same as immediately above
ILR Indian Law Review
J. Justice
MP Member of the Parliament
Mad Madras
MANU Manupatra
MH Maharashtra
MPLJ Madhya Pradesh Law Journal
No. Number
PIL Public Interest Litigation
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(P) Ltd Private Limited

P&H Punjab and Haryana
Pg. Page
Ors. Others
OA Original Application
OBC Other Backward Class
PM Prime Minister
RJP Rashtriya Janata Party
Raj Rajasthan
Rep. Represented
SCALE Supreme Court Almanac
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SC Supreme Court
SCR Scheduled Caste
SC Scheduled Tribe
ST Cited authority develops a Question analogous to
discussion in the text.
See also Same as mentioned before or above, whenever an
authority has been fully cited in proceeding footnotes,
the supra is used
Supra Mentioned before
Suppl. Supplementary
T.L.R Times Law Reports
UCHC Uttaranchal High Court
UOI Union of India
U.P Uttar Pradesh
u/ Under
UNO United Nations Organization
v. versus
Vol Volume
W.P. Writ Petition
W.B West Bengal
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
I. CASES
1) A.K. Behara v. Union of India, (2010) 11 SCC 322 ...................................................... 6

2) A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 .................................................... 15
3) A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1996 ) 9 SCC 548 8
4) Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) A. SC. 487............................................................ 5
5) Ajit Chakraborty v. State of Tripura, 2017 1 TLR 184 ............................................... 11
6) Ajit Singh v. State Of Haryana and Ors., Civil Writ Petition No.18738 of 2009, (P&H
HC, 06.09.2011)............................................................................................................. 4
7) Anil Agarwal v. The National Small Industries Corporation Ltd.,
MANU/CA/0429/2017 ................................................................................................ 13
8) Anirudha Bahal v. State, 172 (2010) DLT 268 ............................................................ 10
9) Ashok Kumar Malpani and Anr. v. State of M. P. and Ors., 2010 (1) MPLJ 229......... 4
10) Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. AIR 2004 SC 280 ............................................ 1
11) Ateek Ahmad v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/UC/0359/2017 .................................. 15
12) Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3172 ............................................. 7
13) Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 38 .................................... 1, 2
14) Bennet Coleman v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 ................................................. 9
15) Bhim Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 234 ......................................................... 7
16) D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC 261 .................................................. 2
17) Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 540 ........... 1
18) Dattatraya v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 Bom 311 ..................................................... 3
19) Dilip Parulekar v. Airesh Rodriguez, MANU/MH/2004/2018 .................................... 13
20) DK Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610 ................................................. 14
21) Dr. D.C.Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 579 .................... 1
22) Dr.Das Rao Deshmukh v. Kamal Kishore Nanasaheb Kadam and Ors., AIR 1996 SC
391.................................................................................................................................. 2
23) Dr.Ismail Faruqui & Others v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605 .......................... 9, 12
24) George Swamidoss Joseph v. Miss. Harriet Sundari Edward, AIR 1955 Mad 341 .... 11
25) Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India 2018 (8) SCALE 72 ................................... 11
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26) His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC
1461...................................................................................................................... 1, 7, 11
27) I.R. Coelho (dead) rep. by L.Rs. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 861 6,
7
28) In Re: Special Courts Bill, by the Seven-judge Bench, AIR 1979 SC 478 ................... 5
29) In the matter of: Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745 .. 15
30) Indian Banks’ Association, Bombay and Ors. v. M/s Devkala Consultancy Service
and Ors., (2004) 11 SCC 1 ............................................................................................. 2
31) Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641
...................................................................................................................................... 10
32) Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain. AIR 1975 SC 2299 ................................................ 3, 6, 11
33) Indira Sawheny v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 477 .................................... 4
34) Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. R.K. Jain, AIR 2011 SC 2234. ................... 13
35) J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India, 1999 5 SCC 138 ........................................................ 13
36) Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, AIR 1993 SC 892 ........................................................ 1
37) Kumari Sheela Phowagat v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Writ Petition. No. 5689/2011,
(Raj HC, 15.07.2011) ..................................................................................................... 4
38) Lalit v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/UC/0490/2017 ................................................. 15
39) M.S.M Sharma v. Krishna Sinha and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 395 .................................... 15
40) Mahanagar Ghaziabad Chetna Munch through its President, Sri Ram Avtar Agarwal
and Ors. v. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary and Ors., 2007 (1) ADJ 77 ........ 2
41) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597................................................... 6
42) Manoj H.Mishra v. Union Of India, MANU/SCOR/11105/2013 ............................... 13
43) Md. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605 ........................................... 12
44) Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1789........... 5, 6
45) Mohan Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2011 (1) U.D. 164 ............................................. 1
46) Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1985 SC 731 ....................................... 12
47) Neelam Rani v. State of Punjab and Ors., ILR (2010) 2 P&H 204 ............................... 4
48) P. Katama Reddy v. Revenue Divisional Officer, 1998 (1) ALD 136 .......................... 4
49) Parveen v. The Secretary, Union Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate
Change, Original Appeal No. 4081 of 2015, (Central Administrative Tribunal,
13.07.2016) .................................................................................................................. 14
50) People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2419 .................... 5
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51) Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal v. Mamta Bisth & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 204 4
52) R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 ................................. 10
53) R.K.Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995 (2) SCC 745 ................................................. 4
54) Rajat Prasad v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2014) 6 SCC 495........................... 10
55) Rajesh Kumar Daria v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC
785.................................................................................................................................. 4
56) Ram Pal v. The Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 184 ................... 9
57) Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620...................................................... 8
58) S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, 1989 (2) SCC 574 ................................................. 13
59) S.M. Matloob v. The Director General, ICCR, Original Appeal No. 1894 of 2014
(Central Administrative Tribunal, 11.12.2014) ........................................................... 14
60) S.R. Bommai and Ors v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1994 SC 1918 ............... 2, 9, 12
61) Sangita Garg v. State of Uttaranchal, 2017 (2) N.C.C.163 .......................................... 15
62) Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765 ..................... 14
63) Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi and Ors., (1987) 1 SCR
458.................................................................................................................................. 2
64) Smt. Kittur Yasmin Riyaz and Anr. v. Deputy Commissioner and Ors., ILR 2009
KARNATAKA 47 ......................................................................................................... 3
65) Sri. Sharad Vithal Kohli v. State of Maharashtra 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 12325 ...... 14
66) State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Vaidya, AIR 1951 SC 157 ......................................... 15
67) State of Gujarat v. The IRCG ( Civil Appeal No: 3249 of 2016) ................................ 12
68) State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin, AIR 1964 SC 1043 ................................ 11
69) State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684 ... 2, 7, 9
70) State of Karnataka v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha (2017) 6 SCC 263 ....................................... 13
71) State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 865 .............................................................. 9
72) Sub-committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 320......... 1
73) Subhash Popatlal Dave v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2012 SC 3370 .................... 15
74) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1579 ................................ 14
75) Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and Ors. v. Union of India; AIR
1994 SC 268................................................................................................................... 1
76) Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 363 ....................................... 11
77) Wamman Rao v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1981 SC 271 ....................................... 7
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78) Ziyauddin Burhammuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1975 Suppl. SCR
281.................................................................................................................................. 9
II. STATUTES
1) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ................................................................................... 15

2) Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014................................................................... 12, 13
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1) Art. 141, Constitution of India, 1950 ........................................................................... 15

2) Art. 15(3) of Constitution of India, 1950 ....................................................................... 5
3) Art. 19(1)(a), Constitution of India, 1950 .................................................................. 5, 6
4) Art. 19(2), Constitution of India, 1950 ........................................................................ 13
5) Art. 25, Constitution of India, 1950 ........................................................................... 7, 8
6) Art. 51, Constitution of India, 1950 ............................................................................. 11
7) Art.13(2), Constitution of India, 1950 ........................................................................... 6
8) Art.139A, Constitution of India, 1950 ........................................................................... 1
9) Art.14, Constitution of India, 1950 ................................................................................ 6
10) Art.21, Constitution of India, 1950 .............................................................................. 15
11) Art.22, Constitution of India, 1950 .............................................................................. 15
12) Art.32, Constitution of India, 1950 ................................................................................ 2
13) Art.51A(h), Constitution of India, 1950 ...................................................................... 10
14) Art.51A(j), Constitution of India, 1950 ....................................................................... 10
15) Part III, Constitution of India, 1950 ............................................................................... 6
16) Part IV-A, Constitution of India, 1950 ........................................................................ 10
17) Preamble, Constitution of India, 1950 ........................................................................... 7
IV. ARTICLES
1) “Actions of the Indian government with respect to minority communities”, Minority

Rights Group International, Universal Periodic Review, 27th session (May 2017) ...... 2
2) Banerjee, Paula, “Institutions, Publications and Eminent Individuals Working on
Minority Rights”, India .................................................................................................. 2
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V. BOOKS
1) A.R. Blackshield, Socialism and Social Control in the West- The Material and the
Ethereal, in, Secularism: Its Implications for Law and Life in India, (G S Sharma
(ed),N M Tripathi, 1966) ............................................................................................. 11
2) Dr. Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India,(Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, V.R.
Manohar, 14th Ed., 2013) ........................................................................................... 7, 9
3) Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constituional Law of India, Vol. 1, (2nd Ed., 2015).... 5, 6, 11
4) Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India, Vol.3, (2nd Ed., 2015) ..... 3, 7, 8
5) H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1, (4th Ed., 2015) ............................... 5
6) H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 2, (4th Ed., 2015) ............................... 9
7) H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 3, (4th Ed., 2015) ........................... 7, 8
8) Krishna Pal Malik and Dr. Kaushik C. Raval, Law and Social Transformation in
India, (3rd Ed., 2012) ...................................................................................................... 5
9) M.H. Beg J., Impact of Secularism on Life and Law, (1st Ed.,1985) ........................... 12
10) M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th Ed., 2016) ............................................. 8, 14
11) Sanjay S. Jain and Sathya Narayan, Basic Structure Constitutionalism, (1st Ed., 2011)
........................................................................................................................................ 7
12) Wigmore, Evidence Vol. 8, (McNaughton rev.1961) .................................................. 14
VI. REPORTS
1) 177th Law Commission of India Report, Law Relating To Arrest, (2001) .................. 14
2) 179th Law Commission of India Report, The Public Interest and Protection of
Informer, (2001) ....................................................................................................... 4, 14
3) Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee On Personnel, Public
Grievances, Law And Justice, Rajya Sabha, Thirty Sixth Report On The Constitution
(One Hundred And Eighth Amendment) Bill, 2008, December, 2009. .......................... 5
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBY DEBATES
1) Statement by Mr. Raj Bahadur in Volume 7................................................................ 11

2) Statement by Mrs. Renuka Roy, Volume 4 ................................................................... 5
3) Statement by Pocker Sahib Bahadur, Volume 7. ......................................................... 15
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
I. TRANSFER PETITION NO. _____/2018

W.P. ( PIL) No. _____/2017
The Petitioner has approached the Hon’ble High Court of Dehri under Article 226 of the
Constitution of Indica, 1950 and it has been transferred to appear before Hon’ble Supreme
Court of Indica under Article 139A of the Constitution of Indica, 1950
II. W.P. (PIL) No. _____/2018

The Petitioner has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica under Article 32 of the
Constitution of Indica, 1950.
III. W.P. (PIL) No. _____/2018

The Petitioner has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica under Article 32 of the
Constitution of Indica 1950.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. The Republic of Indica is an independent, ‘Union of States’, following the values of Human
Dignity and Equality. It guarantees Fundamental Rights to its citizens and the
Constitutional, legal and the policy framework of the Republic of Indica is in ‘pari materia’
to the Republic of India. The ideology of the Constitution is that of “equality among all”,
and “equality among equals”.
II. It exhibits to the world the principle of “Unity in Diversity,” It is a multi-religious, multi-
lingual, multi-cultural and secular country. The major religion of Indica is Hinduism
followed by Islam. The minorities belong to Christianity, Judaism, Jainism and Buddhism.
III. Indica has been a male dominated society, with low representation of women, the example
of which can be seen in 2005, where in the Upper House the percentage of women was
11% and 11.8% in the Lower House. In this scenario a 33% reservation for women in the
Parliament was proposed. This was received with opposition more so because there was no
single majority party in the Lower House from 1996 to 2005. Prior to 1996, Wrongrace
Party, the majority party at that time had shown no interest for the same.
IV. In 1992, a Constitutional Amendment was introduced with the provisions of 33%
reservation of seats for women in Municipalities and Panchayats in all states of India. This
too was faced with opposition from the minority community. However, it received support
from the intellectual class .Mrs. Garima Dhall, Mrs Yamini Paul and Mrs Mannat
Raichandani being some of them.
V. In 2005, the Rashtriya Janta Party (hereinafter referred to as “RJP”) came to power with an
absolute majority. In 2006 with a sudden move the 33% reservation was passed. This led
to the increase of women representation in both houses to a situation in which no Bill could
be passed without their support. A proviso to Art. 19(2) was inserted by a constitutional
amendment (hereinafter referred to as “amendment”) to empower the women and give them
the opportunity to express themselves freely.
VI. This move of RJP was opposed by the majority as well as minority communities as it was
empowering the elite class women exclusively. This law resulted in the tremendous
increase of women representation in both Houses by 2015.
VII. This law became a tool of propagating the hidden agenda of delivering venomous and hate
speech against the minority community. Along with this, the demand for appointment of
women in all important constitutional and Public Offices.
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VIII. The increase in the population of women and the interference of women in the affairs of
men was anti-religious and violating the concept of equality under the Constitution. A PIL
was field by Dr.R.M Sawain in the High the Court of Dehri on the ground that the 33%
reservation law was arbitrary.
IX. Mrs Fatima Ghansari, a member of the Lower House, brought a motion for the repealing
of the 33% reservation law, which was a tool in the hands of the ruling party to achieve
their hidden religious agenda to make Indica, a Hindu state under the guise of the
amendment to Art. 19(2). Mrs Ghansari also brought to the notice of the House, the sting
operation, “Zebra Post”, will reveals the collusion of the ruling party with large media
houses, also running a Hindu agenda. Her motion was repealed in the winter as well as the
summer sessions.
X. In consequence to her raising the motion, on 1st May Mrs Ghansari received a threatening
call on her landline with dire consequences if she insisted on keeping her stand on repealing
the 2006 law. A FIR was lodged the same night by Mrs. Ghansari in the police station of
her locality regarding the same. This made Mrs Ghansari, file a petition in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court for declaring the reservation law as unconstitutional as it was being used to
profess anti-secular agenda. In the same petition she prayed to the Supreme Court, to be
provided with adequate security as she feared for her life. She contended that she played
the role of a ‘whistle blower’, by bringing out the hidden agenda of the ruling party.
XI. In an unprecedented event in February, 2018, the three ladies, the instrumental forces
behind the passing of the law, were arrested by the Intelligence Agency of Indica, on the
grounds of spying for and providing vital State Secrets to the enemy country of Indica with
such credible evidences.
XII. The members of the Wrongrace Party alleged that, Foreign Powers were behind the
enactment of the 33% reservation law. A joint motion was introduced by them in the Lower
House which was rejected by the Speaker.
XIII. Not, having any other way, the party filed a PIL in the Hon’ble Supreme Court, alleging
the role of enemy state, behind the passing of this law. They prayed before the Court to
declare this law as unconstitutional as it was serving the ends of the enemy state.
XIV. The Supreme Court clubbed both the petitions filed before itself and the petition filed in
the High Court of Dehri under Art. 139A of the Constitution.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE
COURT?
ISSUE II
WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE
PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY?
ISSUE III
WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) VIOLATES

THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
ISSUE IV
WHETHER A LAW CAB BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT SERVES THE
MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF COMMUNAL
POLITICS?
ISSUE V
WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN
IN PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME
ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR
PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
ISSUE VI
WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTION ACT 2014
EXTENDS TO MRS FATIMA GHANSARI?
ISSUE VII
WHETHER THE ARREST OF THE THREE LADIES IS LEGALLY VALID?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. Whether the present petition is maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Indica?
The Petitioners humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that the petition b Dr. R.M Swain
has been transferred under Art.139A. Along with this the petitions by Mrs Ghansari and
Wrongrace Party, clubbed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is submitted by the Petitioners
that the 33% reservation law is discriminatory in nature and violative of the basic structure of
the Constitution. Further, the laws are anti-secular and the Fundamental Rights enshrined under
the Constitution.
II. Whether the law providing for 33% reservation to women in the Parliament and
the Amendment to Article 19(2) are arbitrary and violative of the concept of
equality?
It is humbly submitted by the Petitioners that the law providing 33% reservation to women in
the Parliament and the amendment to Art.19(2) are arbitrary and violative of the concept of
equality. The arguments are twofold. Firstly, the reservation of seats for women is arbitrary in
nature. Under Art.15(3) special powers are provided to the State to make special laws for
women and children. However, the laws may be discriminatory it shall be intra-vires to the
Constitution. The reservation that shall be provided should be Horizontal. Secondly, the
Amendment to Art.19(2) is arbitrary as it is against the Basic Structure. The provision gives
excessive rights to women which is violative of the Fundamental Right to Equality.
III. Whether the Constitutional amendment to Article 19(2) violates the basic
structure of the Constitution?
The Petitioners humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that amendment to Art.19(2) violates
the basic structure of the Constitution and should hence be struck down. No amendment can
take away the Fundamental Rights of the citizens and thus should be declared ultra vires to the
constitution. The maintenance of communal harmony is the duty of the state and it has been
violated. To affirm the same reasonable restrictions on speech should be allowed so as to not
give rise to communal tensions.
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IV. Whether legislating the law providing 33% reservation to women in Parliament
and the amendment to Article 19(2) smacks of some ulterior religious motives, and
if so, do they violate secular principles and can they be challenged on this ground.
It is humbly submitted by the Petitioners that the law providing 33% reservation to women in
Parliament and the amendment to Art.19(2) smacks of some ulterior religious motives and they
violate the secular principles. The State is indulging in spreading the Hindu agenda through
spite speeches which is creating communal disharmony along with exposing the minorities to
threat. The law introduced is instrumental in propagating the same. This was further proved by
a sting operation which was carried out. The anti-secular motive of the party along with the
hate speech brings out the ulterior motive of the Ruling Party violating the secular principles.
V. Whether a law can be struck down on grounds that it serves the motive of any
foreign power or has become a tool of communal politics?
The Petitioners humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that any law which is enacted under
the influence of a foreign power may be struck down. The Sovereignty of India is an essential
aspect of the basic structure and something that should never be violated. The law should not
be such that it is serving the motive of any external power. The second submission of the
Petitioners is that, any law which gives rise to communal disharmony too should be struck
down for it effects the unity of the country. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court
that this petition be allowed.
VI. Whether the protection of the Whistle Blowers Protection Act,2014 extends to Mrs
Fatima Ghansari?
The Petitioners humbly submits that the protection under the Whistle Blowers Protection Act,
be extended to Mrs Fatima Ghansari as she has played the role of a whistleblower in bringing
out the ulterior motives of the Ruling Party. She was instrumental in apprising the House about
the sting operation which brought out the hidden agenda of the Party. Most importantly, Mrs
Ghansari’s actions were for the welfare of the people and in public good, which is the most
essential pre-requisite for protection under the Whistle Blowers Protection Act.
VII. Whether the arrest of the three ladies was legally valid?
The Petitioners humbly submits that the arrest of the three ladies, was legally valid. The arrest
was made on basis of the credible evidence by the Intelligence Agency which stated that they
were spying and providing vital State secrets to enemy country of Indica. It is thus stated that
the arrests were made in compliance to all judicial precedents, hence it is valid.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2018 P a g e | xiii
PETITIONER TC-09
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

HON’BLE COURT?
It is humbly submitted by the petitioners, before the Hon’ble Court, that the petitions filed by
the three petitioners have the locus standi to appear before the court and are maintainable. The
petition filed by Dr. R.M. Swain has been transferred u/Art.139A and has been taken up
together clubbed with the other petitions, by this Hon’ble Court.1
1. The PIL filed by R.M. Swain is maintainable

Dr. R.M. Swain is a bona-fide public spirited citizen who has originally filed the PIL, praying
for declaring the law on reservation to be unconstitutional, at Dehri HC and now stands
transferred to this Hon’ble Court u/Art.139A.2 It is submitted that the jurisdiction of the court
can be invoked by the petitioner, a public spirited citizen for the enforcement of interest of the
aggrieved class of men3 as the interest of the males of the society are compromised on
introduction of the laws. In the present matter, the laws are discriminatory in nature, wherein
the discrimination is solely based on sex, thereby violating the right to equality of the men in
the society. Such discrimination is against the rule of law which comprises of equality of law4
and it is a basic feature which permeates the whole of the constitutional fabric. 5 In D.C.
Wadhwa v. State of Bihar6, the Hon’ble SC held that, any law which is against the rule of law,
can be challenged by a member of the public by filing a writ petition and its constitutional
validity constitutional duty of the court to adjudicate upon the validity of such laws. Thus, he
being a bona-fide litigant and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest
litigation will alone have a locus standi7 and can approach the court to wipe out violation of
fundamental rights u/Art.14.8 Therefore, it is submitted by Dr. R.M. Swain that the writ filed
1
Moot Compromis, ¶22.
2
Moot Compromis,¶13 and ¶22.
3
Mohan Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2011 (1) U.D. 164.; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, AIR 1993 SC 892.
4
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
5
Sub-committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 320.; Supreme Court Advocates-on-
Record Association and Ors. v. Union of India; AIR 1994 SC 268.
6
Dr. D.C.Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 579.
7
Videh Upadhyay, Public Interest Litigation in India, (1st Ed., 2007).
8
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, AIR 1993 SC 892; Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. AIR 2004 SC 280;
Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 540; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union
of India, AIR 1992 SC 38.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2018 Page |1
PETITIONER TC-09
by him is in public interest and is maintainable as the laws passed by the State is against the
fundamental rights of the society at large.
2. The PIL of Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is maintainable.
Mrs. Fatima Ghansari, is an independent member of the Parliament9, who has filed the PIL
before this Hon’ble Court, praying for declaration of the law on reservation and amendment to
Art.19(2) as unconstitutional as well as for protection of that of a Whistle Blower as she had
played the role of the same against the ruling party after receiving an anonymous threat call. 10
It is submitted that, though, the petition also seeks for the redressal of her personal grievances,
the Court in furtherance of Public Interest shall treat it as a necessity to enquire into the state
of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice, thus, her private interest of
protection against threats shall be treated as a public interest case11 The PIL was filed also
based on the thereat call received by her, however, to file the writ, she need not wait for the
threat to occur in reality.12 It is further submitted, that the laws are anti-secular in nature, as it
leads to communal disharmony and has pushed the State towards religious extremism and
intolerance.13 Therefore, these anti-secular actions of the Ruling party are violating the
principles of Democracy and Secularism and also the Fundamental Right of the minorities’
u/Art.25, thereby violating the Basic Structure14. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI15 it was
held that u/Art.32, the Court must allow any bona-fide member of the public to file a petition,
whose fundamental rights are violated at large.16 In the present matter, Mrs. Ghansari is a
representative of the minority community, therefore, she has the locus standi to represent
disadvantaged section17 as it is the duty of the State to preserve communal harmony18 and as
actions of the State has infringed the freedom of religion u/Art.2519. Therefore, it is submitted
9
Moot Clarifications, Point 23.
10
Moot Compromis,¶16, ¶17 and ¶18.
11
Indian Banks’ Association, Bombay and Ors. v. M/s Devkala Consultancy Service and Ors., (2004) 11 SCC 1;
Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi and Ors., (1987) 1 SCR 458.
12
D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC 261.
13
14
S.R. Bommai and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1918.
15
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 38.
16
Supra 7.
17
“Actions of the Indian government with respect to minority communities”, Minority Rights Group International,
Universal Periodic Review, 27th session (May 2017), available at http://minorityrights.org/advocacy-
statements/actions-indian-government-respect-minority-communities-universal-periodic-review-27th-session-
may-2017, last seen on 24.08.2018; Banerjee, Paula, “Institutions, Publications and Eminent Individuals Working
on Minority Rights”, India, available at http://www.mcrg.ac.in/inst1.htm last seen on 24.08.2018.
18
State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684; Dr.Das Rao Deshmukh v. Kamal
Kishore Nanasaheb Kadam and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 391.
19
Supra 14; Mahanagar Ghaziabad Chetna Munch through its President, Sri Ram Avtar Agarwal and Ors. v. State
of U.P. through Principal Secretary and Ors., 2007 (1) ADJ 77.
PETITIONER TC-09
that Mrs. Ghansari has the locus standi to approach the court through a PIL filed u/Art.32 as
the laws passed by the State is against the fundamental rights of the society at large.
3. The PIL filed by Wrongrace Party is maintainable.
The “Wrongrace Party” constitutes the Opposition Party and has approached the court u/Art.32
of the Constitution by filing a PIL. A political party is a legal person 20 and therefore, as a
bonafide legal person can file a petition representing the aggrieved disadvantaged communities
for public interest, on violation of their fundamental rights21. In the present matter, the security
and sovereignty of the nation is also endangered, as the laws are passed under foreign influence,
which is against the sovereignty of the nation. Sovereignty constitutes the Basic Structure22,
and when any law which is violative of the Basic Structure, the locus standi of the petitioner
arises23. Therefore, it is submitted that “Wrongrace Party” has the locus standi to file the PIL,
before the Hon’ble Court and thus, is maintainable.
Hence, in the light of the submissions made, it is humbly submitted that, since, the laws passed
by the State violates Fundamental Rights of the citizens, along with the violation of the Basic
Structure of the Constitution, the PILs filed by the three petitioners shall be held maintainable.
II. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN

IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE
ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the law providing for 33% reservation to
women in the Parliament and the Amendment to Art.19(2) are not consistent with the concept
of equality enshrined under Art. 14 of the Indican Constitution and is arbitrary in nature, and
also violative of the concept of equality. The petitioners submit the following arguments to
affirm the same.
1. Reservation of Seats for women is arbitrary in nature.
Art.15(3) provides a special power to the State to make special laws for women and children,
and even though the law may be discriminatory and based on sex, violating Art.15(1), such
law shall be intra-vires to the Constitution.24 However, in case of reservation for women, the
reservation which is protected u/Art.15(3) should be Horizontal in nature within the quota
20
Smt. Kittur Yasmin Riyaz and Anr. v. Deputy Commissioner and Ors., ILR 2009 KARNATAKA 47.
21
Supra 8.
22
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299.
23
Supra 8; Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India, Vol.3, (2nd Ed., 2015).
24
Dattatraya v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 Bom 311.
PETITIONER TC-09
already established u/Art.16(4).25 In 2006, the State passed a law prescribing 33% reservation
for women in the Parliament.26 While discussing reservation for women, the Hon’ble Apex
Court differentiated between Vertical Reservation and Horizontal Reservation, wherein the
court held that the former includes social reservation in favour of SC, ST and OBC
u/Art.16(4)27 and the latter includes special reservation extending to the women within the
ambit of Art.16(1) and Art.15(3)28, moreover, such special reservation can cut across all
vertical reservations.29. The Apex Court in Indira Sawhney v. UOI30 held that Vertical
reservation in cases of offices under State31 is barred by Art.16(2). Moreover, in case of special
social reservation for women, it would attract women from both backward and forward classes.
In this case, the law passed by the parliament, provides for a separate vertical reservation for
women in the Parliament and therefore, relying upon the judgement given by this Hon’ble
Court in the this case32, it is submitted that if reservations are kept for women as a separate
class under Art.16(1), the same inequitous phenomenon will emerge. The women from the elite
classes referred to as “Parkati Mahilayen”33 will secure all the posts, leaving no post for the
backward classes. It will amount to indirectly providing statutory reservations for the advanced
classes, which is impermissible under any of the provisions of Art.16.34 The women are already
provided a quota in the respective class, therefore, there is no need to keep a special quota for
women u/Art.16 and have achieved the status of equality, requiring no more reservation35. It is
further submitted by the petitioners that only horizontal reservation or quota for women within
the vertical reservation would only be constitutional. This is because such horizontal
reservation is allowed u/Art.15(3) and any formation of separate social reservation would lead
to vertical reservation which will be ultra-vires to the Constitutional provisions and arbitrary
in nature.36 The same has been reiterated by the judiciary in many other cases.37 Further, in a
25
P. Katama Reddy v. Revenue Divisional Officer, 1998 (1) ALD 136.
26
27
Art. 16(4), The Constitution of India, 1950.
28
Rajesh Kumar Daria v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 785.; See also Kumari
Sheela Phowagat v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Writ Petition. No. 5689/2011, (Raj HC, 15.07.2011).
29
Ajit Singh v. State Of Haryana and Ors., Civil Writ Petition No.18738 of 2009, (P&H HC, 06.09.2011).
30
Indira Sawheny v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 477; See Also R.K.Sabharwal v. State of Punjab,
1995 (2) SCC 745.
31
179th Law Commission of India Report, The Public Interest and Protection of Informer, (2001), available at
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/179rptp1.pdf, last seen 16.08.2018.
32
Supra 25.
33
Moot Compromis,¶10.
34
Supra 25, ¶608.
35
Ashok Kumar Malpani and Anr. v. State of M. P. and Ors., 2010 (1) MPLJ 229
36
Neelam Rani v. State of Punjab and Ors., ILR (2010) 2 P&H 204.
37
Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal v. Mamta Bisth & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 204.
PETITIONER TC-09
Parliamentary Committee Report it is stated that quota will only help elite women who are
proxy of powerful men. Therefore, there is no need for reservation for women in the
Legislatures.38
Moreover, while deliberating on the reservation for women in the Constituent Assembly, it was
submitted that reservation of seats for women would lead to questioning of the competencies
of the women parliamentarians, and further, there are women members already in the
parliament through their merit and capability. Therefore, there is no requirement of reservation
of seats particularly for women as they are capable and in an equal footing with the men.39
Therefore, any law making separate reservation for women should be declared arbitrary and
violative of Art.14 and such an arbitrary law should be struck down on the grounds of
arbitrariness.40
2. The Amendment to Art.19(2) is arbitrary and is violative of Art.14.
The Amendment to Art.19(2) introduced a proviso providing only few reasonable restrictions
to the freedom of speech and expression to the women.41 Though this proviso upholds special
provision42 for the women, however, the proviso is also subjected to the test of Intelligible
Differentia43 and the reasonable nexus with the object of the Statute44. The special proviso in
the form an amendment is discriminatory in nature as it provides excessive rights to the women.
Such excessive rights are against the right to equality of men as they are subjected to more
grounds of reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression45. Such discrimination
in favor of women is not required because, freedom of speech is allowed to all citizens without
any discrimination. In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. UOI, it was held that fundamental rights are
subjected to reasonable restrictions to protect the rights of the citizens.46 Though, in this case,
the proviso was introduced u/Art.15(3), it should not be allowed to encroach upon the right to
equality of the other citizens of the country. Chandrachud J. had enlisted “equality of
38
Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee On Personnel, Public Grievances, Law And Justice,
Rajya Sabha, Thirty Sixth Report On The Constitution (One Hundred And Eighth Amendment) Bill, 2008,
December, 2009.
39
Statement by Mrs. Renuka Roy, Volume 4, CAD, 18.07.1947; Krishna Pal Malik and Dr. Kaushik C. Raval,
Law and Social Transformation in India, (3rd Ed., 2012).
40
People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2419; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981)
A. SC. 487; H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1, (4th Ed.,2015).
41
42
Art. 15(3) of Constitution of India, 1950.
43
Dhirendra Pandua v. State of Orissa, (2008) 17 SCC 311.
44
Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1, (2nd Ed.,2015); H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law
of India, Vol. 1, (4th Ed., 2015); Manmad Reddy v. Chandra Prakash Reddy, AIR 2010 SC 1001; one of the
principles enunciated In Re: Special Courts Bill, by the Seven-judge Bench, AIR 1979 SC 478.
45
Art. 19(1)(a), Constitution of India, 1950.
46
Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1789.
PETITIONER TC-09
opportunity and status” as one of the fundamental elements of the basic structure. 47 The
Hon’ble Apex Court, held that constitutional amendment would be liable to be declared invalid
to the extent to which it damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution by according
protection against violation of any particular fundamental right48. The same was reiterated in
subsequent cases, making equality as an important part of the Golden Triangle49 and violation
of the same means, violation of the basic structure.50
Therefore, while applying the test of arbitrariness to this amendment, it can be found that the
law providing special provision to women is unreasonable and violative of fundamental rights
of the citizens and that there is no nexus with the object of Art.15(3). Thus, the law is
discriminatory in nature, as it provides undue advantage to the women and on the grounds of
arbitrariness it should be held unconstitutional.
Hence, in the light of the submissions made, it is humbly submitted that the law providing 33%
reservation to women and the amendment to Art.19(2) should be struck down on grounds of
arbitrariness and violative of right to equality.51
III. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Constitutional Amendment to
Art.19(2) violates the Basic Structure of the Constitution and therefore, it should be declared
unconstitutional and struck down by the Hon’ble Court. The petitioners submit the following
argument to affirm the same
1. Amending power does not extend to the Basic Structure.
In 2015, the women laden Parliament amended Art.19(2), thereby introducing a proviso
providing very few limitations on the freedom of speech and expression52 of women.53 The
newly inserted proviso is an amendment to Part III of the Constitution and falls within the
purview of judicial review54 and the Parliament cannot abrogate or take away any fundamental
47
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain. AIR 1975 SC 2299; A.K. Behara v. Union of India, (2010) 11 SCC 322.
48
Supra 41; Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1, (2nd Ed., 2015).
49
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
50
I.R. Coelho (dead) rep. by L.Rs. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 861.
51
Art.14, Constitution of India, 1950.
52
Art. 19(1)(a), Constitution of India, 1950.
53
54
Art.13(2), Constitution of India, 1950.
PETITIONER TC-09
right by exercising amending power.55 In the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala56,
the Hon’ble SC, decided that the fundamental rights formed part of the basic structure and the
Parliament cannot destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. Since power to amend the
Constitution is not unlimited, if changes brought about by amendments destroy the identity of
the Constitution, such amendments would be void.57 The concept of basic structure was further
developed by the Supreme Court and it is now established that the basic features cannot be
altered even by constitutional amendments.58 The amendment strikes at the fundamental rights
of other citizens, and therefore, it is impermissible to it is impermissible to destroy Art.14 and
15 or abrogate or en bloc eliminate these Fundamental Rights.59
Thus, it is humbly submitted that the amendment should be struck down and declared ultra-
vires, as it showcases, sheer misuse of amending power and is such amendment is violative of
the basic structure of the Constitution.
2. Anti-Secular nature against Basic Structure

Maintaining communal harmony is the duty of the State and reasonable restrictions should be
imposed on the freedom of speech60. Such amendment by the State, under the cover of special
provision for women, is against the concept of secularism61 and right to religious beliefs62. This
is because, this amendment led to the misuse of the amendment for establishing the agenda of
the political party by delivering anti-secular and venomous hate-speeches against the minority
communities.63 Secularism is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution64 and any
amendment which allows anti-secular activities should be struck down. The SC has ruled that
the State has no religion and State has to treat all religions and religious people equally and
with equal respect.65 However, the same has been violated by ruling party while spreading hate-
55
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845; Sanjay S. Jain and Sathya Narayan, Basic Structure
Constitutionalism, 5,17 (1st Ed., 2011).
56
Supra 4.
57
Supra 48.
58
Wamman Rao v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1981 SC 271.; Bhim Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 234.
59
Supra 48, ¶66; Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 3, (2nd Ed., 2015); H.M. Seervai,
Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 3, (4th Ed., 2015).
60
State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684.
61
Preamble, The Constitution of India, 1950.
62
Art. 25, The Constitution of India, 1950.
63
64
Supra 4; Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constituional Law of India, Vol. 3, (2nd Ed., 2015).
65
Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3172; Dr. Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India,185
(Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, V.R. Manohar, 14th Ed., 2013).
PETITIONER TC-09
speeches against other community. This amendment not only strikes at secularism, but also,
strikes at the freedom of conscience66.
Therefore, it is submitted by the petitioners that the amendment is anti-secular in nature and is
violative of secularism, a basic feature of the Constitution, and is liable to struck down.
Hence, in the light of the submissions made, it is humbly submitted that the amendment to
Art.19(2) should be held ultra-vires to the Constitution, on the ground of violation of the Basic
Structure of the Constitution.
IV. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO

WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)
SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO
THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE
CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the law providing 33% reservation to
women in parliament and the amendment to Art.19(2) smacks of some ulterior religious
motives and violates the secular principles and therefore, should be declared void and ultra-
vires on the ground of being anti-secular. The petitioners submit the following argument to
affirm the same
1. The law and amending power smacks anti-secular motive through hate speeches.
The law for reservation and the amendment to Art.19(2) has been misused by the ruling party
under the mask of women, the party has been spreading Hindu agenda against the minorities.
The right to freedom of conscience and propagation is subjected to the interest of public order67
so that it would not authorize the outrage of the religious feelings of another class, with a
deliberate intent.68 In this matter, the State has indulged in anti-secular practices through spite
speeches and such practices are anti-thesis to secularism which seeks to contribute in some
degree to the process of secularization of the matters of religion or religious practices and are
liable to held invalid.69 Desai J. in a case held that a secular state must have nothing to do with
religious affairs except when their management involves crime, fraud, or becomes a threat to
66
67
Ibid.
68
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620.
69
A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1996 ) 9 SCC 548; Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap,
Constituional Law of India, Vol. 3, (2nd Ed., 2015); H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 3, (4th Ed.,
2015); M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th Ed., 2016).
PETITIONER TC-09
unity and integrity of the State70 thereby, making the activities carried out by the ruling party
invalid.
The hate speeches delivered by the ruling party has exposed minorities to hatred, delegitimizing
group members in the eyes of the majority, curtailing their social standing and acceptance
within society leading to distress to individual group members.71 They being anti-secular in
nature should be subject to reasonable restrictions to preserve the chore democratic process and
to maintain public order and rule of law.72 In S. R. Bommai v. UOI73, it was held that the right
to free profession of religion and exercising right to organize religious congregations does not
carry with it the right to make inflammatory speeches, nor speak religious intolerance as an
aspect of religious faiths.74 Therefore, the ruling party has misused the amending power to
create communal disharmony and cannot be allowed to deliver such venomous speeches biased
of Hinduism as they have inter-twined religion with politics which is impermissible.75 The anti-
secular nature of the speeches disrupting public order is against the concept of secular state
making it violative of basic structure76 and constitutes an illegal activity.
Therefore, it is submitted by the petitioners, that the law of reservation and the amendment
smacks anti-secular motive as it propagates Hindu agenda under the farce of freedom of speech
and expression enjoyed by the women parliamentarians.
2. Sting Operation proves the propagation of Hindu Agenda.

The sting operation conducted by Zebra Post, a media house proves that the ruling party has
been engaged in propagating Hindu agenda.77The sting operation conducted, forms a part of
the right of the citizens to know each and every public act, everything that is done in a public
way by their public functionaries78 and also the act carried out by the media house falls within
the ambit of their right to freedom of press79. Further, the court should not look into the motive
of the persons who engineered the sting operation, leading to the material being brought into
public domain through electronic media.80 Moreover, in this matter, the purpose of the media
70
Ziyauddin Burhammuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1975 Suppl. SCR 281.
71
Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) 11 SCC 47.
72
State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684.
73
S.R. Bommai and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1918.
74
H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 2, (4th Ed., 2015); Dr. Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of
India, 186,187 (Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, V.R. Manohar, 14th Ed., 2013).
75
Supra 71.
76
Dr.Ismail Faruqui & Others v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605.
77
78
State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 865.
79
Art.19(1)(a), Constitution of India, 1950; Bennet Coleman v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106.
80
Ram Pal v. The Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 184.
PETITIONER TC-09
house is to advance the public interest by publishing facts and opinions 81. In Anirudha Bahal
v. State, the Del HC, while upholding the constitutional validity of publication of sting
operation, stated that it is the fundamental duty82 of the media houses as citizens u/Art.51A(h)
and Art.51A(j), to expose any corruptive practices which they have knowledge of, to move
towards a corruption free state and if possible along with proof83, which in this case includes
the videotaping. The SC has also upheld the legitimacy of sting operations as in view of larger
public interest it serves an important public cause.84 The same was reiterated in another case,
where sting operations were held to be a permissible means to expose illegal activity in view
of Public Accountability and Vigilance.85
Therefore, it is submitted that the publication sting operation is valid and is a proof for the anti-
secular practices carried out by the ruling party as they brought into light the “Hindu” agenda
carried out by the ruling party, which is of larger public interest as it is important to expose the
illegal activities carried out by the ruling party.
Hence, in the light of the submissions made, it is humbly submitted that considering the sting
operation as proof of Hindu agenda and the hate speeches delivered by the ruling party, it shall
be held that they have some ulterior religious motive and are violating the secular principles
set by the Constitution.
V. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT

SERVES THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A
TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the law providing 33% reservation to
women in parliament and the amendment to Art.19(2) should be struck down on the grounds
that it serves the motive of the foreign power and has become a tool of communal politics. The
petitioners submit the following argument to affirm the same.
1. Any law enacted under the influence of a foreign power may be struck down.
In the year 2006, RJP, had suddenly passed the law providing 33% reservation to women and
following this, in 2015, passed a constitutional amendment, thereby inserting a proviso to
Art.19(2), imposing very few reasonable restrictions on the women. Consequently, the laws
81
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
82
Part IV-A, Constitution of India, 1950.
83
Anirudha Bahal v. State, 172 (2010) DLT 268.
84
R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106.
85
Rajat Prasad v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2014) 6 SCC 495.
UU-LCD-NMCC-2018 P a g e | 10
PETITIONER TC-09
were misused through hate speeches against minority communities. There were subsequent
communal riots, thereby disturbing public order. It is also an allegation that some foreign power
has a role in passing the law that provides for 33% reservation.86 Sovereignty is a part of the
Basic Structure of Indica and the same must never be violated.87 India is a sovereign country
according to the Preamble of India.88 Cooley defined a sovereign state as one “where there
resides within itself a supreme and absolute power acknowledging no superior.”89 While
drafting of the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly moulded no new sovereignty, it merely
gave a shape to the aspirations of the people, by renouncing the influence of any foreign power
and evolving into a completely democratic form of Government as a republic.90 The Republic
of India is sovereign because it could make or unmake any decision with respect to itself
without any interference from outside.91
Indica being a sovereign is a state that can make any law which it may deem fit for the welfare
of its people. Indica can enact legislations that give effect to international covenants. 92 But, it
cannot enact any Law to serve the motive of any foreign power or under the influence of a
foreign power. Indica has the power to make laws in order to maintain international peace93
but then also the act of passing a law under the influence of a foreign power is not allowed.
There has also been judicial pronouncement where the Hon’ble Court has struck down a
provision of Law since it was influenced by a foreign Law.94
2. Any law that gives rise to communal disharmony ought to be struck down.
Secularism is a part of the Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution.95 Secularism is not
atheism but just equal tolerance towards all religion.96 Communal politics is mere impediment
to the functioning of the Constitution and perpetuation of communal politics must be avoided
at any cost.97 The then PM declared that secularism was an ideal to be achieved and that
establishment of a secular state was an act of faith. The term “secular” is advisedly not been
86
Moot Compromis ¶20.
87
Supra 4.
88
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299. See also: Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India, AIR
1984 SC 363, Ajit Chakraborty v. State of Tripura, 2017 1 TLR 184, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India
2018 (8) SCALE 72.
89
Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1, (2nd Ed., 2015).
90
State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin, AIR 1964 SC 1043.
91
Kesavananda Bharti v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
92
93
Art. 51, Constitution of India, 1950.
94
George Swamidoss Joseph v. Miss. Harriet Sundari Edward, AIR 1955 Mad 341.
95
Supra 4.
96
A.R. Blackshield, Socialism and Social Control in the West- The Material and the Ethereal, in, Secularism: Its
Implications for Law and Life in India, (G S Sharma (ed),N M Tripathi, 1966).
97
Statement by Mr. Raj Bahadur in Volume 7, CAD, 04.11.1948.
PETITIONER TC-09
defined presumably because it is a very elastic term not capable of a precise definition and
perhaps best be left undefined.98 Anything that is pernicious and exploitative cannot be allowed
to remain outside the control of Law simply because it is paraded under the garb of religion. 99
In a case100, being a secular state, no policy can be enacted on grounds of taxation that violate
the secular principles of the state. The state shall make laws uniformly and thus no particular
community or religion should be preferred over another. State is obliged under the Constitution
to treat persons belonging to all faiths and religions with equality. The Acquisition of Certain
Area at Ayodhya Act, 1933 was under challenge in a case101. The Case was based on a reference
which favoured one religion over another, thus the reference itself was against the principles
of secularism. The reference was thus declared unconstitutional. Even the aforementioned Act
provided for acquisition of land for setting up Hindu structures. As it was opposed to secular
principles, the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993, was struck down as being
unconstitutional. In another case102, a law103 was partly struck down as there was a provision
which was biased towards Hindus. It was declared unconstitutional for being against the spirit
of secularism.
Under the light of these submissions, it is humbly submitted that a Law can be struck down if
it leads to communal disharmony or opposes secularism.
VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLE BLOWERS

PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the protection of the Whistle Blowers
Protection Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) extends to Mrs. Fatima Ghansari as
she is a claimed whistle blower in the present matter. The petitioners submit the following
argument to affirm the same.
1. Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is a Whistle blower.
Mrs. Fatima Ghansari has played a pivotal role in this matter. She is an independent member
of the Lok Sabha104. She has filed the instant petition in the SC asking to strike down the
reservation law and the constitutional amendment as it was prima facie unconstitutional
98
S.R. Bommai and Ors v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1994 SC 1918.
99
M.H. Beg J., Impact of Secularism on Life and Law, 61 (1st Ed.,1985).
100
State of Gujarat v. The I.R.C.G., Civil Appeal No: 3249 of 2016 (Supreme Court, 09.08.2017).
101
Md. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605.
102
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1985 SC 731.
103
Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, 1955.
104
Point 23 of Clarifications.
PETITIONER TC-09
because it was disrupting communal harmony of the country and was functioning against the
Constitutional provisions.105
She apprised the House about a sting operation by “Zebra Post” which reveals that the members
of the ruling party in collusion with large media houses are running “Hindu” agenda. She also
made a written complaint to the Speaker making various revelations about her accusations.
Mrs. Ghansari, who is a MP is also a public servant.106 Thus, she is also a subject to the Act.
One of the basic requirements of a person being accepted as a “whistle blower” is that his/her
primary motive for the activity should be in furtherance of public good.107 Moreover, criticism
of Government Policies is also not prohibited.108 A whistle blower is a person who raises a
concern about wrongdoing occurring in an organization or body of people. Usually this person
would be from that same organization. The revealed misconduct may be classified in many
ways; for example, a violation of a law, rule, regulation and/or a direct threat to public interest,
such as fraud, health/safety violations and corruption109. Hence she was a Whistle Blower under
S.4 of the Act.
2. Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is entitled to be protected under the Act.

S.11 of the Act says that the Central Government will make sure that no person who has made
a public disclosure for the welfare of public is made to go through any kind of victimization by
way of initiation of any proceedings. Thus, S.11 provides protection to a whistle blower.
On 1st May 2018, Mrs. Ghansari was threatened of dire consequences over an anonymous
phone call, she continues to insist revocation of the laws in question. Later, she informed the
Speaker about this. Mrs. Ghansari had made many disclosures for the public good and had
made people aware of the corruption that was going on in the higher government.
A whistle blower who makes any disclosure in public interest to a competent authority deserves
to be protected in toto by the Court.110 Here Mrs. Ghansari had made bonafide disclosures
based on public interest. Hence, she must be protected under the Law for she was just exercising
her right to free speech111. As the disclosure by Mrs. Ghansari is made in public-interest and is
bona fide in nature, then she ought to be protected under S.11 of the Act.112 Good faith whistle
105
106
State of Karnataka v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha (2017) 6 SCC 263. See also: J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India, 1999 5
SCC 138 , Dilip Parulekar v. Airesh Rodriguez, MANU/MH/2004/2018.
107
Manoj H.Mishra v. Union Of India, MANU/SCOR/11105/2013.
108
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, 1989 (2) SCC 574.
109
Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. R.K. Jain, AIR 2011 SC 2234.
110
Ibid.
111
Art. 19(2), Constitution of India, 1950.
112
Anil Agarwal v. The National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., MANU/CA/0429/2017.
PETITIONER TC-09
blowers represent the highest ideals of public service and challenge abuses of power. 113 No
action can be taken against a whistle blower, which is an act of victimization of the person on
account of his/her disclosures. Hence this is by default a defense under the Act. 114 Therefore,
it is submitted by the petitioners, that Mrs. Ghansari had made bona-fide revelations about the
anti-secular agenda of the Ruling Party, in public interest. She also contended herself to be a
whistle blower, thereby demanding for security under the Act. Thus, she deserves to be
protected under the Act.115
Hence, in the light of the submissions made, it is humbly submitted by the Petitioners, that Mrs.
Ghansari being a Whistle Blower is ought to be protected under the Act.
VII. WHETHER THE ARREST OF THE THREE LADIES WAS LEGALLY VALID?
It is humbly submitted, by the Petitioners, that the arrest of the three ladies, namely, Mrs.
Garima Dhall, Mrs. Yamini Paul and Mrs. Mannat Raichandani, is legally. The petitioners
submit the following argument to affirm the same.
1. The arrest of the three ladies was legally valid.
On 28th February, 2018, three social activists, who were instrumental forces behind the passing
of this law providing 33% reservation to women in the Parliament, got arrested by the
intelligence agency of Indica, on the grounds of spying for and providing vital State Secrets to
the enemy country of Indica. The Intelligence Agency had credible evidences behind the arrest.
The reason of arrest was also disclosed to the arrestee.
The rights inherent in Art.22(1) of the Constitution require to be recognized and scrupulously
protected.116 At the time of arrest, the police officer has to inform the arrestee the reason for
arrest.117 It is further submitted that the Intelligence Agency has claimed that it has credible
evidence and in the eventuality of display of violence or escape attempts or credible evidence,
the person can be arrested and be detained.118 Therefore, since there is credible evidence against
the arrestees, there is no reason for the arrest to be illegal.119 Every person who is being arrested
113
179th Law Commission of India Report, The Public Interest Disclosure And Protection Of Informers, 40 (2001).
114
Parveen v. The Secretary, Union Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change, Original Appeal No.
4081 of 2015, (Central Administrative Tribunal,13.07.2016). See also: S.M. Matloob v. The Director General,
ICCR, Original Appeal No. 1894 of 2014 (Central Administrative Tribunal, 11.12.2014).
115
Sri. Sharad Vithal Kohli v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 12325; Wigmore, Evidence Vol. 8,
S. 2378, 792 (McNaughton rev.1961).
116
177th Law Commission of India Report, Law Relating To Arrest, 38 (2001), available at
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/177rptp1.pdf , last seen on 01.09.2018.
117
DK Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610; M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th Ed., 2016).
118
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1579.
119
Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765.
PETITIONER TC-09
should be made aware of the charges based on which he is being arrested. In other words, the
grounds of arrest should be disclosed to the arrestee at the time of arrest. 120 Not just once, a
person can be arrested more than once if the grounds of arrest are disclosed.121 The Government
is bound to provide the reason for the arrest and the same was complied with, the arrest is thus
valid.122 Without proper legal grounds, a person cannot be arrested. However, once credible
evidence has been obtained, the person can be arrested.123 Having credible evidence, the police
may even have the power to arrest the person without a warrant. 124 Similarly, in the instant
case, warrant was not issued and yet the people were arrested because there was credible
evidences. If the arresting authority deems fit that the arrest is necessary on obtaining credible
evidence, he may arrest the person under S.41 of the CrPC.125 Thus, the acts of the police was
in compliance to Art.22126. Under these circumstances, it is humbly being submitted before this
Hon’ble Bench that the arrest of the three civilians was legal as it was in compliance to all the
aforementioned judicial precedents.
2. Right under Art.21 of the ladies are not infringed.
A person can be arrested only if there is credible evidence that the arresting authority has in
hand. In the case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,127the SC held that in Art.21, the
expression “Procedure established by Law” meant the procedure as laid down in the law was
enacted by the Legislature and nothing more. Thus, a person could be deprived of his right to
life and personal liberty only by a procedure established by Law 128 as the cause of arrest is
provided.129 In the instant case, the civilians were arrested and it was legal, since it was in
conformity to the aforementioned judicial pronouncements and as by virtue of Art. 141130, it is
a known fact that judicial pronouncements are considered binding law of the land and also the
CrPC along with Art.22 of the Constitution of Indica. Hence, in the light of the above
submissions, it is further submitted that the civilians were legally arrested and for the very same
reason there was no infringement of any right under Art. 21of the Constitution of Indica.
120
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
121
State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Vaidya, AIR 1951 SC 157.
122
Statement by Pocker Sahib Bahadur, Volume 7, CAD, 09.12.1948..
123
Ateek Ahmad v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/UC/0359/2017.
124
Lalit v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/UC/0490/2017.
125
Sangita Garg v. State of Uttaranchal, 2017 (2) N.C.C.163.
126
Art.22, Constitution of India, 1950.
127
Supra 120.
128
M.S.M Sharma v. Krishna Sinha and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 395; In the matter of: Under Article 143 of the
Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745.
129
Subhash Popatlal Dave v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2012 SC 3370.
130
Art. 141, Constitution of India, 1950.
PETITIONER TC-09
PRAYER
Wherefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly
prayed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court may be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare that;
1. The Petitions are maintainable on grounds of public interest and that the Hon’ble Court
has complete jurisdiction over the matter; and
2. The law providing 33% reservation to women in the Parliament and the Constitutional
amendment to Article 19(2) be declared to be arbitrary and further violative of the
concept of equality; and
3. The act of legislating a law providing reservation to women in the Parliament and the
act of amending Article 19(2) of Indica is violative of the secular principles; and
4. A law that serves the motive of any foreign power or has aided communal disharmony
on grounds is violative of the Constitutional provisions and thus, ought to be struck
down; and that the Constitutional amendment to Article 19(2) is violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution; and
5. The relevant authority must provide protection to Mrs .Ghansari under the Whistle
Blower’s Protection Act 2014, or any other allied law for the time being in force in
Indica; and
6. The arrest of the three civilians is legal and therefore the concerned authority be directed
to take appropriate steps as by procedure established by law;
AND/OR
Pass any order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience. And for
this act of kindness, the Petitioners as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
Counsels for the Petitioners

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PETITIONER TC-09

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

TRANSFER PETITION NO. ______/2018

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ARTICLES 32 & 139A OF

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................... iii

I. CASES ...................................................................................................................... iii

II. STATUTES ................................................................................................................ vi

III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ......................................................................... vi

IV. ARTICLES ................................................................................................................. vi

VI. REPORTS .................................................................................................................vii

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBY DEBATES .........................................................vii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... ix

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ...................................................................................................... xi

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................xii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................... 1

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE

1. The PIL filed by R.M. Swain is maintainable ......................................................... 1

1. Reservation of Seats for women is arbitrary in nature. ........................................... 3

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

III. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

1. Amending power does not extend to the Basic Structure. ....................................... 6

1. Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is a Whistle blower. ........................................................... 12

1. The arrest of the three ladies was legally valid. .................................................... 14

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

(P) Ltd Private Limited

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

1) A.K. Behara v. Union of India, (2010) 11 SCC 322 ...................................................... 6

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

1) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ................................................................................... 15

III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1) Art. 141, Constitution of India, 1950 ........................................................................... 15

1) “Actions of the Indian government with respect to minority communities”, Minority

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBY DEBATES

1) Statement by Mr. Raj Bahadur in Volume 7................................................................ 11

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

I. TRANSFER PETITION NO. _____/2018

II. W.P. (PIL) No. _____/2018

III. W.P. (PIL) No. _____/2018

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) VIOLATES

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

1. The PIL filed by R.M. Swain is maintainable

II. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN

III. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

2. Anti-Secular nature against Basic Structure

IV. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO

2. Sting Operation proves the propagation of Hindu Agenda.

V. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT

VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLE BLOWERS

2. Mrs. Fatima Ghansari is entitled to be protected under the Act.