Cover FAST 11/03/98 21:55 Page 1

FAST 22/p1 ˆ p6 11/03/98 23:45 Page 1

AIRBUS
TECHNICAL
DIGEST

NUMBER 22
MARCH 1998

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
PREVENTING LEAKS
JEROME QUENESCOURT
22
FUEL SYSTEM
DETECTING LEAKS USING HELIUM
ALAIN MARECHAL AND ALAIN DENINOTTI
77
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CLIMATE
ANDREW S. Mc CLYMONT 11
11
IMPLEMENTING JAR-OPS WITH
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTATION
GUY DI SANTO
17
17
THE PORTABLE WATER DETECTION TOOL
FOR A300/A300-600/A310 AIRCRAFT
RENE SAVOIE AND MARIE-SOPHIE CALAIS
21
21
LIGHTNING STRIKES AND AIRBUS FLY-BY-WIRE AIRCRAFT
CAPTAIN CHRIS KRAHE 25
25
AIM-FANS WINS GROWING NUMBER OF ORDERS
JEAN-PIERRE DAMBRINE 28
28
CUSTOMER SERVICES CONFERENCES
30
30
THE FIRST AVIATION REGULATION?
31
31
RESIDENT CUSTOMER SUPPORT
REPRESENTATION 32
32
The articles herein may be reprinted without permission except where copyright source is indicated, but with
acknowledgement to Airbus Industrie. Articles which may be subject to ongoing review must have their accuracy
verified prior to reprint. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the assumptions shown
and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, the Company will be
pleased to explain the basis thereof. © AIRBUS INDUSTRIE 1998
Publisher: Airbus Industrie Customer Services, 1 rond-point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France
Editor: Denis Dempster, Product Marketing
Telephone +33 (0)5 61 93 39 29, Telex AIRBU 530526F, Telefax +33 (0)5 61 93 27 67
Graphic design: Agnès Lacombe, Customer Services Marketing
Photo-engraving: Passion Graphic, 60 boulevard Déodat de Séverac, 31027 Toulouse Cedex, France
Printer: Escourbiac, 5 avenue Marcel Dassault, 31502 Toulouse Cedex, France
This issue of FAST has been printed on paper produced without using chlorine, to reduce waste
and help to conserve natural resources. 'Every little helps'.
FAST may be read on Internet http://www.airbus.com

FAST / NUMBER 22 1
FAST 22/p1 ˆ p6 11/03/98 23:48 Page 2
There
are three as-
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ● design,
pects to be
considered
when looking for the causes of leaks:
Preventing leaks ● control of quality in production,
● maintenance.
Only the manufacturer can do some-
thing about the first two items
andAirbus Industrie is continually
studying how repetitive defects can be
designed out of the system either by
changing the design, the supplier and
/or the production process (Figure 1).
DESIGN
Part of the designer’s work is to make
the maintenance interventions, sched-
uled and unscheduled, as infrequent as
possible, and the maintenance practices
Jérome Quenescourt as simple as possible. The Technical
Hydraulic Systems Engineer Design Directives for the hydraulic sys-
Eng. & Technical Support tem, written originally for the A300, are
Airbus Industrie
largely still applicable, however there
Customer Services Directorate
have been some changes such as the
greater use of titanium piping which is
lighter than stainless steel and less
In an earlier prone to pin-hole corrosion; the gener-
article alised use of flareless fittings; installa-
"Hydraulic system tion of built-in Hydraulic System
Monitoring Units and the qualification
- Working of new fluids and methods of repairing
practices" (FAST pipes.
Further work is being done to en-
N°13), some hance the built-in test and monitoring
fundamental capabilities of the system allowing eas-
working practices ier and more accurate maintenance in-
terventions as early as possible in the
were detailed, degradation sequence.
aimed to reduce
QUALITY IN PRODUCTION
the number of
leaks. Since then, Computer aided design and manufac-
a dedicated turing of pipes have greatly improved
the quality of the installation of pipe
monitoring runs particularly in areas having many
programme has pipes with multiple bends in close
proximity. The improved installation
been launched and allied with:
working groups ● respect of torque values and proper
formed to further tightening methods,
● stress free installation,
minimise the ● seal installation with lubricants
occurrence ● use of dedicated tools,
all lead to trouble free installations.
of leaks. The Airbus Industrie Process
The purpose of Specification (AIPS) sets the standards
for production and installation of the
this article is to hydraulic systems for all the Airbus
provide guidelines aircraft.
for maintenance One area where manufacturer and
operator have to be particularly vigilant
personnel to is in the inadvertent acquisition of "bo-
reduce the gus" parts that do not always conform
with basic quality standards. Hydraulic
frequency of leaks systems have been known to suffer
even further. from the installation of these parts, par-
2 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22
Figure 1
Hydraulic Leak Monitoring
Airbus Data Base (FORDSREP)
TEC
H LOG
Extraction
Leak
events Leak
Analysis
• Study
Airline/fleet
• Tracking
Data repeaters
Resident Customer Base • Effectiveness
Representative Office of improvement
New leak (SB)
events
*ARCS Coding
*ARCS: Airbus Representative events
Communication System
Information flow: about 2000 events in 1997 (all A/C types)
ticularly seals, which has led to rein-
forced audits at vendors and informa-
tion being transmitted to the operators
through the Service Information Letter
(SIL 29-064).
MAINTENANCE
Maintenance can be divided into two
groups - preventive and corrective.
Preventive maintenance
In the Maintenance Planning Docu-
ments (MPD) there are scheduled tasks
which are defined to ensure hydraulic
system integrity and avoid leaks. These
tasks are found in the Zonal Inspection
Programme under System checks (typi-
cal defects are shown in Figures 2 to 6).
Zonal inspection programme
The zonal programme asks for visual
inspection of various aircraft systems
including the hydraulic system, at vari-
ous locations (wheel well bay, under
floor, engine pylons, wing trailing edge
etc). It is during the visual inspections
that anomalies can be identified and
corrected, such as:
● presence of seepage (Figure 2)
● loose or missing ties, spacers or
clamp blocks, (Figures 3, 4, 6)
● damaged pipe-lines
● loose connections
● line chafing (Figure 6 and 7).
System checks
Some system checks are fundamental
to ensure the system integrity and to
prevent future damage. For instance,
regular hydraulic fluid sampling to al-
low the operator to maintain the fluid
quality within given limits (acidity
level, chlorine and water content) and
therefore avoid component erosion or
corrosion. Moreover, as soon as com-
ponents become eroded, internal leak-
age rates increase, fluid is laminated,
3
FAST 22/p1 ˆ p6 11/03/98 23:48 Page 2
There
are three as-
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ● design,
pects to be
considered
when looking for the causes of leaks:
Preventing leaks ● control of quality in production,
● maintenance.
Only the manufacturer can do some-
thing about the first two items
andAirbus Industrie is continually
studying how repetitive defects can be
designed out of the system either by
changing the design, the supplier and
/or the production process (Figure 1).
DESIGN
Part of the designer’s work is to make
the maintenance interventions, sched-
uled and unscheduled, as infrequent as
possible, and the maintenance practices
Jérome Quenescourt as simple as possible. The Technical
Hydraulic Systems Engineer Design Directives for the hydraulic sys-
Eng. & Technical Support tem, written originally for the A300, are
Airbus Industrie
largely still applicable, however there
Customer Services Directorate
have been some changes such as the
greater use of titanium piping which is
lighter than stainless steel and less
In an earlier prone to pin-hole corrosion; the gener-
article alised use of flareless fittings; installa-
"Hydraulic system tion of built-in Hydraulic System
Monitoring Units and the qualification
- Working of new fluids and methods of repairing
practices" (FAST pipes.
Further work is being done to en-
N°13), some hance the built-in test and monitoring
fundamental capabilities of the system allowing eas-
working practices ier and more accurate maintenance in-
terventions as early as possible in the
were detailed, degradation sequence.
aimed to reduce
QUALITY IN PRODUCTION
the number of
leaks. Since then, Computer aided design and manufac-
a dedicated turing of pipes have greatly improved
the quality of the installation of pipe
monitoring runs particularly in areas having many
programme has pipes with multiple bends in close
proximity. The improved installation
been launched and allied with:
working groups ● respect of torque values and proper
formed to further tightening methods,
● stress free installation,
minimise the ● seal installation with lubricants
occurrence ● use of dedicated tools,
all lead to trouble free installations.
of leaks. The Airbus Industrie Process
The purpose of Specification (AIPS) sets the standards
for production and installation of the
this article is to hydraulic systems for all the Airbus
provide guidelines aircraft.
for maintenance One area where manufacturer and
operator have to be particularly vigilant
personnel to is in the inadvertent acquisition of "bo-
reduce the gus" parts that do not always conform
with basic quality standards. Hydraulic
frequency of leaks systems have been known to suffer
even further. from the installation of these parts, par-
2 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22
Figure 1
Hydraulic Leak Monitoring
Airbus Data Base (FORDSREP)
TEC
H LOG
Extraction
Leak
events Leak
Analysis
• Study
Airline/fleet
• Tracking
Data repeaters
Resident Customer Base • Effectiveness
Representative Office of improvement
New leak (SB)
events
*ARCS Coding
*ARCS: Airbus Representative events
Communication System
Information flow: about 2000 events in 1997 (all A/C types)
ticularly seals, which has led to rein-
forced audits at vendors and informa-
tion being transmitted to the operators
through the Service Information Letter
(SIL 29-064).
MAINTENANCE
Maintenance can be divided into two
groups - preventive and corrective.
Preventive maintenance
In the Maintenance Planning Docu-
ments (MPD) there are scheduled tasks
which are defined to ensure hydraulic
system integrity and avoid leaks. These
tasks are found in the Zonal Inspection
Programme under System checks (typi-
cal defects are shown in Figures 2 to 6).
Zonal inspection programme
The zonal programme asks for visual
inspection of various aircraft systems
including the hydraulic system, at vari-
ous locations (wheel well bay, under
floor, engine pylons, wing trailing edge
etc). It is during the visual inspections
that anomalies can be identified and
corrected, such as:
● presence of seepage (Figure 2)
● loose or missing ties, spacers or
clamp blocks, (Figures 3, 4, 6)
● damaged pipe-lines
● loose connections
● line chafing (Figure 6 and 7).
System checks
Some system checks are fundamental
to ensure the system integrity and to
prevent future damage. For instance,
regular hydraulic fluid sampling to al-
low the operator to maintain the fluid
quality within given limits (acidity
level, chlorine and water content) and
therefore avoid component erosion or
corrosion. Moreover, as soon as com-
ponents become eroded, internal leak-
age rates increase, fluid is laminated,
3
FAST 22/p1 ˆ p6 11/03/98 23:50 Page 4
system operating temperature increases
Figure 2
which further degrades the fluid, in-
Detection of typical fluid seepage by stains on talcum powder creasing its acidity level. This never
ending process will continue until af-
fected components and fluid are
changed as necessary. This example
shows the prevention role of the sys-
tems checks required by the MPD both
for mandatory tasks such as internal
leak checks and economic tasks such as
fluid sampling.
Corrective maintenance
For corrective maintenance to be effec-
tive and long lasting a certain level of
basic maintenance training and knowl-
edge of the specific aircraft are re-
quired. These requirements were de-
tailed in the article in FAST 13. A
video, poster and related documentation
are available from the address at the
end of this article.
Most leaks are discovered during line
Figure 3 maintenance - on the walk-around,
Pipe clamping (spacer) loosening and moving night stop or pre-flight checks - and
they have to be corrected as quickly as
possible. This may require the installa-
tion of a temporary repair kit rather
than a permanent hydraulic tube repair
requiring pipe manufacturing capabil-
ity. In this case SIL 29-069 "Pipe repair
kit" and SIL 29-067 "Hydraulic tubing
repairs" provide useful information.
Other SILs providing related infor-
mation on the various leak sources are :
● 29-032 for A300/A300-600/A310,
● 29-064 for A319/A320/A321,
● 29-066 for A330/A340.
LEAK SOURCES
Components
A list of available and essential compo-
nent improvements is provided in the
Figure 4 dedicated SILs listed above. The em-
bodiment of those product improve-
Detail of spacer loosening and moving ments on an attrition basis or through
dedicated retrofit should provide a sig-
nificant increase in system reliability.
Tracking of component reliability
is necessary to meet on-condition/con-
dition-monitoring maintenance require-
ments. For hydraulic systems it con-
cerns the main components such as the
engine driven pumps (EDP) and power
transfer units.
There is evidence that those compo-
nents, even when a proper overhaul has
been performed, do not recover their
full potential after the overhaul, which
affects their long term reliability. Also,
if a part such as an EDP valve block is
not changed at the overhaul of the EDP,
then it will accumulate many years of
operation which may lead to natural
damage, fatigue or corrosion.
4 FAST / NUMBER 22
This is an example of why tracking
Figure 5
of component reliability may justify a
need for a fixed time between overhaul Effect of lubricant on plug-in union threads
(TBO), replacement of a part, or em-
bodiment of a modification. Lubricant on
the threads
Seals
Plug-in union
The keys issues for seal reliability are
product manufacturing quality and O-Ring
proper installation.
Manufacturing quality
The product manufacturing quality has
been recently at the focal point of in-
service failures on the A330/A340 pro- Manifold port
grams. (Refer to SIL 29-064). As a re-
sult, two vendors have been removed
from the approved list of suppliers be-
cause of identified quality deficiency
on some of their products. Three other
vendors (Le Joint Francais, Dowty
U.K, and Parker) have been audited
and their standard of manufacturing During tightening of
quality judged satisfactory. the union the lubricant
fills the groove and
Installation pushes the seal out
Chapter 20 of the Aircraft Maintenance
Manual recommends use of certain
tools and provides other advice for
proper installation of seals.
In the previous article in FAST it
was stated that "Seals, O-rings and Pinching
packing washers should be smeared
with MCS-352 lubricant or hydraulic At final tightening
fluid". It has recently been discovered the seal is pinched
that the application of MCS-352 on the between the plug-in
threads of plug-in unions can have a union and the edge of
negative effect, causing the seal to be the chamfer. This
squeezed and damaged (Figure 5). pinching damages the
For plug-in unions hydraulic fluid rubber on the outer
should be used as a lubricant. surface of the seal
Pipes
There are generally three origins of Figure 6
pipe failure:
● chafing,
Risk of chafing due to loose clamping
● installation under stress,
● corrosion.
High quality of manufacture of the
pipes allowing good installation can
largely prevent these types of failures.
A recent audit performed on all Airbus
pipe production centres revealed that
manufacturing processes and tech-
niques are well adapted and controlled,
with the use of :
● numerical controlled bending ma-
chines and improved knowledge of
spring back effect,
● laser dimensional check for every in-
dividual manufactured pipe,
● chlorine free pipe cleaning,
● laser marking.
Compliance with installation rules
will avoid chafing and pre-stressed
installations. Design will also help
FAST / NUMBER 22 5
FAST 22/p1 ˆ p6 11/03/98 23:50 Page 4
system operating temperature increases
Figure 2
which further degrades the fluid, in-
Detection of typical fluid seepage by stains on talcum powder creasing its acidity level. This never
ending process will continue until af-
fected components and fluid are
changed as necessary. This example
shows the prevention role of the sys-
tems checks required by the MPD both
for mandatory tasks such as internal
leak checks and economic tasks such as
fluid sampling.
Corrective maintenance
For corrective maintenance to be effec-
tive and long lasting a certain level of
basic maintenance training and knowl-
edge of the specific aircraft are re-
quired. These requirements were de-
tailed in the article in FAST 13. A
video, poster and related documentation
are available from the address at the
end of this article.
Most leaks are discovered during line
Figure 3 maintenance - on the walk-around,
Pipe clamping (spacer) loosening and moving night stop or pre-flight checks - and
they have to be corrected as quickly as
possible. This may require the installa-
tion of a temporary repair kit rather
than a permanent hydraulic tube repair
requiring pipe manufacturing capabil-
ity. In this case SIL 29-069 "Pipe repair
kit" and SIL 29-067 "Hydraulic tubing
repairs" provide useful information.
Other SILs providing related infor-
mation on the various leak sources are :
● 29-032 for A300/A300-600/A310,
● 29-064 for A319/A320/A321,
● 29-066 for A330/A340.
LEAK SOURCES
Components
A list of available and essential compo-
nent improvements is provided in the
Figure 4 dedicated SILs listed above. The em-
bodiment of those product improve-
Detail of spacer loosening and moving ments on an attrition basis or through
dedicated retrofit should provide a sig-
nificant increase in system reliability.
Tracking of component reliability
is necessary to meet on-condition/con-
dition-monitoring maintenance require-
ments. For hydraulic systems it con-
cerns the main components such as the
engine driven pumps (EDP) and power
transfer units.
There is evidence that those compo-
nents, even when a proper overhaul has
been performed, do not recover their
full potential after the overhaul, which
affects their long term reliability. Also,
if a part such as an EDP valve block is
not changed at the overhaul of the EDP,
then it will accumulate many years of
operation which may lead to natural
damage, fatigue or corrosion.
4 FAST / NUMBER 22
This is an example of why tracking
Figure 5
of component reliability may justify a
need for a fixed time between overhaul Effect of lubricant on plug-in union threads
(TBO), replacement of a part, or em-
bodiment of a modification. Lubricant on
the threads
Seals
Plug-in union
The keys issues for seal reliability are
product manufacturing quality and O-Ring
proper installation.
Manufacturing quality
The product manufacturing quality has
been recently at the focal point of in-
service failures on the A330/A340 pro- Manifold port
grams. (Refer to SIL 29-064). As a re-
sult, two vendors have been removed
from the approved list of suppliers be-
cause of identified quality deficiency
on some of their products. Three other
vendors (Le Joint Francais, Dowty
U.K, and Parker) have been audited
and their standard of manufacturing During tightening of
quality judged satisfactory. the union the lubricant
fills the groove and
Installation pushes the seal out
Chapter 20 of the Aircraft Maintenance
Manual recommends use of certain
tools and provides other advice for
proper installation of seals.
In the previous article in FAST it
was stated that "Seals, O-rings and Pinching
packing washers should be smeared
with MCS-352 lubricant or hydraulic At final tightening
fluid". It has recently been discovered the seal is pinched
that the application of MCS-352 on the between the plug-in
threads of plug-in unions can have a union and the edge of
negative effect, causing the seal to be the chamfer. This
squeezed and damaged (Figure 5). pinching damages the
For plug-in unions hydraulic fluid rubber on the outer
should be used as a lubricant. surface of the seal
Pipes
There are generally three origins of Figure 6
pipe failure:
● chafing,
Risk of chafing due to loose clamping
● installation under stress,
● corrosion.
High quality of manufacture of the
pipes allowing good installation can
largely prevent these types of failures.
A recent audit performed on all Airbus
pipe production centres revealed that
manufacturing processes and tech-
niques are well adapted and controlled,
with the use of :
● numerical controlled bending ma-
chines and improved knowledge of
spring back effect,
● laser dimensional check for every in-
dividual manufactured pipe,
● chlorine free pipe cleaning,
● laser marking.
Compliance with installation rules
will avoid chafing and pre-stressed
installations. Design will also help
FAST / NUMBER 22 5
FAST 22/p1 ˆ p6 11/03/98 23:53 Page 6

Figure 7 due to loosening, wear or damage,

● corrosion development (exposure to
Risk of chafing due to small clearance contaminants such as saline atmos-
phere, spillage from toilets),
● damage to pipe surfaces during

FUEL SYSTEM
maintenance.

Pipe fittings

Maintenance is a common source of

with improved clamping definition
(adjustable brackets) and dampening of
pressure pulsation of pumps.
Ageing affects the integrity of pipe
installations (Figures 3 to 7) justifying
the importance of periodic inspection
checks such as in the zonal inspection.
Typical ageing effects are:
● reduced efficiency of clamp blocks
Figure 8
Rosan fitting definition: union and port
leakage when loosening is due to un-
der-tightening (often found on large fit-
tings) and damage is due to over-tight-
Detecting leaks using helium
ening, generally found on aluminium
fittings or small fittings and due to
cracking from frequent loosening and
tightening. The main development in
fitting technology has been the intro-
duction of more reliable flareless
unions. However experience has shown
that there is no substitute for systematic
compliance with correct tightening pro-
cedures and use of the correct tools. Alain Maréchal
Airbus Industrie is studying more Structure
"damage tolerant" fitting designs such Engineering Support
as Rosan (Figure 8) and alternative A300/A310/A330/A340
tightening techniques which can cope Airbus Industrie
with vibration and a maintenance envi-
ronment where use of torque wrenches
is not common practice. Alain Deninotti
Quality Assurance
Product Manager
Airbus Industrie

Adapter

U
ntil now curing
Lockring
fuel leaks has been
Serrations a relatively difficult
operation for operators
and manufacturers alike.
O-Ring
The methods available
to identify the leak paths
have been air blowing
CONCLUSION associated with soapy water
Lubricant MCS-352 should not be used on the threads of the plug-in unions. Although the hydraulic leak rate on a fleet-wide to detect bubbles (a method
basis is approaching a satisfactory level it can and will be improved. Further efforts by Airbus Industrie and the vendors to as old as aviation itself),
improve hydraulic system reliability together with preventive maintenance actions applied by operators when necessary and
proper application of procedures, will keep the hydraulic leak rates within an acceptable level. For this purpose, customers’ and suction associated
feedback on in-service experience is vital. with dye penetrant,
Airbus Industrie will assist any operator suffering from a perceived excessive leak rate to initiate a leak preventive pro-
gramme. This programme has been successfully implemented by a number of operators one of whom experienced a reduc- neither method being
tion in leak rates by 50%. ■ very successful.
This article describes
For further information please contact:
a new detecting technique
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Engineering Services, Engineer Hydraulic Systems, Mr TORBJÖRN KETTEL using helium gas developed
by Airbus Industrie.
6 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 7
FAST 22/p1 ˆ p6 11/03/98 23:53 Page 6

Figure 7 due to loosening, wear or damage,

● corrosion development (exposure to
Risk of chafing due to small clearance contaminants such as saline atmos-
phere, spillage from toilets),
● damage to pipe surfaces during

FUEL SYSTEM
maintenance.

Pipe fittings

Maintenance is a common source of

with improved clamping definition
(adjustable brackets) and dampening of
pressure pulsation of pumps.
Ageing affects the integrity of pipe
installations (Figures 3 to 7) justifying
the importance of periodic inspection
checks such as in the zonal inspection.
Typical ageing effects are:
● reduced efficiency of clamp blocks
Figure 8
Rosan fitting definition: union and port
leakage when loosening is due to un-
der-tightening (often found on large fit-
tings) and damage is due to over-tight-
Detecting leaks using helium
ening, generally found on aluminium
fittings or small fittings and due to
cracking from frequent loosening and
tightening. The main development in
fitting technology has been the intro-
duction of more reliable flareless
unions. However experience has shown
that there is no substitute for systematic
compliance with correct tightening pro-
cedures and use of the correct tools. Alain Maréchal
Airbus Industrie is studying more Structure
"damage tolerant" fitting designs such Engineering Support
as Rosan (Figure 8) and alternative A300/A310/A330/A340
tightening techniques which can cope Airbus Industrie
with vibration and a maintenance envi-
ronment where use of torque wrenches
is not common practice. Alain Deninotti
Quality Assurance
Product Manager
Airbus Industrie

Adapter

U
ntil now curing
Lockring
fuel leaks has been
Serrations a relatively difficult
operation for operators
and manufacturers alike.
O-Ring
The methods available
to identify the leak paths
have been air blowing
CONCLUSION associated with soapy water
Lubricant MCS-352 should not be used on the threads of the plug-in unions. Although the hydraulic leak rate on a fleet-wide to detect bubbles (a method
basis is approaching a satisfactory level it can and will be improved. Further efforts by Airbus Industrie and the vendors to as old as aviation itself),
improve hydraulic system reliability together with preventive maintenance actions applied by operators when necessary and
proper application of procedures, will keep the hydraulic leak rates within an acceptable level. For this purpose, customers’ and suction associated
feedback on in-service experience is vital. with dye penetrant,
Airbus Industrie will assist any operator suffering from a perceived excessive leak rate to initiate a leak preventive pro-
gramme. This programme has been successfully implemented by a number of operators one of whom experienced a reduc- neither method being
tion in leak rates by 50%. ■ very successful.
This article describes
For further information please contact:
a new detecting technique
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Engineering Services, Engineer Hydraulic Systems, Mr TORBJÖRN KETTEL using helium gas developed
by Airbus Industrie.
6 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 7
FAST22 p7 ˆ 10 11/03/98 23:36 Page 8
Figure 1
Wing structure (typical)
Fuel tanks in modern commercial air-
liners are housed principally in the
wings, and the wing structure is also the
fuel tank structure; there are no rubber
tanks or other forms of inner walls
within the wings. Wing structures are
composed of large skin panels, dozens
of ribs and stringers, and thousands of
bolts and rivets covered with a sealant
to prevent fuel seepage (Figure 1). This
structure is flexible, as anyone who has
flown in turbulent weather will have
noticed, as they watch the wing tips
moving up and down. Eventually fuel
seepage does occur and the leaks be-
come evident on the outer surface of
the skin. The visible point of seepage is
Figure 2
Different phases of detection method
2a Identification of a leak 2b Use of helium gas as tracer gas
INSIDE INSIDE
Leaking Helium
area
OUTSIDE
8 FAST / NUMBER 22
at the end of the leak path (Figure 2a)
and an efficient repair requires that the
origin of the leak path (or paths) is
identified and properly sealed. If not,
there is a high risk that the leak will ap-
pear again, and quite often it does.
THE INNOVATIVE
APPROACH
Airbus Industrie investigated several
leak path detection methods and has se-
lected and developed a new detection
technique using helium as a tracer gas
to allow easier detection of the source
of the leak (Figure 2b).
This technique, which was developed
Gas leak
=
Location of
sealant
deterioration
OUTSIDE
Figure 3
Example of visual location of fuel leaking from flap track forward attachment lug
Resealing area
and potential leak paths
Access manhole
in cooperation with two companies, Figure 4
Helitech and Varian, and with the sup-
port of different maintenance centres Example of artificial compression chamber around the lug shown on Figure 3
and airlines, was the only one which
offered the required sensitivity and reli-
ability, and is a great step forward
compared to the methods used previ-
ously.
THE HELIUM TECHNIQUE
Helium is a non-toxic inert gas which
does not react chemically with any
other element, making it intrinsically
safe. In addition, due to its small rela-
tive molecular mass, it has a high pene-
tration capability allowing it to pass
through the smallest gaps. Helium is
particularly interesting for this leak de-
tection task because of its low concen-
tration in the atmosphere (five particles
per million) which allows easy detec-
tion of any small increase in this pro-
portion. Finally it is an industrial gas
available anywhere in the world.
Pressurised helium is already used in
Airbus production lines to test for
leaks. The leak is visually located ex-
ternally (Figure 3) and the source is
identified internally by creating a com-
pression chamber around the leak point
(Figure 4) and filling it with helium un-
der pressure thereby forcing the helium
back up the leak channel into the fuel
tank.
FAST / NUMBER 22 9
FAST22 p7 ˆ 10 11/03/98 23:36 Page 8
Figure 1
Wing structure (typical)
Fuel tanks in modern commercial air-
liners are housed principally in the
wings, and the wing structure is also the
fuel tank structure; there are no rubber
tanks or other forms of inner walls
within the wings. Wing structures are
composed of large skin panels, dozens
of ribs and stringers, and thousands of
bolts and rivets covered with a sealant
to prevent fuel seepage (Figure 1). This
structure is flexible, as anyone who has
flown in turbulent weather will have
noticed, as they watch the wing tips
moving up and down. Eventually fuel
seepage does occur and the leaks be-
come evident on the outer surface of
the skin. The visible point of seepage is
Figure 2
Different phases of detection method
2a Identification of a leak 2b Use of helium gas as tracer gas
INSIDE INSIDE
Leaking Helium
area
OUTSIDE
8 FAST / NUMBER 22
at the end of the leak path (Figure 2a)
and an efficient repair requires that the
origin of the leak path (or paths) is
identified and properly sealed. If not,
there is a high risk that the leak will ap-
pear again, and quite often it does.
THE INNOVATIVE
APPROACH
Airbus Industrie investigated several
leak path detection methods and has se-
lected and developed a new detection
technique using helium as a tracer gas
to allow easier detection of the source
of the leak (Figure 2b).
This technique, which was developed
Gas leak
=
Location of
sealant
deterioration
OUTSIDE
Figure 3
Example of visual location of fuel leaking from flap track forward attachment lug
Resealing area
and potential leak paths
Access manhole
in cooperation with two companies, Figure 4
Helitech and Varian, and with the sup-
port of different maintenance centres Example of artificial compression chamber around the lug shown on Figure 3
and airlines, was the only one which
offered the required sensitivity and reli-
ability, and is a great step forward
compared to the methods used previ-
ously.
THE HELIUM TECHNIQUE
Helium is a non-toxic inert gas which
does not react chemically with any
other element, making it intrinsically
safe. In addition, due to its small rela-
tive molecular mass, it has a high pene-
tration capability allowing it to pass
through the smallest gaps. Helium is
particularly interesting for this leak de-
tection task because of its low concen-
tration in the atmosphere (five particles
per million) which allows easy detec-
tion of any small increase in this pro-
portion. Finally it is an industrial gas
available anywhere in the world.
Pressurised helium is already used in
Airbus production lines to test for
leaks. The leak is visually located ex-
ternally (Figure 3) and the source is
identified internally by creating a com-
pression chamber around the leak point
(Figure 4) and filling it with helium un-
der pressure thereby forcing the helium
back up the leak channel into the fuel
tank.
FAST / NUMBER 22 9
FAST22 p7 ˆ 10 11/03/98 23:38 Page 10

The procedure must start with a clear

Figure 5
mapping of the fuel leak on the outer
Detection phases
5a Injection
surface of the tank (precise leak loca-
tion and approximate leak rate) then
the tank can be defuelled, drained and
THE I NTERN ATI ONAL
Rib vented until it becomes completely dry.
Before entering the tank, all the safety
checks have to be performed to ensure
REGUL ATO RY CLIM ATE
INSIDE adequate ventilation and acceptable Andrew S. McClymont, Director Certification Strategies, Product Integrity , Airbus Industrie
Fuel tank fuel vapour concentration.
An artificial compression chamber
(Figure 5a) over the leaking area has to
be created. This is simply done by pen-
etrating one corner of a plastic bag
with the rubber hose from the helium
supply and sealing the join with sealant
I nternational cooperation on civil aircraft regulations and certification has
been in existence to some extent, initially a small extent, for more than 50 years.
It has been increasing in recent years as Europe slowly draws together many diverse
and aluminium tape. The open end of national bodies to create a single Joint Aviation Authority to act on behalf of each
the plastic bag is attached to the skin of European country member. At the same time, the level of cooperation on both sides of the
the wing around the leak, also by alu- Atlantic and with other regions of the world is also increasing in a manner which should -
minium tape. This simple method can in the long term - achieve a practical worldwide certification process and an improved
Skin
be easily adapted to awkward situa- overall safety regulation system.
Artificial compression tions as shown on page 7 where the That ideal is some way ahead, but is becoming a possibility for aircraft airworthiness
chamber taped over leak is from a flap track attachment fit- certification, if political restraints and perceived sovereignty protection policies can be
external leaking point ting. This artificial chamber must be avoided. It may take longer for operational "control" to reach such a common goal.
able to withstand a maximum internal We need to persuade the politicians to support our justifiable intentions for the overall
Helium injected
pressure of 200 mbar. When this has
into the chamber benefit of all. See the following article on JAR-OPS.
OUTSIDE been done, the helium injection can
start at a constant pressure.The initial The International Regulatory Climate is a continually changing environment but
5b Detection pressure choice depends on the kind of there is an overall major purpose to promote an enhanced air safety environment for the
leak (rate, location) and must be based travelling public, without unreasonably increasing the regulatory burden on the
Leak source detected by on knowledge of the structure and po- Authorities, the manufacturers and the operators.
helium detector nozzle tential leak paths. Then the jet of he- The main theme to be remembered, and from time to time we need to be reminded,
Rib "sniffer" lium being forced into the tank has to is that we are all aiming at the same target - safe, reliable, cost effective air transport.
be found. By moving the detection Associated with this theme is an essential need to create a working environment of
"sniffer" (Figure 5b) probe inside the confidence, and positive technical relationships between all involved parties.
INSIDE tank, there will be various sound fre-
Fuel tank quencies emitted by the detection de-
vice depending on how far the probe is
from the jet of helium (and the origin
of the leakage). During this operation,
it could be necessary to increase the in-
jection pressure. It should not be for-
gotten that more than one leak may ex-
ist in the same area. Therefore it could
be necessary to repeat this operation
several times. In this case it is recom-
Skin mended to vent the area between two
detection operations.
The artificial compression chamber
should not be removed, because when
the repair has been performed it can be
used to check, in the same way, the qual-
ity of the repair. This will prevent re-
OUTSIDE fuelling and de-fuelling of the tank if the
quality of the repair is not acceptable.

CONCLUSION

Conventional methods for detecting fuel leaks are now becoming obsolete. This helium technique has been tested and fine
tuned on several aircraft. It is now the most efficient and reliable method of identifying fuel leak sources. It is cost effective
as a much lower number of manhours are required to cure fuel leaks and it reduces significantly the aircraft downtime. In
addition it also confirms the integrity of the repair, avoiding the use of fuel. This operation alone can easily save four days
of ground time.
Airbus Industrie highly recommends that operators apply this procedure, which is described in SIL. 57-091 applicable to
all Airbus aircraft types.
The A330 concurrent JAA and FAA Type Certification Ceremony, 21st October 1993.
Seated left to right: Mr B. Ziegler (SVP Engineering Airbus Industrie), Mr C. Frantzen (DGAC France),
Mr V. von Tein (Chief Operating Officer Airbus Industrie), Mr M. Dambaek (JAA Executive Board
■ Chairman) and Mr D. Curtis (FAA Transport Airplane Directorate representative) plus other
participants from France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium,
Portugal, JAA and FAA.

10 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 11

FAST22 p7 ˆ 10 11/03/98 23:38 Page 10

The procedure must start with a clear

Figure 5
mapping of the fuel leak on the outer
Detection phases
5a Injection
surface of the tank (precise leak loca-
tion and approximate leak rate) then
the tank can be defuelled, drained and
THE I NTERN ATI ONAL
Rib vented until it becomes completely dry.
Before entering the tank, all the safety
checks have to be performed to ensure
REGUL ATO RY CLIM ATE
INSIDE adequate ventilation and acceptable Andrew S. McClymont, Director Certification Strategies, Product Integrity , Airbus Industrie
Fuel tank fuel vapour concentration.
An artificial compression chamber
(Figure 5a) over the leaking area has to
be created. This is simply done by pen-
etrating one corner of a plastic bag
with the rubber hose from the helium
supply and sealing the join with sealant
I nternational cooperation on civil aircraft regulations and certification has
been in existence to some extent, initially a small extent, for more than 50 years.
It has been increasing in recent years as Europe slowly draws together many diverse
and aluminium tape. The open end of national bodies to create a single Joint Aviation Authority to act on behalf of each
the plastic bag is attached to the skin of European country member. At the same time, the level of cooperation on both sides of the
the wing around the leak, also by alu- Atlantic and with other regions of the world is also increasing in a manner which should -
minium tape. This simple method can in the long term - achieve a practical worldwide certification process and an improved
Skin
be easily adapted to awkward situa- overall safety regulation system.
Artificial compression tions as shown on page 7 where the That ideal is some way ahead, but is becoming a possibility for aircraft airworthiness
chamber taped over leak is from a flap track attachment fit- certification, if political restraints and perceived sovereignty protection policies can be
external leaking point ting. This artificial chamber must be avoided. It may take longer for operational "control" to reach such a common goal.
able to withstand a maximum internal We need to persuade the politicians to support our justifiable intentions for the overall
Helium injected
pressure of 200 mbar. When this has
into the chamber benefit of all. See the following article on JAR-OPS.
OUTSIDE been done, the helium injection can
start at a constant pressure.The initial The International Regulatory Climate is a continually changing environment but
5b Detection pressure choice depends on the kind of there is an overall major purpose to promote an enhanced air safety environment for the
leak (rate, location) and must be based travelling public, without unreasonably increasing the regulatory burden on the
Leak source detected by on knowledge of the structure and po- Authorities, the manufacturers and the operators.
helium detector nozzle tential leak paths. Then the jet of he- The main theme to be remembered, and from time to time we need to be reminded,
Rib "sniffer" lium being forced into the tank has to is that we are all aiming at the same target - safe, reliable, cost effective air transport.
be found. By moving the detection Associated with this theme is an essential need to create a working environment of
"sniffer" (Figure 5b) probe inside the confidence, and positive technical relationships between all involved parties.
INSIDE tank, there will be various sound fre-
Fuel tank quencies emitted by the detection de-
vice depending on how far the probe is
from the jet of helium (and the origin
of the leakage). During this operation,
it could be necessary to increase the in-
jection pressure. It should not be for-
gotten that more than one leak may ex-
ist in the same area. Therefore it could
be necessary to repeat this operation
several times. In this case it is recom-
Skin mended to vent the area between two
detection operations.
The artificial compression chamber
should not be removed, because when
the repair has been performed it can be
used to check, in the same way, the qual-
ity of the repair. This will prevent re-
OUTSIDE fuelling and de-fuelling of the tank if the
quality of the repair is not acceptable.

CONCLUSION

Conventional methods for detecting fuel leaks are now becoming obsolete. This helium technique has been tested and fine
tuned on several aircraft. It is now the most efficient and reliable method of identifying fuel leak sources. It is cost effective
as a much lower number of manhours are required to cure fuel leaks and it reduces significantly the aircraft downtime. In
addition it also confirms the integrity of the repair, avoiding the use of fuel. This operation alone can easily save four days
of ground time.
Airbus Industrie highly recommends that operators apply this procedure, which is described in SIL. 57-091 applicable to
all Airbus aircraft types.
The A330 concurrent JAA and FAA Type Certification Ceremony, 21st October 1993.
Seated left to right: Mr B. Ziegler (SVP Engineering Airbus Industrie), Mr C. Frantzen (DGAC France),
Mr V. von Tein (Chief Operating Officer Airbus Industrie), Mr M. Dambaek (JAA Executive Board
■ Chairman) and Mr D. Curtis (FAA Transport Airplane Directorate representative) plus other
participants from France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium,
Portugal, JAA and FAA.

10 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 11

FAST22 p11 ˆ 16 11/03/98 23:20 Page 12
HISTORY
It was through the principles and activ-
ities of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (I.C.A.O.) that guidelines
were produced in an attempt to create
common technical standards in all as-
pects of air transport regulation. These
internationally accepted guidelines, de-
fined in the technical ICAO Annexes,
provide the basic principles to enable
the air transport industry to operate
safely, reliably, regularly and legally.
The broad objectives from the
December 1944 Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation were :
● Safe and orderly development of
International Civil Aviation
● Sound and economical operation for
International Air Transport Services,
and equality of opportunity.
These objectives remain valid today,
providing the background to the de-
fined rules, regulations and require-
ments which are the basic roots of the
flight safety levels achieved in the air
transport industry.
There are more than 180 contracting
states associated with ICAO, and its
Air Navigation Commission, and there
are 18 ICAO Annexes covering the rel-
evant Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPS).
It is the word "recommended", how-
ever, which creates some of the long
term problems associated with the im-
plementation of these ICAO SARPS -
these "International Standards".
Each participating country defines its
own "legal" standards and notifies
ICAO, and all other participating coun-
tries, how they enable (or accept) com-
pliance to be achieved with the
International Standards. In fact, the
normal process is to formally notify de-
fined non adherence or non compliance
with specific ICAO recommendations
in each countries’ internal legal "pack-
age" of regulations. But this "flexible"
way of behaving creates the possibility
of varying interpretations of regula-
tions, because many countries are not
prepared to give up sovereignty, or le-
gal control of their own regulations.
Some of the ICAO-SARPS are quite
general in content and leave some
room for national interpretations.
There is also a problem to be ad-
dressed because a few countries claim-
ing that they comply with the ICAO
SARPS have in fact no structured avia-
tion authority and no related national
regulations.
AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION
There are, or have been, two normal
types of aircraft certification exercises -
12
the basic domestic certification under
the general control of the Authority of
the State of Design and Manufacture
and then the validation of that basic
certification by other countries.
The validations have tended to look
at acknowledged differences in the reg-
ulatory standard between the domestic
Type Certification Basis and the re-
quired Certification Basis of the vali-
dating or importing country.
The validation team, apart from nec-
essary aircraft design familiarisation
and getting an informative grounding
in the basic certification of the aircraft,
generally concentrates on how certifi-
cation can be found with the defined
regulatory differences.
This additional certification/valida-
tion work programme, with the impli-
cation of possible design changes to the
aeroplane, can be a major burden to the
manufacturer, particularly when a num-
ber of countries have significant na-
tional differences. Regulatory differ-
ences have in the past caused some
expensive design changes with ques-
tionable cost effective safety benefit.
HARMONISATION OF
REGULATIONS AND
PROCEDURES
Harmonisation of regulations and pro-
cedures has been a major target of joint
work both in Europe and across the
Atlantic.
As a result of strong Industry pres-
sure both in Europe and in North
America, it has been possible to make
progress in harmonising the various
airworthiness standards in order to re-
duce significant differences in regula-
tions and interpretations (Figure 1).
Taking the European scene as an ex-
ample, this problem of national differ-
ences was behind the early attempts to
create Joint Aviation Requirements
(JAR) as a common set of regulations.
Unfortunately, they were in the begin-
ning, not very common, because a
large number of National Variants were
included, to meet long held basic certi-
fication standards which some coun-
tries were not initially prepared to give
up. Although the JAR 25 large trans-
port aeroplane design regulations were
originally based on the FAR 25 North
American format, all the National
Variants raised defined differences.
Following the experience with real
joint certification and validation pro-
jects in Europe on the Airbus A320 and
Saab 340 during the 1980s, the
National Aviation Authorities (NAA)
in Europe were required to review each
of their National Variants to confirm
whether there was still a justifiable
FAST / NUMBER 22
Figure 1
Harmonising regulations and procedures - The Airbus experience
Creation of JAR 25
Separate certifications
2 AA
FAA
JAR 25 +
National variants
FAR 25
FAR 25
National Requirements
1974 1983
need to retain them. If they still felt
there was a justifiable need, then they
had to be reviewed with the other
European NAAs to try and reach a
common agreement to justify a require-
ment different from the basic JAR 25.
If agreement or justification regard-
ing a National Variant could not be
reached within the NAAs then the orig-
inating NAA was required to drop that
regulation. A difficult and sometimes
time consuming process to find justifi-
able legal means to remove a previ-
ously well considered, and possibly
long time applied, design requirement.
The Airbus A320 type certification
experience (1983-1988) was funda-
mental in promoting the removal of all
JAR 25 National Variants. This was
achieved at JAR 25 Change 13 in 1989,
which was used for the European Joint
Certification of the Airbus A340.
However, it is well worth remember-
ing that no Authority should be imple-
menting a regulation which cannot be
sensibly and acceptably justified. That
point should of course be part of every
new rule proposal justification. It is
more difficult later to remove a regula-
tion which might no longer be justifi-
able for the original reasons.
THE PRESENT DAY STATUS
Work has also been going on for more
than 10 years to reduce the number of
differences between the basic require-
ment standards on each side of the
FAST / NUMBER 22
Deletion of national variants Harmoniation of
JAR 25 and FAR 25
Creation of a joint
Joint certification in Europe
Europe/America process
4 AA 18 AA
23 AA EASA
FAA
FAA
FAA FAA
Harmonised
JAR 25 JAR 25
JAR 25
FAR 25 FAR 25 FAR 25
1988 1992 1993 The future
Atlantic with a major attempt at har-
monisation of JAR 25 and FAR 25.
There has also been an attempt to cater
for appropriate regulatory evolution
during the life of a long production
model of an aircraft.
This latter case was addressed in the
International Certification Procedures
Task Force during the last 8 years, set
up to produce a "harmonised" jointly
agreed means to handle derivative air-
craft, i.e. basic model evolution over
many years of continuous production,
in an attempt to enhance the safety cer-
tification levels during the life of such
type designs. Derivatives of aircraft
which originally went into service in
1968 are being designed, developed
and certificated up to 30 years later.
European harmonisation has been
slowly progressing since the late
1960's, through the certification of
Concorde, Airbus A300 and later mod-
els, BAe146, Jetstream 41, Saab
340/2000, Dassault, Dornier, ATR
42/72, CASA 235, etc... The certifica-
tion procedures, and regulations, have
evolved with experience such that
nowadays a single JAA Team carries
out the Type Certification investigation
and agreement of findings of compli-
ance on behalf of all the NAAs in the
JAA. However, this process, which
does work, is only by "gentleman's
agreement" in the JAA "Club of
Authorities". The creation of a single
European Aviation Safety Authority
will greatly improve the present
13
FAST22 p11 ˆ 16 11/03/98 23:20 Page 12
HISTORY
It was through the principles and activ-
ities of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (I.C.A.O.) that guidelines
were produced in an attempt to create
common technical standards in all as-
pects of air transport regulation. These
internationally accepted guidelines, de-
fined in the technical ICAO Annexes,
provide the basic principles to enable
the air transport industry to operate
safely, reliably, regularly and legally.
The broad objectives from the
December 1944 Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation were :
● Safe and orderly development of
International Civil Aviation
● Sound and economical operation for
International Air Transport Services,
and equality of opportunity.
These objectives remain valid today,
providing the background to the de-
fined rules, regulations and require-
ments which are the basic roots of the
flight safety levels achieved in the air
transport industry.
There are more than 180 contracting
states associated with ICAO, and its
Air Navigation Commission, and there
are 18 ICAO Annexes covering the rel-
evant Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPS).
It is the word "recommended", how-
ever, which creates some of the long
term problems associated with the im-
plementation of these ICAO SARPS -
these "International Standards".
Each participating country defines its
own "legal" standards and notifies
ICAO, and all other participating coun-
tries, how they enable (or accept) com-
pliance to be achieved with the
International Standards. In fact, the
normal process is to formally notify de-
fined non adherence or non compliance
with specific ICAO recommendations
in each countries’ internal legal "pack-
age" of regulations. But this "flexible"
way of behaving creates the possibility
of varying interpretations of regula-
tions, because many countries are not
prepared to give up sovereignty, or le-
gal control of their own regulations.
Some of the ICAO-SARPS are quite
general in content and leave some
room for national interpretations.
There is also a problem to be ad-
dressed because a few countries claim-
ing that they comply with the ICAO
SARPS have in fact no structured avia-
tion authority and no related national
regulations.
AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION
There are, or have been, two normal
types of aircraft certification exercises -
12
the basic domestic certification under
the general control of the Authority of
the State of Design and Manufacture
and then the validation of that basic
certification by other countries.
The validations have tended to look
at acknowledged differences in the reg-
ulatory standard between the domestic
Type Certification Basis and the re-
quired Certification Basis of the vali-
dating or importing country.
The validation team, apart from nec-
essary aircraft design familiarisation
and getting an informative grounding
in the basic certification of the aircraft,
generally concentrates on how certifi-
cation can be found with the defined
regulatory differences.
This additional certification/valida-
tion work programme, with the impli-
cation of possible design changes to the
aeroplane, can be a major burden to the
manufacturer, particularly when a num-
ber of countries have significant na-
tional differences. Regulatory differ-
ences have in the past caused some
expensive design changes with ques-
tionable cost effective safety benefit.
HARMONISATION OF
REGULATIONS AND
PROCEDURES
Harmonisation of regulations and pro-
cedures has been a major target of joint
work both in Europe and across the
Atlantic.
As a result of strong Industry pres-
sure both in Europe and in North
America, it has been possible to make
progress in harmonising the various
airworthiness standards in order to re-
duce significant differences in regula-
tions and interpretations (Figure 1).
Taking the European scene as an ex-
ample, this problem of national differ-
ences was behind the early attempts to
create Joint Aviation Requirements
(JAR) as a common set of regulations.
Unfortunately, they were in the begin-
ning, not very common, because a
large number of National Variants were
included, to meet long held basic certi-
fication standards which some coun-
tries were not initially prepared to give
up. Although the JAR 25 large trans-
port aeroplane design regulations were
originally based on the FAR 25 North
American format, all the National
Variants raised defined differences.
Following the experience with real
joint certification and validation pro-
jects in Europe on the Airbus A320 and
Saab 340 during the 1980s, the
National Aviation Authorities (NAA)
in Europe were required to review each
of their National Variants to confirm
whether there was still a justifiable
FAST / NUMBER 22
Figure 1
Harmonising regulations and procedures - The Airbus experience
Creation of JAR 25
Separate certifications
2 AA
FAA
JAR 25 +
National variants
FAR 25
FAR 25
National Requirements
1974 1983
need to retain them. If they still felt
there was a justifiable need, then they
had to be reviewed with the other
European NAAs to try and reach a
common agreement to justify a require-
ment different from the basic JAR 25.
If agreement or justification regard-
ing a National Variant could not be
reached within the NAAs then the orig-
inating NAA was required to drop that
regulation. A difficult and sometimes
time consuming process to find justifi-
able legal means to remove a previ-
ously well considered, and possibly
long time applied, design requirement.
The Airbus A320 type certification
experience (1983-1988) was funda-
mental in promoting the removal of all
JAR 25 National Variants. This was
achieved at JAR 25 Change 13 in 1989,
which was used for the European Joint
Certification of the Airbus A340.
However, it is well worth remember-
ing that no Authority should be imple-
menting a regulation which cannot be
sensibly and acceptably justified. That
point should of course be part of every
new rule proposal justification. It is
more difficult later to remove a regula-
tion which might no longer be justifi-
able for the original reasons.
THE PRESENT DAY STATUS
Work has also been going on for more
than 10 years to reduce the number of
differences between the basic require-
ment standards on each side of the
FAST / NUMBER 22
Deletion of national variants Harmoniation of
JAR 25 and FAR 25
Creation of a joint
Joint certification in Europe
Europe/America process
4 AA 18 AA
23 AA EASA
FAA
FAA
FAA FAA
Harmonised
JAR 25 JAR 25
JAR 25
FAR 25 FAR 25 FAR 25
1988 1992 1993 The future
Atlantic with a major attempt at har-
monisation of JAR 25 and FAR 25.
There has also been an attempt to cater
for appropriate regulatory evolution
during the life of a long production
model of an aircraft.
This latter case was addressed in the
International Certification Procedures
Task Force during the last 8 years, set
up to produce a "harmonised" jointly
agreed means to handle derivative air-
craft, i.e. basic model evolution over
many years of continuous production,
in an attempt to enhance the safety cer-
tification levels during the life of such
type designs. Derivatives of aircraft
which originally went into service in
1968 are being designed, developed
and certificated up to 30 years later.
European harmonisation has been
slowly progressing since the late
1960's, through the certification of
Concorde, Airbus A300 and later mod-
els, BAe146, Jetstream 41, Saab
340/2000, Dassault, Dornier, ATR
42/72, CASA 235, etc... The certifica-
tion procedures, and regulations, have
evolved with experience such that
nowadays a single JAA Team carries
out the Type Certification investigation
and agreement of findings of compli-
ance on behalf of all the NAAs in the
JAA. However, this process, which
does work, is only by "gentleman's
agreement" in the JAA "Club of
Authorities". The creation of a single
European Aviation Safety Authority
will greatly improve the present
13
FAST22 p11 ˆ 16 11/03/98 23:21 Page 14

cabin safety, there has been little or no

Figure 2 consensus and some difficult decisions
JAA and European organisations will have to be taken eventually by the
Authorities.
European Civil Aviation Council (ECAC) (36) There is a general concern that in
Armenia Lithuania spite of all the significant resources put
Bulgaria Republic of Macedonia into the ARAC process by both
Industry and Authorities, the lack of
Croatia Moldova
productive agreed output in many areas
Estonia Romania
Eurocontrol (23) will reduce Industry commitment, and
Latvia may eventually fail to achieve the orig-
Cyprus inal good harmonisation ideal.
JAA (27)
Czech Republic But by including Industry at a suit-
Hungary able early stage of the review , and in
Poland the drafting process, there ought to be
Monaco Malta
Slovenia less Industry opposition to the final
Slovakia proposed regulatory product.
Turkey The regulations do need to be har-
monised to an acceptable level before
the implementation of joint procedures
European Union (EU) (15) Austria
agreed across the Atlantic, can really
Belgium
result in the easing of the certification
Finland Denmark
burden on manufacturers, by having
France one single certification process on be-
Germany half of all Authorities.
Greece
Ireland THE FUTURE PROSPECTS
Italy
Luxembourg The International Regulatory Climate
Netherlands is a variable environment. The princi-
Portugal ples of harmonised regulation and har-
Spain monised joint certification processes,
Sweden acceptable to all, are a proper ideal to
UK strive for in the civil aviation safety
scene. We need to maintain the effort
European Free Trade Area to reach the ideal in spite of some un-
(EFTA) (3) Switzerland expected set backs. The main way to
Iceland Norway continue to make progress is to talk to-
gether and work together in a coopera-
tive and open manner.
The "getting together" in Europe is
being promoted both by Industry (man-
ufacturers and now gradually the oper-
"heavy" process. The relationship be- ators) and most of the NAAs of the
tween the JAA and other European or- JAA. The major problem is how to cre-
ganisations is shown in Figure 2. ate a single legal entity with the rele- The Industry wishes to see the new The Safety Regulation Codes of FAR The Type Certificates for the A330
The harmonisation between Europe vant powers to act on behalf of all the European Aviation Safety Authority in 25 and JAR 25 provide generally
and the Western side of the Atlantic is members. The main feature to resolve place by the year 2000. equivalent levels of safety. The large
taking its time also. In 1989, a target is the formal handing over of sover- Meanwhile there is a continuing need Regulatory Harmonisation programme
was declared at the annual JAA eignty for aviation safety matters by to maintain dialogue and improve which started 5 or 6 years ago, under
/FAA/Transport Canada and Industry the members governments, or safety working arrangements between the ma- ARAC, was a good principle to follow,
joint meeting in Bordeaux, to go for bodies. There is also the question of jor aviation safety control organisations but it has become very costly and time
major harmonisation of the FAR 25 covering the costs of a European across the world. There are signs of consuming in terms of Industry and
and JAR 25 regulations. At about the Aviation Safety Authority. progress in this field with the conclu- Authority manpower resources. A
same time, the US Government, Recent discussions reviewed a possi- sions and actions coming from the 13th more efficient way to meet the general
through the FAA, set up their Aviation ble legal treaty or convention with rele- and 14th Annual FAA/JAA/TCA and need for harmonisation has to be
Rulemaking Advisory Committee vant connection to the European Industry Harmonisation Conferences found.
(ARAC) structure and invited partici- Union; the EU being the appropriate held respectively in San Diego in June A new idea on how to handle this
pation from Canadian and European European political body overseeing the 1996 and in Berlin in June 1997. growing concern emerged, after some
Authorities and Industry. administration by the European The Industry and the Authorities hard talking between and within the
After a slow and difficult start, at Commission. have looked into a major problem Authority and Industry group. It starts
least in the tasking of the ARAC There are legal difficulties to be re- which has arisen regarding the depth of from the general view that the two
Transport Aeroplane and Engines solved but generally there is a growing involvement expected to be undertaken codes are similar in concept although
Issues Group, the review work and the intent to see it happen and eventually by an Authority when validating the not necessarily identical in regulation
attempts to reach consensus conclu- the political will to make it happen will certification of an already type certifi- or interpretation in all aspects. It
sions have produced some productive be there. The first signs of political cated aircraft, and have proposed a new should therefore be possible to con-
results, notably in flight and structures commitment were seen at the European concept regarding this problem which sider each code "equivalent", and a
regulations. In other subjects such as Council of Ministers in December 1996. is worthy of serious consideration. Type Certification based on one code

14 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 15

FAST22 p11 ˆ 16 11/03/98 23:21 Page 14

cabin safety, there has been little or no

Figure 2 consensus and some difficult decisions
JAA and European organisations will have to be taken eventually by the
Authorities.
European Civil Aviation Council (ECAC) (36) There is a general concern that in
Armenia Lithuania spite of all the significant resources put
Bulgaria Republic of Macedonia into the ARAC process by both
Industry and Authorities, the lack of
Croatia Moldova
productive agreed output in many areas
Estonia Romania
Eurocontrol (23) will reduce Industry commitment, and
Latvia may eventually fail to achieve the orig-
Cyprus inal good harmonisation ideal.
JAA (27)
Czech Republic But by including Industry at a suit-
Hungary able early stage of the review , and in
Poland the drafting process, there ought to be
Monaco Malta
Slovenia less Industry opposition to the final
Slovakia proposed regulatory product.
Turkey The regulations do need to be har-
monised to an acceptable level before
the implementation of joint procedures
European Union (EU) (15) Austria
agreed across the Atlantic, can really
Belgium
result in the easing of the certification
Finland Denmark
burden on manufacturers, by having
France one single certification process on be-
Germany half of all Authorities.
Greece
Ireland THE FUTURE PROSPECTS
Italy
Luxembourg The International Regulatory Climate
Netherlands is a variable environment. The princi-
Portugal ples of harmonised regulation and har-
Spain monised joint certification processes,
Sweden acceptable to all, are a proper ideal to
UK strive for in the civil aviation safety
scene. We need to maintain the effort
European Free Trade Area to reach the ideal in spite of some un-
(EFTA) (3) Switzerland expected set backs. The main way to
Iceland Norway continue to make progress is to talk to-
gether and work together in a coopera-
tive and open manner.
The "getting together" in Europe is
being promoted both by Industry (man-
ufacturers and now gradually the oper-
"heavy" process. The relationship be- ators) and most of the NAAs of the
tween the JAA and other European or- JAA. The major problem is how to cre-
ganisations is shown in Figure 2. ate a single legal entity with the rele- The Industry wishes to see the new The Safety Regulation Codes of FAR The Type Certificates for the A330
The harmonisation between Europe vant powers to act on behalf of all the European Aviation Safety Authority in 25 and JAR 25 provide generally
and the Western side of the Atlantic is members. The main feature to resolve place by the year 2000. equivalent levels of safety. The large
taking its time also. In 1989, a target is the formal handing over of sover- Meanwhile there is a continuing need Regulatory Harmonisation programme
was declared at the annual JAA eignty for aviation safety matters by to maintain dialogue and improve which started 5 or 6 years ago, under
/FAA/Transport Canada and Industry the members governments, or safety working arrangements between the ma- ARAC, was a good principle to follow,
joint meeting in Bordeaux, to go for bodies. There is also the question of jor aviation safety control organisations but it has become very costly and time
major harmonisation of the FAR 25 covering the costs of a European across the world. There are signs of consuming in terms of Industry and
and JAR 25 regulations. At about the Aviation Safety Authority. progress in this field with the conclu- Authority manpower resources. A
same time, the US Government, Recent discussions reviewed a possi- sions and actions coming from the 13th more efficient way to meet the general
through the FAA, set up their Aviation ble legal treaty or convention with rele- and 14th Annual FAA/JAA/TCA and need for harmonisation has to be
Rulemaking Advisory Committee vant connection to the European Industry Harmonisation Conferences found.
(ARAC) structure and invited partici- Union; the EU being the appropriate held respectively in San Diego in June A new idea on how to handle this
pation from Canadian and European European political body overseeing the 1996 and in Berlin in June 1997. growing concern emerged, after some
Authorities and Industry. administration by the European The Industry and the Authorities hard talking between and within the
After a slow and difficult start, at Commission. have looked into a major problem Authority and Industry group. It starts
least in the tasking of the ARAC There are legal difficulties to be re- which has arisen regarding the depth of from the general view that the two
Transport Aeroplane and Engines solved but generally there is a growing involvement expected to be undertaken codes are similar in concept although
Issues Group, the review work and the intent to see it happen and eventually by an Authority when validating the not necessarily identical in regulation
attempts to reach consensus conclu- the political will to make it happen will certification of an already type certifi- or interpretation in all aspects. It
sions have produced some productive be there. The first signs of political cated aircraft, and have proposed a new should therefore be possible to con-
results, notably in flight and structures commitment were seen at the European concept regarding this problem which sider each code "equivalent", and a
regulations. In other subjects such as Council of Ministers in December 1996. is worthy of serious consideration. Type Certification based on one code

14 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 15

FAST22 p11 ˆ 16 12/03/98 7:10 Page 16
should in principle be acceptable to
countries normally using the other
code. With that principle in mind we
can concentrate the harmonisation
work on key subjects where known dif-
ferences in regulatory implementation
are causing undue burden to industry,
without any relevant safety benefit.
This proposal needs careful consider-
ation by all parties before implementa-
tion. A very tight time schedule was
proposed in 1996 to review and imple-
ment the details, and real progress was
achieved in June 1997, with the joint
agreement to two principle documents
defining the future way ahead.
SAFETY OVERSIGHT
The interests of a growing number of
countries, or groups of countries, in the
world aviation safety scene are also be-
ing addressed. This fact, and the recent
aggressive FAA policy regarding
safety oversight, demonstrate the need
to promote further aviation safety ini-
tiatives in a coordinated global fashion.
Increasing interaction between ICAO
and Member States is required, and is
happening, to achieve such progress in
a practical and controlled manner.
CONCLUSION
Enhancement of the present aviation safety levels must be achieved in the coming years to meet the increasing volume of air
transport traffic with a reduction in the actual accident numbers, in order to maintain public confidence in this major produc-
tive industry. Continuing worldwide cooperation to ameliorate the International Regulatory climate is essential to improve
safety. Airbus Industrie is an active participant with the airworthiness authorities in the effort to achieve that aim.
16
A number of regional aviation safety
seminars have been, and are being, or-
ganised in various parts of the world,
supported by the recognised safety
bodies, and by manufacturers and oper-
ators and authorities. These initiatives
and events provide opportunities for
improving safety awareness by com-
munication and dialogue within and
between all involved parties.
As a model for the creation of a re-
gional aviation safety organisation
meeting the intent of the ICAO princi-
ples, the example of the European
JAA, and its future evolution into a sin-
gle authority acting on behalf of all
European countries, can be offered. It
shows how large and small countries
can work together for a common cause.
There is already a large body of re-
cently harmonised regulatory material
covering all aspects of safety regula-
tion, which will soon also be available
in different languages.
Positive progress, using the
European example, is taking place
among the countries of South Asia, and
also in the Caribbean and in South
America. Recent increases in ICAO ac-
tivity and influence in these matters are
welcomed.
■
FAST / NUMBER 22
with Airbus Industrie
Operational Documentation
Guy Di Santo
Department Manager
Airlines Operations Support
Airbus Industrie
Customer Services Directorate
ll major aviation countries have a regulatory
system for applying and monitoring the safety
standards of their civil aviation industry (see article
“THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CLIMATE” on
page 11). The International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO), sets minimum standards for
international air transport but the national standards of
many countries exceed these.
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) are an
associated body of the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation
regulatory authorities of 27 European States (*) who
have agreed to co-operate in developing and
implementing common safety regulatory standards and
procedures. This co-operation is intended to provide
high and consistent standards of safety based on the
ICAO standards. Much emphasis is also placed on
harmonising JAA requirements (JARs) with the
regulations of the USA (FARs).
The JAA undertook a major harmonisation
task to produce common operating regulation
acceptable to all participating countries.
The result, called JAR-OPS, defines the Joint
Aviation Requirements in the fields of aircraft
operation. ICAO Annex 6 has been selected to provide
the basic structure of JAR-OPS, but with additional
sub-divisions where considered appropriate. The
content of Annex 6 has been used and added to where
necessary by making use of existing European
regulations and the Federal Aviation Requirements of
the United States of America where acceptable.
JAR-OPS Part 1 covering Commercial Air
Transportation by aeroplanes was adopted by the JAA
Committee at the end of March 1995, the first issue
being published on 22 May 1995.
A Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) was
issued in December 1996 to include new material
which could not be developed before the first issue
and to take into account some amendments made to
ICAO Annex 6.
(*) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom
FAST / NUMBER 22 17
FAST22 p11 ˆ 16 12/03/98 7:10 Page 16
should in principle be acceptable to
countries normally using the other
code. With that principle in mind we
can concentrate the harmonisation
work on key subjects where known dif-
ferences in regulatory implementation
are causing undue burden to industry,
without any relevant safety benefit.
This proposal needs careful consider-
ation by all parties before implementa-
tion. A very tight time schedule was
proposed in 1996 to review and imple-
ment the details, and real progress was
achieved in June 1997, with the joint
agreement to two principle documents
defining the future way ahead.
SAFETY OVERSIGHT
The interests of a growing number of
countries, or groups of countries, in the
world aviation safety scene are also be-
ing addressed. This fact, and the recent
aggressive FAA policy regarding
safety oversight, demonstrate the need
to promote further aviation safety ini-
tiatives in a coordinated global fashion.
Increasing interaction between ICAO
and Member States is required, and is
happening, to achieve such progress in
a practical and controlled manner.
CONCLUSION
Enhancement of the present aviation safety levels must be achieved in the coming years to meet the increasing volume of air
transport traffic with a reduction in the actual accident numbers, in order to maintain public confidence in this major produc-
tive industry. Continuing worldwide cooperation to ameliorate the International Regulatory climate is essential to improve
safety. Airbus Industrie is an active participant with the airworthiness authorities in the effort to achieve that aim.
16
A number of regional aviation safety
seminars have been, and are being, or-
ganised in various parts of the world,
supported by the recognised safety
bodies, and by manufacturers and oper-
ators and authorities. These initiatives
and events provide opportunities for
improving safety awareness by com-
munication and dialogue within and
between all involved parties.
As a model for the creation of a re-
gional aviation safety organisation
meeting the intent of the ICAO princi-
ples, the example of the European
JAA, and its future evolution into a sin-
gle authority acting on behalf of all
European countries, can be offered. It
shows how large and small countries
can work together for a common cause.
There is already a large body of re-
cently harmonised regulatory material
covering all aspects of safety regula-
tion, which will soon also be available
in different languages.
Positive progress, using the
European example, is taking place
among the countries of South Asia, and
also in the Caribbean and in South
America. Recent increases in ICAO ac-
tivity and influence in these matters are
welcomed.
■
FAST / NUMBER 22
with Airbus Industrie
Operational Documentation
Guy Di Santo
Department Manager
Airlines Operations Support
Airbus Industrie
Customer Services Directorate
ll major aviation countries have a regulatory
system for applying and monitoring the safety
standards of their civil aviation industry (see article
“THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CLIMATE” on
page 11). The International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO), sets minimum standards for
international air transport but the national standards of
many countries exceed these.
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) are an
associated body of the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation
regulatory authorities of 27 European States (*) who
have agreed to co-operate in developing and
implementing common safety regulatory standards and
procedures. This co-operation is intended to provide
high and consistent standards of safety based on the
ICAO standards. Much emphasis is also placed on
harmonising JAA requirements (JARs) with the
regulations of the USA (FARs).
The JAA undertook a major harmonisation
task to produce common operating regulation
acceptable to all participating countries.
The result, called JAR-OPS, defines the Joint
Aviation Requirements in the fields of aircraft
operation. ICAO Annex 6 has been selected to provide
the basic structure of JAR-OPS, but with additional
sub-divisions where considered appropriate. The
content of Annex 6 has been used and added to where
necessary by making use of existing European
regulations and the Federal Aviation Requirements of
the United States of America where acceptable.
JAR-OPS Part 1 covering Commercial Air
Transportation by aeroplanes was adopted by the JAA
Committee at the end of March 1995, the first issue
being published on 22 May 1995.
A Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) was
issued in December 1996 to include new material
which could not be developed before the first issue
and to take into account some amendments made to
ICAO Annex 6.
(*) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom
FAST / NUMBER 22 17
FAST 22 p 17/20 11/03/98 23:10 Page 18
APPLICABILITY
JAR-OPS 1 requirements are "applica-
ble to the operation of any civil aero-
plane for the purpose of commercial air
transportation by any operator whose
principal place of business is in a JAA
member State". Therefore in the JAA
Member States, JAR-OPS 1 applies to
all airplanes regardless of date of manu-
facture. In addition some non-European
states are adopting JAR-OPS 1.
JAR-OPS must be implemented no
later than 1 April 1998 and this will
occur, initially, under national legisla-
tion.
JAR-OPS 1 will be subject to
"phased implementation" with the oper-
ators of large aeroplanes (those over 10
tonnes MTOW or with 20 or more pas-
senger seats) and mixed fleets of large
and small aeroplane being affected first,
followed one year later (1 April 1999)
by those Air Operator Certificate
(AOC) holders operating small aero-
planes only. Some of the provisions in
JAR-OPS have later compliance dates
to alleviate the practical difficulties for
the industry of implementing certain re-
quirements.
JAR-OPS 1 CONTENT
The JAR-OPS 1 consists of the 19 sub-
parts containing requirements for Air
Operator Certificate holders below:
JAR-OPS 1 subparts:
A. Applicability
B. General
C. Operator certification and supervision
D. Operational procedures
E. All weather operations
F. Performance general
G. Performance class A (Multi-engined aeroplanes powered by turbopropeller
engines with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of more
than 9 or a maximum takeoff mass exceeding 5700 kg, and all multi-engine
turbojet powered aeroplanes.)
H. Performance class B (Propeller driven aeroplanes with a maximum
approved passenger seating configuration of 9 or less, and a maximum takeoff
mass of 5700 kg or less.)
I. Performance class C (Aeroplanes powered by reciprocating engines with a
maximum approved passenger seating configuration of more than 9 or a
maximum takeoff mass exceeding 5700 kg)
J. Mass and balance
K. Instruments and equipment
L. Communication and navigation equipment
M. Aeroplane maintenance
N. Flight crew
O. Cabin crew
P. Manuals, logs and records
Q. Flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements (not published in the
first version of the JAR-OPS).
R. Transport of dangerous goods by air
S. Security
18
IMPLEMENTATION
OF JAR-OPS 1
There are areas where the JAR-OPS
formalizes requirements more than or
which differ from or are in addition to
FAR 121. For the operational documen-
tation, Airbus Industrie already took
these requirements into account and
most of the associated information is al-
ready available.
The areas concerned are described
below under:
❍ Aircraft Performance
❍ Operations manual
❍ Miscellaneous
Aircraft performance
JAR-OPS formally requests the opera-
tors to take into account the following
items.
● One-engine inoperative cruising
speed - JAR-OPS 1.295
Selection of aerodrome
For takeoff alternate airport selec-
tion, JAR-OPS requires the operator to
take into account the one-engine inop-
erative cruising speed according to the
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This
speed (green dot speed / drift down
speed) is given in the Flight Crew
Operating Manual (FCOM), and in the
performance chapter of the AFM or in
the OCTOPUS performance computa-
tion program where AFM refers to this
software (A319/A321/A330/A340).
This speed has to be used to adopt ob-
stacle strategy.
When obstacles are not a concern,
any other one engine-out speed pub-
lished in the FCOM or computed
through the In Flight Performance (IFP)
program may be used.
● Operation from / to contaminated
runways
JAR-OPS 1.490 (c)(3) - takeoff
1.520 (b) - landing
Airbus Industrie has published data
on performance on contaminated run-
ways since the beginning of A300B2
operations.
Associated performance may be ob-
tained using appropriate takeoff perfor-
mance computation programs (TCP,
TLC or OCTOPUS) or using data pub-
lished in the FCOM:
❍ for takeoff: special Operations chap-
ter and fluid contaminated runways sec-
tion
❍ for landing: Landing chapter.
For JAR 25 certified aircraft
(A319/A320/A321/A330/A340), these
performance are certified. Therefore
they are also published in the AFM by
reference to TLC for A320 and OCTO-
PUS for the other models.
● Takeoff line-up distance
JAR-OPS 1.490 (c)(6)
As per JAR-OPS, the operator must
take into account lineup corrections
when computing takeoff performance
data when the access to the runway
does not permit positioning of the air-
craft at the threshold.
The NPA published in December
1996 proposes a calculation method
when the aircraft manufacturer does not
provide the appropriate data. However
Airbus Industrie published minimum
lineup distance corrections in its
Takeoff Safety Training Aid and in the
Performance Programs Manual (PPM).
Regarding takeoff performance com-
putation, TCP, TLC or OCTOPUS pro-
grams have all the options to take into
account any line-up distance chosen by
the operator.
● Takeoff obstacle clearance in turn
JAR-OPS 1.495 (c)
During takeoff, aircraft may be
banked by no more than 15° up to
400ft, then up to 25° when above 400ft.
The NPA published in December 1996
proposes to allow, under specific cir-
cumstances, bank angles of 20° above
200ft and 30° above 400ft.
In any case JAR-OPS requires ade-
quate allowance to be made for the ef-
fect of bank angle on flight path and
operating speeds. Furthermore, when
the aircraft is banked by more than 15°,
the net flight path must clear the obsta-
cles by 50ft (instead of 35ft).
FAST / NUMBER 22
Data source for specific JAR-OPS performance requirements
One-engine inoperative cruising
speed
Operation from/to contaminated
runways
Takeoff line-up distance
Takeoff obstacle Gradient correction
clearance in turn
Speed correction
Go-around gradient for decision
heights below 200ft
AFM: Airplane Flight Manual
FCOM: Flight Crew Operating Manual
IFP: In Flight Performance computation program
OCTOPUS: Operational and Certified Take-Off
and landing Performance Universal Software
Regarding allowance on the flight
path:
❍ Climb gradient corrections due to
bank angles are given in the AFM
Performance chapter.
❍ the OCTOPUS program can compute
real takeoff performance taking the turn
into account. No further climb gradient
correction needs to be introduced.
Regarding allowance on the operat-
ing speeds, JAR-OPS proposes that un-
less otherwise specified in the
Aeroplane Flight Manual or other per-
formance or operating manuals from
the manufacturer, an acceptable means
of compliance to this requirement, is to
add a 5kt increment on V2 minimum
speed for bank angles above 15° and
10kt for bank angles above 25° to as-
sure adequate stall margin.
Studies show that there is no need to
add any speed increment on V2 mini-
mum for any Airbus aircraft for any
bank angle up to 20° and even up to 25°
for most of Airbus aircraft. Therefore
this information will be published in the
Performance Programs Manual (PPM).
Airbus Industrie Flight Operations
Support can assist any customer to de-
termine operational procedure and take-
off performance when high bank angles
are required at takeoff.
● Go-around gradient for decision
heights below 200 ft
JAR-OPS 1.510 (b)
For instrument approaches with deci-
sion height below 200 ft, JAR-OPS re-
quires a minimum go-around climb gra-
dient of 2.5%, or the published
gradient, whichever is the greater.
Relevant information is already avail-
able in the AFM of the A320, as well as
for some A310s and for A319/A321
/A330/A340 through the OCTOPUS
program. It will be introduced in the
FCOM as soon as possible.
FAST / NUMBER 22
A300B2 / B4 A310 / A300-600 A320 A319 / A321 / A330 / A340
AFM/FCOM/IFP OCTOPUS/FCOM/IFP
FCOM TLC/FCOM TAB/TLC/FCOM OCTOPUS/FCOM
TSTA/TCP/PPM TSTA/TLC/PPM TSTA/OCTOPUS/PPM
AFM OCTOPUS/PPM
PPM
FCOM AFM/FCOM OCTOPUS/FCOM
TAB: Tabulation and Interpolation Program
TCP: Takeoff Chart Computation program (A300 B2/B4)
TLC: Takeoff and Landing Chart program (A310/A300-600/A320)
TSTA: Takeoff Safety Training Aid
PPM: Performance Programs Manual
For the A300 and remaining A310s, structure may require a longer time to
the information will be available in the be accepted/approved by the authority.
FCOM by 1st April 1998. To facilitate comparability and us-
A summary of the various data ability of Operations Manuals by new
sources for specific JAR-OPS require- personnel, formerly employed by an-
ments is shown on the table above. other operator, JAR-OPS recommends
operators not to deviate from the num-
Operations Manual bering system used in Appendix 1 to
JAR-OPS 1.1045. If there are sections
JAR-OPS 1.200 Operations Manual: which, because of the nature of the op-
"An operator shall provide an eration, do not apply, it is recom-
Operations Manual in accordance with mended that operators maintain the
Subpart P for the use and guidance of numbering system described in JAR-
operations personnel." OPS and insert "Not applicable" or
JAR-OPS 1.1040 General Rules for "Intentionally blank" where appropri-
Operations Manuals: "An operator ate.
shall ensure that the Operations ● Part A: General / Basic
Manual contains all instructions and "This part shall comprise all non
information necessary for operations type-related operational policies, in-
personnel to perform their duties." structions and procedures needed for a
● Structure and contents safe operation and shall comply with
JAR-OPS 1 Subpart P "Manuals, all relevant regulations."
logs and records" defines the general Airbus Industrie developed an
rules, structure and contents for Operations Policy Manual that may be
Operations Manuals produced by the used by Airbus operators as a guide to
airlines. produce this Part A of their own
JAR-OPS prescribes the structure of Operations Manual. It was issued to all
the Operations Manual in four part: Airbus customers in Malaga during the
❍ Part A: General/Basic 9th Performance and Operations
❍ Part B: Airplane Operating Matters Conference in June 96. It is also avail-
❍ Part C: Route and Aerodrome able on diskette from the auhor.
Instructions and Information The structure and the technical con-
❍ Part D. Training tent of the Operations Policy Manual
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1045 con- developed by Airbus Industrie aimed to
tains a comprehensively detailed and fulfil the requirements of the JAR-OPS
structured list of all items to be covered as much as possible.
in the Operations Manual. With the evolution of JAR-OPS, a
Since it is believed that a high degree second issue is now under preparation.
of standardisation of Operations The Airbus Industrie Operations
Manuals within the JAA will lead to Policy Manual is made of the following
improved overall flight safety, JAR- chapters as prescribed by JAR-OPS:
OPS strongly recommends that the 0. Administration and control of
structure described in the JAR-OPS Operations Manual
Subpart P should be used by operators 1. Organisation and responsibilities
as far as possible. Manuals which do 2. Operational control and
not comply with the recommended supervision
19
FAST 22 p 17/20 11/03/98 23:10 Page 18
APPLICABILITY
JAR-OPS 1 requirements are "applica-
ble to the operation of any civil aero-
plane for the purpose of commercial air
transportation by any operator whose
principal place of business is in a JAA
member State". Therefore in the JAA
Member States, JAR-OPS 1 applies to
all airplanes regardless of date of manu-
facture. In addition some non-European
states are adopting JAR-OPS 1.
JAR-OPS must be implemented no
later than 1 April 1998 and this will
occur, initially, under national legisla-
tion.
JAR-OPS 1 will be subject to
"phased implementation" with the oper-
ators of large aeroplanes (those over 10
tonnes MTOW or with 20 or more pas-
senger seats) and mixed fleets of large
and small aeroplane being affected first,
followed one year later (1 April 1999)
by those Air Operator Certificate
(AOC) holders operating small aero-
planes only. Some of the provisions in
JAR-OPS have later compliance dates
to alleviate the practical difficulties for
the industry of implementing certain re-
quirements.
JAR-OPS 1 CONTENT
The JAR-OPS 1 consists of the 19 sub-
parts containing requirements for Air
Operator Certificate holders below:
JAR-OPS 1 subparts:
A. Applicability
B. General
C. Operator certification and supervision
D. Operational procedures
E. All weather operations
F. Performance general
G. Performance class A (Multi-engined aeroplanes powered by turbopropeller
engines with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of more
than 9 or a maximum takeoff mass exceeding 5700 kg, and all multi-engine
turbojet powered aeroplanes.)
H. Performance class B (Propeller driven aeroplanes with a maximum
approved passenger seating configuration of 9 or less, and a maximum takeoff
mass of 5700 kg or less.)
I. Performance class C (Aeroplanes powered by reciprocating engines with a
maximum approved passenger seating configuration of more than 9 or a
maximum takeoff mass exceeding 5700 kg)
J. Mass and balance
K. Instruments and equipment
L. Communication and navigation equipment
M. Aeroplane maintenance
N. Flight crew
O. Cabin crew
P. Manuals, logs and records
Q. Flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements (not published in the
first version of the JAR-OPS).
R. Transport of dangerous goods by air
S. Security
18
IMPLEMENTATION
OF JAR-OPS 1
There are areas where the JAR-OPS
formalizes requirements more than or
which differ from or are in addition to
FAR 121. For the operational documen-
tation, Airbus Industrie already took
these requirements into account and
most of the associated information is al-
ready available.
The areas concerned are described
below under:
❍ Aircraft Performance
❍ Operations manual
❍ Miscellaneous
Aircraft performance
JAR-OPS formally requests the opera-
tors to take into account the following
items.
● One-engine inoperative cruising
speed - JAR-OPS 1.295
Selection of aerodrome
For takeoff alternate airport selec-
tion, JAR-OPS requires the operator to
take into account the one-engine inop-
erative cruising speed according to the
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This
speed (green dot speed / drift down
speed) is given in the Flight Crew
Operating Manual (FCOM), and in the
performance chapter of the AFM or in
the OCTOPUS performance computa-
tion program where AFM refers to this
software (A319/A321/A330/A340).
This speed has to be used to adopt ob-
stacle strategy.
When obstacles are not a concern,
any other one engine-out speed pub-
lished in the FCOM or computed
through the In Flight Performance (IFP)
program may be used.
● Operation from / to contaminated
runways
JAR-OPS 1.490 (c)(3) - takeoff
1.520 (b) - landing
Airbus Industrie has published data
on performance on contaminated run-
ways since the beginning of A300B2
operations.
Associated performance may be ob-
tained using appropriate takeoff perfor-
mance computation programs (TCP,
TLC or OCTOPUS) or using data pub-
lished in the FCOM:
❍ for takeoff: special Operations chap-
ter and fluid contaminated runways sec-
tion
❍ for landing: Landing chapter.
For JAR 25 certified aircraft
(A319/A320/A321/A330/A340), these
performance are certified. Therefore
they are also published in the AFM by
reference to TLC for A320 and OCTO-
PUS for the other models.
● Takeoff line-up distance
JAR-OPS 1.490 (c)(6)
As per JAR-OPS, the operator must
take into account lineup corrections
when computing takeoff performance
data when the access to the runway
does not permit positioning of the air-
craft at the threshold.
The NPA published in December
1996 proposes a calculation method
when the aircraft manufacturer does not
provide the appropriate data. However
Airbus Industrie published minimum
lineup distance corrections in its
Takeoff Safety Training Aid and in the
Performance Programs Manual (PPM).
Regarding takeoff performance com-
putation, TCP, TLC or OCTOPUS pro-
grams have all the options to take into
account any line-up distance chosen by
the operator.
● Takeoff obstacle clearance in turn
JAR-OPS 1.495 (c)
During takeoff, aircraft may be
banked by no more than 15° up to
400ft, then up to 25° when above 400ft.
The NPA published in December 1996
proposes to allow, under specific cir-
cumstances, bank angles of 20° above
200ft and 30° above 400ft.
In any case JAR-OPS requires ade-
quate allowance to be made for the ef-
fect of bank angle on flight path and
operating speeds. Furthermore, when
the aircraft is banked by more than 15°,
the net flight path must clear the obsta-
cles by 50ft (instead of 35ft).
FAST / NUMBER 22
Data source for specific JAR-OPS performance requirements
One-engine inoperative cruising
speed
Operation from/to contaminated
runways
Takeoff line-up distance
Takeoff obstacle Gradient correction
clearance in turn
Speed correction
Go-around gradient for decision
heights below 200ft
AFM: Airplane Flight Manual
FCOM: Flight Crew Operating Manual
IFP: In Flight Performance computation program
OCTOPUS: Operational and Certified Take-Off
and landing Performance Universal Software
Regarding allowance on the flight
path:
❍ Climb gradient corrections due to
bank angles are given in the AFM
Performance chapter.
❍ the OCTOPUS program can compute
real takeoff performance taking the turn
into account. No further climb gradient
correction needs to be introduced.
Regarding allowance on the operat-
ing speeds, JAR-OPS proposes that un-
less otherwise specified in the
Aeroplane Flight Manual or other per-
formance or operating manuals from
the manufacturer, an acceptable means
of compliance to this requirement, is to
add a 5kt increment on V2 minimum
speed for bank angles above 15° and
10kt for bank angles above 25° to as-
sure adequate stall margin.
Studies show that there is no need to
add any speed increment on V2 mini-
mum for any Airbus aircraft for any
bank angle up to 20° and even up to 25°
for most of Airbus aircraft. Therefore
this information will be published in the
Performance Programs Manual (PPM).
Airbus Industrie Flight Operations
Support can assist any customer to de-
termine operational procedure and take-
off performance when high bank angles
are required at takeoff.
● Go-around gradient for decision
heights below 200 ft
JAR-OPS 1.510 (b)
For instrument approaches with deci-
sion height below 200 ft, JAR-OPS re-
quires a minimum go-around climb gra-
dient of 2.5%, or the published
gradient, whichever is the greater.
Relevant information is already avail-
able in the AFM of the A320, as well as
for some A310s and for A319/A321
/A330/A340 through the OCTOPUS
program. It will be introduced in the
FCOM as soon as possible.
FAST / NUMBER 22
A300B2 / B4 A310 / A300-600 A320 A319 / A321 / A330 / A340
AFM/FCOM/IFP OCTOPUS/FCOM/IFP
FCOM TLC/FCOM TAB/TLC/FCOM OCTOPUS/FCOM
TSTA/TCP/PPM TSTA/TLC/PPM TSTA/OCTOPUS/PPM
AFM OCTOPUS/PPM
PPM
FCOM AFM/FCOM OCTOPUS/FCOM
TAB: Tabulation and Interpolation Program
TCP: Takeoff Chart Computation program (A300 B2/B4)
TLC: Takeoff and Landing Chart program (A310/A300-600/A320)
TSTA: Takeoff Safety Training Aid
PPM: Performance Programs Manual
For the A300 and remaining A310s, structure may require a longer time to
the information will be available in the be accepted/approved by the authority.
FCOM by 1st April 1998. To facilitate comparability and us-
A summary of the various data ability of Operations Manuals by new
sources for specific JAR-OPS require- personnel, formerly employed by an-
ments is shown on the table above. other operator, JAR-OPS recommends
operators not to deviate from the num-
Operations Manual bering system used in Appendix 1 to
JAR-OPS 1.1045. If there are sections
JAR-OPS 1.200 Operations Manual: which, because of the nature of the op-
"An operator shall provide an eration, do not apply, it is recom-
Operations Manual in accordance with mended that operators maintain the
Subpart P for the use and guidance of numbering system described in JAR-
operations personnel." OPS and insert "Not applicable" or
JAR-OPS 1.1040 General Rules for "Intentionally blank" where appropri-
Operations Manuals: "An operator ate.
shall ensure that the Operations ● Part A: General / Basic
Manual contains all instructions and "This part shall comprise all non
information necessary for operations type-related operational policies, in-
personnel to perform their duties." structions and procedures needed for a
● Structure and contents safe operation and shall comply with
JAR-OPS 1 Subpart P "Manuals, all relevant regulations."
logs and records" defines the general Airbus Industrie developed an
rules, structure and contents for Operations Policy Manual that may be
Operations Manuals produced by the used by Airbus operators as a guide to
airlines. produce this Part A of their own
JAR-OPS prescribes the structure of Operations Manual. It was issued to all
the Operations Manual in four part: Airbus customers in Malaga during the
❍ Part A: General/Basic 9th Performance and Operations
❍ Part B: Airplane Operating Matters Conference in June 96. It is also avail-
❍ Part C: Route and Aerodrome able on diskette from the auhor.
Instructions and Information The structure and the technical con-
❍ Part D. Training tent of the Operations Policy Manual
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1045 con- developed by Airbus Industrie aimed to
tains a comprehensively detailed and fulfil the requirements of the JAR-OPS
structured list of all items to be covered as much as possible.
in the Operations Manual. With the evolution of JAR-OPS, a
Since it is believed that a high degree second issue is now under preparation.
of standardisation of Operations The Airbus Industrie Operations
Manuals within the JAA will lead to Policy Manual is made of the following
improved overall flight safety, JAR- chapters as prescribed by JAR-OPS:
OPS strongly recommends that the 0. Administration and control of
structure described in the JAR-OPS Operations Manual
Subpart P should be used by operators 1. Organisation and responsibilities
as far as possible. Manuals which do 2. Operational control and
not comply with the recommended supervision
19
FAST 22 p 17/20 11/03/98 23:11 Page 20
3. Quality system
4. Crew composition
5. Qualifications requirements
6. Crew health precautions
7. Flight time limitations
8. Operating procedures
9. Dangerous goods and weapons
10. Security
11. Handling of accidents and
occurrences
12. Rules of the air
The technical content of the Airbus
Industrie Operations Policy Manual is
given for information only and is not
approved by any authority. The infor-
mation mentioned in it represents in
some parts a strict application of re-
quirements, elsewhere it includes
guidelines or examples.
Although many parts of the Airbus
manual may be used as they are or with
minor amendments by an operator, it
has to be customised to include specific
airline policies, special organisation,
area of operations and some detailed
compliance and interpretative informa-
tion which some Civil Aviation
Authorities and industrie organisations
would like to see.
● Part B: Aeroplane operating mat-
ters
"This part shall comprise all type-re-
lated instructions and procedures
needed for a safe operation. It shall
take account of the different types of
aeroplanes or variants used by the op-
erator”. The Flight Crew Operating
Manual (FCOM) and Quick Reference
Handbook (QRH) produced by Airbus
Industrie may be used to fulfil most of
the requirements of this part. However
Part B should also include other items
given in other Airbus Industrie docu-
mentations such as Aircraft Flight
Manual (AFM), Performance Pro-
grams, Weight and Balance Manual
(WBM) and any other type related op-
erational manuals as Aircraft
Characteristic (AC), Noise Definition
20
Manual (NDM) / Octoper, Cargo load-
ing System Manual (CLS).
The following paragraphs of
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1045 Part B
which are not or are only partially ad-
dressed in FCOM and QRH, are ad-
dressed in other Airbus Industrie docu-
ments as mentioned below:
• 1.1.(b) Passenger seating configura-
tion: WBM.
• 2.1.(e) Noise abatement: NDM or
Octoper
• 3.(e) Exceeding cosmic radiation
limits: Not applicable
• 4.1. Performance data: AFM and
Airbus performance programs
• 4.1.(d) Gradient losses for banked
climbouts: AFM or Octopus
• 4.1.1. Icing condition: Values are
given in the FCOM but in addition spe-
cific performance can be established by
computation with Airbus performance
programs.
• 4.2.(f) Performance under
CDL (Configuration Deviation List):
Chapter 6 of AFM
• 6. Mass and Balance: Covered by
Weight and Balance Manual and
FCOM. Airbus customises Load and
Trim sheets on operator request.
• 7. Loading: WBM and CLS
• 8. CDL: Chapter 6 of the AFM.
• 9. MEL:- Minimum Equipment
List is established by the operator using
the Airbus MMEL.
• 10.1. The list of survival equipment is
a function of the operation and is not
indicated in the Airbus FCOM.
● Part C: Route and aerodrome in-
structions and information
"This part shall comprise all instruc-
tions and information needed for area
of operation”. The Jeppesen Airway
manuals or equivalent may be used to
cover this part.
● Part D: Training
"This part shall comprise all training
instructions for personnel required for
a safe operation”. The Airbus Industrie
Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM)
and the Flight Crew Training Reference
Manual (FCTRM) may be used to
THE PORTABLE WATER The consequence of water
ingress into the gearboxes in slat
cover most of the requirements of this
part dealing with flight crew training. DETECTION TOOL FOR and flap actuation system is well
known to aircraft operators.
Miscellaneous
A300/A300-600/A310 In the event of seal damage and
because of the decrease in air
● Mass and balance (Subpart J)
The present Weight and Balance pressure after take-off, air
Manual provided by Airbus Industrie is
not affected by JAR-OPS requirements.
can escape from a gearbox.
JAR-OPS gives a method to make Then as the aircraft descends
statistical evaluation of passenger and Marie-Sophie Calais
baggage mass to be used for aircraft Flight Controls Engineering to land, humid air is sucked into
weight and CG determination. and the gearbox and condenses.
However, JAR-OPS also gives standard René Savoie
Flight Controls & Electrical Systems Department Manager This action is known as
passenger mass values including hand Engineering & Technical Support
baggage as follows: Customer Services Directorate
“breathing”and with time can
Airbus Industrie cause a build-up of water
All flights Holiday
except charters charters
content in the gearbox.
Adult 84 kg 76 kg Until recently it has been
Children 35 kg 35 kg difficult to carry out an analysis
or: of the oil in the gearboxes to
Male 88 kg 83 kg
determine the degree of water
Female 70 kg 69 kg
Children 35 kg 35 kg ingress. It required a specialised
person and a laboratory with
The Load and Trim sheet provided on specific equipment.
request by Airbus Industrie is cus-
tomised taking into account the passen-
ger weight value decided by the airline.
● Instruments and equipment
(Subpart K)
There are small differences in terms
of instruments and equipment require-
ments between JAR-OPS and FAR.
This greatly depends on equipment de-
fined by the operator which are respon-
sible for determining compliance with
the regulation.
Airbus Industrie can provide assis-
tance to operators in determining on a
case by case basis, compliance of their
aircraft instruments and equipment with
JAR-OPS.
CONCLUSION
The operational documentation pro-
vided by Airbus Industrie to its cus-
tomers already meets most of the
JAR-OPS requirements. Airbus
Industrie went even further by the
production of an Operations Policy
Manual which should help Airbus
operators to build their own
Operations Manual. This is another
example of the continuous safety
and support improvement that
Airbus Industrie offers to its cus-
tomers ■
FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 21
FAST 22 p 17/20 11/03/98 23:11 Page 20
3. Quality system
4. Crew composition
5. Qualifications requirements
6. Crew health precautions
7. Flight time limitations
8. Operating procedures
9. Dangerous goods and weapons
10. Security
11. Handling of accidents and
occurrences
12. Rules of the air
The technical content of the Airbus
Industrie Operations Policy Manual is
given for information only and is not
approved by any authority. The infor-
mation mentioned in it represents in
some parts a strict application of re-
quirements, elsewhere it includes
guidelines or examples.
Although many parts of the Airbus
manual may be used as they are or with
minor amendments by an operator, it
has to be customised to include specific
airline policies, special organisation,
area of operations and some detailed
compliance and interpretative informa-
tion which some Civil Aviation
Authorities and industrie organisations
would like to see.
● Part B: Aeroplane operating mat-
ters
"This part shall comprise all type-re-
lated instructions and procedures
needed for a safe operation. It shall
take account of the different types of
aeroplanes or variants used by the op-
erator”. The Flight Crew Operating
Manual (FCOM) and Quick Reference
Handbook (QRH) produced by Airbus
Industrie may be used to fulfil most of
the requirements of this part. However
Part B should also include other items
given in other Airbus Industrie docu-
mentations such as Aircraft Flight
Manual (AFM), Performance Pro-
grams, Weight and Balance Manual
(WBM) and any other type related op-
erational manuals as Aircraft
Characteristic (AC), Noise Definition
20
Manual (NDM) / Octoper, Cargo load-
ing System Manual (CLS).
The following paragraphs of
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1045 Part B
which are not or are only partially ad-
dressed in FCOM and QRH, are ad-
dressed in other Airbus Industrie docu-
ments as mentioned below:
• 1.1.(b) Passenger seating configura-
tion: WBM.
• 2.1.(e) Noise abatement: NDM or
Octoper
• 3.(e) Exceeding cosmic radiation
limits: Not applicable
• 4.1. Performance data: AFM and
Airbus performance programs
• 4.1.(d) Gradient losses for banked
climbouts: AFM or Octopus
• 4.1.1. Icing condition: Values are
given in the FCOM but in addition spe-
cific performance can be established by
computation with Airbus performance
programs.
• 4.2.(f) Performance under
CDL (Configuration Deviation List):
Chapter 6 of AFM
• 6. Mass and Balance: Covered by
Weight and Balance Manual and
FCOM. Airbus customises Load and
Trim sheets on operator request.
• 7. Loading: WBM and CLS
• 8. CDL: Chapter 6 of the AFM.
• 9. MEL:- Minimum Equipment
List is established by the operator using
the Airbus MMEL.
• 10.1. The list of survival equipment is
a function of the operation and is not
indicated in the Airbus FCOM.
● Part C: Route and aerodrome in-
structions and information
"This part shall comprise all instruc-
tions and information needed for area
of operation”. The Jeppesen Airway
manuals or equivalent may be used to
cover this part.
● Part D: Training
"This part shall comprise all training
instructions for personnel required for
a safe operation”. The Airbus Industrie
Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM)
and the Flight Crew Training Reference
Manual (FCTRM) may be used to
THE PORTABLE WATER The consequence of water
ingress into the gearboxes in slat
cover most of the requirements of this
part dealing with flight crew training. DETECTION TOOL FOR and flap actuation system is well
known to aircraft operators.
Miscellaneous
A300/A300-600/A310 In the event of seal damage and
because of the decrease in air
● Mass and balance (Subpart J)
The present Weight and Balance pressure after take-off, air
Manual provided by Airbus Industrie is
not affected by JAR-OPS requirements.
can escape from a gearbox.
JAR-OPS gives a method to make Then as the aircraft descends
statistical evaluation of passenger and Marie-Sophie Calais
baggage mass to be used for aircraft Flight Controls Engineering to land, humid air is sucked into
weight and CG determination. and the gearbox and condenses.
However, JAR-OPS also gives standard René Savoie
Flight Controls & Electrical Systems Department Manager This action is known as
passenger mass values including hand Engineering & Technical Support
baggage as follows: Customer Services Directorate
“breathing”and with time can
Airbus Industrie cause a build-up of water
All flights Holiday
except charters charters
content in the gearbox.
Adult 84 kg 76 kg Until recently it has been
Children 35 kg 35 kg difficult to carry out an analysis
or: of the oil in the gearboxes to
Male 88 kg 83 kg
determine the degree of water
Female 70 kg 69 kg
Children 35 kg 35 kg ingress. It required a specialised
person and a laboratory with
The Load and Trim sheet provided on specific equipment.
request by Airbus Industrie is cus-
tomised taking into account the passen-
ger weight value decided by the airline.
● Instruments and equipment
(Subpart K)
There are small differences in terms
of instruments and equipment require-
ments between JAR-OPS and FAR.
This greatly depends on equipment de-
fined by the operator which are respon-
sible for determining compliance with
the regulation.
Airbus Industrie can provide assis-
tance to operators in determining on a
case by case basis, compliance of their
aircraft instruments and equipment with
JAR-OPS.
CONCLUSION
The operational documentation pro-
vided by Airbus Industrie to its cus-
tomers already meets most of the
JAR-OPS requirements. Airbus
Industrie went even further by the
production of an Operations Policy
Manual which should help Airbus
operators to build their own
Operations Manual. This is another
example of the continuous safety
and support improvement that
Airbus Industrie offers to its cus-
tomers ■
FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 21
FAST22 p21/24 11/03/98 22:53 Page 22
Figure 1 FLAP AND SLAT JAMMING
The Preciwatertest - some elements from the water measurement unit:
The presence of more than 5% of water
in the oil quantity in gearboxes can be
disturbing because the water can freeze,
causing increased torque in the drive
system and perhaps causing it to jam.
Water ingress also degrades the quality
of the oil and can cause corrosion of the
components. To date there has been a
procedure to take a sample of the sus-
pect oil but no practical tool to allow
the mechanic to determine quickly the
percentage of water. The analysis had
to be done by a specialist in a labora-
tory, which was a time consuming
process.
THE SOLUTION
Geserco and Airbus Industrie have de-
veloped a tool called the Preciwatertest
which allows the mechanic to get a di-
rect reading of the water percentage at
the aircraft. The Trouble Shooting
Manuals(TSM) for the A300-600
(Chapter 27-50-02) and A310 (Chapters
A - Sample E - Stop watch 27-50-02 and 27-80-02) are being mod-
B - Identification and record card F - Flask containing the capsules
C - Directions for use for water G - Test tube (reaction flask) ified to incorporate the new method, as
is the FIM Chapter 27-50-00 for the
measurement H - Solvent flask for cleaning
D - Syringe 20cm3 with the 8 cm I - Receptacle for the waste A300. In addition modifications to the
long metal tube seals are available (Mod 06551 for
A300, Mod 10796 for A300-600 and
Mod 10961 for the A310).
Figure 2
The sampling
22 FAST / NUMBER 22
THE WATER DETECTION Figure 3
TOOL The foam in the reaction flask
The Preciwatertest contains two kits,
one for sampling the oil, the other for
measuring the water content. Both are
transported in a single small suitcase
(38 x 33 x 27.5 cm) (see page 21) but
can be carried independently if re-
quired. For example if the sampling and
the measurement were to be done at the
aircraft then both would be carried.
However if the analysis is not urgent
then the sampling kit may be taken to
the aircraft and the measurement done
later.
SAMPLING
The sampling procedure depends on the
gearbox from which the oil has to be
extracted.
The oil can be extracted from some
gearboxes without a syringe. For the
other gearboxes there are three different
nozzles for the syringe: one in metal,
one curved in plastic and the third, a
flexible plastic tube (Figure 2). In the
sampling kit one bottle is provided for
each gearbox.
The samples must be taken no later
than 40 minutes after operation of the
flap or slat system. Within this time the
oil and water will still be mixed other-
wise they will be separated and false re-
sults would be obtained.
MEASUREMENT
Measurement of the water content can
be done at the aircraft or in a workshop
by a non specialist. The oil sample is
poured into a reaction flask (Figure 3)
which is linked to an expansion vessel
and manometer which gives a direct
reading of the percentage of the water
in the oil (Figure 4 on the following
page).
The function is based on a chemical
reaction. The cap of the reaction flask
has housings in which capsules contain-
ing a reactive powder are placed. When
the powder and oil are mixed a foam
will form if there is water in the oil
(Figure 3). The mixture gives off oxy-
gen in direct ratio to the amount of wa-
ter contained in the oil sample. Pressure
in the expansion vessel is measured by
the manometer.
The water detection tool is calibrated
for a 10cm3 sample. Therefore only
10 cm3 of oil should be placed in the
reaction flask and the reading of the
manometer should be taken five min-
utes after all the powder has entered
the sample. If these conditions cannot
be respected a formula and chart are
provided with the kit to allow calcula-
tion of the correct result. A
FAST / NUMBER 22 23
FAST22 p21/24 11/03/98 22:53 Page 22
Figure 1 FLAP AND SLAT JAMMING
The Preciwatertest - some elements from the water measurement unit:
The presence of more than 5% of water
in the oil quantity in gearboxes can be
disturbing because the water can freeze,
causing increased torque in the drive
system and perhaps causing it to jam.
Water ingress also degrades the quality
of the oil and can cause corrosion of the
components. To date there has been a
procedure to take a sample of the sus-
pect oil but no practical tool to allow
the mechanic to determine quickly the
percentage of water. The analysis had
to be done by a specialist in a labora-
tory, which was a time consuming
process.
THE SOLUTION
Geserco and Airbus Industrie have de-
veloped a tool called the Preciwatertest
which allows the mechanic to get a di-
rect reading of the water percentage at
the aircraft. The Trouble Shooting
Manuals(TSM) for the A300-600
(Chapter 27-50-02) and A310 (Chapters
A - Sample E - Stop watch 27-50-02 and 27-80-02) are being mod-
B - Identification and record card F - Flask containing the capsules
C - Directions for use for water G - Test tube (reaction flask) ified to incorporate the new method, as
is the FIM Chapter 27-50-00 for the
measurement H - Solvent flask for cleaning
D - Syringe 20cm3 with the 8 cm I - Receptacle for the waste A300. In addition modifications to the
long metal tube seals are available (Mod 06551 for
A300, Mod 10796 for A300-600 and
Mod 10961 for the A310).
Figure 2
The sampling
22 FAST / NUMBER 22
THE WATER DETECTION Figure 3
TOOL The foam in the reaction flask
The Preciwatertest contains two kits,
one for sampling the oil, the other for
measuring the water content. Both are
transported in a single small suitcase
(38 x 33 x 27.5 cm) (see page 21) but
can be carried independently if re-
quired. For example if the sampling and
the measurement were to be done at the
aircraft then both would be carried.
However if the analysis is not urgent
then the sampling kit may be taken to
the aircraft and the measurement done
later.
SAMPLING
The sampling procedure depends on the
gearbox from which the oil has to be
extracted.
The oil can be extracted from some
gearboxes without a syringe. For the
other gearboxes there are three different
nozzles for the syringe: one in metal,
one curved in plastic and the third, a
flexible plastic tube (Figure 2). In the
sampling kit one bottle is provided for
each gearbox.
The samples must be taken no later
than 40 minutes after operation of the
flap or slat system. Within this time the
oil and water will still be mixed other-
wise they will be separated and false re-
sults would be obtained.
MEASUREMENT
Measurement of the water content can
be done at the aircraft or in a workshop
by a non specialist. The oil sample is
poured into a reaction flask (Figure 3)
which is linked to an expansion vessel
and manometer which gives a direct
reading of the percentage of the water
in the oil (Figure 4 on the following
page).
The function is based on a chemical
reaction. The cap of the reaction flask
has housings in which capsules contain-
ing a reactive powder are placed. When
the powder and oil are mixed a foam
will form if there is water in the oil
(Figure 3). The mixture gives off oxy-
gen in direct ratio to the amount of wa-
ter contained in the oil sample. Pressure
in the expansion vessel is measured by
the manometer.
The water detection tool is calibrated
for a 10cm3 sample. Therefore only
10 cm3 of oil should be placed in the
reaction flask and the reading of the
manometer should be taken five min-
utes after all the powder has entered
the sample. If these conditions cannot
be respected a formula and chart are
provided with the kit to allow calcula-
tion of the correct result. A
FAST / NUMBER 22 23
FAST22 p21/24 11/03/98 22:56 Page 24

Figure 4
Manometer giving direct reading of water percentage
LIGHTNING STRIKES
AND AIRBUS
FLY-BY-WIRE
AIRCRAFT
Captain Chris Krahe, Vice President
Operational Flight Group
Training and Flight Operations Support
Airbus Industrie
Customer Services Directorate

new to fly-by-wire aircraft tend to ask

Pilots very legitimate questions concerning the

effect of lightning strikes on the systems
of these technically very advanced aircraft.
In general, lightning strikes generate direct and indirect effects on
aircraft.
● The direct effects cause physical damage to the structure of the
aircraft. This is due to the high energy content of a bolt of lightning
in the span of fractions of a second. The aircraft structure, built to
ADVANTAGES and it can significantly reduce trouble- represent a Faraday Cage, has been thoroughly bonded and in
shooting times. particular the many parts made of Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic
The Preciwater test has many advan- ● It improves trouble-shooting by pro-
tages: viding operators with a method to al- (CFRP) have been treated to be electrically conductive by applying
● It is portable and small. most immediately assess whether or not various techniques.
● The easy sampling and direct reading water presence in gearboxes is at the Lightning protection of the carbon fiber vertical and horizontal
can be done quickly by non specialists. origin of system jamming. tailplanes is mainly based on the ability of the CFRP material to
● It reduces maintenance costs, since it ● Consumable and spare parts for the carry large amounts of lightning current without suffering damage
can be used for preventive maintenance kits are readily available.
and the electrical continuity is ensured within the whole structure.
Great effort, therefore, has been spent by Airbus Industrie to
CONCLUSION
ensure that lightning current can spread over the whole structure
The ability to determine almost instantly, at the aircraft, whether or not there has been water ingress in the gearboxes of the avoiding areas with significant current concentration and making
flap and slat systems can be used as a preventive measure to avoid delays due to system malfunction. It also significantly sure that electrical continuity is maintained at all structural joints.
reduces trouble-shooting times when a system has malfunctioned. Using the Preciwatertest can avoid expensive mainte- It has been proven by lightning strike tests on the components
nance and delays on the A300/A300-600/A310. ■
themselves, that this design gives a remarkable inherent current
carrying capability.
● The indirect effects of lightning strikes on aircraft are more likely
For further information please contact:
to disturb or generate damage to electrical and avionic equipment.
• AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Customer Services AI/SE-E53 This damage is due to the electromagnetic physics generated from
Flight Controls Systems, Mr Deletain, 1, rond-point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 BLAGNAC Cedex, FRANCE, Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 22 33 the circulation of high currents in the structure of the aircraft.
Fax:+33 (0)5 61 93 44 25
or Airbus Industrie and its suppliers of avionics equipment have
• GESERCO SARL, Mme Pons, 87130 NEUVIC ENTIER, FRANCE, Tel: +33 (0)5 55 69 75 72 made use of the most advanced technology to protect these aircraft
The Part Numbers are :
• Preciwatertest,WT TGC 96-10000 / Measurement kit, WT TGC 96-11000 / Sampling kit, WT TGC 96-12000 against external radiation effects such as Electro Magnetic
Interference (EMI) and lightning strikes.

24 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 25

FAST22 p21/24 11/03/98 22:56 Page 24

Figure 4
Manometer giving direct reading of water percentage
LIGHTNING STRIKES
AND AIRBUS
FLY-BY-WIRE
AIRCRAFT
Captain Chris Krahe, Vice President
Operational Flight Group
Training and Flight Operations Support
Airbus Industrie
Customer Services Directorate

new to fly-by-wire aircraft tend to ask

Pilots very legitimate questions concerning the

effect of lightning strikes on the systems
of these technically very advanced aircraft.
In general, lightning strikes generate direct and indirect effects on
aircraft.
● The direct effects cause physical damage to the structure of the
aircraft. This is due to the high energy content of a bolt of lightning
in the span of fractions of a second. The aircraft structure, built to
ADVANTAGES and it can significantly reduce trouble- represent a Faraday Cage, has been thoroughly bonded and in
shooting times. particular the many parts made of Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic
The Preciwater test has many advan- ● It improves trouble-shooting by pro-
tages: viding operators with a method to al- (CFRP) have been treated to be electrically conductive by applying
● It is portable and small. most immediately assess whether or not various techniques.
● The easy sampling and direct reading water presence in gearboxes is at the Lightning protection of the carbon fiber vertical and horizontal
can be done quickly by non specialists. origin of system jamming. tailplanes is mainly based on the ability of the CFRP material to
● It reduces maintenance costs, since it ● Consumable and spare parts for the carry large amounts of lightning current without suffering damage
can be used for preventive maintenance kits are readily available.
and the electrical continuity is ensured within the whole structure.
Great effort, therefore, has been spent by Airbus Industrie to
CONCLUSION
ensure that lightning current can spread over the whole structure
The ability to determine almost instantly, at the aircraft, whether or not there has been water ingress in the gearboxes of the avoiding areas with significant current concentration and making
flap and slat systems can be used as a preventive measure to avoid delays due to system malfunction. It also significantly sure that electrical continuity is maintained at all structural joints.
reduces trouble-shooting times when a system has malfunctioned. Using the Preciwatertest can avoid expensive mainte- It has been proven by lightning strike tests on the components
nance and delays on the A300/A300-600/A310. ■
themselves, that this design gives a remarkable inherent current
carrying capability.
● The indirect effects of lightning strikes on aircraft are more likely
For further information please contact:
to disturb or generate damage to electrical and avionic equipment.
• AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Customer Services AI/SE-E53 This damage is due to the electromagnetic physics generated from
Flight Controls Systems, Mr Deletain, 1, rond-point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 BLAGNAC Cedex, FRANCE, Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 22 33 the circulation of high currents in the structure of the aircraft.
Fax:+33 (0)5 61 93 44 25
or Airbus Industrie and its suppliers of avionics equipment have
• GESERCO SARL, Mme Pons, 87130 NEUVIC ENTIER, FRANCE, Tel: +33 (0)5 55 69 75 72 made use of the most advanced technology to protect these aircraft
The Part Numbers are :
• Preciwatertest,WT TGC 96-10000 / Measurement kit, WT TGC 96-11000 / Sampling kit, WT TGC 96-12000 against external radiation effects such as Electro Magnetic
Interference (EMI) and lightning strikes.

24 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 25

FAST22 p25 ˆ 31 11/03/98 22:27 Page 26
The protection of the Airbus aircraft
Figure 1
systems, (electrical distribution) against
Segregation of electrical system and components indirect effects of lightning strikes rep-
resents a quantum leap forward in evo-
Secondary emergency circuit breakers lution. Segregation of protected compo-
Secondary normal and nents and separation of wiring lanes is
APU Generator 3G 6G RAT Generator paramount (Figure 1).
battery circuit breaker's
System components are protected by
filters allowing only spike-free voltage
and current to access the functional
parts of the computer.
An example: during a lightning
strike, voltages may get superimposed
Main power centre
on signals that have no lightning pro-
AC APU AC DC DC tection, and thereby increase the overall
ch. & ch. 2 1
2 EXT 1 signal levels 500-times. The currents
PWR that are produced by this phenomenon
ch.
can be 300,000-times higher than under
2G 1G normal conditions. The excess output-
Right engine Left engine power, which the built-in filtering cir-
Generator Generator cuits have to neutralize, could have an
TR2 TR1 equivalent magnitude of 500kW,
whereas, the total power consumption
of the equipment itself is far below
BATs
Emergency AC-DC 100W under normal conditions.
power centre Airbus Industrie has requested the
suppliers of electronic equipment to de-
sign and manufacture them according
to stringent standards and specifications
that are considered to be the highest in
Engine 2 APU the industry.
Generator Generator From the outset and with the design
aim of enhanced electronic hardening, a
considerable amount of research and
6G
Electrical power centre 3G Emergency development has been invested into this
Generator task. Within the framework of the pos-
2G Engine 1 sibilities that were available, the fol-
1G Generator lowing means have been applied in or-
der to guarantee protection against
Emergency AC-DC power centre lightning strikes:
● An integrated grounding/shielding
concept with short connections, and in-
ductances that are kept as low as possi-
ble.
● Guided shields of external cables
right up to the main grounding point of
the computers.
● Symmetrical or separated ground
Figure 2 connections of critical signals (wher-
Functional parts of a computer ever possible) with the help of trans-
formers, integrated circuits, etc.
● Distinctly separated critical electronic
circuits from interference-prone areas
(“dirty areas”) through mechanical sep-
aration and electrical filtering.
● Eradicated voltage surges using suffi-
ciently large-sized varistors, transzorbs,
or zener diodes in the “dirty areas”.
Generally speaking, the protection
device or filter accounts for 25%, the
power supply part for 10 to 20%, and
the pure functional part of the computer
represents 55 to 65% of the total design
effort (Figure 2).
With respect to the wiring, the
method of double twisted wires running
(With compliments of VDO) in metal shielding has successfully been
applied.
26 FAST / NUMBER 22
The effectiveness of the lightning
Figure 3
protection concept was confirmed
through extensive qualification tests in Second lightning strike on A330 nose landing gear door
Electro Magnetic Interference (EMI)
chambers. In production and during the
entire life time, the function will be
tested in accordance with acceptance
test procedures.
The Airbus test aircraft were also ex-
posed in ground tests to high voltage
induction of several thousand Volts per
metre. Thereafter, in a dedicated flight
test campaign, the test aircraft was ex-
posed to multiple lightning strikes by
seeking purposely to be hit by lightning
through flight in real thunderstorms or
highly ionized air masses.
Today, the Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft
have accumulated over nine million
flight hours in more than eight years of
airline service. There are nearly 900 of
these aircraft flying world-wide, and a
considerable amount of experience with
lightning strikes is available.
Like any aircraft in service, they are
struck by lightning.
The experience gathered and the op- or aircraft systems.
erational feedback Airbus Industrie has However, according to the direct ef-
received from the operators have con- fects on the structure, Zeus must have
firmed the effectiveness of the concept hit extremely hard this time. The first
and design. We can state today that impact of the lightning on the fuselage
there were virtually no indirect effects was slightly above door 1R and showed
on the systems by lightning strikes. jumps from frame to frame about one
We know of two significant lightning meter above the row of cabin windows
strike events in the Airbus fleet that until door 3R. On its way, it burned out
speak for themselves, and which we about 30 rivets. Apparently, the light-
wish to share with those interested. ning left the aircraft on top of the verti-
In August 1995, during the interme- cal fin where it burnt the usual one inch
diate approach in a thunderstorm into hole. It should be noted that according
an airport in Denmark, an A320 was hit to the operator’s maintenance depart-
by lightning strike - according to the ment, this lightning hit was the most se-
crew, no aircraft systems were affected. vere suffered across all its aircraft types
However, the approach had to be inter- during the company’s 40 years history
rupted with a subsequent diversion to (Figure 3).
Copenhagen because the destination Lightning strikes are by nature un-
airport was hit by lightning as well, controllable. They channel their energy
which caused a complete electrical content on a small size pinpoint.
blackout including ILS and communi- Concentration of the energy is the
cation. source of physical damage. All that
On 9 October 1996, an A330-300 lightning strike protection does is to
suffered at least two very severe light- disperse this energy.
ning strikes while approaching the Bonding of panels is not meant to
Greek island of Rhodes where the air- avoid damage at all. It is there to evac-
craft made an uneventful landing. uate the static charges generated by air
The flight crew reported that during friction and to provide protection
these severe lightning strikes, there was against High Intensity Radiated Fields
not the slightest flickering of the dis- (HIRF ) in addition to limit damage due
plays nor other effects on the avionics to lightning strikes.
CONCLUSION
The very stringent tests that the Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft were subjected to, have ensured that they can withstand the most
severe lightning strikes with no effect to their electronic systems, which has been demonstrated in commercial service as the
crew reports demonstrate. ■
FAST / NUMBER 22 27
FAST22 p25 ˆ 31 11/03/98 22:27 Page 26
The protection of the Airbus aircraft
Figure 1
systems, (electrical distribution) against
Segregation of electrical system and components indirect effects of lightning strikes rep-
resents a quantum leap forward in evo-
Secondary emergency circuit breakers lution. Segregation of protected compo-
Secondary normal and nents and separation of wiring lanes is
APU Generator 3G 6G RAT Generator paramount (Figure 1).
battery circuit breaker's
System components are protected by
filters allowing only spike-free voltage
and current to access the functional
parts of the computer.
An example: during a lightning
strike, voltages may get superimposed
Main power centre
on signals that have no lightning pro-
AC APU AC DC DC tection, and thereby increase the overall
ch. & ch. 2 1
2 EXT 1 signal levels 500-times. The currents
PWR that are produced by this phenomenon
ch.
can be 300,000-times higher than under
2G 1G normal conditions. The excess output-
Right engine Left engine power, which the built-in filtering cir-
Generator Generator cuits have to neutralize, could have an
TR2 TR1 equivalent magnitude of 500kW,
whereas, the total power consumption
of the equipment itself is far below
BATs
Emergency AC-DC 100W under normal conditions.
power centre Airbus Industrie has requested the
suppliers of electronic equipment to de-
sign and manufacture them according
to stringent standards and specifications
that are considered to be the highest in
Engine 2 APU the industry.
Generator Generator From the outset and with the design
aim of enhanced electronic hardening, a
considerable amount of research and
6G
Electrical power centre 3G Emergency development has been invested into this
Generator task. Within the framework of the pos-
2G Engine 1 sibilities that were available, the fol-
1G Generator lowing means have been applied in or-
der to guarantee protection against
Emergency AC-DC power centre lightning strikes:
● An integrated grounding/shielding
concept with short connections, and in-
ductances that are kept as low as possi-
ble.
● Guided shields of external cables
right up to the main grounding point of
the computers.
● Symmetrical or separated ground
Figure 2 connections of critical signals (wher-
Functional parts of a computer ever possible) with the help of trans-
formers, integrated circuits, etc.
● Distinctly separated critical electronic
circuits from interference-prone areas
(“dirty areas”) through mechanical sep-
aration and electrical filtering.
● Eradicated voltage surges using suffi-
ciently large-sized varistors, transzorbs,
or zener diodes in the “dirty areas”.
Generally speaking, the protection
device or filter accounts for 25%, the
power supply part for 10 to 20%, and
the pure functional part of the computer
represents 55 to 65% of the total design
effort (Figure 2).
With respect to the wiring, the
method of double twisted wires running
(With compliments of VDO) in metal shielding has successfully been
applied.
26 FAST / NUMBER 22
The effectiveness of the lightning
Figure 3
protection concept was confirmed
through extensive qualification tests in Second lightning strike on A330 nose landing gear door
Electro Magnetic Interference (EMI)
chambers. In production and during the
entire life time, the function will be
tested in accordance with acceptance
test procedures.
The Airbus test aircraft were also ex-
posed in ground tests to high voltage
induction of several thousand Volts per
metre. Thereafter, in a dedicated flight
test campaign, the test aircraft was ex-
posed to multiple lightning strikes by
seeking purposely to be hit by lightning
through flight in real thunderstorms or
highly ionized air masses.
Today, the Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft
have accumulated over nine million
flight hours in more than eight years of
airline service. There are nearly 900 of
these aircraft flying world-wide, and a
considerable amount of experience with
lightning strikes is available.
Like any aircraft in service, they are
struck by lightning.
The experience gathered and the op- or aircraft systems.
erational feedback Airbus Industrie has However, according to the direct ef-
received from the operators have con- fects on the structure, Zeus must have
firmed the effectiveness of the concept hit extremely hard this time. The first
and design. We can state today that impact of the lightning on the fuselage
there were virtually no indirect effects was slightly above door 1R and showed
on the systems by lightning strikes. jumps from frame to frame about one
We know of two significant lightning meter above the row of cabin windows
strike events in the Airbus fleet that until door 3R. On its way, it burned out
speak for themselves, and which we about 30 rivets. Apparently, the light-
wish to share with those interested. ning left the aircraft on top of the verti-
In August 1995, during the interme- cal fin where it burnt the usual one inch
diate approach in a thunderstorm into hole. It should be noted that according
an airport in Denmark, an A320 was hit to the operator’s maintenance depart-
by lightning strike - according to the ment, this lightning hit was the most se-
crew, no aircraft systems were affected. vere suffered across all its aircraft types
However, the approach had to be inter- during the company’s 40 years history
rupted with a subsequent diversion to (Figure 3).
Copenhagen because the destination Lightning strikes are by nature un-
airport was hit by lightning as well, controllable. They channel their energy
which caused a complete electrical content on a small size pinpoint.
blackout including ILS and communi- Concentration of the energy is the
cation. source of physical damage. All that
On 9 October 1996, an A330-300 lightning strike protection does is to
suffered at least two very severe light- disperse this energy.
ning strikes while approaching the Bonding of panels is not meant to
Greek island of Rhodes where the air- avoid damage at all. It is there to evac-
craft made an uneventful landing. uate the static charges generated by air
The flight crew reported that during friction and to provide protection
these severe lightning strikes, there was against High Intensity Radiated Fields
not the slightest flickering of the dis- (HIRF ) in addition to limit damage due
plays nor other effects on the avionics to lightning strikes.
CONCLUSION
The very stringent tests that the Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft were subjected to, have ensured that they can withstand the most
severe lightning strikes with no effect to their electronic systems, which has been demonstrated in commercial service as the
crew reports demonstrate. ■
FAST / NUMBER 22 27
FAST22 p25 ˆ 31 11/03/98 22:32 Page 28
AIM-FANS
WINS
GROWING
NUMBER
OF
ORDERS
AIM-FANS customers (full installation), as of early December 97.
The list is growing rapidly.
Jean-Pierre Dambrine
Product Marketing Director
Airbus Industrie
irline involvement in the devel-
A opment of the Airbus Interop-
erable Modular - Future Air
Navigation System (AIM-
FANS) avionics suite, which is due to
enter service this year on the A330 and
A340, has been key to its present suc-
cess.
A core team of seven major Airbus
customers has been working in close
co-operation with Airbus on all aspects
of the programme: system design,
schedules, product support and com-
mercial. In addition, a series of semi-
annual review conferences allowed the
collection of further valuable inputs
from all customers.
Customers generally confirmed the
validity of the basic concept presented
in FAST 17 (issue December 94) with
its major benefits of operational flexi-
bility, development potential and com-
monality, but added inputs which sig-
nificantly improved the value of the
AIM-FANS product. A few examples
are:
● The tuning of the design and sched-
ules of AIM-FANS to provide the right
FANS functionality at the right time in
each region of the world. This results
from the progressive development of a
common understanding by the group of
28
at ional
Intern
the various FANS environments now
emerging around the world.
● The use of VHF Data Radios (VDR)
instead of VHF radios. This makes
AIM-FANS consistent with airlines’
general move towards VDRs and en-
hances its development potential
● The incorporation of the Aircraft
Communication Adressing and
Reporting System (ACARS) Airline
Operational Communication (AOC)
functions into the Air Traffic Services
Unit (ATSU, the AIM-FANS commu-
nication management box). This re-
moves the need for a separate ACARS
box, which simplifies the overall archi-
tecture of the aircraft communication
system and reduces airline costs.
Competition between three AOC soft-
ware suppliers further reduces costs.
● The development of a crew-friendly
FANS cockpit arrangement, able to
support later developments of FANS,
avoiding the need of burdening and
costly downstream reshuffling of cock-
pit configuration and operational phi-
losophy.
● The introduction of a new Flight
Management System (FMS), common
to the A330/A340 and A320 family,
with greatly increased computing
power, memory size and ability to cope
FAST / NUMBER 22
With AIM-FANS, Controller-Pilot communication is
achieved via two Datalink Control and Display Units
(DCDUs), the screens visible at the bottom of the centre
instrument panel of this A340 flight deck. They provide
each crew member with a dedicated interface for ATC com-
munication. This arrangement has been selected for its user-
friendliness and its ability to cope with the busy Air Traffic
Control environments to which FANS will soon spread.
with upgrades. This gives the new FMS functions, the new FMS, re-arranged
a large growth potential, matching that
of the ATSU. Across-the-range com-
monality and easy upgrades reduce air-
cockpit instrument panels ready to ac-
cept the installation of AIM-FANS con-
trols and displays, and wiring provi-
line costs. The ability to procure this sions. This will make the future
new FMS from two competing suppli- installation of AIM-FANS B easier for
ers is another cost-cutting factor. customers and will also allow speedy Flight testing of AIM-FANS has
The equalization of the retrofit instal- installation of AIM-FANS A on the started and will lead to certification of
lation into one-shift work packages and A320 family, if finally needed. ■ the system in the second half of 1998.
the ability to fly any combination of
FANS-modified / un-modified LRUs.
This eases retrofit and cuts its cost.
Thanks to its built-in development
potential, the AIM-FANS A configura-
tion entering service this year on the
A330/A340 will seamlessly evolve by
the year 2000 to the AIM-FANS B con-
figuration, fully compliant with the
ATN (Aeronautical Telecommunication
Network).
No AIM-FANS A step is planned at
this stage for the A320 family but a di-
rect move to AIM-FANS B by 2000,
because the type of route on which the
aircraft is operated will likely require
the ATN directly. The A320 family,
however, will be fitted with a “Pre-
FANS” installation a few months after
the A330/A340 receives AIM-FANS A.
It will consist of the ATSU with AOC
FAST / NUMBER 22 29
FAST22 p25 ˆ 31 11/03/98 22:32 Page 28
AIM-FANS
WINS
GROWING
NUMBER
OF
ORDERS
AIM-FANS customers (full installation), as of early December 97.
The list is growing rapidly.
Jean-Pierre Dambrine
Product Marketing Director
Airbus Industrie
irline involvement in the devel-
A opment of the Airbus Interop-
erable Modular - Future Air
Navigation System (AIM-
FANS) avionics suite, which is due to
enter service this year on the A330 and
A340, has been key to its present suc-
cess.
A core team of seven major Airbus
customers has been working in close
co-operation with Airbus on all aspects
of the programme: system design,
schedules, product support and com-
mercial. In addition, a series of semi-
annual review conferences allowed the
collection of further valuable inputs
from all customers.
Customers generally confirmed the
validity of the basic concept presented
in FAST 17 (issue December 94) with
its major benefits of operational flexi-
bility, development potential and com-
monality, but added inputs which sig-
nificantly improved the value of the
AIM-FANS product. A few examples
are:
● The tuning of the design and sched-
ules of AIM-FANS to provide the right
FANS functionality at the right time in
each region of the world. This results
from the progressive development of a
common understanding by the group of
28
at ional
Intern
the various FANS environments now
emerging around the world.
● The use of VHF Data Radios (VDR)
instead of VHF radios. This makes
AIM-FANS consistent with airlines’
general move towards VDRs and en-
hances its development potential
● The incorporation of the Aircraft
Communication Adressing and
Reporting System (ACARS) Airline
Operational Communication (AOC)
functions into the Air Traffic Services
Unit (ATSU, the AIM-FANS commu-
nication management box). This re-
moves the need for a separate ACARS
box, which simplifies the overall archi-
tecture of the aircraft communication
system and reduces airline costs.
Competition between three AOC soft-
ware suppliers further reduces costs.
● The development of a crew-friendly
FANS cockpit arrangement, able to
support later developments of FANS,
avoiding the need of burdening and
costly downstream reshuffling of cock-
pit configuration and operational phi-
losophy.
● The introduction of a new Flight
Management System (FMS), common
to the A330/A340 and A320 family,
with greatly increased computing
power, memory size and ability to cope
FAST / NUMBER 22
With AIM-FANS, Controller-Pilot communication is
achieved via two Datalink Control and Display Units
(DCDUs), the screens visible at the bottom of the centre
instrument panel of this A340 flight deck. They provide
each crew member with a dedicated interface for ATC com-
munication. This arrangement has been selected for its user-
friendliness and its ability to cope with the busy Air Traffic
Control environments to which FANS will soon spread.
with upgrades. This gives the new FMS functions, the new FMS, re-arranged
a large growth potential, matching that
of the ATSU. Across-the-range com-
monality and easy upgrades reduce air-
cockpit instrument panels ready to ac-
cept the installation of AIM-FANS con-
trols and displays, and wiring provi-
line costs. The ability to procure this sions. This will make the future
new FMS from two competing suppli- installation of AIM-FANS B easier for
ers is another cost-cutting factor. customers and will also allow speedy Flight testing of AIM-FANS has
The equalization of the retrofit instal- installation of AIM-FANS A on the started and will lead to certification of
lation into one-shift work packages and A320 family, if finally needed. ■ the system in the second half of 1998.
the ability to fly any combination of
FANS-modified / un-modified LRUs.
This eases retrofit and cuts its cost.
Thanks to its built-in development
potential, the AIM-FANS A configura-
tion entering service this year on the
A330/A340 will seamlessly evolve by
the year 2000 to the AIM-FANS B con-
figuration, fully compliant with the
ATN (Aeronautical Telecommunication
Network).
No AIM-FANS A step is planned at
this stage for the A320 family but a di-
rect move to AIM-FANS B by 2000,
because the type of route on which the
aircraft is operated will likely require
the ATN directly. The A320 family,
however, will be fitted with a “Pre-
FANS” installation a few months after
the A330/A340 receives AIM-FANS A.
It will consist of the ATSU with AOC
FAST / NUMBER 22 29
FAST22 p25 ˆ 31 11/03/98 22:36 Page 30
A319/A320/A321 TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM
8-12 DECEMBER 1997 IN SAN FRANCISCO
Over 430 representatives from 64
airlines, 46 vendors and Airbus Industrie
attended this conference.
This Symposium was hosted by
Roger LECOMTE, Vice President
Engineering and Technical Support and
chaired by Thierry HÉRAULT, Director
A320 Program from Airbus Customer
Services. From the 500 inputs received from the operators
prior to the Symposium, 60 subjects were retained for formal
presentations and discussion during the plenary sessions
and around 25 subjects were reviewed in side meetings.
In addition, written answers to remaining questions were
given in the documentation provided to each participants.
Several sessions were devoted to present the new
Airbus Technical Information System (ATIS) and Single
Point of Contact (SPOC) concept for on-line access.
These presentations were supported by true on-line
demonstration of on-line access to Service Bulletins and
Technical Follow-Up.
MATERIEL SUPPORT SYMPOSIUM
14-17 SEPTEMBER 1997 IN KUALA-LUMPUR
Over 400 delegates from 60 airlines,
98 suppliers, Airbus Industrie and its partners
gathered recently for the fourth Materiels
Symposium. The conference, which was the
largest and most successful of its kind, provided
an open forum for all parties involved in
the Airbus Industrie supply chain to discuss
a wide range of issues related to materiels
management, with an emphasis on the need
to achieve an effective balance between
cost-reduction and service.
Speaking at the conference, Peter KLOEPFER, Vice
President Material Support, announced that continued
cost-reduction at the industrial level, combined with improved
efficiency in administration and manufacturing processes,
would mean that average material cost expenditure for Airbus
Industrie proprietary parts in 1998 would once again remain
A330/A340 TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM
30
The First
Aviation
Regulation?
Following tradition at the opportunity of the opening
ceremony, Bernard CATTEEUW, Senior Vice President of
Airbus Customer Services, presented awards to A319, A320
and A321 operators for excellent achievements obtained by
some operators.
The awards for OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE was given to:
● AIR FRANCE for the A319.
● ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS for the A320.
● SWISSAIR for the A321.
"It shall be unlawful to
In addition SPECIAL RECOGNITION was given to:
● CANADA 3000 for the highest yearly utilisation in flight
hours achieved with the A320: around 4500 flight hours
manufacture and lift-off
per aircraft and per year.
● TRANSASIA AIRWAYS for the highest yearly utilisation in balloons and other aerostatic
flight cycles achieved with A321: more than 3300 flight
cycles per aircraft and per year.
● SKYSERVICE for the highest average flight time achieved
machines with heaters using
with an A320: 3.3 hours per flight.
All the latter demonstrates the very high versality of the A320 wine spirit, fire crackers and
family.
other flammable materials,
and orders that all other
aerostatic balloons may not
at 1991 levels. Peter KLOEPFER also praised the efforts of third
party suppliers in recent years to support Airbus Industrie's
take-off without
cost-reduction and service enhancement initiatives.
"Each year since 1995 a significant number of Airbus
First flight of
permission".
Industrie suppliers have applied zero escalation on their
prices," he said. "At the same time many of the suppliers have the “Globe Aërostatique” April 23, 1784
also responded positively to customer requirements for
reduced shop processing times, improved part reliability and from Versailles on 19 September 1783 The headquarters of Paris Police
more flexible support contracts."
The Suppliers which had shown the strongest
commitment and support for Airbus Industrie initiatives
were recognised at a special gala dinner with awards
presented by Bernard CATTEEUW to:
● DASA KID SYSTEMS
● DIEHL
● VIBROMETER
● SULLY PRODUITS SPÉCIAUX.
11-15 MAY 1998 IN KUALA-LUMPUR
Providing an opportunity for the operators, suppliers
and Airbus Industrie staff to discuss technical subjects of
common interest and share in-service experience.
FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 31
FAST22 p25 ˆ 31 11/03/98 22:36 Page 30
A319/A320/A321 TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM
8-12 DECEMBER 1997 IN SAN FRANCISCO
Over 430 representatives from 64
airlines, 46 vendors and Airbus Industrie
attended this conference.
This Symposium was hosted by
Roger LECOMTE, Vice President
Engineering and Technical Support and
chaired by Thierry HÉRAULT, Director
A320 Program from Airbus Customer
Services. From the 500 inputs received from the operators
prior to the Symposium, 60 subjects were retained for formal
presentations and discussion during the plenary sessions
and around 25 subjects were reviewed in side meetings.
In addition, written answers to remaining questions were
given in the documentation provided to each participants.
Several sessions were devoted to present the new
Airbus Technical Information System (ATIS) and Single
Point of Contact (SPOC) concept for on-line access.
These presentations were supported by true on-line
demonstration of on-line access to Service Bulletins and
Technical Follow-Up.
MATERIEL SUPPORT SYMPOSIUM
14-17 SEPTEMBER 1997 IN KUALA-LUMPUR
Over 400 delegates from 60 airlines,
98 suppliers, Airbus Industrie and its partners
gathered recently for the fourth Materiels
Symposium. The conference, which was the
largest and most successful of its kind, provided
an open forum for all parties involved in
the Airbus Industrie supply chain to discuss
a wide range of issues related to materiels
management, with an emphasis on the need
to achieve an effective balance between
cost-reduction and service.
Speaking at the conference, Peter KLOEPFER, Vice
President Material Support, announced that continued
cost-reduction at the industrial level, combined with improved
efficiency in administration and manufacturing processes,
would mean that average material cost expenditure for Airbus
Industrie proprietary parts in 1998 would once again remain
A330/A340 TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM
30
The First
Aviation
Regulation?
Following tradition at the opportunity of the opening
ceremony, Bernard CATTEEUW, Senior Vice President of
Airbus Customer Services, presented awards to A319, A320
and A321 operators for excellent achievements obtained by
some operators.
The awards for OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE was given to:
● AIR FRANCE for the A319.
● ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS for the A320.
● SWISSAIR for the A321.
"It shall be unlawful to
In addition SPECIAL RECOGNITION was given to:
● CANADA 3000 for the highest yearly utilisation in flight
hours achieved with the A320: around 4500 flight hours
manufacture and lift-off
per aircraft and per year.
● TRANSASIA AIRWAYS for the highest yearly utilisation in balloons and other aerostatic
flight cycles achieved with A321: more than 3300 flight
cycles per aircraft and per year.
● SKYSERVICE for the highest average flight time achieved
machines with heaters using
with an A320: 3.3 hours per flight.
All the latter demonstrates the very high versality of the A320 wine spirit, fire crackers and
family.
other flammable materials,
and orders that all other
aerostatic balloons may not
at 1991 levels. Peter KLOEPFER also praised the efforts of third
party suppliers in recent years to support Airbus Industrie's
take-off without
cost-reduction and service enhancement initiatives.
"Each year since 1995 a significant number of Airbus
First flight of
permission".
Industrie suppliers have applied zero escalation on their
prices," he said. "At the same time many of the suppliers have the “Globe Aërostatique” April 23, 1784
also responded positively to customer requirements for
reduced shop processing times, improved part reliability and from Versailles on 19 September 1783 The headquarters of Paris Police
more flexible support contracts."
The Suppliers which had shown the strongest
commitment and support for Airbus Industrie initiatives
were recognised at a special gala dinner with awards
presented by Bernard CATTEEUW to:
● DASA KID SYSTEMS
● DIEHL
● VIBROMETER
● SULLY PRODUITS SPÉCIAUX.
11-15 MAY 1998 IN KUALA-LUMPUR
Providing an opportunity for the operators, suppliers
and Airbus Industrie staff to discuss technical subjects of
common interest and share in-service experience.
FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 31
FAST22 p25 ˆ 31 11/03/98 22:39 Page 32

RESIDENT
CUSTOMER
SUPPORT
REPRESENTATION
Mohamed El-Boraï, Vice President Customer Support Services Division
Telephone: +33 (0)5 61 93 35 04 / Telefax: +33 (0)5 61 93 41 01
Jean-Paul Gayral, Resident Customer Representation Administration Director
Telephone: +33 (0)5 61 93 38 79 / Telefax: +33 (0)5 61 93 49 64
Airbus Industrie headquarters
1 rond-point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex France

LOCATION COUNTRY TELEPHONE TELEFAX LOCATION COUNTRY TELEPHONE TELEFAX

ABU DHABI United Arab Emirates 971 (2) 706 7702 971 (2) 757 097 MADRID Spain 34 (1) 329 1447 34 (1) 329 0708
AMMAN Jordan 962 (8) 51 284 962 (8) 51 195 MANCHESTER England 44 (161) 489 3155 44 (161) 489 3240
ATHENS Greece 30 (1)981 8581 30 (1) 983 2479 MANILA Philippines 63 (2) 831 5444 63 (2) 831 0834
BANGKOK Thailand 66 (2) 531 0076 66 (2) 531 1940 MAURITIUS Mauritius 230 637 8542 230 637 3882
BEIJING Peoples Republic of China 86 (10) 6457 2688 86 (10) 6457 0503 MEDELIN Columbia 57 (4) 5361027 57 (4) 5361024
BEIRUT Lebanon 961 (1) 601 300 961 (1) 601 200 MEMPHIS USA (Tennessee) 1 (001) 224 4842 1 (901) 224 5018
BOGOTA Columbia 57 (1) 414 8195/96 57 (1) 414 8094 MEXICO CITY Mexico 52 (5) 784 3874 52 (5) 785 5195
BOMBAY (MUMBAI) India 91 (22) 618 3273 91 (22) 611 3691 MELBOURNE Australia 61 (3) 9338 2038 61 (3) 9338 0281
BRUSSELS Belgium 32 2723 4824/25/26 32 2723 4823 MIAMI USA (Florida) 1 (305) 871 1441 1 (305) 871 2322
BUCHAREST Romania 40 (1) 312 6670 40 (1) 312 6670 MINNEAPOLIS USA (Minnesota) 1 (612) 726 0431 1 (612) 726 0414
BUENOS AIRES Argentina 54 (1) 480 9408 54 (1) 480 9408 MONTREAL Canada 1 (514) 422 6320 1 (514) 422 6310
CAIRO Egypt 20 (2) 418 3687 20 (2) 418 3707 MOSCOW Russia 7 (095) 753 8061 7 (095) 753 8006
CHENGDU Peoples Republic of China 86 (28) 570 3851 86 (28) 521 6511 MUSCAT Oman 968 521 286 968 521 286
CHICAGO USA (Illinois) 1 (773) 601 4602 1 (773) 601 2406 NAIROBI Kenya 254 (2) 822 763 254 (2) 822 763
COLOMBO Sri Lanka 94 73 2197 / 2199 94 (1) 253 893 NEW YORK USA (New York) 1 (718) 656 0700 1 (718) 656 8635
DAKAR Senegal 221 8201 615 221 8201 148 NUREMBERG Germany 49 (911) 365 6219 49 (911) 365 6218
DAKHA Bangladesh 880 (2) 896129 880 (2) 896130 PARIS (CDG) France 33 (0)1 48 62 08 82 / 87 33 (0)1 48 62 08 99
DELHI India 91 (11) 565 2033 91 (11) 565 2541 PARIS (ORY) France 33 (0)1 49 78 02 88 33 (0)1 49 78 01 85
DETROIT USA (Michigan) 1 (313) 247 5090 1 (313) 247 5087 PHOENIX USA (Arizona) 1 (602) 693 7445 1 (602) 693 7444
DUBAI United Arab Emirates 971 (4) 244806 971 (4) 244806 PUSAN South Korea 82 (51) 971 6977 82 (51) 971 4106
DUBLIN Ireland 353 (1) 705 2294 353 (1) 705 3803 ROME Italy 39 (6) 6501 0564 39 (6) 652 9077
DULUTH USA (Minnesota) 1 (218) 733 5077 1 (218) 733 5082 SAN’A Yemen 967 (1) 344 439 967 (1) 344 439
DUSSELDORF Germany 49 (211) 9418 687 Ext. 751 49 (211) 9418 035 SAN FRANCISCO USA (California) 1 (650) 6344375/76/79 1 (650) 6344378
FRANKFURT Germany 49 (69) 696 3947 49 (69) 696 4699 SAN JOSE Costa Rica 506 (4) 417 223 506 (4) 412 228
GUANGZHOU Peoples Republic of China 86 (20) 8612 8813 86 (20) 8612 8809 SAN SALVADOR El Salvador 503 3399335 503 3399627
GUAYAQUIL Ecuador 593 (9) 744 734 593 (4) 290 432 SAO PAULO Brasil 55 (11) 644 54 364 55 (11) 644 54 363
HANGHZOU Peoples Republic of China 86 (571) 514 5876 86 (571) 514 5916 SEOUL South Korea 82 (2) 665 4417 82 (2) 664 3219
HANOI Vietnam 84 (48) 731 613 84 (48) 731 612 SHANGHAI Peoples Republic of China 86 (21) 6268 4122 86 (21) 6268 6671
HO CHI MINH CITY Vietnam 84 (8) 84 57 602 84 (8) 84 46 419 SHANNON Ireland 353 (1) 705 2084 353 (1) 705 2085
HONG KONG Hong Kong 852 2747 8449 852 2352 5957 SHENYANG Peoples Republic of China 86 (24) 272 5177 86 (24) 272 5177
ISTANBUL Turkey 90 (212) 574 0907 90 (212) 573 5521 SINGAPORE Singapore 65 (5) 455 027 65 (5) 425 380
JAKARTA Indonesia 62 (21) 550 1993 62 (21) 550 1943 TAIPEI Taiwan 886 (3) 383 4410 886 (3) 383 4718
JEDDAH Saudi Arabia 966 (2) 684 2864 966 (2) 685 7712 TASHKENT Uzbekistan 7 (37) 1254 8552 7 (37) 1255 2878
JOHANNESBURG South Africa 27 (11) 978 3193 27 (11) 978 3190 TEHRAN Iran 98 (21) 603 5647 98 (21) 603 5647
KARACHI Pakistan 92 (21) 457 0604 92 (21) 457 0604 TOKYO (HND) Japan 81 (3) 5756 5081 81 (3) 5756 5084
KINGSTON Jamaica 1 (876) 924 8057 1 (876) 924 8154 81 (3) 5756 8770 81 (3) 5756 8772
KUALA LUMPUR Malaysia 60 (3) 746 7352 60 (3) 746 2230 TORONTO Canada 1 (905) 677 8874 1 (905) 677 1090
KUWAIT Kuwait 965 474 2193 965 434 2567 TULSA USA (Oklahoma) 1 (918) 292 3227 1 (918) 292 2581
LARNACA Cyprus 357 (4) 643 181 357 (4) 643 185 TUNIS Tunisia 216 (1) 750 639 216 (1) 750 855
LISBON Portugal 351 (1) 840 7032 351 (1) 847 4444 VANCOUVER Canada 1 (604) 276 3776 1 (604) 276 3548
LONDON (LHR) England 44 (181) 751 5431 44 (181) 751 2844 VIENNA Austria 43 (1) 7007 3688 43 (1) 7007 3235
LOS ANGELES USA (California) 1 (310) 342 8504 1 (310) 578 9072 WINNIPEG Canada 1 (204) 985 5908 1 (204) 837 2489
LUTON England 44 (1582) 39 8706 44 (1582) 70 6173 XIAN Peoples Republic of China 86 (29) 870 7651 86 (29) 870 7255
MACAO Macao 853 898 4023 853 898 4024 ZURICH Switzerland 41 (1) 812 7727 41 (1) 810 2383

32 FAST / NUMBER 22 FAST / NUMBER 22 33

Cover FAST 11/03/98 21:55 Page 1

AIRBUS
TECHNICAL

1998
DIGEST

NUMBER 22

SPARES COSTS
MARCH 1998

STILL AT
1991 LEVELS.
Airbus Industrie’s improved production technology has helped

to reduce the proprietary spares expenses for Airbus

operators every year since 1994 to average 1991 levels.

So you can keep your Airbus aircraft in the air and

your operating costs firmly on the ground.

SETTING THE STANDARDS

http://www.airbus.com/
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE