● ​Origins of tension, including:

– Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on the 1948 Arab–Israeli War

- State of Israel declared May 14th, 1948
- Immediately afterwards, forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon attacked
Israel.
- Zionists still maintained the overriding Jewish perspective at the time: that the Arab
forces were united in their determination to destroy the new Jewish state and cast the
Jews into the sea.
- However, although the military experts of the Arab League had worked out a unified
plan for the invasion, King Abdullah – who was given nominal command of all the
forces – wrecked the plan by making last-minute changes.
- King Abdullah’s objective was not to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state but
to make himself master of the Arab part of Palestine. Indeed, King Abdullah did
attempt to engage in secret ‘negotiations’ with Israel to facilitate this.
- All of the Arab states were moved by dynastic and/or national interests, hidden

t
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behind the guise of securing Palestine for the Palestinians.
- The inability of the Arabs to coordinate their diplomatic and military plans was in no
m
small measure responsible for the disaster that overwhelmed them. Israel’s leaders
cu
knew of these divisions and exploited them at the official outbreak of hostilities.
- It has always been assumed that the Arabs enjoyed overwhelming superiority.
Do

However, the Israel Defence Force significantly outnumbered all the Arab forces
arrayed against it by almost 2:1.
p

- The IDF initially had inferior military hardware at their disposal, however the first truce
wa

brought illicit arms supplies from Czechoslovakia which decisively tipped the scales
in their favour.
ks

- Revisionist historian Efraim Karsh​, ‘The final outcome of the war was not a
miracle, but a reflection of the underlying Arab-Israeli military balance’.
in

- Israel negotiated bilaterally with its neighbouring Arab states, beginning with Egypt,
Th

and concluded a separate armistice agreements with each of them.

- The first Arab-Israeli war was officially over by July 20, 1949 when the last armistice
agreement was signed between Israel and Syria.
- Israel expanded its territory from 55% allocated by the UN to 79%
- Israel expelled all the Arab forces from Palestine
- Palestine was erased from the map.
- Palestinian historian Edward​ ​Said​, ‘Palestinians were left out in the cold’. 

– consequences of the war for Israel and the Palestinians to 1967

- Israel was economically exhausted, but had superior organisation and morale, a
tremendous sense of achievement and a confident outlook on the future.
- The victory showed the advantages of direct action over negotiation and diplomacy,
and seemed the only direction that could possibly be taken from then on.
- However, peace was elusive in the region.
- Traditional Zionists: Martin Gilbert​ say this was due to ‘Arab intransigence’.
- Revisionist historians: ​post-war Israel was far more intransigent than the Arab
states and bears a larger share of responsibility for the political deadlock that
followed the hostilities.
- Avi Shlaim:​ ‘the real question facing Israel at that critical point in its history, should
not have been whether peace with its Arab neighbours was possible, but at what
price’.
- 750,000 Palestinian refugees had fled from, or been forced out of, Palestine, and
were living in bleak refugee camps along the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and in
various neighbouring states, such as Lebanon.
- Palestinians in Jordan were allowed to become citizens of Jordan. Many joined the 
army, civil service, others entered business or professions. In Syria Palestinians 
could join the army or civil service. In Lebanon they fared the best. In Beirut 
Palestinians were successful in banking and the freedom of speech they enjoyed 
made the city the intellectual capital of the region.
- 385 towns were taken over and large parts of 95 other towns
- ¼ of all buildings were taken by Israelis (over 200,000 homes and businesses)

t
- Palestinians were in a far worse position than they would have been had they

en
accepted UN Resolution 242.
- m
Skilled Palestinian workers went to the major Arab cities – some gained citizenship
(in Jordan), education and entry to the army/civil service (in Lebanon), while others
cu
had no rights at all
Do

- Most refugees went to UNRWA camps, which had little sanitation or medical facilities.
- Pan-Arab position: Israel alone had created the refugee problem and must not be
allowed to evade its responsibility to solve this problem
p
wa

- Israeli position: Arabs created refugee problem because they started the war in the
first place and Israel was not responsible in any way.
ks

- Israel did not accept the UN resolutions which gave refugees the right of return
and/or compensation.
in

- Palestinian views as to why no Palestinian state emerged:

Th

- the US supported Israel and prevented Palestine emerging

- British hostility and duplicity destroyed Arab leadership, enabling Zionists to
take over and expel Arabs
- Israeli views as to why no Palestinian state emerged:
- Arab state did emerge as an expanded Jordan
- No Palestinian state should exist west of the Jordanian River because ‘Jordan
is Palestine’
- Various plans were proposed within Israel for a separate Palestinian government.
Ben-Gurion actively discouraged political planning of any kind and sought to solve
most problems by military means, pressing Israel’s military advantage.
- Avi Shlaim:​ ‘As a result, Israel’s Arabs felt increasingly marginalised and frustrated’.
- Schlaim:​ “Israel emerged from the war economically exhausted but with superior 
organisation and morale, a tremendous sense of achievement, and a confident 
outlook on the future that formed a solid foundation for the development of 
parliamentary democracy.” 
- No Palestinian Arab state had emerged after 1949 
- Palestinian historians assert this was because Israel, supported by Western powers, 
prevented it. They claim that the British destroyed local Arab leadership through 
 hostility and duplicity to the Arabs and complicity with the Zionists, therefore 
enabling the Zionists to expel the Palestinians from their own country. 
- Israeli historians argue that an Arab state did emerge in the area allocated by the UN 
General Assembly. It was, they say, an expanded Jordan: ‘Jordan is Palestine’. This 
argument goes back to the borders of the British mandate before 1922 when 
Transjordan was separated from the original Palestine mandate as an area in which 
Jewish land sales and settlement were prohibited 
- David Gilmour​ sums over 1948 civil war "not only did it solve none of the basic 
issues of the Palestinian question; it created new and grave ones." 
- In 1958 Arafat created Fatah, which increased guerrilla raids against Israel.
– political and social issues in Arab–Israeli relations in 1967
Political:
- Refusal of Arabs to recognise Israel
- Refusal of Israelis to recognise Palestine
- No solution to the refugee problem (Israel refused to acknowledge the rights of
Arabs)

t
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- US support for Israel
- Israel’s extreme retaliatory strikes over small guerrilla raids
- Rise of Pan-Arab nationalism m
cu
- Great divide over Suez crisis
Social:
Do

- no equal rights for Arabs in Israel due to limited living space, few education
opportunities and stunted economy.
p

- Tension between Zionists and Arabs due to the ‘siege mentality’ and fear of
wa

‘subversive fifth column’

- No solution to the refugee problem
ks

Palestinian refugees -
Palestinain refugees were left throughout surrounding nations, with Israel preventing their
in

return. Israel claims these refugees left of their own behalf, negating Israel’s moral
Th

responsibility. Palestinians claim they fled for their lives. The Arab states too failed to assist
refugees, as their ongoing plight was a useful political tool. Many refugees found themselves
in camps where the UN Relief and Works Agency provided care and education. These
camps were horrid places, but improved marginally into the 1950’s through the UNRWA. In
these camps many Palestinians become well educated, feeling the injustice of their
dislocation, a combination that would lead to a highly politicised population. It is alleged that
had 100 000 refugees been allowed to return to the homes that the Arab states would’ve
recognised Israel.
- In 1949 Israel proposed absorbing Gaza and its citizens into Israel as a solution to
the problem, the acquisition of territory was opposed by Arab states.

Nation-Building -
After 1948 there was a time of nation building for Israel. They are faced with a degraded
environment with limited water supplies. The Jews attempt to rehabilitate, and cite the Arabs
lack of cultivation in contrast to this as evidence of their claim to the land. Israel moved all
government departments to Jerusalem; strengthening their hold on it as part of Israel.
Compulsory universal education was introduced. Conscription was introduced for all Jews
 for 2 years, and was compulsory in order to become a full citizen. It also served to try and
institute a sense of unity. The Law of Return passed in June 1950 gives all Jews the right to
migrate to Israel and settle permanently. However, some economic hardship led to less
immigration to the Jewish state.

Terrorism -
In 1953 Israel made a massive reprisal attack which killed over 65 people for a Jordanian
terrorist attack that killed 3. Towards 1956 Israel tried to provoke Jordan, but Jordan wished
to maintain peace and was reluctant in its support of Palestinians. It hoped that territory
would be divided between Israel and Jordan, and didn’t want a Palestinian state. However,
most Arab states backed the creation of a Palestinian State.
​
The Muslim Brotherhood​ was established in 1928, and by 1946 had a million members in
Egypt. There were vehement attacks on the secularist movement, it believed in Islamic law
and opposed Arab nationalism. Despite supporting the 1952 revolution, it turned to oppose
Nasser.

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● ​War and peace:
m
– causes, course and consequences of the 1967 (Six Day) War
cu
- Shlaim:​ “The Six Day War was a defensive war. It was launched by Israel to
safeguard its territory, not to expand its territory”. Shlaim argues that political and the
Do

government did not define territorial objectives when it gave the IDF the order to
strike and that the war aims emerged only in the course of the fighting in a “confused
p

and disorderly fashion”.

wa

- Michael Breacher claims Israeli foreign policy was dictated by a ‘Holocaust

syndrome’.
ks

- Israeli Military leader General Yitzhak Rabin, a few months after the war, was quoted:
“I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into the Sinai on
in

May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew
Th

it and we knew it”. This suggests that the Arabs were not presenting a significant
threat to Israel. This argument is supported by the fact that the American
administration and the Israeli govt were aware that, at the end of May at least,
Nasser did not intend to attack Israel.
Causes:
- Although the Arabs had lost the 1956 war, Nasser emerged as the symbol of
pan-Arabism against imperialism, colonialism and Zionism. Nasser’s popularity
coincided with the rise of the Ba’ath Party in Syria in the 1950s, who also desired a
more cohesive Arab world. The Syria-Egypt union in 1958 led to the creation of the
United Arab Republic and Arabs and Palestinians benefited from the Pan-Arabism.
However, the union didn’t last long and by the end of 1961, a successful coup
arranged by a group of Syrian officers proclaimed the separation of Syria from Egypt.
At the same time, Fedayeen groups with greater support from Egypt, continued to
attack Israel, provoking violence and harsh retaliation.
- Nasser pursued a cautious policy in relation to Israel as tension between
Syria/Jordan and Israel increased to an alarming level. When Yemen’s royalist
government was overthrown in 1962, Nasser intervened to support the new
 republican governments. Not only did this increase Arab-Israeli tensions, it also put
massive strain on Egypt’s financial and military resources. As a result, Nasser
resorted to a high-risk gamble to regain prestige in the Arab world and gain economic
assistance from the US, who had become increasingly sympathetic to Israel, refused
aid to Egypt.
- A defence pact between Egypt and Syria was signed in 1966 and the Soviet Union
warned Egypt of an Israeli invasion into Syria. In 1967, Israeli jets shot down 6 Syrian
jets over Syrian airspace and Syria asked Egypt for assistance. The Egyptian army
was mobilised and Nasser was confident that he could use this situation to increase
the profile of the Arabs on the international scene. At this point in time, Israel did not
believe that war was imminent and thought Nasser’s actions were simply scare
tactics.
- On May 18, Nasser asked the UN Secretary General to withdraw UN troops in the
Sinai. On 22 May, Nasser moved his troops to Sharm, effectively blocking the Gulf to
Israeli shipping. Israel’s credibility, access to trade routes and ability of self-defence
was then being tested. As Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for aid, Israeli PM turns

t
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to Washington. On 30 May, King Hussein flew to Egypt and a defence pact was
signed which allowed Iraqi troops to enter Jordan and placing Jordanian troops under
m
Egyptian military authority. Facing Arab armies on multiple fronts and with the
cu
election of a new Minister for Defence, Israel attacked on the 5 June.
Course:
Do

- Israel attacked on June 5 by sending 180 aircraft to Egypt, leaving only 8 to defend
Israel. They approached Egypt from an unexpected direction, and warnings from
p

Syria barely got through as the codes had changed so Egypt had trouble
wa

understanding the message.

- On just the first day, Israel had struck multiple points in Egypt, destroying the
ks

Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian armies.

in

- Israel started by destroying runways to prevent the Egyptian planes from getting off
the ground, and those that did manage to fly were no match for the Israeli air force.
Th

- The Egyptians faced a series of mishaps, despite the fact that they had 3 times as
many tanks as Israel without air cover they were in big trouble.
- Jordan responded by shelling Jerusalem, which resulted in a determination to wipe
out the Jordanians.
- Israel then took the West Bank.
- The following day they captured Gaza and the Sinai
- They then decide to attack the Golan Heights which brings the US into the war. They
decide to disguise their planes and attack in stealth.
- The US tells the Kremlin that they are doing everything they can to stop the war,
which is a lie, they never actually contact Israel directly. They then move their fleet
closer which lets the Soviet’s know that they’re willing to get involved.
- A cease fire is then declared after 6 days.
Consequences:
- The 1967 war settled nothing, it only increased the refugee situation, created the
Occupied Territory problem and increased Arab resentment.
- At the war’s end, Israel had captured in addition to eastern Jerusalem, the Sinai
Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Israelis -
- Massive success
- Arabs lost 15,000 men, the Israelis lost 777. 70,000 sq km of land had been gained,
land quadrupled
- The Occupied Territories introduced a new problem. ​Schlaim:​ “The question was
what to do with these territories, and to this question there was no simple answer.”
- The extra labour also created an economic boom. On the other hand, some believed
that if land were trading for peace with Arab neighbours, then giving up the WB would
be worth it.
- The territories were also important for the Sephardic Jews who migrated from Arab
states because it gave them more importance.
- For years, Israel would be hounded by the UN Resolution 242 which called for a
return to pre-1967 borders
- Israel says that in exchange for peace it is willing to give back the Golan Heights to
Syria and the Sinai to Egypt, but they wanted to hold on to Jerusalem and the West
Bank because they are part of Israel.

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- Egypt rejected this proposal as it indirectly implied Israel’s right to exist.
- In the late 1980s Israel would have to cope with the Intifada
Palestinians - m
cu
- Increased Palestinian nationalism, as it was clear that the other Arab states could not
be relied on to guarantee Palestinian self-determination. After the 1967 war, 40% of
Do

Palestinians lived under Israeli control

- Walker and Gowers:​ “After the Six-Day War, it was obvious that the PLO was
p

discredited in the eyes of the masses as the Arab regimes that and supported its
wa

foundation in 1964.”
- PLO therefore took an increasingly radical stance and violence in the region
ks

escalated.
in

- Palestinians in the Occupied territories had very few rights

Arabs -
Th

- Arab hostility was further increased towards Israel, but it also marked the end of the
Pan-Arab dream
- Arab leaders met in 1967 and passed the ‘three noes resolution’: no negotiation with
Israel, no recognition of Israel and no peace with Israel
- Arab defeat allowed the Soviets to entrench itself in the region by quickly offering to
re-equip Egypt. The Sovietsdid not encourage negotiation as this would decrease
their influence in the region
The UN Resolution 242 -
- A foreign diplomatic solution, calling for peace in return for territory, return of
occupied territories, recognition of state sovereignty.
- The two sides interpreted the document very differently.
- All the Arab states bar Syria accepted it as this was an implicit acknowledgement of
Israel’s existence
- The most significant issue is the lack of direct referral to Palestinian people, except a
provision that there should be a solution to the ‘refugee problem’
- The PLO completely ignored it until 1988, when they began to acknowledge it as a
peace basis
 - It has been argued that UN Resolution 242 did not specify when referring to
‘returning occupied territories’ to allow Israel to acquire more defensible territory
- Israel ignored it and it ends up just becoming a complicating factor both in the peace
process and in relation to America’s relations
- UN Resolution 242 made it even clear to the Palestinians that they would have to rely
on their own efforts if they wished to achieve a Palestinian state.
The growth of Palestinian nationalism -
The Six Day War triggered a rise in Palestinian nationalism and reawakened the Palestinian
issue. Over 40% of Palestinians now lived under Israeli rule. Palestinian nationalism grew
into an authentic manifestation of the desire of Palestinians for self-determination. They now
turned away from a dependence on Arab and foreign governments, convinced that the
liberation of Palestine lay in their own hands. Their nationalistic aspirations, now fostered by
a reorganised PLO, gained world recognition.
International Relations -
Many Arab states severed diplomatic ties with the US and American relations in general
deteriorated with the Arabs. The Arabs blamed the US for their humiliating defeat, believing

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that the Israelis are incapable of defeating the Arabs on their own. The US and Israel forged
a symbiotic strategic relationship. The US became the guarantee of Israel’s survival and a
m
strong Israel was increasingly seen in the US as a strategic ally. The Arabs felt the only way
cu
to respond to the 1967 defeat was with defiance through the three no’s: no peace, no
recognition and no negotiation.
Do

– creation, aims, methods and role of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 1964–1974
p

Creation:
wa

- The PLO was created on the initiative of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser at the
Cairo Summit meeting in 1964 at which the Arab League decided to sponsor the
ks

formation of an organisation with the aim of ‘organising the Palestinian people to

enable them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining their
in

destiny’.
Th

- Nasser:​ “The Palestinian Entity must be preserved because the extermination of the
entity would mean the elimination of the Palestinian problem forever”.
- Nasser wanted the PLO to take control of the fedayeen groups that had formed after
the 1948 war. He feared they would drag Egypt into another war with Israel.
- After 1967, The PLO became an umbrella organization for various other factions.
They included The PFLP, The PDFLP, and The Arab Liberation Front and many
others.
- These organisations became known for their radical actions and terrorist activities.
- It was to be financed by contributions from Arab states and taxes levied from the
Palestinians themselves.
Aims:
- The PLO was an army of refugees whose aim was ‘organising the Palestinian people
to enable them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining
their destiny’
- To liberate Palestine from its Zionist colonial oppressors, using the method of ‘armed
struggle’.
- To create an independent Palestinian state.
 - Official objectives as outlined by their covenant were to: remove Zionism from
Palestine, commit itself to an armed struggle and reject the historical events from
1918 to 1964
Methods:
Arafat Takes Control of the PLO:
- In 1969, Arafat won a power struggle within the PLO and emerged as the Chairman.
Arafat’s aims were to remove the influence of the Arab states from the PLO and unite
the various Palestinian factions.
- The PLO now controls the Fatah
- Arafat stresses armed struggle over standing armies
- He also places great emphasis on Palestinian nationalism over the holistic term Arab
- Israel began reprisal attacks against Jordan after PLO steps up violence against
Jews
- Arafat tried to transform the PLO into a powerful independent organization
representing the Palestinian people.

t
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- According to the Palestinian Charter of 1968, “armed struggle is the only way to liberate
Palestine”.
- m
there is controversy over the methods used by the PLO and its many factions and when and
cu
where ‘armed struggle’ became ‘terrorism’ and whether the latter is an appropriate method for
achieving political aims.
Do

- Many scholars argue that the PLO masterminded some of history's worst atrocities as they
attempted to use terrorism to destroy Israel when it became clear that conventional wars were
not going to achieve that goal.
p

- From its new base in Lebanon, various groups within the PLO used international terrorist
wa

activities to create publicity for the Palestinian cause. These included attacks on Israelis inside
and outside of their country to try to undermine Israeli morale and influence Israeli government
ks

policy.
- Notable attacks:
in

- ‘Black September’ where radicals assassinated the Jordanian PM Wafsi Tal in Cairo in
Th

November 1971
- The Munich Massacre, where 8 ‘Black September’ commandos took 11 Israeli athletes
hostage at the 1972 Olympics.
- There is considerable historical debate over whether the PLO were responsible for these
terrorist activities or not, but they didn’t condemn or renounce these terrorist activities either.
- Palestinian historian ​Sayigh​ claims that the major challenge facing the PLO leadership during
this time was to maintain national unity among disparate factions and scattered communities.
- Israel and its supporters has consistently maintained that the PLO is little more than a terrorist
organisation led by arch-terrorist Arafat;
- Mainstream Palestinian groups and their supporters say that Palestinians did not favour
extra-Israeli terrorist activities, preferring to limit themselves to targets in ‘occupied
Palestine’.

Important achievements:
- In 1974 at the Rabat Conference, the PLO was officially recognized as the ‘sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people’. Arafat was invited to address the UN General
Assembly and received a standing ovation. This conference resulted in a diplomatic triumph for
the PLO, which avenged the defeat of Black September in 1970. The UN subsequently granted
the PLO observer status.
Change in strategy:
- In 1974, the PLO adopted a new strategy, the ‘strategy of stages’ that stated that a Palestinian
state should be established in any area of land that might be evacuated by Israel in return for a
peace settlement.

Role:
- There is much historical debate over whether or not the PLO was effective in
achieving its aims.
- In the period 1964 – 1974, the PLO did not achieve any of its aims laid out in the
covenant except to continue armed struggle against Israel.
- Edwards and Hinchclife​: ‘Palestinians became synonymous with terrorism the world
over’
- Sayigh​ suggests that armed struggle provided the political impulse and
organisational dynamic in the evolution of Palestinian national identity and mobilized
Palestinians and provided them with political legitimacy. It also provided the impetus

t
for Palestinians to become politically independent of the Arab states and helped

en
create institutions that could form the basis of a government.
- Pro-Zionist Historian Daniel Pipes ​claims that while Arab rulers make the PLO rich
m
and prominent, they also prevent it from becoming a representative body, an effective
cu
one, or a decent one. Pipes also claims that the Palestinians themselves hated the
Do

PLO.
– causes, course and consequences of the 1973 (Yom Kippur) War, including the Camp David
Treaty
p

Causes:
wa

In March 1969, after continued clashes between Israel, Jordan and Egypt, Nasser’s desire to
reclaim the Sinai and reopen the Suez Canal led him to declare a ‘War of Attrition’. He
ks

wanted to force Israel to withdraw. After prolonged artillery attacks by both sides, in August
in

1970, an American-inspired ceasefire was agreed to. It led to increased American military
support for Israel but in an attempt to lessen Cold War rivalry, the Soviets supplied fewer
Th

arms to the Arab states than previously. When Nasser died in 1970, he was succeeded by
Sadat, who was equally determined to regain Egypt’s lost territory.

In 1971, Sadat proposed opening the Suez Canal if Israel withdrew to the Mitla and Gidi
passes but PM Meir rejected their offer. Sadat, desperate to restore Egypt’s economy,
sought the support of the new Syrian leader, al-Assad and together they secretly began
planning to attack Israel. Neither leader believed that they could defeat Israel, but hoped to
gain some territory in the Sinai and Golan Heights and then negotiate the return of more
territory in return for peace.

Course:
On 6 September 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a combine, surprise military attack on
Israeli territory, including their positions on the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Israel,
believing it was invulnerable was caught by the surprise attack. The Egyptians advanced
across the Sinai on 6 October 1973 before being stopped by an Israeli counter attack. Syria
almost succeeded in recapturing Golan Heights before being stopped in a major tank battle.
The US and USSR played a pivotal role in rearming their respective ‘clients’. On 11 October,
the Soviets began an airlift to rearm Egypt and Syria. On 14 October, the US did the same
for Israel. A Soviet-American ceasefire was accepted on 24 October 1973.

Consequences:
Israel -
- Although Israel was the ultimate victor and had been left with various military
advantages, Israel’s confidence had been shaken. Israeli politics were deeply
affected, the Labour government was weakened the leaders lost their reputations. By
1977, a Likud coalition government was elected. Israel became more dependent on
the US and realised that their ‘defensible borders’ were not as secure as they had
believed. The US now saw Israel as sufficiently strong to be a strategic asset rather
than a liability.
Arabs -
- Many more Egyptians and Syrians were killed and wounded than Israel, however,
although the Arabs lost their war military, they won it diplomatically. World attention
now focussed more heavily on the conflict and they adopted the Yamani Plan, which

t
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proposed that Arab oil producers would not send oil to pro-Israeli countries. Oil prices
increased by 400% and it had an enormous economic impact on Europe and the US.
Palestinians - m
cu
- At the Rabat Conference, in 1974, the Arab League recognised the PLO as “the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”. It acknowledged that the
Do

Palestinians had a right to what Jordan had physically lost in 1967 and forced the
Israelis to cope with the idea that they would now have to face the PLO and not
p

Hussein. They could no longer make the claim that “Jordan is Palestine”.
wa

Camp David Accords in 1978 -

- The Camp David Accords, agreements between Israel and Egypt was signed in
ks

September 1978, which led to a peace treaty signing between them.

in

- Agreements - A framework for the conclusion of peace treaty between Egypt and
Israel and A broader framework for achieving peace in the Middle East.
Th

- It called for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and
the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in stages, to be completed within three
years.
- Called for a five-year transitional period of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and
Gaza. This transitional period would include the introduction of Palestinian
self-government.
- Called for an end to Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
- In the treaty, a formal peace was to be established, a definite border between the two
states was to be created, and there would be the beginnings of diplomatic and
economic interaction between the two states.
- In exchange Israel would begin a phased withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula,
returning control of this land to Egypt. Finally, both Israel and Egypt gained greatly in
terms of diplomatic, economic, and military support from the United States
- Arabs - Regarded Sadat as a traitor; Hindered the achievement of a comprehensive
peace settlement as it radicalised Arab opinion and was seen as a separate peace,
PLO rejected the accords because they did not specifically call for a fully
independent Palestinian state.
 - The Camp David Treaty did not provide a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli
Conflict. In July 1980, the Israeli Knesset passed a ‘fundamental’ law proclaiming
Jerusalem as the permanent capital of Israel, and at the end of 1981 Israel annexed
the Golan Heights, conquered from Syria in 1967.

– role and objectives of the superpowers in relation to events in the Middle East
Role:
1948 War -
- The USSR and The Soviet Union offered diplomatic recognition to the new state of
Israel.
- This decision was based on the desire of both countries to develop strategic interests
in the Middle East.
- The US based their decision to support Israel on their “containment” policy, aimed at
creating boundaries around the Soviet Union in Europe and the Middle East.
- However, the role of the superpowers in the 1948 war was limited. Both the US and
USSR refused to supply arms, and both sides brokered for a “fair” peace. The

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Arab-Israeli conflict remained, at this point, a localised dispute.
1956 Suez War -
m
- The Suez War of 1956 was a watershed in the Arab-Israel conflict in that it marked
cu
the beginning of the internationalisation of the conflict: the role of the superpowers in
the Middle East had begun.
Do

- Israel, Britain and France had launched an attack on Egypt, and the UN, crippled with
vetoes, had virtually stopped functioning.
p

- It was the US and USSR who ultimately tipped the scales and attained a cease-fire.
wa

- The USSR threatened to use ‘every kind of modern destructive weapon’ to stop the
violence, while US President Eisenhower threatened to withdraw support for a $1
ks

billion loan to the British from the International Monetary Fund.

- The US also threatened Israel with discontinued American assistance, UN sanctions
in

and expulsion from the UN if it did not withdraw from the Sinai.
Th

- Israel learnt an important lesson that without US approval they would be forced to
return territory. As said by ​K. Aburish​ has written, the Suez War “was the beginning
of the American era in the Middle East”.
Post 1956 -
- The USSR was determined to play a more active role in an area it regarded as
strategically important in protecting its southern borders, while the US aimed to
prevent the USSR from increasing its influence in the region.
- Nasser turned to the USSR for support, while the US became Israel’s major backer.
Beginning in the early 1960s, Israel and the Arab states entered into an arms race,
purchasing their missiles, planes and tanks from the US and USSR respectively.
- However, neither power was prepared to intervene directly or risk engaging the other
militarily.
The Six-Day War -
- The Palestinian and Arab perspective of the reasons for the outbreak of war, as well
as that of many post-Zionist historians, is that the war was a pre-mediated attack in
which the US played a major role.
 - These historians argue that the Israeli government was involved in secret
negotiations with the US prior to 5 June. Revisionist historian Cheryl Rubenberg
argues that US involvement was so extensive, in fact, that “Washington risked a
conflagration with the Soviet Union, including the potential of escalation to nuclear
confrontation”.
- This view is supported by the fact that American administration and the Israeli
government were aware that, at the end of May at least, Nasser did not intend to
attack Israel.
- However, other historians such as Shlaim argue that such claims are unfounded, and
Israeli historian Ellie Podeh adds that they are “based on the shame of defeat”.
- Regardless of the role played by the US and USSR prior to the outbreak of war, the
role of the superpowers during the war itself was extensive.
- Most historians have accepted that, in May 1967, the USSR informed Syria and
Egypt that Israel was planning to invade Syria.
- On 10 June, the USSR sent a message to US President Johnson threatening military
action if Israel did not refrain from entering Syria. Johnson signalled that the US was

t
en
prepared to meet any USSR challenge. The US secretly supplied Israel with arms
and aerial reconnaissance assistance, which proved to be a key factor in Israel’s
victory. m
cu
- As Stephen Green writes, “the US tactical reconnaissance assistance was not only
important it was critical”.
Do

Following 1967 -
- The Soviet Union responded to the shameful Arab defeat in two ways. Firstly, on 10
p

June, Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Israel, a move followed by nearly all
wa

Eastern bloc countries.

- Secondly, Soviet influence in Arab nations escalated: its arms supplies to Egypt and
ks

Syria were boosted and it became heavily involved in the training of the PLO.
in

- As Israeli historian Itamar Rabinovich notes: “The Soviet Union may not have had a
colonial past in the Arab world, but it was fast acquiring a colonial present”. As a
Th

result of Soviet involvement, the Arabs had largely regained power by 1969.
- While many Arab states severed ties with the US following 1967, blaming America for
their humiliating defeat, the Six Day War forged a symbiotic relationship between the
US and Israel that has lasted to this day.
- For the first time, the US viewed Israel as a geo-strategic asset rather than a liability:
according to Benny Morris, Israel had proven itself “a desirable ally among a bevy of
fickle, weak Arab states”.
- Israel, in turn, became dependent on the US for economic and military assistance.
This was highlighted in Black September, during which President Nixon sent heavy
military backing to ‘encourage’ the Soviets to stay out of the crisis, leading to the
PLO’s expulsion from Jordan. Military backing sent to Israel included two aircraft
carrier task forces with 14 destroyers, a cruiser, 140 aircraft and 1200 marines.
The Yom Kippur War -
- The superpowers played a direct role in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
- The Soviets played a pivotal role in rearming their Arab ‘clients’, forcing the US to
step up its supply transfers to Israel to maintain the regional balance of power. On 14
November, the US began a massive airlift, worth around $3.5 billion, to rearm Israel.
 - Washington’s effective response during the Yom Kippur War helped ensure Israeli
victory. The US saw Israel as stronger than ever, and as a result of American military
assistance, Israel’s military power doubled over the next three years.
- In fact, America has donated more foreign aid to Israel than any other country,
averaging $3 billion per annum since the 1980s. Of this, almost 40% has been
directed towards military aid.
- Post-Zionist historian Edward Said​ claims the single biggest reason for these large
quantities of aid provided to Israel is American fears of Russian control over the oil
reserves in the area.
During the 1980s -
- US support for Israel continued. Israel was given increased access to US military
technology, and American aid was increased and converted to outright grants. The
US tried to weaken the Soviet-backed regime in Syria and Iraq and what it saw as the
Soviet-dominated PLO.
- The USSR, however, did not play a significant role in the Arab-Israel conflict during
most of the 1980s, as it was preoccupied with internal economic problems and the

t
en
invasion of Afghanistan, which ended in chaos.
- It was humiliated by Syria’s inability (using Russian arms) to contain Israel in
m
Lebanon, and frustrated by the failure to protect the Palestinians in Lebanon.
cu
Israeli invasion of Lebanon -
- The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was significant because it marked a shift in US-Israeli
Do

relations. The brutal massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps, generated an

upsurge of sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause, while Israel was the
p

focus of heated international criticism, even from the US.

wa

- Far from reducing international pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied
territories, the war triggered a shift in American policy from acceptance of autonomy
ks

for the Palestinians in accordance with the Camp David Accords to the Reagan plan.
in

- The Reagan Plan, proposed in September 1982, called for Israeli withdrawal from the
West Bank and Gaza to make way for a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank
Th

under the rule of Jordan’s King Hussein. Both sides rejected the plan. However, the
implications of 1982 were that the US came to play a more objective role in the
Middle East crisis, which set the stage for more successful peace negotiations.
The Peace Process -
- With the gradual fading of Russian involvement in the conflict, the US began to see
itself as a ‘peace broker’ in the Middle East and moved towards formulating a lasting
peace in the region. However, America’s history of support for Israel led to Arab and
Palestinian fears that the US would continue to forge a pro-Israel policy even though
it was no longer needed in the fight against the USSR.
- Revisionist historian Edward Said claims that without the presence of the USSR in
the peace process, Arab states lost much of their power within these negotiations, as
they had no superpower to support their demands. He writes that the peace
agreements so far reflect inequality and are weighed heavily in favour of the Israelis.
- Post-Zionist historian Ilan Pappe supports this view. He argues that American
involvement has been the key reason for the failure of the peace process. He asserts
that American mediators have adopted an Israel point of view, which is that the
 conflict had begun in 1967, not 1948, and Arab leaders have thus been asked to
forsake the issue of the right of return of refugees.
- The US has consistently opposed any UN Resolutions defying Israeli interests, even
when Israel is found guilty of Human Rights violations. The US has vetoed 32 UN
Resolutions against Israel since 1972, including the resolution condemning Israel for
massacring over 100 Lebanese civilians at the UN compound in Qana: as Chomsky
argues, all record of Israeli terrorism has effectively been ignored in the US. This
unconditional US support of Israel has been a key factor in the failure of the peace
process.
Camp David Accords -
- The US played a pivotal role in the formation of the Camp David Accords, signed on
17 September 1978. Both Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin
recognized the importance of future relations with the US.
- It was concern for this relationship that led Sadat to announce his willingness to
discuss peace and led Begin to reluctantly agree to the concessions that produced
the peace settlement. Both sides received massive American economic and military

t
en
aid as part of separate agreements accompanying the Accords, Israel receiving $3
billion and Egypt receiving $2 billion.
m
- However, while the West hailed the Accords as a watershed, most Arab states and
cu
the Palestinians denounced them, and it soon became evident that no
comprehensive solution to the conflict had emerged.
Do

​Historical debate -
- The role of the US in the Arab-Israel conflict has been a topic of much historical
p

debate. One school of thought holds that Israel controls the relationship and has
wa

manipulated US foreign policy through intensive lobbying efforts, such as by the

AIPAC.
ks

- During WWII, the American Jewish community developed the collective

in

self-confidence and began to exert the political influence enabled by its numbers,
wealth and ability.
Th

- Journalist Eric Alterman​ writes, “Without a doubt, AIPAC is the most powerful
ethnic lobby to emerge in recent American history”. However, ​Chomsky​ and ​Said​ do
not accept this argument, instead arguing that the relationship is driven by America,
as it helps ensure America’s best defence against Soviet attacks and influence.
- More recently, Israel serves as America’s agent in the struggle against Islamic
extremism. Pro-Israeli lobbies in the US would not have the same degree of influence
in policy formation, had it not been for Israel’s perceived geopolitical role as a
strategic asset.

Objectives:
- The Middle East was important to the superpowers for a number of reasons:
- An extension of the cold war theatre, oil and its strategic position on the map.
- The Arab-Israeli conflict became part of the Cold War as both the US and the USSR
tried to increase their influence at the expense of the other. Israeli and Arabs became
proxies used by the superpowers in their wider struggle. Neither were prepared to
engage in direct conflict.
 - The US wanted to stop the spread of communism, keep Jewish population of US
happy by promoting the security and prosperity of Israel, keep the Suez Canal open
(major trade route for oil supplies) post 1990 leader of the new world order.
- Although the US say that their interest in the region stems purely from an ideological
pledge to promote and protect democracy, this has been proven to be untrue as they
have often been happy to assist anti-democratic regimes if such actions furthered
their interests.
- Chomsky​: "at the rhetorical level, the threat from which the ME must be 'defended' is
generally pictured to be the USSR"
- USSR wanted to please the Muslim population, win allies among Islamic nations
around world, use influence to control oil supplies to USA, test US resolve in ME by
maintaining pressure on Israel. Soviet historian; Dawisha state that the primary goal
was to secure the USSR's southern borders and act in the national interest before
aiding 'national liberation movements'.

● ​The Occupied Territories and Lebanon, including:

t
en
– attitudes and policies of the Israeli Labour and Likud parties towards the Occupied Territories
Likud:
m
- For hardline Israelis the West Bank is linked to the concept of Eretz Israel.
cu
- The Likud party is also known for its extreme pursuit and acceleration of the Jewish
settlements in the occupied territories, and issue which further complicated an
Do

already difficult peace process.

- Begin opposed trading land for peace because he did not trust the Palestinians,
p

giving a new ideological impetus to the settler movement. By 1981 Begin had brought
wa

the number of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories to around 110,000.

- Begin argued that 242 did not apply to the West Bank because it did not state that
ks

Israel should return ‘the’ or ‘all’ the territories. He said that the West Bank had never
been ‘acquired’ because it has always been a part of Israel. He wanted to annex the
in

West Bank.
Th

- Shamir’s government also stated that it would not trade land for peace. It would not
give up its control of the territories that Israel had captured after the 1967 war.
- In July 1984, Israel indicated a loss of confidence in the Likud party in the election,
and as a result Labour and Likud were forced to create a national unity government.
- Following another unclear election in 1988 another National Unity Government was
formed. The country was clearly divided about what to do about the Intifada and the
settlements. Labour was prepared to trade land for peace and security, and Likud
wanted either the annexation of the territories or at least a massive settlement drive.
It’s ‘Iron First’ policy during the Intifada reflected a general attitude of the party that
only brunt force would bring an end to the conflict once and for all. It made it clear
that it would not attend a peace conference as long as the Intifada continued.
- After the Labour-Likud coalition broke up and Shamir formed a government which
now relied on minor religious parties to stay in power. These parties were totally
opposed to giving up land, conversing with the PLO and they pushed for more
settlements in the West Bank.
- Netanyahu’s election in 1996 resulted in further setbacks for the peace process.
Labour:
 - Rabin was elected Prime Minister after the resignation of Meir in 1974. At this stage,
the situation in the occupied territories was becoming increasingly more problematic
for Israel. At this time, the idea of a Palestinian entity alongside Israel was not
seriously considered. The options apparently opened to the party was to annex the
territories and expel the Arab population or to return the areas to their former
Jordanian and Eqyptian status, an option unacceptable to many groups in Israel.
- The establishment of Jewish settlements was initially pursued by Rabin’s labour
party, and approximately 85 settlements had been established by 1977.
- In 1984, after the creation of the national unity govt, Peres remained committed to his
earlier policy of reaching an agreement with King Hussein concerning the West Bank,
thereby excluding the PLO. The Peres solution involved giving up some territory to
Jordan in return for peace and recognition. Likud’s Sharon (minister of commerce
and industry) wanted Israeli annexation of the OTs and this ongoing rivalry blocked
any consensus within Israeli politics about the future of the West Bank.
- In 1992 Rabin defeated Shamir
- Rabin had already been PM previously and was known as a no-nonsense, Israel-first

t
en
military man. This ‘hardline’ reputation actually made it easier for him to sell the later
peace deal with the Palestinians as the Israeli people felt Rabin would be the last
Israeli leader to threaten their security. m
cu
- Rabin’s government took steps to facilitate the peace process; New settlements in
the West Bank were frozen.
Do

- Israeli Arabs were appointed as deputy ministers

- Contacts between Israeli citizens and PLO members were made easier
p

– rise and significance of the Israeli settler movement in the Occupied Territories
wa

Rise:
- The settler movement was initially established by the Labour Party of Rabin. By 1977
ks

there were approximately 85 settlements.

in

- Begin opposed trading land for peace because he did not trust the Palestinians,
giving a new ideological impetus to the settler movement. By 1981 Begin had brought
Th

the number of Jewish settlers in the OTs to around 110,000.

- If an area was considered ‘too Arab’ in character it would often be settled, and
therefore the settlements were often established in heavily populated Arab areas.
- Ariel Sharon, played a significant role in expanding Jewish settlements, exerting
great effort to expand them in the WB and GS. He even proposed to create dummy
settlements in the Sinai to bargain with Sadat.
- Sharon also had close ties with Gush Emunim and backed their efforts to settle in
areas adjacent to large Arab centres.
- Following the accession to power in the SU of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, an
increased number of Soviet Jews were allowed to leave the SU and emigrate to
Israel. Many of these Jews were extremely devout and believed that they had a
divine purpose to re-establish Jewish control over the biblical lands in Israel
- During the 1980s and 1990s, it became increasingly difficult for Israeli governments
to maintain a majority. As a result, coalitions had to be formed which included some
of the smaller, extremist religious parties.
 - These parties had a strong attachment to the OTs and often made it a condition of
continued support that no settlements in these areas be given up in any peace
agreement.
Significance:
- Violence between Palestinian’s and the Jews increased dramatically, as popular
Israeli pressure pushed for more settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank;
by 1988 more than half the West Bank and a third of the Gaza Strip were Jewish
controlled.
- PLO attacks increased in the areas, but Jewish settlement just increased in size.
- As a result of this violence, security tightened in the areas surrounding the
settlements requiring further increasing hostilities.
- The settlers were one of the main factors contributing to the outbreak of the Intifada
in 1987.
- The settler movement significantly complicated the situation in the OTs, as well as
the peace process.
- It also caused a great deal of division within Israel, both on a civilian level and a

t
en
political one.
- The intention of the settlement was to ensure an Israeli foothold in the Occupied
m
Territories and this was achieved in some senses however at a great cost.
cu
- Even after the results of the settler movement had become apparent, govt’s such as
Netanyahu’s continued their expansion.
Do

– reasons for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982

- Lebanese society was divided into loosely-knit family clans, and characterised by a
p

diverse range of religious beliefs.The Christians made up the majority of the

wa

population til the 1960s; after this, 60% are now Muslim.
- A system had evolved to deal with this division between Maronites and Muslims: the
ks

President was always to be a Christian, the Premier a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker
of the Parliament a Shiite Muslim
in

- The Christians feared being overrun by the Muslims whilst the Muslims claimed that
Th

due to demographic change, they should have the bigger say in the government.
- Lebanon’s politics, religions and ethnic differences were further complicated by the
fact that both the Christians and the Muslims were divided amongst themselves into
sects, each headed by bosses who used patronage to build iron loyalty and militias.
These divisions were further complicated by terrain and political groupings
sometimes had a geographical character.
- Lebanon was home to more than 300 000 Palestinians by 1970, who upset the
power balance between Christians and the Muslims and many Lebanese saw the
Palestinians as a disruptive force as they had become a state within a state.
- The Fatah and PLO used Lebanon as their headquarters, prompting Israeli retaliation
on Lebanon
- Soon, the PLO was in direct conflict with the Phalange, Christian militia sick of the
Palestinian’s causing trouble
- By mid-1975, the ‘high-wire act’ that was Lebanon slipped into full-scale civil war.
Syria entered the situation and soon had thousands of troops in the country
attempting to bring peace though more likely trying to impose Syrian influence.
 - Two interpretations can be placed on the significance of the Lebanese civil war on
the overall Middle East position:
- It had the potential to spill over into an all out Middle East War
- On the other hand, it may have acted as a ‘safety valve’ taking pressure off
the wider conflict
1978 -
- The first invasion was In March 1978 when a PLO raide into Israel killed 34 Israelis.
In response, the Likud invaded southern Lebanon to destroy PLO military
infrastructure and set up a ‘security zone’. In the process they killed over 1,000
people and made 200,000 homeless. Faced with a UN Security Council Resolution
that demanded Israel withdraw and created a UN Force in Lebanon, Israel set up a
predominantly Christian army in the south. The Southern Lebanon army, under Major
Saad Haddad, was to prevent PLO attacks on Israel.
1982 -
- Operation Peace for Galilee, 6th June 1982, to stop PLO rocket attacks on Galilee
- By 1982, the Palestinians were firmly entrenched in southern Lebanon, so much so

t
en
that region was known as ‘Fatherland’
- It was from here that terrorist attacks were often launched against Israel
m
- There were also 30,000 Syrian troops based in Beirut or the Bekaa valley with
cu
Soviet-supplied SAM 6 missiles directed at Israel
- Using the assassination of their London Ambassador as a pretext, Israel invaded
Do

Lebanon in June 1982 with 100,000 troops. Their objective was to drive the PLO out
of the country
p

- In June 1982 after the Israeli Ambassador to GB is assassinated in London, Israel

wa

attacked Lebanon again, to drive the PLO further north and install an Israeli friendly
Christian government in Lebanon
ks

- Israel’s invasion proved very successful and they soon reached Beirut. By July, with
in

the help of its Christian Lebanese allies, Israel had forced the evacuation of
Palestinian fighters by sea
Th

- Lebanese President Gemayal was assassinated in September and his brother, Amin,
succeeded him. Israel then attacked west Beirut. In September there were two major
massacres by Lebanese militias in Palestinian refugee camps at Chatila and Sabra.
This may have been revenge for Gemayal’s death.
- The harder the PLO fought back the more that the Lebanese suffered –it got to the
point where even the Muslims asked them to leave.
- Israeli forces were blamed for not acting to prevent these actions
- In July 1983, Israeli forced drew back to the Awali River and by 1984, back to their
security zone in the south, which they still controlled. Israel’s withdrawal was
complete by 1985
- Arafat escaped alive, with around 14 000 PLO fighters, and set up base in Tunis
Objectives -
- The objectives of the Israeli government were contentious, as post-Zionist historian
Benny Morris writes: “It was the contradiction between the real and official aims…that
hamstrung the planning and conduct of the offensive”.
- The initial aim was to drive the PLO north so Israel was out of range of the rockets
and the Likud claimed it had no broader designs on Lebanese territory, declaring that
 Operation Peace for Galilee would be accomplished within 24-28 hours. However,
Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon extended the operation to include the
destruction of the Soviet-armed Syrian missile bases in the Bekaa Valley and to
attack Beirut to install a friendly Chrisitan government. Sharon aimed to drive the
PLO and Syria out of Lebanon. In doing so, it would cause an influx of Palestinians
into Jordan, which would eventually collapse the Hashemite regime, transform
Jordan into a Palestinian state and thus solve the Palestinain/refugee problem.
- Within 4 days, the Israelis had reached Beirut and began bombarding the city. The
artillery and aerial bombardment continued for 79 days, despite American and UN
efforts to end the attack. On the 18 August, Israel finally agreed to a US brokered
cease-fire. Arafat and between 9,000-14,000 PLO fighters were allowed sage
passage out of Lebanon and evacuated West Beirut.

– the significance of the war for Israel and the Palestinians

Implications of Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon -
- It is unclear why Israel invaded Lebanon; they achieved very little, and the Maronites

t
en
proved unreliable allies
- The Arabs simply considered this as another attempt by Israel to implement
expansionist policies m
cu
- The Palestinians had shown great tenacity and fighting spirit during the Israeli
invasion, which raised nationalistic Palestinian hopes and moral everywhere:
Do

increased determination to resist Israeli rule

- Worldwide sentiment shifted away from Israel after the atrocities and towards the
p

Palestinian causes
wa

- 40,000 would die on both sides and Beirut was completely destroyed
- There were two peace negotiations which were proposed and failed: The Reagan
ks

Plan and the Fez Plan

Significance of the war for Israel and the Palestinians -
in

- 19 000 Palestinian’s died, 368 Israeli’s

Th

- About 8,000 Palestinian fighters were dispersed across the Arab world helped by an
International Peacekeeping force. Half of them went to Syria and Syria’s President
Assad sought an alternative leadership to Arafat but to no avail
- In June 1983, Syria declared Arafat ‘persona non grata’ and he was ordered to leave
the country, whereby he fled to Tunis
- Syria’s position in Lebanon at first seemed precarious. However, international and
domestic criticism encouraged the Israelis to leave; the Lebanese army were
impotent and the multinational force soon pulled out. In October 1983 229 US troops
were killed in a massive car bomb explosion
- By the end of 1984, all US forces were out of the country and the Syrians were left as
the dominant force in the country
- Assad’s position in early 1982 was further weakened by risings at home against his
rule but the massacring of 10,000-20,000 of his domestic enemies consolidated his
position
- Israel was politically and morally weakened following the Lebanon adventure
- The greatest cost Israel suffered was losing the unconditional support that the US
government had given it over the years. Formed in the wake of the Holocaust, Israel
 received great sympathy from the USA however; its actions in Lebanon seriously
threatened its support. As Israel continued to establish settlements in the OTs, even
former firm supporters such as ex-presidents Ford and Carter came out denouncing
Israeli settlement policies as a ‘major obstacle to peace’.
- Labour and Likud formed a National Unity government in July 1984, headed
alternately by Labour’s Shimon Peres and Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir
- There were ideological differences between the two parties: Labour wanted to give
concessions to Jordan, Likud wanted to annex the OC’s. This prevented any political
cooperation in Israel

​The situation in Lebanon by the early 1990s -

- Peace had at last arrived after 16 years of civil war and in 1992, the country held its
first elections for 20 years which led to Rafiq al-Hariri becoming PM.
- There was now a degree of optimism about the country’s economic future
- Syria remained the dominant force in the country
- The Palestinian forces gradually returned

t
en
- Israel and its Christian Lebanese allies controlled the southern part of the country in
what Israel termed a ‘security zone.
m
- Terrorist attacks on northern Israel continued, as did quick and firm Israeli retaliation
cu
- By the early 1990s, the main source of instability in the country was coming from
Hezbollah, a guerrilla, fundamentalist, Muslim groups that totally opposed any
Do

accommodation with Israeli. The group was financed by the radical Islamic regime in
Iran. It was an enemy of the PLO.
p
wa

● ​The peace process, including:

ks

– the Intifada 1987–1994: Palestinian resistance and Israeli response

CAUSES -
in

- Started spontaneously in December 1987, in response to four Palestinians being

Th

killed by an Israeli truck collision.

- Young rock throwing Palestinians hurled rocks, in what came to be known as the
intifada, lasting for five years.
- Frustration and anger at Israeli occupation.
- Response to Jewish settler movement
- General frustration with plight of the Palestinian people, lack of political progress,
failure of peace attempts
- “Only the blind it seems could see in the Gaza Strip anything but a hell-hole made for
terrorism”-Jerusalem Post
NATURE​ -
- Generally Palestinian youth throwing stones/Molotov cocktails at Israeli
police/soldiers
- Strikes, demonstrations, civil disobedience
- Restrained → not armed (generally), as this would allow Israel to justify the use of its
military technology, and always within the territories, rather than pre-67 Israel.
- Palestinians not completely unified
AIMS -
 - The long term goals of the Intifada were articulated as:
- desire to bring an end to the Israeli occupation of the WB and GS
- A desire to establish a Palestinian state. In the OTs, a large proportion of the
population lived in refugee camps, there was unbearable overcrowding and
the Israeli military rule was very harsh. The Jewish settlements were
established in 30% of the WB to prevent its return to the Palestinians.
- The short term goals were to achieve a greater level of Palestinian self-reliance and
unity of purpose.
- Schlaim: “The aims of the intifada were not stated at the outset; they emerged
in the course of the struggle. The ultimate aim was self-determination and the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state.”
- Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967
- Creation of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank
- International recognition of the Palestinian cause
SIGNIFICANCE -
- Resistance had of course been present since 1967, although not on this scale

t
en
- United Palestinians (peasants and intellectuals were fighting the same battle. Linked
the occupied territories
m
- Shifted international public opinion. Muddied Israel’s reputation → condemnation of
cu
their actions eg. British minister of state said I defy anyone to come here and not be
shocked. Conditions here are an affront to civilised values. (flouted Geneva
Do

conventions), increased sympathy for Palestinians

- Saw many Christain Arabs leave the Middle East
p

- Palestinian youth were not receiving school/university education as these had closed
wa

down
- General increase in the desire for peace amongst Israelis (and Palestinians)
ks

- Discontent amongst Israeli soldiers

in

- Increase in popularity of Hamas (as diplomatic solutions failed to materialise)

- Jordan renounces claim to the West Bank → ‘Jordanian Option’ is closed →
Th

becomes inevitable that Israel will have to negotiate with the PLO → forces the PLO
to accept Israel
- Algiers Palestine National Council Nov 1988 proclaimed an independent Palestinian
state, accepted UNSCR 242, 338 and 181, reaffirm renunciation of terrorism.
- Palestinians see Saddam Hussein and Gulf War as a violent force needed for the
creation of a Palestinian state
Israeli response -
- The Israeli response to the continuing Intifada protests was uncompromising both
under the Likud government of Shamir and the Labour government of Rabin.
- Initially they were not sure how to oppose the massive civil disobedience – they had
amazing weaponry etc but couldn’t exactly legitimately use them against women and
children throwing rocks. Soldiers were trained to fight against other soldiers – not
regular people and the army felt very uncomfortable about this.
- On 17th January 1988 Israel adopted the ‘iron fist’ policy with Rabin announcing ‘the
first priority is to use might, power and beatings to restore order.’ This did not work
and attracted much condemnation.
 - ‘Shamir Plan’ was the next step and was a diplomatic response. Involved 20 points re
Palestinian autonomy in the OTs and was approved by the Knesset on 16th May
1989. The longer the uprising continued, the more severe Israel’s measures became.
- Israel’s retaliating actions included: curfews, demolition of rioter’s houses, sealing off
the OTs and denying P. workers access to their jobs in Israel
- Israel deported suspected rioters and Intifada leaders as a means of dealing with the
ongoing protest. In December 1992, Israel deported 400 P. members of Hamas to
southern Lebanon, which caused wide condemnation and derailed peace talks
- Throughout the Intifada period, Israel continued to build settlements in the occupied
areas for many Russian Jew, whose numbers in Israel had greatly increased with the
collapse of the SU.
- By 1988 the number of settlements on the WB and GS had grown to 120, with 55%
of the WB confiscated and 30% of Gaza confiscated.
- The Intifada shook the Israeli’s who did not know exactly how to react, and it
attracted a lot of support, even internationally. Schlaim: “a powerful army was being
unleashed against a civilian population that was fighting for its basic human rights

t
en
and for the right to political self-determination.”
- It challenged the status quo in the occupied territories and for the first time, both at
m
home and abroad, Jews began to question the occupation. Humphrey is “reminded
cu
the Israeli electorate that their state was established on land the Palestinians
regarded as rightfully theirs.”
Do

- It also exposed as a failure the process of gradual incorporation of the Territories into
Israel through the settler movement.
p

- It emphasised divisions in Israeli society between the left who were willing to
wa

negotiate with the PLO and the right who believed brute force would bring an end to
troubles
ks

- It also emphasised divisions within the national unity govt – Peres resurrected the
in

idea of Gaza first (should be demilitarised but remain under Israeli supervision and
13 settlements dismantled). Shamir stated that Peres and party were to blame for the
Th

unrest. He saw the Intifada as a threat to Israel’s existence, not as a territorial

dispute.
- It damaged Israel’s international reputation. They were condemned for ‘violation of
human rights’.
Palestinian resistance -
- It demonstrated to the Palestinians that neither terrorism nor street violence would
solve their problem
- Initially the PLO played a very small role, they in fact learned about it from the news.
They could provide very little guidance in exile.
- Local Palestinian leaders threw all their weight behind a moderating mainstream,
urging PLO to recognise Israel, accept a two state solution, declare a Palestinian
state and establish a govt in exhile.
- Hamas, the military arm of the Muslim brotherhood, began activities in 1988 as a
result of the Intifada and quickly became the dominant religious and political force.
Initially, Hamas received Israeli support as they hoped to open a divide between
fundamentalists and the PLO. However as the intifada continued, Hamas was
radicalised and terrorist attacks against Israel increased. Hamas were completely
 against Western Influences and Israel. By 1994 Hamas had commenced suicide
raids in Israel.

– successes and setbacks in the peace process 1987–1996

Hinchcliffe:​ “The white dove with its olive branch had finally shown up in the region where
conflict had become a way of life for citizens and of politics between states.”
- The successes and setbacks in the peace process from 1987-1996 were due to
unresolved tensions between supporters and opposition driven by ideological,
nationalistic and religious beliefs from both the Israelis and Palestinians which
shaped the nature of relations and outcomes during the peace process. These
successes and setbacks are first seen in the intifada, where support for peace grew
when the Israelis and Palestinians realised continued conflict was unsustainable.
This growth of support culminated in the Oslo Accords and the Israel-Jordan Treaty,
however these advancements were offset by increased opposition and hostility to
peace in the form of extremism perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists and
conservative Israelis which ultimately derailed the peace process by 1996.

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Declaration of Independence + election of Rabin + Shamir Peace initiative (success) -
- The Intifada (1987-1994) made the Israelis and Palestinians more amicable to peace
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negotiations, paving the path for future success of the peace negotiations. The Israeli
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response to the outbreak of civil disobedience in the occupied territories was Israeli
prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir’s ‘iron fist’ policy, which was ineffective as it
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encouraged the Palestinians to fight and triggered both international and domestic
criticism. The ineffectiveness of Israel’s draconian response was an indication to both
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the Israelis and Palestinians that violent retaliation and military occupation would not
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protect Israel or achieve Palestinian independence, prompting a shift in attitudes from

both sides which favoured diplomacy, leading to the first major success which was
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the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) renunciation of violence and

recognition of Israel seen in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence 1988. In
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response, the Israeli government introduced a peace proposal called the Shamir
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Plan, which attempted to provide political autonomy to the Palestinians but the PLO
refused to consider it unless Israeli troops withdrew from West Bank and Gaza.
Despite this temporary setback, the increased international pressure to negotiate for
peace combined with the election of Yitzhak Rabin in 1992 saw the initiation of peace
talks directly with the Palestinians. The intifada catalysed a genuine movement for
Palestinians and Israelis towards finding a peaceful solution as they realised Israeli
military occupation and Palestinian armed resistance was unsustainable and led to
the first successes in the peace process as Israeli and Palestinian leaders were
willing to set aside their ideological differences to achieve peace.
Oslo Accords I + II + Israel-Jordan Treaty (success) -
- Major successes in the peace process are demonstrated in the Oslo Accords and
Israel-Jordan Treaty which led to many practical advancements and long-term
benefits for the Palestinians as a result of the increased willingness of political
leaders to cooperate despite domestic opposition. The successful signing of the Oslo
Accords of 1993 and Oslo II in 1995 demonstrated that there was a high degree of
support from Palestinians and Israelis for a peace agreement. The Accords further
promoted Palestinian autonomy where it allowed the election of a Palestinian
 Authority and the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from parts of Gaza and the West
Bank, increasing Palestinian support. However, unresolved matters in the Oslo
Accords such as the protection of Israeli settlers, control over the borders and the
issue of refugees hindered the long-term implementation of the accords and
increased extremist activities, seen in the Hebron Massacre 1994 where 29
Palestinians were killed by an Israeli settler. Improved relations between the Israelis
and Palestinians established a friendlier atmosphere, encouraging the possibility of
peace treaties, seen in the 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace 1994 which settled
border disputes between Israel and Jordan. As a result, other Arab states followed
Jordan’s lead in dismantling their hostility to Israel, where in October 1994 Tunisia
announced low-level diplomatic contacts and the gulf states dropped their economic
boycott. Growing support for a peace that was triggered by the intifada culminated in
the Oslo Accords and Israel-Jordan Treaty, however, the advancement of the peace
process took a backwards step due to increased opposition and extremism.
- The Oslo Accords 1993 
- Arafat delivered a letter to Rabin Arafat formally recognize Israel’s right to 

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exist in peace and security.  
- It was formally signed on September 13 September 1993 at a dramatic 
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ceremony in Washington, by Rabin and Arafat in the presence of President 
Clinton.  
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- The Accords took the form of a Declaration of Principles for a future peace 
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agreement. A Palestinian Interim Self-governing Authority was to be given 

immediate limited self-government (“Autonomy”) over Gaza and the Jericho 
area. A timetable was set for election of a Palestinian Authority, redeployment 
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of Israeli forces out of populated areas in the Territories and the negotiation of 
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a final status agreement within five years. 

- After the Accords, there was an increase in terror attacks against Israel. 
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- Effects: 
- In May 1994, Israel withdraw from Jericho and the Gaza Strip.  
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- In July 1994, Arafat swore in members of the Palestinian Authority (PA) 

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in Jericho. By the end of 1994, the PA had control over education, 

health, tourism, taxation and social welfare. 

Extremist violence + assassination of Rabin (setback) -

- Despite these successes in the peace process, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist
groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and opposition towards the peace process
simultaneously created major setbacks, culminating in the assassination of Yitzhak
Rabin in 1995. The heightened use of force by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) during
the intifada indicated that the possibility of Israel granting Palestinian autonomy was
decreasing. This combined with the PLO’s denunciation of armed resistance and
indifference of Arab states led many Palestinians to join Islamic fundamentalist
groups, notably Hamas, who believed in the destruction of Israel by violent means.
These extremist groups offered an alternative to the PLO who vowed to continue
armed struggle against Israel, which became a significant setback to peace. Hamas’
sequence of suicide bombings seen in 1994 where 22 people were killed in Tel Aviv
by a Hamas suicide car bomb, hindered the peace process by increasing Israeli
support for the conservative ‘hawk’ approach which valued security over peace.
Israeli ultranationalists, right-wing and religious extremists also opposed the peace
 process, demanding that Israel should remain in control and continue to extend
settlements in the occupied territories. The destructive consequences of the growing
influence of extremist politics on possibilities of peace culminated in the
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, which was a major setback in the peace
process and impeded on future peace negotiations. The increased use of force by
the IDF and rise of extremist politics became institutionalised and a constant barrier
to advancements in the peace process and from 1994-1996.
Election of Netanyahu + failure of peace process (setback)
- The successes of Rabin’s attempts to continue the peace process in the background
of extremist opposition was derailed when he was assassinated and Benjamin
Netanyahu was elected in 1996 due to the failure to resolve ideological differences
between the opponents of the peace process. Rabin was integral to the continuation
of the peace process as he appealed to hawkish voters being a former military hero
and was able to maintain Israeli support. After his assassination Netanyahu was able
to win the election because his promise to emphasise security captured the mood of
the Israeli people who grew nervous after a series of Hamas terrorist bombs that

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killed 59 people over 8 days in 1996. Jewish and Muslim extremists who opposed
peace ensured his victory and made slowing down the peace process more likely, a
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significant setback in the peace process. Although he maintained a façade of support
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for the peace process, his actions said otherwise, as he rejected Rabin’s ‘land for
peace’ formula and lifted 4-year-old restrictions on new settlements on the West
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Bank. He declared there would be no Palestinian autonomy and Jerusalem would

remain under Israeli control, subverting the progress of the Oslo Accords and was a
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“blow to the entire peace process” (Shlaim). Netanyahu created a deadlock in the
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peace process and “made it the centrepiece of his programme” (Shlaim) to keep it
that way. Netanyahu’s intransigent attitude created growing tension between the
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Palestinians and Israelis, seen in the Tunnel Affair in 1996 which demonstrated the
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insensitivity of the Israelis, making Palestinians frustrated as they saw no progress in

their cause since Netanyahu’s election. The remaining months of 1996 saw no further
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progress in the peace process and demonstrated how the growing influence of
extremist violence and the election of Netanyahu consistently created major setbacks
in prospects of peace, eventually leading to its failure by 1996.

- The peace process from 1987 to 1996 involved many successes due to the
increased willingness of the Palestinians and Israelis to create a peace settlement
after the intifada, which culminated in the Oslo Accords and Israel-Jordan Treaty.
However, these advancements in the peace process were offset by the rise of Islamic
fundamentalist groups and Israeli extremists’ determination to continue the expansion
of settlements in the occupied territories which led to the election of Netanyahu which
created setbacks in the peace process and heavily impeded on its progress by 1996.
 
Successes 
- Conferences 
- In November 1988, The Palestinian National Council condemned all forms of 
terrorism including state terrorism but not resistance.  
 - Yasser Arafat also recognised the right of all nations in the area including the 
state of Palestine and Israel to live in peace.  
- He also repeated a call for an international conference, demanded a return to 
the 1947 Partition resolution boundaries with Jerusalem as the capital of a 
Palestinian State. 
- Madrid Conference 1991 
- 30th October 1991 the Madrid Conference was officially called by the US 
and the USSR.  
- It was highly successful as it marked the first time other Arab nations joined 
Egypt in negotiating directly with Israel, implying recognition of the 
legitimacy of Israel’s existence. Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan 
participated. 
- PLO recognized Israel 
- Mid-November, PLO announces its willingness to recognise Israel in return 
for direct negotiations. 
- Joint statement - December 1988: (Arafat) reinforced the PLO’s recognition 
of Israel, accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 and fully denounced terrorism. 

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- “Enough is enough. Enough is enough. Enough is enough.” 

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- U.N. General Assembly - 13th December:  
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- Arafat calls an international conference 
- “Our statehood provides salvation to Palestinians, and peace to both 
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Palestinians and Israelis.” Self-determination means survival for the 
Palestinians, and our survival of the Israelis as their rulers claim. 
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- He declared the provision in the PLO charter calling for the 

destruction of Israel ‘null and void’ 
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- The US Secretary of State, George Shultz announced that the US will 

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open dialogue with the PLO. 

- Yitzhak Rabin returns to government 
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- More anciliaritary  
- Curtailed all but ‘security settlements’ and the construction of new housing in 
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the occupied territories. 

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- Lifted prohibitions of contacts between Israeli citizens and the PLO. 

- Cancelled deportation orders on 11 Palestinian leaders. 
- Released another 800 Palestinian prisoners to show good faith.  
- “For once the political interests of the US, the Arabs and the Israelis are in a 
rare alignment and a compromise is conceivable.” 
- Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 1994 
- The treaty recognised the centre of the Jordan River as the international 
boundary “without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under 
Israeli military control in 1967” and Israel made substantial concessions on 
water sharing.  
- Eased the positions of the Arab economic boycott. It was a warm peace with 
open borders. 
- Interim Agreement 1995 
- The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed in 
Washington in 1995. It included detailed maps of areas A, B and C, to be 
under exclusive Palestinian, joint, and exclusive Israeli control respectively. 
- The effect was that 96% of the population in the Territories (apart from East 
Jerusalem) now came under Palestinian self-rule. 
 Setbacks 
- Removal of Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank and Palestinians 
- This was a setback as it removed the proposition in the Camp David Accords 
that Jordan was Palestine. The Jordan something something was closed. 
- Refusal to negotiate directly  
- Refusal to negotiate directly with the PLO 
- 1988 - Arafat emphasised that he was not prepared to enter into direct 
negotiations with Israel.  
- Israel rejected Arafat’s statement at the 1988 Conference stating that as 
long as the provisions in the PLO’s covenant called for Israel’s destruction 
remained unchanged they would not negotiate (PLO one) 
- The Shamir-Rabin Plan  
- In response to Arafat’s 1988 diplomatic bombshell the Israeli PM at 
the time Yitzhak Shamir refused to negotiate with the PLO still 
considering them a terrorist organisation.  
- As a result, he and the Defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin created the 
peace plan where elected representatives from the occupied 

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territories would negotiate the terms of self rule settlement. Shamir 

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stated that the result would be, at best, Palestinian autonomy. He also 
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stated that he would never talk to the PLO and would never give up 
any land. 
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- The Palestinians believed this to be out of touch with the new 
realities. The Palestinians believed they should be free to 
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choose their own representatives. 

-  
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- Gulf War 1990 

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- Emergence of militant groups 

- Hamas, Islamic Jihads and Hezbollah  
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– support and opposition for the peace process among Israelis and Palestinians
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Schlaim: ​“On both sides, the Rabin-Arafat deal provoked strong and vociferous opposition
on the part of the hardliners. Both leaders were accused of betrayal and sell out.”
- Palestinians and Arabs reacted to the 1993 Oslo accords as if it was the first, not the
last step taken.
Israelis:
● There was widespread support within Israel for the ongoing peace process.
● Younger elements of the population in particular were tired of the constant, ongoing
violence and supported the peace process.
● During the first half of the 1990s, there were frequent mass demonstrations calling for
peace.
● However, there were also pockets of dissenting groups which opposed any moves
towards peace if it meant what they believed was Israel’s pre-ordained right to the
land of Palestine. Such groups included extremist religious groups, new settlers in
the Occupied Territories and right wing politicians and the small, radical Jewish
religious parties.
● These groups still could not let go of their desire for Eretz Israel and thus were very
reluctant to pursue peaceful solutions – all of which involved trading land. They were
 very opposed to the idea of Israel withdrawing from any territories or dismantling any
Jewish settlements and the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state.
● Right wing and nationalist extremists were particularly concerned because the Oslo II
provisions had made the possibility of giving up Eretz Israel a reality.
● Following Oslo, 1000 Israeli’s were polled. The results found that 65% supported the
agreement, and only 13% were against.
● Many ordinary Israelis were:
- Suspicious about entrusting security to Arafat who seemed incapable or
unwilling to deal with extremist groups
- Fearful on continued terrorist attacks
- Anxious this was the first step towards the eventual destruction of Israel
- Dismayed at the prospect of abandoning settlers and settlements.
- The constantly changing leadership of the Israelis has always been a big obstacle to
peace.

Palestinians:

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- The Palestinian community was equally divided
- Palestinian leaders had greater difficulty in trying to reach peace with Israel, as any
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peace was bound to involve the loss of Palestinian land and to agree to this would
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mean political suicide
- Many groups existed within Palestinian that aimed to sabotage the peace process:
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Hizbollah guerrilla groups, Hamas and a host of other, radical Islamic groups
- Rabin and Arafat were still miles apart on whether the Palestinian state was to be the
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end result of this process. Many Palestinians became disillusioned by the slow
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process of peace, a factor that helped the rise of groups such as Hamas and Islamic
Jihad
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- Palestinian negotiators and much of the population were:

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- Suspicious of the step by step transfer of land and power

- Dismayed that Israel would retain much of the WB
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- Surprised that the Palestinian authority would only gradually assume

administration and security functions
- Fearful that Israel intended to provide long term protection for Jewish settlers
and never fully withdraw
- Anxious because under the accord Israel would maintain control over 73% of
land, 80% of water, 97% of security arrangements in the OTs.
- Islamic militants were violently opposed to any accommodation with Israel. They
were very unhappy about the recognition of Israel and the fact that the Palestinian
state would be restricted only to the WB and GS. The terrorist attacks that resulted
completely undermined Arafat’s credibility.
– significance of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the election of Netanyahu in 1996
Rabin​:
- on November 4th 1995 – assassinated by Yigal Amir, a right-wing Orthodox Jew who strongly opposed
Oslo Accords and peace process
- Rabin faced an election in 1996, an election in which for the first time Israelis would choose their PM
directly.
- Rabin’s opponent was Netanyahu, who had won the leadership of Likud in March 1995.
 - Netanyahu was known to favour a more hardline approach to the Palestinians than Rabin
- Some questioned Rabin’s seriousness in seeking an accommodation with the Palestinians. However,
greater progress towards peace had been made under his leadership than at any time since Camp David.
- Rabin’s peace efforts alienated many in Israel who totally opposed handing over any of the ancient Israeli
land to Palestinians. Israeli extremists became even angrier as Israel handed over some West Bank towns
and villages to the Palestinian Authority in October 1995.
- 1993 – Signed the Oslo Accords, meaning recognition for both Israel and the PLO. Polarised public opinion
in Israel some seeing him as bringing them closer to peace while others resented the loss of land and
blamed him for the resulting deaths
- One such opponent was a young law student called Yigal Amin, who assassinated PM Rabin at a peace
rally in Tel Aviv on the 4​th​ November 1995.
- Rabin’s Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres was formally approved as his successor on the 22​nd​ November
- The death of Rabin was a shattering blow to the peace process. Rabin’s reputation as a tough leader had
given the Israeli people a great deal of confidence in the peace process. For most Israelis, Rabin had
brought a credibility to the peace process that no other Israeli leader possessed.
- He had always been extremely concerned with the defence of the state, and it was widely believed that he
would never jeopardise Israel’s security in any kind of territorial compromise.

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- Peres, although admired and loved by many, was perceived as a weaker leader than Rabin. He committed
himself to whatever Rabin was but Palestinian terrorist attacks change the political scene as many voters
cared more about security than peace. m
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- Peres Tried to keep the peace process together and due to the repulsion felt at extremism moved the
election forward in the belief he would be re-elected. Due to a series of terrorist attacks making the nation
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want revenge, he lost to Netanyahu. After terrorist attacks there were chants of “Peres is a murderer. Peres
is a traitor. Peres is next in line.” -Weekly Telegraph, 28 February 1996.
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- This event caused a major shift in Israeli politics and the public reacted with a condemnation of right-wing
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extremist and a rise to 70% support for the peace process. Peres (who had recently formed a new govt)
proceeded to implement the Taba Accord and honoured Rabin’s pledge to Arafat to accelerate Israel’s
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redeployment from the remaining major Arab population centres on the WB. Between 7-27 December 1995
IDF forces withdrew from 5 major towns including Bethlehem and Ramallah and Peres indicated that
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redeployment from Hebron would be completed by March 1996.

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Netanyahu:
- Netanyahu’s victory made the future of Arab-Palestinian-Israeli relations uncertain.
- Negotiations in the ‘final status’ talks were interrupted by elections in Israel – Peres called them in May
rather than in October, thinking that he would easily win.
- Though Netanyahu proclaimed his belief in the peace process he then set down new ground rules for
negotiation. Rejected Rabin’s “land for peace”, lifted the four year old restrictions on extended settlements,
abandoned any thought of retreat from the Golan, and declared there would be no national sovereignty for
Palestinians and no discussion of the future of Jerusalem, it would be under full Israeli control.
- This reflected the new conservative view of the government and the growing importance of the religious
right who had supported Netanyahu and now wanted governmental support for religious and social issues
in return.
- The Likud leader Netanyahu narrowly defeated the Labour leader Peres by 29,000 votes, a victory margin
of less than 1%. His campaign had played on Israeli fears.
- Netanyahu’s victory placed the peace process in danger. Through contacts between the Israelis and the
Palestinians continued throughout 1996, Netanyahu made it clear that concessions to the Palestinians had
ended.
- His narrow election victory meant that he was weak within his own party
- He was seen as an ‘obstructionist to the peace process, and he persisted with the controversial
construction of Jewish settlements in Arab East Jerusalem.
- He was not an experienced politician, and his leadership capabilities were unknown and untested.
- He insisted he wanted peace and would honour Israel’s commitments so far. However in reality he asserted
very different things, including the fact that Israel would never accept a Palestinian state on its doorstep.
- In August 1996 he announced that the four year freeze on the expansion of settlements would be lifted, as
well as approving 500kms of new roads to link settlements, requiring the confiscation of more Palestinian
land.
- Netanyahu visited Jordan and Egypt but he refused to meet Arafat.
- The autonomous Palestinian area was in serious economic trouble, causing problems for Arafat with the
Islamists as well as the Palestinian Legislative Council and the PNC.
- In August 1996 Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met for the first time since the Israeli elections.

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