Soliven v.

Makasiar

FACTS:

This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila

 MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
 APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
denied by the Secretary of Justice
 MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice
 MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President
2. WON the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause
3. WON the suit deafeats the president’s privilege of immunity.

RATIO:

1. No.
 Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.
 This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a 
“Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed”, in effect, waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
 Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
2. No.
 This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest:
o Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
  Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrests.
 However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witness.
 Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally
evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable
cause.
3. No.
 Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing
of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s jurisdiction. This would in an indirect
way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand,
she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
 This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President’s behalf.
 The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the President’s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person
(And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege).

Peripheral Issue:

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of
the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling
effect” on press freedom.

-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the
“chilling effect” point.

DECISION:

Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is
LIFTED.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.

Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With
regard to whether or not the libel case would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom,
Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now
rather than later.

Quotable quotes: “Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.” –United States v. Bustos

“No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position
that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.” –People v. Perfecto