TRIAL COURT: rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a
TERRY VS. OHIO (from Wikipedia)
a landmark decision by the  United States Supreme Court  which held that the  Fourth
Amendment  prohibition on unreasonable  searches and seizures  is not violated when a police
officer stops a suspect on the street and frisks him without  probable cause  to  arrest, if the police
officer has areasonable suspicion  that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed and presently
dangerous." (392 U.S. 1, at 30.)
For their own protection, police may perform a quick surface search of the person’s outer
clothing for  weapons  if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed. This
reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts" and not merely upon an
officer's hunch. This permitted police action has subsequently been referred to in short as a "stop
and  frisk," or simply a "Terry  frisk". The  Terry  standard was later extended to temporary
detentions of persons in vehicles, known as  traffic stops; see  Terry stop  for a summary of
subsequent jurisprudence.
The rationale behind the Supreme Court decision revolves around the understanding that, as the
opinion notes, "the  exclusionary rule  has its limitations." The meaning of the rule is to protect
persons from unreasonable searches and seizures aimed at  gathering evidence, not searches and
seizures for  other purposes  (like prevention of crime or personal protection of police officers).
FACTS
- On October 31, 1963, while on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling
for many years, Cleveland Police Department detective Martin McFadden, aged
62, saw two men, John W. Terry and Richard Chilton, standing on a street
corner at 1276 Euclid Avenue and acting in a way the officer thought
suspicious.
- Detective McFadden, who was well-known on the Cleveland police force for his
skill in apprehending pickpockets,observed the two proceed alternately back
and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window.
Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on
a corner. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six
times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen trips. After one of these trips, they were
joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly after a brief conversation.
Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up", detective McFadden
followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in
front of a store.
- The plainclothes officer approached the three, identified himself as a
-
policeman, and asked their names.
The men "mumbled something", whereupon McFadden spun Terry around,
patted down his outside clothing, and felt a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He
reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. The
officer ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry's overcoat, took out a
revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He
patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from
Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer
garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might  
have been a weapon), or under Terry's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt
the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Terry and Chilton were
subsequently charged with carrying concealed weapons.
DEFENSE OF THE INDIVIDUALS: moved to suppress the use of the seized weapons as
evidence on grounds that the search and subsequent seizure were a violation of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted
the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that Terry
and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the
officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their outer clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The trial court made a distinction
between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing
for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime.Terry and Chilton were found
guilty.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT: affirmed the conviction
OHIO STATE SUPREME COURT: dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no
substantial constitutional question" was involved.
Decision of the Court
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court began by reciting first principles. The Fourth
Amendment protects "people, not places", against "unreasonable searches and
seizures". The question the Court confronted was whether "in all the circumstances of
this on-the-street encounter", Terry's reasonable expectation of privacy had been
impermissibly invaded.
The procedure called "stop and frisk" was not uncontroversial. Police argue that they
require a certain flexibility in dealing with quickly evolving and potentially dangerous
situations that arise during routine patrol of the streets. On the other hand, those
suspicious of giving the police broad investigatory power contended that the police
should not be able to assert their authority over citizens without some specific justification
upon intrusion into protected personal security, coupled with judicial oversight to ensure
that the police do not routinely abuse their authority. For the Court, however, the question
was not the propriety of the police actions in the abstract but the admissibility of the
evidence obtained through that police action. "In our system evidentiary rulings provide
the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some
conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by
state agents." For this purpose the exclusionary rule of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), had evolved and been applied against both state and federal
agents.
Thus the question was not whether the stop-and-frisk procedure was proper by itself, but
rather whether the exclusionary rule was an appropriate deterrent of police misconduct
during such encounters.
Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is invoked
“ demands a constant awareness of these limitations. The wholesale
harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority
groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by
the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial. Yet a rigid and
”
unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against
practices which it can never be effectively used to control, may exact a
high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.
— Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15
In view of these concerns, the Court next asked whether it is "always unreasonable for a
policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless
there is probable cause for an arrest."
When is a person seized and what constitutes a search?
The Court first had to determine, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, when is a armed. "The record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of
person "seized" and what constitutes a "search". The Court rejected the idea that a "stop an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and
and frisk" could categorically never be a search or seizure subject to the protection of the others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so."
Fourth Amendment. Instead, it made room for the idea that some police action short of a The police detective here limited his search to the outer surfaces of Terry's clothing.
traditional arrest could constitute a seizure—that is, "whenever a police officer accosts an Thus, the search was reasonably related in scope to the concern for his own safety
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." The Court that justified the stop from the beginning. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
also noted that "... it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest revolver found on Terry's person was properly admitted into evidence.
that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her The sole justification for the search is protection of the
body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.' "
Thus, when the police detective took hold of Terry and patted him down on that officer and public
Cleveland street, the detective "seized" Terry and subjected him to a "search" within the The Ohio Court of Appeals allowed the search, but made it clear that such a search
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But the Fourth Amendment protects only was limited to discovering dangerous weapons that could be used against the
against unreasonable searches and seizures, so the Court next had to determine officer, as Chief Justice Warren noted:
whether Terry’s seizure and search were "reasonable". "In this case, for example, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that 'we must be
careful to distinguish that the "frisk" authorized herein includes only a "frisk" for
What is reasonable? a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for contraband,
The Court assessed the reasonableness of the police activity here by comparing it to evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to
activity that would ordinarily require a warrant. “... in justifying the particular intrusion the arrest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements of the Fourth
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together Amendment, and probable cause is essential.' " (392 U.S. 1, at 16, Fn 12,
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” In a situation quoting State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, at 130)
where the police obtained a warrant, they would have brought these facts and inferences Chief Justice Warren later made it clear that this was also the opinion of the
to the attention of a judicial officer before embarking on the actions in question. Post hoc Court:
judicial review of police activity is equally facilitated by these facts and inferences. "The sole justification of the search ... is the protection of the police officer and
The Court also emphasized that the standard courts should employ is an objective one. others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion
“Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” instruments for the assault of the police officer." (392 U.S. 1, at 29)
Lesser evidence would mean that the Court would tolerate invasions on the privacy of
citizens supported by mere hunches—a result the Court would not tolerate. Moreover, Is such a search a "petty indignity"?
And simple " 'good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.' ... If "... it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his
Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." — the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and
quotingBeck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) it is not to be undertaken lightly." (392 U.S. 1, at 16–17)
The reasonableness inquiry takes into account the "nature and extent of the
governmental interests involved", including the general interest in crime prevention,
the officer's specific concern for his own safety, the citizen's interest in his own
privacy and dignity, and the extent to which the particular search in question
intruded upon those interests. "Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be
struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime."
Even searches that start out as reasonable may "violate the Fourth Amendment by
virtue of their intolerable intensity and scope." Thus, the scope of the search must
be justified by the circumstances that led the police to undertake it in the first place.
The stop and frisk of Terry was very reasonable
These principles led the Court to conclude that the evidence found on Terry's
person was properly admitted because the search was reasonable. The detective
had observed Terry and his companions acting in a manner he took to be a preface
to a stick-up. A reasonable person in the detective's position would have thought
that Terry was armed and thus presented a threat to his safety while he was
investigating the suspicious behavior he was observing. The events he had
witnessed made it reasonable for him to believe that either Terry or his cohorts were