Perspectives on Arctic Security and Russian Northern Development

Leo David Joshua Wiltshire

POL401Y5 Y: Senior Major Research Paper

February 25, 2020

 In August 2007, Russian explorers descended in a deep-water vessel and planted a

titanium flag on the North Pole. Although this action was seen as provocative, especially from

Canada’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Mackay, the symbolic action did not merit a

serious claim to the Arctic region. Rather, it sparked curiosity and speculation on whether the

Arctic could become a theatre of warfare over non-renewable resources. Such speculation was

sensationalism because it neglected the existing diplomatic channels that regulated state

behaviour. An intergovernmental organization named the Arctic Council was founded in

September 1996 to address the sustainable development and environmental protection challenges

facing the region (Huebert, 2017). As an intergovernmental organization, the Arctic Council

consists of the following countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia,

Sweden, and the United States. Rather than being an international legislative body, it makes

policy recommendations to member states.

The Arctic Council & Continental Shelf Disputes

There are two problems with the Arctic Council. Firstly, as an intergovernmental

organization, it does not wield power over other member states to ensure that international law is

being followed. In other words, it is not a supranational government that can enforce legal

penalties for state belligerence. Secondly, and more to the point, the Arctic Council does not

address issues of security throughout the Arctic region. This is mostly problematic considering

the ongoing continental shelf dispute between Canada, Denmark, and Russia in the Lomonosov

Ridge. The Lomonosov Ridge is a ridge that rests on top of the North Pole. The ridge, which

rests at the bottom of the earth’s continental shelf, is located within Eurasian-North America.

Scientists are currently studying the features of this region but it is worth mentioning that the

Lomonosov Ridge transcends the limits of artificial human boundaries. Russia has already

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submitted evidence to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) claiming

that its continental shelf extends to this depth. Indeed, Russia is claiming “… a large part of the

Arctic Ocean seabed – amounting to some 102 thousand square nautical miles and extending

right up to the North Pole – [is] a natural prolongation of its territory” (Byers 2013, 107).

Further, up until recently there was an ongoing fishing dispute between Norway and Russia in

the Arctic Ocean around Svalbard. Despite establishing a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic

zone around Svalbard’s perimeter, Norway dealt with Russians conducting freedom of

navigation operations (Sergunin and Konyshev, 2017). Moreover, continental mapping around

the Alpha/Mendeleev Ridge indicates that Canada’s continental shelf may extend within a

bilateral boundary between Russia and the United States (Byers, 2013). Such a dilemma presents

Canada with the opportunity to alter current international boundaries.

Literature Review

In recent discussions of the Arctic region, a controversial issue has been whether melting

ice sheets will result in warfare between countries over oil and natural gas deposits. On the one

hand, Wallace (2019) argue that the Russian Federation is the strongest maritime and military

power in the high north due to its unparalleled ice breaker fleet and reopening of former Soviet

military bases. From this perspective, it appears Russia is preparing itself for military conflict in

order to secure development of all Arctic oil and natural gas deposits. On the other hand,

however, others argue that Russia is primarily focused on developing its own hydrocarbon

deposits that can be found within its exclusive economic zone. In the words of Sergunin and

Konyshev (2017), one of this view’s main proponents, “Moscow is no longer concerned about

the threat of a large-scale nuclear war and now pays greater attention to threats and challenges

that stem from climate change and growing competition over Arctic natural resources and sea

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routes rather than from the military sphere.” According to this view, Russia is not a belligerent

state that seeks imperial conquest of non-renewable resources. In sum, then, the issue is whether

Russia’s military power in the Arctic should raise the concern of western countries or if the

reopening of former Soviet military bases should be dismissed as an act of nonaggression in

Arctic geopolitics.

The astute reader will notice that Russia is involved in many of these disputes. Russia’s

involvement is no accident because it is the largest country in the Arctic region. Further, the

country is the greatest beneficiary of melting Arctic ice. According to a report from the US

Geological Survey (2008), the Arctic may contain up to 30% of the earth’s untapped oil and

natural gas deposits (Kaczynski 2013, 4). The greatest likelihood of these deposits is located

around Russia’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Indeed, one of the greatest

amounts of petroleum can be found in the East Siberian Sea, which has 32% of the Arctic’s oil

and natural gas deposits (Hough 2013, 20). In addition, melting Arctic ice has opened the

Northern Sea Route for merchant shipping. A mostly ice-free Northern Sea route can cut

shipping between London and Yokohama by 7, 359 kilometres (Hough 2013, 22). It is important

to note that although the environmental consequences of the Arctic are working to Russia’s

benefit, such benefits are not fully tangible unless diplomatic cooperation exists between Arctic

countries. Despite historical grievances with Norway and ongoing boundary disputes with

several western nations, Russia has approached these problems diplomatically with the goal of

peacefully resolving them. Despite the modernization of Russia’s military infrastructure, the

Arctic region is surprisingly peaceful and will likely remain so for decades. Thus, the Arctic is

“politically peaceful” yet “economically competitive” (NATO StratCom, 2018). This paper

argues that although the high north is unlikely to break out in military conflict, Russia is

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 651498.56

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19475.43
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7156.25
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1422.28

1342.15
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191.55
Million Barrels of Oil Billion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Million Barrels of Natural Gas Liquids

encouraging diplomatic cooperation among the Arctic 8 and developing its northern military

power to become the regional hegemon of the Arctic Ocean.

The following graph demonstrates the resource potential that can be found in the Arctic

region. The graph visualizes the levels of oil, cubic feet of natural gas, and natural gas liquids

that can be extracted from the region. The evidence below demonstrates that Russia has the

greatest advantage in resource extraction because these deposits can largely be found within its

exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Figure 1.1: Oil & Natural Gas Deposits in the Arctic (Source: United States Geological Survey,
2008)
Why does petroleum deposits in Russia matter to Arctic Security? The discovery of oil

and natural gas matters because it has enabled the militarization of the Arctic. Oil and natural gas

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deposits have encouraged Arctic nations to strategically map their continental shelves so they

can gain an advantage in resource extraction. If such resources do not fall under an exclusive

economic zone, they can be exploited by any country that has the extractive capability.

Establishing territorial jurisdiction among Arctic resources has become important for the Russian

Federation. For instance, the Kola Peninsula houses two-thirds of Russia’s nuclear submarine

fleet and is also a strategic area to detect aerial operations from the Americans (Sergunin and

Konyshev 2017, 173). Since 2011, Russia has also decided to deploy “two ‘Arctic brigades’ …

within the Russian Armed Forces” to protect their national interest (Wang 2013, 20). Russia’s

greatest strength, however, lies in its icebreakers. For instance, the Russian Icebreaker Arctic can

break up to 3 metres of ice (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 175). In addition, Russia is

undergoing a process in which it is modernizing its icebreaker fleet to meet the nation’s security

and economic goals for the 21st century (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 175). Such icebreakers

will allow Russia to conduct civilian and military operations throughout the Arctic region. A

strong naval presence will grant Russia the ability to conduct Search and Rescue Operations

(SARs), pave routes for merchant ships in the Northern Sea Route, and essentially become the

most versatile naval presence to patrol Arctic waters. The following map details the resource and

strategic military zones in Russia’s Arctic. The details below demonstrate that high levels of oil

and natural gas deposits are usually accompanied by a military presence that could deter most

state and non-state actors.

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Figure 1.2: Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. (Source: Government of the Russian
Federation 2010, Hough 2013, Kaczynski 2013, Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, Wezeman 2012,
Wallace 2019, Wang 2014).

Literature Review: Argument

My own view is that Russia is encouraging diplomatic cooperation among Arctic

countries and developing its northern military power to become the regional hegemon of the

Arctic Ocean. Though I concede that the Arctic is unlikely to breakout in warfare, I still maintain

that melting ice sheets in the high north can fuel continental shelf and resource disputes among

Arctic countries. For example, not only has melting ice sheets revealed an abundance in oil and

natural gas reserves, but there have been discoveries in “… some one trillion dollar[’s] worth of

minerals including gold, zinc, palladium, nickel, platinum, lead, rare earth minerals, and gem-

quality diamonds” (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 177). Indeed, the melting Arctic has even

transformed Canada into “… the world’s third largest producer of diamonds” (Huebert 2017,

367). Although some might object that Russia should not be feared as an Arctic military power

(Byers, 2013), I would reply that Russia has already begun to modernize its nuclear submarine

fleet for strategic operations in the high north. This issue is important because the current

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literature on Arctic geopolitics has not incorporated international relations theory of state

behaviour to understand Russian military and diplomatic efforts.

Literature on the Arctic Region has discussed the region’s resource potential, military

build-up, efficacy of the Arctic Council, and continental shelf disputes between different

countries. Although these sources illuminate scholarly knowledge of Arctic geopolitics, there is

no existing source which attempts to predict Russian behaviour and their motivation behind

Arctic development. This paper is meant to bridge the gap between international relations

literature on state behaviour and the existing geopolitical literature on the Arctic to understand

Russian military and diplomatic strategy.

To be fair, the titanium flag operation in 2007 “… symboliz[ed] Russia’s renewed

preparedness to assert itself in its own backyard after the humiliations of Western incursions into

their Slavic periphery and the 1999 war with Yugoslavia (Hough 2013, 24).” This assessment

suggests that Russia might be trying to gain geopolitical influence in a region that could be

essential to its future growth as a nation. Indeed, the lackluster influence of the Arctic Council

has meant that it usually resorts to issuing “soft law,” or non-legally binding principles, among

its member states (Humrich 2017, 155). In political terms, this means that the Arctic is in a state

of anarchy with no existing power that has supreme influence over other countries. The presence

of western countries in the Arctic, especially the United States, has made Russia realize that they

are in a security dilemma (Mearsheimer, 2014). The reality of international relations demonstrate

that Russia is losing influence in Eastern Europe due to NATO encroachment. Further, the

existence of China and the United States in the Pacific Ocean means that Russia may not be able

to gain geopolitical influence in the region. Thus, melting Arctic ice has presented Russia with

the opportunity to secure its last border from western influence. This paper will combine existing

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geopolitical literature on Arctic Russia with international relations theory on “realism,” “nuclear

weapon free zones,” “anarchy,” “seapower,” “hegemony,” “securitization,” and “sovereignty.”

Literature Review: Outline of the paper

The essay combines academic and professional research from government policy makers

to analyze the geopolitics of the Arctic region. Following the literature review, the essay

discusses the assumptions made by realists on state behaviour. After discussion the meaning of

sovereignty in the international system, the paper outlines why states pursue hegemony and the

implications on state behaviour in an anarchic system. The paper illustrates the military

infrastructures of Russia and the United States as well as the need to establish a Nuclear Weapon

Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Arctic. After acknowledging scholarly criticisms on Russian power,

the paper analyzes the importance of sea power in foreign policy as well as trade in oil and

natural gas among Arctic countries. The paper turns to analyzing the securitization model to

contextualize Russian strategy in the Arctic and discusses cooperative efforts between Norway

and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. A summation and reiteration of the paper’s

argument can then be found in the concluding paragraph.

Literature Review: Filling the Gap in the Existing Literature

The existing literature on Arctic geopolitics highlights important issues around

continental shelf disputes, potential resource extraction, illegal fishing, and the emergence of ice-

free waterways. This research is meant to bridge the gap between the geopolitical realities of the

Arctic with international relations theory in order to better understand Russia’s behaviour as an

Arctic country. Hough concluded in his own research that the country felt humiliated by losing

its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe due to NATO encroachment. Such a conclusion

inspires new research in determining “why” and “how” Russia is paving a path for geopolitical

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influence in the Arctic Ocean. International relations theories such as securitization, despite its

partial acceptance in the academic community, will be vital in understanding why a previously

frigid wasteland has become militarized and experiencing greater economic activity. Building off

of existing literature, this paper will emphasize how naval power can be deployed for aggressive

and non-aggressive actions that could influence state behaviour. As already mentioned, the

strategic potential of the Northern Sea Route reducing merchant shipping time and Russia’s

modernization efforts with its icebreakers will make it a formidable adversary for western

countries. It is important to keep in mind that Russia has not acted too aggressively to catch the

attention of the international community in recent years. With that being said, it is clear that

diplomatic cooperation and a quiet military build-up is needed to establish regional supremacy in

the Arctic Ocean.

Morgenthau and the Realist Assumptions on State Behaviour

The Arctic region is not immune to the political and economic problems that exist in

other parts of the world. Indeed, the geopolitical tensions between strong and weak states in the

high north requires a theory of international relations that is not naïve to the realities of hostile

actors. For this reason, it is appropriate to introduce Morgenthau (1985) and his six principles of

political realism. The first principle stipulates that “… politics, like society in general, is

governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 1985, 4). The

actions of statesmen are governed by objective rules that exist in human nature. Human nature is

an unavoidable reality that gives incentives for statesmen to make certain decisions in the realm

of foreign policy. Although other statesmen are unable to precisely predict the actions of the

other, they can rely on the history of a state’s actions to decipher their strategy. Indeed,

“[realism] assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the

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examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts”

(Morgenthau 1985, 4). The foreseeable consequences of foreign policy encourage states to

remain vigilant of upcoming threats and make strategic decisions that can secure their national

security interests.

States can never be naïve in believing that their neighbors consider their own best

interest. Indeed, states can only rely on themselves because, as the second principle of political

realism demonstrates, “… [interests] [are] defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau 1985, 5). The

nature of these interests can either be interdependent or egocentric, but they are always pursued

for the greater benefit of the nation. For this reason, a state may take unethical steps that expose

the weakness of their rivals. Indeed, if provided the opportunity to do so, “… [statesmen] look

over [the] shoulder [of other statesmen] when [they write their] dispatches; [they] listen in on

[their] conversations with other statesmen; [they] read and anticipate his very thoughts”

(Morgenthau 1985, 5). States take these precautions because they are never entirely sure about

what another state could be plotting or scheming for their own benefit. The only principle that is

certain is that states perform actions for their own interest, even if it hurts or benefits other states.

As a result, observing a state’s actions is one of the best ways to secure one’s national security

interests.

The pursuit of interests in international relations is not only rational but politically

expedient to the longevity of a nation-state. The resource data cited earlier demonstrate that it is

in Russia’s best interest to extract oil and natural gas in its EEZ so it can export these goods in

the international system. Pursuing a resource extractive policy can boost the national economy

and possibly encourage resource dependency on Russian energy, but this is an argument that will

be discussed later in the paper. This irrefutable fact in foreign policy leads Morgenthau to argue

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that “[realism] assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category

which is universally valid, but does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and

for all” (Morgenthau 1985, 10). Indeed, it is rational for states to accumulate more of their

interests because the preponderance of power secures a state’s ability to take what it wants

throughout its lifecycle. Interests are thus “…a governing principle [in human nature] ...” and

although the pursuit of interests could sometimes fall in line with altruism, such motivations do

not fulfill the “social duty” of statesmen (Morgenthau 1985, 11). The welfare of the body politic

must be secured first and foremost before the interests of other countries, and if a nation’s

welfare relies on another country’s suffering then statesmen should not hesitate to take this

course of action. Statesmen should not hesitate to secure national interests because power is an

objective tool of domination. Indeed, “[power] may comprise anything that establishes and

maintains the control of man over man” (Morgenthau 1985, 11). If a statesman does not secure

power over his rivals, he cannot be sure that his rival may try to secure power over him. The

power dynamic between strong and weak statesmen is an asymmetrical relationship that should

be avoided because it can control neighboring state behaviour through brute for or phycological

tactics. The state that properly wields power in the international system is capable of

psychologically controlling their enemies rather than resorting to military action. In the realm of

international relations, military power and diplomatic cooperation can be deployed as control

mechanisms over other states.

The opportunity to secure power at the expense of another state’s independence is

morally problematic yet rationally objective. Indeed, states are better off only considering their

own interests rather than concerning themselves with another country’s security goals. The self-

interested nature of foreign policy encourages Morgenthau to argue that “[political] realism

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refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the

universe” (Morgenthau 1985, 13). Although it is preferable for states to pursue morally

ambitious policies that make them revered among countries, they must first and foremost

accomplish their central objective of accumulating power. There is a positive consequence to the

pursuit of power among competing nations. Countries are able to better predict the actions of

other countries when they believe foreign policy is structured to accomplish national security

interests. Indeed, “[nations] are able to judge other nations as [they] judge [their] own and,

having judged them in this fashion, [they] are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the

interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of [their] own” (Morgenthau

1985, 13). It is thus appropriate to assume that a nation-state would try to exploit a another’s

insecurity because the latter would pursue the same strategy against the former if given the

opportunity.

Realism is a conservative school of thought that is appropriate for the study of

geopolitics. Indeed, realism is preoccupied with the struggle for power among countries and it

attempts to explain “why” this struggle is prevalent in the modern world. As his last principle,

Morgenthau writes that “… the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere …

the political realist asks: ‘How does this policy affect the power of the nation?’” (Morgenthau

1985, 13-14). Statesmen always consider this question when developing their foreign policy. It is

thus no accident that the power accumulation of one nation may make others feel insecure, or

one country’s natural resource wealth is another country’s missed opportunity.

Snyder’s Views on Realism

The political landscape of states encourages them to seek power over other countries.

This reality leads neoclassical realists such as Snyder (2004) to argue that realism perceives

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“international affairs [as] a struggle for power among self-interested states” (Snyder 2004, 55).

This struggle is applicable to any region of the world, and the world’s current political

orientation has pitted western countries such as Canada and the United States against eastern

countries such as Russia. Although western countries are unsure about the motivations behind

Russian foreign policy, they can always be sure of their own defenses when a threat is presented

to their national security interests. Despite the end of World War II and the prevalence of peace

in the world economy, “… realism [is] an antidote to the naïve belief that international

institutions and law alone can preserve peace, a misconception that this new generation of

scholars believed had paved the way to war” (Snyder 2004, 55). Indeed, the international system

will never rid itself of possible warfare from breaking out in part because states are never entirely

predictable. In addition, the existence of human nature encourages statesmen to eventually resort

to war as a method of secure national interests. For this reason, “[the] continued centrality of

military strength and the persistence of conflict, even in this age of global economic

interdependence, does not surprise realists” (Snyder 2004, 55). Human actions characterize state

behaviour, and state behaviour will always be charitable or belligerent to other neighbors.

Realism identifies the “main instruments” of state behaviour in international affairs. “[Military]

power and state diplomacy” are the methods in which states “… compete for power and

security” (Snyder 2004, 59). A state is thus never content with its predicament in international

affairs unless it guarantees its own capacity to exploit and control the actions of neighboring

states.

Morgenthau on Sovereignty

The meaning of “sovereignty” in the international system can be ambiguous because

there is a misunderstanding on what it entails. Sovereignty is an important concept for the

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purposes of understanding a state’s jurisdiction and legal limitations. The confusion of the term,

however, is rooted in two issues. Firstly, sovereignty entails an existence in the international

community, and thus refers to international law. States that exist in international law are only

subject to the rules when they have consented to them (Morgenthau, 1985). Thus, if a country

has not consented to a principle in international law, they are not obligated to follow it. Indeed, a

state’s adherence to international law does not entail that they are sovereign, yet this has become

a point of confusion for scholars who attempt to conceptualize the meaning of the term. The

second issue deals with the ambiguity of international law (Morgenthau, 1985). The ambiguity of

international law is vast and open-ended that countries can essentially argue that they have

followed the tenets of the law even though they did not adhere to its intended purpose.

Consequently, international law is merely “guidelines” for nation-states when interacting with

each other. It can be frustrating to understand the identity of a country when their interactions

with other countries may or may not stipulate their sovereignty. Indeed, just because a country

interacts with other countries it does not mean it is sovereign. The only principles of international

law that truly matter are “… rules of interpretation … rules providing sanctions … [and] rules

delimiting the jurisdiction of individual states” (Morgenthau 1985, 329). Indeed, these are the

governing rules that matter most because they do not rely on the consent of other countries. They

are rules that stipulate a country’s boundaries and guide the interpretation of international law.

Thus, the confusion with sovereignty is mainly rooted in consent and ambiguity of international

law.

The meaning of sovereignty in the realist tradition is unambiguous because it clearly

defines the existence of government powers. Countries that are “sovereign” are essentially the

supreme authority within their own boundaries:

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 The statement that the nation is the supreme authority – that
is, sovereign within its territory – logically implies that it is
independent and that there is no authority above it.
Consequently, each nation is free to manage its internal and
external affairs according to its discretion, in so far as it is not
limited by treaty or what we have early called common or
necessary international law. The individual nation has the
right to give itself any constitution it pleases, to enact
whatever laws it wishes regardless of their effects upon its
own citizens, and to choose any system of administration. It
is free to have whatever kind of military establishment it
deems necessary for the purposes of its foreign policy –
which, in turn, it is free to determine as it sees fit.
(Morgenthau 1985, 331).

The astute reader will notice that this definition of sovereignty did not stipulate that a

nation must be recognized by other countries in order to be considered sovereign. The main

ingredient of a sovereign country is its capacity to govern without the interference of other

countries. Its policies are not reliant on another country’s oversight, it can make its own rules,

and its regime can be of its own choosing. Further, this definition entails that a sovereign country

must have citizens, and those citizens are subject to the rules of the government that governs the

territory. Thus, sovereignty is a social entity that comprises of government, its citizens, and laws,

particularly, its constitution.

There are misinterpretations of sovereignty that must be addressed in order to understand

its true meaning. For instance, “[sovereignty] is not freedom from legal restraint” (Morgenthau

1985, 332). Sovereign states have legal obligations not only to their citizenry but to other nations

in the international community. The quantity of legal responsibilities a state upholds in the

international system do not affect its sovereignty. For instance, a state may have legal obligations

not to commit war crimes, uphold environmental regulations, or amnesty to refugees. It is only in

cases where such legal obligations affect the authority of the sovereign nation is where their

sovereignty is destroyed (Morgenthau, 1985). In addition, “[sovereignty] is not freedom from

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regulation by international law of all those matters which are traditionally left to the discretion of

the individual nation …” (Morgenthau 1985, 333). If countries provide consent for international

laws and regulations, their sovereignty will not be affected if a law comes into the domestic

realm of nations. Thus, laws on the sea, commerce, or aviation would not disrupt the sovereignty

of countries because they already consented to being subject to those rules. Moreover,

“[sovereignty] is not equality of rights and obligations under international law” (Morgenthau

1985, 333). If a country faces restrictions on its own military, financial system, or foreign policy

it does not mean it has lost sovereignty. That is because inherent inequalities exist in the

international system, where some sovereign countries have greater freedom than others, but such

freedom does not mean that sovereignty is lost. Thus, it follows that “[sovereignty] is not actual

independence in political, military, economic, or technological matters” (Morgenthau 1985,

333). Although a country would have difficulty enacting the policies it wanted if it faced

restrictions in its economy or military, it would not “… normally affect their supreme lawgiving

and law-enforcing authority within their own [territory]” (Morgenthau 1985, 333). Thus, a

country still maintains sovereignty within its own borders even if it faces resource restrictions,

whether financial or human capital, in national defence or monetary policy.

Mearsheimer on Hegemony

It is now an appropriate time to turn to the meaning of “hegemony” in international

relations. Why is hegemony important to international relations and the survival of countries?

Hegemony is important because it ensures survival. A country that has hegemony will not need

to worry about the belligerence of other countries. Indeed, “great powers fear each other. They

regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate

danger. There is little room for trust among states” (Mearsheimer 2014, 32). There is little

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incentive for countries to trust each other because another country’s suffering could be another

country’s opportunity to thrive in the global economic system. Indeed, a country must always

make sure that it can defend itself from attack, and although warfare between permanent

standing armies may seem initially farfetched considering the economic interdependence

between states, history does not betray statesmen to remain vigilant of possible attack

(Mearsheimer, 2014).

Mearsheimer & Keohane on the Significance of Anarchy

The anarchic system in international relations makes countries insecure about their own

security. Countries still live in “… a world where great powers have the capability to attack each

other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious

of other states and reluctant to trust them” (Mearsheimer 2014, 32-33). Lack of a supranational

government that can mediate disputes between different countries is another problem.

Institutions such as the UN can only go so far in mediating disputes, but it still demonstrates that

there is “… the absence of a central authority to which a threatened state can turn for help”

(Mearsheimer 2014, 33). In this anarchic system, countries are more incentivized to prepare for

war rather than naively trust the open motivations of other countries. Thus, it makes perfect

sense that states believe they are the only ones that can “… guarantee their own survival”

(Mearsheimer 2014, 33). Although military alliances exist, they are usually created as a way to

provide security guarantees to deter the actions of a potential aggressor. Once a state needs

assistance, it is likely that the alliance falls a part because it is not in the best interest of a country

to deploy soldiers for another country’s suffering. Indeed, “[in] the international system, God

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helps those who help themselves … [and] alliances are only temporary marriages of

convenience: today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy” (Mearsheimer 2014, 33).

The pursuit for hegemony in international affairs is perhaps the greatest interest of any

nation in the world. It is the ultimate security guarantee to make sure other countries do not act

belligerent in its own state affairs. Indeed, hegemony is needed for the “maintenance of order” in

the world of anarchy (Keohane 2005, 31). If a country is able to form a “pax” in the international

system, or perhaps even regionally, it will have the capacity to “… create and enforce rules …”

that fall in line with its own interests (Keohane 2005, 31). Although “… the formation of

international regimes normally depends on hegemony …” this conception could also be reduced

to the regional level in the international system (Keohane 2005, 31). The economic activity in the

world requires the power of a single country that can administer benefits and punishments to

belligerent countries. Such an international system would require “… cooperation, which is

[defined] as mutual adjustment of state policies to one another, [and] also depends on the

perpetuation of hegemony” (Keohane 2005, 31). Considering the theory of anarchy, it is

understandable why President Vladimir Putin is insecure about Russia’s western flank being

encroached by NATO, as well as the Arctic being the last frontier for regional security.

For the purposes of this case study, it is not required for Russia to gain power over the

global economy. Indeed, it is only appropriate for Russia to gain control over a specific region so

it can affect the behaviour of other countries. If Russia had the military and diplomatic tools to

control certain parts of the world then it would effectively establish a hegemony in the Arctic

region (Keohane, 2005). This must not be allowed because it can restrict trade among western

countries, as well as pose a proximate security challenge to Canada, the United States, and

Norway. The country’s military and diplomatic capabilities has enabled its ability to go beyond

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all other countries in claiming regional supremacy. This can grant Russia the ability to set the

rules of maritime trade in the Arctic and convince the Commission on the Limits of the

Continental Shelf (CLCS) that its continental shelf claim should be accepted instead of other

countries.

The ability to establish global hegemony would not only be of tremendous difficulty but

it could also not live up to its expectations. Other countries in the Arctic region have formidable

navies that are unparalleled. The United States is the only country that has come close to

establishing global hegemony, and even its navy, with 10 aircraft carriers, has established

sustained power throughout the world. States can sometimes find themselves in a state of fear

that can make the international system more dangerous. It is likely that “the more profound the

fear is, the more intense is the security competition, and the more likely is war” (Mearsheimer

2014, 33). Morgenthau has also referred to this issue previously. The issue is that there is a

security dilemma among countries that cannot be avoided. Countries cannot be entirely certain

why another country is militarizing a region. Although a country may communicate that it is

doing so because they want to update their regional defense, this could only lead to fear

mongering among some observers, For instance, recent discussions of Arctic security in the

United States Senate has demonstrated that Russian military modernization can be blown out of

proportion. United States Senator from Alaska Dan Sullivan (Republican) appeared to be

“alarmist” when he created a misleading graphic demonstrating Russian military build-up in the

Arctic region, mixing “military airfields and the more numerous search and rescue stations into

the same category” (The Arctic Institute, 2018). If Russia is to gain security in the Artic, it is

only appropriate for the country to establish regional hegemony in the region. Yet, doing so

could undercut the efforts of another country to gain security interests in the region.

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Russian Military Infrastructure in the Arctic

These security challenges have major implications for the Arctic Region that exemplify

the divisions between western and eastern countries. Indeed, Russia is the most capable Arctic

power among the Arctic 8 due to its military capabilities and historic achievements in diplomatic

cooperation. The Russian Federation has eight strategic submarines, including a third generation

liquified propelled ballistic missile that can travel 8300 km and “… carry either 4 or 10 nuclear

warheads” (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 182). This missile is a potential threat to western

security because it “… can be launched from under the ice while remaining invisible to enemy’s

satellites until the last moment” (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 182). Moreover, the northern

fleet composes of 11 large surface ships, which include “… Russia’s only aircraft carrier, 3

cruisers and 7 destroyers (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 182). Further, the northern fleet

includes 4 destroyers/large anti-submarine ships, 9 corvettes, 9 mine-warfare ships, 4 landing

ships, 3 nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines equipped with cruise missiles, 8 nuclear

powered multipurpose submarines, with 5 under modernisation, 6 diesel submarines, and one

experimental hydrogen-fuelled submarine (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 182).

Russian Air Defense is also unparalleled by any other Arctic nation. This includes 13 Tu-

142 anti-submarine warfare aircraft and 14 Il-38 maritime patrol aircraft that are “… capable of

long-distance operations (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 182). Russia’s Air defense can be found

in specific areas of the Arctic. These areas include Kola Peninsula, Chukotka, and islands such as

Novaya Zemlya, Franz Josef Land, New Siberian Islands, and Wrangel Island (Sergunin and

Konyshev 2017, 182). Further, these strategic sites are “equipped” with the RS-26 Rubezh

coastal missile systems, S-300 air-defence missiles, and the Pantsyr-S1 anti-aircraft artillery

weapon system (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 182).

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 Russia’s Arctic icebreakers are also formidable. For instance, “[the] Okean-class ice-

going patrol ship, the Polyarnaya (Polar Star), … can break up to 31.4-inch-thick ice. They have

an endurance of 60 days and a range of 12, 000 nautical miles at 20 Knots. They are equipped

with a Ka-27 helicopter and can be supplied with Gorizont UAVs” (Sergunin and Konyshev

2017, 184). This military infrastructure makes Russia the most capable country to travel Arctic

waters without assistance. Russia has pointed out that this Arctic military “… build-up is

defensive in nature …” due to “… the importance of the North to Russia’s future economic

development plans, the increasing permeability of Russia’s vast northern borders, and the

anticipated increase in commercial shipping along Russia’s north as Arctic sea ice melts”

(Sergunin and Konyshev 2017, 184).

American Military Infrastructure in the Arctic

Given Russia’s military capability in the Arctic, there would be great interest in knowing

the United States’ military capability in the Arctic. Does their military power rival the Russians?

It should be noted that “Arctic security concerns play only a minor role in overall US defense

policy” (Wezeman 2012, 10). The United States is able to tackle its security concerns with the

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD “… controls US interceptor

aircraft in Alaska, all Canadian interceptor Aircraft … [as well as] the North Warning System,

which operates air surveillance radars in Alaska, Canada and Greenland” (Wezeman 2012, 11).

The United States only has 2 major airbases that are “close” to the Arctic: Eielson Air Force

Base (AFB) near Fairbanks and Elmendorf-Richardson AFB near Anchorage (Wezeman 2012,

11). Both bases, however, have the fifth-generation F-22 fighter aircraft, one of the best aircrafts

in the world (Wezeman, 2012). In addition, the United States has the US Coast Guard HC-130

aircraft based on Kodiak Island which conducts operations over the Bering Sea and Arctic

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(Wezeman, 2012). They also have Thule airbase, although this site only houses “… a large

intercontinental ballistic missile detection radar …” (Wezeman 2012, 12).

United States land forces in the Arctic are less than impressive. They are not exactly

specialized to fight in Arctic conditions and they are only composed of the US Army Alaska

division (Wezeman, 2012). There is one base that is dedicated to training solders for Arctic and

non-Arctic condition. Indeed, the Northern Warfare Training Center in Black Rapids is

responsible for “… all US Army cold weather training …” and Alaska has a National Guard that

is 1, 850 strong (Wezeman 2012, 12). Although the U.S. Army is conscious of the need to have

cold weather clothing so soldiers can conduct operations, this equipment is usually deployed for

Afghanistan. Nonetheless, this equipment could be useful for Arctic warfare, and the U.S.

Marine Corps also have received training for “extreme cold” operations (Wezeman 2012, 12).

It is undeniable that the United States has the strongest Navy in the world. With that

being said, many of their naval ships are able to conduct operations in “northern weather

conditions” despite “… not being specifically adapted to ice conditions ...” (Wezeman 2012, 12).

The US Navy has conducted operations in the Alaska region, such as the Northern Edge and

Alaska Shield summer exercises. The Navy only had one ship, which was called the MV Susitna,

which was capable of conducting operations through Arctic ice. This ship was eventually given

away to local civilian authorities after testing in 2010-2011. Many of the US nuclear submarines

(not SSBNS) have the ability to pierce Arctic ice from below. Not only is it common for them to

conduct operations underneath Arctic ice, but the Arctic Submarine Laboratory “… is

responsible for developing and maintaining the Arctic capabilities of submarines” (Wezeman

2012, 13). Two submarine ships participated in Arctic exercises in 2011, a camp has been

established 278 kilometres north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, and the “US Coast Guard … regularly

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deploys offshore patrol vessels in or near the Arctic” (Wezeman 2012, 13). There are some

offshore patrol vessels that are meant to operate in Arctic weather, but they are “… not ice –

strengthened” (Wezeman 2012, 13). Moreover, “the US Coast Guard has three large, unarmed

icebreakers capable of breaking Arctic ice; two of them have reached the North Pole during the

summer time” (Wezeman 2012, 13). One of these ships, however, are soon to be

decommissioned due to budget constraints (Wezeman 2012, 13). In all, although the United

States appears to have a naval, land, and air infrastructure for military operations, they are not

adequate for projecting power in the Arctic region.

On the Eastern front, the Russian Federation has invested more planning and finances to

its Arctic military power. Although many of their air defences do not have the ability to operate

in the Arctic due to range capability, they do have 100 long-range Tu-22 bombers, Tu-142, and a

Il-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft (Wezeman 2012, 9). Regarding land forces, Russia has a

naval infantry and an army brigade, as well as an Arctic Special Forces brigade on the Kola

Peninsula (Wezeman 2012, 9). Regarding naval capability, the Northern Fleet is the largest of

Russia’s 5 naval fleets, and are stationed “… at several large naval and air bases on the Kola

Peninsula and along the coast of the Barents and White Seas” (Wezeman 2012, 9). The northern

fleet has nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNSs) which are capable of operating

under Arctic ice and are usually protected by surface ships, an aircraft carrier, and regular

nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft (Wezeman, 2012). Russia has one of the strongest

icebreakers in the world, the 50 Let Pobedy, which is capable of travelling through thick Arctic

ice. In addition, the Russian Coast guard has three Project 97P large armed icebreaking offshore

patrol vessels in the Northern Fleet, as well as “… 20 civilian icebreakers, and several former

navy ships” (Wezeman 2012, 10). Russia is currently going through the process of modernizing

23
some older SSBNSs and then constructing new SSBNSs for the northern fleet (Wezeman, 2012).

Although the Russian Navy has additional plans for expanding their naval presence in the Arctic,

budget constraints will likely hinder their ambitions. In addition, although they ordered four

Mistral class amphibious assault/helicopter carrier ships, one of which were going to be stationed

with the Northern Fleet, the order was eventually cancelled by France. France decided to sell the

Mistral class amphibious helicopter carrier to Egypt due to Russia’s involvement in the Crimean

conflict (2014).

Establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Artic Region

Within the realm of international law, there exists no legal ramifications for developing

or transporting nuclear weapons in the Arctic region. Indeed, although Antarctica has been

established as a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) states have not accomplished the same goal

in the high north. Hellestveit and Mekonnen (2014) have discussed challenges in making the

Arctic a nuclear free zone. For instance, although Finland and Denmark wanted to establish a

nuclear free zone during the Cold War within their own territory, they ultimately accepted

NATO’s suggestion “… to keep the nuclear weapon option open in case a future military conflict

rendered the stationing of nuclear weapons on Danish or Norwegian territory desirable”

(Hellestveit and Mekonnen 2014, 361). Further, proposals for establishing a NWFZ failed once

again in the 1970s because it did not take into consideration the “… Soviet nuclear arms being

held on the Kola Peninsula” (Hellestveit and Mekonnen 2014, 361).

There have been several agreements in establishing a NWFZ in other areas of the world,

such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and Caribbean. The deficiencies in these

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treaties will help this essay suggest a stronger treaty measure that can be established in the

Arctic. For instance, Goldblat (2012) has pointed out that the treaty does not “… [specify] that

the denuclearization provisions are valid both in time of peace and in time of war” (Goldblat

2012, 262). Further, the 1975 United Nations General Assembly made insightful

recommendations for states who wish to establish a NWFZ. These provisions include, but are not

limited to, ensuring that “… the zone would be, and would remain, effectively free of all nuclear

weapons [as well as] the participation of all military significant states …” would be necessary in

enforcing the effectiveness of the agreement (Goldblat 2012, 262). Considering that the current

security challenges facing the Arctic are in 2020, states should endeavor to implement all aspects

of the suggestions made by the 1975 General Assembly.

The military capability, specifically naval power, appears to be more ambitious among

the Russians than they do with the Americans. It should be noted that both countries have

nuclear powered submarines conducting operations in the Arctic. In the case of Russia, they have

already deployed SSBNs and have a nuclear missile capable of carrying several nuclear

warheads. The presence of nuclear warheads in the region should concern observers because it

could theoretically become a nuclear Arctic theatre. Thus, it would be appropriate to make the

Arctic Region into a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) to prevent a future nuclear war

between nuclear powers. NWFZs exist in other parts of the world, and although the Arctic

Council does not address issues of Arctic security, it would be appropriate for member states to

negotiate a deal. This deal would ideally be a ratified treaty that follows the scope of

international law. The United Nations (UN) provided insightful suggestions for states who wish

to establish a NWFZ during its 1975 General Assembly. Existing NWFZs also have several

deficiencies that should not be a part of an Arctic NWFZ.

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 A NWFZ in the Arctic should consider the conditions of the 21 st century, specifically the

melting of Arctic ice and increased trade throughout the region. The UN General assembly in

1975 suggested that the “obligations relating to the establishment of such zones may be assumed

not only by groups of states, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also

by smaller groups of states and even individual countries” (Goldblat 2012, 250). For the

purposes of this treaty it would be appropriate to consult the communities who will be affected

by it. Indeed, a nuclear weapon free zone agreement could be met with consulting the indigenous

peoples living in Canada, Norway, Russia, as well as the citizens of Iceland, Greenland, Sweden

and Finland. This is appropriate because any agreement that is met between countries should not

violate their living conditions, or if it does, they should be compensated. This agreement would

essentially affect the military capabilities of Russia and the United States, as no other country in

the region has nuclear weapons.

Maintaining such an agreement would be easier said than done. Considering the covert

operations from the United States and the Russian Federation, keeping the Arctic nuclear free

will require sustained vigilance. Thus, the UN General assembly had also suggested that “NWFZ

arrangements must ensure that the zone would be, and would remain, effectively free of all

nuclear weapons” (Goldblat 2012, 250). Such an arrangement would neuter the Kola Peninsula

and other nuclear sites in northern Siberia of weapons. It can help curb Russian power because

they would no longer be the premier nuclear state in the region. Forcing them to close their

former nuclear sites would be in the best benefit of all western countries. Although Russia has

mostly been non-hostile, the existence of nuclear weapons in the region is a source of deterrence

for their diplomatic power. A NWFZ would also affect western nuclear capabilities as well, but

26
considering Russia’s robust northern fleet the benefits of implementing this zone would be more

beneficial to western interests.

Despite the potential for cooperation, it is likely that states may not entirely agree with all

the provisions in the treaty. It would be preferential if all Arctic 8 countries join the agreement,

but this agreement would need to be decisive in making the region free of nuclear weapons. The

third suggestion made by the UN General Assembly is that “the initiative for the creation of a

NWFZ should come from states within the region, and participation must be voluntary”

(Goldblat 2012, 250). It would be appropriate for Canada to make the initiative in introducing a

NWFZ not only because it is the second largest Arctic country, but its historical reputation in

peaceful mediation could enable the Americans and Russians to meet at the negotiation table.

Russia and the United States should not introduce a NWFZ because it could be judged that one

were trying to undercut the nuclear capability of another country. Further, it is unlikely that the

United States has the Arctic on its foreign policy agenda due to internal struggles with its own

democracy. Countries such as Canada should introduce a negotiated treaty.

As previously mentioned, the military power of Russia and the United State would be

most affected by a NWFZ. The evidence thus far suggests that Russia might have more nuclear

weapons stationed in the region than the United States, so it would be in America’s best interest

to come to the negotiating table. The third measure proposed by the UN General Assembly is

“whenever a zone is intended to embrace a region, the participation of all militarily significant

states, and preferably all states, in that region would enhance the effectiveness of the zone”

(Goldblat 2012, 250). This would be a great opportunity for countries such as Norway and

Canada to mediate between both the United States and Russia. Norway is geographically closer

to Russia and has greater communication on past negotiated settlements. Canada has a dynamic

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trading relationship with the United States that could enable the former to cooperate on keeping

the region nuclear free.

There is no supranational organization in the Arctic region that can penalize member

states for violating a NWFZ agreement. The Arctic Council would not be appropriate because it

only consists of the Arctic 8 and international observers who have economic interests in the

region. Despite this, the General Assembly encouraged that “… the zone arrangements must

contain an effective system of verification to ensure full compliance with the agreed obligations”

(Goldblat 2012, 250). If one of the nuclear states sign and ratify the treaty, it would encouraged

most countries to agree to its provisions. States often feel pressured by the actions of other states

in the international system to assume global norms. Indeed, countries such as Canada and

Norway would not have much to lose if they joined the treaty because they do not have nuclear

weapons. In addition, although it would be ambitious, it would be appropriate if the International

Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) would be the official body that verified the region as nuclear

free. This might encourage the oppositions of Russia and the United States, but there is no other

international organization that could effectively verify that the region was free of nuclear

weapons.

Although the Arctic Council does not address matters of security in the region, it has

been effective in addressing problems facing the Arctic’s biodiversity and continental shelves.

The cooperation based on scientific observations could pave a way in which all countries could

reach a mutual understanding on creating a NWFZ. The second to last provision suggested by the

UN General Assembly is that “the arrangement should promote the economic, scientific, and

technological development of the members of the zone through international cooperation on all

peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (Goldblat 2012, 250). This can give some leeway to countries

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who require nuclear energy as a source for their military power. If produced responsibly, nuclear

energy is not a threat to any country or region, using it for the purposes of nuclear weapons

would make the region dangerous. Any agreement that restricted the use of nuclear energy in the

zone would not be accepted by most member countries because the energy source has proven to

be a great alternative to oil and natural gas.

One of the major issues with establishing a treaty is whether there should be any time

constrains. It would be appropriate for an Arctic NWFZ not to have an expiry date and ensure the

peaceful longevity of all countries. Indeed, even the General Assembly suggested that “the treaty

establishing the zone should be of unlimited duration” (Goldblat 2012, 250). The treaty would

not be entirely useful if it only lasted five years because countries could eventually reintroduce

their nuclear weapons and decide not to agree to an extension of the treaty. It would be in

Russia’s interest to encourage the unlimited timeframe of a NWFZ in the Arctic because it would

not need to worry about a potential American nuclear strike.

Although the existing NWFZ treaties have effectively kept their regions nuclear free,

they contain deficiencies that could nonetheless lead to nuclear warfare. Golblat (2012) has made

several suggestions that could strengthen future NWFZ agreements. Indeed, he has pointed out

that NWFZ should specify “… that the denuclearization provisions are valid both in time of

peace and in time of war” (Goldblat 2012, 262). This point would especially be important for the

Artic in case a military conflict were to erupt. The Cold War period was one of the most

contentious periods for the Arctic because of the militarization from Russia and the United

States. If there is to be a new Cold War between any other country in the Arctic region then a

NWFZ should indicate that the agreement is valid during times of peace and war.

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 The testing of nuclear weapons should also be prohibited because it can affect the

region’s biodiversity, inhabitants, and tectonic shelves. Despite this, the Treaty of Pelindaba is

the only treaty that explicitly prohibit the testing of nuclear explosives (Goldblat 2012, 262).

This is a gap that should not be tolerated in future agreements. Indeed, treaties should be more

robust to address all aspects of potential proliferation. Only two NWFZ treaties in the world “…

make it clear that the bans cover nuclear explosive devices also in unassembled or partly

assembled forms” (Goldblat 2012, 262). An agreement for the Arctic in the 21 st century should

improve on previous treaties to make sure unassembled or partly assembled weapons are not

used in the region. Some provisions in future agreements could be ambiguous. For instance, the

Treaty of Tlatelolco, which covers the Latin American and Caribbean region, permits “peaceful

nuclear explosions” (Goldblat 2012, 262). Russia or the United States may try to have such

language incorporated in a NWFZ agreement for the Arctic region but it would be appropriate to

prohibit this. A peaceful nuclear explosion would not serve any good to the security tensions

among the Artic 8.

A major point of contention in former negotiated agreements has been whether nuclear

facilities should exist in the NWFZ. This, like previous deficiencies, is a gap for all member

states who are concerned about regional security. Despite this, “nuclear-weapon-related support

facilities serving the strategic systems of the nuclear powers are not banned by any NWFZ

treaty” (Goldblat 2012, 262). If an Arctic NWFZ was implemented this provision would hit

Russia the hardest due to their former Soviet nuclear facilities in the Arctic. Other deficiencies

include the prohibition of attacking nuclear facilities, the denuclearization of maritime areas

adjacent to the territorial waters of zonal states, the toleration of aircraft and naval vessels

transporting nuclear weapons, that withdrawal from a treaty should only occur in an instance

30
where “… a material breach of the parties’ obligations,” that oversight should be implemented to

ensure nuclear power states respect the treaty’s provisions, and the use of nuclear weapons

against zonal states is not unconditional (Goldblat 2012, 262). This would suggest that Russia

and the United States could never use nuclear weapons against each other, because both of their

territories stretch into the Pacific Ocean and Russia stretches into Eastern Europe. Getting a

Republican congress to agree to such a measure would be a tall order, and many of these goals

are already highly ambitious. In addition, another deficiency in existing NWFZ agreements is

that specific punitive measures are not taken against a country that violates the treaty (Goldblat

2012, 262).

Academic Criticism of Russian Power

Although Russia may appear to be the strongest power in the Arctic region, western

academics do not accept the threat Russia poses to western hemispheric security. Indeed, the

broad consensus is that Russia is a slowly declining power in international affairs, and is soon to

fall to the wayside. There are three major reasons which encourage academics to view Russia as

a declining power. First, and most important, is Russia’s demographic problem. Secondly,

Russian intelligentsia has not produced leaders in industry that are innovative or sufficient for an

advanced industrialized country. Thirdly, although Russia’s military expenditures still make it a

formidable power in international affairs, there is reason to believe that these expenditures are

not sustainable and will put great strain on other government services. The strains experienced in

social services could especially encourage unrest among Russians.

Western researchers are sceptical that Russia can reclaim its superpower status after the

fall of Communism in the early 1990s. Population decline remains to be Russia’s greatest

sociological challenges in the 21st century. Indeed, its population has “plummeted” by “6.6 years

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for men and 3.3 years for women …” making the country rank 122 nd “… in the world for life

expectancy ….” (Berman 2017, 37). In general, Russians are dying earlier than their western

counterparts. Any robust country requires its people to have a long life expectancy and for

people to replenish the population. These problems were initially evident during the Cold War

period in the 1970s (Berman, 2017). The problem was never resolved, and as a result “…

Russia’s total fertility rate declined precipitously … by the early 2000s [it] averaged just 1.3 [per

female], far below the figure of 2.1 live births per female required to maintain a stable national

population” (Berman 2017, 37). As late as 2017, the country’s fertility rate improved yet it only

reached 1.7 (Berman 2017, 37). Thus, the country’s declining population poses challenges to its

goals in international affairs. The country’s mortality rate, high levels of abortion, and

emigration to other countries are to blame for its demographic problem (Berman 2017, 38).

Problems which exist in demography have also affected Russia’s knowledge economy. In

turn, this has made the country less competitive with western industries. Indeed, Russia is now

producing poorer quality graduates from post-secondary institutions, which has severe effects on

the quality of skilled workers in Russian business (Balzer 2017, 130). Russian business will have

a pivotal role to play in extracting hydrocarbons from Russia’s continental shelves. Companies

such as Gazprom and Rosneft are leaders in the Russian oil and gas industry. If these companies,

however, do not recruit the right talent that can develop the country’s fossil fuels then the

government will find it harder to fulfill its Arctic goals. Faculty members at Russia’s post-

secondary institutions no longer have the ability to lead their students. Specifically, “[faculty

members are aging, while administrators rarely have training for their increasingly difficult roles.

In some instances, retiring politicians have been appointed to head universities, with at best

mixed results” (Balzer 2017, 130). In this case, it is likely that Russians will attend post-

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secondary institutions in western countries. Although some may return to Russia, others may

decide to remain in the country that trained them. This phenomenon ties in with Russia’s overall

demographic problem. Russia will have difficulty accomplishing its goals in Arctic development

unless it is able to retain its educated working class.

Russian military expenditures will need to be addressed because of its burden on the

overall economy. One western critic has pointed out that “[if] Russia cannot sustain its huge

investment in military power or only do so at the cost of impoverishing its overall economy, then

neither the military buildup nor Putin’s system are sustainable over time” (Blank 2017, 192).

Military building is a source of national pride and is essentially meant to boost the country’s

morale. With that being said, President Vladimir Putin cannot continue to make sacrifices that

severely hinder the Russian people. Russian military buildup is made worse by the prevailing

thought from Putin that “… NATO and the United States [is] trying to force Russia into an

unsustainable arms race …” (Blank 2017, 192). Indeed, Putin is uncertain as to why NATO is

trying to encroaching on Russia’s eastern border. Putin is certain, however, that if he was a part

of a strategic military alliance he would fortify his position to make sure a land, air, or sea

invasion could commence with little notice. In addition, these issues are compounded

considering Russia’s population loss during World War Two, especially Germany’s invasion

from the east. As Morgenthau has said previously, states can never be certain that history will

never repeat itself, and Snyder would agree that conflict between states will exist despite the era

of economic interdependence because human nature permits statesmen to act aggressively.

Russia’s supreme military presence appears to be in the “… Baltic, Ukrainian and Black Sea

theatres that could defeat any current NATO force” (Blank 2017, 195). Needless to say, Russia

would like similar security guarantees in the Arctic.

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Russian Sea Power in the Arctic

The most important component of Russia’s efforts in establishing regional hegemony in

the Artic is its sea power. Without its sea power capability Russia would not be able to conduct

its goals such as patrolling the Northern Sea Route, extracting hydrocarbons from the nation’s

exclusive economic zone, and conduct search and rescue operations during times of crises. The

unprecedented melt of artic ice in the Northern Sea Route will increase maritime shipping in the

Arctic and give Russia the opportunity to implement duties on ships that want to cut down their

shipping costs. It would be in maritime shippers’ best interest to take advantage of the Northern

Sea Route. It has the ability to “… cut sailing between London and Yokohama by 7, 359 km”

(Hough 2013, 22). Generally speaking, the ocean is one of humankind’s greatest mediums for

transportation (Till 2013, 8). Indeed, “… over 90% of the world’s trade by volume is conducted

by sea, and the amount of that trade has hugely expanded over the past 30 years …” (Till 2013,

8). The Arctic will play a pivotal role for maritime trade because it will make previously far

distant locations more accessible. Data from 2005 demonstrates that 7.12 billion tons of goods

are transported by sea (Till 2013, 8).

It is undoubtable that sea power is important to a nation’s foreign policy and national

security. It is appropriate to see a nation’s sea power in terms of its “input” and “output.” The

input of a nation’s sea power is demonstrated by its “… military or economic strength …”

whereas the sea power’s output is a country’s ability to make other countries do what it wants

(Till 2013, 24). Keeping these variables in mind, it is appropriate to conceptualize a definition of

sea power. In terms of a nation’s input, sea power is its “… navies, coastguards, the marine or

civil-maritime industries and … the contribution of land and air forces” (Till 2013, 25). In terms

of a nation’s output, sea power is “… the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people or

34
things by what one does at or from the sea … [it is] the sea-based capacity to determine events

both at sea and on land” (Till 2013, 25). Thus, sea power is multidimensional in that it is not

simply about brute force, but also entails a soft power capability to influence the actions of other

states in different sectors of international relations.

Whether it is foreign or economic policy, the national policy of a country is clearly

defined by its sea power. Due to the level of maritime shipping, a nation’s economic policy is

linked to its maritime policy, and its policy on maritime commerce is linked to its specific

maritime capabilities (Till, 2013). Further, a nation’s foreign policy is usually linked to its

defense policy, so it makes sense that the defense of the nation relies on a country’s military

strategy and, in turn, naval strategy (Till, 2013). The main components of sea power are its

maritime capabilities, either military or civil, how maritime military capabilities influence naval

operations, and how maritime civil capabilities influence commercial operations (Till, 2013). All

of these strategies are interdependent and rely on a country’s naval capacity.

A country’s sea power can have severe consequences on the actions of other countries.

Indeed, because sea power could be used for belligerent actions, regional countries could act to

make sure a state does not intervene to disrupt its interest. For instance, sea power could enable a

country to blockade or raid another country’s ships (Till, 2013). For this case study, it is unlikely

that Russia will begin to raid shippers once it achieves its goal of regional hegemony, but its

ability to do so, as well as its ability to enforce a naval blockade should raise the attention of

western countries. Overall, maintaining a strong naval presence brings wealth to a country, and if

such a naval force is nonexistent then a country could become “politically” dependent on other

nations (Till, 2013). In other words, if a country feels as though it cannot get its goods to market

without the assistance of a stronger country, then it will rely on the naval capacity of that country

35
to transport goods. This is a compromising scenario where the country may need to shift its

national policy to accommodate the country that assists in transporting goods. If one country’s

national policy is not friendly to a country that has the naval capacity to help the weaker country,

then their goods may not get to market.

Trade in Oil and Natural Gas among Arctic Countries

Political dependency can be a serious issue for Arctic countries, especially those that are

geographically closer to Russia. The vital importance of trade means that there could be an

economic dependency between some Arctic countries. Thus it would be appropriate to take a

closer look at the economic relationships between these countries to determine if Russian oil and

natural gas is vital to a country’s economy. Crude petroleum for Finland account for 7.1% of the

country’s overall imports (OEC, 2017). The import value of this crude petroleum is about 4.62

billion dollars (OEC, 2017). Not only is crude petroleum Finland’s highest important, but 81% of

its crude petroleum imports come from Russia (OEC, 2017). This is a 3.72-billion-dollar trading

relationship that is vital to Finland’s economy (OEC, 2017). It should also be noted that 13% of

all Finland’s imports come from Russia (OEC, 2017). This import relationship had a value of

8.37 billion dollars (OEC, 2017). The goods Russia exports to Finland are diverse, such as long

iron pipes (11%), Nickel Mattes (6.9%) and cyclic hydrocarbons (2.7%) (OEC, 2017). Finland is

thus one of the most economically dependent countries among the Arctic 8 on Russian oil and

natural gas. It is in stark contrast to a country like the United States, whose total Russian imports

are only 0.17% of all imports, and 42% of this very small percentage is refined petroleum (OEC

2017). In addition, Russian imports to Canada only account for 0.24% of the nation’s entire

imports, worth about $780 million, and only 16% and 13% of those exports account for crude

and refined petroleum, respectively. Considering both countries geographic proximity to Russia,

36
 8100.00%

7900.00%
10000.00%
9000.00%
8000.00%
7000.00%
Total % of Russian Imports

6000.00%

3600.00%

3200.00%
5000.00%

2600.00%

2200.00%

2200.00%
4000.00%

1600.00%

1400.00%
1100.00%
3000.00%

910.00%
820.00%
2000.00%

120.00%

86.00%
45.00%

42.00%
12.00%
0.00%

0.00%
0.00%

0.00%
1000.00%
0.00%
Fin lan d Kin g do m o f Sweden Norway Un ited Ca n ad a I celan d
Den mark States o f
Am erica

Arctic countries

Crude Petrolium Refined Petrolium Petrolium Gas

it is possible for Finland to move away from Russian oil dependency. Moving away from

Russian oil could dramatically alter its national policy, making it more independent.

Figure 1.3: Dependency on Russian Energy (Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity,

2017)

The graph on page 36 illustrates Russian fossil fuel exports to other Arctic countries. The

astute reader will notice that despite the United States and Canada’s proximity to Russia,

European countries are more likely to be reliant on Russian energy. Arctic countries in North

America have their own industrial capability to fulfill their fossil fuel needs.

It would be appropriate to ask why Vladimir Putin has decided to focus his attention on

the Arctic. His attention in Arctic affairs is not accidental. There are certain advisors, such as the

current Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu who has directed Vladimir Putin’s attention to Artic

Affairs. In addition, the Secretary of the Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, has been

instrumental in having Putin understand the potential of Artic resources. These men have helped

37
Putin focus on establishing policies for developing the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation

(AZRF). Moreover, there are three main governmental bodies that are responsible for creating

Russia’s Artic policy: The Presidential Administration, National Security Council, and Ministry

of Defence (currently headed by Shoygu) (Staun, 2017). There is also collaboration from the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make sure resources within the nation’s exclusive economic zone

are exploited. The Northern Sea Route will also need the proper infrastructure that can permit

maritime shipping. Developing Russia’s Arctic resources and securing navigability throughout

the Northern Sea Route has been granted to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment,

as well as the Ministry of Transportation, respectively. It should also come as no surprise that

Russia’s largest oil and natural gas firms, Gazprom and Rosneft, have encouraged Putin to

develop Artic oil and natural gas (Staun 2017, 317).

The Securitization Model

These factors point to Russia’s security and economic investment in the region. In order

to understand this concept, it would be appropriate to draw on existing literature that can explain

the nation’s interest with the Arctic. In fact, it would not be dubious to suggest that Russia is, as

the Copenhagen School would call it, “securitizing” the Arctic for its own interests. This would

be a rational action considering its melting conditions and extent of the Russian coastline.

Securitization is an international relations theory that is meant to help understand the

policy decisions of political actors. There are several actors within the model that must be

addressed. Firstly, there is the securitizing actor that perceives different variables. This

securitizing actor could be a person or a state, and usually makes investments in a variable (or

variables) to secure its interest. In this model, the variable is referred to as the “referent object”

and can be anything from a region to a commodity (Emmers 2007, 134). When the securitizing

38
actor is observing the referent object, they believe that the object is “… existentially threatened

… [and has] a legitimate claim to survival …” (Emmers 2007, 134). It should be clear that the

referent object does not exactly “die” or is destroyed. The existential threat that the referent

object is experiencing can mean that it is undergoing a change in the status quo. For instance, if a

region is currently within the preferential interests of a country then it would not require

securitization. When a hostile actor issues a policy on that region it could threaten its status quo.

Thus, this would mean that the region is undergoing an existential threat that could jeopardize

the securitizing actor’s interests.

Considering the dilemma of securitization, the securitizing actor believes that

investments must be made to secure its inherent interests. In order for the securitizing actor to

make this investment, it applies “extreme politicization” to the referent object. The referent

object goes through extreme politicization to make sure the actor is alert on why saving it from

an existential threat is important in the first place. Moreover, the concept of “saving” should not

only be understood as a jeopardizing principle, but as a way in which the securitizing actor can

simply secure its interests in order to maintain the status quo (or turn the situation more

decidedly in its favour). Extreme politicization allows the securitizing actor to inform “the

audience” that the referent object “… requires emergency action beyond the state’s standard

political procedures” (Emmers 2007, 133). That is to say, whatever previous investments were

being made to the referent object must now be ramped up in order to secure the securitizing

actor’s interests. The “audience” in this model are the other observers who acknowledge the

referent object’s existence. In international affairs, it is advantageous for the securitizing actor to

persuade the audience that a referent object requires attention because the audience could urge

the securitizing actor to make even more investments for securing the securitizing actor’s

39
interests. In other words, if the securitizing actor could convince the audience that their interests

fall in line with their own interests, then this could increase their probability of securing the

referent object. Indeed, such emergency action means that the state is willing to redirect public

spending or manpower to the referent object so it can be secured from the existential threat.

In the current literature, the concept of securitization can be rather controversial. For

instance, Vuori (2016) has argued that securitization is a “social construction of threats” in which

a “referent object” is under jeopardy by an existential threat (Vuori 2016, 65). Indeed, when

placed in the context of international affairs, the securitizing actor is perceiving the precarious

circumstances of the referent object as a risk to its national interests. The ultimate goal for the

securitizing actor is to make sure the existential threat does not gain a strategic advantage (it is

clear that both are in competition for the referent object) which is why the referent object goes

through a process of extreme politicization. It is in this way that the referent object “… acquires

the status of security through intersubjective socio-political processes” (Vuori 2016, 64). On the

other hand, however, others believe that securitization theory is flawed because of its narrow

focus on state and state actors (McDonald, 2008). There is also the problem that the existential

threat is simply a designation from a securitizing actor (McDonald, 2008). In other words, the

perception of the securitizing actor is subjective because it is choosing to perceive a threat when

it fact the referent object may not be threatened at all. This essentially makes the theory

inherently reactionary which also does not account for non-state actors. In the case of Arctic

security, securitization theory may have trouble to account for terrorists who are trying to gain

access to former Soviet nuclear facilities or the influx of illegal immigrants entering through

northern Russia (Sergunin and Konyshev, 2017).

Cooperation Between Norway and Russia during the Cold War

40
 The following is a section that discusses cooperation in the Barents Sea between Russia

and Norway. Although the issue took decades to resolve, the case gives insight as to how Russia

could cooperate with other countries in the Arctic. Indeed, the resolution created a win-win

scenario for both countries in which they were able to equitably exploit the resources within the

Barents Sea. The issue around sovereign jurisdiction in the Barents Sea arose in the 1970s.

During the middle of the Cold War period the fishing industry was able to effectively catch more

fish, which resulted in greater competition for fishing resources. By 1973, the United Nations

began discussions on whether or not countries should have the ability to establish an exclusive

economic zone (EEZ) around their coastal borders. By 1982, the United Nations agreed that

states could establish a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone which gave “… an exclusive

right to explore, extract and manage marine resources …” (Hønneland 2016, 72).

Historically, the Soviet Union and Norway have had disagreements as to where their

country’s borders existed within the Barents Sea. After initial discussions from the United

Nations on whether countries should have exclusive jurisdiction beyond their coastline, Norway

and the Soviet Union decided to establish their own EEZ during 1976-77 (Hønneland, 2016).

Although these zones were established, there was still the issue of the Barents Sea. Talks during

the 1970s revealed that both countries did not initially agree on a border beyond their coastlines.

Their talks were based on the 1958 Conventional Shelf Convention, which outlined how

countries should establish borders in the sea. Most significantly, the convention stipulated that if

countries were unable to agree on an artificial boundary, then the “median line principle” would

come into effect. This meant that “… the dividing line offshore is determined by the direction of

the boundary on land” (Hønneland 2016, 72). For Russia and Norway, that meant that the

41
median line would start at the land border which gave both countries access to the Barents Sea.

The border would then extend northward to accommodate the EEZ of both countries.

Russia did not want the median line to determine the nation’s jurisdiction in the Barents

Sea. The reasons for the disagreement were both territorial and dealt with security issues. Firstly,

Russia had already claimed sovereignty over several islands that sparsely populated the Barents

Sea. The median line would not recognize Russia’s sovereign claim in these islands, a claim that

went back to 1926. Secondly, and probably more important, the median line would severely

hinder operations by the Soviet Union’s largest naval fleet, the Northern Fleet based in the Kola

Peninsula. Thus, establishing the median line would have forced bases to relocate because the

Soviets would have less access to the Barents Sea. As a result, both countries eventually decided

to establish the “Grey Zone,” which created joint custody of contested regions of the Barents

Sea. Both countries opted for this option as “… a way of organizing the supervision of the two

countries’ fishing activities; it had nothing to do with oil and gas” (Hønneland 2016, 73).

After the establishment of the Grey Zone, Norway and the Soviet Union embarked on

secret talks to establish a better deal. These talks took decades, and were held in such secrecy

that the international community did not believe the Soviet Union and Norway were still working

on equitably splitting the Barents Sea. Thus, it was a big surprise that President Mikhail

Gorbachev refereed to negotiations on a “delimitation line” in the Barents Sea when he was

picking up his Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 (Hønneland, 2016). From that point onward, talks

continued for almost two more decades until both countries finally agreed to the Treaty on the

Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean (2010). Russian

Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, current

Secretary General of NATO, were relieved that the issue could finally end. In the words of Prime

42
Minister Stoltenberg, “[the] agreement will be based on international law and the Law of the Sea.

It is evenly balanced, and will serve both countries” (Hønneland 2016, 75). Indeed, the

delimitation line gave equal access to the Barents Sea and extends northward to consider the

sovereign claims of both countries. The delimitation line, unlike the previously proposed median

line, does not come close to Russia’s EEZ and provides detailed rules on the exploitation of

hydrocarbons.

This paper has explored international relations theory such as securitization and realism

to understand the geopolitical developments in the Arctic. Russia’s focus on the Northern Sea

Route, Arctic military modernization, and investments in extracting oil and natural gas enable

the country to project power throughout the region. Consequently, Russian military and

diplomatic efforts in the Artic will eventually make it a formidable adversary among Arctic

western countries. By bridging the gap between international relations literature on state

behaviour and the geopolitics of the Arctic region, the paper has contributed new insights on

Russian strategy in a region presumptively in anarchy. The existence of a NWFZ would diminish

Russia’s military capability and thus remove its source of deterrence against state and non-state

actors. Despite scholarly criticism of Russian power, it is likely that if Russia is able to extract

oil and natural gas from the Arctic it will export these goods to European markets, which would

facilitate greater dependency.

43
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