"KNOW YOURSELF, EXOwW X0UR ENEMY + A HUDDRED BATTLES, A HUNDZED VICTORIES". Swi tarfc) Syeben of commands *, (4). Physical fitness of the troops. zh @ecenders at all levels to i Pits iean era eedne’ theinesreeeas g The Beview was to be carried out by Lieut Geaeral ‘TS EETDSRsoT ae peas Brigadier FS HiajatT VW. (Chier af the Letter Ho 70212/9/c045, dated (14 Decenber, ‘—annemara T). however, to assgas tho above aspects, it Ls nec@ssary, ot et, to exunine the devolopments end events tna howtit{tios sa also the bulatce, postare, and th of the Urey ct the outbreak of hoctilities. With thig ong Lt will thec be easy to f2liow tue operations 55 well as understand the reasois acd causes for the various + actions and the turn in everte. SATO: Gf THE REVIEW 4 ‘The background of deyelopsests e-d tie polee of the Army Bro pore in the strategie sphere therefore, the concern of a2uy Heniquarters, and, perhsps, that cf the Conzands. The operations iteclf exbrece both the stratecicel os well as the tectiog, amest end hence require exaclnatio: dow to Corps Level aid evon Lower. It would, therefore, tave been canvectent and eee ae trace ee ny warters and then move Gown to Commande for more detmils, sd, ficsllyy ending up With fiel4 foraations for the battle itself. : 5 Review of the functioning of army Headquarters, hovever, hes oot been dealt wit on @ivies of the Chief of ‘he Ary Staff. Thus, perforce, the actiona and develorie=ts at Arey Headquarters have hai be traced from documents available at Comgend Headquarters, Tr thia process, 2 sasber of lovee erda concerning icmy Heaiquerters could not be vorifled and have been left unsaswered. Tho relstions:ip between Defence Ministry end pire Baaidaer tat 5 aod the directions given by the foraer to the di sould, therefore, also sot be exanineds 6 ‘The major leodaarks in the developsents o1 the LiMO-TIBET Bordar, broadly speaking, are as uider:- (a) In Ostober, 1959, the LiDJ-TI:7 Eorder became tho regponsibility of the ancy. This wag as a reailt of Chinese agcressive on at LO fn Tera in fagaats 1959, and at ROTGEILA in LADS: im October, . Doe sect3 % Sv 2.) * (>) The totroduction ofthe "Forward Policy" — J f Novenber/Decsaber, 1961. of p)) Tho curraunding of Gabian Post in nadie |" ELT Ape mErrSS oe GUSTER Post, 2 Lah 8 Septesber, 4962, 4) The raleing of IV Corps and the announcement of i thecentctiek operations — 4 Ootoner, 1962, (@) The outbreck of hostilities on 20 October, 1962. (2) Geace Fire on 21° November, 1962, 7 tt will be seen thet peck of the above events marked | succeselve stages in the border Gevolopments and required strategioal reappraisal at each stage. Thue, it vould ba convenient to eohsider the developments within these stages and at the spprogri ate Levela from Command downwarde. It is gles obvious the developments In EFA wore clo, corélated to those fn LADAKH, and, thus, any study of NEFA operations must be carried owt in Senne with davelop- ments and operations in the Western Theatre. The Review, therefore, enbrases both Western end Bastern Comanda. but, for siuglfettyy each has been studied separataly.. Actiona on one fropt had repercussions on tie other have, however, been corel ated, 8 ‘The Leyout of the Review 1a, tharefore, broadly as undors- ETT (a) GUAPTER T= WESTERY cower This Chapter deals with the ceveloumente end Speratione as viewed freq Wastern Command. (b) = Bas! i This deals with the developments in NEFA upto the outbreak of hostilities, (c) GUPTER TTL — Iv comps This Chapter covers the details of cperstions in EPA and includes, where applicable, the commend and cantzol exercised at various levels fron Aray Headquarters downwards, (4) CHAPTER I¥ — eoigunsrors This Chapter brings out the salient factors and actions that led to our reverses aid the lessons derived fron then, BART EL DRLATLED BEssous io this are included the detatled lessons, snd covers all. ‘the facets, as required in the Terms of Reference. These ore largely in the tactical evhere and are neant for core general distritetion. ; f | TOP SECRETTr Srey oie These tvo incidents vividly poe ‘that the z might of CHIVA had arrived in TIEET meant to gilive ones In conse ee, the tas made re sible for te border, watch’ ao fir, bed Been looked after by police or seni-military forces, . 3 The developments in WEFA will be considered Later under Bastern Commands Only LADAKH will be dealt with 4n this Ghapter. The developments in LiDskH fall into three distinct phases ani hence this Chapter is divided into sections to correspond with the phases as under?— (a) Section 1 = October, 1959, to Novenber/ December, 1961, the tine of z introduction of the "Yorvard Policy". (b) Section 2 . Yoveuber/Decenber, 1961, to zee 20 Ootober, 1962, outbreais of hostilities. ) Section 3 - 20 Ostober, 1962, to 21 November, 1962, the dato of Cease Fares” (a) Section 4 - Conclusion.2 The period October, 1959 = Movember/Decamber, 1961 was mainly devoted to the consolidation by the Army of the territory actually in possession of our forces in LADAIH, It was also a period for appraisal of tho Shinese threat and for planning and Tuilding up of our fotees in tho LADAKH Sactor, 2 dn intelligence appreciation was issued by Arey Headquarters in October, 1959, and this was zolieese up by ‘Opsrationsl pCa "No 2S iesued Fg 1960, It ia significant ths the last opsrats ruction to be iemed by. Koay Weatquirteis ‘waa, therefore, current could be considered the basis of our planning to meet the » t Chinese aggression im 1962. How far short were these arrangements) dn the light of the subsequent build up of the Chinese and other developments on both sides of the border, will be seén in sore detail as oventa unfold themselves. It ig thua inportant that the eae and arrangements then undertalean are studied in some detail, 3 A systematic appraisal was carried out, and, az vo hava een, an intelligence appreciation was made, Based it and ‘tieitation imposed due to the terrain and other factors, taske were allotted, commensurate with the forces that could be indueted into LABAKE, a ‘Thia proces’ of planning and issue of orders was Wndéertalem at successive levels, It would take a great deal ‘of time and space to exagine the planning and orders at each of ‘these levels, Thus these are being grouped together and the general situation Beating in 1959-1960 in LADAKH is boing dealt 7 with in detail. SITUATION TW LADAKH — 1959 = 1960 Shinens threat The Chinese were in the process of paling pee a Serengit and improving communications snd ag #1 i ‘expected that they would bs in a position to laumch a aii offensive during 1959-1960. It was estiwated, however, that the Chinese could deploy over a regiment plus (enanvastt of a brigade plus of ours) with some tanks against LADAEH, The ,main sectors whare opsrations could be expected wera aa undort= i (a) DEMCHOK = CHUSHUL, with main | attack on CHUGHUL with a zeae supported by tanks. (Arrow 4) (b) Battalion group along CHANOCHEMO towards HOT SPHIRG and SAYOE. Carrow 5) Ce} Battalion group on KURAKORAM rout: to LEi. (arrows ¢, Cl and 02). or (ab Battalion group siete EAURIK. Re and B) "oF E eee@- Geasrally, tlorafors; it could be said that the Chinese ~\ cwould sore likely 2imit their ections to border incidents of -Seompany and battalion strength and would hesitate to launch « bigger offensive during ‘this periods z A-total build up of e brigede group with two additional T ani EK Militde battalions was planned by Army Headquarters. ‘Heaiquarters 114 Infantry Brigede was eotablished at LEH on 1 May, 1960, and 7 and.14 J and K Milipia Battalions formed A soreen by establishing a series of forward posts/picquets. The renainder of the 4a Group, however, could not be indasted inte LADART oving-to shortage of air lifts 8 ‘The task: in general given to the Brigede was to reatrict |} any FURTHER (capitel Jettera used for emphasis) Chinese ingrens|| into Indian territery along the INDO-TIGET Border in LADAKH. Atong with this, the particular task eiven to the Brigade vas to bold tho general Ling HURGO ~ TSOGSTSALO = PHORRANG CHUGEUL — DEMGHOE and defend LEX, (Gea Sketch A). Tho sersen established by 7 and i4 J and K Militia Battelfons by middle of 1960 generally fallowed thie lino. (Refer to relevant portions of dray Essdquartera Opsration Instruction No 26 at Annemire &, dray Headquarters Intelligence Appreciation at Annemre 3, and Western Command Operation Tnstruction Mo 25 at Annee 4)+ 9 Arny Headquarters a150 lnid down thet the status quo in the disputed areas should be maintained and patrolling was to be carried cut to ensure that no further iugress was made. (Ainnexares 5 ana 6). The Chinese Clain, as then known, wos }) tho 1954 Tine (Geo Sketch B}- It will be seen that, except if perhapa for DEMCHOX, there was no difference between the ling || actuslly held by us ond the Chinese Glain. The Chinese from . The exact positions were not known, bat it could be olaina. talten tobe DEHRA LA, KONGKA LA, XHURNAK Fort, and. ReER SS (Gketeh A, Line ¥). Tims there was a wide gap between th || forces and a great deal of territory cleined by the Chinese | was not then eecapled by either side. Sosqual race 40 nthe meantime, in 1960, the Chinese had gradually consolidated and strengthened their positions. A reappraisal was, thefefore, made through _ war Tun in Western Command é g “See that cc in October, 1960. This brought a gin Ore division was quired to meet the Chinese thre’ le Recoamendations amerging from this war gama wore forwarded to Aruy Headquarters by Western Command, and, after somo cortesponience between the two Headquarters, a firm domand of @ division with additionel administrative troops was submitted by Western Command in September, 1961. Ho decision on this wat given by Army Headquarters. (Rolevant extracts from Weatern Command Exercise 'SHEEL' Annexire 7, Western Command letter Mo 2519/15/A/08(0pa), dated 29 September, 1951, Annoxire §)+ i Arny Headquarters, by October, 1960, issued a Ui solidered Intelligemee Review on CUIZA’and TISED, bringing ROP sachet il PHOBRANG Horthwards actually held positions well EAST of theirrom whit ote frech impetus in’ 1p voen Border Roads Organi fon took, aver red seine ‘aay or 188 to LEE ws Our ard ach aa waeintained. StTUATIO I Labs IN 961" ‘wn Geplovmsnt = Sentenbor/October, 196% Lae oaly3 one ee ee battalion (1/8 GH) os opainst « brigade ‘inducted into LADAKH during 1951. | Segleynent or oaid Tarentey Brigade, by October, 1961, Was as e a i Ee = & 8 adé in = LEE (b) 147 end EMilitie = EdRAZ0RIM Sector from ee ee & et ae gies Hesiquarters of THIISs te) 1/6 oR —- Middie sector from HOT SPRIWG to CHUSHIL, with Battalion Headquarters aad two companies in GHUSEIL. (a) Vd ma RMitie = Southern LADAKH Sector 4 Te from inclusive DONGTI to rH DENCSOK. ¢ 4 Thus, the line of our poste, in October, i boon | # (a) Headquarters 114 “ nfantey Brig penerdlly omg as for 1860, exoapt that it had extenied to DAW? EEG Gil, in the NORTE, pee a ae DUNGII Sector, and Jans La, in DENCHOR eee in the Enemr_situstion s 15 Wo freeh review wat carried out, but, from the Weekly . Int Susmaries issued arny” Heséquerters, it vas * clear t sa Chinese had fur’ caneai ised ele poaltions and opened ov tracke in the WORTH. Therefore, emcee Ms stronger in aetars 1961, than in October of ‘the’ 28 yee! Comparative situation ~ Chinese and own 16. Tk will be cen that, ty October, 1961, the situation had further been Weighted Jn favour ofthe Chinese. We hed ZUR SEGREonly sanaged-to complete the induction of-one infantry hattalion, and thus there wera, at that time, ome ‘brigade (214 Infantry Erigade) of one regular infantry battalion and two J and EK Militia battalions in+LADAWH, This Brigade 17. All posts were maintalsed by alr drops, except the following, where ‘abefisids had bean oonstrustedt= ee ee (>) GaTEAL (@) FUSCHE near DUWOTE (e) THoTe., 13 These airfields also coincided with the larger garrisons; where, upto two companies, were deployed. The other twanty-four posts were gonarally ‘of platoon strength | oT Lease 19 Tas the deployment in 1961 was essentially one of stating claims and showing the flag rather than for fighting. 20 Qn the othar hand, the Chinese bad opened wu) vehicular voutes upto their Western-most pasts (see Sketch 3), and ale atrengtheasd thes. Their capacity for deployment of forces, therefora, was greater than in 1950. ‘Tras, mach greater ggutien was required for the seperisy of wat forces at this atage than at any time sreviously. nstead, however, st this guneture, the 'Forvard Folloy' vas brougst into teres ‘SUMMARE 22 ‘Tn this Section we have seem thet, after the Aray took over the border, the normal systex of Army plancing and issue of orders was undertaken at each successive Lov Generel poliey and tasks were laid dom aad decaiis wera Left to be worked out at the appropriate levelse 22 The boild wo, However, Decause of Shortage of alr Lift, vas congidersply less than planned. Go the other band, the tests laid dow were also lisited to the means available. 2OP SECRET' MOWEIBSR, Jog] «Bo ogropm, 1982 [rm POLICY" DECTSTON E Government Decision ©1. The kgekground to tha Government's decision on the "Forward ta-not ici. “Nor are the winates of the meeting Laying down the “Forvard Poltcy* available, a A pasting, however, was held in the Prime Minister's office of @ Movember, 1991, and‘vaa attended amongst others by the Defence ‘Minister, tho Foreign Gecretary, the Chief of the Army Staff, and the), ‘Director, Intelligence Burem. It appears that the DT3 was of the opinion thet "the Chinese woula not react to our establishing new posts and that they were HOT LIABLY 10 Ube POOR AGAINST ANY oF OUR POSTS. EVEN I¥ THEY WERE TN A POSTTION TO 10 GO" (in capitals for | emphasis). (Avay Headquarters letter No 71939/05/H01, dated 30 | Dasenber, 1962, para 7, dmncaure 10)- a Thig wae contrary to the military intelligence appreciation, | ga brought cut in the CONCLUSION of Aray Headquarters Anmzal ~Intelligance Review ~ CHINA-TIGET, 1950 - 1993 [annsmure 9); whlch clearly indicated that the Chinese would resist by force any attempts; jito take back territory held by them. ‘het opinion vas given by |) Genera? Staff Branch at the meeting is, however, not kmowe Nevertheless, tha meeting laid dowa three oparative decisions for the iaplementation of the "Forward Policy". These decisions are of ‘ome sigaificance and are, therefore, reproduced in full bolowt= "(m) So far as LADAKH 4s concerned, we are to patrol as fur forward as poasfble from cur preseit positions towards the International border. This witl be dong with a viev to sstebilehing our posts which should prevent the hingse from advancing further snd also dominating from any posts which thoy may have already established in our territory. This sust be done without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese, unless thig becomas necessary In self defence. (b) da regards UP and cther Northern areas, there are not the sane difficulties az in LADAMH, We showld, thererors, of fst 2a practicable, go forward and be in effective occupation of tha whole frontier. where there are any gaps, they mst be covered oither by patrolling or by posts. fe) In view of numerous operations! and afminiatrative difficulties, efforts should be made te postition major concentration of forees atong cur borders in places conveniently situated behind the forward poste from whore thoy could be czintained logietically and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice." To? _secrer(0) above) was obviously a (seve. Without this there could Western Command haf alroady indicated that @ minimum of a division wag required for the effective ~ +: em Beadquarters achion 6 From 2 Hovember, 1961, to 5 Daceubor, 1981, Aray Headquarters took no Gcticn on the Goverament's frerwand Policy" decisions, What €: ‘ad in this period is_not known, bat that there vas 2 major deviation from the Government's decisions ig obvious from the directive sent out by Aray Headquarters to Commnds., This is reproduced in fall below (Ulnnexure 11)t= teh "4 The policy regarding patrolling and establishing posts with reference to TNDO-TIBET Border has recently been reviewed by Government, The decisions taken by Government are reflected in the succeeding paragraphs. I LADAKE, @ Wo are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International Border ea recognised by us. This will be done with s view to natablishing additional posta located to prevent the Chinese from advancing further end also to dominate any Chinese posts alrendy established in cur territory. 3 This “Forward Policy" shall be carried out without getting involved in a clash with tha ‘Chinese unless it ‘becomes neceasary in self—dafences UP_and other Horthern borders 4 As regards UF and other Northern sreas, thers are fot the same difficulties a3 in LADAKH, Wa should, therefore, as far as practicable, go forward and be in effective egeupation of the whole frontier. Gaps should be covered either by patrolling or by postse Esanpreienl of tasks & realise that the application of this new policy in LADAKH and on our other borders will entail considerable movenents of troops with attendant logistical problems. I would Like you to make a fresh ic in view of the new directive from appraisal of your tas! Government, especially with racard to the additional Jogistieal effort involved. Your recommendations in this respect are required by wo by 30 December, 1952s Meanvnile, wherever possible, action should be taken 8 indicated aboves™ TOP BgCRED19: It will be soeu that Lrey Hosiquarters directive 41d not reflect the prerequisite for the "Forward Policy" laid dom in Government's Third Operative Decision. There was also YO astion of Army Headquertara NOE imowing that such bases did — oxist at that time. Thus on the face of it, there appeared = to bo ® situation witch is bard to reconcile. ‘The Government a (who politically must have boen keen to recover territory, & | edvesated a cautious policy} whilst Aray Hoadquarters dictated “ a policy that was clearly militarily unsound. fz } ' iH i nh .. This, to some extent, perhaps explains Army Headquartera delay in sesding cat their directive, Once, the. directive was issued, Aray Egedquerters prossed on with ite iuplenentation, irrespective of the difficulties brought out by lower formations. c (ALYSIB OF TER “FORWARD. POLICE" E The policy virtually intended tho establishing of posts o deminatea the Chinese: positions in cccupied axeag of LADARE, oo | Thug, tn effect, 1t could wean our evantual domination of the | asad Carr Highway. In fact, Army Hoodquartera dia reflect this in a letter in which it was stated "In pursuance of recent orders from Government, it’ was proposed to establish certain poots in AEBAT CHIN and in other parts of IAPAKE in our territory naw, the Chinese". (army Eendquarters letter Ho 57828/T8/HO0, A dated 7 Dacember, 1981, Anmemre 12). 8 This Review ts NOT concerned with the probability of senflict, with or without the "Forward Foliey", but with its introduction the chances of a conflict cartainly increased. Tt is obvious that politically the "Forward Policy" was desirable and presumably the eviction of the Chinese from LADAKH mst always be the eventual ais. For this, there can be no argument, but what is pertinent is whether we were uilitarily in a position at that time te isplerent this policy. 10 That this implementetion would bring stout a major change in the military situation was obvious,and it cannot be viewed now “as being wise sfter the event". Yet, no operational or intelligence appreciation was given out by Army Headquarters bor fresh operation oriera or instruction issued to Commaniss Thig, together with the fact thet the Third Operative Decision of the Government was not conveyed to Commands, literally meant that had to take Army Headquarters directive at ita face value. 8 troops, only to man the additional posta, ware asked for by Western Command, (Western Coumand istter No 2005/10/C/ GS(Ops}, dated 89 December, 1961, Annexarsa 13). Had tha whole of the Governzent directive been conveyed to the Commands, it is almost certain that “estern Command would have brought out their inability to implement the "Forward Policy" till on infantry division as asked for by them had been inducted into LADAKH, There 1s, therefore, no doubt that the L=plementation of the "Forward Policy", in the mannor it was dene, was eprried eut deliberately by aru parteres without the necessary backing, aa Jad dow by the Goveraments OP SECRET2b tee eleosily boon br out that, with the "Forward ‘directive,-no overall ereatl iucteusti ony were dgsued fron FE Arey farters., Indeed, pee everaly: es oe tha probe ‘forvard wis given mia Staet however, e of orders, beth witten and verbal, tha latter, sone he corpo, were given out, from Tine 0 tine, by Ayny Headquarters. f BR ‘The probe Rastwards from our bases con be conveniently divided tuto groups ag under?= (Sketch ¢) | (a) Based on DAULAT BEG OLDI i elong CHIP CHAP River, (Sketch ¢ = PI) f 1 Cb) Based on SULTAN pet ong UNCHARTERED is torsts Sapo, (Sketch C = P2) Ce) AL oer Eiver tovards (Sketch C - F3) (a) Based on PHOBRARG enceee THRETOARCLL toward: WYIMCEI, (Sketch C = P4) (oe) Based on CHUSHUL to (2) Area CHARTSE (aa) Yuba (Sketen ¢ - Ps) (41a) RAZANGLA } (f) Based on KOYIL to 8 = CHATCEA (Sketeh ¢ = Pa) (g} Based on DEMCHOK to (a) TARA LA (44) CHARDINGTA 13 A short account of each of these probes from the time of their initiation is given in the ensuing paragraphs. 14 Erobe based on DAULAT BEG CELDT (Sketoh ¢) (a) Reconnaissance ath @ view to petatitabiag s post wes ordered vide Army Hear 1S458/L/H/TS/M03 of 8 i “Tpe1. ae kaneis ly Paragraphs 1, 2 ami 3). (hd Seccae anna ond bern aes ae) poe mai carr: ur pleme: Boots wero also establisned Ja the areas Ce) The first Chinese reaction was on 22 April, 196, when ona of the observation posts was threatened and had to withdrew, fates the Chinsse eencbisitied thres posts in that ay, TOE _SEGHET } 3 (keteh C = P7)ay te) (a) ~j, &) - (ed ta} (ed @ (g) - Recounadssance-with @ view to establishing = post Gt the head’ of UNCHARTERED River was ordered. vide Arey Noedquarters Jetter No 15458/1/E/P8/M0g of 10 April, 19605 Gunsxure 15, paragraph 3)4 Patrol sont during April, 1962, reached the vLotnity of Chinese post at SUMD0, Arup Headquarters, ride their signal No 152452/H09, dated 23 April, ordored a post by be established by tha patrol in tha area Peacheds~ © sini, (16 GAD Rover urbe (akotchh ©) Reconnatssanes with a view to establishing posta wan orderod vide army Headquarters letter No 15458/1/H/ 78/M03 of 9 Novenber, 1961. {Annexure 14). Eacomeaissance along the River approach vas attempted in winter, but vas nct successful Gonersl Steff Brsneh Arey Headquarters ordered 2 Tecoansissance vie HOT SPRING, vide their letter Bo 15458/1/H/T5/H03 of 10 April, 1962. (annexure 15, peragraph 4)+ Western Command. @ their Mo 2905/10/R/G8 (OPS) Gated 1g May, 152 (innemire 13, paragraph 3) formed General Staff Branch Army Headquarters that, in view of the possible Chinese resections, NO post should be established near SAMAUNGLING (@ALWAN Biver)« Aruy Headquarters overruled Wester Comand Fecomendation Vide their Yo 15458/1/a/T8/N03 of 28 May, 1962, (nnexira 17)0 Shis post wae then established on 5 July, 1992, and subsequently brought upto approximately a platoon strength. It was surrounded by some 70 Chines@ on 10 July, 1968, and gradually they increased their strength to a battalions Western Comsand, vide their signal Hp 08087 of 14 a 2052, (Annexure 18} fecosmended that Land route to GAziAN Poot should not he weed, os that might Fesult in an armed olesh, and asked for air paintenacce: Army Eendquerters directed, vide their aignal Fo ISOS41/0PE RGOM of 14 July, 1962 (Annexure 19), that Maintenance will be carried out by Isnd routes Tané eolums were sent between 15 - 1g July, 1982, but were intercepted and prevented by the Chinese from reachitg the poste 17 = Raped on PHOPRANG (Gxetch C) (a) Tn June, 1962, the Chief of the Aray Staff, whilat on tour in ¥ Corps, approved of the establishment Tor SkCREE~ ef the foitowing posts! Aad a “ta4) ‘SURAEANOLA (Subs equently moved further EAST, as TRPATSANGLA was not found suitable)» (b) Both, thene- posta were established by tha end of Juns, Baged_on GHUSHUL (Eieten ©) (a) Arey Hendsearters divected that = post be established ak Teens Wo 15456/1/8/T6/4/M03 of 7 = Annexure £0). Subsequently, on 14 Deoenber, Jost, Chtet of the lnay Statt, whilst on tour of AV Gorpa, ordered a g gecbien past tp be eeetiaeea et at GLA, This post was established on 15 February, 18é25 (») Various other posts were established around CHUSHUL = Some under oriers of General Staff Branch Aray Beodquarters = othefs to Till the vacwum, in. porsuanee of the "Forvard Policy"+ Thus by June/July EHUSHUL had around 4t the following wain postst= (i) STRIZAP (WORTH of Take PANOONG). (41) YOLA 1 and ge 19 Bazed_on ROVE (Sketch 6) | CHANGLA was ordered to be sstablished by er F Headquarters | yids thoir lettor Mo 15458/1//15/4/M0a of 7 December, 1951 = Annexure 20. "his post of some 12 men was established in December; 1961, | 20 Baned on DENCHOR (Bireton ©) A mambar of minor posts were established around DEMGHOK, pushing forvard the line of actual control. Lina held_by tho onf of July, 1992 (Sketch €) | 91 By the end of July, 1962, we had, in the NORTH, moved forward fairly desp, and, in the central sector around gone upto the vicinity of the Chinese posts. In the SOUTH,’ wa ‘hed established posta at REZETGLA, CHANOLA, and around DEMCHOK upto the International Forders 22 These nev poste, some thirty-six in number, obviously ft further dispersed our meagre resouress and dept our strength — in the vitel basese Thus, whereas we nesded added strength at - Our bases te back up the new posts, we now had wealmesse Chinese reactions 23 This probe forvard also activated the Chinese, With their! much grester resources end easier commnloctions, they set up stronger posts adjacent to ours, and, in many cade, surrounded our posts« 24 ‘Tho two sides ware now within striking distanca of each other. “his race for establishing posts by both aides also Top SRoRerroute part: ‘evented b: Culasge from Brovoeding to (e) July e1 ~ Chinsse Fired on our patrol, hich : wont from the main SIFIJaP Post to ‘@ntablish a sceond post. at pests were threatened, |. BB *hus; by the and of July, 1962, tension had reached & piteh | whore @ small incident could spark off widespread nostilitice, Tr would, therefore, be appropriate to take stock of the military | situation then provisiinr. SITUATION - aUGUST = SEPTxIBER 196p 24 444 Tnrantry Brigute had boen «uguunted by ons addi tfonal infuntry battalion and the Brigade's depleymont in august 1962 Wag a5 Undert- (Sketch D) Zzoona Locations (a) Headquarters: 114 Brigade - Le (b) 5 JaT less ons company - Area HOBRANG — ROT SPRING. c. Ome company 2 ©) 5 ar - area DAULAT BEG OLDI, (a) 1/6 GR wita under command ons platoon sag - area CHUSHOL. (e) 7d and E Militig - Aves EOYUL - DEHCHDE (2) 14 J and FE Wilitia - #fea GHYOK - DAULAT BEG OLDE SOR SECRET15 The above deployment gives an. ‘agsion of concentrations of at or sven tore et the main foral centres. In reality © the-pesition was different, With the probe forward the total ‘Pposta that had come into extatence were in the region ef. 60. Gi-few of those were perhaps upto platoon atrengtiiy the remit jware perforce scetion and below. Even with these very woak posta ‘they bed sbuorbed more than half the garrison strength in LADAZH, thos, tho bases were no Bore than adeinistrative centres with few troope. CHUSHUL with a battalion had the largest single ‘coneeutration, yet it had mo more than « battalion headquarters ani two weak rifle companies. for tha protection of the Airfield, wother installations, and the bage. 114 Infantry Brigade had no ‘guns nor heavy mortars and had only one platoon of UNC. WESTFRN COMMAND REAPPRATSAL Gomeral basi. 28 Our weekness on the ground and the developments in July (4882 wore o oausc of considerable concern to Westurn Csumuni, thers bet ston sybatited te bende taper ry oe aray Head- quarters a pRaisal of the. a in in a5 on it i ae partorn Command letter No 2013/1 /4/es cee) oF TP 1982 = Annexure 21) 2a Tha reappraisal is an important document, az it scts forth realistically the situation then obtaining, and gave recommenda- tions, both short and long term, to ment it, The reaporaieal is reproduced {n full in Annexure £1 and the more important aspects are discussed in the enguing paragraphs, Comparative strengths 30 ‘The Chinesa hs@ 2 well equipped @lyision with susporting arms deployed against LADAXH, Purther, the Chinese had developed Toads to 2ll the important areas they held and ting eould [concentrate large forces et any given place, As against this, 4 } we wera thinly spread-out, with no supporting arms worth the name VI pand with poor commmicstions between the various sectors, Thos, |) | in case of hostilities, we would be defeated in detail. ha. The comparative strbngthe, sector-wise, are given below: | (a) Batter geo ont pector A regimental group againat our thinly spread-out three companies over a frontage of some €0 miles, (b) CHANG CHEN (HOT SPRING) Sector including GALWAN Ares Here again the Chinese had 4 regimental against three companies deployed over a Frontage ot 60 miles, (c) CHUSHUL Sector 4n estimated regimental group, which could be further easily reinforced. Against this we had ons battalion, (a) wr: Seo a = A major throat wag mot visualised, but the Chinese could deploy 2 battalion group. TOE SECRETon s atross the gravity of the ay, of sabes the Flag" and it level for future attion, eatin and is resrohnst belor:. of tha going, it io erative that politieal Ractier. oF tie fee vertagg ie os aioe Te tha tre ure aay there is a danger of creating & situation } where ve lose both in tha material and moral senae / | qwach more than wo already hava. Thus, there is no short ' gut te ailitery preparedness to enable us to pursue f effeetiv our prosent, policy almed at y Tetutling tie I iilegal ie elaim over omar territory, ™ $$ ‘The Jong and stort tora t requirements to meet the Comaitments are. fivem below. gt tire troop (aq) Long term ase rour brigate division, with adequate aupport: sal administrative’ coves aT —_ (b) Short term's poerphy such tine. aoe ae. tha long ty term at remmeset 8 Were tional +; to be seta tely tn indueted a “one (4) Four infantry battalions (14) 0 OBe mountain regiment (442) ‘two companies La bo The reappraisal finally went on te recomund the courses ef action to taken till such time as the strength war adequately made us. These, in main, were ss underr= (a) 4a the prevalling oiMtary sftuation in LanWw was unfavourable, it was Vital thit we did mot preveka the Chinsse into an armed clash. (b) Loses such time ag our etrensth in LADAKH gag Imilt Sep emretiyis with the Chinese, the "forward Policy® ‘held in abeyance, (ec) & a sttatatony pastas solution for the surronndsd Gaba! Post sholtid be sought. (amnamre 81, paragraphs P4, G8 und 21). Army Heudowartora regetions $3 «It ia not known whether this importent document or the Sontents of it were conveyed te the Governnont, There howewer, 2 mecting on ®% August 1962 at which the Chief moe tha aruy gtaff, the General Offic -, Companiing—in-Chief, Western Comsand, and the Chief of tho General Staff discussed the various points raised, Wo simntes of ths mesting wore issued. AQP SECRES‘pet i letter of 5 Sees 1862 from Gemsral Staff Branch catiquarters to featern Command brings out the stand ES (23 Whe Vetter gives the impression that Gonaral Staff Branch ay day Beste rete tle. Hot consider it Likely that the Colaese a nears to sey. ares or aaa nee in epee ‘They ° a letracked- tinin igetcg, argucd on Sortettinoss of ‘tho policy! and iromeally : ‘Forward OnUgh tantended that Page: events had justified the policy adoptod. ‘The immediate. ie redelremat for extra troops was not touched x and the dong tera requirement wae brushed egide, quoting eas Comund theaelves could not erat extra troops * dn LADARE. “the reason for Festern Command rot boing able te eecept extra forces way ersten of erty and this wes o tion eee ey eee before eee troops could , ES'inincted, General Statt Branch arey Headcuartere, however, oo ites that, omitg to shortage of foreign exchange, it war (Gra Boece Gavermient would consider inoressing ti air flat. cele ee eptree ‘No 18a69/1/H/re/mme, duted & peptenbsry = ees ty Lee ak) fabios \note’or: pect eee peel oa tiptoe De eee attributed to an areca pried ty beri Tis te also bone ny thal 2g irc seh, ‘This 4p also borne out by the remark o7 tho Deputy thier Priolating Chis? of ths Gehoral stetr} ta Tdcusenine-tennral ~P, S88, bpd in September 1862 that Wexperionce in DADAKE had shown that a fow rounig fired at the Chiviesa would cause them to Fun away", (Report of Liewtenant-Gencral L.P. SEN, DED - Appendix A, paragvapa 6), 58 Whateve> tha reasoas, (aneral Staff Br: adquarters took little uction 9a Western Comani's Poeommendat. iy eltasr to etrongtaen Lanai or, aaiee ate a » t@ lessen the tension there. On £0 Septenber, 1988, fsaiquarters ordered that no further seeeoant og of posta ey the the Chinese or opcupying of dropping sohes would be tolerated, (Army petinertord signal Ko tbs0/S05 © of 50 September 1862 ~ Anrexure £5}. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS - 4 In ths m mnanttins, tension was building up in NEPA as well. had been surrounded on 6 Septenber, 1268 and a number of firing inet iemisents hal taken pleco, 41 The Defonee Minister held s meeting on 22 September 1962 and the border situation was reviewed. Chier of the Staff considered thai any action us in BOLA Area may wi Fasult in the Chinsse retaliating LADAKH, espetially along ‘the UHCHARTERED River ond the GALWAW River, The Foreign Soeretar; howe¥er, wis ¢f the opinion that the Chinose would mot: react Wory atrongly apainst us in LApARR, He considored that Sesrebinny for cviction of the Chinesa from HEPA should be carried out, evan at the expense of loshog som: territory in LapaKH, ZOR_BECHETSefence Hindstey: thas ‘on tha fyatest of the Chief of aeuy Staff; issued tho iustructionsr , tae Sees ayer re been, av disoussed en previous jeer should are ce the Wainens"outy ip asen ck 08: «The Chief ge ‘ ‘ore, n bray Eeaiquirters to Bot o' ensure the pr tions a2 EFA but. Before amie ‘threat, When both these were proverly, eked thee and then only should any operations TY Ey ee run 44 In LADIEH the Arey was not even prepared to moct a Limited operation was brovgbt out by Western Command, Hiner loss of territory is one thing, but it ds the regponsibility of General Staff Branch dray Houdquarters to ensure that the strength, . deployment, und poise of the arny is adoguite for its security and ita task. hpi rca A cioay oat as aE the mercy of the eneay on the off-chanog that the Letter would MOT reset, dzay Headquarters uetiong 4b It was essential for Cenoral Staff Branch Aray Headquarters at this stage to eurry out s pajor appraisal of the border gituation afd on the Srenersthre:6) and ‘fining for the operationg, They ehould not hive allow cives tobe bestied into fits prepared operations that oak a one lead to disaster, 48 Ag far uz Wastern Command ig concerned the only action taken General Stuff Branch trmy Headquarters waa warn them of the iupending operatious ia NEFA amd the poseibild Limited resotions LADAKH, (army Headquarters sf 160895/0Pe ROOM of £2 September 562 - Annuxure 25), The Socrabire paragraphs of the signal for Wostorn Command are given "for OOC-in-8 Wasterm Command and COC XV Corps (.) the shove action (the evicting of Chinese from i werd) te Likely to have reperctgesions tn LataKH to a. that Cuinsas way attack soma of our formard posts (.) all pests will therefore be alerted and thelr defences strengthened au far as possible {.) if attacked poste will fight it cut and inflict maximum casualties on the Chinese (.) any adjustuents which may be comsidered mecescary to stroagthen our prosont positions may be earrdod oth.” at The pednt of significnwes in the afgait was the strengthen of otr positions ani posts amd the poste to fight it out, ee sounds peu An vier of tha fat that eantees Command » with little gnccesg, since 1950 hea ee and the hecessary airlift and "lopiatical tuntine: strengthening, therefore, could amount to very little, Further, the ordara to "fight it out" to these far-flung, eee unsound and uncoordinated small posta brings out vividly how S02 SEREDtive of ty of the field Sp ana Bei... The Review of Western Commané ves undertden as the “Forverd Pokey" was prinerily introduced to bell: the Chinese claims in LADAEH, the develo te oteantog out of it been oereetay perleee! the General Steff at on Hordquarters end ated to UEFA; it 1a possible ‘thi eel LS SE, desee Ge sokpl Vetaa ast B. we ware better prepared in both theatroa, te 2 an tt riliterity unodind baste of ves, we ‘noted on a poribrten ae not on cur om strength rather on bolisved of resstion from the Chinsse, WeZorgot the age old dictua of the "art of War" sumed up co ently by Fi Harahel Lord i BORRRES = “Tho. art ef wer teashes usa to rely not on the Likelihood of the enemy NOT coming, bat on our own remliness 1 to recelve himy not on the chance of his not sttasiing, tt i Yathar on tho fact. two have made our poeition wisdeailable™. i a... Militi it in uathinkstle thet the General statt ata not adv. Goverment on oer wedluses and dnabili: to ement the "forward Policy". Generel KML in his Peper’ Gepiats Paras GY-69) has broucht out that, on a Humber of occasions in 1961-68, the Government vere aivisad h of ou¥ deficiencies in equipment, manpower, and Logistio gappert, wiich would serionely pre: ec our position in tho of a Chinese attack on us, The fect, howver, remains that orders vere given by the General Staff in Decsdber 1961 for the inpleasntation of the "Forward Policy” without the BPreraqaigite of "4 Hasta" for restoring a mtlit: 1 situation, as Lald by Governsent, Indead General LA | ae COS eal the PMO, time and tgeih; ordered in furthermce / | of eae Worvard Poltoy® the ehidehuest of indlvidaat— /)/ poste, overruling protests mata by Western Comsand, vi 4 Thera might have been Gore mat on by the Defence Mintotey, but it wih the ath of the General Staff to have ! ed out the un: @8 Of the “Yorvard Policy” without means to implement it. ‘Thia was bronght ont Hy foredi G0C-Lo-¢ Western Command in bis letter 7 7 diguot 1963 (insemre 21). Avparently, hovever, the General Steff at NO atege subpitted to the Goverment an aise on the cancaquences of the "Forward Policy" or the basie ' requiremsnt of troops and resources required before it showld have bean implemented, immber of mestings held by the Defonca Winister and attended by 045, binself as CS, BIB ond roprescntatives of Defence, External affaire, and Hone Mintctriea, the genercl tier wes that the Chinese would not provoke 9 Shey-down (appendix 5 General KML in hie revert goes on to state that in a Bera 70). his in strange, beemss militay astion morgea i ‘TOR _S2cHer,erat from both political md military eppreciations, It was 5 dleer ‘tron’ 4900 onwerda the: cutKa hed greatly increased her » foreen in TIMeT, A sewire tee greater than that required «for defoneo or quelling of Tibetian uprising. This was brought out in Gatober {760 in the wiiitary intelligence P5P=-L0y _ Review 1 a To base milit: ations and plese in jardy the security of troops oan sitions ond belli sae across at conference tables ates aither acceptance of the * pelief it omind, The Generel Staff, tieulecty the Cul’ Depety oa the DMO went a step ar a a f Purther fee perpoctel Eels beliel into the ‘aray, with tha , Geastrous ‘© that even field formations vere fnfeoted comploomncy, This ctemed from the fast vith a senge of. that efter 1860 Beenie and detelled steff work to essential for “Higher Direction of War" was never serisudly undertaien, STAFF DUTIES t Where there are nom intangibles, as in war, it is agsentiol thet all facets of a probicm ara # oxenined bef of. higher the level. Sie greater the necessity for a exaninations higher levels must be carried in writing aa the wide range of exerinstion eannot obviously be corared mentally or verbally, Thus, in modern tines, staff has increased as the complexities of war increased, and a system of staff dutios have evolved which enoures a thorough svorai cal end systematic planning before a course of action is adopted, a The detailed steff work thot was carried out before the NORMANDY Operations is common knowledge. Our staff at deny Headqarters is patterned on the War Office in the UNITED EYNGDQM. Our General Staf? with ita Operations, Intelligenca, wok grace Duties Directorates is designed for such detailed 9 Tn fact, till ipew one can sce systenatio planning being | taevied out at cll lovels, Intalligence and operations sppraciationa wera made and plane evolved, in which the taske || Lntd dow vere compatible with the resources evalleble, The I yee worg then tried out through war genes and it was hoped the flave discovered would be put richt, Thio as has been seen was not dene. In 1961 major developments took Place that required fresh wporeleas” st ach stsges These vere eo under (s) The Chineso build up dn TIBET by end of 1960 had substantially increased and was brought out the Military Intelligence Revicw 1950=60. tie required a fresh reeppraisal of our forces end tastes (b) The introduction of the "Forw: Policy" end of 1961. Hefore ite introduction it van omsential ‘TOP BECKEToe 10 Itis erent that none of this planning tock placa and 10 operation orders or fastragtione were iosasd by the General Statf. It was therefore No? possible for Command or lower formations to Lease comprehensive order without a direetive from the Generel Steff. alT that could be dona by Wastern Corum to mect the situation, when the hostilities brolte out, was done, Troops and equipment were depleted frou formations facing PAKISTaT to reinforce LADAKH. " This Lapse in Staff Duties on the part of the chief eur of the General Steff, his athe DMO, Dut, and other “} Staff Directors 15 ihexcurshles Frog thin cteased tha wipreparédnéss ed the unbsalmes of cur forces, These appointments in Generel Staff ere key a::cintmente and officers were hanl-picked Generel KAUL to fill them. ‘There was therefore no quastion of snp clack of poroonalitions General Steff appointments are stepping stones to high commend end co: vegndi oly corry heavy regponsitiitty, When, however, these appointgents are.looked upon as adjuccts to a sacceseful | career and the respongibility if mot teken serigugly, the | fewclts, as is only too clear, are disastrous, This should never be allowed to be repeated and the ateff cs of old mist be mate to bear the coneequenses for their Lepsem snd mistakes, ar ati; the olstakes and lapses of the staff aitting i DELET without tho etree: and strain of battle are more heinous thes the errors sade by samtanders tn the fleld of COURSE OF OPERATIONS 18° The unmilitary potee of our foreas in LaDAKE hes already been too clearly brought out and oesdg no farther @laborgtion, How they ease to be ao pleced hag aieo bees exmined in detail, Por this the respo-at ty lies in the “Etzher Birection of War' CiaoToe ee ogy bs Phe Chinese onployed periizpe o uinimua of a division plus} nraginont in LIDATE and, by concentrating the requisite ~£0i inst our various outposta, liqnidated them, in turn, The Chineos perheps deployed their forces aa undert— % ‘egiment’ plus =- DAULAT BEG GLDI end Boe mS HO? SPRING Sector, (>) Division lens a = CSUSHUL Soctor, Poginant. 4 a) Regiment mins = Tubs Valley sector (ay aa 3 1 er Ao wecinst this, by 10 Koveaber, ve hal upprozinat * saben oat onde A mad. preneetion ting opus, Eut where cur main disedvestage lay was now inductions, which reinforeed CHISHTL defeneas, the reneinder of our troops were diepersed in penmy-paskete in outposts slum entire LaDazH Borders -E: Sector was iscleted frou the other and, “within the Sector, thore were 80 reserves to influence the 15 Thus the battle in the main was individual roste 'fighting it out! end, once overrun, the survivors triciled to 9 focal point in ech Bactor, Efforte were nade to organisa defences at these focal points, but, by then, there waa neither the strength nor the tine to carry it out; and the only recourse was a withdrawal to the rear, 16 Tt was a junior Leaders aod jawans battie ant there iano donbt that they acquitted theaselves well. They fought under grave handicaps snd in face of defeat; yet there Was HO Sign of undue panic and never a rout. The main reason for this wan that troops fought under comanders they Imew end truated, Thore vas no interference or short-cireniting an‘the chain of commend ond commsniers on th: spot were given freedom of antion. Tho good name of ont Arey waa NOT ComplLately marred in LADAKH the grave errors committed by the Gonerel Steff to en omtent mitigated; thanke to the fighting ability of our troopa, Wa must, hovever, ensure that maver agein should cur troops be pleced in such jeopardy, ‘Tass0ns Befonce of LADAEH 7 To LADAKH militarily we will clways remain st a Gisaiventege compared to the Chinese, Cur roads even wien fally developad will not have the eapsctty to metein major operations, Tho road to LADAKH is snow-bound in the winter sod croseaes several mountain ranges varying in heights from 8000 = 15500 feat snd is over 700 miles in Lengths 18 In LADAFH itself our manoeuvrability ig restricted to CHUSEDL and INDUS Valley Sectors, accessibility to DALAT Bd OLDT and HOT SPRING Sectors in the Kanak0nd! Mountains will alwaye be difficult, TOP SecREthave no doubt difficult moming upto the Ribetian pletemm. Once BSeotora ard. easily sccessible from their apacity for’ manoeuvre lo much grester than B sapport ccs Bal y but it in clear that Ga eh additional form of sapport: end rio-will be sore Glearly brought cut from NEFA of our territory in LADsKH or holding the per Peer 18 no denkt he of some 43 q E ff gq sa Gold war positions ment for icing gould NOr be beats of our o ein a eatud. contiion Pleng should be. uade to withdrey these outposts to mejor defences at focal Fointg, a6 Indiested in the previous paragraph, 28 Ghe focal potnts chow bet group aa che ‘ange o ie y Nodeab tbls APE ae adequate ex ery capport to break up mage a’ o Chine Rasorves chould be avelleble to reiniorcs a Sieparinat Sector or clear the eneay who ney have iafiltrated ° Feats draining ood equipgent 24 Our besie training proved adequate md stood the test of battles But our officers end men were unfmiliar with Chinesa tactics, thelr wespone, equipment, ani capabilities, lo directive on werfare egainet the bhinsso had bean isseed by General Staff firey Heaiquerters, Confidence in troops can ol come when they have full knowledge of the cap ities and limitations of the sneyr. The uninown begets fear, 25 There wore comparatively few troops employed and hence shortages in equipment were made np ty Western Command through milicing other units in the Commaid. Ow eguipment, eet nfeda to be suitably modified for ths intense cold 3 a 26 Equipment, clothing, and rationa will bo dealt with under goneral Lossons from both theatres. ‘bogistie supsort ar The mevhinery for the allotment af logistia support, particularly cir, needs hoverhamllinge Targeta were eee ate ae? ee these aes Borer arte ante was 8 craft or supply ropping el en (parachates). Thduetion of troops and stocking was aera behind echedule, It is essential that accurate forecast is made of the logistical support that will be avellable eo that formations can olan reclistically and meet their commitments Secastelys Inflated figures for planning only mean hardship to troops Latore GP SECRETw= ation of militarily the ate is, on ate ThDOATISaY Doldaee ‘The vocle Forder, after this incidast, ves placed usder the control of the inkiee BEF A hed bear protually opened L ation asel sted ty ASSet ee fore, 6 siakience of ener Ny ead coctrol inmost areas of NEPA, “ilitarily, however, it wos stil) a Gloged booky uid this the immediate reqiireneat van for tha induction of sone forces to act as © firw bass for i Ee special, operacion instruction ues issued by iruy 1 aber, 1980, to Bastern Commend, 1 fo estaltich ous rights of poceesoion on our gids of the McHAT0N Line and to % oleo sliotted te Bestern Commend zy Brigaia for thie purpose, together vith the comacod of the a5Sif Rifles operetional pictoona im HEPA. os thelr turn, on 7 Sertenker 1999, prve do: tractions in x Operation Instruction Ho-6, dated 7 Septomber 1959, to 116 Infantry Brigade. The i a the pops Be ae aray Teadeusrters ar * ge B Hit = F 2, a Ameeting wae held in SHILLONG oa 15 Septasber 1959, ‘are the Calef of the Army Staff presided ang, amqngat uthars, Goneral Offieer Comumnding-in—-Chier, Eastern Commend, aid tho Inspeator General of AGS Hiflos vars present, The Hinutes gave out the gonerel polley ta be foliowad, which VGR as under (a) Ho new poste sere to bo estettiched on the HGLAGON Line, “nolther yere tha exiating posta ected ta stay ani fight, in the event of &@ Chinass abe, (b) fhe oxisting posts on tha border choula be of atooa strength, so that they could extricate eeLyes teotically, if necessary, It was also seroed that tie taste of these poste vere Oo act 68 = (1) qyabols of authority; (42) owtposte to pass bade information af the Chinese ketittisa em (se) Shoes forvard posts showld, in the event of an aitegk, Tall tack on firm bases, from voers thoy poral O8 the oifeieives The locstien of the firm bases was to be decided Later, SOD SEoneT reArmy Hondquarters 1014 down tha oie forean vibeoevia the Chinese ag This stressed that the stetus Maintained snd provocative action 18/2/GS/MO1 dated ore ‘tent, of they formed 1g Fe be , tL the introduction en Was the 2b to Western Comandy was current ef the outbreak of hostilii ia, . duportent end relevant to the operations. BALIEUT POLWES FROM OPERATION INSTRUCTION WO 25 (AMNEXURE 27) Chinese throst 8 Tt was considered that the Chinese tn 1960 would not be in a position to lainch a major offensive. They were engaged eolidating tha: 4 over TIBET and opening eon communicatlona, we po In case of hostilities, however, the throat thet could be posed in the Eastern Thaatre WES 85 underse (a) SIREIM - BHUTUF = One divigion () wera @) Western mera ~ Upte two regimante, (1) Eastern NEFA ~ Ons reginent, fm forcen 10) ERWIIT Gorpe had been formed with Headquarters at SHILLONG te Leak after the followings- (a) SCKXIM - BEET Cb) tera (e) AS5aM - EAST PuxTSTaN Border (a) Nagananp i Troops placed under MMIII Corps with their tastes were a8 undert= 4 Iefetry Division = MFA DP or= Ee 25 Infantey Division =) MAQaID 18% Latentey Bright 68 Infentsy Brigada ‘Take portaleing to UPA’ 12 ‘The overall task was to aan eae territory sgaloct BGhineso sggreasions — 15) This van te ba. watelat out one : cothers ee an degen, eat SER is peseee wp.oy aS? os siasias eee ‘gum pecurza =~ ILONG = RGLHG TSU = LOHITPOR ~ HAYULLAMG. In addition, security of a nusber of vilierable pointe ¥ eRe Ee: A to be. Theoe were in main, focal nis, Tonedistalg an devth of the beider outhost 8 were as under (sketch E}s— TOWANG BANG EMMENG Frontier Divisions ERARED LIMEETad SUBANSRE Frontier Divisions HECHUEA 3 TOUTING SLANG Frontier Divisions oon } count aia LOHIT Frontier Divisiong WALONG d HAULING ) 45 Tt will be ssen that @ threastier arstem of defence vas Visuslised in HEPA, Peay contort ee CURT ok oF ‘border on! ee a5 6of sn and controlling routes of ent Theea inertior cutouts were not moant to fight, but to ioe end fell bask to firm bases in the rear, 1? In the eiddle tler wore the wilnershle points on which ‘the border outposts vere endent and to which they would fall back, when attacked, go Vulnerable points ware sufficiently in depth so as to increase the Logistic problema of the Chinese, 78 The lect tier was the "Defence Line", vhere the main pares would ‘bo f a and from where offensive os would in coh gituation. The "Defen tins was gited ao thee he Chinese would bo at a logiseien. disadvantage and thus would he cmnght off balances TOP Scher‘ebrunty 19£1, This dane tempor. Boncire, bat, till tha cutaceak Gf hogeilities in October 005, it wes SHll dn meet che nev eituatica if consiiered necescary. It in glo pertinent ta tring out thet, soon after the Intelligence Reviev was ee the Chief of ths bree et. es eirector: Mere chensd. It vas, therefore, all che more nbceanary for Deseosubadt superseded their Sely”$9e%, poe wen aca basea Tnatrauction Ho 25, rps Likewise: revised their Operation Instraction 4 Infontry Diviaion for NEFA and ismed a fresh one in on 26 XLII Go: to (a) Both Instructions tock cogmisance of the Intelligence Review, but only in co for os to draw attention to ergeilzation and locations of the Chinese forces in TIBET. Tho eqtudl threat browht out was the emo as given in Arey Heed tere Operation Ingtruction Wo 25, that is, upto regimante against Western ‘HEFA end one against Eastera, (b) The planning at cll levels, therefore, continucd to be against ao threat of a division, as againat threo divisions that the Chinese could @ bring sgainst WEF4. This wes time and egain d by various members of the Genera Staff from the Chief of the General Staff downvard during their tours in NEFA during 1961-62, In fast Fidiewled as dlarmict any astion of a greater fores being b against BEFA. ‘The Director of Military Operations as late as pe 1962 openly declared at Healquarters 4 ‘antry Division that the Chinese would pot react end were in oo poeition to fight, peyehologicslly snd otherwisa preparations for meeting amajor threat were never really undertaken, TOP SECRET= ees SETUATION IN WEPa IM 1961 20 Woe have eden tho developments in BEFA in 1960 and ‘the progressive build wp of the Army there. 716 nfantry Brigada was Fiptaoea, by 4 Infantry Division in November/Desesber 1959 gig a formed to lock efter NEFA, ASS, ond WAGAL AMD. 4 Inf Avision was moved out to MAMLAND. Tims, in 1961, we had elaborate defence plana, in astasl fact, we were very ground. How we wore will be o¢en from the deployments. Outposta 31 Fifty S890 Rifles platoons were made available for outposts, Not all the posts were on the WatAHoy Lines a fuaber of platoone vere qanleres. in depth to lock after the line of communicstiona, to act as staging Posts, and alsa to maintain the forward poste. Their deployment vas as fdllowsr- (Sketch B)i= (a) Kaeo Frontier Divicion = Fourtosn posta. (>) SUBMTSRI Frontier Diviaion = Saven poste. (c) SIAN Frontier Division = Eight postse (a) LOHIT Prontier Division = Eight poste. 32 The strength of the posts varied from one te two aboonse Ths, in effect, the border outpost line was estanlt Beplameni on “Wulnorsble Pointe" and mefence Line” 33 (a) 4 Infantey Division with two infantry ber: 2 deployed as under (aketen Bye? Eas was (4) Division Headquarters - TEzpTR (44) Ome infantry brigade = - KamenG Frontd (7 Infantry Brigade) Division, = EOE SECRET(a1 infantzy-brigate = fouainser of 7 rarertey Brigade) HEPA. The dotelIed deployment af 7 Infantry Brigade vas us Followst=-" e (1) > Brigads ess one = TOAIG area. GA) ‘one battalion = BOWDTdy te) the daployesnt of 5 Infantry brigsde vas as fcllowse eiquerterg § = we Tefantay prageds ; = SORE LAMCUPin, | Gi) Gne battalion ~ dren 2Tn6 ~ DOPORTD - . ie suaarant Frontier - Divicion, The ‘| Battelion less tuo = eaten was In at BIRO, and one Sompany es LIMEEING. (iit) One bettalion = dlong the TumUPTTaa Biver (in ST av Frontier Division). Battelion less two companicoa _ cd 4 8G ae ew 7 ates deplore: roe of it at TOUTING tad GELIBG. (lr) One battalion + In LOWY Prontier 34 «Tt wii be oven that the Volnersile Points in most wanes hed upte a company strength, which, consideriag tha troops syallable, vou not unsatiefastory, ] The situation regerding the major bases on the "Defence Line® wes, however, different. In TOWsNo @ wes a brigade lees a battalion, his was the lersest baso on tha “Jofenes Line’, but, considering the threst of two divisions thet hed been bailt up the Chinese in this Ssctor, this strength could not be consider stequate. There was only 2 battdlion st BODILA, the other baco oa the “Defcneo Line" in Western HEFA. Tn Eastern TSFa, TEU and HAXULTANG, tho tyo bases between them, hed ono battclion Less a Bee = herily stoqiste for the groving throat in that es It ig sf interest te note thet WaLONG wes aot on the “Defence Line™, but in the operations the main battle in Eastern NEFA wee fought theres 36 Thus, eg in LADAKH, so in NEFA, we vere herdly in a Position to adopt the "Forward Policy" with ell ite aggressive IE wan cloyted ty Bay Soeibiastene. Page es eat wes waiquarters, once again, a ‘that “Higher Directicn of War" was faslty and it vas paged more on Tit sooLa Hus acis 2 *.. ede elddae Shesae dg? st i. age E nel oe ae ne rial felind (RE ules ld aid clei ag! Hil i nt ytd ye gael taps! ad fol MG ae did de Hilt | afta: in i ne Hi seed Cas oped aint al Hig welll alt fl il ae ts at ae filsji thie Chepter has t out the situation EFA in October 1961 the cartious policy 7 Seotion og it existed followed on the border vis-a-vis the Chinese. Our patrols A Sekine ors were ee eo bepeeeraentye aed ‘they wore ot no time «to aross tha border. In. event of the Chinese crosi our Sein tat wer ecient ace os oa 2 Veo \ being oyersgn or ifthe Chineso initiated a fire-fignt. 2 The “Forvard Policy" in Esstern Commend wea bri 1% into: forca Chief of the army Staff letter Mo 18486/1/i/T3/05. seteabel 2, which wan sidressed to both General ce ae isi, Zostera eu ewers Comm ani : operative Deragrapks astezo Comoend wore paragren! 4 aul 5. Tose paragraphs are reproduced belows- (9) Bocezrenh 4 "hp erde UF and other Northern areas, there are hot the same difficulties ag in LAbatH. We should, therefore, as far as presticable, go forward aid be in effective occupation of ¢: whele frontier. Ges ehould be covered either by patrolliag or by posts," (>) Bemenrosh & "I rodlise that the application of this new polley in LADEN and on our other borders vill @atall considerable movenenta of troopa, with attendant Logistical problems. I iLike you to mada a fresh appraisal of your task, in view of tha directive from Government, gopeclslly with regard to the aidiciosal Logietiowl effort involved. Your recommendations in this respect are required by me by 30 Decamber, i961. Meanwhile, Soe pea e, action showld be taken aa indicated above.” 3 The dotroductioa und anulysis of tha "Forward Poligy" hae glrealy been dealt with under Chapter I, Section 2. It would, however, be useful to brik recapitulate the Government's decizions on the introduction of thiy Policy. Three operative decisions wera taten (Chapter 1, Bectica &, para $). The firet two vere reflected in Ghler of the aroy Staff'e letier to the General Officers Comzandingeine Ghief, Eastern ani Western Commands (Annestre 11), The third Operstive Becigion, woich Laid down the prerequisites for the implementation of the "Forward Policy” was omitted from ths letters Thia, tt will be Tecdllected, streased She forming of major concentrations of fercss along our | TOP sechsneae ie fig R88 i 9 Apt Hd “4 z F é Fe a8 & a : ane a to Wastern Command, This Review having no + Neaiquarters documents and staff is. aot the Teasong or cenges for thie onl geion. va wht oy ap ali furtocr dovelooeent J must be taken note of, ag 2 ents operations wore gravely affected by lack of thes restoring the sufustions . aEeEnE E ct, 2 2 z @ é NEP sen BE Pow General 5. She tomaddate roqsirencnte esked for by Zesteen Gonmand oa fhe inirodastton of the "Worwerd Polieyt, (e) The Government's decision-of the preregaiatte of beving major bades to sapoort tha “Forward Policy" wes elec not mam tO Bastarn Command, (>) Genaral Steff did not deme any upprocistion of the likely Chinese reactions end the method ‘by whieh it wae to be coubateds Besipeeinul Eastera Comand, vide thedr letter Wo eee) ber 1964 to Arsy Hewicuerters (ancemure 31) made Fegppraissl of tasks smi roqirendits as asked for by Chief of the wmy Staff for implemeating the "Forward dey". The main points in the reeporaissl. es fer as HEPA wan concerned ara given below (a) Establishment of poste well forward clong tha Feta Lp ahere4 sere Besleiaadd Lackatls Sappo, ner = gicport asd nelicopters for evacuating casudltien. (ansemce Sip Paras 1 to 4). ie i (b) ately, one more battalion of ssSAt RL aa would be required for manning the forward posta (ce) Engineers were required for the construction ef winter accomoantions (4) To lock efter epprovimataly 630 miles of the BBVA border, 4 Infantry Division was far too Tob sucaETtretehed. Bastezn Conn therefore, required natntemiaé nace brigeaee Fo @ inf - cd Divistons This nowt an-additionsl brigade to permanent. eaont of the three infan aden in € entry Divielon order of battle, at timmy however, @ infantry Division had two brigstos, as the third brigade had earkier oan, sent to NaQALJiD. Thus, in effect, two nore brigades vara required in HPA, Previous sapssguente for Wary | 7 Xt wilt be xecollected thet, after Hzercheo Las Grbd held in éprii’ 19 3, Eastern Commend assesment for WEFA, with | the threat then obtaining, wes for a division of four brigades (Chapter Il, Section 1, Faraz 19 = 30). Defence Siadp Greuy’ted Wy Le Gen Le aki bike secon oe al ence pr ner . OFfiosr H-Chiet, Eastern Commend) to assess the Tequirement for bordey defence, The of the Study Croup was gabaltted to Jimmy Headquarters end Hinistry of Defehos in May 1961. as fer os KEFA and the Chineso threat was concerned, @ munber of recommendations were mada, including such things es Tera SEE eed Intelligences, Command sot up, davdlopient of roads; Logiati besking, and alr support. Ag fer an troop requirements wore concerned, howaver, the report brought Fequiren ‘tlonal infantry aivi sion fon TEVA (annemure 52, Para 20), This recommendation, as will bo geen, Vas made before the introduction of the "Forvard Policy". The action taken on these recomendations can any be known from Hesiquartera but suffice it to say that fresh induotion troops tock place. g In Joly 1961, Genstal Steff reviewed their Emergency ae On Plan, the previous ono having been dram up in 157. A lotter wag sent cut to Commands asking for thei phi demcagr nt tet in View of the changes that had taken place between 1957 1961. ‘The sim of the Expansion Plan vasa to provide shead in peane for such unite and formations as vara eoosldered eseentigl in.an enargency, in order to eustain national war effort, (anneware 33, Paras 1 and & to Te 10 -Easterm Comusnd gave their recomendations vide their Letter Ho pe Ve dated 16 October, 1961 (Annexure 34, Pores 1, 2, and 3). ‘tha Esergenoy Expulsion Plan for Eastern Command was divided inte two parte as underr- Ca) Bart 4 Formations and waite to be ralsed/roorgenised for completing upto acale the existing field foree. This included tha raising of sn infantry divLalon Ear ep it in SIKKIM, a corps head e to gon! the new division and 20° Infan’ Divleton, Which vas then located in RANC=T, tens TOR SECRET“gn 'ebaitdonel infantry division a for EXMIIT Corps, 44) “an dng, ivielon for UITaR ()° antry eee > infantry Brigade Group) (114) dn Chfantsy division for BETA.) only in case i = evr ‘a Ware (iv) dn infantry division for iupai.' } required to "n Thus a total of five info’ divigions vere regzirat epic Sine agrees aod others in time to no an emergency; out of the 1 fer, ona was for HEP * 12 —saeny Headquarters" action/deciolon on Eastern Comend'a recommendations is not avaidlable with Neadquarters Eastern Command, Tt Uy howe een emply clear that from 1960, tima and ‘BE Eastern Comend went on preesing for extra troops. But ti11 ths outbred of hostliitien, UEFA coatiased to have 4 Infantry Division leas a brig: Tt is, therefore, all more herd to underatend the General Staff's decision to inerossa our commitments by the “Forward Policy" rather than reduce thes becaise of the paucity of troops, BOWDSR SITUATIGN IN EFA PRIOR TO "FOsWwanD POLICE™ is It will be recoliected thet fifty a5sa Rifles platoons were deployed ‘on some thirty-ciz outposte, before tho “Forward Policy" waa introduced. A mumber of thees posts were in depth, agting as staging posts, and otherwise eupsorting ths forward poste. 14 The general situation of the forverd posts in HEPA was as unders- (sketch F) (a) KiMEnO Prontion Divieton (14 posts) (1) The as3a4 Rifles posts were deployed to look after Sistas pat tank routes into the Sector, Thess were = (ea) KHEEZIMAHE axis slong the UYH7asGCH iver. {bb) the BUMLA = TOWANG axis. (cc) TULUKNLA axle along COSEU CHI. OR SEcHETTn thease frontier divintons, some twenty-one ota were oyeds of thes twelve poste were tha vicialty of border on the botter known tretiks between TIBET end INDIA, Theso posts were located ss follows: (2). @ forword posts in SUSKNERT Frontier vv Digtetony © (it) 6 forward posts in StaNd Frontier Hivisions (244)" H forvard posts in LOHIT Vrentier Division, Thus, in thane theea frontier divisitns large groas of the border wera not policed, Tits was aeturals pee ey the WEG and N0aTa WSST region of ths + Frontier Division, etromely difficult terr \ becausa ‘of ¢: BLD i our forwerd posts could be located in the ' wid-forward sreas some twenty to thirty miles | short of the border, | PROSE FORWARD Erelininory planning 15 Eastern Gosnand (a) Bastern Command on 10 Junuary 1962 iseued inatroctions to Sar IT ee for the plaining ahd implementation of the “Forward Fold: in NEPA (Annezre 35). The main voints from the tdona era given below: SAD: Piyaeleabe tis eaceetan toceteas pas B Bei ‘poste to be converted into “weather postas Purther, if any change in location of existing posts wos found necessary, in view of tha "Forvard Policy", this was a inphemented. (Annerure 35, Pare 2 (ii) In the ST40@ ond LonrT Frontier Diviatona, there ware fever pasts and most of these Wore G60 distance from the borders Heoowsendations were, therefore, required for pushing forvard of old posta and aa Bev neg. (Atnexure Soy SOR SESREE2s eres 15 Ce)» Thm estathi sine of these ost way be a jas feram the conser that tod fo tebe” roverses in Fa ere concerned, but, ESEEIS Frontier’ PEstae : this Led opectze of the Ds and ts, tharafora, Boot 5 at Gere (a) COCET corms, on 34 Febrascy 1962, recommnied the cpent=s of nine oe ane ot a Wditiss to the cwentyefour vil in tha eaatine, ordered by imy Se: 28 Sammy 1952. (danexice 53) apace DaSee siatahad 5 poe at the Tar S08CRt oh of 4 ‘cht SaWisG Frootier Division of TEBE be ‘ tiie wen che ola 7a SUSCLIGH, ss shown im 7 mag ont ae 1982 and dic oo follow the hed prixeinle}. (be) Graare vere tsemed ty KOGTI Corps for “he eateblitmiest of the teentyofout posts, as given oy ancy Eesiquerters. Tho posta, inclu ths TSE suactt Leter, led to estanl she were not 11} then ordered. it willbe Post. noted frog areqreph 15(e)(i) above that iyphemestixg cf posts in the Tas Frontier Division vas ta fe carried cat vitcost eos Le serso in. Eastern Whe emaloclty of oF ag beeing ee ns oe = £ sana uitiae gies es Sen ty ore aoe (e) on $y Febresy THis s qvotlag was Belt te GIST and wae sbtesd the Chief of the, Beste tee Gamal, Off ieee Comsat ae ia Gkief, Sasser tatives of WOREE Frostiar igensr stratice snd fornaston fa a of establishing these Forward Posts", Worked oct the details of the release oF tha giditionel ‘twenty. Rifles platocas he ‘e Xt was decided thal logistle eupport would coq! te ba the resyonsi tility of the Seeninkede tetntse th Steen ae soces would be Eeepisg in view the celling above which the IMGd Ainways supporticg Ica Rifles sould cot fly (12,000 feet), Finally, the Chief ef tha General Staff reiterated te urgemoy of 48 The esteblidment of these posts cootiased trou March co Ga. The aegn of their move forvard, the eer enniene and the pre ut cm subordinate formstions by aray Eesiquerters For Sie we ourly utabliatmont ateack avert, Serie Rot tase with tho haste and power pa a for the oatablisheant ot the postsy 19 ‘The manner fn which these @ Were eatablished Eeeires detelled scrutiny and it is worthwndte for tho future that P Procedure ia worked out for the estab! ishwent of fc flung posts sore 10 = 14 days! porch from their bases, That many posta went without proper ees, eqairment, or even food for considerdile periods is coumon imowledge in IEFA. 0 The not result is vividly brought out by IV Commander a in bis signal of 16 October 1962 (Anmemre 37}, Thia aignel, after going into the details of aircraft requirement TOP SEGIETSgniend imotiate ordera are tumucd the gitdation of these poste which is areal precarious nay start Es a et: end desertion of 233u07: a “porennne).s =) — - Brom the above, it will bo _nees that, for prongs plansthe and ordesiy progress, it ig escentidl that lover : rormetions are left to execate ordars Without interference £ and undue preagure from drny Headquarters, ee aes ‘ { zi 4 pi F g & E a H B thers ay @lements, including unsensed count: it is eapecially Sy tee eietconmetiona 6a ths’ spot are consulted during the planning stage rather then arbitrary orders given, which are difficult or impossible to execute, 2 As the DHOLA Post was the fooun of the stert of ines. es Indie® hastilities in NEPA, it is important that the back- to tha esteblishment of the DHOLA Post 1s given in ictal, “HLL the introduction of the "Forward Policy" in Becesber =| [ ‘1, the pol ‘dn HEFA in regard to activities in tha vicinity of the Mesali0N Ling wes eo under t= "7a dakar exespt defensive patrolling 7 ia be permitted within to to threa miles eH of tha McfAHOW Line. cn eae ee 0 eatablicshed within tvo miles of ‘HMoanoW Tine, in accordance with parsgraph 2 wbove, then defends pares is permissible in the this post." Para 2 of the letter 4 post could be established NO? more than 2 miles { ‘ag the arow flies from the McMMHON Line. (Heaigquarters Bastern Comand letter Wo 120701/20/4/G5(0) of 9 Tuna 1960 = nnomro 40). 24 The Chinese in Jono 1961 had, it speared, patrolled geross the McMAHON Line some S = 4 miles We? of KHTWZiMANE and hed chown interest in the arom Thus, in Merch 1962, i vith the approacting of the patrolling season, Bastern Come: | on the subject from EVELII Corpa, asked sray foalquarters f Permission to patel the aroa of tho MoNaUN Lins WESE of ! EETWZAMTE, TOP Scanmiles NORTH of the ca The post for various reasons was not established at the old TRY JUNCTION, but et DHOLA Mi 6316. Capt MIRABIR PRASAD of 2 STKE selected and ‘estelilished tha DEA Post with strength of one platoon of ASSJM Rifles on 4 dime 1962, Datelle of pidus Post Bp In ayaa 7? en hone Corps browght to the notica of Bastert gerepancy between the arbitrary. Sing: kraan on Ene arg Gol toe Adie aa it should be ascor: to the waterchod principle. (annexure 42), This letter is aucntenty os it gave the deteiis of the two boundary lines. a points are given belowr- (For location of various fees ee Sxetch H}. (e) The boundary ling printed on the maps had considerable inaccuracies, if the watershed principle and ussge were be applied. : {b) According to log2l inhebitants (grasiers) 2 the political representatives who accompanied the aSS4% Rifles to the DHOLA Fost, the sccepted/ Feeognised boundsry was the one based on the watershed principle. (The letter did not rey as to who accepted/recognissd this boundary line). It was, hovever, common knowledge ehat the NgsaBON Line ‘was based oa the watershed principles TRIeJURCTION, according to the watershed etal; should bo MM Y5R2 and not as ghown in the map MM 7314. fe) There were three tent approaches on the water shod beater lead into our area Detueen KINESIN and the recommended TAt— VUICTIOW WM 7522. The epprosches were ag unders= (4) THAGLA Mi 8717 (ii) KARPOLA II mt asaq (LiL) MaDaliGha Me vaee SGP SHGRETss . EXEITE Corp seccmmended that ot o obowld, be sutesiisnes at THIGA cal tnothor at ary Ot iyi beaver fhe other twa. aa wa cording fof cad bounty wag, in BODE Ganvtay nel Fr pepresettenG of theirs approached Corp: Need quarters: The letter went on to give recomendations for aus eat 1 these posts and also esked for a aout. PF vel of foe ote De Carrie: ae ending appro Eu Pecomendations, Waa intended to carry Sut patrolling between and the Water died ‘Fer wma SE ‘The Lest aeearaph of the Letter 4 of a inportanas da Feproguced balows- rid Bite, in erect, neant that the poat ven actualy HORE of Eno Wotan tee, the post, on the sep, The location ag given out My S13 ves ast SOUTH snd Mi 6 S juot WORTH of the Line. ¢ he Se erton sound te, the ss We Hever re expres till 12 September 1982, 30 Eastern Comand Sonveyed the contents of thig letter to Army Headquarters on 31 August, 1962, Bi godt ineddent of come interest to the ed ty A tatantty STi esTes Oe Bolt sonvey, an on to ID By ern Commend, and Bei artere oh 42 July i968, KAnnosare 45; This then was anther Gane CHU ang the waudea’ Ridge ware sensitive areggs a2 One tember 1962, as 4s welt imoun, DEOLA Port was surrounded oe Chinese, uhs, nd the eva wera reported was bole cere fee im the atone ee eset oP buat was ested in ironkcally herastter a 0 ah: the Latter Bat would have popercussions in Ormers fe TOR spongyThe Chinese, eteking claing os EEA, arma corelated i o F BF re 5, stuzbed the stitas gto in one theatre, Steere eee ontionad in hte Soport the various ae ba yy for increasing the of eee Para 65). The xe, ees, Tendins that Generel Staff showld NOT have | themselves te be pushed inte a militery ienteee without the requisite forces, i] DHGL.A Post was eatablished NORTH of the NctAHOW the Chinese our External Affaire Ministry indicate the UcHAHOH Lines It is also learnt that we tried to clarity the error in our ates. but the Chinese did not accept our Sateitiane The General Steff must heve been well avare of ‘thle: and it was their duty to have pele ag Let Soeas iene regarding the dispute, This vas and the seriousness of the esteblichneat of the Bama Pe: Post wes not fully know to lower formotiona, 36 (Our forward in other areas in WEFA did not figure in the operations, and, therefore, tended to cireansteness ss thay were could be expected to oc - ordera, let dione Tights It is ufplanned actions like if these carried out in haste and imrry that changed | Gisaiplined men inte 2 rabble, ané an ivey into a mobs one a+ ee etaee (1 nf te) Enun oe ‘antry (b) Heedquerters 5 Infantry Brigada (i) One Battalion (20 ana E) (11) One Battalion (3 MapRas) iii) One Battslion (se ZMaom) (iv) 3 RAIPUR (ce) Headquarters 7 Infant: Beigua = q@) One Battalion (9 PUHTaB) (ii) One Battalion (1 SIKH) (444) 4/9 GORKHA RIFLES NORTE LAMP area DOPORIJO ~ ZTRO in the SUBANSAI Frontier Division. ares WALONG - TETT Moved to TOWANG in Mareh/iprll 1961s aeae to FET CHT sivened elemsnte bad resohed LIMPU, while See ae wes out between SHAKTI, LOMLA, and TOWANG. area TOWANG. the outgoing bettclion of the Brigade wan att Battery's mobility wes Festricted to roois eee] wat es where could eosin (2) Seventy-seven ABSA - & ‘ed. ational: i) Hilo fistoona “y nae pid a erty Division along the border outposte, 2 ‘The slew-p ‘ef induction of a inte TOWARD From 1960 to 1988 was due ta the Taltowang ier ‘ (a) A Very Titelted rood cepesity, 1 f-ten toad hed | ‘been completed to To te jest The state ee oats however, could mot tate custained (b) & shortege of toton tracks end Jeeps. Those that were available vere dlao ast In good (c) Limited air support and shortage of sup dropping Snipene (parasites. sia DESCRIPTION OF THE EAMENG FRONTIER DCWEStON Bast GF Towans (Secu K) 3 I$ is nscescary to order to got a true picture of tha conditions to get on idea of the geography of the coun and the tracks. TOWMG is on a ateun segs 10,000 Zest high with higher bills WOHPH of it. Tho tren ta suhMr via 1 winds tha sides of thé plateen dropping ta soma 7250 Sele ig caesar ta oa, runs in the upper One, enters TIBET EAST of KHINZMNE, wer tune through’ ¢ fee, geno 300-400 feet below the shoulders of ths gorge. rom SHAKTE tha track crosses the NaQaMJANG CHU ovar a narrow bridge diffieult for inimsl Franspurt, ond thea, after sous $- Smiles along the river, voera off weer to TOPU. 4 EAST of WATA(IM00 CHV end WORTH of LUMPY is the area of the scene of operations, (See panoramic shotogranh opposite and Seeteh EH). thts ares La domineted by two ve features ‘TOP SBcREEDEDLA gan be Soprented froa two Grestions from an undert= Cay Prom 201 nya Rar = “alone ait aitttent ‘route somo 3 march fron le (b) “Pron NORTH vis HATURGLA ~- Thig route was the F Slong the Ieika car One that vas : eibss quien! sad : end wea dn a Tha diatence in the Soateh botwoen tho various places a mie, thea sre Bg ar short in terms of th the: onsider. oO naa a trae pic therefore, it is | Reeeoary to" bring out the arching between the various \plages, Thesa ars se waders | (a) TOWWNG vie LILA to ~ Three days! | SaeTT i B part (b) aHAKTE to LOGO - One day's march, | (0) LUWPU to DEA = 4 good tro dayat } march for troops and three days for portord. Ab ‘te that tine, however. LUPO ves estinated to be only one day's merch from BHD This in itsel? shows the leck of knowledze then obtaining of that Part of the country even at brigade and Givision level, The nae was bere and eteep, espe: el LOWED end aizfiowlt even for porters, BELIEF OF DHOLA (OPERATION LEGHORN) On 9 September 4962 Eastern Command ordered MMI Corpa to ‘tske firm action to link up with DHL one fact, Rastern Comasnd omiered the damedisto move of 9 PONJAS and the remainder of the Brigade to follow witiun 45 howe, (aanesure a4). TGE_GECHEDThis p tary ordex hed Little practical basis, rt ‘now, fi without. planning end conoideration of logistic erent Piet Mi ie aadoratent, ~The General Officer Prmeang-ta tee eevee Somat ehaneet oat oh ie thet Ghiet of the rng ordering the Brigate for che relief of Diu E MOCT Co: on. 1Septbabe:pointed out to Eaatern (eomiual the undosizabili ty of uncovering TOANG, and that (8 fire decicion could only be taken afte? proper reconnaisomece ‘end appreciation by the Divicional and Brigade Commanders ‘eliminary action was taken by EXEIIE Corps ond 2 BAIPUE ware placed under command of ai Brigede ond ordered nove to TOWANG. 1/9 GORKHA RE (slgo avadting move to peste station) were to be in reserve. cm then on t£11 4 October, when LV Corps under [Lt Gen By EM was fo it was e tug-of-war betveen | Esetern Comsnd and KOULIL Corpse = the former pressing for 2 quick move of 7 Infantry Brigade to DHA craa ond the latter remisting sexy hasty atep being tokone ead by edlling him up for conferences at army Headquarters and Defence Ministry. Unfortusctely, there eppoora to be no telephone Log regarding telesbono conyarsations end Bastern Commatd are not mare soy minutes kept meetings, let aloné iseucd. Thao important decisions at Defence Ministry end Amy Nsadquerters Leyol on Eastern Commend operations cen only be curmtised from actions taken Eastern Command end the General Officer Com. ef"e version of these decisions. It io strange also that arny Feaiquerters during thie porlod did out issue a elngle Gleat-cut oporatich inatrustion. EO apsrecistion of the eGLbLG Chinkse reactions appears to have been made. On a other bh. a feeling vas injected thst there woule be no major re 12 Simtlerly, st Command level, no coordinated instructions wero icouels sak Command, im sost cases, it appeared, tranamitted to § What ves ordered by Amy Hesiquarters. Thus the operations, of necessity, lack a set pattern or continuity. In order trace the operations with some cohesich, they have been deglt with under three heads as under (a) Walon doveloments Under this the policy decisions ty ary Hestyiarters, Beaten Ooniand, ast Carpe will be dLecusned, (>) Ghinses bald up The Chinese build and our intelligence syotem wlll be exaained. TOR SECRETsubmitted thelr appreciation on 12 een evens al ‘The main barits that querged from the appreciation sre.given balove~ (a) Chinese could patie ag papas as etn less a x thrent brought out in the Intelligence Review). OW strength thet etald be maseered immedi. (b) Our om logistic support had to bo based on sir ret commenced, On the other hand, 88 commnications being depeotent omlusively by land they would be &t a disadvantage area to us when show and winter conditions set 1 dhad Thug in winter the Chinese may well have/te reduce thelr commitment, if not withiray altogether, (e) would arctic clothing anf teatage = thee euler ool en ot Sedat oe (a) XGMIT Corps, ‘therefore, recomended that @ force of tvo battalions, b: sit ‘the be covered. (e) Finslly, Corps asked for clear-cut ordara from ‘Com side Move of 62 Infantry Brinsdo 14 In the menntime, 62 Infi Brigade was made available ‘by Aruy Hesiquarters to move to HEPA oz EGMQAR. (annexure 47) Cup BECKER6 He on conference soasing out Aray Keedquartera eee eae Soetio peteittine our posts and petrols 2 fire on Chiness int territory, if the situation justified dt, ‘The other | fa that vere Browsht out - ‘ Ca) Phyatcat contact with DEULA met be nade, ) Government would not coccpt any intrusion & of tha Chinese into cur Liccingpcot hd If they they must be thrown oat by forac, ff € e a By e i thorad: gignsl of 9 September 1962, (o) the ihe are Commander felt that there was somo Goubt in the winds of officers re tng the tho Metso Line of ETRZALOE. He clarified that the Goverment had dwaya Saberebed princishe snd, thirefore, St san.. w we, Lt ran ome ‘the caer pail This DHA was wall (a) Tho demy Comonder then steed that he had pointed out ut DELnr ee at wae Peestions by the Chinese along HEF, Border, where ca gpetlaee wore relatively week compared to Chinese. Govermesnt had accepted this, kate at the sane tine, directed th: should any of our poste be loat, every ort will be peda to retdke then: The DIB who was at the meeting in BELET, in thie Scere Bod stated that he considered thst tha likely Chinese a. ae iH i aE Ai these plates would be re: as under (4) - TUTTNG to bo made up te o battalion strength. (42) “THRSEYG to be veinforcad by a company, cE icnet( (a) | Set ese niet i ee Biaemrhs aries rere fs Ee) the establishment of post at THAGLA, the Foreign Secratery in the mecting at DELHI suggested that we establish ao post pe to the rarest sane re Camaniar, hovever, had considered that t! . should only be dene ‘after the winter. ted oe ed to the use of close ee ior as, se Ba eae ae Dee crue tad i ters shot to try and Spee, egiitiom) support, af att Vii be, open thet there ore 3 cae important and fer- aching points frising out of the DBL and TE2PUR conferences, Those are given (a) ty) Ce} Lee eee ad tae beets Ay a out that the Defence ster gatogortealty stated that in view of tha Top of Lore conferensa NO minctes vould te t. This it appears, waa folloved at all the « apenas het were hela by tha ‘operetionse Hide tava surprising @ Se sis a surprising decision ong which could and did lead to grave consequences. oe ee in the ultimate fe areas anyone of onaibility of any jeision, ot oe coat and did a ton dee Sions boing talks: withott careful and considered thought on ‘the Consequences of those decisions, The Coverments stipulation that any Chinese echoing our territory would be evicted by force, Gni that our territory went upte the THAGLA Hidge lferally meant that tho Defence Minister's i meeting at DELEI-hod PErreky fee: eoned on the Chinssa eviction fran the KAMENG Frontier Davialors A hn gotgi ac that was later given ae in writing Beptenber 1962 by the Goverment. is Army Commander's clarification of tho MeMAHOH sone efficere twed eusniniags “St ie lect tn ho see CPA Nee ear ming stage and after ou eatablisheent of the DHULA Post that XXXII Corps and formations under 4G wero working under the impression that the MeMABOW Line ag such wad as civen in the a then syauetie te. cers ths XOXTIT cane 4 letter of the nosxure 3 ecmeoniing eabh hes sian of posts bpest rial, mantioned the blishnent of a it at the old version of the outa JUNCPIOT a (Sketeh a H). Later, in thedz letter of 15 August 1962 (Annexure 2 atte tha DEOLA Post waa established, XXIII Sorps brought yi ee) and siced for clarification as if posta could be eatabliched on “Yo clarification of the nor ‘detiaion fcr establishing poste ~ wags given till'thip conference, Had a been dona sarliex perhaps ve right have forestalled the Chinese. : Tho azceptance in tote of DIB's estimate of the Chinese reactions aa Saat MECHIRA, and TUTING, unsound, ‘This wat completely against the « of the Defenge Line end was perhepe the stert of frittering are ‘of foreas in forward areas rather “than strengthening the Defence Line, | (0) fhe Forsigh Secretary's mggection of estebliching « waitha Eideo elosngaids the Chine: ANA against tha sa penings in LADAKH, seens te: a. 3S seems incredible, 3 ot ‘The sbows brings out that military decisions mst only to ba teken ty those who ere in the full Inowledge of the allitary situatiom snd can appreciate the tactical implications: i The Stmy Comander followed up the 15. Bop teaber Conference ay another on 14 Septenber. This dealt with éxecutive action $o be teken on the points brought out on 15 September, These wore gs undert= (a) 68 Infantry Brigade less a battelion for JLONG to be initially located at a suitable road/rall head vith of airfield mach 2s TE2PUR or JORHAT, (b) Reinforcing of the places given in 13 September Conference to be carried out with speed. (c) XXEEIT Corps acid to formate a new plan for the ction of the Chinese from our farethort ‘The plah would be.geen by Chief of the army Staff. Hamme of other develooments in TEPS ao The mong st troops and the other developments in REFA, a8 alresiy brought owt, will be diescusged in detail laters juty in order to meintwin the contioutiy of the 2 s. the tevelopaents thet took place between 8 September - Septenbor are briefly described in the subsequent peragraphs, - a 9 PUNJdS had made contact with the DAGLA Post and move af 9 PUNVSS to the DHOLA Area was in progress, Mesnvhile, Headquarters wes prodding Eastern Comiand for the move wf the whole Brigade tc DHOLA, and Bastarn Gomzand, in turn, fan pressing XXXIII Corpo. TOP Cae: ‘the Wi pease the. THAGLA Ridge was far greater fe cores ‘though could be peen on the o jot yet reached. any major proportion, r 7 Agog 83 oe catain ‘the pening ese sea et ae this ed 3 ations Roview) except wh e given in ewtiine ia tne Booman of Evente" issued to ue by dry ore. ‘Be a4 this meeting, once egain, reiterated the Governuent's Gookcion to eviet the Chinese, was hel intruded into HEPA. 5 _-The Chief of the dray Staff gave out the poucitle actions of the Ghinsse as undeurr | (a) ‘The Chiness codld send mre relaferoments to the DHA sren, (>) They could retaliate alseviere, (e) They coulé retaliate in Labatt. 85 The Chief of the army Staff considered that the (Ghinese would most ia react in LiDaKH and captare our post in the GJLWaW Valley and others, ond so achieve their alm of reaching the 1950 cleim line, ‘a7 ‘The Foreign Seeretary, however, considersd that the i se would not react in any strength but, perhaps, would ‘geptare one or two poste, _ i (BB The Chief of the dray Staff then asled for written [instructions of the Goverment to evict th: Ghinose in DHULL areas The followLag Government directions ware then givent- sg "the declolom throughout has been as discnssea at rericus seshinge: thet the fray should prepare and ie ce lie Sylernen tier ne, hart wes rat to teke ection for the eviction of the Chinese in ae ee Diviston of HEFA as soon as he ie re * So | amy Headquarters, in turn, iseued these directions = a8 Bertentar ts68 to"hoth Weotern snd Eastern Commands. Pointe arising out of the meeting 30 It de apparent from the records of tha meeting thet there wes a general focling prsvaltice ‘that there vould bo major reastions by the meses Why this should be co Top seonerGing. ‘bed in dugust written dn no uncertain manner ‘qonsequences of our tailng any provocative sstions Whether the elvice given Chief of the iray Stett B easttetiar was cares a, erationgl ani intelligence fibres th is not Iniwe It 15 ie £. in It wes for the Generel ‘Staff to have mais out a an the B1Lt, ong on a doubtful intelligence surmise is freaking all precepte of war ana daviting gure disasters EERIE Come phen for evistion of the chinese Whilst theee developments were taking plase end Fuad? dof uitry Seigete' Commenters cate caneeieg” ent mashders & slagsnces and formulating a plan for the srhotron Desay In 50 Septenber 1962, MOCIE Corps forwarded their eiqasrters Eastern Command. (annexure 49). J stipulations were msde, before the plan could be The plan and the stipulations are discussed in paragrephes She Plsn fa) The Be enviesged a limited task of securing a te J across the MAMKA CHU River and cleart, the Chiness from those areas. 7 Infantry Brig: io Would require three infantry battalions, a b: Ley plus of guns, and a company of 0G Tor lie (b) It will teeen that this plon only dealt with ‘the action sgainst the ese in the THABLA 4rea and did not cover the defence aspect in the reaalnder of tho KAMENG Frontier Divicich, This ip widerstaniable, as the Commander in the conferencs on 14 Soptembar only required B from the a ih a. E ag pe for the eviction of the Chinssa aFoas (ec) The execution of the plan was dependent upon the ert of tha logistic build up, but it was enviesged troops could concentrate by 10 Octaber iyae, TOP _SeGneT0 Siinetonn “eoveriag letter. The main ones ore as unsers- fe) aera yhion could start was 10 October Pha stipulations laid down wera brought eat in the the 4062, ana the iatest by 15 October fake tha Lattet date wea finedon the basis that, softer = _ that dete, there would not bo cuffivien' to build winter shelters-for the troope io } arets tb) the tion to oogmend a niniwam fe a cree tons ot rane wad in post tion, in DHEA arom, (ce) Fire enypore of | aninioum cf one battery plus “a troops was required, The guna hed to be air Se sta thee vas no other neaag of taking (a) Ths attedk ould only be carried out from the “ VWostern flenk ana hence eccupetion of any areas (220NCLE) on the Westorn flonk acrosa the HIMKA CHD should only bo done alt tho coamencement of eens din order WOT to disclose tha decision gwttack. When dedling with the dovelopaents an Geteil, we will see that the occupation of TGANGLE was carricd out prensturelys The plan and the stigulations were not een but they hava been brought ow’ sdhered to, an eee te Dearing on the davelopsents eae raliawel Fomation of new corps for NEFA and was zepl sce Commanders operations in NEFA. Qn 4 Ootober 1952, KXKIII Corps ceased to bo re: sible od by EV Corps with bt Gon BY as LY epee was sot yet Baloo yet it was to similtaieously form, funetion, end conduct 1 aruy Hesiquarters had placed ths whole of the Eastern ‘Dead Northern Border uncer IV Gorpe: (aray Headquartera signed} Wo 161S20/004(h} dated 4 October, tee - dnnexore 60) however, retuned Bastern Comvand to HEPA gigndle of 4 ond 5 October 1962, (snnemte 51). ‘The chatge over of Compa brought to an end the uneqial tug-of-war between Bestern Comeand and XxXiII Corps, The phase q of moshing and proiding of DXTIE Corpa by Eastern Command fo hasten the cpcrations findlly ended. ‘Imstesd = new phase had sta ted whens the new Corps Lesped into sn operation. without first. pub ead the implications, It will, Pace Wits he of interest, to exenine the Chinese build up own ti11 then in order to see if XIE Corps were eustitied in their cation. TOR _SESRELence weenades Tt is, th eyaten tor toa Follontee @) Fee fetes tice the Chinese taila wp and Much has bean rogatding tho Chinese not reat a tho Comemedl, the General gtaff, Sll cima cas with 1t et ome time oF ancthor. ect, would be fron ilitery ortiehile oy Fer verkiog = oe syetes and 3 end = Sho di of thi Gasewines sore ees. OF RE a3 given 8 CEDA-@ 1859-1860 (ammemre 9), This as are ae was } Divisd arte - and. conic sy - Sema (b) Second regiment with By ot DZ0HG deployed aa (i) One battalion = TST DZONG ge if inning of September 1962 @) One battalian (41) One battalion (411) One battalion SHAQ (opposite BMEa) Le fopposdte TEONTSE DZ080 SAN CADHOLING (opraite Lasany area) rea see Reais from respective rogimettal beses to forward area glso been compl . Tt will be seeny therefore, that, from 1960 to the deployment, 28 Imom to ts, 30E_SECRET thera were no chabges in the |t Sf Geptembor 1962, imreased * a ee notised in this gecter. Tilia 4 at out in We Pees —— Ho ~ vendaular trettis batvesn Spaanty Tecka bogie, ont forward to battalion areag auring the proseding to wooks. Be aapeagtttioant that this, vou Qumory iy signed on Ba and THOLA incident took place on & deptenbor, tay te asked pas it wan aot (e) 10 Baptember 1969 (annemre 2) Por seeaay Sotel igenoe Eirean reported tha 1 tents wors geen in territ Oy one aaeineen oe, Guts and LAD. (This could indicate @ Company plus), @i) all eiyn opulation in Tso DZONG and border erehs’ was evacuated to the rear first week of September 1062, aot ass fer Malina ne eo 0 for use of ¢ thet the dhitese ef ev ustig pa ese Wele gett Es fora show dom). ® G18) About 40 bie tants seen ta firea 250Ha ~ DEONG. Thig ¢ wall battalten) , eRe (iv) Pelephone ling Installed upto NORTH of THAGLA dn the first week of Geptember 1p6, tonts () Tnamier cme oeytet at Le ant EHINZAMARE (vi) Four buts opposite and west of KHTNZAUANE. (wid) Telephone line laid to LaMET, The reason for the sctivity at LAMEU to not quite clear. It is situated midway between the two respective rowtes TS0HA DEG. eee a Pais a eas Te my Bethapa be as a deception 0 take away attention fron the THAGLA Ares. 2 SIORET(a) (e) fa) ‘Sorprds BUMLA upte DOMCHANGLA ahowed movemsnt of larga bedics. (2) 40 wheeled guns arrived ToORA DEONG during the preceding week(s roximtely three Chines. ents equivalent of one divieional ‘artiliory) * (241) 8 tents mear SHAO (possibly one company), (4v) 80 Chinese soldiers (two platoons) area THAGEA. (vy) aoe jeg Tepotted between HAKKA CHU Eidge (The effect of this and tt of the Foport of 12 September 1962 agether under detailed Th addition to the two cospenies already reportel NORTH of the Malla Gi, troops in DOA reported the WAMKA CHU area. 13 Boptenbor 1962 Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau rep 30 huts and tents meat SHAD. ietjinres compan companies’ The total tulad Sy See reports would amount ze myers, inionts ‘our Tate Most of these iS cert new locations and hence could er bo fresh troops of trocps moved ott of a rcaiat iosstions. With the, inoreased movenemt iene es between TSETHANG and forwerd areas, it bs safely agsunei that upto one more regimont had been inducted in ty 19/20 geptember 1962. EP Sane(x) “pai “battalion pas = THAGLA tng battalion plum Hs eee aeata aaa to THAGLA within a dey, in area - la (a) Comentration opposite HMLA built upto a regiment. (a) Hovesent of 40 cunt into T$0H4 BZOIO cleo gave an dodieation of 2 divisional concentration in TZ0HA DGG and forward of ite eh inns. be: ‘ed out could either mean mak: oy a eee ares et cra a re noe aes eotio. (2) Keeping sbctestia tm ainfica .fe es had cesoentrated in Tsola DZONG and forward of it by 20 September. eek ae ee ee cee Drona ds some 20 — 25 miles from the border, eye es the ronds go upto tyo miles short of the jer, it would deply that the Chinese were in & position to comentrate a division on the border within three days, if required. tg) The concentration opposite BUMLA showed that wa Sane Sore mere! jong EAST of KHIIZAMANE as woll, that is, ToWaNG 40 A curious point is thet the Subsidiary Intelligence Buresu abruptly started giving thelr reports of Chinese uw to 4 antry Divigion from 10 September, soon after the DEOLA Pi Wal surrounded. Fiene, hovevor; pevered ost by 20/0 September Fy Tyas intelligence apart, ftom seperia ay oan troops inc it the crucial period between nee and 19 9 october eee not available to the ne aetes 1] already b:; out that these reports feschel ‘the Direstor oot fz irri Bureau direst an ers soumatly were gre imodistely available te the Governmant Branch at army Headquarters. Sl Army Headquarters a weve. peers Susmariea, 1b appears, Tugel retbee aay Tote Intelligence Baran Reports bet BO sesessicnt seens is Fees: hae tale or given ort to lower formations. These weekly intelligerce summaries, in most Oaiedy produced intelligesse one to two weeks old and he took another week or s0 for the summaries to reach lower formations, Thus, the imtelligems was of little value to the find Commanders. We have eens jeer ee that General staff contimed +o press for the le Sap rire THAGLA Ridge right upto 10 Qetobar, the dat, the Firat | lash with the Chiness, It ia, Saeoess aria thet eee they were tenorant of the orted or failed to take due cogmisarse of the Eee 2 SwOREEfe) elisction of intelligence in ganatsl mas Before the DHOLA Post incident was eiifgerte on the build up, but, | after the DHOLA Post lad been surrcumed, there ! of 4t fora week = Most of i€ ing novesehts taking place in the proveding oad, Thin could mean that = (2) oar acquisition of intelligenve is too } slow to be of any uge for operations; (14) the inteliigeme ds butlt erounl to suit the estia that hes ened. Then agein imtelligente ether than acquired in the field was not avallcbla after 29 Geptenber t£11 the end of the operations» : The abrupt starting and ceasing of Intelligeme Bureau reporta tan ceault imo rez din field comanders a lack of cortidence in the Intelligence Bures organisetiony ‘The reporting of Dutelligence liself was * ‘he sotirces did nut appear to have been %o pick owt ‘the Luportunt aul the essentials. 88 Gellaiden and Gvelmtion a) (b) Even fron these vague reporte attempt could have been mede to evaluate the build up the Director of Military Intelligence, It is agreed that besouse of the vague moture of the reports the evaluation may not nave been accurate, tut that there was a Bajor baila up coald nave been brought out. AS ft was, bits and plecas of the build up given in the Weelly Intelliganse Summarica hod little value, Mo sttenpt was ade to link us the now build up with the 1a dep . Thos field formations had little guidance whother thesa were iresh troops or ald ones moving %¢ new Locations, TOE _SECHET