Land System in India: A Historical Review

Author(s): Rekha Bandyopadhyay

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 52 (Dec. 25, 1993), pp. A149-A155
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4400592
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 Land System in India
A Historical Review
Rekha Bandyopadhyay

Hierarchical social structures based on inequality and exploitation have been very much part of land relations in rural
India. This paper attemptsa broad historical review ofland relations in Indiafrom ancient times and exposesthe complexities
which prevent a change in the existing oppressive socio-economic order.

I made good quality land comparatively
Introduction
AGRICULTURE in India holds a pride of
place in terms of both income and employ-
ment. It is a way of life that penetrates its
organisational structure and moulds its value
system.
In India unequal distribution of property
and income forms the basis of agrarian
hierarchy. The prevailing value system jus-
tifies this existing inequality. Both the privi- having an overlordship, was unable to abol-
leged and the unprivileged believe that men
are born unequal. The respect for higher
status runs through every level of the social
system. The hierarchical values and un-
equal social structures reinforce each other
thereby making the change of any status quo
very difficult.
Indian agriculture comprises multiple
social systems each displaying a different
process of change. This structure thus pro-
vides ample opportunities for research in
land systems and reform procedures. Before
exploring the inherent complexities of the
Indian agrarian sector, we shall trace the
process of evolution which contributed to
this complex structure. Our discussions of
the pre-independence era will be classified
into ancient, medieval and British period.
Later we shall examine the post-indepen-
dence agrarian policy and the reform ef-
forts. This background study will enable us
to assess the present situation.
II
Pre-Independence Era
ANCIENT INDIA
Ancient India depicts a complex set of
land relations involving private ownership,
royal administration and communal rule of
villages. This multiple structure is a com-
plete whole comprising three different lay-
ers [Powelson 1988]. Land tenure in one
layer or level would be completely different
from the other. Hence quite often we find
conflicting pictures from authors who stress
on only one type of relationship. A brief
discussion about three formations will
clarify the issue. Private ownership finds
justification in the writings of Manu [Bumell
1884]. According to him land belongs to the
person whoclears it. This refers to the age of
abundance and free possession. Later, geo-
graphical constraint of demographic factors
shares of village produce and in some cases
scarce. At this stage private ownership was by small plots of land. But these castes
acquired through land grants or assignments. always retained some measure of freedom
Reference to land grants is found in vedic to sell their goods and services for extra
literature where grants to brahmins were income. The payment made by the village
revenue free with right of alienation was meant to assure them of their minimal
[Mujumdar 1977]. During the Maurya pe- subsistence [Dharmakumar 1982].
riod private land transfers were marked by The village structure was quite organised.
public ceremonies [Kautilya]. By this time Reference to village organisations and coun-
private ownership had acquired a strong- cils is found in old inscriptions. Village
organisations were very powerful during
hold in the social structure. The ruler, though
the Hindu period. All land belonged to the
ish privatepurchase, saleordonation [Nigam village community. The king exercised mini-
1975]. All these evidences show that pri- mal influence. At times since the village
vate owners possessed the right to alienate was inhabitated by a particular tribe, village
land owned by them. But this kind of abso- authority was akin to tribal authority. The
lute ownership was exercised by religious land distribution was not completely static.
grantees only. The case was different with Migration and demographic changes brought
others. These landholders were closely about alterations in the distribution pattern
watched by village officers of the king. of the village land. Village organisations
Their land was liable to confiscation for became the centre of power after the Gupta
improper use or partial use. Though land period when central authority was compara-
transfer was theoretically possible, the fol- tively weak and emerged as "nuclear areas
lowing constraints were present on the right of corporate institutions" [Stein 1969].
of transfer: (a) Sale was to be made within In the south two types of village
the same group or sect only, and (b) any organisations predominated: (a)
proposal of alienation needed to be sanc- 'Brahmadeya' (a group of villages con-
tioned by the elders of the group. trolled by a brahmin organisation) and (b)
Such a constrained ownership cannot be 'Periyandu' an extended locality by
termed private in the modern sense of the organisations of commoners. The
term. The overlordship of these private lands decentralisation of authority and emerging
belonged to the king or the supreme ruler. role of the village organisations started dur-
From time immemorial, the ruler (whether ing the Gupta period. The process started in
indigenous or foreign) was the sole owner of the south and gradually extended over the
land in India [Blunt 1936]. The homogene- sub-continent.
ity of products, urban planning and the These village organisations were consid-
nature of dwellings of the Harrappan periodered as the embryo form of future feudal
also show the existence of a centralised structure. The king or his intermediary
authority [Rafique 1973]. The reign of a claimed a part of the produce of the land.
sovereign continued over the ages. T he epic The revenue was collected from village
period refers to the supremacy of the ruler individuals and deposited in acommon pool.
and is mentioned in the writings of Some common expenses of the village were
Megasthenes. From the vedic times India paid out of this pool. The share of the
had a stratified social structure. Thle village
overlord was given by the village commit-
evolved as a self sufficient unit of society tee (as representative of the village people)
based on the caste system. It developed its [Desai 1954]. Thus land as a thing of value
own support system. The complementary was regarded as being part of an aggregate
relationship between groups of dominant wealth of the community rather than be-
peasant castes on the one hand and artisan longing to a single person [Neale 19691. But
and peasant classes on the other, was a the system was not free from exploitation
special characteristic of Indian rural and class differentiation. The contribution
economy. In essence this oft-quoted system to the pool differed among different people.
centred round the organisation of produc- The headman enjoyed some revenue free
tion and distribution by the hereditary occu- allotments. The persons controlling the pool
pational castes. The non-agricultural castes and the class favoured by the dominant
were compensated by traditionally fixed group paid lower rates of revenue. To com-

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pensate, the lower strata of peasants had to solely extended to land revenue collection at to the furthest corner of the kingdom was
pay more. Growth of hierarchical structure a superior level or fiscal overlordship of difficult to control directly and representa-
and evolution of the posit(on of intermedi- lower landowners. The primary zamindar tives were appointed, thus giving rise to
aries with landed estates were considered as was the landholder having immediate pro- three-tier relationship in land [Irfan Habib
feudalistic features by some [Tod 1984]. prietary dominion over the soil, including a 1963].
But others [Desai 1954] have refuted the restricted power of mortgage and alienation Revenue rates were also not uniform. Of
notion. According to them those types of as well as the right to locate cultivators, course varying revenue rates accounted for
societies, though bearing a close resem- control the waste, sink wells and plant groves.various types of land (according to inscrip-
blance to feudal type, had a striking differ- They were generally found to be settled as tions in earlier days). During Nizamsahi
encjhe intermediari's were the kins of dominant lineages in a number of contigu- period, land was divided into irrigated and
the ruling authority. Nowhere'had tfte mili- ous villages. The important aspect was not unirrigated types and again both types were
tary tenure entirely obliterated the original only the territorial extent but also the depth subdivided into four groups and revenue
tenure by blood and birthright. This has of penetration of the lineage groups over the was charged giving due importance to these
generated a con'topversy about Indian feu- agricultural community. Their grip was most differences. Land revenue accounted for the
dalism amongst tht, Academics. The Ency- tenacious'where the primary owners were larger part of the agricultural surplus.
clopedia Britanica (EBM 9': 363) alludes identical with thecultivators [Dharmakumar Mughal tax was not proper rent or even
this comparison as follows: "There is con- 1982]. The division of land rights continued land tax as it was a tax on the crop. Though
siderable controversy among historians as further. The small landowners ceded their the system reduced expenses of collection
to whether the feudatory pattern (in India) rights to the large landowners and became and vexation of revenue collecting authori-
can be accurately described as feudalism. their dependents, on condition that they ties, it kept the peasants ignorant about the
Some argue that, although it was not identi- retained the hereditary use of their land. The amount they had to pay. To reduce the
cal to the classical example of feudalism of continuous extension of land made it impos- chance of exploitation of the peasantry,
western Europe, there are sufficient simi- sible for the large landowners to collect annual assessment was made on the basis of
larities to allow the use of the term. The revenue without the help of others. Thus area statistics. Measures were adopted to
counter argument is that the emphasis on the sub-infeudation evolved creating differen- curb the power of the intermediaries by
economic contract, essential to the western tiation of land control rights over land under keeping their possession of land as tempo-
European feudalism, was absent in India or direct or indirect supervision. The land cul- rary by transferring them yearly or every
was at least not clearly stated. But whether tivated directly by the zamindar was termed two or three years. Also there was a provi-
the trend indicated feudalisation or not, it "'Sir or Khas" land to distinguish it from land sion of award of promotion or demotion by
created considerable change of land rela- which was allotted to sub-intermediaries for changing the size of their territory on the
tions, politics and culture and the major cultivation. From this allotted land zamindar basis of their performance. To prevent the
characteristics of that change was used to take a portion of the produce as his intermediary from charging more than the
decentralisation [Powelson 1988]. due for overlordship. authorised taxes-a copy of the revenue
The identification of different levels of paper was kept with the permanent local
MEDIEVAL INDIA
land rights in India has been long ridden by official (kanungo). But the short-term ar-
The medieval period exercised consider- the confused use of terms. The term zamindarrangement only enhanced the desire for
able influence in the evolution of intermedi- became predominant in the 17th century maximal unauthorised exaction. In its cu-
aries. The Muslim rulers engaged the mili- replacing or altering with a large number of mulative effort, such pressure not only in-
tary personnel and paid them with a plot of local terms signifying the same or similar hibited extension of cultivation, but also
land for their services. Over a period of time land owning right as 'khoti', and involved the Mughal ruling class in a deep-
by a process of commendation these free 'maqqaddam' in Doab Satarabi and 'biswi' ening conflict with the major agrarian classes
proprietors lost their independence and there- in Awath, 'bhomi' in Rajasthan, 'bhant' or (the zamindars and the peasantry). By early
with their allodial tenure became feudal. 'vanth' in Gujarat. The zamindar in Persian 1850 there was growing official restiveness
Early jagirs could not be inherited or language means keeper or holder of land. that land control was passing steadily into
transferred. But they could be confiscated The suffix 'dar' implies a degree of control the hands of the non-agricultural classes.
by the sovereign if the intermediary left or attachment, but not necessarily owner- The majority of the intermediaries were
his service. In the following centuries, ship. The ownership right originated during finding it difficult to afford to maintain the
these rules were modified as the interme- the Mughal period when the term implied requisite contingents and farmed out their
diaries (jagirdars and zamindars) estab- hereditary claim to a direct share in the assignment to bankers and speculators from
lished local power enabling them to retain produce of land under his possession. The the cities who emerged as rapacious absen-
their status and pass this on to their sons. peasant group was called 'muzari', 'asami' tee landlords. The board of revenue ob-
When zamindari rights became alienable, or 'raya'. Application of similar terms to served that the nature of transfer was far
the land belonging to the zamindar was denote different land rights in different re- more complex than could be explained by
divided among his sons on his death. Thus gions added to this confusion. The term the crude categorisation of landlords and
zamindari rightsbecame scattered through taluqdar (for example) in northern India tenants or of agriculturist or non-agricultur-
inheritance. As a result, two type of land- meant a big zamindar engaged on be4alf of ist classes.
owners emerged. few smaller zamindars to pay revenue 'to the Till this time estate was unit of account in
Each lineage was divided into the more government. His rights were hereditary but the revenue records and brought under one
powerful branch which held the fort and not transferable. In Bengal the same term head the lands for which a particular person
other less powerful branch who held lesser was used to denote a person of a lower status or group had revenue paying responsibility.
village privileges. The former were termed than zamindar. Extension of land control rights of the larger
intermediary or secondary zamindars who The supreme overlordship of land rested intermediaries and the consequent sub-leas-
might collect revenue from their less afflu- upon the ruler. Variety in land relations ing created constant dualism between the
ent kinsmen (who were known as the village originated from the revenue exactions. The proprietary and cultivating rights-the
or primary zamindars). These primary land close to the capital was kept under former yielding rental income and the later
zamindars were sometimes also called direct control of the ruler. Hence these khas
agricultural surplus . Thus a distinction was
pattidars. The intermediary zamindar' lands s rights
had wage tenanlcy. But land extendingcreated bctween the unit of account and unit

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of cultivation. The transfer of proprieta,j of the land though they did not cultivate. An ryotwari settlements. Zamindari or
rights, however, mostly left the cultivating exorbitant increase in revenue demand weak- mahalwari system was considered unac-
units undisturbed. Hence the village and the ened the position of the zamindars. Ap- ceptable in this region. The government
peasantry remained passive in the face of pointment of active revenue farmers introduced mahalwari for a short period but
agricultural conflict involving change of (jagirdars) and collectors (amils) disrupted soon changed to ryotwari system in Madras.
ownership. the patron-client relationship of landlord It was considered successful and extended
and tenants which served as insurance against to other regions. The changeover from
BRITISH PERIOD
natural calamities. The confiscation of es- mahalwari to ryotwari was necessitated to
The British realised that land was the key tates by British government for non-pay- eliminate the village officers. These offic-
factor in the process of Indian economic ment of revenue added to the disruption of ers were suspected of concealing the exact
development and they must control land in the rural sector. The labour force was set amount of village resources and thus usurp-
order to stabilise their rule over the conti- adrift creating labour shortage. Because ing part of the revenue. Changeover to
nent. But they found the prevailing land nobility was getting dispossessed of land ryotwari system, however, did not solve the
systems quite perplexing. With a multitude therefore capital provided by the nobility problem. Even after the change revenue
of claims upon land by numerous people at for improvement of land was sharply re- gain was negligible. Thecompany-appointed
various levels of hierarchies, it was difficult duced. As a result of all these, by the middle intermediaries quickly perceived the oppor-
to attribute a particular land to a particular of the 19th century the whole agrarian sector tunity for advancing their social and eco-
person. Nor did the system appear similar to was in a decaying condition. Rural inhabit- nomic interests under the canopy of com-
the British system of feudalism although it ants dependent on agriculture were emigrat- pany protection. Within a short period they
was termed feudal or semi-feudal. ing. The villages deteriorated and their rev- established themselves as a complex layer
Their first effort was to fix the legal ownerenues declined. of adept and influential manipulators be-
of the land. In 1769, the company divided The case-of Oudh and northern India was tween the company and the ryots [Stein
parganas into 15 lots each and auctioned quite different. The taluqdars of Oudh were 1969]. By the middle of the 19th century, the
them with revenue to be paid to the com- owners of large estates and had complete land revenue systems and consequent tenur-
pany. Till this time rent had to be negotiated control over the resources of these areas. ial structures exhibited a pattern of striking
and adjusted to the ability to pay. But the The British policy was to curb the strength provincial variations. Zamindari system in
British emphasis in legality and consistency of the taluqdars. From 1764 to 1801 the Bengal, ryotwari and peasant proprietorship
resulted in dispossessing farmers who could British government gradually tightened thein Bombay and Madras, and a hybrid system
not pay fixed amounts of revenue. Again noose on oudh. They installed British troopof mahalwari (where effective ownership of
auction sales placed the ownership of land in Oudh under the pretext of helping the most land was vested in cultivators but
beyond the reach of the poor persons at- nawab to keep the taluqdars-under control. revenue was rendered communally by the
tached to the soil and created a new aristoc- Payment forthesetroops was made by hand- village)prevailedinPunjab, north-westprov-
racy who were originally moneylenders or ing over half of Oudh to British in 1801 and inces and Oudh. It seems ideological dis-
traders. The new owners squeezed the peas- the other half in 1856. They acquired the taste for landlordism born of utilitarian phi-
ants to pay the speculative land revenue. adjacent provinces. The British, however, losophy was a major force behin'd the devel-
Famines, land abandonment and decline in extended the contract of the taluqdars by a opment of ryotwari and mahalwari settle-
revenue made the government understand period of five years after which the lease ments [Stokes 1978].
the failure of the scheme but they attributedwas terminated. Substantial land transfers and sub-
the failure to the short period of land settle- British government faced a dilemma in infeudation occurred as creditors supported
ment. Te govemmentexpected that length- changing the land relations of Oudh and the by the westernised legal system attempted
ening the period of lease would create an northern parts. This region had a tradition of to secure peasant debtors' land by foreclos-
incentive to invest and make the landlords communal village proprietorship and the ing mortgages. It led to the creation of a
innovative. But the extension of period of taluqdars still had considerable influence large agrarian proletariat. The beneficiaries
tenure did not bring the desired change. over the area. Hence a system of mahalwari of this change were the moneylenders and
Land revenue increased four-fold (comparedsettlement involving mostly the original traders. They had a parasitical attitude to
to the level before the assessment). The taluqdars was introduced. But the assess- agriculture. They did not typically dispos-
zamindars were so heavily taxed that they mentwas quite high. A number of propertiessess peasant debtors from the land; used the
kept themselves busy in shifting the burden went out into arrears. Inexperienced man- forms of land mortgage as methods of coer-
to thie ryots. The dispossession of zamindarsagement, depression and frequent occur- cion, thus exercising substantial control over
due to non-payment continued. rence of natural calamities made the situa- agricultural activities and production. They
The British East India Company, super- tion worse. Distress sales increased during occupied the position of the rich peasants
imposing 18th century western concepts of 1839-59 [Metcalf 1979]. To ease the situa- having an established figure in the village,
private property on a very different indig- tion and prevent the speculative rise in land intensifying their wealth and power through
enous land system, assumed that the 'rev- prices the government started leasing prop- more subtle measures of market control.
enue farmers' in fact owned the land, even erty in arrears and wanted to res ore the This group appropriated the economic sur-
though they neither worked on it nor in- original landholder by acclepting p aymentplus which was the prerequisite for develop-
vested in it. Ignoring any rights of the actual of the arrears through rent. When the ownerment.
tillers, the permanent settlement of Bengal failed to pay the arrears even after this After 1870 constructive efforts were made
in 1793 gave the zamindars the right to fix arrangement, auction sale vas the only op- to improve agrarian conditions. In the es-
their terms with the cultivators in return for tion left to the governmen . As a result land tates under the direct control of the govern-
a fixed land revenue from the zamindars to relations changed considerably and there ment, new crops and new methods of culti-
the state. The latter was payable in cash was a shift from old landholding class to vation were introduced. To encourage dis-
while the rents to be paid by actual cultiva- new commercial class. semination of new technologies the govern-
tors to the zamindars were not. By this Tanjore Committee criticised zamindari ment gave monetary assistance to those
single piece of legislation, actual tillers of and ryotwari forms and suggested the intro- landowners who had initiative. Thus the
the soil became tenants, while a class of duction of mahalwari system in Madras. But commercial process was initiated in several
revenue farmers became defazcto owners southern India had a long tradition of pockets but could not penetrate the tradi-

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tional sector. As a result dualism evolved in Thus there was the persistence of semi- owners, small and medium owners, tenants
the agrarian sector. feudal bondages of various types. The strongat will and landless workers [Government of
The modernised parts worked on com- hold of usury condemned the Indian agrar- India 195 1]. Special emphasis was given on
mercial lines with fully developed modern ian society to a state of stagnation. It re- the abolition of intermediaries, enactment
technology and know-how. A new type of mained a constantly crisis- ridden system, of radical tenancy laws and resumption of
commodity production was taking shape which provided no scope for the generation cultivation based on peasant proprietorship.
here. It was marked by a fundamentally new of new productive process. The need for providing a ceiling and lower
(as compared to the traditional) structure of The process of production continued to be limit to agricultural lands was recommended.
theproductionprocess, in which modernised marked by backward techniques with very The ceiling issue was later given proper
labour played an increasingly important role low yields, colossal waste of labour, ex- importance in the Agra session of the All
on the basis of expanding intersectoral com- tremely poor accumulation of capital and India Congress Committee. Later the panel
modityexchang e. The traditional sector with diversion of agricultural surplus into non- on land reforms under Gulzarilal Nanda
low income and consequent low rural de- productive channels. All these created a (1955) elaborated the method of imposition
mand for producer goods, extensive arrears socio-economic set-up in which parasitism of ceiling, the unit of ceiling fixation and the
in debt and subsistency continued to hold flourished, land concentration in the hands requisite precautions required to plug the
back the revolutionary influence created by of the rural rich continued to grow and loopholes of the ceiling law. The panel also
the modernised sector. Hence restructuring landlessness and land hunger of the peasantsdealt with the question of security of tenure
of the agrarian economy was the essential mounted at an ever increasing pace. Evic- and introduction of co-operation in the case
precondition for accelerated development tions and insecurity of tenancy and rack of non-viable units.
of the economy. A built-in depressor renting became aphenomenon. The cultiva- Confirmation of ownership rights and
characterised by exploitation of the peas- tors were burdened by a colossal load of starting a redistributive process by imposi-
antry, low capital intensity and traditional indebtedness. After independence a high- tion of ceiling were the two broad areas of
methods of production were operating all power committee was set up in 1948 under reform efforts undertaken under the second
over the country which resulted in virtual thechairmanshipof PanditJawaharlaINehru. plan [Government of India 1956]. The first
stagnation of the economy as a whole. The committee recommended: (i) the elimi- plan, while introducing the ceiling provided
After independence, the primary task was nation of all intermediaries and the intro- for the right of resumption up to the limit for
to remove the stagnation and provide initia- duction of non-profit making organisations personal cultivation. But experience showed
tive to the mass of poor cultivators. The (as co-operatives) toperform the function of that provisions of resumption actually re-
need for agrarian reform to change the pre- intermediaries, (ii) land should be held as a sulted in ejections of tenancy. Hence condi-
vailing structure and build an egalitarian source of employment. Land belonging to tions of resumption were properly specified
distribution pattern was earnestly felt. From non-cultivating owners should be taken over in the second plan toplug loopholes. Special
the modest approach of abolition of inter- by the government, and (iii) maximum and attention was given to the ownership issue
mediaries and provision of security of ten- minimum size of holding should be fixed of the small farmers. To enable the small
ure, the programme included numerous is- (ceiling and floor). farmers to resume personal cultivation the
sues which reduce disparities and contradic- As a follow-up, the Congress Agrarian time constraint was removed in their case
tions in social and economic spheres and Reform Committee under J C Kumarappa (in other cases resumption period was only
thus facilitate economic development. suggested the following course of action for one year). Considering the fact that me-
reforming the land structure and relations: dium-sized owners could transfer part of
m (1) abolition of intermediaries and land their land in another name to enlist them-
Post-Independence Period given to the tiller of the soil, (2) encourage-selves as small holder-all land transferees
ment of self cultivation. Leasing to be pro- were debarred from being considered as
POLICY BEFORE THE PLANS
hibited (permitted under exceptions), and small farmers.
Before independence, the Congress party (3) tenants of six years should be granted The third plan reiterated the policy ac-
focused its attention on the agrarian scene. occupancy rights. In case of sale, right to cepted by the previous two plans and
Recurrent unrest in the agrarian sector ne- purchase should be given to these tenants atemphasised the necessity of quick comple-
cessitated immediate reform efforts. Some price fixed by the land tribunal. tion of land reform programmes as the foun-
of the high points of the Bardoli satyagraha, After independence in the early 50s, Indiadation for agricultural growth [Government
no-tax campaign of north Canara and the went for planned economic development. In of India 1961].
agrarian unrest of Uttar Pradesh were spear-framing planned development strategies, Fourth Five-Year Plan reviewed existing
headed by Congress in their proposals of the above aspects of land restructuring and land reforms measures and acknowledged
reform. Kisan conference of April 1935 changing of production relationships re- many gaps between set objectives and ac-
under the presidentship of Sardar Patel rec- mained very prominent in the minds of our tual legislation [Government of India 1966].
ommended introduction of a system of peas- planners and policy-makers. During the four Implementation ofprescribed laws was con-
ant proprietorship. Security of tenancy was decades of planned development, what hap- sidered inadequate and ineffective. The
the main issue of discussion of the 50th pened to these considerations should be ownership conferred so far included 16 per
session of Congress at Faizpur. Tenancy appropriately examined before deciding on cent of the tenants only and in spite of the
legislations enacted in the preindependence future strategic issues in this vital area. In efforts of making the tenurial institution
period aimed at guaranteeing (a) security of what follows the progress of land reform secure, 82 per cent of total tenants were
tenure, (b) fair rent, (c) occupancy rights, and related aspects during the period of each uncovered by security provisions.
and (d) compensation for permanent im- plan starting from the First Five-Year Plan A high power committee was appointed
provements. The agrarian society (in spite will be briefly reviewed. under the fourth plan to decide the question
of some degree of commercialisation) as a of ceiling and laws adhering to exemption
LAND REFORMS UNDER PLANS
whole remained backward and medieval. limit. The plan allotted Rs 28.4 crore for
The system was hidebound and restricted by The land reform (LR) policy was consolidation efforts. The success in this
archaic landlord tenant relations, ancient concretised for the first time in the First field also needed alleviation of differences
caste formations, and by old traditional cus- Five-Year Plan (1 951-56). Agrarian classes in land values and provision of normal infra-
toms, social habits and modes of thinking. were classified into intermediaries, large structure in 9ie form of link roads.

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 Land reforms was made a state subject. Land reforms should encompass various ers utilised this clause as a method for
For periodical review of the situation and aspects of land relationships such as ten- landgrabbing. Hence this right of resump-
for maintaining uniformity of policy, peri- ancy, homesteads, consolidation of hold- tion should be extinguished at least until
odical meeting of chief ministers of all ings and distribution of surplus land at the 'personal cultivation' is so defined as not to
states were organised in 1969, 1970 and disposal of the government. The land so infringe on tenancy rights [Ladejinsky 1977] .
1972. The detailed plan of action in the provided to the poor must be developed to Tenancy legislation has not been able to
sphere of implementation of land reforms make it fit for cultivation on a group basis. regulate rent to 1/5 or 1/4 of the produce.
programme and needed follow-up proce- So far as tribal lands are concerned, there The definition of fair rent is not uniform-
dures were finalised in these meetings. should be prohibition on its sale or transfer to this itself creates possibilities of inequal
Fifth plan again re-emphasised the need non-tribals. In the context of land refonns, treatment. The clause of continuous posses-
for speedy implementation [Government ofproper maintenance and improvement of land sion of a number of years created a bottle-
India 1976]. The-implementation work to be records should be given priority. neck in the way of acquiring occupancy
successful must be preceded by knowledge rights. Landlord avoided continuous ten-
EVALUATION
and training. High priority was given to ancy by resorting to rotation of tenancy
preparation and maintenance of land records We hive used a controlled method of from plot to plot. Right of purchase being
and cadastral surveys. Civil courts along reform to bring a change in our agrarian optional, fear of intimidation by landowners
with land reform tribunals were given power structure. The idea was to create an egalitar- prevented the tenants from endeavouring
to handle implementation problems. At the ian distribution system. for ownership rights over lands leased out to
lower level, land committees at the village The listing of results of first round of land them by poor or small owners thus nullify-
and block level would help the implementa- reforms (1948-54) in different states shows ing the objective. Hence the law should be
tion procedures. These blocks and village that the main achievement was the abolition class specific and the implementing author-
level committees would absorb the services of intermediaries and direct contact of the ity must take a proper view of the class
of the beneficiaries and of the members of states with 20 million cultivators. But the composition of tenancy. The generalised
the lower strata of agrarian population (ten- reform was not complete. The rural struc- provision for security of tenure, of confer-
ants and landless). ture was like an onion with many layers. The ment of ownership rights on tenants would
Sixth plan critically evaluated the progress British peeled off one layer by their effort bring more injustice than justice to them. In
of implementation [Government of India through legalistic approach; abolition of spite of these defects, the tenancy was suc-
1981]. In spite of vigorous effect to plug the zamindari system in the post-independence cessfully banned in Gujarat, Maharashtra,
loopholes and ensure proper implementa- era peeled off another. But the core re- Kamataka, Kerala, UttarPradesh, Himachal
tion, problems relating to ceiling limit and mained unaffected. The sharecroppers andPradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and in
security of tenure; gap in achievement per- labourers were still squeezed to the lowest other states only for protection against un-
sisted. Hence further strengthening of ef- margin of subsistence [Maddison 1971]. lawful eviction. Sharecropper's position im-
forts in these areas of reform was advocated Moreover the effort to change existing ten-proved in Kerala where tenants on both
in the sixth plan. ancy agreements created additional disad- homestead and cultivated land were pro-
But by the end of sixth plan period the vantages to the weaker sections of the com-vided with complete security of tenure. In
emerging picture was not at all impressive. munity. This period was characterised by anWest Bengal 'Operation Barga' method'
Even after abolition of intermediaries such unprecedented wave of eviction of tenants helped in the quick restoration of the culti-
relations still prevailed in certain pockets of and sharecroppers due to the presence of vating rights of sharecroppers.
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Goa, highly defective land records, prevalence of But on the other hand, oral and insecure
Daman and Diu. The tenants of religious oral leases, absence of rent receipts, non- tenancies still prevail in almost every state.
lands were not given ownership rights. In- recognition in law of a sharecropper and Notable among these are Bihar, Tamil Nadu,
formal and oral tenancies still prevailed various punitive provisions existing in the Andhra area of Andhra Pradesh, Saurashtra
leading to insecurity of tenure. tenancy laws. Actually most of the evictions area of Gujarat, Punjab and Haryana. The
Again security of tenancy had limited were made to convert the protected tenancy second phase of reform was concerned with
application as sharecroppers, sub-tenants, into an unprotected one [Khusro 1973]. A the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural
cultivating partners and farm servants were closer look into the causes of termination of land, predominantly as a redistributive mea-
not treated as tenants. tenancy reveals various justified as well as sure. The idea was to ration a crucial asset in
Seventh plan decided to remove the inef- unjustified causes. The so-called voluntary such a way that above a certain minimum
ficiencies of prevailing tenancy laws [Gov- surrenders were hardly ever voluntary. Land- the surplus land would be taken away and
ernment of India 1986]. It insisted on re- lords resorted to pressure and coercion to given to the landless or small or marginal
cording of informal tenants. The involve- secure surrenders in order to get their ten- landholders in accordance with certain fixed
ment oflocal personnel and people's insti- anted land vacated. In order to avoid this priorities. But the ceiling laws became inef-
tutions in this sphere was advocated for loophole, the fourth plan suggested that the fective because, (a) the ceiling limits were
achieving permanent solutions to this prob- possession of surrendered land would not be generally fixed so high that the concentra-
lem. In order to formulate long-term mea- given back to the old landowners. The gov- tion of land in the hands of big landholders
sures on the recording of land rights a one- ernment should resettle other tenants on and rich peasants remained intact; (b) the
man committee was appointed under Dr D C these surrendered lands. Butexcept in Kerala, ceiling acts provided enough scope for ma-
Wadha of Gokhale Institute. Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, nipulations and fictitious transfers to cir-
Eighth plan also focuses attention on agrar- Karnataka and West Bengal this provision cumvent the provisions of the laws; and (c)
ian relations [Government of India 1990]. was not strictly and effectively followed exemption from ceiling were many and
Restructuring of agrarian relationship is [Appu 1975]. these made ceiling legislation largely inef-
considered crucial to rural transformation. Another loophole was provided by the fective.
It proposes to initiate steps to review and right of resumption. Te idea behind grant- After 1972, the ceiling limit was lowered
reformulate the land legislations and ensure ing this provision was to convert non-work- and family land instead of the individual
effective implementation. The inclusions of ing and rent-receiving landowners intoowner was accepted as the unit of ceiling fixation.
land reform laws in the Ninth Schedule of cultivators who could step up agricultural The Planning Commission estimated that
the Constitution is a step in this direction. production. But the unscrupulous landown- the imposition of ceiling limit will extract a

Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 1993 A-153

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surplu3 of 37 million acres which will pro- million to 89.30 million mainly due to a aspects of these trends in the concluding
vide 90 per cent of the area required to give continuous process of sub-division of hold- section. The salient aspects are summarised
landless family a basic holding of 42 per ings, while the area operated increased by a in two broad groups-one pertaining to
cent of the area required to increase sub- mere 0.67 million hectares. The number of ancient period to pre-independence era and
basic holding to basic holding or 29 per centmarginal holdings increased by nearly 15 the other pertaining to post-independence
of the area required for both these purposes.million and that of small holdings (1-2 period.
Ceiling laws were enacted and imple- hectares) increased by 2.5 million. Conse- In the ancient period,
mented in practically all the states except quently the proportion of marginal holdings (i) multiple structure of land relations
Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh (below one hectare) rose from 50.6 per cent consisted of three different levels. --
and Mizoram where land is generally held of the total in 1970-71 to 56.5 per cent in (ii) Absolute ownership (private) was ex-
by the community; With the implementa- 1980-81 and has reached (estimated) 60 per ercised only by religious grantees. In
tion of the revised ceiling laws based on the centin 1990. The process of marginalisation all other cases, there was no private
1972 scheme, nearly 15.58 lakh hectares of will pose formidable problem. It may be ownership (or the concept of land as
land were declared surplus by the end.of noted that due to increase in population private property) till the advent of the
1981 of which 10.64 lakh hectares have overall per capita availability of agricultural British.
been distributed to nearly 13.31 lakh benefi- land will decline significantly. By 2000 A D (iii) Land as a thing of value was regarded
ciaries. overall per capita availability of agricultural as being part of an aggregate (belong-
A comparison of the proportion of area land (which was 0.48 hectare in 1951) will ing to the community as a whole)
operated by different size groups of hold- decline to 0.14 hectare. In view of these, rather than belonging to a single per-
ings during the years 1970-71, 1976-77 and proper utilisation of existing agricultural son.
1980-81 and the projections made for the land and its distribution assume further (iv} In spite of absence of the concept of
year 1989-90 by the recent Khusro report urgency. private property in the ancient and
indicate the result of the ceiling effort To break the bottleneck in agrarian struc- medieval period the land system was
(see the table) [Reserve Bank of India 1990]. ture the tendency of increasing not free from exploitation and class
Figures in the table clearly indicate that marginalisation should be restricted bydifferentiation. strict
during the last 20 years there is a gain of imposition of a floor level. From the (v)point
TIhough of one can debate whether an-
about 8 per cent in terms of area under small view of structural reform, a distinctioncient has land relations in India were feu-
and marginal holding while there is a reduc- to be made between physically justified dalistic or not, it is un-mistakable that
tion of more than 11 per cent under large fragmentation, which provides the farmer the ancient system had similar ex-
holdings. The increase in medium size hold- with a few individual plots serving different ploitative trends and effects as the
ing is about 3.78 per cent. Thus it may be productive purposes, and the excessive frag- feudal system prevalent in western
seen that there is some improvement in the mentation which is agriculturally meaning- Europe.
distribution pattern but the changes are veryless splitting up of the farm land. Consolida- (vi) During themedievalperiodzamindari
slow and can be considered marginal as tion should be concerned with the later type system got established and with the
small number of large farmers consisting of fragmentation. Hence in future reform passage of time the zamindari rights
only of 2 to 2.5 per cent of the total farm consolidation programmes should be given got scattered through inheritance.
households have command over 19 per cent a priority. This programme to be effective During the medieval period extension
of cultivatable land. Moreover, these farm- must be accompanied by effective implemen- of land control rights of the larger
ers have command over the best land and tation of existing legislation or land reforms intermediaries and consequent sub-
therefore these figures do not clearly denote and providing incentives to the tenant for leasing created constant dualism be-
the real nature of disparity and skewness in application of available technology in agri- tween proprietory and cultivating
the holding size distribution. Thus the land culture. Agro-forestry, sylvi-pastoral, sylvi- rights-the former yielding rental in-
reform efforts over the years have not been horticultural and other combined land-use come and later agricultural surplus.
adequate to bring about the desirable changes systems are essential for meeting food, feed (vii) Changes of ownership (at the level of
in distributional pattern of land holdings. and fuel requirements and should be given zamindars) did not create any change
As against 66 per cent increase in the rural detailed scientific and extensive attention in the villages or the peasantry. Vil-
households between 1953-54 and 1971-72 which they deserve [Reserve Bank of India lages and the peasantry remained pas-
the cultivated area increased by 20 per cent 1990]. sive in the face of coriflicts involving
which led to a reduction in the average size change of ownership.
IV
of farm holding from 2.5 hectares to a little (viii) In ancient and medieval India the land
more than 1.5 hectares. Number of marginal Conclusions
relations were structured on social
holdings of more than one hectare increased In this paper broad historical trends in relations based on interests. During
from 15.4 million to 35.6 million and aver- land relations in India have been sketched. the British rule these were changed to
age size of these holdings fell from 0.20- Though no detailed diagnostic analysis has those based on exclusive claims of
acres to 0.14 acres during the same period. been attempted, but certain trends are un- ownership of land based oTn legal
During 1970-71 to 1980-81 the number of mistakable and even at the cost of repetition framework of private property.
operational holdings increased from 70.49 it may be pertinent to present the salient (ix) The emphasis (often undue) on legal-
ity and consistency resulted in dispos-
TABLE: AREA OPERATKED BY DiFFERENT SIZE GROUPS OF HIOLDINGS AND PROJECTIONS
sessing the farmers (those who could
Year Small/Marginal Farmers Medium Farmers Large Farmers not pay fixed amount of revenues) of
No Area No Area No Area their cultivating rights on land.
(x) Creation of zamindari system of in-
1970-71 69.89 20.87 26.21 48.25 3.90 30.88
termediaries by the British was based
1976-77 72.64 23.52 24.37 50.24 2.99 26.24
on the principle of extracting heavy
1980-81 74.54 26.27 23.05 50.92 2.4 22.81
1989-90 28.96 52.03 - 19.01 taxes from the zamindars without car-
ing for the improvement of land or
3ource: Khusro Corntittee Report, Table
agriculture. 30,
This burdenof p 821
heavy taxes

A-154 Economic and Political Weekly December 25, 1993

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 was transferred to ryots. The net result would be adequate to stress, that in spite of
A-(1990): Eighth Five-Year Pla,,, Planning Com-
flow of time and efforts towards changing
was cruel oppression of farmers, inad- mission, New Delhi.

equate capital investment in agricul-the systems from time to time, and under Hlabib, Irfan (1963): The Agricultural System of
Afughal India, Bombay.
different conditions of history, basic nature
ture and marginalisation of small farm-
Kautilya: Arthashastra H1.
ers. of land relations in India remained stub-
Khusro, A M (1973): Economics ofLanldReform
(xi) Land system in British India showed bornly unchanged. Thus even after indepen-
and Farm Size in India.j Macmillan India,
a significant variation from state to dence the system remains non-egalitarian Madras.
state. Commercial processes in agri- and oppressive in spite of the proclaimed Ladejinsky, W I (1977): 'Agrarian Reform an
culture were initiated during this pe- desire to the contrary . After more than four Unfinished Business' in Walinsky (ed), The
riod in several pockets in different decades of planned efforts the basic nature Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky, Oxford
states but overall effects of such of land system has at best undergone only a University Press, New York.
commercialisation were not penetra- marginal change. Maddison, A (1971): Class Structure and Eco-
tive enough to affect the basic charac- tnomic Growth: India and Pakistan since the
Mughials, Morton, New York.
ter of the traditional sector. References
Metcalf, T R (1979): Lan4 Landlords and the
(xi i) A built-in depressor characterised by
British Raj: Northern India in the 19th Cent-
exploitation of the peasantry, low capi - Appu, PS (1975): TenatncyReforn ittItndia, Plan- tury, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London.
tal intensity and traditional methods ning Commission, New Delhi.
Mujumdar, A K (1977): The Econoomic Back-
of production was operating all over Blunt, Edward (ed) (1936): An Introductiotn to
ground ofthe Epic Society, Progressive Publi-
Some Social and Econottic Problems of the
the country. This resulted in decay of cation, Calcutta.
Itndian People, His Majesty's Stationary Of-
agricultural sector and before inde- Neale, W C (1969): 'Land is to Rule' in R E
fice, London. Burnell, A C (Trans) (1884):
pendence the entire sector (agricul- Frykenburg (ed), Land Control and Social
The Ordinances of Manu, London, 1884.
tural and rural) was in virtual stagna- Desai, A R (1954): 'Social Background of Indian Structure in Itndian History, University of
Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin.
tion. Nationalisation', G R Bhaktai, Bombay.
Nigam,-- Shyamsunder (1975): Econtomic
After independence the need for the agrar- Dharmakumar (ed) (1982): The Canmbridge Eco-
Organisation itn Ancient India, Munshiram
ian reform to change the prevailing struc- nomic History of India, Orient Longman in
Manoharlal, Delhi.
ture and to usher in an egalitarian distribu- Association with Cambridge University Press,
Powelson, JP (1988): TheStory ofLand-A World
tion pattern was earnestly felt. During the Hyderabad.
History of Lan d Tenure an dAgrarian Reform,
periodsofplanneddevelopment(1950-1990) Etncyclopedia Britanica (1975): EBM/9:/363, The Lincoln Institute of Iand Policy, Cam-
London, 1975.
efforts were made towards (i) abolition of bridge, M A 02138, USA.
intermediaries; (ii) enactmentof radical ten- Governmentof India (1951):FirstFive-YearPlan, Rafique, M (1973): Present State of Research of
Planning Commission, New Delhi. Indus Valley Civilisation, Government of
ancy laws; and (iii) provision of land ceiling
-1956): SecotndFive-Year Platt, Planning Com- Pakistan, Karachi.
laws. Stress was placed in giving land (i e,
mission, New Delhi. Reserve Bank of India (1990): A Review of the
ownership right) to the actual tiller. Land
-1961): Thiird Five-Year Platt, Planning Com- Agricultulral Credit System in India, Bombay.
reform programmes to fulfil the objectives mission, New Delhi. Stein, Burton (1969): 'Integration of the Agrar-
as summarised above were drawn up in -1966): Fourth Five-YearPlatt, Planning Com- ian SystemsofSouthern India' in Frykenberg
various five-year plans. However, both in mission, New Delhi. Robert E (ed), LandConttrol anidSocial Struc-
terms of implementation of ceiling laws and -(1976): Fifth Five-Year Plat, Planning Com- ture in, Indian History, University of Wis-
distribution of surplus land among the land- mission, New Delhi. consin Press, Madison, Wisconsin.
less and marginal farmers, efforts up till -(1981): Sixth Five-Year Plan, Planning Com- Stokes, Eric (1978): The Peasant and the Raj,
mission, New Delhi. Cambridge University Press, New York.
now have not met with any significant suc-
-(1986): Seventh Five-YearPlan, Planning Com- Tod, James (1984): TheAnnals andAntiquities of
cess. In fact, over years landlessness and
mission, New Delhi. Rajasthan, Oriental Books, New Delhi.
marginalisation of poor and small farmers
have accentuated.
The summary and conclusionsabove based
on the broad trend survey attempted in this
paper present a distressing picture. The fu-
ture trend is also equally disturbing because
in the future there is no evidence of any CENTRE FOR SOCIAL STUDIES
significant shift in the existing (depressing)
trend in the land relations in the agrarian South Gujarat University Campus
sector.
Thus, over the remaining period of the SURAT 395 007
present century there is little likelihood of
bringing about significant changes in the The Centre, a multi-disciplinary Social Sciences research
persistent depressing situation in the agrar-
ian sector. Changes can only be brought
institute, invites applications forthe positions of Senior Fellows,
about by effective implementation of land Fellows and Associates. Scholars specialised in agricultural
reforms programme already promised. This and industrial economics, sociology, political science,
is a function of strong political will to
anthropology and law, and interested in studying Western India
disturb the existing low level equilibrium in
the agrarian sector which helps to maintain and Gujarat in particular, and willing to join on tenure basis shall
the status quo of power relations. be given preference. Those who are interested may send their
The details of such implementation strat-
bio-data giving details about research experiences, interests,
egy (given the requisite political will) and
creation of a dynamic and productive land publications, etc. to the Director before 15th January 1994.
relations in actual practice may form the
subject matter of a separate paper. Ilere it

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