Front. Philos.

China 2009, 4(1): 143–155

DOI 10.1007/s11466-009-0009-2

RESEARCH ARTICLE

ZHANG Shiying

The double meanings of “essence”: The natural

and humane sciences — A tentative linkage of
Hegel, Dilthey, and Husserl

© Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2009

Abstract Early in Aristotle’s terminology, and ever since, “essence” has been
conceived as having two meanings, namely “universality” and “individuality”.
According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history
of Western philosophy, “essence” unequivocally refers to “universality”. As a
matter of fact, however, “universality” cannot cover Aristotle’s definition and
formulation of “essence”: Essence is what makes a thing “happen to be this
thing.” “Individuality” should be the deep meaning of “essence”. By means of an
analysis of some relevant Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it
can be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the
natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly lies in the fact that the former
focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value
and significance of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural
things is a process in which essence shifts from universality to individuality. It is
the author’s contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human
culture and society is the construction of an ideal society that is “harmonious yet
not identical”, on the basis of respecting and developing individual peculiarity
and otherness.

Keywords essence, universality, individuality, natural science, human science,

culture

摘要 “本质”最早在亚里士多德的用语中包含有两重含义：一是指“普遍的东
西”(“共相”)，一是指“个体的东西”(“这个”)。在西方哲学史上长期占统治
地位的思想片面地认为：“本质”就是指“普遍的东西”。但实际上，“普遍的东
Translated by Zhang Lin from Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking
University), 2007, (11): 23–29
ZHANG Shiying ( )
Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
E-mail: zhangsy1921@163.com
144 ZHANG Shiying

西”并不能涵盖亚里士多德对“本质”的界定和表述：本质是使一事物“恰恰地是
这个事物”的东西。“本质”的深层含义应是“个体性”。通过对西方一些相关思
想观点的分析和文化现实的考察，可以得出结论：自然科学与人文科学对待事物的
态度的区别在于：前者重普遍性规律的追求,后者重个体性的人生价值意义的追求。
从自然物到文化物是一个由以普遍性为本质到以个体性为本质的转化过程。在人文
社会领域应该强调的是：在尊重和发扬个人的独特性和差异性的基础上,建立“和而
不同”的理想社会。

关键词 本质，普遍性，个体性，自然科学，人文科学，文化

The word “essence” (“Wesen” in German) that is translated into Chinese as 本质

originated from the Greek to ti en einai, first used by Aristotle and meaning the
original being of a thing. Wu Shoupeng translated it into “zenshi 怎是” (Aristotle
1959, p. 6). Aristotle often used to ti en einai and ousia interchangeably. In
Chapter 4–6 of volume Z of his Metaphysics, Aristotle focuses on issues
concerning “essence,” contending that the essence of a thing is its “species of a
genus” (genous eidon). For example, in the statement that a “human being is an
animal with two feet,” “animal” is the “genus”, while “with two feet” is its
“species”, and a “human being is an animal with two feet” tells of the essence of
a human being (Aristotle 1959, Vol. z, 1030a11–13, 1037b14–21). For one thing,
the “essence” of Aristotle refers to universality in that both “genus” and
“species” are universals. “A species of a genus” also refers to what is called
“form” by Aristotle. However, whether “form” is universal or individual is still at
issue in that “a species of a genus” can be sub-categorized into more levels. The
lower the level of a species is, the nearer it approaches the individual; hence the
“form” becomes an individual (Aristotle 1959, 1038a9–35). Thus, “essence”
becomes “this”, viz. the individual rather than the universal. As a consequence,
Aristotle failed to offer a precise answer as to whether “essence” is universal or
individual. In the history of Western philosophy after Aristotle, “essence” began
to appear with multiple meanings: It might refer to an individual thing or the
character of a thing, to reality with its opposite as appearance or the universal
(universality), to a species of a genus, to the idea or meaning of a thing, etc.
(Schimidt 1978, p. 727). Summed up, these meanings are still within the scope of
the question left by Aristotle: Namely, they either hold that essence is individual
or insist that essence is universal (universality). The theory of ideas presented by
Plato, Aristotle’s instructor, is the earliest theory stressing the issue of
universality (Russell 1963, p. 169). According to Plato, the nature, character, and
reality of a thing lie in universality whereas an individual thing is unreal. In
The double meanings of “essence”: The natural and humane sciences 145

Russell’s opinion, the meaning of a thing and our thought can only be expressed
by language meaning universality in lieu of those proper names meaning
individual things. Platonism has governed Western philosophy for several
thousand years, and hence the main school of thought in Western philosophy
holds that “essence” is universality. Plato once said that “the interest and the
work of philosophy” (“das Interesse und das Geschäft der Philosophyie”) consist
in the “cognition” of “species and genus” (“die Gattungen”) (Hegel 1970b, p. 59).
“Species and genus” are universals called, by Plato, “ideas.” Just as Hegel
contends, this is what people sometimes translate into species or genus (Gattung,
Art): “Idea is of course species or genus,” and “is usually named universality”
(Ibid., p. 63).
To be sure, in our process of cognition, when we recognize the universality of
various individual things, we would grasp the essence of them to a certain extent,
and hence deepen our cognition of things. Take for instance a flower and tree:
When both of them are plants, the universal concept “plant” indicates their
essence. This perspective treating universality as the essence of things has
undoubtedly contributed much to the development of Western natural science,
which aims at seeking for natural regularities, that is, universality. the natural
sciences focus their research on finding out universality by means of various
methods (experiment, induction, deduction, etc.). Plato’s celebrated thesis, to wit,
“the interest and task of philosophy lies in recognizing universal things,” lays a
solid theoretical foundation in philosophy for the substantial development of
Western science, although according to Plato, the universality of idea pursued by
philosophy is far higher, deeper, and broader than that pursued by mathematics
and science.
However, does the essence of things only stop at the phase of universality? As
stated by Aristotle, “essence” is what makes a thing “be” a thing, what “defines”
(“gives a definition to”) a thing (Aristotle 1959, Vol. z, 1030a6–7, 1031a12), and
what makes a thing “happen to be this thing” (Aristotle 1959, 1030a3–5). In this
way, we may ask, can a thing be defined only by means of universality? Can
universality “happen to” define “this thing”? Take a “Confucian temple” for
example: If people designate the essence of it only by “temple” before
confirming that a “Confucian temple is a temple,” we may press: is “temple”, the
universal, that which makes a Confucian temple “happen to be” the essence of
itself? Obviously, merely saying that a “Confucian temple is a temple” fails to
demonstrate that a Confucian temple happens to be the essence of itself rather
than the essence of a common temple. It follows that instead of giving the most
exact and the deepest essence of “the thing happening to be this thing,”
universality can only demonstrate the superficial essence of a thing. Anything in
the world, insofar as its peculiarity is concerned, is unique. Universality by no
means equals uniqueness and hence cannot demonstrate the essence of a thing
146 ZHANG Shiying

that “happens to be this thing.” The case is rather this: the higher the degree of
universality and the wider its range, the further it is to the “happening to be this
thing” of a thing; contrarily, the lower the degree of universality and the narrower
its range, the nearer it is to the “happening to be this thing” of the thing. Again, in
the case of a Confucian temple, when the universality of “a Confucian temple is
a temple” is broadened to “a Confucian temple is a group of buildings,” the
essence of the Confucian temple is beyond our reach. Whereas, when the
universality of a Confucian temple is narrowed down to “a Confucian temple is
the crystallization of Chinese traditional culture” or “a Confucian temple is the
crystallization of Confucian traditional culture,” the essence of the Confucian
temple is at hand.
It seems that there is a process wherein the essence of a thing is revealed. In
the first instance, what is revealed is the simple individuality of the perception of
a thing, such as a colorful flower revealed in sight or the overall appearance of a
Confucian temple. In the second instance, the universality of things will be
revealed, such as a flower is a plant or a Confucian temple a temple. What is
finally revealed is the unity of the universality and the particularity (universal
thing and particular thing) of things — i.e. individuality at a higher level, in the
traditional Chinese example of a plum blossom with noble character or a
Confucian temple with the significance of Confucian culture. The revealing
process of essence that I am describing here is rather cursory. On the contrary,
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind is a voluminous work describing the revealing
process of essence which, in this aspect, offers us a great model. Hegel says,
“Substance is essentially subject” (“Die Substanz ist wesentlich Subjekt”) (Hegel
1970a, p. 28). Substance refers to the “object of ego” as a knower (Ibid., p. 39).
The process whence the object or thing is recognized and revealed mentally is
simultaneously the process wherein the self-cognition and self-revealing of the
essence of this object or thing are done. This process goes from the easy to the
difficult: At the initial phase, the thing (substance) is devoid of subjectivity, just
being “this”. As regards “what is this,” the knower knows nothing. That is to say,
the essence of the thing has yet to appear so it can only be said that it is “being
nothing” when people want to know what the essence is at the time. This is
called “Sense-Certainty” by Hegel. Along with the proceeding development of its
movement in consciousness, the thing goes through the phases from
“Sense-Certainty” to “Perception” and on to “Understanding”; hence, the essence
of the thing appears from nothing to some specific qualities. For example, as salt,
the thing is white, salty, and cubical, etc. It will further appear as a universal, i.e.
universal regularity, in the instance to follow: This flower is a plant and the salt is
a mineral, both subject to a certain universal regularity, and so on. This is
generally called “essence” or “supersensible essence” (Zhang 2007a). As held by
the philosophical principles of Chinese philosophical circles in the 1980’s, the
The double meanings of “essence”: The natural and humane sciences 147

essence of a thing as such is all over, and what would be done next is merely to
change the world in accordance with natural essence and regularity. Hegel
however argues that the in-depth essence of a thing remains to be touched on in
the recognition of this universality. His phenomenology of mind developed from
various phases of “Sense-Certainty”, “Perception”, “Understanding”, etc. which
belong to consciousness, to the phases of “Self-consciousness” and even
“Reason”, “Spirit”, “Religion”, and “Absolute Knowledge”. None the less, it’s in
the last phase of “Absolute Knowledge” that “substance” completely reveals
itself as “subject”, and that the thing reaches and reveals its most deep-seated
essence, called “absolute essence” (“das absolute Wesen”) by Hegel (Hegel
1970a, p. 495, 583, 584). After expatiating the “essence” in the sense of
“universality and universal regularity” in the “Understanding” phase, Hegel
spends nine tenths of the space in his Phenomenology of Mind discussing the
historical and cultural activities of the entire human society (including politics,
law, virtue, arts, religion, philosophy, etc.). In the view of Hegel, the singular
activity of “consciousness” (with “Understanding” as its top phase) holds that the
object is outside the self, according to which the recognized “essence” will by no
means be the deep essence of a thing or an object. It is his contention that the
in-depth appearance of “essence” will not be reached unless some activities with
the attitude that the object belongs to self (this is also a phenomenological
attitude) are carried out: that is, the historical and cultural activities of the whole
human society that he mentions in various phases from “self-consciousness” to
“reason”, “spirit”, “religion”, and “absolute knowledge”. Ostensibly, Hegel
incorporates the historical and cultural activities of the entire human society into
the appearing process of the “essence” of a thing. That is why he calls the
“essence” in the phrase of “Absolute Knowledge”, after the progression from
“Self-consciousness” to “Reason”, “Spirit”, and “Religion”. “Absolute essence”
is the name for the highest and deepest essence.
It stands to reason that, compared with the “absolute essence” in the phase of
“Absolute Knowledge”, the supersensible “essence” in the phase of
“Understanding” is too abstract and superficial, whereas the former is concrete as
well as profound. The key to the question is that the latter holds that object lies
outside the subject, while the former takes the opposite attitude. For that matter,
the essence that the latter achieves, namely the abstract and universality, appears
so general that it fails to hit any particular individual. In Aristotle’s words, it fails
to demonstrate that a thing “happens to be this thing.” For the same matter, none of
the “essences” in various phases which belong to the “conscious phase”
(“Sense-Certainty” or “meaning”, “perception”, and “understanding”) can be said
to be real essence: “The being in meaning, individuality as well as its opposite,
universality, in perception — and the empty and internal thing in understanding
(“das leere Innere” referring to abstract essence and regularity — by the writer) —
148 ZHANG Shiying

are no more essences but rather are just moments of self-consciousness. … In

contrast to consciousness itself, they are, simultaneously, purely disappearing
essences (rein verschwindende Wesen)” (Hegel 1970a, p. 138). That is to say, the
“essences” in such phases as “meaning”, “perception”, and “understanding” are
not authentic ones (“no more essences”) but just “disappearing moments” in the
process wherein “essence” itself appears. In the example previously used, the
thought of this passage by Hegel will proceed as follows: neither the saying that
“a Confucian temple is a group of buildings” nor the statement that “a Confucian
temple is a temple” can be said to have demonstrated the “essence” of a
Confucian temple in that a “group of buildings” and “temple” are no more than
“disappearing moments” in the self-appearing process of the “absolute essence”
of a Confucian temple, viz. the transitional essence. Only when we say “a
Confucian temple is the crystallization of the traditional culture of Chinese
Confucianism (we provisionally say so), can we be said to reach or near the
“absolute essence” of a Confucian temple. This assertion indicates that after
thousands of years of manifestation and the depositing of Chinese traditional
history and culture, the essence that a Confucian temple conceives points out,
concretely as well as profoundly, the “happening to be this thing” rather than the
abstract, superficial, and indiscreet essence as embodied by a “group of
buildings” or “temple”. Perhaps a Chinese Phenomenology of Mind is needed to
reach the “absolute essence” manifested by the statement “a Confucian temple is
the crystallization of the traditional culture of Chinese Confucianism.”
Needless to say, there is one aspect that transcends time in Hegelian “absolute
essence” which, in the past, was the focus of our (myself included) criticism of
Hegel’s philosophy. Carefully scrutinized, however, Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Mind particularly stresses that “absolute essence” or “pure concept” must
manifest itself in concrete history (including the history of human knowledge) as
well as time. In addition, most of this book is devoted to the depiction of this
aspect. If we slice off this part (it is a faulty expression in this great work), we
can still argue that Hegel’s “absolute essence” is the unity of particularity and
universality, the concrete and highest individuality, rather than abstract
universality.
The key reason that Hegel’s “absolute essence” can hit upon individuality and
demonstrate the “happening to be this thing” of a thing lies in its
phenomenological thought: “Substance is essentially subject.” Neither a thing
nor an object can have so-called independent, exterior, and objective meaning
without a subject. Hence the essence and meaning of a thing or a phenomenon
relies on a subject which takes uniqueness and individuality as its characteristics.
Also because of this, the “absolute essence” of a thing cannot but equal
“happening to be this thing” instead of the abstract universality in the phase of
“Understanding”.
The double meanings of “essence”: The natural and humane sciences 149

Some would perhaps suggest that the “absolute essence” or “happening to be this
thing” is no more than an artificial product inseparable from human beings, and
hence lacks objectivity: Only the regularity or essence in the Hegelian phase of
“Understanding” is objective. Meanwhile, the “absolute essence” that
Phenomenology of Mind reaches via various phases of the historical cultural
activities of human society is subjective, and hence incapable of being the
essence of natural things. Obviously, such questions result from an ignorance of
the basic views of phenomenology, which led the questioners to fail to get the
true essence of Hegel’s statement “substance is essentially subject.” Neither
Hegel nor Husserl ever denied the independent existence of things outside man,
but nevertheless, both the Hegelian proposition that “substance is essentially
subject” and Husserl’s method of parenthesizing exterior things tend to point out
that any exterior thing unrelated to subject and consciousness is of no
significance, let alone to its essence or to telling what its “essence” is. When we
make use of universalities such as “flower” or “plant”, “organism”, etc. to
demonstrate the essence of some individual flower, we conclude that this essence
is objective. Is it because the universality of “plant” exists independently without
correlating with subject or consciousness? In effect, without subject and
consciousness, none of the so-called universalities of “flower”, “plant”,
“organism”, are meaningful. All the universalities result from the abstract
activities of subject and consciousness. The “primary quality” of Locke, even the
most abstract “number”, is also “subjective as well as objective”, which would
not be without the participation of subject and consciousness (Zhang 2007b).
The action of consciousness can be roughly divided into two directions: from
concrete to abstract and from abstract to concrete. In the first direction, the
generality of universality widens, so much so that it sublimates into the concept
of identity such as “number”. This identity hence becomes the standard for
objectivity: that is, the biggest generality or the most abstract identity has the
greatest objectivity. This is also the meaning of objectivity in terms of natural
science. Modern science pursues digitization and quantification, reducing
everything to mathematical formulas; this is due to its taking abstract identity as
the standard for objectivity, and to its contention that only by doing so can it
reach the most objective and most scientific level. This shows that the objectivity
of natural science by no means originates from some so-called thing-in-itself
exterior to subject and consciousness but rather results from the abstract action of
consciousness. Dilthey holds the same standpoint. To him, the view with respect
to “objectivity as pertaining to things which exist independently of the
experience, thought, or consciousness of the person or ‘subject’, judging,
150 ZHANG Shiying

perceiving, or otherwise ‘minding’ things, that is, the view of attributing the
meaning of objectivity to ‘thing in itself’ (Sein an sich), is ‘a sort of nonsense’.
It’s not because such kind of objectivity is ‘silly’, but because such objectivity
could not have vital or cognitive meaning” (Ermarth 1987, p. 82). Moreover,
“Dilthey’s objectivity does not originate from, nor cultivate in, Sein an
sich…There is no absolute standpoint wholly ‘other’ from what is to be known”
(Ibid., p. 83). Also, “In Dilthey’s view, the natural sciences are an activity and
product, an expression, of historical human reason” (Ibid., p. 50). Dilthey argues
that the object of natural science, “outer experience”, is also “a mode of
experience, and as such is internally related to intending consciousness” (Ibid.).
He says, “the exterior world is a relation of pressure embedded in life, that of
impulse and resistance. The actuality of the exterior world only exists in the
life-relation whose actuality just means that the relations of psychological
construction contrast to the scope of spiritual science. Therefore, there is no
transcendent thing contrary to the consciousness embedded in it” (Dilthey 1927b,
p. 332). In a word, the general regularity and objectivity achieved by natural
science do not lie in some independent exterior reality but result from the
abstract activity of human consciousness (Ermarth 1987, p. 32; Makkreel 2003, p.
415). This view of Dilthey is worthy of acknowledgment.
In the other direction of conscious activities, namely that moving from abstract
to concrete, the degree of universality becomes lower, so much so that concrete
individuality is increasingly approached. For instance, from “a Confucian temple
is a group of buildings,” we can further recognize that a “Confucian temple is a
temple,” and that the “Temple of Confucius is the one located in Qufu,”…and so
on and so forth, until the recognition that “a Confucian temple is the
crystallization of the traditional culture of Chinese Confucianism.” In this way,
along with the progressing of the movement wherein consciousness reduces the
scope of universality, we can increasingly approach the essence of “happening to
be this thing” of a Confucian temple. Here, essence refers to individuality, which
sets up a sharp contrast with the universal essence achieved in the opposite
direction. Can we however conclude hereby that this essence is subjective, and
hence that there is no objectivity in terms of the humane sciences?
In my view, the objectivity of neither the natural sciences nor the humane
sciences lies in exterior things independent of subject and consciousness. They
share this point but differ from each other in the meanings of their respective
objectivities. As mentioned before, the objectivity of the natural sciences is the
identity that has reached an abstract level, and hence the more abstract and
universal a thing is, the more objective it becomes. On the other hand, the
investigation with regard to the humane sciences should not cease at the phase of
abstract identity. It demands that the process be reversed after conscious
activities reach the level of abstract identity, to wit, from abstract to concrete,
The double meanings of “essence”: The natural and humane sciences 151

reducing the universal things to individual ones step by step. A stock example of
this reduction is the Confucian temple mentioned previously. It has been the main
thinking trend of modern Western philosophy from Dilthey on that universality is
stressed in the study of nature, whereas individuality is emphasized when it comes
to the investigation as for man. The view that tries to keep a balance between the
natural sciences and humane sciences on universal regularities has been out of date
due to its failing to respect the individuality and dignity of man.
In the humane sciences, objectivity refers to something other than abstract
identity. Dilthey once differentiated the significances of the two objectivities but
failed to present detailed elaboration (Dilthey 1927b, p. 71). As interpreted by
Michael Ermarth, in Dilthey’s view, “Objectivity in the ved-world and the human
sciences consists in tracing relations, within a set of horizons and coherences.
These relations are, so to speak, followed interpretively and reflectively”
(Ermarth 1987, p. 82). Relations are demonstrated by this kind of objectivity
which “begins with a ‘point of interest’ and explicates a web or constellation of
meanings, values, situations, roles, and world-views” (Ibid., pp. 82–83). For
example, the objective explanation of an important historical event includes
interpretations with respect to such relational networks as interest, value,
worldview, etc. The objectivity of the humane sciences is relative because it
includes interpretation (Ibid., p. 88). The “interest”, “value”, “worldview”, etc.
here refer to cultural factors like activities of interest, ethics, and morality,
aesthetics, philosophy, etc., aiming at their respective significances. Human life
is the unity of these activities and the cognitive activities of the natural sciences
mentioned above. In the life-world, these significances of a thing, together with
those of scientific cognition which aim to achieve abstract identity, construct
another unity. Every individual person, and even every individual thing in human
life, is a concrete unity as such. The objectivity of science lies in abstracting this
concrete individual with rich significance, leaving aside the significances of
philosophy, aesthetics, morality, and interest so as to achieve abstract identity
(that is, Locke’s “primary quality” or number). On the contrary, the objectivity of
the humane sciences rests with the shift from the abstract to concrete,
transcending (not abandoning) the significance of abstract identity, and hence
further reducing the above-mentioned significances to their organic unity. What
is needed here is the “coherence” of various significances and relations
mentioned by Dilthey: The higher the coherence between these significances and
relations, the more objective, authentic, and concrete the “coherence”.
Objectivity here means authenticity and concreteness. Take a concrete flower for
example: We can abstract it, from the perspective of the natural sciences, step by
step, into “plant”, “organism”, … even into some abstract identity that can be
expressed in mathematical formulas. Nevertheless, we can also reverse the
procedure to the perspective of the humane sciences, viz. reduce the abstract
152 ZHANG Shiying

identity of mathematical formulas, step by step, to an organic unity with various

particular significances [“organism”, “plant”, “flower”, “plum blossom (e.g.),”
plum blossom with implications of Chinese traditional culture-…], so as to
display the concrete characters of the plum blossom in the life-world of Chinese
people. E.g., the plum blossom has once been described as something that “when
it withers and turns into earth, its fragrance still retains” (Yongmei 咏梅 (Ode to
Plum Blossom) by Lu You), which is the real, concrete character as well as
objectivity of plum blossom in the life-world of Chinese people. The essence of
plum blossom grasped in this way therefore conceives not only scientific
cognitive significance such as “organism”, “plant”, “flower”, etc., but also the
meanings of virtue, aesthetics, philosophy, etc. of Chinese traditional culture. For
another example, some individual person can also be grasped from the two
aspects of the natural sciences as well as the humane sciences: We can abstract
him by saying “this man is a rational animal,” “… a two-foot animal,” “…an
animal,” and so on. We can also reduce this, from the perspective of the humane
sciences, to “this man is a person with Chinese traditional cultural character,”
“…a philosopher with Chinese traditional cultural character,” “…a philosopher
with Chinese traditional cultural character who is engaged in the study of
Lao-Zhuang 老庄 (Laozi and Zhuangzi) philosophy,” … In this progression, we
are increasingly approaching the most authentic and most concrete personality of
the person, and hence his objectivity.
In the same vein, the objectivity of a national culture can also be grasped from
the standpoint of the organic whole and individuality. A nation is composed of a
variety of individual people. The humane sciences should stress the individuality
of people, respecting their respective dignities, and pay attention to the organic
whole “integrated as one” by a good many individuals of the nation as well.
Without the organic whole and individuality, a nation would lose its authenticity
and concreteness, and its objectivity.

There is no insurmountable gap between natural things and human things. Firstly,
the so-called “thing-in-itself” alienated from the human world is of no
significance. Secondly, in factual history, natural things completely beyond the
reach of human beings are becoming fewer and fewer. Anything in the life-world
of mankind conceives human elements. As for human beings and things, we can
treat and grasp them either from the perspective of the natural sciences or from
the perspective of the humane sciences. A human is a natural being as well as a
human being, and human life is the unity of nature and human culture. On the
other hand, as a human being, man takes transcending natural things as his
The double meanings of “essence”: The natural and humane sciences 153

orientation. As Dilthey asserts, a human being as a part of nature may and should
demonstrate something via natural science. In this way, “spiritual science”
depends on “natural science” to a certain extent. None the less, human life is by
no means totally determined by nature in that natural science can only interpret
cause-and-effect relations with regard to natural aspects of man, whereas the
spiritual aspects, viz. human purposefulness and the meaning of value, go beyond
the reach of cause-and-effect relations in the natural aspect of the human. That is
to say, the dependence of the humane sciences on the natural sciences is relative.
Or, the humane sciences are in a measure independent of the natural sciences.
Dilthey calls this individuality “relative independence” (Dilthey 1927a, pp.
15–17). “Human action is characterized by some purposefulness beyond the
interpretation from natural science” (Makkreel 2003, p. 54).
This differentiation of attitudes toward the humane sciences and their natural
counterparts can be eventually summed to that between the individuality-
orientation and the universality-orientation. While the natural sciences go after
universal regularities, the humane sciences focus on pursuing the value and
significance of human life of individuality. Dilthey thus attaches great
importance to the role played by individuals in promoting the development of
history (Dilthey 1927a, p. 53). However, Dilthey is by no means an individual
libertarian who runs counter to Hegelian historical philosophy. He argues that
while the individual is the carrier (Träger) of history, he is a “crossing point”
(Kreuzungspunkt) of interactions between various social relations (Ibid., p. 37,
87). Human beings cannot but subject to the lively correlation of socio-historical
actuality” (Makkreel 2003, pp. 55–56). It can be seen, from Dilthey’s
differentiation of the two attitudes of the natural sciences and the humane
sciences, how simple the view appears to be when it totally characterizes the
humane sciences as seeking for universal regularities.
Taking the view the human being as the “crossing point” of various historical
social relations as a starting point, Dilthey emphasizes particularly that human
individuality is composed of a “culture system” (Kultursysteme) and “exterior
social organization” (die aüssere Organization der Gesellschaft) (Dilthey 1927a,
p. 43), and that the former refers to cultural activities such as language, science,
art, religion etc. whereas the latter refers to family, nation, etc. In our opinion,
nevertheless, both of them can be fit into the category of cultural activity in the
global sense. According to Dilthey, every individual is a “carrier” as well as
“cultivator” of cultural value (Ibid., p. 87; Makkreel 2003, pp. 56–57, 60). This
makes us think of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind in which the “absolute
spirit” — “absolute subject” is one carrying a long developing process of history
and culture. As long as we criticize the “absolute” of Hegel and his artificial
system (this is also what dissatisfies Dilthey), what is conceived in
Phenomenology of Mind will surface, namely every individual is the carrier of
154 ZHANG Shiying

the subject during the long-developing course of culture and history. Different
people reflect this process from different perspectives of being a “crossing point”
and in different ways, which are the manifestation of respective individualities.
The process with natural things and cultural things as its two extremes is one
wherein essence shifts from universality to individuality. The shift from the attitude
of the natural sciences to that of the humane sciences covers a process whence
universalization (generalization) changes into individualization, a process where
emphasis shifts from commonality to idiosyncrasy. Focusing entirely on seeking
common ground in the field of human society will result in linking the humane
sciences to the natural sciences, and the human to thing. It is my contention that
what should be emphasized in the field of human society is to respect and develop
individual particularity and idiosyncrasy, and to set up an ideal society
“harmonious yet not the same” on the basis of the philosophical ontology of being
“different but communicating” rather than pressing “difference” with “identity”, or
pressing individuality or particularity by means of universality or unity.
Will emphasizing the humane sciences valuing particularity and its status lead
to the effacement of the important significance of the natural sciences? This is
not so. As has been mentioned before, at the same time that Dilthey emphasizes
the independence of the humane sciences from the natural sciences, he argues
that the independence is relative. Dilthey attaches great importance to, rather
than denying, the close relationship between the humane and natural sciences,
and to the fact that nature is where spirit bases itself. As he says, “Spiritual
actuality is the upper limit of its natural counterpart while natural actuality is
necessarily the basic prerequisite of spiritual life” (Dilthey 1927a, p. 17). Dilthey
agrees that humane sciences should get support from natural sciences (Ermarth
1987, p. 35). Differing from Dilthey, Husserl all the more inclines to connect the
natural sciences to the humane. According to Husserl, the humane sciences will
undoubtedly show interest in the natural sciences, but the nature thereof is by no
means the same as understood by the natural sciences, i.e. a heterogeneous and
alien thing. What is more, the view that the humane sciences need heterogeneous
and alien support, and that the natural sciences and nature have absolute
independence, is wrong. In this way, on the part of Husserl and contrary to what
Dilthey holds, it is not that the humane sciences have relative independence but
that the natural sciences have nothing but relative independence (Ibid., p. 36).
According to Husserl’s theory of intentionality, the study of “nature” by the
humane sciences lies in purely taking “nature” as the object of intention. — This
is however what the humane sciences concern rather than what te natural
sciences do (Ibid., p. 41). On all accounts, in Dilthey’s view, a human being
cannot be alienated from nature, whereas Husserl holds the opposite view, viz. a
human being can be alienated from nature. While Dilthey merely established a
status for humane sciences, Husserl’s theory of “transcendental reduction” seems
The double meanings of “essence”: The natural and humane sciences 155

to have dismantled the hedge between the humane and natural sciences, offering
the former an absolute priority (Ibid., p. 40, 42). In addition, “Husserl’s aim is
not only to demonstrate the independence of the human from the natural sciences,
but also to halt the ever-increasing alienation of natural science from life” (Ibid.,
p. 43). Husserl’s intention of overcoming “alienation” is worthy of approval. A
voice advocating the attribution of the natural sciences to the humanities can be
heard today in the intention to overcome the “alienation” of present cultural life.
Has Husserl’s “theory of transcendental reduction”, nevertheless gone too far? It
is my contention that the intention of isolating human life from nature is
impractical. The imbroglio of thought between Dilthey and Husserl was
originally hard to clarify, but in any event, Dilthey’s assertion that “spiritual
science” is “relatively independent of” “natural science” is more practical and
more accurate.
What should be particularly pointed out here is that besides presenting the
thought of “intersubjectivity” and the “life-world” in his old age, Husserl
belittled history, prescribing essence as universality but ignoring the importance
of individuality. All these run counter to his intention of stressing the priority of
the humane sciences and overcoming the alienation of the natural sciences from
human life. The “purity” of his philosophy has in effect alienated history and
culture hence human life. Comparatively, Dilthey’s philosophy gets closer to
human life.

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