HANDBOOK ON PARLIAMENTARY ETHICS AND CONDUCT

A GUIDE FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS

GLOBAL TASK FORCE ON PARLIAMENTARY ETHICS

CHAIR: GHASSAN MOUKHEIBER

AUTHOR: GREG POWER

A GUIDE FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS
Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics

Greg Power
Published by GOPAC- WFD
The Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) is an international
network of parliamentarians dedicated to good governance and to improving parliaments as
institutions of oversight. It is the only parliamentary organisation/network with the single
focus on combating corruption throughout the world. GOPAC members represent over 90
countries in all regions of the world. There are more than 30 national chapters in Africa, the
Arab Region, Asia, Latin America, North America, and Europe working to improve governance
in their respective countries.

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) is the United Kingdom’s democracy-
building foundation, aimed at supporting the consolidation of democratic practices in
developing democracies. Working with and through partner organisations, WFD seeks to
strengthen the institutions of democracy, principally political parties (through the work of
the UK political parties), parliaments and the range of institutions that make up civil society.
WFD believes that, for a democracy to flourish, all of these institutions must be strong.

Acknowledgements
This document was commissioned on behalf of GOPAC by the Westminster Foundation for
Democracy, and produced under the auspices of the Global Task Force on Parliamentary
Ethics, chaired by Ghassan Moukheiber.

The document was written and edited by Greg Power on behalf of the Task force, the
Westminster Foundation for Democracy and GOPAC.

About the author

Greg Power is a Director of Global Partners, a social purpose company working on projects to
support democratic politics. He is a parliamentary specialist involved in projects to support
the development of legislative institutions and political parties in countries in the Middle
East, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe including Iraq, Rwanda and southern Sudan.
www.global-partners.co.uk
greg@global-partners.co.uk

The author would like to express his gratitude to Ghassan Moukheiber as chair of the task
force, and to all of its members, for their help in developing the content. In addition, he
is very grateful to Dina Melhem at WFD, Stephen Tsang and Nola Juaritis at GOPAC, and
Oonagh Gay and Alda Barry at the House of Commons for their comments and suggestions
on the text.
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
foreword
The Global Organization of Parliamentarians
Against Corruption (GOPAC), in collaboration
with the Westminster Foundation for Democ-
racy (WFD), is pleased to publish this Hand-
book on Parliamentary Ethics and Conduct.
The objective of the Handbook is to provide
reform-minded parliamentarians with clear
and useful guidance to develop the various
building blocks of an effective ethics and con-
duct regime – a regime that is consistent with
their respective political and cultural contexts,
and at the same time, adheres to fundamental
international standards.
Developing the rules of such an ethics and con-
duct regime with an appropriate enforcement
mechanism for parliamentarians has become
necessary in order to:
• allow parliamentarians to demonstrate
high standards of ethics consistent with
their important public interest roles, par-
ticularly in holding the executive branch
of government accountable
• deter and sanction specific cases of un-
ethical behaviour by parliamentarians in
the broader context of preventing and
fighting corruption
• enhance the public’s level of trust in the
democratic political system in general,
and in parliaments and their members in
particular, which is greatly influenced by
perceived and real corruption
5
• implement the provisions of Article 8 of the
United Nations Convention Against Corrup-
tion, which provides for the development of
‘Codes of Conduct for Public Officials’
GOPAC members have recognized the con-
cerns and needs mentioned above. During
their global conference held in Arusha, Tan-
zania in September 2006, the members re-
solved to create a Global Task Force (GTF) on
parliamentary ethics and conduct and man-
dated its Arab chapter (ARPAC) to lead it.
The Global Task Force comprises GOPAC
parliamentarians from several continents,
expert consultants, and representatives of
international organizations. Its main goal is
to develop a handbook on parliamentary eth-
ics and conduct that can be disseminated to
and used in various countries. A cooperation
agreement was signed with the WFD, who
provided the necessary expertise, technical
and financial resources for the project, and
for which we are most grateful. The Handbook
was written by Mr. Greg Power, an interna-
tionally recognized expert on parliamentary
rules and procedures. The GTF members met
several times to establish the project’s meth-
odology, to develop an action plan, as well as
to review and discuss the various drafts in or-
der to make the Handbook a professional and
useful document of high quality.
6 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
In doing so, the GTF members focused their
attention on important issues that were less
addressed so far in the literature and parlia-
mentary practice, namely those related to
conflict of interest, transparency, disclosure
and restrictions on political activity. However,
they opted to leave them out from any major
development in this Handbook, in order
to keep the focus on the selected issues. It
is useful to highlight the two main areas not
fully developed in this Handbook, albeit cor-
nerstones of any ethics regime:
The first area is encouraging full compli-
ance with the rules that criminalize acts of
corruption, in compliance with the minimum
standards provided by the UN Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC). Although such
rules are generally applicable to public offi-
cials and private citizens, some of them are
of particular relevance to parliamentarians,
who are more vulnerable to certain acts than
other public officials, given the nature of
their functions and responsibilities.
The second area is the personal demeanour
of parliamentarians inside and outside par-
liament, which covers the most classical and
strict rules of ethics and conduct, however
indirectly related to corruption. These rules
tend to cover mostly the relationships be-
tween parliamentarians themselves. They
are most commonly included in the parlia-
mentary rules of procedure and by-laws.
With the release of the Handbook, it is hoped
that many reform-minded parliamentarians
around the world will read it, and be inspired
by its content to take the necessary action
to develop their own ethics and conduct re-
gime, or to improve their existing ones.
It is also our wish that this first edition of the
Handbook will lead to significant follow-up
action, such as: the development of a similar
handbook on ministerial ethics and conduct,
translation into various languages (a project
of translation for the Arab countries is already
under way), training programs (A training
on how to use the guidebook for members
of Arab Parliamentarians against corruption
has already took place), development of ex-
amples and compilation of best practices of
ethics and conduct regimes for parliamentar-
ians around the globe.
Finally, we would like to express our deep
appreciation to those who have generously
contributed their knowledge, expertise, time,
effort and resources to make the publication
of the Handbook possible. Our gratitude goes
particularly to the following individuals
and organizations:
• GOPAC Parliamentarians: Hon. Dan Wan-
dera Ogalo (Senator Uganda), and Hon.
Ross Robertson (MP New Zealand).
• The Author: Mr. Greg Power of Global
Partners and Associates.
• The Westminster Foundation for Democ-
racy, particularly the countless effort of
Ms. Dina Melhem and her team.
• UNDP - POGAR: Mr. Arkan El Seblani.
• Expert consultants: Ms. Alda Barry (Regis-
trar of Members' Interests UK); Ms. Oonagh
Gay (House of Commons Library UK); Mr.
Howard Whitton (The Ethicos Group); Mr.
Kenneth E. Kellner (Senior Counsel to the
Committee on Standards of Official Con-
duct, U.S. House of Representatives).
• The team of GOPAC and ARPAC, particu-
larly, Ms. Maia Bulbul, Ms. Nola Juraitis,
Mr. Martin Ulrich and Mr. Stephen Tsang
and all their support staff.
Ghassan Moukheiber (MP Lebanon) Chairman
GOPAC Global Task Force on Parliamentary
Ethics and Conduct
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
contents
Foreword | 5
Introduction | 8 i) Forms and timing of disclosure | 23
• Terminology and structures for an ethics and
conduct regime | 9
• Building an ethical culture - consultation and
discussion | 10
• The process of developing an ethics and
conduct regime | 11
Section 1: Determining the purpose of an ethics
and conduct regime | 12
• Defining the problem | 13
• The broader purpose of the ethics and conduct
regime - ensuring MPs understand their roles | 14
• Summary – A toolbox approach | 15
• Key Questions | 15 enforcement | 30
Section 2: Establishing the principles for an
ethics and conduct regime | 16
• Defining the principles of parliamentary
conduct | 17
i. Internal sources | 17
ii. International parliamentary experience | 17
iii. International standards | 18
• Summary - Identifying universal principles | 19
• Key questions | 19
Section 3: Developing the content of the ethics
and conduct regime | 20
• Part one – Identifying and addressing
conflicts of interest | 21
• Summary – Ensuring the integrity of the
institution | 22
• Key questions | 22
7
• Part two – Rules for transparency and
disclosure | 23
ii) Who should register? | 23
iii) What should be registered? | 24
• Summary – Disclosing the right details | 25
• Key questions | 25
• Part three – Restrictions on ‘outside
interests’ | 26
• Post-employment restrictions | 27
• Summary – Finding the right balance | 27
• Key questions | 27
• Part four – Parliamentary Immunity | 27
• Key Questions | 29
Section 4: mechanisms for regulation and
• Three models for regulation of ethical conduct | 31
• A sliding scale of sanctions | 32
i. Categories of rules | 32
ii. Three categories of sanctions | 33
• Summary – Finding the right mechanisms
and proportionate sanctions | 34
• Key questions | 34
Section 5: developing a culture around the ethics
regime - education and training | 36
• Summary – Influencing parliamentary
behaviour | 38
• Key questions | 39
Section 6 - Conclusion | 40
Sources | 42
introduction
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
This handbook has been designed by politi-
cians for politicians. It is aimed, principally, at
reform-minded members of parliament (MPs)
but, we hope, will also be used by others
(including citizens, Civil Society Organiza-
tions and the media) seeking to understand
and improve standards of ethical conduct
within legislative bodies.
The handbook has two purposes, first, to
describe and explain the constituent parts
of a system of ethics and conduct that need
to be implemented and, second, to identify
the key issues for politicians in developing,
implementing and enforcing such a system.
The handbook does not aim to provide
a universal blueprint, capable of being
implemented in every legislature. This is
not feasible. It is impossible to transplant
practice directly from one parliament to
another. The content, structure and provi-
sions will vary according to the political
context, culture and rules that exist within
that institution. Instead the guide sets out
the key stages of a political reform process
– firstly, establishing political agreement on
the broad principles for ethics and conduct,
and then building more detailed rules and
mechanisms for their enforcement.
It is for each parliament to decide the detail
– and whether the system will be implemented
by legislation, new parliamentary bylaws,
protocols, or some other mechanism. But
a new system which determines standards
of behaviour inside and outside the parlia-
ment must command support from politi-
cians and be regarded as legitimate by the
public. Therefore it should complement and
reinforce existing parliamentary rules, but
9
should also reflect globally-accepted ethical
standards if it is to ensure the integrity of the
institution.
Terminology and structures for an ethics
and conduct regime
At the outset, it is important to be clear
about terminology. The phrase most often
to describe these systems is a ‘code of
conduct’. However, the GOPAC Global Task
Force felt that this term could be interpreted
in different ways. For countries with a Civil
Law tradition ‘code’ has a legal connota-
tion, implying that such rules would need
to be based in a single compiled statute,
whereas the ethics and conduct rules and
related regulatory framework could be
developed incrementally and be included
in several different statutes. In Common
Law countries a ‘code’ often infers the op-
posite, that it is developed by agreement
within an institution and its application
rests on non-statutory regulation.
We have sought to avoid using the word
‘code’ where possible in the main body of
this document.1 The handbook is designed
to be relevant for both types of legal system.
However, finding alternative terminology
that is commonly understood is difficult.
The task force suggests that it is perhaps
more helpful to think of a 'system of ethics
and conduct', or an 'ethical regime'. The
intention is to provide the building blocks
around which new systems of ethical behav-
iour can be built or further developed.
For the purposes of this handbook we use 'eth-
ics and conduct regime' as an all-encompassing
1 Although where other authors are cited and refer
to a code of conduct, or where parliaments describe
their own systems as 'codes of conduct', we have not
changed their terminology.
10 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
term to cover the constituent parts of the sys-
tem. That system is made up of three distinct
parts, which will be referred to as 'principles',
'rules' and 'regulatory framework':
i) Principles: The general ethical principles
which all members of the parliamentary in-
stitution should seek to uphold.
ii) Rules: The detailed provisions which
identify acceptable and unacceptable con-
duct and behaviour for MPs.
iii) Regulatory framework: The mechanisms
for enforcing the rules and applying sanctions.
“A legislative code of conduct is a formal
document which regulates the behaviour of
legislators by establishing what is considered
to be acceptable behaviour and what is not. In
other words, it is intended to create a political
culture which places considerable emphasis
on the propriety, correctness, transparency,
and honesty of parliamentarians’ behaviour.
However, the code of conduct is not intended
to create this behaviour by itself.”
Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, p. 9
Whether these individual aspects of the
ethics and conduct regime require legal
authority or can be enforced through other
means, such as a parliamentary resolution,
will need to be decided in each country.
Politicians will also need to determine the
content in each of the three areas according
to their own circumstances. But each ele-
ment should link to, and inform, the others.
A set of general ethical principles might
be widely-accepted, but cannot be used to
judge MPs’ behaviour unless they can be
linked to activity in certain contexts and cir-
cumstances. The principles are given force
through the development of more detailed
rules. But in order for the rules to be effec-
tive there must, in addition, be the threat of
real, but proportionate punishment of those
who break them.
Building an ethical culture - consultation
and discussion
The purpose of an ethical regime is to en-
sure certain standards of conduct amongst
its members. It should take as a basis the
commonly-accepted standards that already
exist within the institution, but it should
also seek to establish new ones.
Developing an ethics and conduct regime, in
other words, requires more than simply pub-
lishing a written set of principles, rules and
regulations. It means developing political
agreement around the purpose of the regime
and building a culture around its provisions.
Parliamentarians must be engaged in the
process of developing the system at each
stage. This can be done in different ways,
but the early stages of development should
involve as wide a range of MPs as possible -
through general debate and discussion. At
the later stages it will be more effective to
delegate the task of writing rules to a com-
mittee, but again it must be accompanied
by consultation, discussion and delibera-
tion within the parliament.
The effectiveness of such a system in prac-
tice is determined by the way in which it is
observed and applied. But an ethics and
conduct regime will not, by itself, solve
problems of unethical behaviour, nor will it
be able to govern the conduct of Members
in every given situation – no matter how
comprehensive or detailed it is. There will
always be grey areas or rules that are open
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
to interpretation. In these cases the legisla-
ture must rely on the individual MP’s best
judgement to always behave in a manner
that upholds the integrity of the institution.
The process of developing an ethics and
conduct regime
i) Creating the political will for reform
The first stage is to build a coalition for
change within parliament around the need
for an ethics and conduct regime. This may
be prompted by a political crisis, an inci-
dence of corruption or general parliamentary
concern about public trust in the institution.
Politicians must understand why a compre-
hensive and effective ethics is needed and
what it is designed to achieve. This is the
subject of section 1.
ii) Get agreement on ethical principles first
Once parliamentarians have accepted the
need for an ethics and conduct regime, the
next stage is to generate agreement around
the broad principles by which all politicians
should abide. It is important to start with prin-
ciples for two reasons. First, most institu-
tions already have defining values included
in their bylaws or in the constitution. Sec-
ond, it is easier to get agreement around
general principles than around the detail of
the rules. This is dealt with in section 2.
iii) Develop detailed rules
The application of ethical principles requires
more detailed rules which explain how those
principles operate in practice. There are three
main elements to these rules; first, defining
what constitutes a conflict of interest, sec-
ond, greater openness to minimise the risk of
a conflict of interest and third, limiting poli-
ticians’ activity where conflicts might occur.
11
Section 3 examines each of these elements
and the sorts of provisions that parliaments
might want to implement.
iv) Establishing the regulatory system and
training members
The final stage is to develop a robust system
of regulation which can enforce the rules.
This must also though include the training
and education of MPs so that they under-
stand and abide by the rules. This is the
subject of section 4.
The process can be likened to one of build-
ing a pyramid, starting from a very wide and
general base, but building to a narrower
and more detailed pinnacle.
This handbook is structured around this pro-
cess, starting with the broad principles and
building to greater detail. It aims to provide
the tools for its readers to build their own pyr-
amid, and an understanding of the strategy to
do so. However, each parliament is likely to
develop the regime in its own style and
according to the local political circumstances.
Summary
The development of high ethical standards
depends more on politicians than on the
contents of an ethics and conduct regime.
It relies on MPs understanding and respect-
ing the regime. Developing a new system is
therefore a political process which should
seek to carry the agreement of Members at
every stage. Identifying opportunities for
reform and starting with broad principles
with which few can disagree will provide a
basis from which to build not only detailed
rules, but also the political will to establish
certain standards of behaviour.
12 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics

section 1
determining
the purpose of
the ethics and
conduct regime
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
Developing an ethics and conduct regime is
a political process. The political context will
therefore shape both the content and the
process of developing the regime.
The political situation may also provide the
initial opportunity for reformers. It is impor-
tant that reform-minded politicians regard
political and public concern over standards
as an opportunity – it may provide the basis
for building political will to do something
This section examines how and why ethics
and conduct regimes are developed. It is im-
portant, first, to be clear about the reasons
for introducing an ethics and conduct regime
and the problem that it is seeking to address.
Second, the regime must complement exist-
ing parliamentary rules and procedures to
ensure MPs understand their roles, and thus
influence their behaviour.
Defining the problem
Parliaments introduce new systems of eth-
ics and conduct usually for one of three rea-
sons: i) as a response to ethical misdemean-
ours, ii) public concern about parliamentary
standards and iii) enforcing existing parlia-
mentary bylaws within parliament.
First, some countries have introduced sys-
tems as a direct result of MPs breaking the
existing rules. In the United Kingdom, for
example, a new system for policing ethical
behaviour was introduced in the mid-1990s
following several cases where MPs were
being paid to represent private interests
in the House of Commons. This behaviour
breached previous parliamentary resolu-
tions, and highlighted the weaknesses of
the existing system of self-regulation. In
response to political, public and media
13
concern a new and more comprehensive
regulatory system was introduced which
tightened and reinforced the rules govern-
ing ethical conduct.
Second, in some countries the need for a
new ethics and conduct regime has been
mooted in response to a more general
public concern about the standards and
behaviour of politicians. This may often be
prompted by specific cases of MPs using
public office for private gain, but the eth-
ics and conduct regime is seen as a way of
emphasising public standards across the
board as much as the need to introduce
new regulations to deal with specific cases.
In Australia, for example, the debate about
the need for a code of conduct was the re-
sult of a slew of stories about misuse of
public funds and declining levels of public
trust in politicians - at one stage only 7%
of Australians believed that MPs had high
standards of honesty and ethics. In such
circumstances, ethics and conduct regimes
are principally about attempting to restore
public trust in politicians.
Third, although ethics and conduct regimes
have traditionally been used to combat cor-
ruption and unethical behaviour their scope
is expanding to cover other forms of mis-
conduct which interfere with the operation
of parliament. There is particular interest in
emerging democracies as to how ethics and
conduct regimes might be used to establish
the authority of the rules - and the Speaker
- in a new parliamentary institution. In the
early years of a legislature, there is no gen-
eral acceptance or common understanding
of how the rules of procedure should be in-
terpreted. In fact, they are highly-contested
by MPs, so that debate is fractious and the
Speaker’s authority frequently questioned.
The battle is over the type of institution that
14 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
members wish to create – in which all Mem-
bers have a direct interest – and the high
turnover of MPs at each election prolongs
that process of contestation. Increasingly
such parliaments are seeing ethics and
conduct regimes as a way of reinforcing
parliamentary procedure, protocol and eti-
quette in the chamber, committee work and
even interaction with voters.
The key issue is to identify the nature of the
problem that the new system is seeking to
address. It is likely that it will include el-
ements of all three of the examples listed
above. Although each example might be re-
garded as a problem, they also provide op-
portunities for reforming parliamentarians
- each provides conducive circumstances
for establishing a new regime. In short,
reform-minded MPs should use these op-
portunities to frame the discussion around
a new ethical regime. Still, the objectives of
the new system need to be closely defined.
They will determine its contents and scope,
and the way in which it is enforced. If the
objectives of the regime are clear from the
outset, the more likely it is that it will suc-
ceed in meeting those objectives.
The broader purpose of the ethics and con-
duct regime - ensuring MPs understand
their roles
In deciding the nature of the regime it is
also important to ensure that it comple-
ments other sources of advice and guid-
ance for MPs. At its most basic level an eth-
ics and conduct regime should ensure that
MPs understand and adhere to the basic
rules of parliament. But, given that all par-
liamentary institutions are governed by of-
ten quite detailed rules of procedure, what
additional purpose should an ethics and
conduct regime serve?
The initial problems exist at three levels.
• First, there is frequently a lack of knowl-
edge amongst members about how the
institution works, especially when they
are first elected.
• Second, rules of procedure tend to be
complex, legalistic documents. They are
often difficult to understand, and inter-
pretation of one section of the rules often
relies on understanding the provisions in
other sections.
• Third, although the rules dictate how the
institution works, they do not tell the MP
how to behave. They deal only with the
MP’s role within the institution, and even
then only offer guidance on process, but
rarely on the quality or content of that work.
In new parliaments with limited democratic
experience and a high turnover of MPs at
each election, it is more difficult because
there is not always a clear parliamentary
culture. Members will need help in firstly,
understanding the rules of procedure and
secondly, understanding the standards ex-
pected of them.
The most obvious way in which to achieve
this is through a system of induction or
training for new members. Although most
parliaments acknowledge the principle and
importance of training, it varies enormously
in practice and delivery. In addition, the im-
pact of training can be time-limited, espe-
cially if such efforts are not followed up or
are not part of an on-going programme.
As a result a number of parliaments have
developed guides to act as reference sourc-
es for MPs. These documents are generally
used as supplements to the rules of proce-
dure, explaining the institution and its pro-
cesses. These can simply be glossaries of
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
parliamentary terminology, such as that de-
veloped by the Namibian parliament. Other
parliaments have more detailed handbooks
of parliamentary procedure, which include
more guides to the operation of the institu-
tion. For example, the House of Commons
Business of the House and its Committees:
a short guide covers aspects such as the
rules of debate and how and when to table
a question to a minister, as well some of the
technical aspects of statutory instruments,
regulatory reform orders and programming
orders. Similar documents exist in Canada,
Australia, India and Japan.
Some legislative bodies in the Arab region
are also developing more user-friendly
guides to parliament for members. These
handbooks of procedure, such as that devel-
oped by the UNDP with the Bahraini Council
of Representatives, provide an overview of
the institution and the MPs role within it.
However, although most of these guides will
give MPs a better understanding of their
role and the institution, they tend to focus
on process rather than content. That is, they
will explain how the institution works but
won’t necessarily describe how to behave.
It is here that ethics and conduct regimes
could perform a complementary role. Ethics
and conduct regimes should focus more is-
sues that determine the standards and qual-
ity of an MP’s work, but in doing so need to
be informed by, and seek to reinforce the
parliament’s rules and procedures.
Summary - A toolbox approach
One of the key points of this guidebook is
that each parliament should determine its
own needs and the measures necessary to
address them. In some parliaments this may
involve the restatement of existing princi-
ples through a parliamentary resolution.
15
In other cases, the principles and rules of
ethical conduct may be added to the rules
of procedure, or may be published as an
entirely separate document. In those coun-
tries with a civil law system, the implemen-
tation of an ethical regime may require leg-
islation to give the document legal force.
It is impossible to transplant the experience
of one parliament directly to another. Rather
those wishing to develop an ethics and con-
duct regime need to establish the following:
first, the nature of the problem that they are
seeking to address and whether a new sys-
tem is likely to meet these objectives; sec-
ondly, how the new system will complement
other initiatives and improve the general
understanding of the rules amongst MPs;
and thirdly, what are the most appropriate
measures to achieve those objectives.
Key questions
• What problem is the ethics and conduct
regime seeking to address? Is it tackling
a specific instance of corruption?
• Is it intended to improve public trust in
the institution? If so, how will the success
of the regime be measured?
• Is the system also likely to be used to en-
force parliamentary procedure and shape
parliamentarians’ behaviour in the cham-
ber, committee and with voters?
• What is the attitude of the main politi-
cal parties and significant parliamentary
figures (e.g. the Speaker, key committee
chairs, etc.)?
• Is the development of the ethics and con-
duct regime likely to split opinion along
partisan lines? What does this mean for
the likely success of the regime?
• What other mechanisms are in place to
ensure that MPs understand and abide
by the rules? How will the ethics and con-
duct regime interact with these?
16 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics

section 2
establishing the
principles for
an ethics and
conduct regime
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
Parliament needs to identify the basic prin-
ciples and values that should characterise the
institution and the behaviour of its Members.
Such principles tend to be general char-
acteristics, such as honesty, integrity and
responsibility – principles that few MPs will
disagree with.
Parliaments can draw on three sources to
develop these principles: first, the internal
rules of procedure or the constitution; second,
ethics regimes from other parliaments;
third, international standards and guide-
lines, such as the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Corruption.
Building consensus around these defining
values provides a basis from which to develop
more detailed rules.
Defining the principles of parliamentary
conduct
The parliamentary process of developing an
ethics and conduct regime must start with the
political culture within which it needs to oper-
ate. The regime should embody and build on
the cultural values of the parliament.
Most institutions will already have defining
values, either included in the rules of pro-
cedure or, sometimes, in the constitution. If
parliamentary behaviour is failing to reflect
one or more of the principles, it can be a use-
ful catalyst for starting a debate about the
need for a new regime. Even if such a set of
principles does not exist, the discussion of
what values MPs should uphold is a useful
way of creating a basis from which to launch
the creation of a new system, in that they are
17
usually so general that it is relatively easy to
generate widespread political agreement.
i. Internal sources
Some countries already include such prin-
ciples as part of the parliament’s rules of
procedure or within the constitution. For
example, the constitution of Belize includes
the following provisions:
Legislators should not act in such a way as:
• to place themselves in positions in which
they have or could have a conflict of interest
• to compromise the fair exercise of their
public or official functions and duties
• to use their office for private gain
• to demean their office or position
• to allow their integrity to be called into
question
• to endanger or diminish respect for, or con-
fidence in, the integrity of the Government
In countries where there is no specific refer-
ence to the behaviour of legislators, there
may be a more general set of principles for
all public officials which could be used and
adapted to parliamentarians.
ii. International parliamentary experience
Parliamentarians may also draw on the ex-
periences of other parliaments that have
implemented new ethical regimes. One of
the most widely-cited set of principles is
that developed by the Committee on Stan-
dards in Public Life, established in the UK
in 1994. The committee established a new
comprehensive code of conduct for MPs,
which incorporates the committee’s ‘Seven
Principles of Public Life’. These are:
1. Selflessness: Holders of public office
should act solely in terms of the public
18 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
interest. They should not do so in order
to gain financial or other benefits for
themselves, their family or their friends.
2. Integrity: Holders of public office should
not place themselves under any financial
or other obligation to outside individuals
or organisations that might seek to influ-
ence them in the performance of their
official duties.
3. Objectivity: In carrying out public busi-
ness, including making public appoint-
ments, awarding contracts, or recom-
mending individuals for rewards and
benefits, holders of public office should
make choices on merit.
4. Accountability: Holders of public office
are accountable for their decisions and
actions to the public and must submit
themselves to whatever scrutiny is ap-
propriate to their office.
5. Openness: Holders of public office
should be as open as possible about all
the decisions and actions that they take.
They should give reasons for their deci-
sions and restrict information only when
the wider public interest clearly demands.
6. Honesty: Holders of public office have a
duty to declare any private interests re-
lating to their public duties and to take
steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a
way that protects the public interest.
7. Leadership: Holders of public office
should promote and support these prin-
ciples by leadership and example.
Other countries have similar statements which
provide basic standards of conduct for MPs.
For example, in Canada MPs must agree:
• to recognise that service in Parliament is
a public trust
• to maintain public confidence and trust in the
integrity of Parliamentarians individually
and the respect and confidence that society
places in Parliament as an institution
• to reassure the public that all Parliamen-
tarians are held to standards that place
the public interest ahead of Parliamen-
tarians' private interests and to provide
a transparent system by which the public
may judge this to be the case
• to provide for greater certainty and guid-
ance for Parliamentarians in how to rec-
oncile their private interests with their
public duties
• to foster consensus among Parliamen-
tarians by establishing common rules
and by providing the means by which
questions relating to proper conduct
may be answered by an independent,
non-partisan advisor
Other parliaments set down similar defin-
ing characteristics. For example, in Uganda
the general principles are selflessness,
integrity, objectivity, accountability, open-
ness, honesty and promotion of good gov-
ernance. In Ethiopia the standing orders
state that an MP must be 'a loyal and hon-
est servant as well as a good example to
the Ethiopian people... protecting and re-
specting national and public interests', and
'shall, at any place, keep the prestige and
dignity of the House'.
iii. International standards
As well as drawing on internal sources and
the experience of other parliaments for
the regime’s principles, there are other in-
ternational resources. The United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
provides the benchmark for anti-corruption
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
initiatives, by setting out a comprehensive
set of standards, measures and rules for
countries to implement. These are based
around both preventative measures and
criminalisation of certain acts.
The Legislative Guide for the Implementation
of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption describes the measures needed
to implement the convention and takes a
three-stage approach which identifies a) the
mandatory requirements that states need
to take, b) the optional requirements which
states are obliged to consider and c) further
optional measures which states may wish
to implement. It provides a useful reference
point for parliamentarians, with Article 8
stating that each country should promote in-
tegrity, honesty and responsibility amongst
its public officials, and should endeavour to
apply ‘codes or standards of conduct for the
correct, honourable and proper performance
of public functions.’
The Global Organisation of Parliamentar-
ians Against Corruption (GOPAC) itself is
committed to ensuring that parliamentar-
ians should play an active leadership role
in the implementation, domestication and
monitoring of UNCAC. In particular, parlia-
ments play an important role in adapting
international standards to regional or na-
tional circumstances, and ensuring effec-
tive oversight of its provisions. It provides a
checklist for parliamentarians designed to
build awareness, consensus and capacity
within parliaments.
Summary - Identifying universal principles
As can be seen, each of the examples in-
cludes very similar basic principles designed
19
to uphold the integrity of the institution and
retain public trust, and urges members to act
in such a way as to not bring the institution
into disrepute. Such principles are usually
general, so that all members of parliament
can agree to them. They reflect values that
are regarded as the foundation of the orga-
nization and as such tend to be aspirational,
rather than prescriptive.
In short, the establishment of core prin-
ciples is an important first step in build-
ing an ethics and conduct regime, but it is
not enough by itself. Giving them meaning
and application requires the institution to
elaborate more detailed provisions, and
develop a mechanism for monitoring and
enforcing the rules.
Key questions
• Are there internal sources which define
principles of good conduct? For example,
do MPs have to commit to upholding the
integrity of the institution on taking office?
• Are the values of the institution enshrined
in a constitution or the rules of procedure?
• Where these values do not exist, can ex-
isting parliamentary rule books be used
as the starting point for developing a set
of principles?
• Is disagreement over certain principles
or values likely? Is this to do with party
politics or other sources of cultural/ethnic/
religious difference?
• How will the existing political culture and
context influence the debate about the
institution’s core values?
• Are there principles used by other parlia-
ments or international standards that might
be used as the basis for consultation?
20 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics

section 3
developing
the content of
the ethics and
conduct regime
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
Agreement over the principles for parliamen-
tary behaviour provides a base from which to
build an ethics and conduct regime.
But because such principles are general
they can be interpreted in different ways.
Politicians may continue to have different
understandings as to which activities are ac-
ceptable, and which are illicit. Parliaments
need to build understanding and consensus
around detailed new rules.
This section is broken into three parts, each
dealing with one element of developing rules
for codes of conduct.
• First, the potential for conflicts of interest
between an MP’s public duties and their
private interests
• Second, the key provisions in ethical rules,
specifically relating to transparency and
disclosure of interests
• Third, how this greater openness is recon-
ciled with protection for MPs in carrying out
their work
Part one – Identifying and addressing con-
flicts of interest
At the root of most unethical behaviour lies
the notion of a ’conflict of interest’ - in other
words, where the private interests of a poli-
tician conflict with the public interests of
those they were elected to represent. In its
most extreme form this involves an MP using
their public position for private benefit. But
even the appearance that a conflict of inter-
est influenced a politician's behaviour may
undermine the integrity of the institution.
Addressing conflicts of interest is therefore
at the centre of almost all parliamentary
ethical regimes. However, it is important to
21
understand that conflicts of interest are in-
evitable for politicians. They are constantly
being asked to mediate between different
interests, including locality, race, gender, re-
ligion or political party. A conflict of interest
is not the same as corrupt or unethical be-
haviour, but the potential difficulties need to
be understood and absorbed by MPs.
The task of an ethics regime for parliamen-
tarians is to identify which conflicts of inter-
est may lead to - or appear to lead to - un-
ethical behaviour.
The ultimate task of the MP is to ensure that
they always seek to promote the public in-
terest. Some constitutions, such as that in
Rwanda, are explicit in stating that the MP
should not be beholden to anything other
than representing the national interest.
However, ‘national interest’ is a subjective
judgement. All politicians will claim that
their party has the best policies for pursu-
ing the national interest, yet those policies
are likely to diverge significantly.
The perception of a conflict of interest will
also be affected by contextual factors such
as culture and constitution. In many societ-
ies there is a tradition of gift-giving which
forms a familiar part of political practice.
Culture, though, should not be used as an
excuse for bribery and the buying of fa-
vours. Here international standards, such
as those provided by UNCAC or GOPAC pro-
vide guidance.
UNCAC states that bribery takes place
when the giving of a gift (or even the offer
of a gift) gives undue advantage to a par-
ticular person over a public official or any
decisions they may take.
22 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
The difficulty for all ethics regimes is in
establishing that a gift influenced a sub-
sequent decision or might result in some
future benefit. Ethical rules therefore tend
to include examples of the sorts of conflicts
that might occur in order to guide politicians.
These, though, are often very specific, and it
is impossible to cover every possible situa-
tion in a single set of rules. For that reason,
ethics and conduct regimes tend to include a
general clause which urges politicians to be
cautious when accepting anything. For exam-
ple, the Canadian parliament’s code of con-
duct states that MPs should not accept “any
gift or benefit connected with their position
that might reasonably be seen to compro-
mise their personal judgement or integrity.”
Interpreting the rules will also be condi-
tioned by the constitutional system within
which they operate. In the US Congress
legislators are expected to lobby for gov-
ernment grants for district interests, while
in Westminster-style systems, MPs would
usually be prevented from taking part in di-
rectly pressing for financial benefits – their
involvement would be regarded as exerting
undue influence and, as such, distorting
the wider public interest.
However, even where MPs are prevented
from certain types of lobbying, there are
grey areas. For example, a dairy farmer
elected to parliament by a constituency
with a large number of dairy farms would
be expected to articulate their interests in
parliament. A distinction could therefore
be made between representing the inter-
ests of the dairy farm industry as a whole
(which would not be seen as a conflict) and
seeking to influence decisions which would
benefit only the dairy farms in that constitu-
ency (which would be a conflict). (See Ger-
ald Carney, Conflict of Interest)
Summary – Ensuring the integrity of the
institution
These few examples highlight some of the
difficulty in defining what constitutes a
conflict of interest in any particular set of
circumstances. Ultimately, the purpose of
identifying the potential for conflict is to en-
sure public trust in the political system, and
avoid any suggestion that MPs are using
their position for private gain. The percep-
tion of misuse of power can be as damaging
as the actual misuse of power.
Therefore, one of the underlying principles
of any ethical regime should be that MPs
should not behave in a way that they would
find difficult to justify in public.
Ultimately, an ethics and conduct regime
cannot govern MPs behaviour in every situ-
ation. Its observance must rely on the intel-
ligence and good sense of the MP. It is im-
portant that they understand and abide by
the spirit of the rules. For that reason, the
process of consultation with politicians –
ensuring they are involved and understand
the purpose of the rules – is as important as
the outcome.
Key questions
• Does the parliament anywhere define a
conflict of interest for MPs? Will the con-
cept impinge on commonly-accepted pat-
terns of behaviour?
• Are there particular areas of activity (e.g.
gift-giving) that are likely to be conten-
tious when defining a conflict of interest?
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
• Will the ethical rules include a specific
definition of bribery?
• How far will the rules seek to define the
explicit circumstances which present a
potential conflict of interest?
Part two – Rules for transparency and
disclosure
Although disclosure and transparency do not
necessarily remove a conflict between a pri-
vate interest and the public interest, they do
identify that the potential conflict exists.
This approach requires MPs to declare their
private interests to a parliamentary register,
thus allowing others – and especially voters -
to judge whether their actions as an MP might
have been influenced by those interests.
However, the definition of what needs to be
registered, by whom and when varies from
county to country.
This section deals with,
i) Forms and timing of disclosure
ii) Who should register?
iii) What should be registered?
Rules for improving transparency and dis-
closure usually have three main elements.
i) Forms and timing of disclosure
The forms of disclosure tend to fall into one
of two categories, either ad hoc or routine.
Ad hoc disclosure means that the MP must
announce an outside interest before they
participate in a debate, committee hearing
or vote where that interest is likely to con-
flict. Routine disclosure means that MPs
23
must declare their interests on taking up
the position, and at regular intervals there-
after. Of course, the two forms of disclosure
are not mutually exclusive, and in many
cases MPs are expected to do both.
The purpose of disclosure is to highlight
the potential for a conflict of interest. In
some cases this may result in the MP be-
ing prevented from participating in a debate
or vote, or it may be enough simply for the
MP to announce the nature of the interest.
However, the routine registration of inter-
ests is a far more thorough and consistent
mechanism for declaration. It means devel-
oping a register of all MPs’ interests which
is periodically updated during the lifetime of
a parliament. It is easier for parliamentary
authorities to manage, and to identify where
MPs have failed to declare an interest.
It can also constitute an indispensable el-
ement in investigating and prosecuting
crimes of corruption. It is important that
any system of routine disclosure obliges
MPs to state their interests at regular inter-
vals, so that any unexpected increases in
income or assets can be explained. In such
cases, the accused will carry the burden of
proving their innocence and demonstrating
that this enrichment was legal.
ii) Who should register?
Although it seems obvious that the register
should contain the interests of the legislator,
many countries also include the financial de-
tails of the MP’s spouse and children. This is
partly so that MPs are not tempted to circum-
vent the regulations by channelling assets to
other members of their family. However, this
has raised concerns about the level of privacy
24 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
afforded to those who, after all, have not
sought public office themselves, and do not
see why their private affairs should be made
public. This can be dealt with in a number
of ways, either by limiting the level of detail
held on other members of the family, or by
obliging families to register collectively rath-
er than as individuals.
In many countries there are restrictions
on access to certain parts of the register
frequently limiting public access to family
details. In France, for example, the com-
mittee on Financial Transparency in Politics
ensures the privacy of the records, whilst in
Spain the private assets of legislators are
kept private but the remainder of the regis-
ter is open to the public. In South Africa, the
financial statements are divided into confi-
dential and public parts, with the Commit-
tee on Members’ Interests determining the
contents of each.
iii) What should be registered?
It is in this area that there is most variety be-
tween different ethical regimes as to what
should be disclosed publicly by politicians.
This itself reflects the significance of adapt-
ing the rules to the specific parliamentary
institution and to ensure the support and
compliance of those covered by the rules.
For example, in Nigeria in 1979 when sever-
al thousand public officials were obliged to
declare their private interests, only two did
so, the incoming President and his Deputy.
Despite the variety there are, broadly, four
categories under which declarable inter-
ests fall: a) assets, b) income, c) liabilities
and d) gifts (including travel).
a) Assets
Assets will typically include property,
shares, directorships, trusts, partnerships
and any other investments. In addition to
disclosure there may be further require-
ments on certain elected officials. For ex-
ample, in the USA they are required to place
shares and other assets into blind trusts or
declare their full value. Similar provisions
exist for ministers in the UK to place sub-
stantial assets into blind trusts so as to
avoid any suggestion of undue influence on
their governmental decisions.
b) Income
In most countries there are restrictions
on certain forms of outside employment,
deemed incompatible with holding elected
office (see below). However, few countries
have an outright ban on outside employ-
ment, and many MPs combine their official
role with professions that can be pursued
part-time such as journalism, law or medi-
cine. Where this is the case, MPs should be
obliged to declare by whom they are em-
ployed and how much they are being paid.
Other forms of income such as sponsorship
or remunerated offices (directorships or oth-
er appointments) also need to be included.
c) Liabilities
In many respects the need to declare liabili-
ties is equally important as declaring assets
and income. For example, a politician who
is hugely indebted is perhaps more likely
to try to use their official position to secure
additional sources of funding. If liabilities
are built up the register needs to include
details of how much is owed, to whom, the
rate of interest and the reason for the debt.
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
Miscellaneous: Any relevant interest, not fall-
ing within one of the above categories, which
nevertheless falls within the definition of the
main purpose of the Register which is "to
provide information of any pecuniary interest
or other material benefit which a Member re-
ceives which might reasonably be thought by
others to influence his or her actions, speech-
es, or votes in Parliament, or actions taken
in his or her capacity as a Member of Parlia-
ment," or which the Member considers might
be thought by others to influence his or her
actions in a similar manner, even though the
Member receives no financial benefit.
United Kingdom House of Commons, Regis-
trable Interests, Clause 10
d) Gifts and travel
Restrictions on gifts and travel are included
in most ethical rules. In some countries,
such as Argentina, there is a direct ban on
gifts directly related to the MP’s position.
In Australia, by contrast, MPs are allowed to
accept gifts, provided they do not present a
direct conflict of interest. In the UK gifts are
acceptable, and do not have to be disclosed
if they are unrelated to membership of par-
liament. But where they are related and val-
ued above 1% of the annual parliamentary
salary MPs are required to declare them
and their value in the register of interests.
In the USA no gift valued at more than $100
can be accepted by an elected official.
As can be seen, in each of the categories
there is usually a lower limit, below which
interests do not have to be declared. How-
ever, as some of the examples have shown,
25
these vary enormously according to local
context, often the specific provisions reflect
an attempt to prevent the sort of abuses
that led to the introduction of the ethical
rules in the first place.
For those seeking to draw up a new ethics
and conduct regime it is also worth includ-
ing a ‘catch-all clause’ which again suggests
that MPs need to be cautious and exercise
sensible judgement. For example, the UK’s
list of registrable interests includes a final
clause which encourages MPs to declare
anything which others might feel would af-
fect their judgement in office.
Summary – Disclosing the right details
The detailed rules of the ethics and conduct
regime need to cover a wide range of even-
tualities. At the most basic level it means
deciding what form of disclosure, how reg-
ularly disclosures are made, and what cate-
gories need to be covered by the register of
interests. All elements of the system need
to complement each other, and the detail
in each section will determine how well the
system works overall.
Key questions
• What form of disclosure does the parlia-
ment wish to adopt – routine, ad hoc or
both?
• If the parliament uses a routine form of
disclosure, how often will MPs be re-
quired to update their list of interests?
• Who will be responsible for the upkeep
of the register – a parliamentary official,
parliamentary committee or some other?
• Will the register be a fully public document
or will parts of the register be kept private?
26 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
• Who should be obliged to register their
interests? Will family members be includ-
ed? If so, which members of the family?
• What should be registered? How detailed
will the rules be in determining the vari-
ous assets, income, liabilities and gifts
that need to be declared?
• At what level should lower limits be set
for declaring these interests? What provi-
sion will be made to update and change
these limits over time?
• Will non-pecuniary interests be included
in the register?
Part three – Restrictions on ‘outside interests’
The purpose of disclosure is to enable others
to judge whether there is likely to be a conflict
of interest. In other words, it is sometimes
enough to know about the interest without
any further action.
However, in certain circumstances where the
nature of an outside interest has a direct bear-
ing on the MPs’ involvement it may be nec-
essary to prevent the MP from participating
further, or where the MP is adjudged to have
broken the rules, further sanction may be nec-
essary. (The enforcement of sanctions is dealt
with in detail in part four).
This part describes the situations in which
politicians should be prevented from par-
ticipating and how this needs to be balanced
with parliamentary immunity.
Those developing an ethics and conduct re-
gime will need to decide whether disclosure
is enough. It may be that monitoring the po-
tential for a conflict of interest is sufficient in
certain cases. For example, MPs may simply
be obliged to announce their interest at the
start of a debate in order to allow others to
understand their interest in the matter.
In other circumstances the parliament may
wish to prohibit certain forms of activity by
MPs due to their interest. An MP might be
prevented from speaking in certain debates
or voting on specific issues where their pri-
vate interests are likely to conflict with their
public responsibilities.
In most ethics and conduct regimes there
are also restrictions on certain outside in-
terests that are deemed to be incompat-
ible with membership of the legislative
body. Many parliaments have ‘incompat-
ibility’ rulings which identify categories of
outside earnings and employment that are
deemed to be unsuitable with the task of
being an elected official. These typically
include working in sensitive professions
such as the armed forces, security services,
civil servants or judicial roles. In addition,
some countries have restrictions on mem-
bers of the clergy. In all such cases MPs are
required to resign from these roles before
becoming an MP.
In some situations and countries the re-
strictions are severe. For example, in many
countries, such as Rwanda, MPs may not
have any form of outside employment. The
intention is to preserve the independence
of the politician, and to avoid any possibil-
ity that a private business interest might
interfere with their public duties. The situ-
ation in the UK is different where the argu-
ment is made that that outside interests
enable MPs to get a variety of perspectives
which assist with their role as lawmakers.
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
Post-employment restrictions
There are also restrictions on forms of em-
ployment for politicians after they have left
office. Politicians – and especially ministers
– have privileged access to key decision-
makers and information when in office, and
are likely to take much of this with them
when they depart parliament. In general
ethics and conduct regimes tend to place
restrictions on politicians – and especially
ministers – from using this information for
private gain once they have left office.
It is therefore common for ministers to be
prevented from taking up jobs in areas of
business for which they were previously
responsible. For example, a minister of
defence might be tempted to favour cer-
tain companies if they knew they would be
working for them after leaving office.
Summary – Finding the right balance
The ethics and conduct regime must en-
sure that it reconciles giving MPs enough
freedom to do the job, with ensuring that
all MPs adhere to the expected standards
of conduct. There is undoubtedly a tension
between rules for ethics and parliamentary
immunity. In emerging democracies it may
be that conditions dictate the need to err
on the side of protecting MPs. But an eth-
ics and conduct regime should also be seen
as a way of ensuring that systems of parlia-
mentary immunity are not abused.
Key questions
• The disclosure of interests is likely to re-
sult in monitoring, restricting or prohib-
iting certain activities by MPs. How will
each of these be determined?
27
• Does the parliament wish to prevent MPs
from any form of outside employment? If
outside employment is permitted, how will
these forms of employment be defined?
Which forms of employment will be deemed
incompatible with holding public office?
• Will the ethics and conduct regime include
post-employment restrictions? If so, how
long will this ‘cooling off’ period last for?
Restrictions on ministers
No reporting public office holder shall, except
as required in the exercise of his or her official
powers, duties and functions,
a) Engage in employment or the practice of a
profession
b) Manage or operate a business or commer-
cial activity
c) Continue as, or become, a director or officer
in a corporation or an organisation
d) Hold office in a union or professional as-
sociation
e) Serve as a paid consultant
f) Be an active partner in a partnership
Conflict of Interest Act, Canada
Part four – Parliamentary Immunity
The arguments against disclosure of inter-
ests or restrictions on MPs’ activity are usu-
ally made on the grounds that it limits the
ability of the MP to pursue their represen-
tative role and, more specifically, conflicts
with the principle of parliamentary immu-
nity. This is another contentious area, but
there are few substantial arguments as to
why an ethics and conduct regime cannot
co-exist with a system of parliamentary im-
munity. However, the development of the
regime does need to consider how far it will
limit the immunity of MPs.
28 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
The purpose of parliamentary immunity is
to ensure that MPs have enough freedom to
discharge fully their duties in holding gov-
ernment to account, scrutinising legislation
and representing the public. Some of these
functions will bring them into direct con-
frontation with various institutions of state
and MPs must be able to do so without fear
of being prosecuted, victimised or in some
other way targeted by the authorities.
“Parliaments should adopt functional systems
of parliamentary immunity that provide
protection from unwarranted and politically
motivated prosecutions, but also ensure that
parliamentarians are held accountable to
the law.
GOPAC, Arusha Declaration, 23rd September
2006
Although the detailed provisions of par-
liamentary immunity schemes differ, they
tend to follow either the British model of
‘non-accountability’ or the French model of
‘inviolability’.
The British model of non-accountability
protects freedom of speech in the pursuit of
the MPs’ duties. It means that representa-
tives cannot be prosecuted for any opinions
expressed, or votes cast in the course of
parliamentary business. This right often ex-
tends to witnesses in parliamentary hearings.
In some cases it also covers activity outside
of parliament, such as constituency work,
provided it can be defined as ‘parliamen-
tary business’.
The French system of ‘inviolability’ is a
much wider ranging notion of immunity,
which means that elected representatives
cannot be prosecuted for any criminal ac-
tivity, unless they are caught in that act. The
extent of inviolability tends to take three
main forms. In Westminster-style systems
there is a very limited form of inviolability
where the Speaker simply has to be noti-
fied of the arrest of any member. In some
countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Norway)
members cannot be arrested on their way to
or from parliament. However, in most other
countries MPs cannot be prosecuted during
the term of their parliamentary mandate,
without the approval of the parliament.
The concept of parliamentary immunity is an
important one, and absolutely necessary for
a properly functioning parliament. In newly-
emerging parliaments – and especially in
post-conflict societies – this principle can
be particularly important. There are many
examples of Executive bodies seeking to
undermine or victimise members of opposi-
tion parties through the misuse of laws or
parliamentary procedure. The system of
immunity must therefore be strong enough
to withstand this threat.
However, the worldwide trend is away from
the broad-ranging principle of ‘inviolability’
to the more limited concept of ‘non-account-
ability’. The fear in many countries is that by
protecting MPs from prosecution, the sys-
tem of immunity is being used as a means to
hide corruption and misuse of power.
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics 29

The guiding principle for the system of par-

liamentary immunity should be that the
right to immunity is integral to the position,
not the individual. The purpose is to protect
the integrity of the office and the institu-
tion, but should not be used as a means to
protect individuals who are engaged in ob-
viously criminal activities.

Key Questions
• How will the ethics and conduct regime
interact with provisions for parliamentary
immunity?
• How will the parliament ensure that par-
liamentary immunity is not used to avoid
provisions within the ethics and conduct
regime?
30 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics

section 4
mechanisms for
regulation and
enforcement
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
The content of the principles and rules will
provide guidance for elected officials, but
an ethics and conduct regime also needs to
include systems for enforcement and sanc-
tions to deter potential offenders.
This section examines three different mod-
els of enforcement and regulation, namely,
internal regulation by the parliament, ex-
ternal regulation by a judicial body and the
creation of an independent commissioner
who reports to a parliamentary committee.
The second half of this section examines
the possible sanctions that parliaments
might seek to apply in upholding ethical be-
haviour and good conduct.
Three models for regulation of ethical conduct
It is not surprising that the growth in the
number of ethics and conduct regimes in
many parliaments in the last two decades
has also resulted in the adoption of new
mechanisms for overseeing and enforcing
the regulations. In general there are three
main models. The first is entirely external
regulation, as used in Taiwan. The second
is to rely solely on regulation within the
legislature itself, as practised in the USA.
The third is to combine an external inves-
tigative commissioner with a parliamentary
committee to enforce sanctions, which is
the system adopted in the UK and Ireland.
The first model involves the creation of a ju-
dicial or quasi-judicial body which oversees
and enforces the regulations on Members
of Parliament. The difficulty in this model
for many parliaments is that it makes any
31
breaches of the regulations subject to
criminal proceedings and therefore may
interfere with the provisions of any rules
relating to parliamentary immunity. But, in
addition, as an externally-enforced regime,
there is little sense of ownership of the pro-
visions of the principles or rules amongst
parliamentarians. If the intention of the re-
gime is to build some collective acceptance
of its provisions, it may make more sense to
find a more direct way of building it into the
parliamentary culture.
The second model relies on parliament's
self-regulation. This system requires the cre-
ation of a special ethics committee, which
deals with the reporting, investigation and
sanctioning of MPs who have been alleged to
have violated the rules. However, the model
has come in for considerable criticism, as it
turns legislators into investigators, judges
and juries, rather than maintaining them as
a body which ratifies a judgement reached
by an impartial adjudicator. In addition, if
the intention is to ensure or restore public
trust in politicians, a model that relies on
politicians regulating themselves is unlikely
to retain public credibility.
The third model combines elements of the
first two. This model involves the creation
of an independent regulator appointed by
and reporting to parliament. The regulator
is then responsible for investigating cases
and advising members on the application
of the rules, but the imposition of penal-
ties is decided within parliament by a spe-
cially-convened committee. This has been
the model in the UK since the mid-1990s,
but has been criticised for giving too much
32 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
power to MPs, and being too similar to self-
regulation. The concern over British parlia-
mentary standards in 2009 saw the govern-
ment propose a new, entirely independent
form of regulation.
A common factor for all models is determin-
ing how cases are referred for investigation.
In South Africa, for example, the Ethics
Committee can instigate its own enquiries
against MPs. In other systems, such as the
UK until 2009, the Commissioner for Stan-
dards could only investigate complaints
made against specific MPs, but these com-
plaints could be submitted by other MPs or
by members of the general public.
However, as mentioned previously, the de-
velopment of ethics and conduct regimes
has blurred the responsibility for aspects
of parliamentary conduct that fall beyond
purely ethical considerations. For example,
the constitution of Sierra Leone empowers
the Presiding Officer to refer cases where
a Member has defamed someone, and the
Committee of Privileges determines disci-
plinary sanctions. In other parliaments the
Ethics Committee is charged with determin-
ing sanctions in the more serious breaches
of parliamentary protocol.
The key point is that the distinction between
traditionally understood ethical rules and
more general issues of parliamentary con-
duct is starting to blur. This is in part be-
cause ethical rules have sought to establish
broad standards of acceptable behaviour in
all aspects of public life. This has obvious
implications for newly-established parlia-
ments seeking to develop standards of par-
liamentary behaviour.
A sliding scale of sanctions
The rules relating to conduct within par-
liament are so diverse and specific to the
particular institution that it is difficult to
draw anything other than the most general
points in a guidebook of this length. How-
ever, a general overview reinforces the per-
ception that sanctions for breaches of ethi-
cal rules and poor conduct in parliamentary
proceedings are overlapping and blending
with each other. This section looks briefly
at four categories of rules relating to par-
liamentary proceedings and then at three
main types of sanctions.2
i. Categories of rules
The first set of rules relates to the prohibition
of force during proceedings and an implicit or
explicit ban on carrying weapons. The second
set of rules prohibits threats, intimidation,
provocation and insults. However, definitions
of what constitutes ‘unparliamentary lan-
guage’ vary between institutions. This usually
relies on the ruling of the Presiding Officer to
determine where the boundaries lie. The third
set can be categorised as rules which prevent
the unlawful obstruction of proceedings. In
other words, cases where parliamentarians
refuse to obey the rules of procedure and, in
so doing, prevent business from continuing.
This may include taking the floor without the
Speaker’s permission, ignoring a call to order
or refusing to acknowledge the Speaker’s
authority in some other way. The final set of
rules is designed to preserve the dignity of the
parliament. Such rules often refer to language,
but also commonly apply to dress code, par-
ticularly those with a British parliamentary
2 This section draws heavily on Van der Hulst, pp. 112-
119
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
tradition. The Sierra Leone constitution stip-
ulates that MPs shall maintain the dignity
and image of parliament at all times.
ii. Three categories of sanctions
The sorts of rules identified above are usu-
ally enforced by the Presiding Officer, main-
ly because they relate directly to proceed-
ings in the chamber. However, in the case
of more serious misdemeanours or those
relating to unethical conduct, the tendency
is to refer matters to an Ethics Committee
(if one exists), which then determines the
nature of the sanction.
However, the sanctions available to either
the Presiding Officer or the Ethics Commit-
tee generally fall into three categories. The
first, found in the French parliamentary tra-
dition, is the call to order, which is followed
by increasingly severe steps. A first offence
simply results in a call to order, the second
stage is that the call to order is noted in the
parliamentary record and the third is to de-
prive the member of the right to speak if they
refuse to follow the Speaker’s ruling. This is
then followed by an official ‘censure’ or ‘rep-
rimand’, which is entered into the record,
and can be accompanied by a temporary ex-
pulsion from the chamber. This is used in the
most serious cases where there has been
the threat or use of violence or a challenge to
the head of state. In the US Senate, this can
be accompanied by a deduction from salary
for the time the senator is expelled.
The second category revolves around the
British tradition of ‘naming’ Members, which
is the most severe penalty the Speaker can
33
impose. This is usually only enforced after the
offender has been warned several times and
been asked to withdraw from the Chamber.
Once a Member has been named, the House
is invited to agree a Motion that he or she be
suspended, and such suspension lasts for
five sitting days in the first instance.
The third category relates to subsidiary sanc-
tions, which are linked to the above stages.
These may include a fine or loss of salary, an
enforced apology to the parliament, or the
loss of seniority, such as a committee chair
and the privileges that go with it.
As mentioned, the sanctions and enforce-
ment mechanisms attached to ethical
breaches tend to fall into the same catego-
ries. But because, by definition, such cases
tend to be at the more serious end of the
scale they tend to involve suspension, ex-
pulsion and fines for misconduct or the with-
holding of salary for a period. For example,
breaches of the code of conduct in Ireland
involve suspension, fines or public censure;
in France there is only one option; banish-
ment from future candidacy for one year;
and in Germany (where the complaints are
dealt with entirely by the Presiding Officer)
he or she discloses any violations to the vot-
ers, letting them determine the MP’s fate.
And, in all cases, the most significant de-
terrent should be that greater transparency
means that the final verdict is the decision
imposed by voters at the ballot box.
34 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics

Summary – Finding the right mechanisms
and proportionate sanctions
Determining the right mechanisms for reg-
ulation and what sort of punishments are
suitable can only be decided in the context
of the political system and the specific mis-
demeanours. But whichever is chosen both
elements of the system must ensure par-
liamentary and public support. In order to
preserve the integrity of the institution the
system must be regarded as independent,
legitimate and proportionate.
• What safeguards will be put in place to en-
sure that the ethics and conduct regime is
not used simply to pursue political or per-
sonal vendettas against particular MPs?
• Will MPs have a right of appeal if they
believe they have been unfairly treated?
Will this be heard by a commissioner, a
parliamentary committee or a plenary sit-
ting of the whole house?

Key questions
• Does the parliament wish to create an
external form of regulation presided over
by the courts, an internal form of regulation
by the speaker or a parliamentary commit-
tee, or an external commissioner that re-
ports to a parliamentary committee?
• If the regime relies on an external com-
missioner, who will make this appoint-
ment, how long will they serve in that
post, who will they report to in parlia-
ment?
• Will the parliament need to create an
additional committee to deal with the
enforcement of the rules or will the task
be given to an existing committee?
• What sort of sanctions will be imposed
against those who breach the rules?
How will they be determined? Who will
be responsible for implementing them?
• Who will be entitled to launch an investi-
gation against an MP? Will members of the
public be able to complain? Will the com-
mittee or commissioner be able to decide
for themselves when to investigate?
A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics 35
36 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics

section 5
developing a culture
around the ethics
regime - education
and training
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
The intention of the ethics and conduct regime
should be to prevent as much as punish. A re-
gime is at its most effective where MPs under-
stand and abide by its rules.
The ethics and conduct regime should iden-
tify the correct path for MPs to walk, but
also needs to provide streetlights making it
is as easy as possible to follow.
The system of regulation and enforcement
must also include provision for the training
and education of MPs, providing continuing
advice and guidance on how to interpret
and implement the rules.
This section examines options for building a
culture around the ethics regime.
The process of developing and implementing
an ethics and conduct regime is an integral
part of creating a culture in which clear
standards are, firstly, understood, and sec-
ondly, regarded as legitimate by those who
have to abide by them.
A dominant culture which has high ethical
standards will do more to deter potential
offenders than any detailed set of rules -
the opinion of one’s fellow MPs can often
be the most powerful deterrent to certain
forms of behaviour.
For this reason, it is important that MPs are
involved at every stage in developing the
contents of the ethics and conduct regime.
This is not to suggest that their view should
dominate in all instances, but that the pro-
cess of developing the regime should ensure
37
that MPs regard its provisions as fair and
realistic, and that they therefore have a
stake in the success of the regime.
In addition, the ethics and conduct regime
needs to ensure the active support of the
key parliamentary actors to generate ac-
ceptance and understanding of the rules
and principles. In this respect the Presiding
Officer plays an important role in setting
the tone within the institution. Any new
ethics and conduct regime will need to be in
keeping with the general principles for par-
liamentary proceedings and the Speaker
will be a key figure to involve in the devel-
opment of the regime.
In terms of consulting and educating mem-
bers, the role of political parties will also
be crucial. It is within the political parties
that MPs learn many of the critical skills
and standards for discharging their duties.
Development of the regime should involve
key figures from the political parties at an
early stage to secure their support for the
process, and also ensure that they play a
role in educating members as to what is ex-
pected of them.
The experience of the Indian Lok Sabha is
interesting in this regard. In their decision
to develop an ethics and conduct regime for
members, the Ethics Committee also rec-
ommended that “Concerted efforts should
be made to ingrain amongst the legislators
the basic values of ethics... The culture of
ethics has to be evolved and the sense of
discipline and responsibility should come
from within.” To this end, the Committee
recommended that the parliament hold a
38 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
seminar covering An Analysis on the pres-
ent day functioning of Parliament – An
Introspection, involving the leaders and
deputy leaders of the parties, secretaries
and whips, as well the chair and members
of Committee on Ethics, and the Secretary
General. This was to be followed up by a se-
ries of four or five seminars for all members
of the Lok Sabha.
Parliaments need to consider a variety of
awareness-raising tools and opportunities.
Incorporating the ethics and conduct regime
into frequently-used resources such as ex-
isting publications or websites is one option.
Providing handbooks which explain the im-
plications of the principles and rules in pa-
per or electronic form may also be useful.
But politicians will also need specific train-
ing when the new system is introduced
and at the start of every new parliamentary
mandate. Education around the provisions
of the regime should be included in any in-
duction programme for all new MPs. Instill-
ing the key values and an understanding of
the rules at the start of a parliament is most
likely to shape the dominant culture.
The last element in ensuring the ethics and
conduct regime is understood is to establish
an official and permanent source of guid-
ance and advice for Members. Given that the
rules are likely to be complex, and in some
instances open to interpretation, they will
need access to sources of expert advice. This
role is usually performed by a committee -
as in South Africa, where the Committee on
Members’ Interests both interprets the code
of conduct and advises Members on its con-
tent - or by a Parliamentary Commissioner
for Standards who acts as the guardian of
the code and the main source of advice to
individual MPs unsure about any aspect of
the rules.
Summary – Influencing parliamentary be-
haviour
An ethics and conduct regime by itself will
not change parliamentary behaviour. That
behaviour must develop from and reflect
the internal dynamics of the institution.
The very development of a new system will
be an important feature in this process.
Simply developing an ethics and conduct
regime may act as a catalyst for setting cer-
tain standards of behaviour.
Ultimately, it is impossible to develop a
new system which is capable of governing
the behaviour of MPs in every single set of
circumstances. Most of the time, MPs will
be expected to use their own judgement to
determine which is the correct course of be-
haviour. This means that the way in which
the institution educates and trains its mem-
bers, so that they understand and accept
the regime, should be an essential part of
any new framework.
Key questions
• What provisions will be made to ensure
that MPs understand the ethics and con-
duct regime?
• How far will the key figures within the in-
stitution be involved in the development
of the ethics and conduct regime?
• To what extent will the political parties
shape the content of the regime and be used
to instil its central values? Can the parties be
used to deliver training to Members?
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics 39

• Will training on the new system be includ-

ed as part of an induction programme for
all Members?
• Where will MPs be able to get impartial
and authoritative advice on the rules and
regulations?

“No set of rules can bind effectively those

who are not willing to observe their spirit,
nor can any rule of law foresee all possible
eventualities which may arise or be devised
by human ingenuity.

This Code of Conduct has been formulated

in as simple and direct a manner as possi-
ble. Its success depends both first and last
on the integrity and good sense of those to
whom it applies.

Therefore, where any doubt exists as to

scope, application or meaning of any aspect
of this Code, the good faith of the member
concerned must be the guiding principle.”

South African National Assembly, Code of

Conduct
40 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics

section 6
conclusion
 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
Just as there is no blueprint for an all-en-
compassing ethics and conduct regime that
will be suitable for every parliament, nei-
ther is there an exact right way of develop-
ing a new system. An ethics and conduct is
ultimately a political document.
Its success does not lie in its contents
alone, but in the way they are understood,
observed and enforced. As such, the pro-
cess of developing the ethics and conduct
regime is as important as what goes into it.
This is a highly political process that needs
to ensure the final document is regarded as
legitimate by MPs. Even if they do not agree
with all of its provisions, they must respect
its authority.
The purpose of this guidebook is to pro-
vide an overview of the stages involved in
developing an ethics and conduct regime.
The process of defining the problem that
the new regime seeks to address through
the development of principles, detailed
rules and an effective enforcement regime
means negotiating numerous objections.
That process will be shaped by the exist-
ing political conditions, the cultural values
within the institution and the attitudes of
the key parliamentary figures.
However, it is worth emphasising the four
basic tenets around which a regime should
be built;
• First, the effectiveness of a parliament is
determined by the attitudes, outlook and
behaviour of its members as much as by
its constitutional powers. As such, the
new system must focus on changing be-
haviour as much as changing the rules.
41
• Second, a new regime which seeks to
influence behaviour must emerge from
the specific parliamentary circumstances
within which it seeks to be effective. MPs
must feel a degree of ownership of the
rules if they are to regard them as legiti-
mate and authoritative.
• Third, the process of developing the new
regime is as important as the content
that emerges. Developing a detailed set
of rules should not be the only objective.
If the rules are to be effective the process
must also engage with MPs to build a set
of core institutional values.
• Fourth, the creation of the ethics and
conduct regime will not, by itself, solve
all the problems faced by the institution.
The principles, rules and regulations
should be viewed as only one part of a
wider effort to improve the functioning of
the institution.
Ultimately, this guidebook can only of-
fer suggestions as to how these might be
achieved. Their application is down to poli-
ticians themselves.
42 A Guide for Parliamentarians/Global Task Force on Parliamentary Ethics
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