A literal application of general principles to the Facts:
facts before us would, of course, cause the inevitable
deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by
reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whole
members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the
laws.
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which
permits corporations or companies to obtain a certificate
of Philippine registry only on condition that they be
composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or
of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine
Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the
exceptions.
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most
persistent and far reaching in influence is, broad and
comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was
designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and legislate
so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the
very necessities of society, legislation of a special
character, having these objects in view, must often be
had in certain districts. This is the same police power
which the United States Supreme Court say "extends to
so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as
to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people."
For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the
Philippine Organic Law could could have had the effect
of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands,
acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the
sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of
the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-
alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the
Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building.
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia v. The Superintendent
of the Philippine Military Academy
GR Number 211362
Petition: Petition for Mandamus
Petitioner: First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia
Respondent: The Superintendent of the Philippine Military
Academy, The Honor Committee of 2014 of the PMA and HC
members, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB)
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Date: February 24, 2014
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the
Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military
Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the
class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top
Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the
Navy.
Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he
was late for two minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets
were also reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the
Department of Tactical Officers and were logged and
transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for
explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13
touring hours.
Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor
Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor Code. Lying that
is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written
appeal stating that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that
made him late for the succeeding class.
Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report.
The HC constituted a team to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be
formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty
verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC
reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer
announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.
The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics
Group (HTG) conducted a formal review and checking of
findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on
indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of separation
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a
letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting
his re-instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet Review
and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.
Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President
sustained the findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a
resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights
Violations.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Cudia in utter disregard of
his right to due process and in holding that he
violated the Honor Code through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military
affairs
Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has
rights to due process, education, and property should
be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All the
administrative remedies were exhausted. A student of
a military academy must be prepared to subordinate
his private interest for the proper functioning of the
 institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary
measures and punishments as it deems fit and
consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution.
PMA has regulatory authority to administratively
dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal
rules and regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance
machinery mandated by Article VIII of the
Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to
Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the
courts is not only to “settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is above the
law, including the military, especially in violations of
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is
affirmed.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, v. HI-
GRADE FEEDS CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 160684, September 02, 2015
FACTS:
Both parties derive their titles over the disputed
property to the Mother title OCT 994. The petitioner OCT
No. is dated 19 April 1917 and the respondents OCT No.
994 is dated 3 May 1917.
Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land
Registration Case No. 4429, the decree registering OCT
No. 994, the date of the issuance is 19 April 1917 while
on the other hand, OCT No. 994 was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. In
this case, the date which should be reckoned as the date
of registration of the title is the date when the mother title
was received for transcription, 3 May 1917.
ISSUE: WHEN IS THE DATE OF REGISTRATION TO
BE RECKONED?
HELD:
A title can only have one date of registration, as there
can only be one title covering the same property. The
date of registration is reckoned from the time of the titles
transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds.
Therefore, the date appearing on the face of the title
refers to the date of issuance of the decree of
registration.
Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book
of the Registry of Deeds is 3 May 1917, we rule that the
genuine title is the title of Hi-Grade.
Any title that traces its source to a void title, is also void.
The spring cannot rise higher than its source.
While tax declarations and receipts are inconclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land,
they are prima facie proof of ownership or possession
and may become the basis of a claim for ownership
when it is coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property.
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi
and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi
and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
 The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their
habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan,
selected by the provincial governor and approved by the
provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was
duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by
said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as
follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected
by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected
by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of
the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department
head, therefore making it unconstitutional?
HELD:
 No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is
valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later
no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The
growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the
"necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the
Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor,
with the approval of the provincial board and the Department
Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law.
This is necessary since the provincial governor and the
provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As
officials charged with the administration of the province and
the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to
select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not
an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
Pedro vs Provincial Board of Rizal
G. R. No. 34163, September 18, 1931
Facts: Gregorio Pedro argues for the nullity of Ordinance
No. 36, series of 1928, approved on December 29, 1928, by
the temporary councillors appointed by the provincial
governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval,  on the ground that (1) it
impairs  the acquired rights of said appellant;  (2)  it was
enacted on account of prejudice, because it was intended
for a special and not a general purpose, namely to prevent,
at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of
the  cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and (3) it 
provides  for special committee composed of persons  who
are not members of the council, vested them with powers
which of their very nature, cannot be delegated by said
council to that committee.
He further contends that, having obtained the proper
permit to maintain, exploit, and open to the public the
cockpit in question, having paid  the  license fee and
fulfilled all the requirements provided by Ordinance No. 
35, series of  1928,  he has  acquired a  right  which cannot
be taken away from him by Ordinance  No. 36, series of
1928, which was subsequently approved.
Issue: Whether a license authorizing the operation and
exploitation of a cockpit falls under property rights which
a person may not be deprived of without due process of
law
Held: No.
The court held:  (1) That a license authorizing the
operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property  of
which the holder may not be deprived without due process
of law, but a mere privilege which may be  revoked when
the  public interests so require; (2)  that the work
entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary
committee to make a study of the sanitary effects upon the
neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not
legislative in character, but only informational, and may be
delegated; and (3) that an ordinance, approved by a
municipal council duly constituted, which  suspends the
effects of another which had been enacted to favor the
grantee of a cockpit license, is  valid and legal.
the proper authority in contravention of the
provision of the mining law governing at that
time. In addition, the permit expired on 6 July
1994. It is, therefore, quite clear that SEM has
no right over the area.
Repubic vs. Rosemoor Mining (2004) 426 SCRA 517
Facts:
The four (4) petitioners after having been granted permission
to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-
Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble
deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in
Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain
range. The petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now
Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the
corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. License
No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the
herein petitioners. Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R.
Maceda was appointed Minister of the DENR, petitioners
License No. 33 was cancelled by him through his letter to
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
dated September 6, 1986.
CA Ruling:
Cancellation of respondents’ license without notice and
hearing was tantamount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law. It added that under the clause in the
Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of obligations
and contracts, respondents license must be respected by the
State.
Petitioners Argument:
 The license was validly declared a nullity and consequently
withdrawn or terminated. In the said issued letter,
respondents were informed by then Minister Maceda that
their license had illegally been issued, because it violated
Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public
interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the
license. The latter reason, they added, was confirmed by the
language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public
interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that
was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status
of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
*Section 69. Maximum Area of Quarry License
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof, a quarry
license shall cover an area of not more than one hundred
(100) hectares in any one province and not more than one
thousand (1,000) hectares in the entire Philippines.
The license in question, QLP No. 33, is dated August 3, 1982,
and it was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining
Development Corporation. The terms of the license allowed
the corporation to extract and dispose of marbleized
limestone from a 330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel,
Bulacan. The license is, however, subject to the terms and
conditions of PD 463, the governing law at the time it was
granted;
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation no. 84 violated the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.
Held:
NO. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of
the non-impairment clause. As pointed out earlier,
respondents license is not a contract to which the protection
accorded by the non-impairment clause may extend. Even if
the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws
and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it,
because it concerns a subject impressed with public
welfare. As it is, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state.
In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents license
may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the
national interest so requires, because it is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
Republic vs. Cagandahan G.R. No. 166676 September 12,
2008
JANUARY 27, 2018
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries
in Birth Certificate[In her petition, she alleged that she was
born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in
the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and
at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered
that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that
her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development.
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well
as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such
that her gender be changed from female to male and her first
name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
 The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated
January 12, 2005.
 ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her
sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer
to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
 RULING:
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of
himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has
not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he
was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his
life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he
did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its
due course in respondents development to reveal more fully
his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private
as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on
whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the
male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider
respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his
intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to
take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law,
the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the
diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what
nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to
be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We
cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right
but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The
trial courts grant of respondents change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
14. YINLU BICOL MINING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.:]
TOPIC: PERSONS – EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS –
REPEAL OF LAWS
DOCTRINE: Rights pertaining to mining patents issued
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing prior to
November 15, 1935 are vested rights that cannot be
impaired.
FACTS:
1. This case involves 13 mining claims over the area
located in Barrio Larap, Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which
was owned and mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc.
(PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to
financial losses.
a. PIMI’s portion (known as the PIMI Larap
Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to the
Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB, later Banco De Oro, or BDO).
2. The Government then opened the area for
exploration.
a. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development
Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the
area from 1986 onwards.
i. In 1996, it entered into an
operating agreement with Philex
Mining Corporation over the area,
their agreement being duly
registered by the Mining Recorder
Section of Regional Office No. V of
the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
3. 1997: Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval
of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) over the area in that Regional Office of the
DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB), in Daraga, Albay.
a. The application, which was amended in
1999, was granted on July 28, 2007 under
MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia
was given the exclusive right to explore,
develop and utilize the mineral deposits in
the portion of the mineral lands.
4. August 31 2007: Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation
(Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that it had
acquired the mining patents of PIMI from
MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale,
stating that the areas covered by its mining patents
were within the areas of Trans-Asia’s MPSA
5. September 14, 2007: Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by
letter that it would commence exploration works in
Yinlu’s areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested
Yinlu to allow its personnel to access the areas for
the works to be undertaken.
a. Yinlu replied that Trans-Asia could proceed
with its exploration works on its own
private property in the Calambayungan
area, not in the areas covered by its (Yinlu)
mining patents.
6. TransAsia found out that the registration of its
MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlu’s
request to register the deed of absolute sale in its
favor.
7. DENR Secretary directed MGB Regional Office V to
verify the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu.
a. MGB Regional Office V informed the Office
of the DENR Secretary that there was no
record on file showing the existence of the
mining patents of Yinlu. Accordingly, the
parties were required to submit their
respective position papers
8. DENR Sec Atienza ordered the amendment of Trans-
Asia’s MPSA by excluding therefrom the mineral
lands covered by Yinlu’s mining patents
a. DENR Sec. Jose L. Atienza, Jr in his order
found that the mining patents had been
issued to PIMI in 1930 as evidenced by and
indicated in PIMI’s certificates of title
submitted by Yinlu; and that the patents
were validly transferred to and were now
owned by Yinlu.
b. He rejected Trans-Asia’s argument that
Yinlu’s patents had no effect and were
deemed abandoned because Yinlu had
failed to register them pursuant to Section
101 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended.
c. He refuted Trans-Asia’s contention that
there was a continuing requirement under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining
patent holder to undertake improvements
in order to have the patents subsist, and
that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation
to register and to undertake the
improvement, observing that the
requirement was not an absolute
imposition.
i. He noted that the suspension of
PIMI’s operation in 1974 due to
financial losses and the foreclosure
of its mortgaged properties by the
creditor banks (MBC/PCIB)
constituted force majeure that
justified PIMI’s failure in 1974 to
comply with the registration
requirement under P.D. No. 463;
ii. that the Philippine Bill of 1902,
which was the basis for issuing the
patents, allowed the private
ownership of minerals, rendering
the minerals covered by the
patents to be segregated from the
public domain and be considered
private property; and
iii. that the Regalian doctrine, under
which the State owned all natural
resources, was adopted only by the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
9. Office of the President affirmed the DENR Sec’s
Order.
a. Under the Philippine Constitution, there is
an absolute prohibition against alienation of
natural resources. Mining locations may
only be subject to concession or lease.
i. The only exception is where a
location of a mining claim was
perfected prior to November 15,
1935, when the government under
the 1935 Constitution was
inaugurated, and according to the
laws existing at that time a valid
location of a mining claim
segregated the area from the
public domain, and the locator is
entitled to a grant of the beneficial
ownership of the claim and the
right to a patent therefore.
b. The right of the locator to the mining
patent is a vested right, and the
Constitution recognizes such right as an
exception to the prohibition against
alienation of natural resources.
i. The right of the appellee as the
beneficial owner of the subject
mining patents in this case,
therefore, is superior to the claims
of appellant
ii. The existence of the TCT’s in the
name of appellee further bolsters
the existence of the mining
patents. Under PD 1529, also
known as the Property Registration
Decree, once a title is cleared of all
claims or where none exists, the
ownership over the real property
covered by the Torrens title
becomes conclusive and
indefeasible even as against the
government.
10. CA: It agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP
that Yinlu held mining patents over the disputed
mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to
register the patents under PD No. 463 in order for
the patents to be recognized in its favor.
a. It found that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-
interest did not register the patents
pursuant to PD No. 463; hence, the patents
lapsed and had no more effect
11. Yinlu asserts the following:
a. The mining patents of Yinlu were registered
pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land Registration
 Act of 1902) in relation to the Philippine Bill
of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1 , 1902),
the governing law on the registration of
mineral patents, were valid, existing and
indefeasible.
i. Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902: allowed citizens of the
United States and of the Philippine
Islands to explore, occupy and
purchase mineral lands
ii. Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of
1902: after the exploration and
claim of the mineral land, the
owner of the claim and of the
mineral patents was entitled to all
the minerals found in the area
subject of the claim
iii. its registered mineral patents,
being valid and existing, could not
be defeated by adverse, open and
notorious possession and
prescription;
b. substantive rights over mineral claims
perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902
subsisted despite the changes of the
Philippine Constitution and of the mining
laws
i. Constitution could not impair
vested rights;
ii. Section 100 and Section 101 of PD
No. 463 would impair its vested
rights under its mineral patents if
said provisions were applied to it;
iii. Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly
prohibited the application of
Section 100 and Section 101 to
vested rights.
ISSUE: Whether Yinlu’s mining patents constitute vested
rights and could not be disregarded.
HELD: YES
1. A mining patent pertains to a title granted by the
government for the said mining claim.
2. Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on
November 15 1935, the alienation of natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, was expressly prohibited.
a. The natural resources being referred
therein included mineral lands of public
domain, but not mineral lands that at the
time the 1935 Constitution took effect no
longer formed part of the public domain.
b. Prohibition against the alienation of
natural resources did not apply to a mining
claim or patent existing prior to November
15, 1935.
c. McDaniel v. Apacible: A mining claim
perfected under the law is property in the
highest sense, which may be sold and
conveyed and will pass by descent. It has
the effect of a grant (patent) by the United
States of the right of present and exclusive
possession of the lands located.
d. The owner of a perfected valid
appropriation of public mineral lands is
entitled to the exclusive possession and
enjoyment against everyone, including the
Government itself. Where there is a valid
and perfected location of a mining claim,
the area becomes segregated from the
public domain and the property of the
locator.
e. A valid and subsisting location of mineral
land, made and kept up in accordance with
the provisions of the statutes of the United
States, has the effect of a grant by the
United States of the present and exclusive
possession of the lands located, and this
exclusive right of possession and enjoyment
continues during the entire life of the
location. There is no provision for, nor
suggestion of, a prior termination thereof.
3. Even without a patent, the possessory right of a
qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the
claim is a property right in the fullest sense,
unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to
the land is in the Government, and it is capable of
transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise.
a. the mining claim under consideration no
longer formed part of the public domain
when the provisions of Article XII of the
Constitution became effective, it does not
come within the prohibition against the
alienation of natural resources; and the
petitioner has the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms
and conditions prescribed by law.
4. Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463
require registration and annual work obligations,
Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly
provides that the provisions of PD No. 463 shall not
apply if their application will impair vested rights
under other mining laws
Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired
Substantive Rights. Changes made and new provisions and
rules laid down by this Decree which may prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with order mining
laws previously in force shall have no retroactive effect.
Provided, That the provisions of this Decree which are
procedural in nature shall prevail.
a. A right is vested when the right to enjoyment
has become the property of some particular
person or persons as a present interest.
 i. It is “the privilege to enjoy
property legally vested, to enforce
contracts, and enjoy the rights of
property conferred by existing law”
or “some right or interest in
property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy”
b. The due process clause prohibits the
annihilation of vested rights.  ‘A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by
the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power’
c. It has been observed that, generally, the term
“vested right” expresses the concept of present
fixed interest, which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately  just an  imperative  against the petitioner did not really matter.”
right which an enlightened  free  society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny
d. Republic v. Court of Appeals: that mining rights
acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
were vested rights that could not be impaired
even by the Government.
e. In the present case: the mining patents of Yinlu
were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and were subsisting prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-
interest had acquired vested rights in the
disputed mineral lands that could not and
should not be impaired even in light of their
past failure to comply with the requirement of
registration and annual work obligations.
Nelson Lai Y Bilbao v People
G.R. No. 175999, July 1, 2015
Bersamin, J:
Nelson Lai Y Bilbao was convicted of the crime of
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
for allegedly killing Enrico Villanueva Jr. during a benefit
dance that was being held in Purok Azucena, Barangay
6, Bacolod City. Judge Fernando Elumbra heard and
decided on the case.
However, on Motion for Reconsideration, the defense
argued that Elumbra should be disqualified from hearing
and deciding on the case, because he had prosecuted
the same case prior to his appointment as Judge. The
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, the
issue, among others, was raised before the Court of
Appeals.
CA affirmed the judgement of the RTC, and ruled
against the disqualification case on the ground that 1)
Judge Elumbra was only assigned as public prosecutor
after the prosecution has already rested its case, and 2)
a petition to disqualify a judge should have been filed
before the rendition of judgement. The accused asks for
relief before the Supreme Court, arguing that his right to
due process has been violated because the case was
not decided by an impartial judge.
Issue:
Is a decision rendered by a trial court judge who
previously prosecuted the same invalid for violating the
due process clause of the Constitution?
Held:
Yes, a judge cannot claim impartiality when he,
regardless of extent of participation, had previously
prosecuted the case. “To be clear, that Judge Elumba's
prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive,
or that he entered his appearance as the public
prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case
Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges who
had served as counsel in a case to inhibit themselves.
“As such, the mere appearance of his name as the
public prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No.
17446 sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting
on and deciding the case.” The Constitutional right to
due process assures parties a decision of a cold, neutral
judge. Such is absent in the case at bar.
Furthermore, the rule that a petition to disqualify a judge
must be filed before rendition of judgement applies only
when the supposed disqualification of the judge is
premised on bias as perceived by a party. It does not
apply in cases where there is a mandatory basis for
disqualification, such as what happened in the case at
bar.
The decision must be set aside and is remanded to the
lower court.
St. Raphael Montessori v BPI 773 S 419
Facts:
Spouses Rolando and Josefina Andaya (Sps.
Andaya) are the President and Vice-President,
respectively, of St. Raphael Montessori, Inc. (St.
Raphael). From 1994 to 1998, the Spouses Andaya
obtained a loan for themselves and on behalf of St.
Raphael, from the Far East Bank and Trust company,
now Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). As security for the
loan, they executed real estate mortgages over a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-45006.[4] They, however, defaulted on their obligation
and thus, BPI extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged
property and the title was issued in its name when the
mortgagors failed to redeem the subject property. On
March 15, 2005, upon petition by BPI, the court a quo
issued a Writ of Possession ordering the sheriff to place
the subject property and all its improvements thereon, in
possession of the same.
The Spouses Andaya asked for deferment of the
implementation of the writ of possession and executed
for themselves and on behalf of St. Raphael an
Undertaking wherein they: (i) acknowledged BPI's
ownership of the property; (ii) promised to vacate the
premises and remove all movables from the same on or
before September 23, 2005; (iii) promised to voluntarily
and peacefully surrender the property in favor of the
rightful owner BPI without the necessity of any demand
on or before September 23, 2005; and (iv) pledged not
to take advantage of the accommodation extended to
them to secure any remedy from the courts. BPI, thus,
deferred the implementation of the writ toSeptember 23,
2005 and upon the lapse thereof even extended for
another 60 days or until November 23, 2005 the
implementation of the writ.
The Spouses Andaya, however, failed to vacate
the subject property. Despite BPI's reminder of their
commitment to surrender possession of the property
without further need of demand, the Spouses Andaya
refused to turn over its possession and contended that
BPI no longer had the right to possess the property
because the writ of possession had already been
implemented.
St. Raphael filed a Motion to Quash Writ of
Possession and claimed that the school building, while
standing on the subject property, was not included in the
real estate mortgages. The Motion to Quash Writ of
Possession was granted by the court a quo. Aggrieved,
BPI filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals wherein the CA reversed the decision and the
motion to quash writ of possession was denied and the
writ is declared valid and enforceable, thus entitling BPI
to possession of the subject property, including the
building occupied by St. Raphael. Thus, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether a writ of possession that was issued
ex-parte as a result of the foreclosure of the mortgages
executed by Sps. Andaya on the subject property can be
enforced and utilized by BPI tooust St. Raphael from the
physical possession of its school buildings built on the
same subject property.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The Court recognized that the writ of possession
was warranted not merely on the basis of the law, but
ultimately on the right to possess as an incident of
ownership. The right to possess a property merely
follows the right of ownership, and it would be illogical to
hold that a person having ownership of a parcel of land
is barred from seeking possession. Precisely, the basis
for the grant of the writ of possession in this case is
respondent's ownership of the property by virtue of a tax
delinquency sale in her favor, and by virtue of her
absolute right of ownership arising from the expiration of
the period within which to redeem the property.
The real estate mortgage agreement entered
into by BPI and the Spouses Andaya is the law between
them. Suffice it to say that in all of the real mortgage
agreements executed by BPI and the Spouses Andaya
in favor of St. Raphael, it was clearly and commonly
stipulated that the parties intend to include the
improvements or buildings erected or to be erected in
the subject lot.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of a
contract that if its terms are clear and leave no doubt on
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulation shall control. In the absence of
proof that the parties intended otherwise, the Court will
not delve to interpret the terms of the contract which are
unequivocal as to the intention of the parties.
Cherith Bucal v. Manny Bucal, GR. No. 206957 (2015)
FACTS:
Cherith A. Bucal (Cherith) and Manny were married
on July 29, 2005 and have a daughter named Francheska A.
Bucal (Francheska). Sometimes in 2010 Cherish filed against
Manny a Petition for the Issuance of a Protection Order base
on VAWC Law. Cherith specifically prayed that the RTC
prohibit Manny from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with her, directly or
indirectly and order Manny to absolutely desist and refrain
from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty and from
taking from her custody or charge of Francheska, and direct
Manny and/or any of his family members to stay away from
her and any of her designated family or household members
under the limitations set by the court. Defendant Manny, in his
pleading never prayed for visitation rights. While Manny was
present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and
PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any pleading which
would indicate that he was seeking for such relief. After due
proceedings, the RTC issued a TPO granting the above-
mentioned reliefs. However, Manny was given visitation
rights every Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00. Cherith filed an
Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order, seeking the reversal of the
grant of visitation rights. Manny filed an Omnibus Motion
praying among others that Cherith be cited for contempt for
failure to abide by the visitation rights granted to him. Cherith
opposed Manny’s Omnibus Motion, alleging that after she
filed her petition, Manny personally appeared before the court
but did not file any pleading, nor oppose the prayer in her
RTC Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may grant a relief which was
not prayed for in the pleading?
RULING:
NO. It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief
not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being
sought by a party to a case. The rationale for the rule was
explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston,
viz: “Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the
opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of
recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.”
The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation
rights. While he was present during the hearing for the
issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed
any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for
such relief.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the
grant of visitation rights by the RTC in favor of Manny, as
contained in the PPO, and reiterated in its assailed Orders,
being both unexplained and not prayed for, is an act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
which deserves correction through the prerogative writ of
certiorari.
REPUBLIC vs. MUPAS 769 SCRA 384 (2015)
FACTS: (4 consolidated cases)
On October 5, 1994, Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC)
submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government for the
construction and development of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III)
under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The
DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit competitive
and comparative proposals to AEDC’s unsolicited proposal.
Both AEDC and Paircargo Consortium offered to build the
NAIA-IPT III for at least $350 million at no cost to the
Government and to pay the Government: 5% share in gross
revenues for the first five years of operation, 7.5% share in
gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10%
share in gross revenues for the last ten years of operation.
However, Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the
Government a total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment
for 27 years while AEDC offered to pay the Government a
total of P135 million for the same period. After the AEDC’s
failure to match the competitive bid, the DOTC awarded, the
project to the Paircargo Consortium (that later organized itself
as PIATCO). On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a
Concession Agreement with PIATCO. On March 31, 2000,
PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, a local branch of
a foreign corporation duly organized under the laws of Japan
and doing business in the Philippines, for the construction of
the NAIA-IPT III. On the same date, PIATCO,  likewise
contracted the services of Asahikosan, a foreign corporation
duly organized under the laws of Japan, for the design,
manufacture, purchase, test and delivery of the Plant in the
NAIA-IPT III. On November 29, 2002, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that the Government
would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same day,
Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they were
suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT III for
PIATCO’s failure to provide adequate security.
On May 5, 200, in the Agan v. PIATCO Case, the Court
nullified the PIATCO contracts after finding that Paircargo
Consortium (that later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a
duly pre-qualified bidder for failure to meet the minimum
equity requirements for the NAIA-IPT III project, as required
under the BOT Law and the Bid Documents. On December
21, 2004 (The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-0876),
the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the
NAIA-IPT III and informed the RTC that it had deposited
with the Land Bank the amount of P3,002,125,000.00,
representing the NAIA-IPT III’s assessed value. On the same
day, the RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the
Government. On January 7, 2005, the RTC appointed three
Commissioners to determine just compensation without
consulting the Government and PIATCO. Due to these
successive adverse rulings, the Government sought to inhibit
Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon, the RTC’s presiding judge, from
hearing the case. (The judge was ambushed and killed on
December 31, 2005.) On December 14, 2005, Asahikosan
filed a motion for leave to intervene and Takenaka manifested
its voluntary appearance before the RTC. Pending the RTC’s
resolution of Takenaka and Asahikosan’s motions for leave to
intervene in the expropriation case, the Government went
directly to the Court seeking Judge Gingoyon’s inhibition
from the case; the nullification of the order of release of the
sum of $62.3 million (P3,002,125,000.00) to PIATCO; and the
nullification as well of the appointment of the commissioners.
On May 5, 2006, the RTC ordered the engagement of the
services of an internationally accepted independent appraiser
who shall conduct the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III.
Thereafter, the Government and PIATCO submitted their list
of nominees for the appointment of an independent appraiser.
On May 3, 2007, the RTC appointed DG Jones and Partners as
independent appraiser. The Government directly challenged
the order in a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction , which, the Court thereafter issued.
Subsequently, the parties and the BOC conducted a
preliminary conference on April 22, 2010, to adopt an
alternative course of action to avoid further delay in the
determination of just compensation. On August 5, 2010, the
RTC ordered the parties to submit their appraisal reports of
NAIA-IPT III with supporting documents and affidavits. The
Government appraised the NAIA-IPT III at $149,448,037.00
while PIATCO concluded that its replacement cost was
$905,867,549.47. On the other hand,Takenaka and Asahikosan
claimed that the NAIA-IPT III’s construction cost amounted
to $360,969,790.82.
RTC: The RTC adopted the Government’s computed just
compensation of $149,448,037.00. The RTC rejected
PIATCO, Takenaka, Asahikosan, and the BOC’s computation
for lack of factual and legal basis.
CA: the CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own
formula of the NAIA-IPT III’s cost.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in computing just compensation
in the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III.
HELD:
Eminent domain is a fundamental state power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is an inherent power and is
not conferred by the Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
embodies two constitutional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of eminent domain: first, private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation; and second,
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.
Just compensation is defined as “the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. Simply
stated, just compensation means that the former owner must
be returned to the monetary equivalent of the position that the
owner had when the taking occurred. To achieve this
monetary equivalent, we use the standard value of “fair market
value” of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint
for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property,
whichever is earlier.
Fair market value is the general standard of value in
determining just compensation. Jurisprudence broadly defines
“fair market value” as the sum of money that a person desirous
but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
received for a property.
While jurisprudence requires the “fair market value” to be the
measure of recovery in expropriation cases, it is not an
absolute and exclusive standard or method of valuation. There
are exceptional cases where the property has no fair market
value or where the fair market value of the property is difficult
to determine.
In cases where the fair market value of the property is difficult
to ascertain, the court may use other just and equitable market
methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair market value
of a property.
In the case at bar, this Court exercises its judicial function to
fix just compensation in eminent domain cases on the basis of
the law, the rules, and the evidence — including the appraisal
reports and the embedded formula on how the parties arrived
at the amounts of just compensation — presented by the
parties before the trial court and the entire record of the
consolidated cases.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is essentially and exclusively a judicial function. Fixing
the formula with definitiveness and particularity in just
compensation is not the function of the executive nor of the
legislative branches, much less of the parties in this case. Any
valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may
not replace the court’s own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how this amount should be arrived at.
Legislative enactments, as well as executive issuances,
providing the method of computing just compensation are
treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just
compensation.
When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, courts
are not strictly bound to apply the formula to its minutest
detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not
warrant the formula’s strict application. The courts may, in the
exercise of their discretion, relax the formula’s application to
fit the factual situations before them.
SECURITIES and EXCHANGE COMMISSION, vs.
UNIVERSAL RIGHTFIELD PROPERTY HOLDINGS,
INC.,
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and Respondent is Universal Rightfield Property
Holdings, Inc. (URPHI). URPHI is a corporation duly
registered and existing under Philippine Law which is
engaged in the business of providing residential and
leisure-related needs and wants market.
SEC issued an Order revoking URPHI's Registration of
SEC for failure to timely file its Year 2001 Annual Report
and Year 2002, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Quarterly Reports
which required pursuant to Section 17 of the Securities
Regulation Code (SRC). On October 16, 2003, URPHI
Filed a motion to set aside the revocation order and
reinstate registration after complying with its reportorial
requirements. On October 24, 2003, SEC granted the
motion to lift the revocation order. However, URPHI
failed again to comply with the same reportorial reportorial requirements before the Order of Revocation
requirements. was issued by SEC.

On June 24, 2004, in a NOTICE OF HEARING, SEC

directed URPHI to show cause why its registration of
Securities and Certificate of Permit to Sell securities to
the Public should not be suspended for failure to submit
said requirements in violation of SRC Rule 17. On July
6, 2004, the scheduled hearing, URPHI through its Chief
accountant, informed SEC why it failed to submit the
reportorial requirement, viz:
Held: YES. SC granted the petition as meritorious
stating that there is no dispute that the violation of
reportorial requirements under Sec 17.1 of the Amended
IRR of the SRC is a ground for suspension or revocation
of the registration of securities pursuant to Sec 13.1 and
54.1 of the SRC to wit:

(1) it was constrained to reduce its accounting staff due
to cost-cutting measures; thus, some of the audit
requirements were not completed within the original
timetable;
(2) its audited financial statements for the period ending
December 31, 2003 could not be finalized by reason of
the delay in the completion of some of its audit
requirements.
13.1. The Commission may reject a registration
statement and refuse registration of the security
thereunder, or revoke the effectivity of a registration
statement and the registration of the security thereunder
after due notice and hearing by issuing an order to such
effect, setting forth its findings in respect thereto, if it
finds that:
a) The issuer:

On July 27, 2004, SEC suspended URPHI's registration xxx xxx xxx
of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the public
(ii) Has violated any of the provisions of this Code, the
for failure to submit the reportorial requirements
rules promulgated pursuant thereto, or any order of the
DESPITE THE LAPSO OF THE EXTENTION PERION,
and due to lack of sufficient justification. Commission of which the issuer has notice in connection
with the offering for which a registration statement has
On August 23, 2004, SEC informed URPHI that it failed
been filed;
to submit its 2004 2nd Quarter Report in violation of the
amended IRR of the SRC Rule 17.a (1)(A)(ii). It directed 54.1. If, after due notice and hearing, the Commission
URPHI to file the said report and show cause why it finds that: (a) There is a violation of this Code, its rules,
should not be held in violation for the said rule. or its orders; (b) Any registered broker or dealer,
associated person thereof has failed reasonably to
On September 23, 2004, URPHI requested for a final
supervise, with a view to preventing violations, another
extension or until November 15, 2004.
person subject to supervision who commits any such
On December 1, 2004, URPHI filed with SEC its 2003 violation;
Annual Report. On December 8, 2004, SEC revoked
URPHI's Registration of Securities and Permit to Sell
Securities to the Public for its failure to submits its
reportorial requirements within the final extension period.

On December 9, 10 and 14, 2004, URPHI finally

submitted to the SEC its Quarterly Reports.

URPHI appealed the SEC Order of Revocation dated

December 8, 2004 by filing a Notice of Appeal and a
Memorandum both dated January 3, 2005.

On December 15, 2005, SEC denied URPHI's appeal

through a resolution.

Aggrieved, URPHI filed a petition for review with the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the URPHI was accorded all the

opportunity to be heard and comply with all the
(c) Any registrant or other person has, in a registration
statement or in other reports, applications, accounts,
records or documents required by law or rules to be filed
with the Commission, made anyuntrue statement of a
material fact, or omitted to state any material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading; or, in the case of an
underwriter, has failed to conduct an inquiry with
reasonable diligence to insure that a registration
statement is accurate and complete in all material
respects;
or (d) Any person has refused to permit any lawful
examinations into its affairs, it shall, in its discretion, and
subject only to the limitations hereinafter prescribed,
impose any or all of the following sanctions as may be
appropriate in light of the facts and circumstances:
(i) Suspension, or revocation of any registration for the
offering of securities;
SC further held that the essence of due process is
simply giving an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of
opportunity to be heard.
The due notice of revocation given to URPHI through the
SEC Order dated July 27, 2004, wherein the SEC
expressly warned that such registration would be
revoked should it persistently fail to comply with the said
requirements. Still, URPHI continuously failed to submit
the required reports. Due notice simply means the
information must be given or made to a particular person
or to the public within a legally mandated period of time
so that its recipient will have the opportunity to respond
to a situation or to allegations that affect the individual's
or public's legal rights or duties.
Furthermore, the SC notes that SEC has both regulatory
and adjudicative functions. The revocation of registration
of securities and permit to sell them to the public is not
an exercise of the SEC's quasi-judicial power, but of its
regulatory power.
The case used by URPHI which is the Globe Telecom
ruling is different from the case at hand. The SC in
Globe Case ruled that the fined imposed by the NTC
without notice and hearing was null and void due to the
denial of petitioner's right to due process. The revocation
of URPHI's registration of securities and permit to sell
them to the public cannot be considered a penalty but a
withdrawal of a privilege, which regulatory power the
SEC validly exercised after giving it due notice and
opportunity to be heard.
Thus, petition is granted and the decision of CA is
reversed. The requirements of due notice and hearing
under Section 13.1 and 54.1 of the SRC were
substantially complied with.
ACAMPADO V. SPS. COSMILLA
G.R. No. 198531, September 25, 2015
FACTS:
The present petition stems from the Petition for the
Declaration of the Nullity of Document filed by
respondents against petitioners before the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6. In their Amended Complaint6
docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 6644, respondents
Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of their share on
the subject property was effected thru a forged Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) and is therefore null and void.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision
dated 31 March 2005 dismissing the complaint of the
respondents for failure to prove by preponderance of
evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the
SPA were forged.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 on 6 May 2005 seeking for the
reversal of the earlier RTC Decision. For failure of the
respondents, however, to comply with the requirement
of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo
denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion, respondents
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus12
with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO seeking
to annul and set aside the RTC Order dated 16 May
2005.  For lack of merit, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition filed by the respondents.
On Motion for Reconsideration by Respondents,
however, the Court of Appeals reversed its earlier
Resolution and allowed the relaxation of the procedural
in a Resolution16 dated 28 June 2007. Hence, the
appellate court vacated the 16 May 2005 Order of the
RTC directed the court a quo to thresh out the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the respondents on the
merits.
In a Resolution17 dated 19 August 2011, the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have complied with the
requirement of notice of hearing as required under
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.

RULING:
PETITIONERS. Rule 15 Secs 4-6 The foregoing
requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the
parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for
the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not
religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro
forma. A motion that does not comply with the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of
court has no right to receive and which the court has no
authority to act upon.21 The logic for such requirement
is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which
the movant makes to the court which is usually in the
interest of the adverse party to oppose.
The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a
form of due process; it gives the other party the
opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the
prayer of the movant. In keeping with the principles of
due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford
the adverse party a chance to oppose should simply be
disregarded.24 Principles of natural justice demand that
a right of a party should not be affected without giving it
an opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, the three-day
requirement is not a hard and fast rule.31 Where a party
has been given an opportunity to be heard, the time to
study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with
the rule.32 The test is the presence of the opportunity to
be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion
and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds
upon which it is based. Considering that the running of
the period towards the finality of the judgment was not
stopped, the RTC Decision dated 31 March 2005 became
final and executory. Every litigation must come to an
end once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable.
It is important, however, to note that these doctrines
refer exclusively to a motion, since a motion invariably
contains a prayer, which the movant makes to the court,
which is to repeat usually in the interest of the adverse
party to oppose and in the observance of due process,
the other party must be given the opportunity to oppose
the motion.[27] In keeping with the principles of due
process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the
adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be
disregarded.[28] Failure to comply with the required
notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious to
respondents cause.[29]
In New Japan Motors, Inc. v. Perucho,[30] the Court
dismissed the motion for reconsideration that was
unaccompanied by a notice of hearing as a piece of
paper unworthy of judicial cognizance:
"Under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
x x x a motion is required to be accompanied by a notice
of hearing whichmust be served by the applicant on all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the
hearing thereof. Section 6 of the same rule commands
that '(n)o motion shall be acted upon by the Court,
without proof of service of the notice thereof x x x.' It is
therefore patent that the motion for reconsideration in
question is fatally defective for it did not contain any
notice of hearing. We have already consistently held in
a number of cases that the requirements of Sections 4,
5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory
and that failure to comply with the same is fatal to
movant's cause." (Emphasis supplied)
Zarate v Aquino III
Petitioners aver that they are members of various progressive
party-lists that have been wrongfully tagged by the military
and the police as "communist front organizations. As alleged
in the petition, sometime in March 2014, the Government
commenced intensified military offensives in Talaingod,
Davao del Norte under the rubric of counterinsurgency.
About 1,300 Manobos allegedly evacuated to Davao City to
escape the effects of said military operationsevacuees.
Beginning January 2015, however, some of the Manobos
started going back to Davao City. By July 2015, approximately
700 Manobos were at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines (UCCP) Haran. Petitioners claimed that these
Manobos sought refuge at UCCP Haran due to the persisting
militarization of their communities and their forcible
recruitment to the paramilitary group, Alamara Certain
Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that they were
deceived into going to Davao City; that, upon reaching UCCP
Haran, they were deprived of their freedom of locomotion
and were held there against their will from 3 February 2015
to 25 February 2015; that during said period they were forced
to listen to lectures and join rallies; until a fellow tribe
member was found dead, hanging lifeless on a tree, inside
the UCCP Haran compound; and that it was only then that
they were allowed to go home with the body of the
deceased. Filed a complaint for (Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention), and Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2003). To determine who would be charged
in the complaint, the complainants were shown "lists" from
which they purportedly identified the defendants. Petitioners
now aver that the inclusion of their names and photographs
in the "lists" indicates that they are and have been the
subject of State surveillance. incriminate them in fabricated
criminal charges, and insinuations of their links with the New
People's Army. petitioners argue that their inclusion in the
"lists" are threats to their life, liberty, and security warranting
the protection of the writ of amparo. Additionally, petitioners
claim that as there is absolutely no basis for the inclusion of
their names and photographs in the "lists," then respondents
should be compelled via the writ of habeas data to disclose
and to provide petitioners with copies of all information and
evidence pertaining to them which respondents have in their aggrieved party,35 the Habeas Data Rule presupposes that
files or records, and for such information to be destroyed. the aggrieved party is still alive.

Held: Dismissed. Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires

substantial evidence. "only actual threats, as may be
established from all the facts and circumstances of the case,
can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Mere membership in
organizations or sectors historically involved in EJKs cannot
equate to an actual threat that would warrant the issuance of
a writ of amparo. We note, however, that the matter of
petitioner Zarate's supposed inclusion in the military's OB has
already been addressed by the Court in the consolidated
cases of In re: Petition for the Issuance ofa Writ ofAmparo in
favor of Lilibeth 0. Ladaga, et al. As for the pending cases
against petitioner Zarate, suffice it to say that the complaints
were duly supported by affidavits,20 police blotters,21
medical records,22 and reports of social workers
Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940
G.R. NO. L-46496             FEBRUARY 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO,
MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND 
NATIONAL WORKERS
BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS. 
 THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due
Process in Administrative Bodies

Petitioners Mariano and Casino, on the other hand, cite their
previous charge of rebellion,24 and their earlier implication in
a kidnapping with murder case. The filing of cases, however,
cannot be characterized as an unlawful act or omission in the
context of the Amparo Rule. Of all the petitioners, it is only
petitioner Balaba personal who alleged circumstances
claiming threatened violations of her right to life, liberty and
security. However, The instances cited by petitioner Balaba
fail to demonstrate an actual threat to her life, liberty, and
security. The writ of habeas data is a "remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. The extraordinary
writ of habeas data "provides a judicial remedy to protect a
person's right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. Rule on the Writ ofHabeas Data) provides that
the petition should aver "the manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party."
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of
a number of his employees. However, the National
Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said
lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were
members of NLU while  no members of the rival labor
union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid
off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union
and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to
the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme
Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: 

The Habeas Data Rule likewise requires substantial evidence.

In the present petition, petitioners fail to show how their
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled
right to privacy is violated given that the information
to a new trial.
contained in the "lists" are only their names, their positions in
their respective organizations, and their photographs. All
these data are of public knowledge and are readily accessible
even to civilians. HELD: 

Although the petition for a writ of habeas data may be filed

by family member, or even relatives, on behalf of the
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered
evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so
inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include
books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay
which were not previously accessible but already
existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the
CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court
must also make sure that they comply to the
requirements of due process. For administrative bodies,
due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something
to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Anzaldo vs Clave GR L-54597 15 December 1982
Facts: The Science Research Supervisor II
position was vacant and both Dr Felicidad
Anzaldo and Dr Eulalia Venzon were next-in-rank
for the said position. Venzon was recommended
for the position to w/c Anzaldo protested. The
position was not filled up until NIST OIC
appointed Anzaldo to that position. The same was
approved by Civil Service Commission. Venzon
contested this and appealed to the Office of the
President. This protest was sent to Civil Service
Commission and was decided in favour of Venzon
by Chairman Jacobo Clave. Anzaldo’s motion for
reconsideration was denied and she appealed to
Office of the President to w/c Clave is
concurrently Presidential Executive Assistant.
Appeal was revoked and ruled as “as
recommended by the Civil Service Commission.”
Issue: Whether or not Clave denied due process
to Anzaldo on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion?
Decision: Decision of respondent set aside and
Anzaldo’s appointment declared valid. Due
process of law means fundamental fairness. It is
not fair to Anzaldo that Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave should decide whether his own
recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, as to w/c doctor should be
appointed for the position, should be adopted by
the President of the Philippines. Common sense
and propriety dictate that the commissioner in
the Civil Service Commission, who should be
consulted by the Office of the President, should
be a person different from the person in the
Office of the President who would decide the
appeal of the protestant in a contested
appointment.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)Rivera vs.
CSC, Land Bank of the Philippines (January 4, 1995)
Facts:
Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of
LBP and was charged with dishonesty, receiving
for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the
course of official duties, committing acts punishable under
the Anti-Graft Laws, and pursuit of private business
vocation or profession without permission required by
CSC. Rivera allegedly toldPerez that he would facilitate the
processing, approval and release of his loan if he would be
given 10% commission. Riverawas further charged having
served and acted, without prior authority required by CSC,
as the personal consultant of Lao andconsultant in various
companies where Lao had investments. LBP held Rivers
guilty of grave misconduct and actsprejudicial to the best
interest of the service in accepting employment from a
client of the bank. The penalty of forcedresignation,
without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon
imposed on Rivera.
Issue:
Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in
composing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis
of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions
Ruling:
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have
behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally
from any participation in resolving Rivera’s appeal to CSC
to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental
aspect of due process.CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the
case is remanded toCSC for the resolution, sans the
participation of CSC Commissioner Gaminde, as she was the
Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus appealed.
Title : AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY
vs THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
Citation : G.R. No. L-26803
October 14, 1975
Ponente : ANTONIO, J.:
Facts :
ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office
concerning the use of trade mark and trade name. ATC et al
challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of
Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark
Cases” as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to
designate any ranking official of said office to hear “inter
partes” proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that “all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be
personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed
by him.” These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition
to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference
proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the
question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark,
trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration
of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the
hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the
amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the
law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes
case. Said objections were overruled by the Director of
Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to
compel the Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of
petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
Issue : Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the
Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers
are within due process.
Held :
The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely
in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not
preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the
basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will
be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to
exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude
him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report
to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his
decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion
finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair
hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before
the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As
long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the
decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is
no question that the requirements of due process and fair
trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of
responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the
actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is,
however, required that to “give the substance of a hearing,
which is for the purpose of making determinations upon
evidence the officer who makes the determinations must
consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”
FABELLA V. CA
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a
return-to-work order to all public school teachers who
had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various
dates during the period of September to October 1990.
The mass action had been staged to demand payment of
13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill
in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed
administrative cases against respondents, who are
teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets
required respondents to explain in writing why they
should not be punished for having taken part in the mass
action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative
hearings started on December 1990. Respondents,
through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings
on the following due process grounds: first, they were
not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the
committee for the investigation and denied access to
evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of
proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third,
that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their
composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the
action assailing the validity of the administrative
proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a
decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their
immediate dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due
process?
HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has
been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence
in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as
to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during
the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special
law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of
said law expressly provides that the committee to hear
public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the division as
chairman, a representative of the local or any existing
provincial or national teachers’ organization and a
supervisor of the division. In the present case, the
various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents did
not include “a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings
undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could
not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of
private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of
a teachers’ organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and
meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners
allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because
the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers
Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said
teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does
not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of
such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA
4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization
possesses the right to indicate its choice of
representative to be included by the DECS in the
investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot
be usurped by the secretary of education or the director
of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case,
there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed
by the DECS as members of its investigating committee
was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’
organization as its representative in said committee. Sec
9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle,
a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous
specific law, unless there is an express stipulation.
Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.
01 Romualdez vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
FACTS
COMELEC Law Department filed two separate
informations before the RTC Barauen, Leyte against
spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R.
Romualdez for knowingly making false or untruthful
statement in their application for voter’s registration
relative to their place of residence and non – registration
in other areas, which are violations of Sections 10(g) and
(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of RA 8189 or the Voter’s
Registration Act, to wit:
SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. – xxx The application shall
contain the following data: x x x (g) Periods of residence in
the Philippines and in the place of registration; x x x (j) A
statement that the application is not a registered voter of any
precinct;
SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be
considered election offenses under this Act: x x x (j) Violation
of any of the provisions of this Act.
Pending the above case, the spouses filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari against COMELEC, on the ground,
among others, of the unconstitutionality of Section 45(j)
for being contrary to the fair notice requirement Section
14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, as such penal provision is vague on its
face.
ISSUE
WON Section 45(j) of RA 8189 is unconstitutional for
having uncertain election prohibition.
RULING
No, the Supreme Court held. Using the void for
vagueness doctrine, it the law is said to be facially
invalid only if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.
As structured, Section 45 of RA 8189 makes a recital of
election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) clearly
specifies that a violation of any of the provisions of RA 8189
is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise.
The challenged provision renders itself to no other
interpretation and involves no guesswork.
GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
Facts:   (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as
the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein
through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He
further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct
of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings
and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that,
they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web
page.
Issue:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s
website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.
Held:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of
the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is
not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven
circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to
comply with the due process requirement because the Rules
of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through
the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only
for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only
"in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION [322 SCRA 160 (2000)]
Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC
Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S.
The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and
other supporting documents for said extradition were
attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel
proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of
the extradition treaty which they found having matters
needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for
copies of all the documents included in the extradition
request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the
completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is
in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine
Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have
been complied with by the Requesting Government.
Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized
disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of
treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari,
and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the
respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of
the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings.
Issues:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due
process rights of notice and hearing
Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of
an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.”
Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an
administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply
lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for
the extradition process which may ultimately result in the
deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional
arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of
the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective
extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in
court. Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective
extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage.
Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin
to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal since such technical assessment sets off or
commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of
liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court
has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an
administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life,
liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are
deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the
nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary
investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings which may result in the filing of an information
against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to
the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be
accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to
A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern & the corollary right
to access to official records & documents
The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which
will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request
exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The
evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation
since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest
and imprisonment of the respondent.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal,
civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these
rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled
to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, &
upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present
their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action
(preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking
filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, &
the respondent isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to
notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of
the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an
appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise
them had not been claimed.
2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal
commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government
under the RP-US Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about
the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process
protection to their respective citizens. The administrative
investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the
due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of
the Rules of Court.
3. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s
basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition
treaty
No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international
law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to
national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute
can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during
trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation
process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary
investigation because it involves the basic constitutional
rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person
ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house,
separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His
rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness
are taken away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a
conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled
to have access to the evidence against him and the right to
controvert them.
Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or
innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an
extradition treaty where at stake is our government’s
international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a
citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense
committed within that jurisdiction.
Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the
evaluation stage.
Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
 Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the
Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for
hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
US Government requested the extradition of Mark
Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such
warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez
to post bail for his provisional liberty.
 Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition
proceedings
 Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a
case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
  Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the
use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision
on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
 It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he
left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its
laws. His invocation of due process now has thus
become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Placido et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 180888, September 18, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners Placido and Caragay had been employed as cable
splicers by PLDT.
PLDT had been receiving reports of theft and destruction of its
cables. PLDT inspector and security guard, responding to a report
that cables were being stripped and burned in one of the residences,
proceeded to the said area where they saw petitioners’ service
vehicle parked infront of the house.
Petitioners were seen stripping and burning cables inside the
compound of the house which turned out to belong to Caragay’s
mother. With the assistance of police and barangay officials, PLDT
recovered the cables bearing the "PLDT" marking.
PLDT filed an Information for Qualified Theft against petitioners.
PLDT also required petitioners to explain within 72 hours why no
severe disciplinary action should be taken against them for Serious
Misconduct and Dishonesty. Petitioners submitted a joint explanation
denying the charges against them.
By their claim, they were on their way back from the house of one
Quezada from whom they were inquiring about a vehicle when they
were detained by the PLDT investigator.
On petitioners’ request, a formal hearing was scheduled. Their
request for a copy of the Security Investigation was denied, however,
on the ground that they are only entitled to "be informed of the
charges, and they cannot demand for the report as it is still on the
confidential stage.
Petitioners’ counsel later reiterated the request for a setting of a
hearing and an audiotape of the June 25, 2001 hearing, but the same
was denied. A third time request for another hearing was likewise
denied.
PLDT sent notices of termination to petitioners, prompting them to file
a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
Labor Arbiter held that petitioners were illegally dismissed which was
reversed by the NLRC. Pettitioners appealed to CA which affirmed
the NLRC Decision holding that since the cables bore the "PLDT"
marking, they were presumed to be owned by PLDT, hence, the
burden of evidence shifted on petitioners to prove that they were no
longer owned by PLDT, but they failed.
Issue:
WON petitioners were denied due process and were illegally
dismissed
Ruling:
No, petitioners were not denied due process. They were legally
dismissed.
Article 277 of the Labor Code provides:
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure
and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just or
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the workers
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford
the latter ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with
company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the
guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any
decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right
of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing
a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer.
And the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code require a
hearing and conference  during which the employee concerned is
given the opportunity to respond to the charge, and present his
evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. Thus Rule I,
Section 2(d), provides:
Section 2. Security of Tenure. —
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards
of due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in
Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned,
with the assistance of counsel if he so desires, is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence
presented against him.1avvphi1
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify his termination.
The abovequoted provision of Section 2(d) should not be taken to
mean, however, that holding an actual hearing or conference is a
condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process
requirement in case of termination of employment.
For the test for the fair procedure guaranteed under the above-
quoted Article 277(b) of the Labor Code is not whether there has
been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer
and the employee. The "ample opportunity to be heard" standard is
neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the
employee’s right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that
right.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or,
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of
the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due
process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his
side.
A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioners were, among other things, given
several written invitations to submit themselves to PLDT’s
Investigation Unit to explain their side, but they failed to heed them. A
hearing was conducted where petitioners attended along with their
union MKP representatives during which the principal witnesses to
the incident were presented. Petitioners were thus afforded the
opportunity to confront those witnesses and present evidence in their
behalf, but they failed to do so.
SC found that as the cables bore the "PLDT" marking, the
presumption is that PLDT owned them. The burden of evidence thus
lay on petitioners to prove that they acquired the cables lawfully but
this they failed to discharge.
Mendoza vs Comelec, GR 188308, October 15, 2009
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent
Roberto M. Pagdanganan vied for the position of
Governor of the Province of Bulacan in the May 14,
2007 elections.  The petitioner was proclaimed winning
candidate and assumed the office of Governor.
 
The respondent seasonably filed an election
protest with the COMELEC.  Revision of ballots involving
the protested and counter-protested precincts soon
followed.  The revision was conducted at the
COMELEC’s office in Intramuros.  The COMELEC later
transferred the some ballot boxes, including those
involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET).  Because of this, petitioner
moved to suspend further proceedings but was denied
by the COMELEC, ruling that the COMELEC has
plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate
the resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded
that it would continue the proceedings after proper
coordination with the SET.  This prompted petitioner to
file a petition for certiorari asserting that the COMELEC,
exercising judicial power, conducted proceedings in the
election contest within SET premises for the
gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan,
between him and the respondent Pagdanganan, without
due regard to his fundamental due process rights of
notice and participation.
The COMELEC, claims that its decision-making
deliberations are internal, confidential and do not require
notice to and the participation of the contending parties.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.
Held: No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial
since it is a constitutional body, other than a court,
vested with authority to decide election contests, and in
the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold
hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it
receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these
submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of
the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the
merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the
exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in
character, particularly with respect to election contests,
COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of
government and is not a court exercising judicial power
in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative
function, exercised as it is in the course of administration
and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
Under these terms, the COMELEC under our
governmental structure is a constitutional administrative
agency and its powers are essentially executive in
nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws),
quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over
election contests of regional, provincial and city officials
and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other
lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking
on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation
of its rules of procedure).
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant, - versus - JUDGE CADER P. INDAR,
Respondent.
Fake marriage annulment decisions -
"In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous
annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the
records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato
City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were
had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been
paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled
hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been
conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision.
As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles
submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and
Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed,
pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak,
nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words,
Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law,
issued decisions on the questioned annulment of
marriage cases, without any showing that such cases
underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act
undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
The Court condemns Judge Indar’s reprehensible act of
issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without
conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance
not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-
changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the
basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only
that, Judge Indar’s gross misconduct greatly undermines
the people’s faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust
and confidence in the courts. Judge Indar’s utter lack of
moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar
deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service.
Jamsani-Rodriguez vs Ong
Judges in Sandigang Bayan who sign a decision without
the concurrence of their fellow judge setting en banc to
try the case brought to their jurisdiction.
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T.
SAQUILAYAN, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed
as winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC of the digital images of the ballots were done
in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the
the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and,
petitioner and for the first time on appeal.
based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as
the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan
to cease and desist from performing the functions of said HELD: The decision of the court a quo is
office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the granted.
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for
execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed POLITICAL LAW notice to parties
as Mayor.
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay
The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to
the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power
use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure
cards. Thus, it issued an order dated requiring the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised
Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be
expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be
images. Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be
augment his cash deposit.
waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of
the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby
caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the
The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and
COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First
declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.
Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in the
guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that
its failure to provide the parties with notice of its
he had been denied his right to due process because he
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most
had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He
basic requirements of due process.
argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot
images, which were secondary evidence, had been
The picture images of the ballots are electronic
unwarranted because there was no proof that the
documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the
integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
original official ballots themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.
199149, January 22, 2013the Court held that "the picture
images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari,
PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture
reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and
in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined
examination of the ballot images without prior notice to
by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts
him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images
thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots
in the recount proceedings conducted by the First
filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
Division.
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed
That the two documents the official ballot and its picture
the same. The Court then pronounced that the First
image are considered "original documents" simply
Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use
means that both of them are given equal probative
the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining
weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence,
that the printouts of the ballot images were not
one is not considered as weightier than the other.
secondary images, but considered original documents
with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts,
under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First
the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly
Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes
and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture
had been tampered had been fully established by the
images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them
large number of cases of double-shading discovered
without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative
during the revision.
weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts
of their picture images, the rules for the revision of
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing
ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still
the instant petition despite a clear violation
consider the official ballots to be the primary or best
of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law
evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture
considering that decryption, printing and examination
images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first
shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity
has been compromised.

1.
biometrics validation is an unconstitutional requirement
of literacy and property.
2.
strict scrutiny test.
3.
the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015 violates
Section 8 of RA 8189.
KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318       December 16, 2015
 FACTS:
                RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to
implement a mandatory biometrics registration system
for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent, and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology.
                RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters
whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of
application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
elections shall be deactivated x  x x.”
                COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as
amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among
others, the said Resolution provides that: “the
registration records of voters without biometrics data
who failed to submit for validation on or before the last
day of filing of applications for registration for the
purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated.
                 Herein petitioners filed the instant petition
with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI)
assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics
validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well
as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all
related thereto.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the statutory requirement of
Whether or not biometrics validation passes the
Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed
 HELD: FIRST ISSUE: No.
                 The Court held that biometrics validation is not
a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of suffrage,
but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which
the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
                The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases
that registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The
process of registration is a procedural limitation on the
right to vote.
                Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified
elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with the
registration procedure in order to vote.
                Thus, unless it is shown that a registration
requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or
other substantive requirement as contemplated by the
Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of
any rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good -the same
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this
case.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
                In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the
burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
Presence of compelling state interest
                Respondents have shown that the biometrics
validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a
compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to
facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible
elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial
problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and
multiple registrants. The foregoing consideration is
unquestionably a compelling state interest.
Biometrics validation is the least restrictive
means for achieving the above-said interest
                Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the
procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the
registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear
before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a
competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo,
signature, and fingerprints recorded.
                Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721
did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves
to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it
only required the voter to undergo the validation process
one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding
elections, provided that he remains an active voter.
                Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude
deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in
the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they
could still apply for reactivation.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
                Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:
System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election.
                The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods
stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond
which voter registration may no longer be conducted.
The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to
conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only
provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be
extended depending on the administrative necessities
and other exigencies.
Lao Gi v CA (1989) 180 SCRA 756
Facts:
Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue
of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However, this
was revoked when his father’s citizenship was cast aside
due to fraud and misrepresentation.
Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias.
Charges also alleged that they refused to register as
aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability.
The Chias said that the CID has no authority to deport
them which was denied by the CID.
They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of
preliminary injunction which was dismissed for lack of
merit. Their MFR was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chia’s case of falsification of public
documents in alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was
alleged to have done this for the sale of real property.
The trial court acquitted him by saying that Opinion 191
was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion
147.
The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against
the Chias and told them to register as aliens. The Chias
tooks further action. Their petition for injunctive relief
was denied by the CFI of Manila.
They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias mfr was
denied.
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA
decision. They argued that they weren’t subject to
immediate deportation, the presence of fraud in the
citizenship, the CA’s overstepping of appellate
jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didn’t make a
ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false
pretenses.
Issue:
1. Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the
deportation?
Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued
to determine if they are really aliens
Ratio:
Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
SEC. 37. (a)          The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose
and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien:
(1)          Any alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designated
port of entry or at any place other than at a designated
port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No.
503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the
ground charged, particularly illegal entry into the country.
Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also,
there must be appositive finding from the CID that they
are aliens before compelling them to register as such.
This power is the police power to protect the state from
undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.
Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process
must be observed. In the same law, it is provided that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the
specific grounds for deportation nor without being given
a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by
the Commissioner of Immigration.
The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be
in ordinary language for the person to be informed and
for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the
warrants of arrewst must be in accordance with the rules
on criminal procedure.
On the information of a private prosecutor in the case:
Deportation is the sole concern of the state. There is no
justification for a private party to intervene.
Guzman Vs NU
FACTS:
Students Diosadado Guzman, Ulyses Urbiztondo, and
Ariel Ramacula seeks relief from what they describe as
their school’s ” continued and persistent refusal to allow
them to enrol”
BACKGROUND:
August 7, 1984 Students prayed for preliminary
mandatory injunction for the refusal of the National
Universty to let them enrol.
September 24, 1984 University president replied that the
petitioners failure to enrol for the first semester of SY 84-
85 is due to their own fault because the enrollment was
already closed and that DeGuzman and Ramacula’s
academic showing was “poor” and they have failures in
their records and are not of good scholastic standing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a school or university have the right to
deny acceptance of students without due process.
HELD:
The 3 students were allowed by the court to enrol. The
court declared illegal the University’s act of imposing
sanctions on students without due investigation.
RULING:
Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, have
the right among others “to freely choose their field of
study subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course up to graduation except in case of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.”
Petitioners were being denied this right , or being
disciplined without due process, in violation of the
admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools that ” no penalty shall be imposed upon any
student except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or
in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated
and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted.”
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON.
JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644;
G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student
of Petitioner University, died of serious physical
injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido
Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned
by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him
on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia
del Castillo created a Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which
was tasked to investigate and submit a report
within 72 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice
also required respondent students to submit their
written statements within twenty-four (24) hours
from receipt. Although respondent students
received a copy of the written notice, they failed
to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed
on preventive suspension. The Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witness, found a prima facie case against
respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file
their written answers to the formal charge.
Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to
hear the charges against respondent students.
The Board found respondent students guilty of
violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation
in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack
of unanimity among the members of the Board
on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed
the penalty of dismissal on all respondent
students. Respondent students filed with RTC
Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled.
This was granted. A TRO was also issued
enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the
temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo
created a Special Board to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students
Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be
stricken out by the respondents and argued that
the creation of the Special Board was totally
unrelated to the original petition which alleged
lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against
the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more
particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature
and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the
twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are
not in a position to file the instant petition under
Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration first before the trial
court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court
of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or
not respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein,
thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has
legal authority to review decisions of institutions of
higher learning that impose disciplinary action on
their students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights
in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due
process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to
academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents
proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on
private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.
Held:
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of
petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96
disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it
nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU.
However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner
DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different
directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge – CHED
ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner
DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree
courses until their graduation.
It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722,
otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on
Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other
purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation
of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher
Education. – In pursuance of the abovementioned
policies, the Commission on Higher Education is
hereby created, hereinafter referred to as
Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate
from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the
President for administrative purposes only. Its
coverage shall be both public and private institutions
of higher education as well as degree-granting
programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. –
The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise
such other powers and functions as may be necessary
to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of
this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary
for its effective operations and for the continued
 enhancement of growth or development of higher
education.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and
dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution
181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of
completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar.
On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private
respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its
rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.
Go vs. Colegio De San Juan De Letran, et al.
Facts:
In October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of Letran’s
Auxiliary Services Department, received information that
certain fraternities were recruiting new members among
Letran’s high school students, together with the list of
allegedly involved students.
The school conducted medical examinations on the
students involved and on November 20, 2002, Dr.
Emmanuel Asuncion, the school physician, reported that
six (6) students bore injuries on the posterior portions of
their thighs. Mr. Rosarda, the Assistant Prefect for
Discipline, conferred with the students and asked for
their explanations in writing.
Four (4) students, admitted that they were neophytes of
the Tau Gamma Fraternity and were present in a hazing
rite held in Tondo, Manila. They also identified the senior
members of the fraternity present at their hazing. These
included Kim, then a fourth year high school student.
In the meantime, the school’s security officer, prepared
an incident report that the Tau Gamma Fraternity has
been recruiting members from Letran’s high school
department. He had spoken to one of the fraternity
neophytes and obtained a list of eighteen (18) members
of the fraternity currently enrolled at the high school
department. Kim’s name was also in the list.
Mr. Rosarda has informed Kim’s mother, Mrs. Go, that
her son is a fraternity member whereas she expressed
her disbelief stating that her son has always been in
constant supervision.
Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to
explain his side. Kim responded through a written
statement dated December 19, 2001; he denied that he
was a fraternity member.
In time, the respondents found that twenty-nine (29) of
their students, including Kim, were fraternity members.
The respondents found substantial basis in the
neophytes’ statements that Kim was a senior fraternity
member. Based on their disciplinary rules, the Father
Prefect for Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr. Jose
Rhommel Hernandez) recommended the fraternity
members’ dismissal from the high school department
rolls
On January, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC of Caloocan City claiming that
the respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim. They
refused to accept the respondents’ finding that Kim was
a fraternity member. They likewise insisted that due
process had not been observed. Mr. and Mrs. Go also
sought compensation for the “business opportunity
losses” they suffered while personally attending to Kim’s
disciplinary case.
In ruling for the petitioners, the RTC ruled that Kim was
dismissed without due process, his membership in the
fraternity was not duly proven, and the the school had no
authority to dismiss KIM from school.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the RTC and
reversed the decision, thereby prompting the petitioners
to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA had erred in setting aside the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-19938, whereas
petitioners claim that respondents had unlawfully
dismissed Kim from the high school department rolls
RULING
the RTC’s statement that Letran, a private school,
possesses no authority to impose a dismissal, or any
disciplinary action for that matter, on students who
violate its policy against fraternity membership must be
corrected. The RTC reasoned out that Order No. 20,
series of 1991, of the then Department of respondents
cite as legal basis for Letran’s policy, only covered public
high schools and not private high schools such as
Letran.
However, in ascertaining the meaning of DECS Order
No. 20, s. 1991, the entire order must be read in whole,
not in isolated parts, but with reference to every other
part and every word and phrase in connection with its
context.
The order’s title may also serve as an aid for
construction, which states, “Prohibition of Fraternities
and Sororities in Elementary and Secondary Schools.”
This serves to clarify whatever ambiguity in the fourth
paragraph. It directs the prohibition to elementary and
secondary schools in general, and does not distinguish
between private and public schools.
Incidentally, the penalty for non-compliance with DECS
Order No. 20, s. 1991, is expulsion, a severe form of
disciplinary penalty consisting of excluding a student
from admission to any public or private school in the
country. In contrast, the penalty prescribed by the rules
of Letran for fraternity membership among their high
school students is dismissal, which is limited to the
exclusion of an erring student from the rolls of the
school.
Private schools have the authority to promulgate and
enforce a similar prohibition pursuant to their right to
establish disciplinary rules and regulations. This right
has been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, which has the character of law.
DECISION
The Supreme Court finds no reversible error in the
assailed CA decision, and accordingly, deny the present
decision. The Supreme Court hereby affirms the
decision dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 80349.
Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989) G.R. No.
84818, December 18, 1989
Fact: The petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1
issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of
the NTC which directs the provisional reduction of the
rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain
specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%)
with the reservation to make further reductions later, for
being violative of the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of
procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.
Petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then
Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC.
However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 placed
under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services
and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive
Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply
for the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it
renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge
rates therefor. petitioner filed with respondent NTC an
application for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously
operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue
providing the international satellite communications
services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to
charge the current rates applied for in rendering such
services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a
provisional authority so that it can continue to operate
and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the
services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein
applied for. petitioner was granted a provisional
authority which was valid for six (6) months which was
extended 3 times, but the last extension directed the
petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a
reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present
authorized rates. Hence this
petition.adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Issue: whether the Respondent violates procedural due
process for having been issued without prior notice and
hearing in exercising its power to fix the rate of the
Petitioner?adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Held: Yes, the respondent violated the procedural due
process. if the authorities that where the function of the
administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not
required by due process of law, Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding
and the circumstances involved. In so far as
generalization is possible in view of the great variety of
administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general
rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of administrative action where the
administrative body acts in the exercise of executive,
administrative, or legislative functions; but where a
public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-
judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate
rather than general and prospective, the person whose
rights or property may be affected by the action is
entitled to notice and hearing.
Diona vs. Balangue
G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in
the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party.
They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the
evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be
supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court
expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of
relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which
affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard
with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental
purpose of the requirement that allegations of a
complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right
to due process of a defendant who was declared in default than
of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance,
amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial
is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not
feasible when the defendant is declared in default because
Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and
limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has
been prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment
rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the
amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor
award unliquidated damages.
The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be
granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would
not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default
had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief
greater than or different in kind from that sought in the
Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9
of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to due
process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment.
This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of
due process. It embodies "the sporting idea of fair play" and
forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was
not given the opportunity to be heard thereon.
In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is
not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the
evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the
parties does not include any provision on interest. When
petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that
respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱45,000.00), with interest thereon at
the rate of 12% per annum" and sought payment thereof. She
did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest.
Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly,
the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum
lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due
process requirement because respondents were not informed
of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly
interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to
refute and present controverting evidence as they were made
to believe that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what
she merely stated in her Complaint.
Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered
subsumed by petitioner’s general prayer for "other reliefs and
remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x." To
repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has
been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported
by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of action.
Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60%
per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during
trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to
be equitably reduced in accordance with applicable
jurisprudence.
People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186
Facts:
     Eusebio Nazario, the defendant, was charged of refusal and
failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to Php362.62
because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4,
Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa,
Manila and leases a fishpond in Pagbilao, Quezon with the
Philippine Fisheries Commission. The defendant fails to pay
in 1964,  1965 and 1966. He did not pay, as he argued, that he
was not sure if he was covered under the said ordinance. He
was found guilty and filed a petition thereafter.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as
amended, is null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain.
Ruling: The Court held that Ordinance 4, Series of 1955
covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond, thus comes
with the term “Manager.” He was the one spending for the
development and maintenance of the fishpond, so the national
government does not profit from it as it goes only to Nazario.
Therefore, the appeal was dismissed with cost against Nazario.