German Naval Laws

The Kaiser had long wanted a large naval force to assure Germany of what he called "a place in the sun".
A large German navy could assist in German attempts to attain colonies, as well as further the country's
economic and commercial interests elsewhere in the world. He was determined to make his country a
colonial power in Africa and the Pacific.[1] He was also a very militaristic man, and wished to increase
the strength of the German armed forces; in particular he wanted to develop a navy that could match
the British Royal Navy.[2] As he wrote in his autobiography:[3]

I had a peculiar passion for the navy. It sprang to no small extent from my English blood. When I was a
little boy...I admired the proud British ships. There awoke in me the will to build ships of my own like
these some day, and when I was grown up to possess a fine navy as the English.

— Kaiser Wilhelm II, My Early Life

Though Wilhelm loved naval power, he was initially unsure what form the German Navy would take: a
force made up primarily of smaller vessels such as cruisers, or larger vessels such as battleships. He
initially leaned toward cruisers because they could go to all corners of the globe and display the German
flag wherever they went, while battleships were large and cumbersome and thus needed to stay in the
Baltic or North Sea. The Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Office, Admiral Friedrich von Hollmann,
also favoured cruisers because they were cheaper and more suited to German maritime strategy, which
then emphasized coastal defence. However, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the leading proponent of
battleships for the German Navy, argued that because Germany did not have many colonies or overseas
coaling stations, cruiser warfare did not make sense. Rather, it was important to concentrate a large
fleet of battleships in close proximity to the strongest sea power, as this was the only way that Germany
could compete with Britain (the world's leading naval and colonial power) and thus achieve world power
for itself. Tirpitz further claimed that the mere existence of a large battleship fleet would indirectly
protect German colonies and commerce the world over, despite the battleships' limited range. The
victory of the battleship camp in this strategic debate was cemented when Tirpitz replaced Hollmann as
State Secretary for the Navy.[4]

On 15 June 1897, Tirpitz unveiled a memorandum that was to alter European history. In this document,
he argued that in order to defeat the strongest naval power, a fleet of battleships was necessary. He
then proceeded to reverse his argument: if battleships were necessary, Germany's enemy must be the
strongest naval power – Britain.[5] Tirpitz's plans were predicated on "risk theory" – even if the German
fleet was smaller than that of Britain, it had to be able to inflict damage on the Royal Navy that was
severe enough to endanger British dominance of the seas. The losses would be so heavy that another
power, perhaps a German ally or British foe, could then swoop in and destroy the remnants of the
British fleet. To avoid such a costly naval confrontation with Germany, British diplomacy would become
more accommodating towards German colonial and economic desires.[6] Tirpitz felt that such a massive
shipbuilding program could only work if its particulars were enshrined in law; this would commit the
navy to building a fixed number of ships in advance, ensure that the fleet was built up continuously, and
avoid the need to haggle for the money to build each ship in the Reichstag.[7] The stage was thus set for
a set of laws that would precipitate the transformation of Anglo-German relations.

At the turn of the 20th century, Britain adhered to the "Two-Power Standard": the Royal Navy had to be
equal in strength to that of the next two naval powers combined.[8] The standard, long accepted
unofficially, was made official by the Naval Defence Act 1889, and designated the French and Russian
navies as the most likely adversaries for Britain on the high seas.[9] However, the German Naval Laws
advocated by Tirpitz began to threaten this standard.

The First Naval Law, introduced to the Reichstag in late 1897, outlined the composition of the fleet by
vessel class and the number of ships to be constructed by 1904 and also set a cost limit.[10] It
authorized a fixed number of battleships that would not be altered by an annual parliamentary vote,
proposing that 16 battleships be built in the following three years. The law passed the Reichstag on 26
March 1898 over the opposition of the Conservative Party and the Social Democratic Party, who were
against spending vast amounts of money on naval warfare. Its ramifications were not immediately
evident, as the seven battleships it called for would not be sufficient to fight either the British or French
navies.[11]

Germany's real threat to the Royal Navy began with the Second Naval Law. During the Second Boer War
(1899–1902), the Germans greatly sympathized with the Boers, whom they considered a racially and
culturally akin people. In January 1900, British cruisers on patrol detained three German mail steamers
off the coast of Africa to search them, suspecting them of carrying materiel to the Boers. Although the
British quickly apologized, the Germans were outraged, and Admiral von Tirpitz took advantage of the
anger to introduce a new naval bill, which passed through the Reichstag with very little opposition on 14
June of that year. This law doubled the size of the fleet from 19 to 38 battleships; two flagships, four
battle squadrons of eight battleships each, and four reserve battleships were to be constructed over
seventeen years, from 1901 to 1917. This law made clear that not only was the German Navy to be a
powerful battle fleet instead of a coastal defence force (in the process turning Germany into the second-
strongest naval power in the world), but that the primary opponent of this enlarged fleet was to be the
United Kingdom.[12]

The next 12 years saw the Reichstag pass three more Naval Laws, in 1906, 1908, and 1912; in each case,
Tirpitz took advantage of a sense of crisis and alarm in Germany to ensure the success of the legislation.
In June 1906, the Third Naval Law, mandating the construction of six large cruisers, became law
following the German failure to break the Entente cordiale at the Algeciras Conference. The Fourth
Naval Law of April 1908 pared down the age at which battleships were to be replaced from 25 to 20
years, and was sparked by a feeling that King Edward VII and Great Britain were trying to encircle
Germany. The Fifth Naval Law, sparked by the German retreat in the Agadir Crisis of 1911, passed in
June 1912 and added three more battleships to the building program