to establish the confidence of the people in the Government of a State.

[36 B-E] (11) Undoubtedly,

the subject is one on which 'appropriate and healthy conventions should develop so that the power
under Art. 356(1) is neither exercised capriciously or arbitrarily nor fails to be exercised when a
political situation really calls for it. If the views of the Union Government and the State Government
differ on the subject, there is no reason why the Union Government should not aid the development
of what it considers to be a healthy practice or convention by appropriate advice or direction, and,
even to exercise its powers under Art. 356(1) for this purpose when it considers the observance of
such a directive to be so essential that the constitutional machinery cannot function as it was meant
to do unless it interferes. The Supreme Court cannot, at any rate, interdict such use of powers under
Art 356(1 ) unless and until resort to the provision, in a particular situation, is shown to be so grossly
perverse and unreasonable as to constitute patent misuse of this provision or an excess of power
ore, be argued that, although, the Constitution itself does not Jay down specifically when the power
of dissolution should be exercised by the Government on the advice of a Council of Ministers in the
State, yet, if a direction on that matter was properly given by the Union Government to a State
Government, there is a duty to carry it out. The time for the dissolution of a State Assembly is not
covered by any speci dicates most strikingly the extent to which inroads have been made by it on the
federal principles of Government. [38 A-C] Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1975] 1 S.C.R. p. 875,
referred to. (15) As the question of the proper time for a dissolution of a State Assembly is not a
matter extraneous to Art. 356(1) of the Constitution, the most that can be said is that questions
raised do not go beyond sufficiency of grounds for resorting to Art. 356(1) of the Constitution. [41 H,
42 A] K. K. Aboo v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1965 Kerala 229; Rao Birender, Singh v. The Union of India
A.I.R. 1968 Punjab 441; In re. A. Sreeramulu' A.I.R. 1974-A.P. 106, Bijenananda Patnaik and. Ors. v.
President of India and Ors., A.I.R. 1974 Orissa 52 referred to. (16) Attempts to secure political
victories by appeals to the electorate, are parts of the recognised rules of a democratic system of
Government permitting contests between rival parties so as to achieve certain other objectives. If
such a contest with the desire for achieving a political victory in order to enforce certain
programmes, believed by the members of a party to be beneficial for the people in own lights, it
could not possibly be asserted that procuring the dissolution of a State Legislative Assembly with the
object of gaining a political victory is, in itself, an extraneous object which could not fall at all under
Art. 356 of the Constitution. [42 F-F] Attorney General v. Dr. Keyser's Royal Hotel, 1920 AC 508;
Liversidge v. Anderson 1942 AC 206; Addl. Dist. Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, 1976 Supp.
SCR 173, Bhagat Singh & Ors. v. The Kine Emperor, 50 I.A 169 King Emperor v. Benorilal Sharma 72
I.A. 57, Padfield and Ors. v. Minister Of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Ors., 1968 A.C. 997 @
1006 (not applicable). (17) In all the grounds of action taken under Art, 356(1) are disclosed the
public by the Union Government and its own disclosure of grounds reveals that a constitutionally or
legally prohibited or extraneous or a collateral purpose is sought to be achieved by an impending or
actual proclamation under Art. 356 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court will not shirk its duty to
act in the manner in which the law may then oblige it to act. But, when allegation made in the plains
and in the petitions before the court relate, in substance, only to the sufficiency of the grounds of
action under Art. 356(1) of the Constitution and go no further, the Court cannot proceed further
with the consideration of the plaints under Art. 131 or the petitions under Art. 32 der Art. 356 (1 ),
but, on the other hand, Article 356(3) makes it clear that the only effect of even a failure or refusal
by either House of Parliament to approve the Proclamation is that it ceases to operate after two
months. Obviously, this means that it operates for at least two months. Hence, whatever is done in
these two months cannot be held to be illegal for that reason alone. [47 A-B] (19) It is true that the
exercise of power under Art. 356 of the Constitution is subject to Parliamentary control. This means
that it is subject to such control as the two Houses out of which the Council of States really
represents the State Assembly may be able to exercise during the period for which the Proclamation
lasts. But, the existe