RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW

PATIALA

PROOF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTS

IN EVIDENCE ACT

STATE OF MIND, BODY OR BODILY FEELING

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED TO:

ARNAV BISHNOI DR. MANOJ SHARMA
Roll No. 15244 ASST. PROFESSOR OF LAW,
RGNUL.
Group No. 27
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

As my work gets ready for submission, I recall the assistance, encouragement and

inspirations received from many people. I would like here to put on record humbly and with

gratefulness the necessary help, encouragement and inspirations they extended to me at

different stages during the course of the work.

Gratitude is a noble response of one’s soul to kindness or help generously rendered by

another and its acknowledgment is a duty and a joyance. I am deeply indebted to my

supervisor Dr. Manoj Sharma Sir for approving and giving me this interesting project topic.

Also, his precious guidance and time matched unrelenting support kept me on track

throughout the completion of this project.

ARNAV BISHNOI
IVTH YEAR

1|Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT............................................................................................................1

RESEARCH METHODOLY.....................................................................................................3

 Scope and limitation of the study....................................................................................3

INDEX OF AUTHORITY.........................................................................................................4

INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................6

What Evidence is?..................................................................................................................6

What is PSYCHOLOGICAL FACT?....................................................................................7

State of Mind or of Body or, Bodily Feeling.............................................................................9

Proof of Mental and Physical Conditions................................................................................11

By Evidence of Person Concerned.......................................................................................12

By Evidence of Other Persons..............................................................................................12

Contemporaneous Manifestations........................................................................................12

Collateral Facts.....................................................................................................................13

Similar Acts..........................................................................................................................13

Admissibility of Evidence to Prove Knowledge or Intention or other State of Mind..............14

Q.) Whether the State of mind, guess or intelligent guess or an Inference be regarded as
Fact within the meaning?......................................................................................................15

Acts Showing Intention, good faith, etc...............................................................................16

Previous or Subsequent Facts...................................................................................................17

Evidence of Previous & Subsequent Events........................................................................17

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................20

2|Page
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The proposed research work is a Doctrinal and Non-Empirical Research. Hence, this
research work is purely based on the resources from libraries, archives and online databases
and various e-learning resources

 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This proposed research work being a Doctrinal and Non-Empirical research did not require
any field data or sample collection. The data collection was restricted to only the primary
and secondary sources. All the relevant sources were broadly classified into two basic
categories namely Primary and Secondary sources, with primary resources being the
decisions of the Court in a number of judgments that I have relied upon to establish the
arguments and the secondary sources being the scholarly works of other researchers either
on those decisions or on the points of arguments that I have attempted to make. The study is
limited to analysis of the Section 14 th of the Evidence Act in the light of Proof of
Psychological Facts and their impact upon the several other issues circumscribing to
Psychological Facts which are to be adjudicated on the basis of Case Laws mentioned in the
coveted books of C.D. FIELD & SIR JOHN WOODROFFE. The study does not make an in-
depth analysis of those propositions and provisions which deals with Psychological Facts in
Evidence outside of the Contents within the Project.

3|Page
INDEX OF AUTHORITY
CASES
AH Gandhi v. King, AIR 1941 Raj 324.............................................................................13, 16
Amrit Lal Hazra v. Emperor....................................................................................................18
Anant Baburao Sawant v. State, AIR 1967 Bom 109........................................................10, 15
Ashok Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 MPLJ 300.....................................................9
Averson v Kinnarid (1805) 6 East 188....................................................................................12
Baharuddin v. Emperor, AIR 1914, Cal 589 (2)......................................................................13
Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society (1878) 4 CPD 94........................................................8
Chidambram Pillai v. Emperor................................................................................................17
Dariyao v. State, 1969 Cr LJ 1273...........................................................................................10
Edington v. Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459............................................................................8
Emperor v. Philip Spratt, AIR 1928 Bom 78.....................................................................16, 17
Goma Rama v. Emperor, AIR 1945, Bom 152........................................................................13
Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 SC 51...................................................9
Hardwick v. Coleman (1859) 1 F & F 53................................................................................11
Juggan Khan v. State, AIR 1963, MP 102...............................................................................14
Kakar v. R (1924) 25 Cr LJ 1005.............................................................................................12
Krishna v. R, AIR 1917 Cal 676..............................................................................................14
Makin v. Attorney General for NSW, (1894) A.C. 57.............................................................18
Mansell v. Clements (1874) LR 9 CP 139...............................................................................11
ML Pritchard v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 382.........................................................................13
NN Burjorjee v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Rang 456.......................................................................16
Queen- Empress v. Amba Prasad.............................................................................................17
Queen- Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose............................................................................17
R V. Armstrong........................................................................................................................16
R v. Debendra Prasad ILR 36 Cal 573.......................................................................................9
R v. Harrison- Owen, (1915) 2 All. E.R. 726..........................................................................18
R v. Johnson (1895) 2 C & K 354............................................................................................12
R v. Mortimer...........................................................................................................................16
R v. Prabhudas (1874) 11 BHCR 90........................................................................................14
R v. Richardson (1860) 2 F & F 343..........................................................................................8

4|Page
R v. Whilley (1892) 2 Leach’s CC 983......................................................................................9
R v. Yakub, AIR 1917 All 251................................................................................................14
R. v Mason (1914) 10 Cr App Rep 169.....................................................................................9
Raghunath v. R, AIR 1919 Cal 1084.........................................................................................9
Ram Sumiran Pandey v. Emperor, AIR 1942, Pat 291............................................................13
Ramzan v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Sindh 203..............................................................................10
Rex v. Rhodes..........................................................................................................................17
Shankar Gopal Patil & Ors. V. The State Of Maharashtra, MANU/MH/0541/2000...............7
Srinivasmal Bairoliya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 pc 135..............................................................16
State of Bombay v. Purshottam, AIR 1952 SC 317.................................................................10
Thomas v. Connell (1838) 4 M & M 267................................................................................12
Vacher v. Cocks (1829) M & M 145.......................................................................................12
Wilson v. Wilson (1872) LR 2 P & C 435, 444.......................................................................11
Wright v. Tatham (1834) 7 A & F, 313...................................................................................11

5|Page
INTRODUCTION
 WHAT EVIDENCE IS?

Most lawyers and students think of evidence as a collection of rules governing

what facts maybe proved in court, what materials may be placed before the court
to prove those facts, and the form in which those materials should be placed
before the court. What they have in mind is the law of evidence, but not
evidence itself. One of the curiosities of the common law is the emergence of
rules of evidence whose purpose is not to enable a party to bring before the
court evidence which might help his case, but to prohibit a party from bringing
some kinds of evidence if his opponent objects, or even if the court itself
refuses to permit it. Because of the demands made by the realities of practice, it
is only natural that familiarity with the rules should be emphasized. What is
taught and examined in the field of evidence is the law of evidence. Yet there is
a whole field of inquiry which related to evidence itself, rather than the law of
evidence. The field is a fascinating mixture of logic, epistemology, sociology,
psychology, and the forensic sciences, and is, therefore, wide enough to
encompass a vast library of its own. Its concern is the use of evidence as
material in the reconstruction of past events. 1

It is a field which has attracted a distinguished, but relatively small number of

investigators, at least as far as lawyers are concerned, and some of its main
contributors have been philosophers and psychologists. Some of these
contributors, for example, Jeremy Bentham, while deeply interested in Science
of Evidence, actually disapproved of the whole concept of a law of evidence.
Bentham perceived rules of evidence to be nothing more than an artificial
restriction on the science of evidence, invented by lawyers for less than
honourable purposes. 2 John Henry Wigmore, the dean of American evidence

1
Murphy on Evidence.
2
Namely increasing their potential for earning fees, and making it impossible for lay people
to penetrate the complexities of the law. Bentham saw the attitudes of lawyers as the most
dangerous obstacle to reform. His excoriation of the judiciary and the profession in his
monumental treatise on evidence, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827) was, however,
weakened by its intemperance. There are rules of public policy which support some rules of
evidence.

6|Page
writers, required his students to master the science of evidence before turning to
the law (a luxury now foreclosed by the tyranny of practice- based syllabi and
examinations) and developed through cumbersome system for the
methodological analysis of evidence to be presented in court. 3

Evidence in general terms maybe defined as any material which has the potential
to change the state of fact-finder’s belief with respect to any factual proposition
which is to be decided and which is in dispute. In more formal terms, Achinstein
defines Evidence as follows:

Evidence E is potential evidence on hypothesis H if and only if (1) is true; (2) E

doesn’t make H necessary; (3) the probability of H on E is substantial; and (4)
the probability of an explanatory connection between H and E is substantial. 4

Although, the definition doesn’t make clear the logical role of evidence in
proving a hypothesis. It is, of course, a logical rather than a legal definition,
appropriate to scientific inquiries of any kind. But, lawyers have superimposed
on it the particular requirements of their own interests in the uses of evidence.

 What is PSYCHOLOGICAL FACT?

In the law of evidence. A fact which can only be perceived mentally; such as the
motive by which a person is actuated. 5

In Sarkar on Evidence 1999, Fifteenth Edition on page 41 the word 'fact' has
been considered by the Author as:

"Bentham has classified into physical and psychological . By "physical facts"

are meant such as either have their seat in some inanimate being or if in one that
is animate, then not by virtue of the qualities which constitute it such: while
"psychological facts" are those which have their seat in an animate being by
virtue of the qualities by which it is constituted animate. Thus, the existence of
visible objects, the outward acts of intelligent agents, range themselves under

3
Principles of Judicial Proof (1913).
4
P. Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation (1983).
5
Burrill, Circ. Ev. 130, 131.

7|Page
the former class: while to the latter belong such as only exist in the mind of an
individual." 6

In India, it is to be noted that psychological facts, if proved in the court of law

are relevant facts so as to proof that an evidence is admissible. Section 14 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 is the corroborating to the above statement as it states that:

“F ACTS SHOWING THE EXISTENCE OF ANY STATE OF MIND , SUCH AS

INTENTION , KNOWLEDGE , GOOD FAITH , NEGLIGENCE , RASHNESS , ILL - WILL OR

GOOD - WILL TOWARDS ANY PARTICULAR PERSON , OR SHOWING THE EXISTENCE

OF ANY STATE OF BODY OR BODILY FEELING , ARE RELEVANT , WHEN THE

EXISTENCE OF ANY SUCH STATE OF MIND OR BODY OR BODILY FEELING , IS IN

ISSUE OR RELEVANT .”

The first explanation makes it clearer as to ascertain the state of mind of a

person, the fact must show that the state of mind exists, NOT GENERALLY, but
in reference to the particular matter in question.

Thus, if the existence of a mental or bodily state of bodily feeling is, as is

assumed by the section, in issue or relevant, it is clear that facts from which the
existence of such mental or bodily state or bodily feeling may be inferred are
also relevant. 7

6
S HA NKAR G OPA L P A TIL & O RS . V . T HE S TATE OF M AHARA SHTR A , MANU/MH/0541/2000.
7
Evidence under S. 14 or next is not admissible, when the case depends on the proof of actual
facts and not upon the state of mind, Gokul v. R, AIR 1925 Cal 674; Jag Mohan v. State 1995
JCC 1 (Del).

8|Page
S TATE OF M IND OR OF B ODY OR , B ODILY
F EELING
Facts, it has been seen, are either physical or psychological; the former being
the subject of perception by the sense and the latter the subject of
consciousness. 8 A person may testify to his own intent. But, if he acts and
conduct are shown to be at variance and inconsistent with the intent he swears
to, his own testimony in his own favour would ordinarily obtain very little
credit. 9 Of facts, which cannot be perceived by the sense, intention, fraud, good
faith and knowledge are examples, 10 But a man’s intention is a matter of fact
capable of proof.

T HE STATE OF A MAN ’ S MIND IS AS MUCH A FACT AS THE STATE OF HIS

DIGESTION . IT IS TRUE THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO PROVE WHAT THE

STATE OF A MAN ’ S MIND AT A PARTICULAR TIME IS ; BUT IF IT CAN BE

ASCERTAINED IT IS AS MUCH A FACT AS ANYTHING ELSE . 11

The latter class of facts, however, are incapable of direct proof by the testimony
of witnesses; their existence can only be ascertained either by the confession of
the party whose mind is their sear or by presumptive inference from physical
facts. It has been debated whether the ‘opinion rule’ excludes testimony to
another person’s state of mind. 12 But, it may be safely and in general said that a
witness must speak to facts and let the inference from those facts be drawn by
the court or jury. 13 This action is in accordance with the principle laid down in
numerous cases 14 that, to explain states of mind, evidence is admissible, though
it doesn’t otherwise bear upon the issue to be tried. As regards this principle,
there is no difference between civil and criminal cases. 15 The present section in
context with the project report makes for general provision for the subject, and

8
Vide, S. 3, Ill (d).
9
John Henry Wignmore, Treatise on Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 3 r d Ed, Little, Brown
& Co, Boston, 1940
10
First Report of the Select Committee, 31 March 1871
11
Edington v. Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 per Bowen LJ.
12
John Henry Wignmore, Supra note 9.
13
Swift, Evidence, P 111.
14
Judgment of Williams J in R v. Richardson (1860) 2 F & F 343 .
15
Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society (1878) 4 CPD 94 .

9|Page
the next section is a special application of the rule contained in this present one.
The subject of the existence of states of mind is one of the most important
topics with which judicial enquires are concerned; in criminal cases, they are
the main considerations; and in civil cases, they are often highly material, as for
instance, where there is a question of fraud, malicious intention, or negligence.
The present section is framed to avoid all technicalities as to the class of cases
or the time within which the fact given as evidence of mental or bodily
condition, must have occurred. The only point for the court to consider, in
deciding upon the admissibility of evidence under this section, is, whether the
fact can be said to show the existence of the state of mind or body under
investigation. The same considerations will, it is apprehended, determine the
question of the admissibility of facts subsequent to the fact in issue to prove
intent and other like question. 16 So also, though the collateral facts sought to be
proved shouldn’t be so remote in time as not to afford a reasonably certain
ground for inference, yet such remoteness will, as a rule, go to the weight of the
preferred evidence only. 17 In the next case cited, the appellant was convicted
under S. 209, IPC 1860 of having made false claims in three suits brought
against certain persons. Two other persons, besides the appellant were similarly
prosecuted and convicted for bringing other false suits against the same
defendants. It was held that the evidence relating to suits by the appellant other
than those specified in the charges were properly admitted under this and the
next section for the purpose of showing the ill-will or enmity of the appellant
towards the defendants, in those suits as a body, but the evidence relating to
suits brought by other persons, when no case of a conspiracy between them and
the appellant was alleged or established, was inadmissible. 18 When the
allegation against the accused, an officer, was that he was acting in pursuance of
the policy of the Ittehad- Ul- Muslimen, that his state of mind was to
exterminate the Hindus, it was held that he was entitled to lead evidence to show
that he didn’t possess that state of mind but that, on the other hand, his

16
R. v Mason (1914) 10 Cr App Rep 169 ; R v. Debendra Prasad ILR 36 Cal 573 .
17
R v. Whilley (1892) 2 Leach’s CC 983 ; cited in R v. Vajiram 16 Bom 414.
18
Raghunath v. R, AIR 1919 Cal 1084 .

10 | P a g e
behaviour towards the Hindus throughout his official career had been very good
and he couldn’t possibly think of exterminating them. 19

Evidence of character and state of mind is admissible under Ss. 8, 14 and 53. 20

PROOF OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

T

he mental and physical conditions of a person maybe proved either by that

person speaking directly to his own feelings, motives, intentions, and the like,
or by the evidence of another person detailing facts from which the given
condition may be inferred; but such other person may not, in general, testify the
state of mind of the first, as to which he can have no direct knowledge, and may
only state those external and perceptible facts, which may form the material of
the court’s decisions. 21

The state of a man’s mind is a question of fact. 22 Whether the state of

mind of a person should be proved by the evidence of that person himself or by
the evidence of another person, it is not a question of law.

As a matter of abstract law, the state of man’s mind can be proved by evidence
other than that of the man himself. But whether that would be enough in any
given case, or whether the ‘best evidence rule’ should be applied in strictness in
that particular case, must necessarily depend upon its facts. 23

A distinction has to be drawn between simple mental phenomena, which

can be inferred from the acts relevant, and complex mental phenomena, which
will be no guide on the basis of which one can prove those phenomena and raise
an inference about their existence. 24

In assessing the value of medical evidence to prove injuries on the body of a

person who took the plea of exercise of the right of private defence, what the

19
Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 SC 51 .
20
Ashok Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 MPLJ 300 .
21
Phipson, Evidence, 13 t h Edn, pp 92-93.
22
Ramzan v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Sindh 203 .
23
State of Bombay v. Purshottam, AIR 1952 SC 317 .
24
Anant Baburao Sawant v. State, AIR 1967 Bom 109

11 | P a g e
Doctor had done in the matter of the grant of certificate in another case is
irrelevant. 25

The question of the admissibility of evidence of similar facts under this section
is not free from difficulty. That the question is yet not solved in a wholly
satisfactory way, appears from a collation of criminal appeals. 26

The Existence of a particular state of mind may be proved in the following

ways:

1. BY EVIDENCE OF PERSON CONCERNED

The state of man’s mind may be proved by the evidence of the person himself.
In a case for malicious prosecution, where the defendant himself was called and
asked in chief. ‘Had you any other object in view, in taking proceedings, then to
further the ends of justice?’ The question was admitted. 27 And in cases of
obtaining goods on false pretences, the prosecutor is constantly asked, not only
in cross-examination, but in chief, with what motive, or for what reasons, or on
what impression he parted with the goods. 28 So, on a question of domicile, A
may state what his intention was in residing in a particular place. 29 In a suit by a
house agent against the former owner of a house, in which the question was,
whether the former was entitled to receive from the latter, a commission by
reason of having effected the sale of the house ‘through his intervention’, the
judge at the trial, in order to ascertain whether any acts of the plaintiff
conducted to the completion of the sale, put the following question to the
purchaser; ‘Would you, if you had not gone to the plaintiff’s office and got the
card ( a card to view the premises, with terms of sale written by the plaintiff’s
clerk on the back), have purchased the house’ and, overruling an objection,
received his answer, which was, ‘I should think not’. 30

2. BY EVIDENCE OF OTHER PERSONS

25
Dariyao v. State, 1969 Cr LJ 1273
26
Roscoe’s Criminal Evidence 16 Edn., P. 96, 1952.
27
Hardwick v. Coleman (1859) 1 F & F 53.
28
IBID, See, R v. Hewgill Dear C 315.
29
Wilson v. Wilson (1872) LR 2 P & C 435, 444.
30
Mansell v. Clements (1874) LR 9 CP 139 .

12 | P a g e
It is obvious that in many cases, such evidence may not be reliable, and in other
cases, may not be had. The mental and physical conditions of a person must then
be proved by the evidence of other persons who speak to the outward
manifestations known to them, of states of mind and body. Such manifestations
may be either by conduct, conversation or correspondence. 31

3. CONTEMPORANEOUS MANIFESTATIONS

To prove mental and physical conditions ‘all contemporaneous manifestations’

of the given condition, whether by conduct, conversation, or correspondence
maybe given in evidence as part of the res gestae, it being for the court or jury
to consider whether they are real or feigned. Thus, the answers of patients to
enquiries by medical men and others are evidence of their state of health,
provided, they’re confined to contemporaneous symptoms and are not in the
nature of a narrative as to how, by whom, such symptoms were caused. 32 And, if
the condition of the patient before or after the time in issue, be material, his
declarations at such time as to his then present situation, are equally
receivable. 33 A statement of an accused immediately after an occurrence, maybe
relevant to show the state of his mind. 34 Not only may a party’s own statements,
but those made to him by third persons 35 , be proved for the purpose of showing
his state of mind at a given time. 36 Thus, where the question was whether a
person knew that he was insolvent at a certain time, his own statements
implying consciousness of the fact, as well as letters from third persons refusing
to advance him money, were held to be admissible after the fact of his
insolvency had been proved independently. 37

4. COLLATERAL FACTS
In addition to evidence of contemporaneous manifestations of the given
condition, collateral facts are admitted to show the existence of a particular

31
Wright v. Tatham (1834) 7 A & F, 313 .
32
Averson v Kinnarid (1805) 6 East 188
33
R v. Johnson (1895) 2 C & K 354
34
Kakar v. R (1924) 25 Cr LJ 1005.
35
Vacher v. Cocks (1829) M & M 145
36
Phipson, Evidence, 13 t h Edn 97, 98.
37
IBID, 105; Thomas v. Connell (1838) 4 M & M 267 .

13 | P a g e
state of mind. Acts unconnected with the act in question are frequently to prove
psychological facts such as intent. 38

5. SIMILAR ACTS
In order to show them, similar acts done by the party are relevant, but similar
acts are not relevant to prove the existence of the particular fact in issue, being
inadmissible for the purpose under the rule by which similar but unconnected
acts are excluded.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE

KNOWLEDGE OR INTENTION OR OTHER STATE
OF MIND
It is the admissibility of evidence under the third heading, to prove knowledge,
that has to be considered here. It is settled law, that neither under this section
nor under S. 15, can the evidence of facts similar to but not part of the same
transaction as the main fact be received for the purpose of proving the
occurrence of the main fact, which must be established by the evidence directly
bearing on it. But when the existence of that fact has been so established and a
question arises as to the state of mind of the person who did it, or whether the
act In question was done accidentally or with a particular knowledge or
intention, that evidence of similar acts may, under certain conditions, be
admitted. 39 The section applies only to cases where the question of guilt or
innocence depends upon facts, as it does at a trial for the offence of arson. 40
Evidence of a collateral offence cannot be received as substantive evidence of
the offence on trial, though under this section, evidence maybe given of
intention and like matters where the factum of such intention or like matters was
relevant. 41 Evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal
acts other than those covered by the indictment is not admissibly unless upon
the issue, whether the acts charged against the accused were designed or

38
WM Best, Evidence, P. 255
39
ML Pritchard v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 382 at 387.
40
AH Gandhi v. King, AIR 1941 Raj 324
41
Goma Rama v. Emperor, AIR 1945, Bom 152 .

14 | P a g e
accidental, or unless to rebut a defence otherwise open to him. 42 Thus, when a
man, in his trial for a specific crime, such as uttering a forged note or coin, or
receiving an article of stolen property, the issue is whether he is guilty of that
specific act. To admit, therefore, as evidence against him other instances of a
similar nature, clearly is to introduce collateral matter. This cannot be with the
object of inducing the court to infer that, because the accused has committed a
crime of a similar description on other occasions, he is guilt of the present; but
to establish the criminal intent and to anticipate the defence that he acted
innocently and without any guilt of knowledge of that he had no intention or
motive to commit the act, and generally to interpret acts, which without the
admission of such collateral evidence, are ambiguous. 43

In other words, the existence of the fact in issue must be always independently
established, and for this purpose, evidence of similar and unconnected acts is
inadmissible, but when once the fact in issue is so established, such similar acts
may be given in evidence to prove the state of mind of the party by whom it was
done. 44 Thus, in a trial of forgery, proof of similar transactions, which are not
the subject of the charge is admissible as evidence of intention, but not of the
forgery, 45 and, in a trial for cheating, evidence of a similar trick (a suggestion
that a certain person would lend money) in another case was admitted to prove
the state of mind of the accused. 46 Where a medical practitioner is tried for
causing death of a patient by administering a lethal dose of DHATURA and the
prosecution shows that even a man of no education is aware of the extremely
poisonous nature of DHATURA, but the defence is that there are cases in which
the drug has been successfully administered for curing a certain disease, it is
open to the prosecution to show that the previous experiment carried out by the
accused himself, in exactly similar circumstances, had shown him that, far from
being a cure, the drug was certain killer. 47

42
Ram Sumiran Pandey v. Emperor, AIR 1942, Pat 291.
43
Baharuddin v. Emperor, AIR 1914, Cal 589 (2).
44
R v. Prabhudas (1874) 11 BHCR 90
45
Krishna v. R, AIR 1917 Cal 676
46
R v. Yakub, AIR 1917 All 251 .
47
Juggan Khan v. State, AIR 1963, MP 102

15 | P a g e
 When several offences are so connected that proof of one can be arrived
at through evidence going to prove the others, the evidence is not on that
account excluded. 48

Q.) WHETHER THE STATE OF MIND, GUESS OR INTELLIGENT GUESS OR AN

INFERENCE BE REGARDED AS FACT WITHIN THE MEANING?
“Fact” has been defined by the Indian Evidence Act, in S. 3 to include any
mental condition of which any person is conscious; as has been observed by
Lord Justice Bowan, “the state of mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion”. It is, however, necessary to note that it is only a mental condition of
which a person is conscious which falls with the inclusive definition of the term
“fact”. Section 14 of the Indian Evidence Act says what facts showing the
existence of state of mind are relevant.

The words used, viz. “intention”, “knowledge”, etc. used therein are preceded
by the expression “such as”. Therefore, apparently, what follows is an
illustrative list and is not necessarily exhaustive. On a close consideration,
however, it appears that the list was exhaustive except in those cases where a
special plea of unsoundness of mind, etc. has been raised. The expression used
while defining “fact”, viz., “of which any person is conscious” is significant in
that connexion. The object apparently is to make simple mental phenomena
which could be inferred from the acts relevant. As soon as we are dealing with
complex mental phenomena, such as, fear, apprehension, etc. there will be no
guide on the basis of which we can prove those phenomena and raise an
inference about their existence. Hence, it may be held between simple mental
phenomena as mentioned in S. 14, and complex mental phenomena. The question
of the unsoundness of the mind stands entirely on different footing. In any case,
it appears clear that an inference which is arrived at by a process of
rationcination doesn’t stand on the same footing as a mental condition as
defined in S. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is settled that all that need be
mentioned in a sworn statement such as an affidavit is facts. It will be difficult
to categorize the guess or calculation which a person might indulge in as a
fact. 49
48
Prabhudas, Supra Note 44.
49
Anant Baburao Sawant v. State, AIR 1967 Bom 109.

16 | P a g e
  ACTS SHOWING INTENTION, GOOD FAITH, ETC.
When there is a question whether a person said or did something, the fact that he
said or did something of the same sort on a different occasion, may be proved if
it shows the existence on the occasion in question of any intention, knowledge,
good or bad faith, malice or other state of mind or of any state of body or bodily
feeling, the existence of which is in issue or is deemed to be relevant to the
issue; but such acts or words may not be proved merely in order to show that
person so acting or speaking was likely on the occasion in question to act in a
similar manner. 50

50
Stephen, Digest of Law of Evidence, Art. 11, Page 15.

17 | P a g e
PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUENT FACTS
Both previous and subsequent events maybe relevant under this section as
showing the state of mind, 51 but as subsequent events can merely show the
reflections of what a man’s mind may have been, previous events are of more
importance as showing the influences which have worked upon the man’s mind
to bring it into the condition, that it was the moment under investigation. 52
Illustration (e) refers to ‘previous publication’ and ill. (j) refers to threatening
letters ‘previously sent”, but in ill. (m), the test is merely proximity of time, not
priority. In a case in which the accused was tried on charge under S. 124- A,
IPC 1860, it was held, ‘Primarily, anything he has written is, if it comes within
the general words of S. 14, is relevant and admissible.’ At the same time, of
course, the writing should be within a reasonable time of the particular
occurrence, ie., the particular article or other document in respect of which he is
being charged. 53 But the question of proximity of times goes rather to the weight
to be given to the evidentiary facts than to their admissibility. It is, however,
plain from all the decisions that the acts of which evidence is tendered must be
of the same specific kind as that in question. 54

In R V. A RMSTRONG , 55 where the accused was charged with the murder of his
wife by administering arsenic, evidence, that the accused had attempted to
poison another person with arsenic on a subsequent occasion, was held to have
been rightly admitted to rebut the defence that the wife had committed suicide
and that the arsenic was kept by the accused for an innocent purpose, namely,
for killing weeds. As also in R V. M ORTIMER , 56 where the charge was one of
murder by deliberately running down a woman bicyclist with a motor car,
evidence was admitted of similar attacks on other women, immediately before or
after the offence charged.

 EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS & SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

51
Srinivasmal Bairoliya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 pc 135 .
52
NN Burjorjee v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Rang 456
53
Emperor v. Philips S Pratt AIR 1928 Bom 78
54
AH Gandhi v. King, AIR 1941 Rang 324 .
55
(1922) 2 KB 555.
56
AIR 1947 PC 135.

18 | P a g e
When the state of mind of a party with reference to a transaction is material all
facts from which it may be inferred, whether previous or subsequent thereto, are
in general admissible either for or against him. Subsequent events can merely
show the reflections of what man’s mind may have been, previous events are of
more importance as showing the influence which have been, previous events are
of more importance as showing the influence which have worked upon the man’s
mind to bring it into the condition that it was at the moment under
investigation. 57 Ill. (e), S. 14, refers to “previous publications as being relevant
in a libal case”; Ill. (j) refers to threatening letters “previously sent”. On the
other hand, Ill (m) doesn’t insist on such priority. There the test is merely
proximity of time and not priority. In Q UEEN - E MPRESS V. J OGENDRA
C HUNDER B OSE , 58 which was one of the earliest sedition trials in Bengal and
where the accused was charged in regard to some articles he had published, the
Court allowed other subsequent articles to be put in evidence. The point has
been discussed in another sedition case from Madras, viz. C HIDAMBRAM P ILLAI
V. E MPEROR , 59 and there it will be found that even a statement that the accused
had made after he had been placed before the committing Magistrate was
considered to be admissible evidence of intention under S. 14. Similarly, in the
Allahabad Case in Q UEEN - E MPRESS V. A MBA P RASAD , 60 the passage, in which
Sir John Edge has referred to this point, certainly makes no limitation in regard
to this point of time or as to publication.

Primarily, anything that an accused has written is, if it comes within the general
words of S. 14, relevant and admissible. At the same time, of course, the writing
should be within a reasonable time of the particular occurrence, i.e. the
particular article or other document in respect of which he is being charged. 61 It
was, no doubt, held in the last cited case that the acts tendered must have been
proximate in time to that in question but the decision in R EX V. R HODES 62

57
N.N. Burjorjee v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Rang. 456 at p. 457
58
I.L.R. 19 Cal. 35
59
I.L.R. 32 Mad. 3
60
I.L.R. 20 All. 55 at p. 69
61
Emperor v. Philip Spratt, AIR 1928 Bom 78 at p. 79
62
(1889) 1 Q.B. 77

19 | P a g e
shows that this question of proximity of time goes rather to the weight to be
given to the evidentiary facts than to their admissibility. It is, however, plain
from all the decisions that the acts of which evidence is tendered must be of the
same specific kind as that in question. 63 A MRIT L AL H AZRA V. E MPEROR 64 is
authority for this proposition.

In criminal cases it is usually not sufficient to prove that the prisoner did the act
complained of. He may admit so much but plead that the acts were not

PRIOR SIMILAR ACTS intentional but accidental, or that he did them under
some misapprehension which will entitle him to an
acquittal. In such a case the prosecution must show
that he acted intentionally and under no mistake and a most effective way of
doing this is to show that he had done similar acts before. However, if his
defence is that the acts are not his acts at all because he was in a state of
automatism at the time, it seems that this cannot be rebutted by evidence that he
has committed similar acts before. 65 A was charged with the murder of B, an
infant whom she had promised to adopt and
IN MURDER CHARGE
maintain on receipt of a small premium from B’s
mother. B’s body was found buried in A’s garden
in a condition which left the cause of death uncertain. Evidence that A had
received other infants from their mothers on similar terms, who had afterwards
disappeared, and that the bodies of unidentified infants were found buried in the
gardens of other houses occupied by A was admitted to rebut the defence that
B’s death was accidental. 66

63
A.H. Gandhi v. King, AIR 1941 Rang 324.
64
ILR 42 Cal 957
65
R v. Harrison- Owen, (1915) 2 All. E.R. 726
66
Makin v. Attorney General for NSW, (1894) A.C. 57

20 | P a g e
CONCLUSION
Which facts are relevant to the fact in issue is usually a matter of reason or
experience but sometimes a matter of law (i.e., where a presumption of law
operates). The connecting link between a fact in issue and a fact alleged to be
relevant thereto is often a presumption of law or of fact. To put in another way,
it is permissible, in establishing a fact in issue, to prove the existence of a basic
fact or facts from which a conclusion must by law, or may, by the use of reason
or experience, be drawn that the fact in issue exists. 67 The project report based
on S. 14 is grounded on the principle that when the intention of the accused is a
relevant fact evidence of similar transaction both prior and subsequent to the
alleged offence is admissible as evidence of intention. The principle on which
evidence on similar acts is admissible, is not to show that, because the
defendant has committed one crime, he would, therefore, be likely to commit
another but to establish the animus of the act and rebut, by anticipation, the
defences of ignorance, accident, mistake or some innocent motive or intention. 68

It is plain that S. 14 is of assistance where the existence of a state of mind such

as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill- will or good will
towards a person or the existence of a state of body or bodily feeling in issue.

67
Phipson, Manual of Evidence, 8 t h Ed, p. 33
68
Phipson, Evidence, 4 t h Ed. P 153.

21 | P a g e