18th Recit 163-182

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994 ]

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992. [1]
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned
various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente
followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990,
private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's
sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of
San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters
of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They
alleged, inter alia, viz:
xxx
"4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or

descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or
representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish, given the
change to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-
deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were
without issue and/or without descendents whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez
Badua who was raised and cared for by them since childhood is, in fact, not related
to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; x x x"
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the
sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.
The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the
estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child
of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal
Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership
with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
(4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared
and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand,
private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said
spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then
thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted
obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-
Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age,[2] categorically declared
that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to
physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It
dismissed the private respondents petition for letters of administration and declared
petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the
Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992
by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Decision
of the appellate court states:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and another one
entered declaring that appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or
child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and,
therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the
petition for the appointment of an administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED; said petition and the
proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the lower court is directed to
proceed with the hearing of Special Proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with
law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED."
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:

“1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and misapprehension of
facts when it failed to apply the provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170,
and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in adopting or upholding private
respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child;
“2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn directly or
indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still the respondent appellate Court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial
evidence of witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and demeanor have
not convinced the trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof, than the
documentary and testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-
Badua;
“3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way not in accord
with law or with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, more particularly, on
prescription or laches."
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the
Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
"Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
"Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of

the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the
husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth
of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the
birth certificate of the child.
"Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
"1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
"2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband except in the instance provided in the second
paragraph of Article 164; or
"3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within
one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth
as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two
years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth
of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs,
the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child
or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
"Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding Article only in the following case:
“1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing
his action;
“2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted
therefrom; or
“3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of
said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply
these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs
of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our
ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited
in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she
is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased."
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not
the biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties
as follows:
"x x x And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's evidence is
utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid
spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that she is not, but
that said couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late
Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without he
and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved
her as their own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she herself
had believed that she was really their only daughter and entitled to inherit from
them as such.
"The strong and convincing evidence referred to by us are the following:
"First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became
pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and
sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married for
ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she had not begotten or still
could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his
mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the
testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez
Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the
youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through law school, and whom
Vicente and his wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her
youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt
elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she
feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally
brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria that he would register
the baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old
and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of
her testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her
residence in Parañaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak physical
condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is
highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any
time, she would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be
expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There were also several
disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in
Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who
testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday
especially as she had a drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but that they
never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez
was allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all,
and that this is also true with the rest of their townmates. Resurreccion A. Tuico,
Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her
(Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become
pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she
saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day when she went to Isabel's house to set
the latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the baby came from,
and “she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell
about it (p. 10, tsn Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as
her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and
so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not have, therefore,
delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a
baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel
Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that
she is not the true mother of that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O. Benitez
appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's
wife Isabel, who was already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth,
was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate,
should the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful,
and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan,
since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and
quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in
appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent
times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption
to simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps
Atty. Vicente O. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the
trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings
by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth
certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a
little older but did not come around doing so either because he was too busy or for
some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late
Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only
brother and sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state
in the extrajudicial settlement Exh. "E" that they executed of her estate, "that we
are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without
descendants or ascendants"? Dr. Chipongian, placed on the witness stand by
appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who
prepared said document and that he signed the same only because the latter told
him to do so (p. 24, tsn Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make such
statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is really not his and
his wife's daughter and descendant and, therefore, not his deceased's wife legal
heir? As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document
without understanding completely the meaning of the words "descendant and
ascendant" (p. 21, tsn Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian
being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn
Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously, Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of
appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as against
those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is really the
daughter and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian, that the latter, before her death, would write a note to her husband
and Marissa stating that:
"even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my child or only
daughter will inherit what is legally my own property, in case I die without a will,"
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband --
"that any inheritance due him from my property - when he die - to make our own
daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not mean what he legally owns or his inherited
property. I leave him to decide for himself regarding those."
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")

We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the spouses
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for
Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa
would be their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to
implore and supplicate her husband to give appellee although without any legal
papers her properties when she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa
the properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that
Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her
(Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even
testified that her brother Vicente gave the date December 8 as Marissa's birthday in
her birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and
Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and
the mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as
Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's
child and that they gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother."
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record.
The weight of these findings was not negated by the documentary evidence
presented by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live
Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly showing that her parents were the late Vicente Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to
have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New
Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related above, the totality of contrary
evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of
the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. Of said rebutting evidence, the
most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente
Benitez, and Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In this notarized document,
they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian
because she died without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed,
Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner
where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty
eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000 ]
TEOFISTA BABIERA, PETITIONER, VS. PRESENTACION B.
CATOTAL, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious.
Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years
old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil
registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely
affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for
the cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review

on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March
18, 1999 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031.
Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No.
3046, the CA ruled as follows:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the
instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-
appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto."[4]
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court,
judgment is hereby rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void
'ab initio';
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry
of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City
Prosecutor, counsel for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for
petitioner.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as
TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3046.
"From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted 'that she is the only surviving
child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on
May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby
girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the
child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was
the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years
old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature x
x x; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by
'hilot'; that the birth certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was
totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false
entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The
signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the
informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family
name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and
her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it;
that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is
patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the
supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera,
was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the
year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and
simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of
petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and declared void and theretofore
she prays that after publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed]
declaring x x x the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared
void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of
Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE
recorded as Registry No. 16035.
"Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an
order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof 'in a
newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor
of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
"TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the petition states no
cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child
of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has
no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family
Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance
with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an

answer/opposition in behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later
on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent.'
"In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred 'that she was always known as Teofista
Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the
matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera
are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother
Hermogena Babiera, x x x Certificate of Baptism, x x x Student's Report Card x x x
all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of
special and affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition
states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as
the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera; that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of
the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in
accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." [5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that
petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no
evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It
further observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth
took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its
concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not
signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to
be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which
stated that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same
was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a
situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was
not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth
Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to
either the father or the mother.
Hence, this appeal.[6]
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:

"1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity
to file the special proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter
of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is

barred by [the] statute of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that
the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral
testimony of respondent."[7]
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Subject of the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article

171[8] of the Family Code states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by
the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a
child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the
present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in
interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."[9] The interest of respondent in the
civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed
against the former.[10] The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent
from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A
close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that
the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer
herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action
does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court ruled thus:

"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the
Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
x x x x x x x x x
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply
these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs
of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our
ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited
in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
`Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.'"[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue:
Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late
Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family
Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within
one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth
as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two
years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth
of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs,
the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child
or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier."
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily,
the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly
void ab initio.[13]
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's

testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption
of regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys
the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well
as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate
itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar.[14] More important, the Court of
Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her
signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena
is not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's
pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given
birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home,
when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in
a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena

Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter
was not hers nor her husband Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:
"q. Who are your children?
a. Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q. Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband
Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?
a. She is not our child.
x x x x x x x x x
q. Do you recall where she was born?
a. In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q. Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your
residence?
a. Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.
q. Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with
your husband?
a. No, sir."[15]
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has
presented no other evidence other than the said document to show that she is
really Hermogena's child. Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed
mother would make a deposition stating that the former was not the latter's child at
all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and
the appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 142877, October 02, 2001 ]
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS AND JACQUELINE A. DE
JESUS, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER,
CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE ESTATE OF
DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. AND
MARYLIN DIZON AND AS PROPER PARTIES: FORMS MEDIA
CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES
CO., INC. AND AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to
enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It

was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06
July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged

Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some
real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that
petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon
City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15
February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of
Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and
ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled
that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial
considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to have
effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several
other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact,
made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of
decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief
once petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such heirs. It
was contended, in fine, that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to
likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be
taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately,
dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
improper.[1] It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a
special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for
judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.[2]
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by

petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn
legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the
complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,[3] which
has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in a direct action
frontally addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is
time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)

the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.[4] The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required.[5] In fact, any authentic writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. [6] Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish
the child's acknowledgment.[7]
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage
of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate.[8] This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in
the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious
illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.[9] Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, [10] and in
proper cases Article 171,[11] of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.

Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children
of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,[13] or in
exceptional instances the latter's heirs,[14] can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of
the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor

in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had
claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document,
signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a
case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children.
Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant
circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate
children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of
Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners
are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be
aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,[15] one that can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
[16]
Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as having been an adulteress.[17]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is

DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 138961, March 07, 2002 ]
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER
CORAZON GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. JUANITA TANHOTI-
LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND
LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 [1] which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in
declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased
William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose
L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as
a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional
rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.

Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an
action for compulsory recognition as “the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late
William Liyao” against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.[2] The complaint was later amended
to include the allegation that petitioner “was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao,” petitioner having been
“recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."[3]
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case.
Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of
Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in

Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting
marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice
president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale.
She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite
the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel
of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far
East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao
visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the
medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of
William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia
Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He likewise instructed
Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company[4] and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.[5] William Liyao
would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their
pictures taken together.[6]
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among
others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyao’s legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio.[7] Corazon
also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William
Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings.
[8]
During the occasion of William Liyao’s last birthday on November 22, 1975 held
at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son
in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, “Hey, look I
am still young, I can still make a good looking son."[9] Since birth, Billy had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or
acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts. William
Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs.
However, after William Liyao’s death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to
Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his
personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations
at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G.
Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit
Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with
some housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some
occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the
couple’s residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would
usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part
of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to
four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would
often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal
Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at
White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave
support by way of grocery supplies, money for household expenses and
matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During
William Liyao’s birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket
Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2)
daughters from his legal marriage, “Look, this is my son, very guapo and
healthy.”[10] He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas.
He intended to make it “engrande” and “make the bells of San Sebastian Church
ring.”[11] Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away on
December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyao’s funeral and helped Corazon pack
his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray [12] which Mr.
Liyao wore in a photograph[13] as well as another shirt of lime green[14] as belonging
to the deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: “To
Cora, Love From William.”[15] Maurita remembered having invited the couple during
her mother’s birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting
affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to
Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally
separated from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of
William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other
man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew
that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter
being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazon’s house in Scout
Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to
see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to
White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving,
Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted
that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught
Corazon how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes’ wife and sister-in-
law, had mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided
Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He
also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is
separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo
with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo,
from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was
about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time
of the latter’s death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond
of Enrique’s half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao
carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enrique’s testimony was
corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures
showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the
negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.[16] Linda grew up and lived with her parents at
San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents
were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her
parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at
their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of
town business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father
would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her
father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other people’s homes. Linda described him
as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of
success would compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very
tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered
two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He
suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr.
Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his
therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his
name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office.
She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their
lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was not
active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder
stroke during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for
two (2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and
was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried
to spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon
was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil
Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment[17] of their
marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia
at the company garage. Immediately after the death of Linda’s father, Corazon
went to Linda’s office for the return of the former’s alleged investments with the Far
East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and
Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company,
was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William
Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was told by the guards,
“Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again.”[18] Linda then instructed the
guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to
let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which
belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of
men’s clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never
been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village,
Makati up to the time of her father’s death on December 2, 1975. [19] Her father
suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the
first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands
were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict
medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr.
Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control. [20] Tita Rose
testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the
Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received
any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an
illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the position of
President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her
late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by
Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by
Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at
the latter’s office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and
bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported
for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 o’clock in the
morning. At past 7:00 o’clock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin
Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr.
Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in
September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added
that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among
which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2,
1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his
employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyao’s breast and decided
later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat.
Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the
hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees
of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr.
Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo
who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon.
He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic
Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to
the latter’s law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda
said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo,
Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with
the lawyers’ wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not
remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like
shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the
minor William Liyao, Jr.;

(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
deceased William Liyao;

(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr.
as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights
as such; and

(d) Costs of suit.[21]
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr.
since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the
deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and
overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through
his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly
acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing
herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the
law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and “the
presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that
marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period
cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code.” The appellate court
gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon
Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal
separation, were seen in each other’s company during the supposed time that
Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further
noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr.
which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity
in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates and considering that his signature does not appear
thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute
competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as
evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to
prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon
Garcia since William Liyao’s signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a
number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by
petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao.
Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this
litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate.[22] The presumption of legitimacy of children does not
only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.[23]
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and

consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255
of the New Civil Code[24] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution
or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten
(10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the
late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations
with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim,
petitioner presented a document entitled, “Contract of Separation,” [25] executed and
signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any
property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.[26]
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under
the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.[27] Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the
one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral
and economic interest involved.[28] It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are
allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs -
can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.[29]
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as

guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage
is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[30] We cannot allow
petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law
that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other
hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the
paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.[31]
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon
Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of
the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the
records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the
birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably,
the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon
Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the

evidence presented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with
the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 123450, August 31, 2005 ]
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND MA. THERESA ALMONTE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special
safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as after
birth.[1] In case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his
innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded
purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma.
Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married on December 29, 1989.[2] After their marriage, they lived with Ma.
Theresa's parents in Fairview, Quezon City. [3] Almost a year later, on December 8,
1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.[4]
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa's relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On

December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy. [5] He alleged that nine years before he married
Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which
marriage was never annulled.[6] Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive
and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.[7]
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She,
however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario
at all.[8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting
when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The
custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights.[9]
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage
annulled. She held him responsible for the "bastardization" of Gerardo. She moved
for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of
the ... decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called "visitation rights'...
between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday." [10] She
argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child." [11] She further maintained that Jose
Gerardo's surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden
name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother's surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention
of "Concepcion" as Jose Gerardo's surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma.
Theresa's motion and made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to
hurt the other, something they should never do if they want to assure the normal
development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a
father, especially as he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize -
something that the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the
emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he were
allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this
matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is
hereby DENIED.[12]
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the
ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed
the continued use of Gerardo's surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose
Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her
surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. [13]
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a
putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court
affirmed the "best interest of the child" policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled
that "[a]t bottom, it (was) the child's welfare and not the convenience of the
parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few
hours once a week."[14]
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mother's
surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate
proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the
correction in the civil registry.[15]
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of
the appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so
that she could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the
appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling
and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable - established by the evidence in this case - that
the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never
entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called
"marriage" with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had
established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to
Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990.
Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo - under the law - is the legitimate child of the
legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot
be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent "marriage"
between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the
legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art.
164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can
claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further,
[Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis
(even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]);
it would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao,
would prevent any possible rapproachment between the married couple, and would
mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship.[16]
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardo's
birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and
Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movant's argument that various evidence exist
that appellee and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their
natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of
the Family Code mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress."
(underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be
deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or
even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law
determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one's
legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein
are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what
the law says and not what a parent says it is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above
decision but the same was denied. [18] Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. [19] Article 164 of the
Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child [21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article
167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy.[22] We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania
v. Court of Appeals[23]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) [24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has
no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa's
husband Mario or, in a proper case,[25] his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of
the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. [26] Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a
strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. [27] Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

particularly during the period of conception. [28] To overthrow this presumption on
the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to
father the child.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is
not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. [30]
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of

physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.[31]
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to
make marital intimacy impossible.[32] This may take place, for instance, when they
reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the
period of conception.[33] Or, the husband was in prison during the period of
conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of
prison regulations.[34]
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in
Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon
City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no
evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them.
Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her
lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible
for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the

assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa's statement in her answer [35] to the petition for
annulment of marriage[36] that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an
admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an
admission that was binding on her.
Gerardo's argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa's statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her
legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an
avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was
never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that
there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she
never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between
them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time
material to Jose Gerardo's conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility
of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such
possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa's statement is to allow her to arrogate unto
herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. [37] A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.
[38]
Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo's
legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say
that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.
[39]
The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family
solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of
children.[40]
Gerardo's insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in
the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was
immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the
Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the
mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to
the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the
very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.[41] Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to
exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has no

evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.[42]
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth.[43] Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary
evidence of the filiation of a child, [44] as the status of a child is determined by the
law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is
being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the
termination of marriage is sought to be established. [45]
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it
could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in
extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this
case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained

therein.[46] As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be
rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect
to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties.
[47]
Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo's
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it
bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in
consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose
Gerardo's illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the child's interests at
heart. The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more
favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred
and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and
mother, full support and full inheritance. [48] On the other hand, an illegitimate child
is bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his
mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is
only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. [49] Moreover (without unwittingly
exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a "bastard" is
usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the
legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble
between the very persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him.
The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This
madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is
that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these
proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim
of incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the
controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames.[50] A person's surname or family name identifies the family to
which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. [51] Hence, Gerardo cannot
impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to
him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardo's name and effecting the corrections of the
entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed
out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the

Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child
to each other's company. There being no such parent-child relationship between
them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Child's Welfare Paramount. - In all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of
which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private

social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years. [52] Through its laws, the State
safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their
eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant
where, as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very
identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and

January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Carpio Morales, J., no part.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007 ]
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, PETITIONER, VS. MINOR
JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER AND
GUARDIAN, JINKY C. DIAZ, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing (1) the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November
2005 and (2) the Resolution[2] of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint[3] for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation

was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and
guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that
judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente

lite and thereafter to fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the sum of
P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in
the premises.[4]
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and
Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into
love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa
Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court
Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.[5]
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived
together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25
February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors' Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after
delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and
provided for all of minor Joanne's needs - recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped
supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinky's remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and
refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus
leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any
responsive pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial
court to declare him in default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelio's Answer
with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial
court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on
the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision granting the
reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision[6] dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00

and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of

P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for
reconsideration seeking the court's understanding, as he was then in a quandary on
what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life. [7]
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision
of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for
trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.[8]
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelio's Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendant's motion for new trial to be impressed with merit,
the same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court
dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in
record, subject to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the
proceedings.
In the meantime defendant's answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of

plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer to defendant's counterclaim within the period
fixed by the Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiff's application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be
warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of
P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in
arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support
pendente lite during the pendency of this case.[9]
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the
plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiff's mother Jinky Diaz was married at the
time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a
legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family
Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared
against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided
for in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that
there must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
the wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child
because of –
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;

b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible;

c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he
was living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home
only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was
outside the country and no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country
in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man
before she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual
relations with other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne
Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole
(according to defendant) must have a different father or may be the son of
Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills
representing the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence
of admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that
even when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even
after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to see
Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched
Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of
Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support
plaintiff.[10]
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the
illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of
this Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed
and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached
majority age.[11]
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an
Order of the trial court dated 19 January 2001. [12] From the denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive
pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for decision and ordered re-raffled
to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002. [13]
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelio's counsel filed a
manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a
Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted
in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,[14] which motion was accordingly granted
by the Court of Appeals.[15]
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to
make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity
of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.[16]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:

In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in
the early stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiff's
mother submit themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity,
as a sign of good faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this
modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that
he is the biological father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual
relations with plaintiff's mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing, as current
jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling
the present paternity dispute. Considering, however, the untimely demise of
defendant-appellant during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in
consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, can
possibly avail of such procedure with whatever remaining DNA samples from the
deceased defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor whose
illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for support. [17]
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS
RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G.
ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE
RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE
HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE
PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE
TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO
LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.[18]
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the
judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by
dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by
declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo. [19]
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to
concentrate its attention on the third one, the propriety of the appellate court's
decision remanding the case to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing.
Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the
issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first two
issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of the
DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor
Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the
present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to
face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.[20]
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.
[21]
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article
167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania
v. Court of Appeals[22]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255
of the New Civil Code[23] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution
or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.[24]

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied
about by the parties to the present petition. But with the advancement in the field
of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through
DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person's entire genetic make-up. DNA is
found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic
identity is unique. Hence, a person's DNA profile can determine his identity. [25]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample

obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a
pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This
DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical
twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life.
Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individual's
blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen,
samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G
(guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases
appear in an individual's DNA determines his or her physical make up. And since
DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T
or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular

sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA
framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic
loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting).
In other words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a

molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5)
techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment
length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in
287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November
1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent
which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem
repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic laboratories in
the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample
a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate
places and can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less
than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To

illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal
case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known"
print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or
fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA
or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In
each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one
inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a
number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine
which half of the child's DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father's profile is then
examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the
paternal types in the child. If the man's DNA types do not match that of the child,
the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded
as the father.[26]
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;

(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample
obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from
that person;

(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction
of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the
information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more
distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the
biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and

(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a
putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated
individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution
thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for
minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals[27] is particularly
relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous
decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in
1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new
science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity
(would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating acts,verbal and written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of

parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March
2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University
of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.
Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said results is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in
Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v.
Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder
victim's DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted
in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference
sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584],
we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts
persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex
offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we
had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3

March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of
filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.
In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May

2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with
homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner
questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the
remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already
died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no
longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility
of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more
ostensible than real. Petitioner's argument is without basis especially as the New
Rules on DNA Evidence[28] allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or
upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any
time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due
hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso
facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate
biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material
originating from a person's body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids,
tissues, hairs and bones.[29]
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated
above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner
has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that
can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v.
Umanito,[30] citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,[31] this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March
2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our
jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely
to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father
of AAA's child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the
fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules,
the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a
DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar,
capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct
hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to the
RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the
parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals[32]:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when
DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our
stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 108366, February 16, 1994 ]
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil
Case No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent before the RTC of
Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio
P. Solano,[1] who found that "(t)here is nothing in the material allegations in the
complaint that seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge
(petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and
competent evidence to prove the petitioners' filiation. [2]
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they filed the case at bench, another
action for recognition and support against the private respondent before another
branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and
guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN
PAUL FERNANDEZ. Violeta and the private respondent, CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ,
met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco
employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at
said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they
started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The
tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of
petitioner John Paul on February 11, 1985. Violeta further claimed that she did not
know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they
were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she
discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence:

their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the
baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is
respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner
Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta
Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, [3] Dr. Milagros

Villanueva,[4] Ruby Chua Cu,[5] and Fr. Liberato Fernandez.[6] The first three
witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times,
[7]
introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on
the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the
father of petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two
petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of
petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante
Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of
petitioner Claro during his baptism. The private respondent also presented as
witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's
allegation that she and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during
their affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito
together at the said restaurant. Private respondent also declared he only learned he
was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was
sued for support in Civil Case No. Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners, viz.:
"In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the plaintiffs
minors (petitioners herein) are entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
The defendant (herein private respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro
Antonio Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 41/2,
as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he has a supervisory job at the
Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000 each a month,
payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra, the children's mother and natural
guardian, within the first five (5) days of the month, with arrears reckoned as of
the filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners' complaint dismissed by
the respondent Court of Appeals[8] in its impugned decision, dated October 20,
1992. It found that the "proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to
prove the (private respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further
held that the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied on December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not giving
full faith and credit to the testimony of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and
value to the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value
to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken during the
baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving
probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so much credence
to the self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and
(6) holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be
reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is
when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in the
case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power, and
settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private respondent
is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which
the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold
that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and
Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the
father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the
baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated
by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent
showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity
(Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio,
192 SCRA 764, viz:
"x x x The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman,
another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like
playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity.
The same must be said of x x x (the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing
allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to
prove paternity and much less would prove violation of complainant's person and
honor." (Underscoring supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificate (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming private
respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that
private respondent participated in its preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles
vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
"As to the baptismal certificate, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the
baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if
in the preparation of the record the decedent had no intervention, the baptismal
record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. x x x The reason
for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the authentic document
prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that
such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify
by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like
the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the
declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of
prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence."
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that
while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only
serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect to the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying
private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of
their paternity. Again, the records do not show that private respondent had a hand
in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of
the respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:
"x x x Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines explicitly prohibited, not only the naming of the father or the child born
outside wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made
by him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he
could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make
or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the
mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child."
(Underscoring supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent
evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners
and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly calibrated their
weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who
solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness
stand:
Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you called for the father and the
Q mother of the child, that both father and mother were present?
Yes.
Would you able to recognize the father and the mother who were present at that time?
Yes.
Please point to the court?
There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito Fernandez).
For instance, just give us more specifically what question do you remember having asked
him?
Yes, like for example, ‘do you renounce Satan and his works?’
What was the answer of Fernandez?
Yes, I do.
I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the defendant again. I want to be sure
if he is the person who appeared before you on that occasion?
I am sure."
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be
shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the
private respondent, viz:
When was the, approximately, when you were first shown this picture by Violeta Esguerra?
Q
I cannot recall.
At least the month and the year?
It must be in 1986.
What month in 1986?
It is difficult. . .
When was the first time you know you are going to testify here?
Let us see, you came there two times and first one was you want to get a baptismal
certificate and then the second time was I asked you for what is this? And you said it is for the
court.
On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your place, you were already
informed that you will testify here before this Honorable Court?
Yes.
And you were shown this picture?
Yes.
An you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this man wearing the blue T-shirt is
the father?
Yes, sir.
So, it was Violeta Esguerra who . . .
Yes."

(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta
Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his
identification of the private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the
absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who
officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the
parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of
Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself,
is insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent appellate
court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing
petitioners' action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering our
findings that petitioners' evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent

court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G. R. No. 143256, August 28, 2001 ]
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ AND MERCEDES CARANTO
FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND AND WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ
AND LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, PETITIONERS, VS. ROMEO
FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO
FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ,
MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ, GERARDO
FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO FERNANDEZ AND GREGORIO
FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision[1] of the

respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1999 affirming the decision [2] of
the Regional Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action for nullity of
contracts, partition, recovery of possession and damages in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows: [3]
"The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the
registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City covered by TCT No.
T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey building constructed
thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is undisputed that Generosa gave
birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years
old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp. 9-
14) it was revealed that the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son,
purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy
being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein
appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and
became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and
disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de
Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate consisting of the following:
(a) "A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of
Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in
the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the
SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the NW. by Lot No.
9131. Containing an area of One Hundred Ninety Four (194) square meters, more
or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan
Registry of Deeds."
(b) "A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and wood, G.I. roofing
with a floor area of 154 square meters and 126 square meters of the first and
second floor, respectively. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22-592-1 and assessed
therein at P26,000.00."
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son over the following:
"A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square meters including
the building and/or all existing thereon to be taken from the southwestern portion
of the parcel of land described as follows, to wit:
`A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of
Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in
the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the
SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the NW. by Lot No.
9131. Containing an area of One Hundred and Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters,
more or less, covered by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) -
Pangasinan Registry of Deeds" (Exh. "8", Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary,
Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews
and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother
of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio (docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by

unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff and other
heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any
iota of rights to succession or inheritance, taking advantage of the total physical
and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa de Venecia aggravated by unlawful
scheme confederated, colluded and conspired with each other in causing the fake,
simulated grossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be executed on August 31,
1989 and jointly on the same date, caused the execution of the deed of absolute
sale purportedly signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the same property
described in the deed of extra-judicial partition and by virtue of the said acts,
appellants were able to secure new land titles in their favor (Records, pp. 3-4,
Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Deed of
Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared void from the
beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
"16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were husband and
wife blessed with one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they
acknowledged during their lifetime. (underscoring supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
the late Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez which are now in
question were all made with the full knowledge, consent and approval of the parties
thereto and for value." (Records, pp. 20-21, Answer)."
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads:[4]
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the

defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 (Exh.
"3"), the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. "8"), the TCT
No. 54641, and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully surrender to the

plaintiffs the possession of the house and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs the

following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED."
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a
legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa
de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses. Rodolfo's
claim as a son of the deceased spouses Fernandez was negated by the fact that (1)
he only reached high school and was told to stop studying so that he could help in
the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he failed to present any birth certificate, (3) the
book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by respected people such
as Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-
Sison, showed the geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez
without a child; a pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of
genealogy and that entries in a family bible or other family books or charts,
engravings or rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree,[5] (4) the certification issued by the Records Management and Archives
Office that there was no available information about the birth of petitioner Rodolfo
to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay
certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there
were blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfo's baptismal
certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no available records of
baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936, while Rodolfo's
baptismal certificate which was issued in 1989 showed that he was baptized on
November 24, 1934. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the deed
of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular
circumstances which rendered the documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals

which affirmed the trial court's judgment in its assailed decision dated December
22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the legitimacy of
defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez' filiation with the deceased spouses. It
found that appellants' evidence which consisted of a certificate of baptism stating
that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez and the application for recognition of
rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter
referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his
filiation. The appellate court concluded that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they were evidence only to prove the administration
of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk; that while the
application for back pay was a public document, it was not executed to admit the
filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant; that
the public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code referred to the
written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as
an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public
document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay
under Republic Act No. 897. Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion
for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated May 17, 2000. [6]
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with the following
issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL

COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO RECONVEY TO,
AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE
POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER
IS PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE,
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO BE
CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY

CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED AB
INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL

COURT DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION DATED AUGUST
31, 1989 (EXH. `3'), THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST 31,
1989 (EXH. `8'), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO. 54693 NULL AND VOID FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON

RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED DEEDS, HAVE NO

PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR.
JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD NOT BE
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECLARE IN
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ IS
NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND

ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO FACTUAL BASIS IN
THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the parties to
the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial partition
executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez, widow of Dr.
Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former allegedly failed to prove
legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners,
contend, however, that the burden of proof lies with the respondents because they
were the ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that both
lower courts had no power to pass upon the matter of filiation because it could not
be collaterally attacked in the present action but in a separate and independent
action directly impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.
It must be noted that the respondents' principal action was for the declaration of
absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial partition and deed
of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn one's legitimacy. The respondent
court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine
Rodolfo's right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of
the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that one's legitimacy can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents' claim was that
petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa
Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that
Rodolfo was a child of their uncle's wife. The case of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of
Appeals,[7] which has a similar factual backdrop is instructive:
"A careful reading of the above articles[8] will show that they do not contemplate a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the
action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court
did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case
at bench is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is
not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born
to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the Family
Code) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.""
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez

to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal right
Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue
of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-
trial brief[9] filed before the trial court, hence they are now estopped from assailing
the trial court's ruling on Rodolfo's status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed to
prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual issue
which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the
appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry even more weight [10] when
the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court. [11] We accordingly
find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent court's evaluation of the
evidence presented, thus:[12]
"The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records of the birth
of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it issued a certification
worded as follows:
"This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of Dagupan,
Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not on file with the National Archives, hence, there
is no available information about the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez alleged to have
been born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa
de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan" (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay
Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document and a conclusive proof of the
legitimate filiation between him and the deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants'
Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under
Act No. 897 is a public document nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the
filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant. The
public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code refer to the written
admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an
admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document
was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under
Republic Act No. 897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
"Sec. 32. Public documents as evidence - Documents consisting of entries in public

records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date
of the latter."
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document are
conclusive evidence against the contracting parties as to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein. They constitute only prima facie evidence of the facts
which give rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. Thus, a baptismal
certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the Spanish regime constitutes prima
facie evidence of the facts certified to by the parish priest from his own knowledge
such as the administration of the sacrament on the day and in the place and
manner set forth in the certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the
statements made therein concerning the parentage of the person baptized
(Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516, citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642;
Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193;
Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public documents are perfect evidence of the fact
which give rise to their execution and of the date of the latter if the act which the
officer witnessed and certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be
false; but they are not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties (Martin, Rules of Court in the
Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is
only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said application on June 5, 1954 in
Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the declaration and statement
contained in the said application that concern the relationship of the applicant with
herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a conclusive proof of the filiation of
appellant with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez the contents being, only prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a
legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they died (Rollo, p.
42; Appellants' Brief). Open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges
usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal
surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant
attendance to the child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation
of being a child of his parents (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, pp.
245-246). However, it must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC,
132 SCRA 590, possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his
assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant presented a

baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St. John Metropolitan
Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating therein that appellant is a
child of the late spouses having been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized on
November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1" Exhibits for the Defendants). As stated, while
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only
to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but
not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that a
baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal
certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the
Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on
October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August
8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh. "G"). Neither the family portrait
offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not
constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) (supra). In fine, the
evidence presented by appellant did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his
filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed
by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void."
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the
spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez , thus the subject
deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between
Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is
concerned[13] pursuant to Art.1105 of the New Civil Code which states:
"A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be
void only with respect to such person."
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property in question
was the conjugal property of the late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de
Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his estate consisted
solely of ½ pro indiviso of the conjugal property and the other half belonged to his
wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was only survived by
his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the
½ share of the decedent's estate while the ¾ share of the conjugal property will
still belong to Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial court's
order reconveying the possession of the subject lot and building to respondents
was contrary to the admitted facts and law since respondents are not related by
consanguinity to Generosa vda de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
"Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half."
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in the above-
quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the ½ of the inheritance and the respondents
to the other ½. In effect, ¾ pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as the surviving
spouse, i.e., ½ as her share of the conjugal property estate and ½ of the remaining
½ as share as heir from her husband's estate. Thus, we find well taken the
petitioners' assertion that the annulment of the extra-judicial partition between
Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily result in respondents' having
exclusive right to the conjugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent
court. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of her
property without other limitations than those established by law, [14] which right she
exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents' right, not being heirs of Generosa, to question the
validity of the deed of sale since the action for the annulment of contracts may only
be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. [15]
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged principally
or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when a contract prejudices the rights of a
third person, he may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced
in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show detriment
which would positively result to him from the contract in which he had no
intervention.[16] As we have discussed above, respondents are entitled to the ¼ of
the entire conjugal property, ie., lot and building; however considering that widow
Generosa, during her lifetime , sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie
Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their ¼ share therein, thus the deed
of sale was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards their ¼ share in the
building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the annulment of
said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring null and void
the deed of sale executed between Generosa and petitioner Eddie Fernandez
concluding that the same was simulated or false and in affirming the trial court's
findings that the deed was prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and
irregular circumstances without however, particularly stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated because there
was no consideration for the sale. However, this assertion was controverted by
vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez' declaration, that the money he paid for the sale
came from his savings as overseas contract worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989
which respondents failed to controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary. The
presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a
mere assertion that it has no consideration.[17] Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code,
consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of sale was not
that of Generosa because she was already bedridden with both legs amputated
before she died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence[18] and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the
same;[19] a burden respondents failed to discharge. The respondents had not
presented any convincing proof to override the evidentiary value of the duly
notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear
unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant.[20]
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to petitioner
Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her ¾ undivided share in the building
but also the ¼ share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the entire
building without the consent of the respondents is not null and void as only the
rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner
Eddie , a co-owner of the ¾ share of the building together with the respondents
who owned the ¼ share therein.[21]
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees awarded
by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A party is entitled to an
adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has
duly proven.[22] Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of
proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. [23] Courts
cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact
and amount of damages.[24] The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he
suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not supported by any documentary
or other admissible evidence. We also agree with the petitioners that the
respondent court should not have awarded moral damages in the amount of
P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of moral suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation.
Attorney's fees should likewise be deleted for lack of factual basis and legal
justification. Both the lower courts did not cite specific factual basis to justify the
award of attorney's fees, which is in violation of the proscription against the
imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate. [25]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby Affirmed with

Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the ¼

share of the conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa
Fernandez who died childless and intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner

Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the
name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the ¾ share of Generosa sold
to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title should
be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners
of the ¾ and ¼ shares respectively in the conjugal building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 132305, December 04, 2001 ]
IDA C. LABAGALA, PETITIONER, VS. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO,
AMANDA T. SANTIAGO AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4,
1997,[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set
aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990,[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 87-41515, finding herein petitioner to be the owner of
1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land.
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal
Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered
it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein),
sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. [3] On April 20, 1981, the trial
court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of
ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of
Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the
certificate of title to said property.[4]
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed a

complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner,
Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to recover from her the
1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation
of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their
brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979[5] was executed through petitioner's
machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding
transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334[6]) in petitioner's name alone.[7]
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. The deed showed that
Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been
able to graduate from college, Jose never put his thumbmark on documents he
executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed that Jose could not have
sold the property belonging to his "poor and unschooled sisters who... sacrificed for
his studies and personal welfare."[8] Respondents also pointed out that it is highly
improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150,000 for
the sale of the subject property because petitioner was unemployed and without
any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They also stressed
that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of
sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale.
[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as
claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by
the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus
entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always
stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported
sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have
precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his
signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged
respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim
portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire
to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment cases against
her and other occupants of the property. The first was decided in her and the other
defendants' favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and
resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the property as decreed by

the RTC. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a title in her name alone,
allegedly after respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the property
from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay realty taxes thereon. She
added that with a title issued in her name she could avail of a realty tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the plaintiffs [herein
respondents] as being entitled to the ownership and possession each of one-third
(1/3) pro indiviso share of the property originally covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 64729, in the name of Jose T. Santiago and presently covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the name of herein defendant [herein petitioner]
and which is located at No. 3075-A Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as
per complaint, and the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No. 56226
of this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share
adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T. Santiago in said case, is hereby
adjudged and adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and entitled to possession
of said share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge damages, attorney's fees and
costs. Upon finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is
ordered cancelled and a new title issued in the names of the two (2) plaintiffs and
the defendant as owners in equal shares, and the Register of Deeds of Manila is so
directed to effect the same upon payment of the proper fees by the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.[10]
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration for the deed of
sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid donation.
Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property as Jose's daughter. The trial court ruled that the following evidence shows
petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two ejectment cases
filed by respondents which stated that petitioner is Jose's daughter, and (2) Jose's
income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said that
respondents knew of petitioner's existence and her being the daughter of Jose, per
records of the earlier ejectment cases they filed against petitioner. According to the
court, respondents were not candid with the court in refusing to recognize
petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that she was Ida C. Labagala, thus
affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is entered declaring the
appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago the co-owners in equal shares of the one-
third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose Santiago in the land and building
covered by TCT No. 172334. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Manila is
directed to cancel said title and issue in its place a new one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted that the birth
certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of
different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into account the statement
made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for
consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that

she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the petitioner
as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that she had adduced
sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago, making her his sole heir
and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She points out that respondents had,
before the filing of the instant case, previously "considered" [11] her as the daughter
of Jose who, during his lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate daughter.
She asserts that her identification as Jose's daughter in his ITR outweighs the
"strange" answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally,
citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals[12] in which we held that "(t)he
legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law."[13] Petitioner
also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of this contention. [14]
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of Jose, per
her birth certificate that indicate her parents as Leo Labagala and Cornelia
Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. [15] They argue that the
provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to the present case since this
is not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title,
ownership, and possession of property.
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not
respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and
possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to be
misplaced. Said article provides:
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within
one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should
be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should
reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter
on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would
reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a
man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the
child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the
child at all of a particular couple.[16]
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and

prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is
not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
all.[17] Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and
thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu present

in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged by
petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by
the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel
Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly
adopted since Doribel had already been born to the Sayson couple at the time,
petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the
child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the
decree of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a challenge to the
validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a direct proceeding. [18]
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but are,
instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother's child. The birth certificate
presented by respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:

The Certificate of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)[19] plainly states that... Ida was the
child of the spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states
that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and
therefore the supplier of the entries in said Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is
proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth
Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is
not her birth certificate, then where is hers? She did not present any though it
would have been the easiest thing to do considering that according to her baptismal
certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such denials and holds
that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida...
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony and a
baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellee's parents were Jose Santiago
and Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a
baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. This
document can only prove the identity of the baptized, the date and place of her
baptism, the identities of the baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered
the sacrament -- nothing more.[20] (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel admitted that
petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though
she had been using this name all her life.[21]
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with
Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate.[22] However, as we
held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals:
...a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations
therein stated with respect to [a person's] kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of
the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the
priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship
of the person baptized.[23]
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation.
[24]
More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that
income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.[25]
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth
certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor, failed to do so.
Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be
found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We find petitioner's silence
concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the
existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of Jose
Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would
raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be adverse to
her claim. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all
her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same
birthdate as Ida Labagala.[26] The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere
coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia
Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In
her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her
mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements that
affect her credibility and could cast a long shadow of doubt on her claims of
filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and
contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being
a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate
succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly
transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that:
...This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects that a
reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake. The intrinsic
defects are extractable from the following questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to
donate the properties in question to Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the nature
of the contract in the façade of the sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document, how
could it have happened that Jose Santiago who was of course fully aware that he
owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the properties covered by his title sold or donated
the whole properties to Ida? c) Why in heaven's name did Jose Santiago, a college
graduate, who always signed his name in documents requiring his signature
(citation omitted) [affix] his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the]
child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating his properties to
her when she would inherit them anyway upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago
affix his thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was
earlier married to Esperanza Cabrigas); Ida was of legal age (for [s]he was then
just 15 years old); and the subject properties were free from liens and
encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388,
Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated in the title of said properties). If the
deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984 after the death of
Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in possession was the baptismal sponsor of
Ida?[27]
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his
sisters.[28] Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a
minor at the time.[29] Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential
requisites of a contract,[30] including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid
contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property,
[31]
which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to
have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again, as
explained by the Court of Appeals:
...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks
the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in
1979, the acceptance of the donation should have been made by her father, Leon
Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal representative pursuant to
Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at
all - accepted the "donation" for Ida.[32]
In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals, hence it must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena J., on official leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (DAUGHTER
OF THE LATE MARIA LOCSIN ARANETA), THE SUCCESSORS
OF THE LATE LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER
LOCSIN JARANTILLA AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
LATE JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. JUAN C.
LOCSIN, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of
which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law,
is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, if there are material
discrepancies between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the September 13, 2000 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which affirmed in toto the
September 13, 1996 order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in
Special Proceeding No. 4742. The September 13 order of the trial court appointed
Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the late Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan
"Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.[1] died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E.
Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for
Letters of Administration" (docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that
he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C.
Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which
include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and
1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings,
namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester
Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for
hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly published, [2] thereby giving
notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr.,
the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the
lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters
of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged
natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr."
in his name .
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop
(sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel
Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's
claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also
entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors.
This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester
Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no
filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and,
therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate, respondent
submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D")[3] of his Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father
is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as
evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and
authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine
copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City. She produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of
birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C") [4] showing him and
his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead
body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been
recognized as family members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit
"8",[5] indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C.
Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on
October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1,
1958 revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956
form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario clearly suggests that
Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a
handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G.
Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a
spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth records
of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
After hearing, th trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of respondent's
illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued on September 13, 1996 an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED and
the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of the late Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr.
"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his filing of a bond in the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) to be approved by this Court.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision
affirming in toto the order of the trial court dated September 13, 1996. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Both motions were, however, denied by the Appellate Court in its
Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents - Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is
genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal [7] does not
apply when there appears in the record of the case some facts or circumstances of
weight and influence which have been overlooked, or the significance of which have
been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case. [8] Here,
the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that would have altered
its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred
who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
"Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall
be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife,
or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow,
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of a person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select." (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
"Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so
far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)

An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited
in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor.[9] Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the
estate as distributees.[10] In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,[11] this Court held that in
the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by
a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent
alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that
he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has
respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On
this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
child's acknowledgment."[12] (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased,
presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a
photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the trial court made
the following findings, affirmed by the Appellate Court:
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 in
the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original having been testified to by Rosita
Vencer, exists in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner since birth
enjoyed the open and continuous status of an acknowledged natural child of Juan C.
Locsin, Sr., he together with his mother was summoned to attend to the burial as
evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of the deceased with petitioner
and his mother in the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial that the
standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in public document and may
also be called questioned document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477,
the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or primary evidence. The
anomalous and suspicious characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate
of live birth as alleged by oppositors was found was testified to and explained by
Rosita Vencer of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in
1957 and requisitioned forms. However, the forms sent to them was the 1958
revised form and that she said their office usually paste the pages of the bound
volume if destroyed. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness of
the signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious
circumstances of the bound volume were erased due to the explanation of Rosita
Vencer."
This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the
records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and
regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil
Registrars. Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all
parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires
expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if
not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in
Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating
from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is

obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing
evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented by
respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit "D" are
dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of
respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago.
The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa.
Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and
entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her
general impressions of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary
from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General,
pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more
persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not
convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a
December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used
in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "xxx during
that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil
Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised
Form."[13]
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily

explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on
January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar
General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July, 1956. We
find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would
continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in
1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of
the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is
merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon
copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries
therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten.
Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate
important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation,
address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the
child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the
alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence
Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no
answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." As
to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the volume, she explained as
follows:
"COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees would only paste a
document like this Certificate of Live Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to replace the record.
Sometimes we just have it pasted in the record when the leaves were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume to be taken out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so we have to

paste them."[14] (Emphasis ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document,
Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the anomalous
circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually highlighted the suspicious
circumstances surrounding its existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the
petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and
credence by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of
registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil
Registrar General, thus:
"Duties of Local Civil Registrar. - Local civil registrars shall (a) file
registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry; (b) compile the
same monthly and prepare and send any information required of them by the Civil-
Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or copies of any document registered upon
payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly classified, of all certificates
or documents registered during the year; (e) send to the Civil Registrar-
General, during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the entries
made during the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate
search and identification in case any information is required; and (g) administer
oaths, free of charge, for civil register purposes" [15] (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the Local
Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in
substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as
transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as
appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious
document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the
same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's
father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on
November 28, 1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar[16] that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
x x x explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of
wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made
by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he
could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make
or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only
by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said
child." (Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated
in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals[17] where this Court said that "a birth certificate
not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not
competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil

Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.
However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be
refuted by contrary evidence.[18] Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where
there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this
case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the
Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges
of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates
of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D"
entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the
Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late
Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we recklessly
set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent
claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others
and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C.
Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. Indeed,
respondent is not an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79
of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002 ]
ERNESTINA BERNABE, PETITIONER, VS. CAROLINA ALEJO AS
GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR THE MINOR ADRIAN BERNABE,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children
who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or
taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within
which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals [2] (CA)
Decision[3] in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA
Resolution[4] denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the
reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing
Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.” [5]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
“The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The
son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal
Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of
the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
“On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint
praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe
and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now
being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
“On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court
of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x.”[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabe’s Motion
for Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the
Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that
the death of the putative father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative
father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give
him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian
should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the
Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after
the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family
Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.[7]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I
“Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner,
the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with
accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any written
acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
“Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents
had four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as
provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the
[express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by
the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
“Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective
for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.” [9]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.

First and Second Issues:
Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them
jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition,
because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the
Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect,
since no vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition
as follows:
“ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1 If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
) may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2 If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
) nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
“In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.”
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however
been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
“ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1 The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
)

(2 An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
) instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1 The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
)

(2 Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”
)
“ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
“The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.”
“ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.”
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must
be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no
distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the
putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering
that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without
the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent
should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this,
he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already
vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
“ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.”
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian’s right to an
action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had
already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is
affirmative.
A vested right is defined as “one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to

the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.”[11] Respondent however
contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that
“as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural
laws.”[12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:

“x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes
those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of
normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause
of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion.”[14] (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
“[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter;
but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.”[16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil
Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family
Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because
that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at bar, because the
plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a
minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals [18] the Court ruled that
an action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be
affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had
already vested.
Not Limited to
Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of
“natural” children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of
by respondent, because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded
from marrying each other. In other words, he is not a natural child.
A “natural child” is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not
disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos
v. Angeles,[19] the Court explained:
“A child’s parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at
the time of conception for him to qualify as a ‘natural child.’”[20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned
upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a
case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each
other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man,
had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two
illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children
were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In
short, at the time of their conception, the two children’s parents were legally
disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper,
even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father.
At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said that the rules
on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the
prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious
children. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
“The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural
children, commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those
born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her
husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They
are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly
proven.
“How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the
investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the
circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is
that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to
spurious children.
“Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules
on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.
“That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term
is used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or
instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the
filiation of spurious children.
“A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the
modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.
“In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child,
then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for
compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
“The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case
of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to
spurious children.”[22] (Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights
over spurious ones.[23] However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other
rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family
Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus
given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period
of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired
or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who
could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents.
As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum, [24] the State as parens
patriae should protect a minor’s right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years
old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died
in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue:
Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required
to implead “the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents.”
Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the
petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party
is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., no part. Relationship with family.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 155733, January 27, 2006 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA AND OTHER HEIRS
OF LUIS DELGADO, NAMELY, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE
AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO,
ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO
DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO AND
CLEOFAS DELGADO; AND HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO,
NAMELY, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS AND
MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, PETITIONERS, VS.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, NAMELY,
GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN AND JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, NAMELY, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-
ENRIQUEZ AND FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN
RUSTIA, SR., NAMELY, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; AND
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, AS OPPOSITORS;[1] AND GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, AS INTERVENOR,[2] RESPONDENTS.[3]
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,[4] in SP Case
No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its
decision[5] dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado.[6] The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between
petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is
attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided
into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and
full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,[7] his nephews and
nieces,[8] his illegitimate child,[9] and the de facto adopted child[10] (ampun-
ampunan) of the decedents.
THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa[11] Delgado by one Lucio
Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa
Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood
siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado's life.
Before him was Ramon Osorio[12] with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But,
unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the
benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio's and Felisa Delgado's union
is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is
crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.[13] If Ramon Osorio and
Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a
legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the
latter's intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if
the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado's intestate estate, as they would all be within the
illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In
support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it,
not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage.
What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis,
her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento[14] stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child
of Felisa Delgado),[15] significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances of his father.[16] Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist
that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that
no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several
months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado [17] but

whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two
eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove
their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage
existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa
Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919
and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on
September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they
were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To
support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs.

Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the
United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting

from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim
No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of
the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo
J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3
June 1919;[18]
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was
married to Josefa Delgado.
THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of
their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and
Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was
known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child,[19] the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter,
his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that
status from her birth in 1920 until her father's demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado's
obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent
as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas
identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.[20]
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no

interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot
claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the
authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.[21]
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo
Rustia filed a petition for the adoption[22] of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction." [23] The petition
was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his
sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the
children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia
Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia
and Leticia Rustia Miranda.[24]
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed
the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the
"spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.
[25]
This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;[26] (2) the
heirs of Guillermo Rustia's late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory
that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the
law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the

proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the
motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to
state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely
lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The
motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other
claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission
of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister,
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as

administratrix of both estates.[27] The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the
estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere
in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa
Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and
entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions
referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire
estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties
hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the

late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no
force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their
settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a
single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner
Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as
administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in
relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the

petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and

desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered
to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and
income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents,
papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt
of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of
her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[28]
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that
the record on appeal was not filed on time.[29] They then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus[30] which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
[31]
However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties' oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors'
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.[32]
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court
of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors' failure to file the record on appeal within
the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On
October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent
portion of our decision[33] read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court's pronouncements as to
certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the
decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to
be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on
appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents' intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is
apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court's decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court

hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents' Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Court's May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals[34] partially set aside the trial court's
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,[35] the Court of Appeals amended its
earlier decision.[36] The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate
estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this
decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion
referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible
to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in

relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the
oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in
the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist

from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the
appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the
assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice
of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of
her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator's qualification
and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr.

Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and
the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which

courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified
into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in
turn, either conclusive or disputable.[37]
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation
of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original
petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975
referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of
the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a
witness[38] attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman. [39]
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage,

its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.[40] Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, [41] the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, [42] the declaration under oath of no less
than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado [43] and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents
which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[44] No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners' own witness whose testimony they

primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had
proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived
together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate[45] was conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained therein,[46] such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and

Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if
the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.[47]
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of
the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be
addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.

Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. [48] On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be
relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname
Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado's and Caridad Concepcion's Partida de
Casamiento[49] identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child
of Felisa Delgado).[50]
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never
married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with
Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,
[51]
were her natural children.[52]
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X
and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they
succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood
between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab
intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that
of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should
be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between
legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration.
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons.
They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of
half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate
brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and
sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share
equally.[53]
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate,
they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new
Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor
of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. [54] Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time
of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.[55] The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial
court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of
Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,[56] they are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new
Civil Code:[57]
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not
have validly adjudicated Josefa's estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent's entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate
by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child [58] of

Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.[59] She, however, claimed the
status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil
Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate
children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however,
later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to
illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. [60] Recognition is

compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother)[61] by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father. [62]
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.[63]
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory

recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this
did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts.[64] Furthermore, any (judicial)
action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the
child and the lifetime of the putative parent.[65] On the death of either, the action
for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.[66] In this case, intervenor
Guillerma's right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of
Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma's second ground) must likewise fail.
An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This
includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
[67]
Did intervenor's report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgado's obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under
the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did
not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenor's parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the
SUNDAY TIMES on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the
authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an
authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of
Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenor's claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who

was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was
filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the
latter's death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to
inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction.
It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the
relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.[68]
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new
Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters,[69] nieces and nephews.[70]
ENTITLEMENT TO LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate

estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order
of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6 When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply
for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed.[71] The order of preference does not rule out
the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates,[72] a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of
Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of
Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia's June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is

hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate
estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and
half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any
of Josefa Delgado's full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also
surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado's grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court
is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia's estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado's

estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose
respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa
and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint
administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in
such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 159785, April 27, 2007 ]
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA CLARISSA
POSADA, IN HER OWN BEHALF, AND AS MOTHER OF MINOR
VERNA AIZA POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA AND
FRANCISCA POSADA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] dated May 30, 2003 and
the Resolution[2] dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
50557. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the Judgment[3] dated
January 4, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch
42, in Civil Case No. 1401. The RTC held petitioner liable to pay monthly support to
Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as well as moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are as follows:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of
Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner
Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the
end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioner's offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor's
office starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with
companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she
accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning. They
stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My
Brother's Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her
that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone
ahead. When they reached the place her companions were nowhere. After
petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. She
panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until
someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the
mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of
her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to

follow up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she
went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on
the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because
he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly
embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would
"divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal
development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she kept the
incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote
petitioner that she feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987,
she told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, he
replied:
My darling Chris,
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have no regret, because
I love you and you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility — you and I shall take care of it and let
him/her see the light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
2/4/87[4]
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris,"
probably because of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified
petitioner's penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in
his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters [5] sent to her by petitioner, two of
which were in his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. She also presented the
pictures[6] petitioner gave her of his youth and as a public servant, all bearing his
handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed
her a letter and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that
she would enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner
went to see her in Manila and gave her another P2,000 for her delivery. When her
parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father fetched her and
brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987, [7] she gave birth to a baby
girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissa's mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissa's story. She said they learned of
their daughter's pregnancy through her husband's cousin. She added that she felt
betrayed by petitioner and shamed by her daughter's pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente

Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987. [8]
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[respondents] and against the [petitioner] and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth
on September 23, 1987 as he was proved to be the natural father of the
above-named minor as shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the
[respondents];
2. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
5. to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with
modification, specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with modification by ordering
[petitioner] Teofisto I. Verceles:
1. To pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada from her birth
on September 23, 1987.
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral

damages and [P]15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca Posada the sum of

P15,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents] P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;

and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now presents the following issues for resolution:

I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT VERCELES

WAS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD?
II.
WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?
III.
WOULD THE RTC COURT HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THIS ISSUE OF
APPELLANT'S PATERNITY OF THE CHILD, WHICH IS MADE COLLATERAL TO THIS
ACTION FOR DAMAGES?[11]
In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether or not paternity and
filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support pendente lite; (2)
whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of
petitioner was proven; and (3) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages.
In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity and filiation of
Verna Aiza Posada has not been duly established or proved in the proceedings; that
the award for damages and attorney's fees has no basis; and that the issue of
filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a collateral action.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as
father and that it was respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the birth
certificate as father without his consent. He further contends the alleged love letters
he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of paternity but mere expressions of concern
and advice.[12] As to the award for damages, petitioner argues Clarissa could not
have suffered moral damages because she was in pari delicto, being a willing
participant in the "consensual carnal act" between them.[13] In support of his
argument that the issue on filiation should have been resolved in a separate action,
petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo Rosales[14] where we held that the
legitimacy of a child which is controversial can only be resolved in a direct action.[15]
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum maintain that the Court of
Appeals committed no error in its decision. They reiterate that Clarissa's clear
narration of the circumstances on "how she was deflowered" by petitioner, the love
letters and pictures given by petitioner to Clarissa, the corroborating testimony of
Clarissa's mother, the fact that petitioner proffered no countervailing evidence, are
preponderant evidence of paternity. They cited the case of De Jesus v.
Syquia[16] where we held that a conceived child can be acknowledged because this is
an act favorable to the child.[17] They also argue that damages should be awarded
because petitioner inveigled Clarissa to succumb to his sexual advances. [18]
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages' On this score, we
find petitioner's stance unmeritorious. The caption is not determinative of the
nature of a pleading. In a string of cases we made the following rulings. It is not
the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning to a pleading. Courts are
called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof. [19] In determining
the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and
the character of the relief sought, that are controlling.[20]
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states
"Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite," Clarissa's averments therein, her
meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction,
their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support
for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held
that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.[21]
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are declarations that lead
nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an
alias in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the
annotation at the back of petitioner's fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable.
Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written by
one and the same person, petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his affair with Clarissa,
the exchange of love letters between them, and his giving her money during her
pregnancy. [22]
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They
are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of
petitioner which establish Verna Aiza's filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family
Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates,
letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence
that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner's illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no
evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that
denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. [23]
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article
2219[24]of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of
seduction is inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the
time she had an affair with petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or
jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child
to damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law
or jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorney's fees in consonance with Article 2208
(2)[25] and (11)[26] of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and exemplary
damages be DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 ]
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ AND MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA
CRUZ "AQUINO," REPRESENTED BY JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ, PETITIONERS, VS. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela
Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino
(Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
They resided in the house of Dominique's parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel
Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After almost two months, or on

November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique's parents, gave
birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the
Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child's birth, using Dominique's surname
Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which
she submitted the child's Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of
the Father[3] (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominique's father Domingo Butch Aquino.[4] Both
affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had
continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never
been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
I'M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20

THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE
BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER'S NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER'S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS
AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN
OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE
FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF
NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE
NOW. THAT'S ALL.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005, [7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie's application for registration of the
child's name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules

and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to
Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the `Family Code of the
Philippines'"]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten
instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration
is supported by the following documents:
a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the
document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the
father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born
out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more
capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of
Municipal Form No. 102 - Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity - or
the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint [9] for injunction/registration of name
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as
SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint
alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child's name is a violation of
his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if
their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father
has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation
during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an

admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the
contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons,

respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of

her common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her
AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child. [11] She
offered Dominique's handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her documentary
evidence-in-chief.[12] Dominique's lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also
testified, corroborating Jenie's declarations. [13]
By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of
cause of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2
(Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004
(the Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A.
9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through which a father may
acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument - an instrument executed in the

handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes
paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten
Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising
this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE

DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT"
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS
AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER'S
SURNAME.[15] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not
expressly require that the private handwritten instrument containing the putative
father's admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add that the
deceased's handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for
the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative
Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void as
it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.
[16]
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominique's
handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the
child's paternity.[17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondent's
position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays
for the dismissal of the petition. It further submits that Dominique's Autobiography
"merely acknowledged Jenie's pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she
was carrying in her womb."[18]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate
child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized
him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child's paternity; hence, no separate
action for judicial approval is necessary.[19]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that
the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child's paternity must be
signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction
with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the
father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
x x x x
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument

must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code.
Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such
requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by
petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique's
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of
the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child's birth. Second, the
relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique,
correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.
[20]
Third, Jenie's testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of
Dominique's father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the
questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique's
paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE
DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW
SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on

establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation
xxxx

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule
130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. -- The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related
to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or

tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as
evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by
a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation
must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose
filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence.
Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the
putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate
of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father
gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in
Dominique's Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together
with the other relevant facts extant herein - that Dominique, during his lifetime,
and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005
at his parents' house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his
death, Jenie gave birth to the child - they sufficiently establish that the child of
Jenie is Dominique's.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission
of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence

submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount
consideration" in resolving questions affecting him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is
similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social

welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
[23]
(Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x
x."[24] Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from
abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development."[25]
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor.
It is to petitioner minor child's best interests to allow him to bear the surname of
the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is
DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto.
Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his
Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Leonardo-De Castro,

*
and Peralta, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010 ]
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, PETITIONER, VS. ARHBENCEL ANN
LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER ARACELI LOPEZ,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli

Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint[1] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an

extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his
signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August
7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support in
the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August
15, 1999.
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note,
Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2)
give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3)
give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of
Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account
of threats coming from the National People's Army.[2]
By Order of July 4, 2001,[3] Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of

petitioner's handwritten note which it treated as "contractual support" since the
issue of Arhbencel's filiation had yet to be determined during the hearing on the
merits, granted Arhbencel's prayer for support pendente lite in the amount
of P3,000 a month.
After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the
trial court granted by Order dated June 7, 2006, [4] whereupon the case was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencel's Certificate of Birth was
not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioner's
signature; that petitioner's handwritten undertaking to provide support did not
contain a categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there
was no showing that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of
Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007,

[5]
reversed the trial court's decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioner's
illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to give Arhbencel financial
support in the increased amount of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month,
or a total of P8,000 a month.
The appellate court found that from petitioner's payment of Araceli's hospital bills
when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his subsequent commitment to provide
monthly financial support, the only logical conclusion to be drawn was that he was
Arhbencel's father; that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement
of paternity in his handwritten undertaking to provide financial support; and that
the amount of P8,000 a month was reasonable for Arhbencel's subsistence and not
burdensome for petitioner in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3,
2008,[6] petitioner comes before this Court through the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari.[7]
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by Araceli

is an explicit statement made by him that he is the father of Arhbencel; that absent
recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support
from the putative parent; that the supposed payment made by him of Araceli's
hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during the trial; and
that Arhbencel's claim of paternity and filiation was not established by clear and
convincing evidence.
Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions of fact which the
appellate court had already addressed, along with the issues raised in the present
petition.[8]
The petition is impressed with merit.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code[9] that treat of the right to support are
Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance,

dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding

paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in
going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following
are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding
article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-
blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article
194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is
due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Arhbencel's demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner
as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her entitlement to
support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation.
Herrera v. Alba[10] summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing

filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation
xxxx
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule
130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. -- The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related
to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or

tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as
evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by
a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be
made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the
putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence.
Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the
putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate
of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father
gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note
executed by petitioner which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support

in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total
of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in
the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject
to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about
Arhbencel's filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article
172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to
support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized.
And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the
putative father's admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation.
Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through
contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her

Certificate of Birth,[11] has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the
latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner's handwritten undertaking to

provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of
filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative father's legitimate family.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 20,

2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan
City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015 ]
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, PETITIONER. VS. EDNA G. SIASAT,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the August 30, 2006
Decision[2] and December 20, 2011 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the August 17, 1999 Decision [4] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 and denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died,
intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994,
respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein subject
properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462)
1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles). [6]
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City
(Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against
respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591 and assigned to
Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint[7] alleged that petitioner is the only
son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered
that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the
Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the
subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago;
that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of
second owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896, which respondent opposed;
and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two
missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for
mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered to surrender to him the
owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer,[8] respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the
Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a
natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar
predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal
share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers
and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles
were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar,
who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses
as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following documents, among
others:
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit “C” and
submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;
2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit “F”), which indicated that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10,
1957 (Exhibit “G”), a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by
Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature
and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5,
1945, is his son and dependent;
4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated October

29, 1954 (Exhibit “L”), indicating that petitioner is his son;
5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit “M”), where it is

declared that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit “O”) addressed to a BMMC supervisor

introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for
employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry
to the effect that the record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were
“all destroyed by nature,” hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth
of petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit “Q”).[9]
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-Aguilar
(Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and sister
of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed petitioner’s identity, and she
testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and that during her
marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar spouses’ conjugal
home built on one of the subject properties. On the other hand, 81-year old
Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar
spouses have only one son – herein petitioner – who was born at BMMC; that after
the death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim ownership of
the subject properties because they recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses’
sole child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted, imprisoned,
and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole, petitioner
continued to live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in one of the subject
properties, and continues to live there with his family. [10]
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher;
that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his name from her aunt
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by consanguinity or affinity to
petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under
medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital
and funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar
executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole
heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate; that she did not steal the subject
titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a
prior planned sale of the subject properties did not push through because when
petitioner’s opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement as to the
agreed price.[11]
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-

Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were married on June
22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that
she does not know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a certain
“Rodolfo” whose nickname was “Mait”; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar
spouses; and that Alfredo Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano. [12]
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-

Aguilar (Exhibit “2”) announcing among others that she and Alfredo have no issue,
and that she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as follows:
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting to
the fact that plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one was
ever presented. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced
confirming his biological relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and
Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar
(Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue
and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof that
plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the
deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this
action to be considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory
injunction and damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with

cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.[14] Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229,
the appeal essentially argued that petitioner is indeed the Aguilar spouses’ son;
that under Article 172 of the Family Code,[15] an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the documentary evidence
presented, petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate biological son of the
Aguilar spouses and the sole heir to their estate. He argued that he cannot present
his Certificate of Live Birth as all the records covering the period 1945-1946 [16] of
the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed as shown by Exhibits “Q” to
“Q-3”; for this reason, he presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove
his relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular reference to,
among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”), arguing that the same
was made under oath and thus sufficient under Article 172 of the Family Code to
establish that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar spouses. Finally, petitioner
questioned the trial court’s reliance upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s affidavit
(Exhibit “2”) attesting that she and Alfredo have no children and that she is the sole
heir to the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has been discarded by
the trial court in a previous Order dated April 1, 1998, stating thus:
Except for defendant’s Exhibit “2”, all other Exhibits, Exhibits “1”, “3”, “4” and “5”,
together with their submarkings, are all admitted in evidence. [17]
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial court’s
August 17, 1999 Decision, pronouncing thus:
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the
deceased spouses Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court. The
Elementary School Permanent Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as
proof of filiation. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Reyes vs.
Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:
“Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute
evidence of filiation.”
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, WE hold that it cannot be considered as evidence of filiation. As
stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:
“A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation.
More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that
income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.”
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the

parents of the former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not prove
filiation. The Highest Tribunal declared that a marriage contract not signed by the
alleged father of bride is not competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage
contract recognition in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1 (Exhibit
“G”) and the Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit “L”),
allegedly tend to establish that plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently known
as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has been bearing the surname of his alleged
parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument. Use of a family surname certainly

does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo
Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof to establish and
prove the filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses. While the
former is a public instrument and the latter bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar,
they do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to show filiation based on
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a
serious matter that must be resolved according to the requirements of the law.
All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to hurdle the “high standard of proof”
required for the success of an action to establish one’s legitimate filiation when
relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses

Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs in his
favor, this Court cannot grant the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and
unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither had he shown permanent and
urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in denying the
same. Aside from the fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to show his clear right over
the subject parcels of land so that he has not sustained any damage by reason of
the withholding of the TCTs from him, there is no clear testimony on the anguish or
anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result thereof. Well entrenched in law and
jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral damages is expressly allowed
by law in instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral
shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is hereby

DENIED. The impugned Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[19] but in a December 20, 2011

Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,[20] this Court resolved to give due course to the
Petition, which raises the following issues:
In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of RTC Branch 49,
Bacolod City, and the Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration,
the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error [in] not taking into
consideration petitioner’s Exhibit “G” (SSS E-1 acknowledged and notarized before
a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son)
as public document that satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the [Family]
Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father,
Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to the
application of Article 172 of the Family Code particularly [paragraph] 3 thereof in
conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court relating
to public document which is substantial enough to merit consideration of this
Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and forestall future litigation. [21]
Petitioner’s Arguments
In his Petition and Reply[22] seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA
dispositions and praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to
surrender the owner’s duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and
T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”)
satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that said SSS
Form E-1 is a declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as
the latter’s son; this recognition should be accorded more weight than the
presumption of legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares that said evidence
establishes legitimate filiation without need of court action. He adds that in
contemplation of law, recognition in a public instrument such as the SSS Form E-1
is the “highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature of a complete
act of recognition bestowed upon” him as the son of the late Alfredo Aguilar; that
respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally
attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already
prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code; [23] and that having
proved his filiation, mandatory injunction should issue, and an award of damages is
in order.
Respondent’s Arguments
In her Comment[24] and Memorandum,[25] respondent simply echoes the

pronouncements of the CA, adding that the Petition is a mere rehash of the CA
appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by the appellate court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,[26] has held that –
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo
de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and

founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption
indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that
the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in
Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect
on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer
be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be

concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage
of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar[28] and before their respective
deaths[29] – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit
“G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes
an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all
the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod
City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary
evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) – to prove
filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first
paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court
has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission
of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount
consideration” in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is
similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social

welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.”
Too, “(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from
abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.”[30] (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy
of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the
Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to
go through the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy
would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the Certification dated
January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit “Q”) contained
just such an advice for petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General at the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since
for every registered birth in the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is
submitted to said office.
As to petitioner’s argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his

legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to
impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code, the Court has held before that –
Article 263[31] refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and
prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is
not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
all.[32]
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter’s estate. Respondent is then left with
no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s estate, since succession
pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line.[33]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision and
December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the
petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner’s duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* , Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 163362, July 08, 2015 ]
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO
ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO,
JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD,
ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO,
NICETAS VENTULA, AND NILA ARADO, PEDRO ARADO,
TOMASA V. ARADO, PETITIONERS, VS. ANACLETO ALCORAN
AND ELENETTE SUNJACO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on February 28, 2003,

[1]
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on January
15, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, in Dumaguete City (RTC)
[2]
dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim for being without merit.
Antecedents
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and

their marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas).[3] In turn, Nicolas
married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia)[4] but their union had no offspring. During
their marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita
(Francisca), who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13,
1951[5] during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia.[6] In 1972, Anacleto
married Elenette Sonjaco.[7]
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died m 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in
1960, and Joaquina in 1981.[8]
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan.
[9]
Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all
surnamed Arado.[10] Nemesio had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was
married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was married to Tomasa Arado; (3)
Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria;[11] and (6) Felicisima.[12] During the pendency
of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1)
Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly
Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse,
Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa
filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and damages (with application
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette.
[13]
Named as unwilling co-plaintiffs were Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan,
along with Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima.
The properties subject of the action were the following: (1) Lot No. 4100, covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OV-1379; (2) Lot No. 4054, covered by
OCT No. OV-1380; (3) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6065; (4) a
parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 20470; (5) a parcel of land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 11-028-A; (6) Lot No. 709 covered by OCT No. OV-7784;
(7) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 87-011-215-A; (8) a parcel of
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 87-011-217; (9) Lot No. 5234 covered by OCT
No. 3489-A; and (10) Lot No. 5224 covered by Tax Declaration No. 8-201. [14] The
parties later stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had previously
belonged to Raymundo, while the last two had been the paraphernal properties of
Joaquina.[15]
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939, his
properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as it was during the period of
the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not inherit but only a share of the
usufruct, which was extinguished upon the death of the usufructuary;"[16] that when
Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his properties were inherited by his wife,
Florencia, and the other half by his mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn,
succeeded by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage
of Nicolas and Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from which affair
Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether he was the spurious son of Nicolas;
that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime;
hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto
claimed entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will
executed by Joaquina; that the will was void for not having been executed
according to the formalities of the law, and the same did not reflect the true
intention of Joaquina; that the supposed testator did not acknowledge the will,
which was not submitted for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the
properties; that notwithstanding their repeated demands for the return of the
properties, the defendants persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction should issue to prevent the defendants from further violating
their rights in the properties; and that the defendants should be ordered to
reconvey the properties, and to pay; P20,000.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. [17]
In their answer,[18] the defendants (respondents herein) countered that Anacleto

was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact evidenced by the
certificate of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus had the right to inherit the
properties from Nicolas; that because Anacleto was still too young when Nicolas
died, the administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's grandmother,
Joaquina; that Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor; that
Joaquina's possession of the properties was for and in behalf of Anacleto, who had
been living with her since his birth; that such possession began in 1954 when
Nicolas died and continued until Joaquina's death in 1981; that Anacleto then took
over the possession of the properties to the exclusion of all others; that granting for
the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the same were
already lost through laches, estoppel and prescription; and that Anacleto was the
rightful owner of the properties, and his ownership and possession should not be
disturbed.
By way of counterclaim, the defendants prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay
50,000.00 as moral damages, 1,000.00 "as initial expenses as costs of this
litigation which will increase as the case progresses"[19] and 10,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
Veronica Limpahan and Sulpicio Limpahan likewise filed their answer[20] to the
complaint, stating that they were not interested in pursuing any claim of ownership
in the properties; that assuming that they were entitled, they were abandoning
their rights, interests, title and participation in the properties; and that they be
excluded from further court processes.
Judgrnent of the RTC
On January 15, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, decreeing thusly:

Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint and the counterclaim for lack of merit.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth of Anacleto
(Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births of the
Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit 3), which proved that Nicolas had himself caused
the registration of Anacleto's birth by providing the details thereof and indicating
that he was the father of Anacleto. It observed that the name of Nicolas appeared
under the column "Remarks" in the register of births, which was the space provided
for the name of the informant; that because the plaintiffs did not present evidence
to refute the entry in the register of births, the entry became conclusive with
respect to the facts contained therein; that Anacleto's claim of recognition was
bolstered by his baptismal certificate (Exhibit F), in which was indicated that his
parents were Nicolas Alcoran and Francisca Sarita; that also presented was a
picture taken during the wake of Nicolas (Exhibit 5) showing the young Anacleto
being carried by Joaquina, and also Nicolas' wife, Florencia; that in addition, the
school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6) showed that Joaquina stood as his guardian
during his grade school years; that when Anacleto got married, it was Joaquina who
gave consent to his marriage because he was then still a minor (Exhibit 8); and
that Joaquina executed her will in 1978 (Exhibit 9), bequeathing the subject
properties to Anacleto, but the will was yet to be probated.
As the case was filed during the effectivity of the Family Code, the RTC ruled that
Articles 172,[22] 173[23] and 175[24] of the Family Code allowed Anacleto to establish
his filiation during his lifetime through the record of his birth appearing in the civil
register. It further ruled that because there were no legitimate children of Nicolas
who contested Anacleto's right to inherit, the rule on the separation of the
legitimate from the illegitimate family was rendered irrelevant; and that,
accordingly, Anacleto was entitled to possess the subject properties upon having
established that he was the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. Consequently,
it also dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient basis.
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA.[25]
Decision of the CA
On February 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision, [26] affirming the judgment
of the RTC in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch
43 stands.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto was an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It agreed that the Register of Births of the
Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that Nicolas was the father of
Anacleto, and that the former had supplied the information on the latter's birth. It
declared that the plaintiffs did not rebut the filiation of Anacleto by contrary
evidence; that the baptismal certificate of Anacleto and the picture taken during the
wake of Nicolas further showed that Anacleto had been acknowledged by Nicolas;
that based on the Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, the law applicable
at the time of the filing of the case, Anacleto's filiation was established by the
record of his birth appearing in the civil register; and that Anacleto possessed rights
in the subject properties.
Anent the successional rights of the parties, the CA pronounced that after
Raymundo died in 1939, his wife, Joaquina, and his son, Nicolas, inherited his
properties; that when Nicolas died in 1954, he was survived by Joaquina (his
mother), Florencia (his legitimate wife), and Anacleto (his illegitimate son); that
Joaquina was entitled to one-half of Nicolas' estate, and the remaining half should
be divided between Florencia and Anacleto; that in 1960, when Florencia died
without issue, the share she had inherited from Nicolas was inherited by her
siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; and that when Joaquina died in 1981, she
was survived by her sibling Alejandra; her nieces Jesusa, [27] Josefina, Gliceria and
Felicisima; her nephews Pedro and Teodorico; and her illegitimate grandson,
Anacleto.
The CA declared that the plaintiffs were already barred from asserting their rights in
the properties by estoppel by laches; that Joaquina had executed her last will and
testament on April 19, 1978, whereby she bequeathed her properties to Anacleto;
that the properties were thus transmitted to Anacleto upon her death in 1981; that
the plaintiffs filed their complairtt in the RTC only on January 14, 1992; that it
would be unjust to award the subject properties to the plaintiffs who had slept on
their rights for a long time; and that the plaintiffs could probably pursue their claim
in the appropriate intestate or testate proceedings.
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[28] but the CA denied their motion
on March 24, 2004.
Issues
In this appeal, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners, [29] implore the Court to nullify the
assailed rulings of the CA, and to determine once and for all the following issues:
(a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran x x x;
and
(b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.[30]
The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas'
illegitimate son; that inasmuch as Anacleto was born to Francisca during the
subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia, Anacleto could only be the spurious
child of Nicolas; that there was no law for the acknowledgment of a spurious child;
that even if Anacleto would be given the benefit of the doubt and be considered a
natural child. Article 278 of the Civil Code states that "[r]ecognition shall be made
in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing;" that the appearance of the father's name in the certificate of
birth alone, without his actual intervention, was insufficient to prove paternity; that
the mere certificate by the civil registrar that the father himself registered the child,
without the father's signature, was not proof of the father's voluntary
acknowledgment; that the baptismal certificate was insufficient proof of paternity;
and that if there was ground for Anacleto's recognition, the period to claim
recognition already prescribed.
The petitioners reject the claim of Anacleto that Joaquina bequeathed the subject
properties to him by last will and testament. They assail the validity and due
execution of the will, which was not submitted for probate; that the joint affidavit
allegedly executed in favor of Anacleto by Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan,
with Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima Arado, whereby they ceded their rights in the
subject properties in favor of Anacleto, was unwarranted; and that the veracity of
the affidavit was doubtful because it was purportedly inconsistent with Anacleto's
stance that he had inherited the properties in his own right.
In tum, the defendants, herein respondents, counter that Nicolas recognized

Anacleto as his illegitimate child because Nicolas had himself caused the
registration of Anacleto's birth; that the petitioners' allegation of prescription lacked
basis inasmuch as Anacleto was not seeking compulsory recognition; and that
Anacleto had already been voluntarily recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC, albeit for different
reasons.
The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the subject properties is
properly characterized as an accion reivindicatoria. According to Cañezo v. Bautista,
[31]
an "[a]ccion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus
utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion
reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land
and seeks recovery of its full possession." In essence, the petitioners seek to put an
end to Anacleto's possession of the properties on the basis of their being the
rightful heirs considering that Anacleto, being the spurious child of Nicolas, held no
successional rights in the estate of Nicolas.
The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by preponderance

of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the plaintiffs. In that regard, we have
discoursed on preponderance of evidence in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.,[32] thusly:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he
must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent. (Bold underscoring for emphasis)
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.
At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the
provisions of the Family Code[33] should apply because the petitioners' complaint
was filed, litigated and decided by the RTC during the effectivity of the Family Code.
Under the Family Code, the classification of children is limited to either legitimate or
illegitimate.[34] Illegitimate filiation is proved in accordance with Article 175 of
the Family Code, to wit:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article I72, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established m accordance with
Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code, which state:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or laws.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had
duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of Anacleto
appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental
(Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the
birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in
the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of
Births. Based on the certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the Register of Births
entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was the space provided for the name of the
informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering that Nicolas, the putative
father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the
birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully warranted. [35]
Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in determining

his filiation. We have already held in Cabatania v. Court of Appeals [36] that "while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the
veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal
certificates were "per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus
"cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]."
Hence, we attach no probative value to the baptismal certificate as proof of the
filiation of Anacleto.
The weight accorded by the RTC and the CA to the picture depicting the young
Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of the departed
Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also undeserved. At best, the picture merely manifested
that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto. Cautioning
against the admission in evidence of a picture of similar nature, we have pointed
out in Solinap v. Locsin, Jr.[37] that:
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C.
Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very
dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims.
Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and
thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that Joaquina was
the guardian of Anacleto in his grade school years, and the marriage contract
between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C), which indicated that Joaquina
had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not have the evidentiary value
accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent recognition of Anacleto
mattered little, for, as we stressed in Cenido v. Apacionado,[38] the recognition
"must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by any brother,
sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary
declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish
the paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence

notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained
beyond question in view of the showing that Nicolas had personally and directly
acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the respective rights
of the parties in relation to the specific properties subject of the complaint?
To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had
previously belonged to Raymundo, while the remaining two had been the
paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was the
governing law on succession. Under Article 807 thereof, [39] Joaquina and
Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the legitimate son of Raymundo, were the
forced heirs who acquired legal title to Raymundo's estate upon his death. In
accordance with Article 834 thereof,[40] Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire
estate of Raymundo, while Joaquina was entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to
the one third portion available for betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was already in effect.
[41]
Under Article 1000 thereof,[42] the heirs entitled to inherit from Nicolas's estate
were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his surviving spouse), and Anacleto (his
acknowledged illegitimate son). Said heirs became co-owners of the properties
comprising the entire estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in accordance
with Article 1078[43] of the Civil Code.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate included the
first eight of the subject properties that had previously belonged to Raymundo.
Anacleto became a co-owner of said properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in
1954.[44] Likewise, Joaquina succeeded to, and became a pro indiviso co-owner of,
the properties that formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in
1981, her hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her
share in the estate of Nicolas. In as much as Joaquina died without any surviving
legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or spouse, Article 1003 [45] of
the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives should inherit her entire
estate.
Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by law from
inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto could not inherit from
Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina.
[46]
Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the
illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[47] the right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto could not
inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will and
testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento) (Exhibit K). Article 838 of
the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. We have
clarified in Gallanosa v. Arcangel[48] that in order that a will may take effect, "it has
to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The
probate of the will is mandatory." It appears that such will remained ineffective
considering that the records are silent as to whether it had ever been presented for
probate, and had been allowed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The petitioners
alleged this fact in their complaint, and the respondents did not controvert the
allegation. In the absence of proof showing that the supposed will of Joaquina had
been duly approved by the competent court, we hold that it had not been so
approved. Hence, we cannot sustain the CA's ruling to the effect that Joaquina had
bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by will, and that the properties had been
transmitted to him upon her death.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are the
ones entitled to inherit from her estate.
Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not establish
that the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been respectively settled
with finality through the appropriate testate or intestate proceedings, and
partitioned in due course. Unless there was a proper and valid partition of the
assets of the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether
extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not adjudicate unto themselves and
claim specific portions of their estates, because, as we have declared in Carvajal v.
Court of Appeals:[49]
x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim
ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose
of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.
Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the
whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to
him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the
estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and
Joaquina had been previously partitioned, the Court concludes and holds that none
of the parties herein can lay claim over any of the disputed specific properties. The
petitioners cannot contend, therefore, that they were the rightful owners of the
properties of the late Joaquina to the exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the
dismissal of the petitioners' complaint for recovery of such properties.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 28, 2003

by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015 ]
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, PETITIONER, VS. KAREN
SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 promulgated on January 17, 2011
and May 24, 2011, respectively, which affirmed the Decision [3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8. Both courts a quo ruled that the
subject document titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman is null and void, and
ordered herein petitioner Eugenio San Juan Geronimo (Eugenio), who was
previously joined by his brother Emiliano San Juan Geronimo (Emiliano) as co-
defendant, to vacate the one-half portion of the subject 6,542-square meter
property and surrender its possession to respondent Karen Santos. In a
Resolution[4] dated November 28, 2011, this Court ordered the deletion of the name
of Emiliano from the title of the instant petition as co-petitioner, viz.:
x x x The Court resolves:
xxxx

(2) to AMEND the title of this petition to read "Eugenio San Juan Geronimo, petitioner vs.
Karen Santos, respondent," considering the sworn statement of Eugenio San Juan Geronimo
that he does not know whether his brother is still alive and that his brother did not verify the
instant petition; x x x[5]
The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court
in its assailed Decision, viz.:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and
recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who
are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the
property consisting of one-half of the parcel of land located at San Jose, Paombong,
Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging to her parents
was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that
defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and
adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that consequently they
took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and
the tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate
the property and pay her damages.
In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the
only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino
and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who was
in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed that the birth certificate of the
plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly impossible for Rufino and
Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had
never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher
in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from
August 1963 until October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-brothers of her
father Rufino, being the children of Rufino's father Marciano Geronimo with another
woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot 1716 with the defendants' mother
Carmen, and upon his death in 1980, when the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his
share in the property devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad
and she executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino's estate
entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan,
whereby the plaintiffs mother Caridad waived all her rights to Rufino's share and in
the land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it may, in 1985,
guardianship proceedings appeared to have been instituted with the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it was established that the plaintiff was the
minor child of Caridad with her late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed
guardian of the person and estate of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the real
estate taxes on the property, but in 2000, the defendants took possession of the
land and had the tax declaration transferred to them. This compelled her to file the
present case.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is the
only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that when Rufino's wife
could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad's
niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage,
when Karen joined her adoptive parents' household. Believing that in the absence
of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their
brother, they executed in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman.
Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth certificate. It had
irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the
box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the
name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the
informant's signature.
Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of the
DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiffs service record as an elementary school
teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to show that she did not have any maternity leave
during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984, and a
certification from the Schools Division Superintendent that the plaintiff did not file
any maternity leave during her service. He declared that as far as the service
record is concerned, it reflects the entry and exit from the service as well as the
leaves that she availed of. Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that
the leaves were reflected but the absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiffs
birth certificate, Exhibit 14, Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed
that there was an alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In
view of the alterations, he considered the document questionable. [6]
On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman dated March 9, 2000

executed in favor of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo as
null and void;
2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject property in the

names of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo;
3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-

Geronimo to vacate the 1/2 portion of the subject property and to surrender the
possession to the plaintiff;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of [P]30,000.00 as

attorney's fees;
5. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir - being the legitimate child - of
the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad).
It found that respondent's filiation was duly established by the certificate of live
birth which was presented in evidence. The RTC dismissed the claim of petitioner
that the birth certificate appeared to have been tampered, specifically on the
entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant.
The trial court held that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to explain how the
erasures were done. Petitioner also failed to prove that the alterations were due to
the fault of respondent or another person who was responsible for the act. In the
absence of such contrary evidence, the RTC relied on the prima facie presumption
of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate as a public document.
The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate
is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by
evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child
under Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC considered the
following overt acts of the deceased spouses as acts of recognition that respondent
is their legitimate child: they sent her to school and paid for her tuition fees;
Caridad made respondent a beneficiary of her burial benefits from the Government
Service Insurance System; and, Caridad filed a petition for guardianship of
respondent after the death of her husband Rufino. Lastly, the trial court held that to
be allowed to impugn the filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should have
brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code.
Since petitioner failed to file such action, the trial court ruled that respondent alone
is entitled to the ownership and possession of the subject land owned by Rufino.
The extrajudicial settlement executed by petitioner and his brother was therefore
declared not valid and binding as respondent is Rufino's only compulsory heir.
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of
respondent and the offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the
Civil Registry instead of the birth certificate itself. According to petitioner,
respondent's open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is
only secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent questioned if it
was legally permissible for petitioner to question her filiation as a legitimate child of
the spouses Rufino and Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and
recovery of possession that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-
defendant. Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated under Articles 170
and 171 of the Family Code, giving the putative father and his heirs the right to
bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of the child, are not present in the instant
case. She further asserted that the Family Code contemplates a direct action, thus
her civil status may not be assailed indirectly or collaterally in this suit.
In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate court held that
under Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be
reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother
during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in the
civil registry. The CA found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth
to respondent on a specific date. It further resolved that the birth certificate
presented in this case, Exhibit 14, does not qualify as the valid registration of birth
in the civil register as envisioned by the law, viz.:
x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil register, Act No.
3753, the declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or in
default thereof, that declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of birth in the civil register. The document in question
was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either the parent of the
plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally,
cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant
as shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened.
Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final
judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation. The final judgment
mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child legitimate.
Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad
based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff. [8]
Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or admission in a public
or private document that respondent is the legitimate child of the spouses Rufino
and Caridad, the appellate court — similar to the trial court - relied on Article 172 of
the Family Code which allows the introduction and admission of secondary evidence
to prove one's legitimate filiation via open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child. The CA agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven
her legitimate filiation, viz.:
We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her filiation by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The evidence consists of
the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their
family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for
lier tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial
benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied
for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff
from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are
both the legal heirs of the deceased.
It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate child of Rufino
and Caridad has been open and continuous, x x x The conclusion follows that the
plaintiff is entitled to the property left by Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the
defendants, which consists of a one-half share in Lot 1716. [9]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration[10] but the motion was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated May 24, 2011. Hence, this petition raising the following
assignment of errors:
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ALLOWED
THE INTRODUCTION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE AND RENDERED JUDGMENT
BASED THEREON NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY
EVIDENCE OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE [EXHIBIT 14].
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO IMPUGN RESPONDENT'S
LEGITIMATE FILIATION.[11]
On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to prove one's filiation
is admissible only if there is no primary evidence, i.e, a record of birth or an
authentic admission in writing.[12] Petitioner asserts that herein respondent's birth
certificate, Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence enumerated under Article
172 of the Family Code and the ruling of both courts a quo that the document is not
the one "envisioned by law" should have barred the introduction of secondary
evidence. Petitioner expounds this proposition, viz.:
The findings of the courts a quo that the birth certificate [Exhibit 14] is not [the]
one envisioned by law finds support in numerous cases decided by the Honorable
Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates,
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Where the birth certificate
and the baptismal certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation,
they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. x
xx
x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of birth originally
written in ball pen was erased and the date April 6, 1972 was superimposed using a
pentel pen; the entry on the informant also originally written in ball pen was erased
and the name E. Daño was superimposed using also a pentel pen; there is no
signature as to who received it from the office of the registry. Worst, respondent
Karen confirms the existence of her birth certificate when she introduced in
evidence [Exhibit A] a mere Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, which highlighted more suspicions of its existence, thus
leading to conclusion and presumption that if such evidence is presented, it would
be adverse to her claim. True to the suspicion, when Exhibit 14 was introduced by
the petitioner and testified on by no less than the NSO representative, Mr. Arturo
Reyes, and confirmed that there were alterations which renders the birth certificate
questionable.
Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or
falsity, the courts a quo should have stopped there, ruled that respondent Karen is
not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate. [13]
On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred and abused its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he does not have
personality to impugn respondent's legitimate filiation. [14] While petitioner admits
that the CA "did not directly rule on this particular issue,"[15] he nonetheless raises
the said issue as an error since the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioner argues that in so affirming, the CA also adopted the ruling of the
trial court that the filiation of respondent is strictly personal to respondent's alleged
father and his heirs under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,[16] thereby
denying petitioner the "right to impugn or question the filiation and status of the
plaintiff."[17] Petitioner argues, viz.:
x x x [T]he lower court's reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code is
totally misplaced, with due respect. It should be read in conjunction with the other
articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation of the Family Code. A careful
reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt
exists that a child is indeed a man's child, and the father [or, in proper cases, his
heirs] denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not
merely that respondent Karen is not a legitimate child of, but that she is not a child
of Rufino Geronimo at all. x x x[18]
We grant the petition.
Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent offered in evidence is
questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate child and the sole
heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on
secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the second paragraph
of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the filiation of legitimate children, viz.:

In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct
action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted
as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as
in the instant case which is an action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession.
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under
Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove
the filiation of a child. The rationale behind this procedural prescription is stated in
the case of Tison v. Court of Appeals,[19] viz.:
x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code xxx actually fixes a civil status
for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally.
The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in
the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: 'The contest of the legitimacy of a
child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.' This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because
they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The
obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from
being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to
settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to
the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the
conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none -
even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory."[20]
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is
applicable only to actions where the legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of a child is at
issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein respondent - is not at issue.
Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased
brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is
not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at; all. He proffers this
allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by way of defense that
respondent is not an heir to his brother Rufino. When petitioner alleged that
respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in the
proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting
and ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent - even if such proof is similar
to the evidence admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite
the instant case not being a direct action to prove one's filiation. In the following
cases, the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of secondary
evidence in actions which involve allegations that the opposing party is not the child
of a particular couple — even if such evidence is similar to the kind of proof
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172.
In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,[21] therein deceased spouses

Vicente Benitez (Vicente) and Isabel Chipongian (Isabel) owned various properties
while they were still living. Isabel departed in 1982, while Vicente died intestate in
1989. In 1990, Vicente's sister (Victoria Benitez-Lirio) and nephew (Feodor Benitez
Aguilar) instituted an action before the trial court for the issuance of letters of
administration of his estate in favor of Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged
that Vicente was "survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or
descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x x x."[22] They
further argued that one "Marissa Benitez[-]Badua who was raised and cared for by
them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted,
and is therefore not a legal heir [of Vicente]."[23] Marissa opposed the petition and
proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente. Marissa submitted the
following evidence, viz.:
1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);
2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);
3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the
late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their
legitimate daughter.[24]
Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence to show that the
spouses Vicente and Isabel failed to beget a child during their marriage. They
testified that the late Isabel, when she was 36 years old, was even referred to an
obstetrician-gynecologist for treatment. Victoria, who was 77 years old at the time
of her testimony, also categorically stated that Marissa was not the biological child
of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate. [25]
The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa
as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The
appellate court: reversed the RTC's ruling holding that the trial court erred in
applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this Court, we
affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child
of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a
said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his
child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to
Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but
that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child,
nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased."[26]
Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago[27] originated from a complaint for
recovery of title, ownership and possession before the trial court. Respondents
therein contended that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent Jose and
sought to recover from her the 1/3 portion of the subject property pertaining to
Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents sought to prove that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent as
evidenced by her birth certificate which did not itself indicate the name of Jose as
her father. Citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263 of the Civil
Code (now Article 170 of the Family Code),[28] petitioner argued that respondents
cannot impugn her filiation collaterally since the case was not an action impugning
a child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership and possession of
property. We ruled in this case that petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil
Code is misplaced and respondents may impugn the petitioner's filiation in an
action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed the ruling of the
appellate court that the birth certificate of petitioner Labagala proved that she "was
born of different parents, not Jose and his wife."[29] Citing the aforecited cases
of Benitez-Badua and Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] we stated, viz.:
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter
on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would
reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a
man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the
child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the
child at all of a particular couple.[31]
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and

prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case
is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting
not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is
not a child of Jose at all. x x x[32]
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting secondary
evidence similar to the proof admissible under Article 172 of the Family Code in this
action for annulment of document and recovery of possession, we are constrained
to rule after a meticulous examination of the evidence on record that all proof
points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad. While we ascribe to the general principle that this
Court is not a trier of facts,[33] this rule admits of the following exceptions where
findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz
v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622
[1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners'
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).[34]
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring
respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad is one based on a misapprehension of facts.
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was
tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent
and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent -
April 6, 1972 - and the name of the informant -Emma Daño - were both
superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still
relied on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth
certificate for failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the
alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that respondent's
filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The appellate court did not
agree with this finding and instead ruled that the birth certificate presented does
not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by the
law. We reiterate the relevant pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not
identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who
attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate envisioned
by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma Daño, the
floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the court
Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof
of filiation. The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court
finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of
guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her representations that she is the
mother of the plaintiff.[35]
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent has
proven her filiation by showing that she has enjoyed that open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad, viz.:
x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her
putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and
sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she
was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GS1S; (4) after the
death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and. was appointed legal guardian of the
person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both
Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino
on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased. [36]
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court itself
ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of
birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable. The
corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further
confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of the informant
are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document questionable.
To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such
irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to
overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth
certificate, viz.:
1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed as the
informant regarding the birth of respondent, remains unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the

Department of Education in Bulacan, proved that the deceased Caridad did not have
any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to
October 24, 1984 as shown by her Service Record as an elementary school teacher
at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification from Dr. Teofila R.
Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she did not file any maternity
leave during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered
to prove that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the
marriage of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. When respondent was born,
Caridad was already 40 years old. There are no hospital records of Caridad's
delivery, and while it may have been possible for her to have given birth at her own
home, this could have been proven by medical or non-medical records or testimony
if they do, in fact, exist.
4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for herself in the
instant case.
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by
both courts a quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case:
that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA
ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative parents because she was
allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and her
education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS
policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to
the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romnaldo Villanueva[37] which incisively discussed

its parallelisms and contrasts with the case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,
[38]
we ruled that the presence of a similar set of circumstances - which were relied
upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at bar - does not
establish that one is,a child of the putative parents. Our discussion in the Rivera
case is instructive, viz.:
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to
prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate
of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet
for membership in the Government Service Insurance System of the decedent
naming her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she had
been reared and continuously treated as Vicente's daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's alleged parents

had been unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez-Badua's supposed father
were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact
that was counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel
Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years of marriage, all of a
sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:

But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate
as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of
such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his
or her birth certificate, which is a public document, (emphasis ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence
of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of
the statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have adduced
evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The
records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua that are simply too
compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted
birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of
parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born after
their alleged parents had lived together childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case

which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not
Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-
Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old,
and on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian
who had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been
living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that
it was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales.
Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial
partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid. [39]
In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both courts a
quo and rule that the confluence of the circumstances and the proof presented in
this case do not lead to the conclusion that respondent is a child of the deceased
spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 dated January 17, 2011
and May 24, 2011, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in
Civil Case No. 268-M-2001 for Annulment of Document and Recovery of Possession
is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
With costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016 ]
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF
SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P.
MACAPAZ, JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which
affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated September 28, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for
annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA
Resolution[4] dated April 5, 2010 denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this
case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-
Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio
Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273
Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered
in the names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.[5] In said certificate of title, appearing
as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights
and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m. [6]
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No.
183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466, [7] was issued
in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale[8] dated January 18, 2005
whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of
cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit[9] dated July 12, 2005 purportedly
executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the
affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of
Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005,
Fidela passed away.[10]
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of
falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against the petitioner.[11] However, said criminal charges were eventually
dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra,
instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati
City.[12]
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,[13] the petitioner averred that the

respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that
they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over
Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits
illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of their father and mother.
After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on
September 28, 2007.[14] The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in favor of

[the petitioner] on January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 183088 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as Null and Void;
2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 221466
issued in the name of [the petitioner], the same having been issued on the
basis of a fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and thereafter to reinstate TCT
No. 183088 issued in the name of [the petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all the
liens and encumbrances annotated thereon, including the adverse claim of
[Fidela]; [and]
3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of P100,000.00

as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who
purportedly executed said deed of sale died on November 11, 2002, about three
years before the execution of the said Deed of Sale.[16] Respecting the respondents'
legal capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the
[respondents] to initiate this action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The
marriage between [Anastacio Sr.] and [Fidela] is evidenced by the
Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The name 'Fidela Obera
Poblete' is indicated in [the respondents'] respective birth certificates as
the mother's maiden name but Fidela signed the same as the informant as
"Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz"
is indicated as the name of the father.[17] (Emphasis ours)
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that
the respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for
cancellation of deed of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as
legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased,
Silvestra.[18]
On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with
modification as to the amount of damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for
lack of merit. The Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City,
Branch 147 in Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the award of moral and exemplary damages is hereby reduced from
P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.[19]
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the petitioner were obtained through
forgery. As to the question of whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra
and thus have the legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this wise:
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the
appellees' legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court
found unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity
of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO
that their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and
[Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a marriage license.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A
certificate of marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte
(Exh. "M") as well as a copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in
evidence by the [respondents].
xxxx
The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a marriage license
number and in the absence of a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and
[Fidela] may not be invalidated on that ground.
x x x.
xxxx
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. This
jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of
great weight.
Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by
competent and substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born
during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate
children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting evidence.
[20]
(Citations omitted)
The petitioner sought reconsideration,[21] but her motion was denied in the
Resolution[22] dated April 5, 2010.
Hence, this petition.
Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that
forgery was indeed committed to effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
consequent transfer of title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition, the
petitioner continues to assail the legal capacity of the respondents to institute the
present action. Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the Civil Code, [23] the
petitioner insists that the respondents have no legal right over the estate left by
Silvestra for being illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of
Silvestra, she, however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their
legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr. considering that the marriage between
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven. According to the petitioner,
the marriage contract[24] presented by the respondents is not admissible under the
Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged marriage
contract, and which is not even authenticated by the concerned Local Civil
Registrar. In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document was
ever received by said office. Further, while the respondents also presented a
Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage,[25] the petitioner asserts that the same is not the
marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code; [26] that said
Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage ceremony actually
transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.[27]
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the
respondents do not conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr.
In their Comment,[28] the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that
the petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy
can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related
to the former either by consanguinity or affinity.[29]
Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether
or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,
[30]
this Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents'
relationship to Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject
property. Besides, the question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity
to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the
parties in the pre-trial.
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio,

Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the
canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact
of marriage without running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules
of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the
subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a
reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence
subject to certain requirements specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,[31] it
was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5,
which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the
secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction
of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the
original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the
due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis
for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x.[32] (Citation omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As
early as in the case of United States v. Evangelista,[33] it has been settled that
church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the
promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials.[34] They
are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other
private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.[35] Accordingly, since there
is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of
marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in
evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the
fact of a solemnized marriage.[36] Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.[37]
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their
respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office [38] where
Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to
the same parents — their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their
mother's maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it
asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it
was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in
Alang-alang, Leyte."[39]
The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the
respondents' legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering any evidence to the
contrary. The certificates of live birth contain no entry stating whether the
respondents are of legitimate or illegitimate filiation, making said documents
unreliable and unworthy of weight and value in the determination of the issue at
hand.
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth,
only the signature of Fidela appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio,
Sr. She argues that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be
competent evidence to establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
invoking Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila[40] where it was held that a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity.
[41]
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding
the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."[42] Thus, being public documents, the
respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.[43]
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."[44]
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in
order to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law
and jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces[45] is misplaced
considering that what was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an
illegitimate child, and not legitimate filiation.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,[46] the declaration of either parent of the

new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the
civil register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the
law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:

Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or
by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f)
and such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxxx
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and

sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father
refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give
therein any information by which such father could be identified. x x x (Emphasis
Ours)
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly
executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth
of legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said
documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as
the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio,
Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as
a result of which they had two children—the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born
more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible
proof to establish the validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13,
2013 in GR. No. 183262 entitled Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S.
Enobiso[47] had the occasion to state:
Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be
offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of
marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the
couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during
such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
[48]
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,[49] it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage."[50]
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela

transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption
accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage
cannot be disregarded. Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on official leave.

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SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994 ]

"4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or

Costs against appellee.

In this petition for review, petitioner contends:

"Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of

c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.

"The strong and convincing evidence referred to by us are the following:

(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Statement of the Case

Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review

"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an

Hence, this appeal.[6]

Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:

2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is

The Petition is not meritorious.

Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article

In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court ruled thus:

Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's

The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged

In their comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.

Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor

WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

We deny the present petition.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Gerardo and Ma. Theresa's relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the

Gerardo's argument is without merit.

The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has no

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and

Costs against petitioner.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

A Complaint[3] for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation

(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente

In its Decision[6] dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:

1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;

2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00

3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of

In the meantime defendant's answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of