Christine Joy G.

Co
2009-47217

1.
a. The marriage of Solenn and Sonny is voidable due to lack of parental consent being
only 19 years old and 20 years old respectively when the marriage was solemnized.
Art. 45 of the Family Code provides that a marriage may be annulled where the party
in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was 18 yrs. old or over but
below 21 and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority.

b. Yes, the marriage can be ratified by free cohabitation of the parties. Art. 45(1)
provides that after attaining the age of 21 of the party and such party freely cohabited
with the other and both lived together as husband and wife, then the marriage may no
longer by annulled.

2.
a. Shalimar is a legitimate child being born during the marriage of the parents as
provided in Art. 164 of the Family Code. Also, the declaration of nullity of Shalimar’s
parents does not affect his legitimacy as he was born before the judgment of absolute
nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 has become final and executory provided in Art.
54 of the Family Code.

b. Rules on co-ownership would be the system of property relationship. Art. 147 of

the Family Code provides that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work
or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

c. Sancho should get the parcel of land because even if the completion of payments
for such was already during marriage, full ownership of the land was vested before
the marriage. Sancho’s Contract of Sale was secured by a mortgage on the land which
indicates that he was already the full owner of the land because Art. 2085 of the Civil
code requires a mortgagor to be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.

As to the jewelry, Sandy should get it because she acquired it during marriage by
gratuitous title. Such was not acquired by both of them through their work or industry
and thus rules on co-ownership will not apply.

3.
a. There is no any legal bases for the court to approve Silverio’s petition for correction
of entries in his birth certificate. Petition must be denied as it has been decided in
Silverio v Republic that a person’s first name or any entry in the birth certificate
cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

b. My answer will not be the same in the case of Sharon’s petition because the facts
are not similar. Petition should be granted as it has been decided in Republic v
Cagandahan that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
Sharon, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Unlike in Silverio’s case, Sharon has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with.

c. The marriage of Silverio and Sharon can be recognized as valid in the Philippines
because by law, Silverio and Sharon are still considered male and female respectively.
Even though the petition of Sharon should be granted, it was not stated in the facts
that her petition changing her gender from female to male was already granted. If the
petition of Sharon was granted at the time of marriage, then such marriage is not valid
in the Philippines because it would be a marriage between two males. Being Filipino
citizens, Art. 15 of the Civil Code states that laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. Thus Philippine law applies to the couple
which prohibits marriage between same sex couples.

4.
a. The first sale to Dr. Santos and the subsequent repurchase were valid but only as to
the corresponding shares of the older siblings to the property. This is supported by
Art. 1612 of the Civil Code wherein if several persons, jointly and in the same
contract, should sell an undivided immovable with a right of repurchase, none of them
may exercise this right for more than his respective shares.

b. The second sale to Dr. Sazon was valid as to the siblings and the mother’s
respective shares. As to the share of the minor twins, the sale is unenforceable
because the mother failed to ask permission from the court to sell as provided in Art.
1403(1) of the Civil Code. The twins may redeem their share after they reach the age
of majority.

5. The two legitimate children are entitled to their legitime which is half of the 8M
and thus each of them will get 2 million. Santino will inherit even if he attempted to
kill her mother before because in order to be incapable of succeeding by reason of
unworthiness under Art. 1032, there must be conviction on the attempt against the life
of the testator which was not so in this case. Sara will also inherit even if she acted as
an attesting witness to the will. Art. 1027(4) will not make her incapable of
succeeding because she is a compulsory heir. Such law applies to testamentary heirs.

The legacy is valid as there is no legitime affected. The priest will get his share of 1M
from the free portion. The prohibition in Art. 1027(1) of the Civil Code applies to
priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness only.

The remaining 3M will be divided by the two legitimate children of the testator. Thus,
to sum up, 2M from their own shares plus 1.5M from free portion which is equal to
3.5M for each child.

6. Santi may successfully require demolition through legal action as both parties were
in bad faith. Sammy was in bad faith when he knew of the encroachment but did not
tell his cousin and there was also bad faith on the part of the landowner Santi as he did
not object even if he knew of such encroachment. Under Art. 453, if both parties are
in bad faith, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted
in good faith.

Being both in good faith, Art. 448 applies which gives the landowner the option to
appropriate the works as his own with indemnity due to the builder or to oblige the
one who built to pay the price of the land or the one who sowed to pay the proper rent.
Santi may demolish the improvement if he appropriates the same for himself but is
subject to retention by the builder under Art. 456 of the Civil Code.

7.
a. Yes, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies in this case. The doctrine
applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended
to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as
substitute for the old and the new disposition fails or effect for some reason as
explained in Molo v Molo. It is presumed that the testator prefers the old will rather
than intestacy.

b. No because Art. 832 is an exception to such doctrine which provides that a

revocation made in a subsequent will shall take effect even if the new will should
become inoperative by reason of xxx renunciation” of the heirs, devisees or legatees
designated therein.

8. Yes, the usufruct will continue even after the house has burned down. Art. 607
provides that If the usufruct is constituted on immovable property of which a building
forms part, and the latter should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the
usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and the materials. It will not
continue after Sinforoso’s death because the exception in Art. 606 applies where the
usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of such
person. In this case, the grandfather gave the mother usufructuary rights over one of
his properties specifically in consideration of his grandson til he reaches the age of
majority.

9.
a. No, the doctrine of proximate cause will not apply in this case because such
doctrine does not apply to actions involving breach of contract. It only applies to
actions for quasi-delicts and is a device for imputing liability to a person where there
is no relation between him and another party as decided in Sps. Guanio v Shangrila.

b. Yes, the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract was a contract of adhesion as
there was a ready-made form of contract which the other party may accept or reject
but which the latter cannot modify. This is not void. It is not entirely against the law
and is binding as ordinary contracts because the party who adheres to such is free to
reject it entirely.

10.
a. Sabina was an illegitimate child as she was conceived and born outside a valid
marriage. Also, Sabina could not be legitimated under Art. 177 of the Family Code
because her parents, at the time of her conception, were disqualified by an
impediment to marry each other because the father was validly married to another.
b. Yes, Sinclair is legally required to finance Sabina’s law education because Art. 194
of the Family Code requires support which includes schooling or training for some
profession even beyond the age of majority. Also, Art. 195(4) obliges the parents and
their illegitimate children to support each other.

11.
a. The payment made by Sergio is valid even if without knowledge and consent of
Samantha because there is legal subrogation. Art. 1302 (3) presumes legal
subrogation when even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the
fulfillment of the obligation pays. In this case, Sergio is interested in the fulfillment of
the obligation because he could not operate the business without electricity. Since
Sergio is legally subrogated, he is entitled to reimbursement of the amount he paid
(50K) from Samantha.

b. Yes, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi. It is the delay of the creditor to accept
the delivery of the thing which is the object of the obligation. All the elements of such
are present:
1. offer of performance by the debtor
2. offer must be to comply with the prestation as it should be performed
3. creditor refuses performance without just cause

12.
a. Contract of simple loan or mutuum. Under Art. 1980 of the Civil Code, fixed,
savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be
governed by the provisions concerning simple loan. Also in Serrano v Central Bank of
the Philippines, bank deposits were defined as loans because they earn interest.

b. The bank did not have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit because the
criminal case of estafa against Saachi was still pending with the Prosecutor’s office.
Saachi then did not have any obligation under any law, contract, quasi-contract, delict
or quasi-delict. The Hold-out Agreement only applies if there is a valid and existing
obligation arising from any of the sources of the obligation under Art. 1157 which
was not so in this case.

13.
a. Yes, SEP can legally recover the deficiency because the remedy it chose was
collection suit and not foreclosure of chattel mortgage. Each remedy has different
effects. Choosing foreclosure of chattel mortgage would bar SEP from pursuing
further remedies on the deficiencies.

b. Yes, SEP can commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose the mortgage on

Stan’s house and lot in order to recover the deficiency as this is an alternative valid
remedy.

14.
a. Yes, legal easement exists which is an easement of subjacent and lateral support.
Art. 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavation
upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support.

b. No, annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the servient estate is not proper
because Segunda does not have a claim of ownership of the land. Annotation of an
adverse claim over registered land requires a claim on the title of the disputed land as
provided in Sec 70 of P.D. 1529. What Segunda really wants is judicial recognition of
the existence of the easement of subjacent and lateral support which cannot be
achieved thru annotation.

15.
a. Yes, Simon can compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into writing as
provided for in Art. 1357. 1357 provides that if the law requires a document or other
special form, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form. A
lease with a period of greater than 1 year which in this case was 3 years, needs to be
in writing to be enforceable as required in Art. 1403. Thus, Simon can compel
Shannon as the law requires such to be enforceable.

b. No. The sublease was not a ground for terminating the lease as it was not expressly
prohibited. Art. 1650 of the Civil code states that where there is no express
prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased in whole or in part without
prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the lessor.

16. No, Sam’s parents are not correct. Inter-country Adoption Act is not applicable
and thus the requisite age gap doesn’t apply. Only a legally free child who is
committed to the DWSD or other authorized child-caring agency and released from
parental authority of his biological parents may be the subject of such Act. In this
case, the child is under the custody of the parents. Domestic adoption act is applicable
and thus the adoption is valid. Also the age gap requirement doesn’t apply as Sam is
the spouse of the adoptee’s parent.

17.
a. Art. 147 of FC. The properties should be partitioned between Sofia and
Semuel in equal shares. As a stay-at-home mother, Sofia shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition of properties as her efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household in accordance
with Art. 147 of FC.
b. Yes, Semuel should be required to support the minor children even if they are
illegitimate children provided the children have been recognized by the father.
If unrecognized, the relationship between the children and the father must first
be proved. Once paternity has been proven, only then the children are entitled
and can ask for child support from the father. The support of illegitimate
children shall be governed by the provisions on Support (art. 94 of FC). The
provision on Support under Art. 195 provides that parents and illegitimate
children are obliged to support each other.

18.
a. Both SAL and SMA can be held liable for damages that Sasha suffered. The
contract of transportation is between the ticket issuing airline and the passenger and
the carrying agent is liable for its acts that has cause damages to the passenger. As
decided in China Airlines Royal v Chiok, the obligation of the ticket-issuing airline
remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact that another airline had undertaken
to carry the passengers to one of their destinations.

b. Yes, the agency is coupled with interest under Art. 1927 of the Civil Code which
states that an agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it
is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed
manager of a partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the
management is unjustifiable.

19. Yes, Sebastian can legally refuse to pay SSC because SSC has not yet paid BIR so
there is no basis for its recovery from Sebastian.

20.
a. The liability for actual and moral damages would depend on the basis. If the source
of obligation is contract of carriage, SBL is liable for actual damages and defense of
diligence in the selection of employees will not prosper. Also, SBL will not be liable
for moral damages because Art. 2220 requires fraud or bad faith which was not
present in this case. If it is quasi-delict, may be liable for actual damages if not
diligent in the selection and supervision of employees and may be liable for moral
damages under Art. 2219(2) which is moral damages for quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries.

b. Yes, SBL may be liable to pay interest. In a contract, interest may in the discretion
of the court be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract under Art. 2210
of the Civil Code and in quasi-delict, interest as part of damages may be adjudicated
in the discretion of the court under Art. 2211.