CASE 1

FIRST DIVISION
 
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738
Complainant,
Present:
 
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
 
 
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008
 
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
 
 
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected
thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother,
Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored
demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against
them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila[4] where the parties reside.
 
 Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to
conciliation meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
 
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth
and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
 
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was
to hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he
heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head
of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or
partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It
was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He
handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to
prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
 
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh
out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit
their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the
IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]
 
 According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay,
he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina
and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and
Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the
answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By
so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.
 
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition
under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]
 
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
 
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
 
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition
constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
 For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents
suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.[9] This was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]
 
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent
as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
 
 
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
 
 
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in
said service.
 
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed
the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
 
 
 
 
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)
(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE
OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
 
 
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during
their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which
applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b)  Sanggunian  members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the
officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
 
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of
profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is,
the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of
profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.
[13]

 
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor
and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor,
the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang
barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
 
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This
is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore
devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
 
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they
may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at
least once a week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their
professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours,
there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization
from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
 
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors,
mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a
total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members
of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they
are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to
practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated
to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular
sessions only twice a month.[16]
 
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice
his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.
 
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE
LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY
FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
 
 
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to
be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law
only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.
[17]
 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
 
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
 agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further,
That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments,
made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
 
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior
written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he
entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
 
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty
to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy
and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written
permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but
also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
 
 
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
 
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis
supplied)
 
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he
disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
 
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should
act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.[19]
 
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney for violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
 
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
 
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the
Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
CASE 2

Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty.

VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was

the malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as
security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon
at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had already
been paid.

The Case

Before us is a verified Petition  for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed
[1]

by Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this
Court. Petitioners charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty,
falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his
Comment  on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
[2]

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay, held several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May
12, 2003, the parties were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary
[3]

evidence. After the filing of the parties respective formal offers of evidence, as well as
petitioners Memorandum,  the case was considered submitted for resolution.
[4]

Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated January
30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts
 In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees
working at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier
receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000. [5]

Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan
from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued
and delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos.
0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other
loans that might be obtained in the future.[6]

On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37

corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter
issued a receipt, herein quoted as follows:
[7]

August 31, 1999

Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan
of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes.

(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99 [8]

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five)
blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount
of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999,
October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively. [9]

On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the
afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he
immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and
0046242 totaling P100,000. [10]

Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners
another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others,
that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City,
they again approached him and requested that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos.
0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000. [11]

Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to
Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they
were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have
been physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an
interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the heavy traffic
conditions in those places.[12]
 Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois,
Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings
with respondent.[13]

In his Comment,  respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless

[14]

and devoid of any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had
deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999
transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by
their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to ACCOUNT
CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had
already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further
claimed that he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because
his previous satisfactory transactions with them convinced him that they had the
capacity to pay.
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal
transactions, which were not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The
criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate
his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that
his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that

respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible.
Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence
presented:

In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the

Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E.
OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M.,
both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and
requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated
checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business
venture.

The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his
testimony before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003
hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you,
you filed two separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the
other in Quezon City, is that correct?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15,
1999, is that correct?
A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your
Honor, the first two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the
afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Which are the first two checks?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And
Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with
number 0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to
10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Q. Is that your house?
A. No, its not my house?
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
A. That is my retainer client.
Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
 That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you
these checks have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer.
Thats why I am asking your client
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued
here in Pasig. What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth.
The place, Your Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking
who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check
Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in
the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.

Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the
complainants. As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find
the story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the
truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place.
Such distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of
the transaction with complainants.

Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place
are also obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements
made before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of
respondents version of the transaction.

Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the
payment of a loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks
in amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are
mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous loan
of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid x x x. Respondent does
not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction between
the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due
such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by
giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately
release the amounts under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear
credible given the background of the previous transaction and personal circumstances
of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from
complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them
what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of
credibility of respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the
version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public
prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in
dealing with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result
of respondents filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent
has also filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central
Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions. [15]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved

and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more
severe than what the IBP recommended.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.

 It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to
[16]

possess good moral character.  A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose

[17]

conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose
primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she]
has sworn to be a fearless crusader. [18]

By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of
law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
 Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
[19]

beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession.[20]

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

xxxxxxxxx

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxxxxxxx

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of

the bar.  Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in
[21]

their public or in their private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics
faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. [22]

The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting
the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others.
The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus,
lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.
[23]

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners,
who said that they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central
Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found
untrue and unbelievable was respondents assertion that they had filled up the checks
and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful
review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at
an inevitable conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from
him by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they
asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext that
he was not able to bring the checks with him,  he was not able to return them. He thus
[24]

committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by

petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust
him with their blank checks.[25]

It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously
transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts
that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the
loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen
act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment,
respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners,
thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for
frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one
of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months  because of the Complaints.
[26]

Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He

committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly
unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the
practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.  Good moral character
[27]

includes at least common honesty.  No moral qualification for bar membership is more
[28]

important than truthfulness and candor.  The rigorous ethics of the profession places a
[29]

premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.  Lawyers must be ministers

[30]

of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice.
In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.
[31]

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are
disgraceful and dishonorable;  they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the
[32]

legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the
penalties of criminal laws.
[33]

Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the

penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to
be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible.
His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,  the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the
[34]

respondent to make it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well
as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein respondent is even
worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and
thereby caused the detention of one of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of
this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy be
furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
 Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

CASE 3

A.C. No. 2841            July 3, 2002

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV,
TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.

PER CURIAM:

"Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A
lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and
justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader." 1 These were the eloquent words of the
late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession. But he
laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, "many a law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission
as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and
a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying the benefits of his
enlightened advocacy in direct proportion to a litigant's financial posture instead of a faithful friend of
the courts in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike." 2 Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña,
as later shown by his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an
apostate to his exalted position as an officer of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from
the legal profession to protect its sanctity and nobility.

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William C. Ogan
which has since been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S.
Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio
Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then
inquired into the principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that
Atty. Samuel C. Occeña caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully
prolonging the litigation through his various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that
he will not willingly sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any man's cause for money
or malice.

Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the
late William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his seven children. One of them,
Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her
husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer.

The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of America), and
real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the
estate should have been simple and speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1,
1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of
Atty. Occeña.
Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña,
filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the probate court approved
the project except certain portions. The executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay
caused by the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed several motions praying that the estate's
remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United
States be distributed among all the heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña,
vehemently opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked
for her husband's attorney's fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be
distributed among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her possession. The dispute
between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which delayed the
proceedings, centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.

Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, interposed numerous appeals from the
orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release
of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the
same, thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of
Appeals, in remanding the case to the probate court, had this to say:

"It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences with the
view to closing the estate which has been pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and
the lawyers, are reminded that the prolongation of administrative proceedings can only
benefit the executor or administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It always
results in the diminution of the share of each of the heirs because the estate is burdened
with the expenses of the administration proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorney's fee
and the longer the proceedings the bigger the attorney's fee." 3

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña's claim for
attorney's fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix's refusal, through her husband, to
account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which, according to her, were not in her
possession. The other heirs could not accept that explanation because as executrix, she was
charged with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment why the
securities were not in her possession. She filed her comment, through her husband, that some
Philippine and American securities were not in her possession. To determine which securities were
in her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within
30 days the latest inventory of all the securities of the estate. However, she failed to comply with the
order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978, "directing her to take possession
of all certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date
inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value." Again, she did not comply with the
order.

Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occeña,
appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence,
adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, to elevate
interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing
her to "refrain from instituting any action or proceeding without first informing the court." The
executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals
and one with this Court.

On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs,
to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the
estate and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the court
ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund,
the same to be liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of her report on or before
September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on
January 13, 1981 for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:

"Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the court
which is and would be for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs
completely agreed with what the trial court did. xxx

"Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned orders he should be complimented in finding ways and means of promptly and
expeditiously determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately distributed among the
heirs."

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to obey the
orders of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October 16, 1979 and
directed her to report to the court which securities were and were not in her possession and to give
the reason therefor.

On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña were held in contempt of court and fined
P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the executrix to release
$1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to explain their failure to comply with
the order, but they did not submit any explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the
proceedings for four (4) years.

On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to distribute
immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the Batangas-Laguna
Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor Service Co.; to report her compliance within
10 days from notice; and within the same period, to file a written report to the court stating (a) what
other certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are in her possession; and (b) which certificates of
stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty.
Occeña, did not comply with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she
should not be punished for contempt of court. After several postponements at her instance and that
of her husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared,
thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in the
performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No. 14456 for
damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on
October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-
complaint against Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in
that without prior notice and hearing, he punished the executrix for indirect contempt of court and
censured her for non-compliance with the probate court's order of October 16, 1979. For lack of
merit, Atty. Occeña's complaint was dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a
Resolution dated November 19, 1984.
On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against
Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court
dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Occeña to substantiate his charges during the
investigation.

Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative complaint, Atty.
Occeña and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case NO. 14957 for damages against the
former. The couple alleged that they suffered damages upon reading the judge's comment filed with
the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action,
the comment being an absolutely privileged communication.

By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to be
groundless, Atty. Occeña further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and inflicted hardship
and pain upon Judge Ruiz.

More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occeña has inflicted
greater harm to the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.

From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with this Court
and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occeña, questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court.
But most, if not all, were without merit.

Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same probate
proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occeña with groundless administrative charges and suits,
both criminal and civil. These cases, while pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occeña in securing
restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds for the judge's inhibition.

Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that the CFI may
suspend an attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the
same probate court Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña with gross misconduct,
violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an
answer, he submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty.
Occeña was then directed to file his answer within 15 days from notice which was extended to
another 15 days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.

Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning and afternoon.
Upon Atty. Occeña's motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from November 3, 1982 within
which to file his answer. However, he did not comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.

Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a temporary
restraining order in G. R. No. 62453, "Samuel Occeña vs. District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4,
Bohol" for prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty. Occeña's petition for
lack of merit. The hearing of the administrative case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again,
he did not appear.

The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear. Upon his telegraphic request,
the hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer
and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion
was denied. The hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of Atty.
Occeña, the hearing was postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus, in
its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his
right to present evidence.4

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty. Occeña has
"abused, misused and overused the judicial system," 5 Judge Ruiz rendered a decision
suspending6 him from the practice of law for three (3) years. The decision 7 unfolded a long list of his
administrative offenses, thus:

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occeña, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed
with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing
the order of the probate court directing the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized
to determine the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and
the order ordering the same executrix to report to the probate court the securities belonging
to the estate. Atty. Occeña's refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the
higher courts unnecessarily delayed the probate proceedings.

II

Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless suits and gave aid or consent to
the same; delayed persons for money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two actions
for damages which were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of cause of action.
Respondent also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge of the
probate court with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint was
likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative
complaint which was again dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal
charge which were found to be groundless and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed
the settlement of the estate proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time,
effort and money to defend himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.

In fact, respondent's propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil and
criminal suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the
case. As a measure of self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare and file
pleadings or comments thereby using time which could have been devoted to expediting the
closure of the estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed
with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals questioning the interlocutory orders of the
probate court. Most, if not all of these petitions, were determined to be groundless and
without merit.

III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyer's oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of
Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled "Charges Against Judges of First
Instance," which reads as follows:

"Sec. 6. Confidential – Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private

and confidential."

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. "Z")
filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he violated the private and
confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to wit:

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and
certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-
G.R. No. SP-10604", questioning an interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. "V")
to which he attached as Annex "AW" a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative
complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial to the issue raised in
said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et al.
vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162" (No. 4, Exh. "V"), impugning an
interlocutory order of the probate court, he attached as Annex "C" thereof a true and
complete copy of the said administrative complaint although not relevant to the question
therein raised; and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the
Tanodbayan (Exh. "Y"), he also attached as Annex "A" thereof a true and complete copy of
said administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said administrative complaint is not
germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. "Y").

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the
court, put to naught one of the principal purposes thereof which is to protect the personal
and professional reputation of judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive
and irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs.
Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI,
page 260). Respondent committed gross misconduct in office and has not conducted himself
as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.

IV

Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. "W"),
respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. "W-1") that his wife-executrix Necitas
Ogan Occeña was held in contempt and censured, "without any hearing," for not obeying
the probate court's order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. "N").

However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that in
the order of February 26, 1980, the probate court directed said executrix to explain within 5
days from notice why she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. "O"). In the order of April 8,
1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning (Exh. "P") but was reset to October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the restraining order
 of the Court of Appeals (Exh. "Q"). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the
denial by the Supreme Court of the respondent's petition for review impugning the Court of
Appeals' decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. "R"),
copies of the order setting the hearing of the contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981)
were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on March 24, 1981. On the date of
the hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The following day (April 21,
1981), the court received executrix's motion for postponement of the hearing, which was
denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. "R") was rendered
holding the executrix in contempt and penalized with censure.

In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged

under oath in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge
Ruiz (Exh. "Y") that "without prior notice and without any hearing," Judge Ruiz adjudged
executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2,
Exh. "Y-2"; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. "Y-3").

Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15, 1979
(Exh. "C"), directing said executrix to remit immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir
Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet whatever necessary expenses that she might incur
in inquiring into the status of the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County,
Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood when they stated in
their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was
issued "without hearing" and thus a violation of procedural due process. The Court of
Appeals, in its decision which has become final (Exh. "E"), confirmed this falsehood when it
held that the petitioner-executrix "was not deprived of her right to be heard when the
respondent judge issued the two orders in question" (Page 6, Exh. "E").

In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138 8 and Section 9, Rule 1399 of the Revised
Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of facts. 10

On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña's motion, restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing
his decision of November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989,
this Court issued an Order11requiring "the parties to move in the premises, by informing the Court
about the status of the decision or order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of
law, Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within ten (10) days from
notice."

On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Court's action on his
decision suspending Atty. Occeña.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case be referred
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and recommendation. This Court denied the
motion and instead referred the case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant,
for evaluation, report and recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended "that the
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated
November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law for a period of
three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña be DISBARRED from the
practice of law for grave violation of his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name
be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys."
We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the same
being supported by the facts on record.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency
in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 12 His guilt, however, cannot be
presumed.13 It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation
thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by
himself and counsel.14 All these requirements have been complied with in the case at hand.

In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative
case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded
the full measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the
case ex parte as Atty. Occeña deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against him.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in
office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of
the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty. Occeña commit
deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond
these transgressions, he violated the lawyer's oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following
duties, thus:

"I, ________________________,of ________________________,do

                                                                                   (place of birth)

solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willing promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."

As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special
Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers,
he successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold
hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For
respondent's part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly
declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay "can only benefit the executor or administrator" and "the
longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorney's fees." But the more tragic reality is the fact that
Atty. Occeña has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the
administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct.
Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose
of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law
as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of
his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. 15
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon
those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. 16 A lawyer must at all times
conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 17 He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the
lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeña's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a
single moment.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal
profession.18 Atty. Occeña has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his
profession,19 because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. 20

Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña
deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name

is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing *, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

CASE 4

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The
Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of
a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The
eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
 On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February
1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2)
years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April
1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from
probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court
evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen
(15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court
judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence
that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the
criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul,
to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of
his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide
but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying
abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a
pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and
Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart
attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his
son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed
him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the
bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only
to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law
but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly
become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the
reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The
senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that
moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible,
irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes
impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character." [1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to

consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty.
Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases
where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the
reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief
and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the
accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent,
given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner
is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the
legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public
service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking
judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he
has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to
render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to
take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

CASE 5

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE

SILVA, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos.
96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No.
0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine
National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the
same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a
lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent
was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted
from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the
dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the
drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a
letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check.  However, his
[1]

demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against

her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22,
1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva. [2]

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for
disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath. [3]

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at

Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to
comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.  However, it was returned
[4]

unserved with the notation Moved.  The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP
[5]

submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City. [6]

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the

administrative complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was
again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and
recommendation. [7]

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C.

Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers
Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
554 which adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her
personal check by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad,
with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for
payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against
her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing
check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should
be accordingly penalized.  Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties
[8]

for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
 The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of
good moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to
enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which
puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the
practice of law.
[9]

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her
suspension or disbarment,  because it is important that members of the legal
[10]

brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.  Any wrongdoing which
[11]

indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-

professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak
well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all
times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. [12]

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices

served on her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the
nobility of the legal profession.  Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of
[13]

respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw
in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of
justice because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every
lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law
when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost
command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders

directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which
merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.  We can not tolerate any misconduct
[14]

that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE
SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective
upon receipt hereof.Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.

ANOTHER CASE

The Supreme Court has suspended Calayan Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI) president Ronaldo
Antonio Calayan from practicing law for 2 years.

In a 15-page en banc decision, the SC found Calayan guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The case arose from the complaint by retired Judge Virgilio Alpajora over Calayan’s serial filing of
complaints and motions against the lawyers and judges involved in the Lucena City school’s intra-
corporate dispute.

The SC said his “indiscriminate” filing of pleadings, motions and cases even against the judges “runs
counter to the speedy disposition of cases” and “degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts.”

It criticized Calayan for resorting to “harassing tactics” against the opposing lawyers to prevent CEFI from
being placed by the Lucena City court under receivership and retain his control over the school.

“Even assuming arguendo that such acts were done without malice, it showed respondent’s gross
indiscretion as a colleague in the legal profession,” read the decision penned by Associate Justice
Alexander Gesmundo.

The SC also took Calayan to task for accusing Alpajora of being in cahoots with the opposing party and
coaching the lawyers, without presenting proof.

“No matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client’s cause, he must not forget to display
the appropriate decorum expected of him… and to continue to afford proper and utmost respect due to
the courts,” the decision read.